The Anti-Statehood Movement and the Legacy of Alice Kamokila Campbell

When Hawai‘i entered the union as the fiftieth state in 1959 the popular support for admission among the islands’ 600,000 people was overwhelming. In the Congressionally mandated plebiscite on statehood held in June of that year, citizens of the territory responded 17-1 in favor (132,773 to 7,971) with 90 percent of Hawai‘i’s 155,000 registered voters participating in the biggest electoral turnout as of that time in the islands’ history. Of the territory’s 240 voting precincts, only the island of Ni‘ihau opposed statehood. Hawai‘i’s mandate for admission dwarfed the 5-1 (40,052 to 8,010) plebiscite Alaskan voters gave to statehood a year earlier. Given such overwhelming support, one might well wonder if the opponents of statehood expressed any viewpoints that commanded public notice in 1959 or in the ensuing years. Indeed the simple evidence of the statehood plebiscite might convince historians to dismiss outright any potential legacy from the anti-statehooders.¹

There were, however, a few nagging clues in the public record during the spring and summer of 1959 that could cause a dogged investigator to look behind the voting statistics. No sooner had statehood legislation passed the U.S. Congress than territorial delegate John Burns wrote in a national magazine:

John S. Whitehead is professor of history at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. He is currently working on a comparative history of Alaska and Hawai‘i’s statehood using oral history interviews.

The reasons why Hawaii did not achieve statehood, say, ten years ago—and one could without much exaggeration say sixty years ago—lie not in the Congress but in Hawaii. The most effective opposition to statehood has always originated in Hawaii itself. For the most part it has remained under cover and has marched under other banners. Such opposition could not afford to disclose itself, since it was so decidedly against the interests and desires of Hawaii’s people generally.  

Given the tenor of Burns’s statement, one might well wonder if there was a strength to the anti-statehood opposition that the June plebiscite did not reveal.  

In the decade and a half before admission there had been a few economically and politically powerful opponents in the islands. The spotlight of opposition as well as the wrath of the statehooders was usually focused on Walter Dillingham, the industrial patriarch of the islands, and Ingram Stainback, Democratic territorial governor from 1942 to 1951 and subsequently a member of the territorial Supreme Court.  

After World War II Dillingham expressed great concern over the alleged Communist infiltration of the ILWU. He linked his fear of the political power of the ILWU to his opposition to statehood. Though Dillingham did not hide his concerns with statehood, he did not make dramatic public stands against admission. Many statehooders, however, assumed that he used his influence privately with Republican members of the U.S. Congress to whom he had access. Stainback was much more public in his opposition. Though he had supported statehood as late as 1946, he became a vocal opponent in 1947. The governor claimed that he changed his stance in 1947 after being briefed by the U.S. Army about Communist activity in the islands. Even after President Truman removed him from the governorship in 1951, he continued to oppose statehood throughout the 1950s in favor of commonwealth status.  

In addition to Stainback and Dillingham, statehooders directed their wrath at the Hawaii Residents’ Association, or IMUA, an anti-Communist organization formed in 1949 during the territory’s crippling dock strike. IMUA had the support of some of the islands’ most prominent haole, Republican families, including
Walter and Louise Dillingham, and former Republican territorial governor Lawrence Judd. Through its publication, Spot Light, and speeches by members in various parts of the United States, IMUA constantly sounded the alarm against Communist infiltration of Hawai‘i's labor unions. The organization insisted throughout the 1950s that it was neutral on statehood, but many statehooders, both Democrats and liberal Republicans, claimed that IMUA’s constant reiteration of the Communist threat gave statehood’s enemies in Congress the ammunition they needed to deny Hawai‘i admission.4

Given the opposition of Dillingham and Stainback and the controversies over IMUA, one might well take Burns’s 1959 assertions seriously and look more closely at the opposition, particularly for evidence of a potential legacy. Despite the prominence of some of the older, haole opponents, it is difficult to find any lingering influence from them. It is well-known that Hawai‘i’s big business community accommodated itself to both the Republican and Democratic administrations that governed the state after 1959. As early as February 1959 Walter Dillingham told reporters that he was prepared to live with statehood if Congress admitted Hawai‘i. Indeed, he did for four years until his death in 1963. As in the case of Dillingham, there was also no lingering influence from Ingram Stainback. After he was removed as governor in 1951, no faction in the Democratic party claimed him as its champion or supported his cause. His death in 1961 ended the personal, vocal opposition he had once espoused. IMUA did thrive in the first years after admission and continued its anti-Communist editorial stance. However, with the death of Louise Dillingham in 1964, the organization lost a major sponsor and its impact diminished dramatically.5

As Hawai‘i approached its silver anniversary in 1984 much of the criticism of IMUA and the older haole opposition had subsided. Supporters of statehood who were interviewed in a University of Hawai‘i oral history survey dismissed IMUA as a minor organization of older, “lunatic fringe” conservatives who had little impact on statehood. Interviews with islanders on different ends of Hawai‘i’s economic and political spectrum, ranging from Castle & Cooke chairman Malcolm McNaughton to ILWU leader Robert
McElrath, failed to pin an anti-statehood label on any significant group in the business community.\(^6\)

If Dillingham, Stainback, and IMUA left no significant legacy, was there any other source of opposition thought that would influence the future growth of the islands? Though they attracted much less wrath from the statehooders in the 1950s, some members of the native Hawaiian community opposed statehood and espoused an alternative view for Hawai‘i’s political future. This ambivalent and often misunderstood opposition, which appeared to vanish with admission, would reemerge a decade after Hawai‘i entered the union.

In the 1950s there had been repeated references in the newspapers and in statehood literature to opposition among native Hawaiians. A 1958 opinion poll commissioned by Lawrence Fuchs for his book *Hawaii Pono* cited 27 percent of native Hawaiians opposed to statehood. The Hawaii Statehood Commission noted nervously in the late 1950s that Hawaiian taxi drivers and tour guides were telling tourists that statehood was not desirable.\(^7\)

These nagging sentiments, however, represented only one side of native Hawaiian opinion. Except for Ni‘ihau, a privately owned island maintaining a traditional lifestyle carefully guarded from the rest of Hawai‘i’s population, districts on other islands with a heavy Hawaiian population voted overwhelmingly for statehood. In the 6th Rep. District for the islands of Moloka‘i and Lāna‘i, for example, the vote was 29–1 (1,904 to 75) in favor. Statehood seemed a way to gain political power at home and overthrow the dominance of the people whom many Hawaiians still held responsible for toppling the monarchy in 1893 and the subsequent 1898 annexation, the haoles, or Caucasians, composing the tightly knit oligarchy of the Republican party and the Big Five. Many natives actively participated in the statehood movement. Twelve Hawaiians were members of the 1950 constitutional convention and signed the completed document. A major issue in the Hawaiian community was the continuation of the Hawaiian Homes Commission, a territorial agency created by Congress in 1920 to transfer land to Hawaiians. Both the 1950 constitution and the statehood bill confirmed the HHC. Politically vocal Hawaiians, including most of those in the territorial legislature, favored statehood.\(^8\)
The often-cited opposition to statehood among Hawaiians, which may well have been voiced privately, lacked a public spokesperson to counter the pro-statehood forces—that is, with one striking exception, Mrs. Alice Kamokilaikawai Campbell, or Kamokila Campbell as she was known to everyone in Hawai‘i. Her dramatic testimony against statehood given before a visiting Congressional committee chaired by Representative Henry Larcade of Louisiana in 1946 stands as the most elaborate public position against statehood delivered by anyone from 1946 to 1959. It is also one of the very few public documents that historians can use as evidence of the private sentiments of the Hawaiian community, or at least of one of its most prominent and outspoken members. Although statehooders dismissed Kamokila Campbell’s testimony as a rambling assortment of non sequiturs, I suggest that her speech presented a passionate statement of cultural politics in its most open and direct form. This unique and largely neglected testimony may be seen as a guide not only to the private sentiments of Hawaiians prior to statehood but also as a precursor to the emergence of separatist and anti-statehood sentiments among Hawaiians since admission, particularly in the Modern Hawaiian Movement that originated in the 1970s. To understand the importance of this anti-statehood legacy, we must know who this outspoken woman was and what she had to say in 1946.

Within the context of American politics and culture Kamokila Campbell was a woman shaped by the unique social system of Hawai‘i. Born in 1884, she was the daughter of Abigail and James Campbell. Her father, a Scots-Irishman, came to the islands in the mid-nineteenth century and became one of Hawai‘i’s wealthiest landowners, sugar growers, and financiers. Her mother, Abigail Maipinepine, was descended from Hawai‘i’s ruling chiefs. As a child, the young Kamokila played in ‘Iolani Palace, where her family were friends with Queen Lili‘uokalani. Her sister Abigail married Prince David Kawananakoa. By ancestry she was part of the exclusive worlds both of Caucasian wealth and of Hawaiian nobility. After her father’s death, she became a beneficiary of the Campbell Estate, one of the largest landed estates in the islands, valued after World War II at approximately $20 million. Her annual income, at times running as high as $200,000, made her one of the wealthiest people in Hawai‘i, though she
once shocked the Campbell Estate trustees by applying for public welfare when they withheld her allowance. The Campbell family home on Queen Emma Street became the Pacific Club, the bastion and very symbol of the exclusive haole business community. As a young woman, Miss Campbell married wealthy sugar planter Walter McFarlane, had five children, and divorced him after 25 years in 1929. During the 1930s she married twice again and lived in San Francisco, where she tried to stimulate interest in Hawaiian music and dance while also running a French supper club. After her third marriage ended, she returned to Hawai‘i in 1939 and changed her name back to Campbell, though retaining the Mrs. 9

A few years after her return to Hawai‘i, Mrs. Campbell served in the territorial Senate as the Democratic senator for Maui-Moloka‘i from 1942 to 1946. In 1943 she advanced further politically and became Democratic national committeewoman. While serving in the territorial legislature, Senator Campbell combined politics with her considerable social skills and entertained, by some estimates, more than 350,000 servicemen at her Ewa Beach estate, “Lanikuakaa.”

By the end of World War II Kamokila Campbell had clearly established herself as prominent public figure in Hawai‘i—not only by her wealth and family position, but also by her elected achievements. A striking and charismatic woman, she had a flair for dress, theater, and a sense of the dramatic moment. In her different roles she was known by different names—Kamokila Campbell, Mrs. Campbell, Senator Campbell, and often, by her own public statement, simply Kamokila.

As Kamokila Campbell’s political life changed, so did her stand on statehood. After her return to Hawai‘i from California in 1939, she had favored statehood. With the onset of World War II her political attitudes were affected by her sentiments toward Americans of Japanese Ancestry (AJA). Mid-way into her first term in office she publicly announced that she distrusted AJAs in Hawai‘i and hence supported martial law for the duration of the war. In 1945 she broke ranks with other members of the legislature and was the lone legislator to vote against a resolution favoring statehood. As the 1946 Larcade committee hearings approached, the
first Congressional hearings on statehood held since the end of World War II, many wondered what Senator Campbell would do next.10

Kamokila's sense of the dramatic guided her preparation for the hearings. By careful design she forced the committee to provide a full day for her testimony alone. When the committee tried to schedule her during an afternoon or evening with other wit-
nesses, she protested that graphs and charts necessary for her presentation were not ready. Finally at 10:00 A.M. on Friday, January 17, Senator Campbell appeared before a crowd of 600 for the committee hearing held in 'Iolani Palace. Clothed in a black satin holokū-type gown and bedecked with red and yellow leis, Kamokila spoke for the next two hours with frequent applause from her followers.11

Senator Campbell began her testimony by identifying herself as an "American." She spoke proudly of her family's economic and social prominence, but was quick to establish that the Campbells were "neither missionary nor Big Five." She never stated that her views were those of the native Hawaiian community, but that is how she was received. Possibly she implied this in saying that she spoke "from the heart and soul of all Hawaii."12

Kamokila's opposition to statehood was based on her fear of the numerical dominance of ajas in Hawai‘i and the financial power of the Big Five. She told the committee:

I do not feel . . . we should forfeit the traditional rights and privileges of the natives of our islands for a mere thimbleful of votes in Congress, that we, the lovers of Hawaii from long association with it should sacrifice our birthright for the greed of alien desires to remain on our shores, that we should satisfy the thirst for power and control of some inflated industrialists and politicians who hide under the guise of friends of Hawaii, yet still keeping an eagle eye on the financial and political pressure button of subjugation over the people in general of these islands.13

Senator Campbell compared the financial power of the Big Five to Hitlerism and stated emphatically that the Big Five "are definitely behind this movement for statehood." She had the proof of an insider and explained she knew this "because . . . we do business with the Big Five." She went on to add that Big Five pressure for statehood was so great that it was impossible for people to speak against statehood for fear of losing their jobs. As a result, she claimed, there had never been any organized opposition to the statehood movement.14

Economic control of the islands by the Big Five was not Kamokila's only objection to the economic oligarchy. As further proof of
the Big Five's undemocratic perfidiousness, she pointed to the fact that the territorial legislature was not properly apportioned on the basis of population. Kamokila was correct; the rural outer islands had more representation per capita than urban O'ahu. She claimed this was the result of Republican dominance over the sugar interests. Statehood, she feared, would give them even more power to wield their undemocratic ways. Kamokila's stand on reapportionment struck the committee as strange because she had voted against reapportioning the legislature in 1945. This seeming contradiction in principle and action was not the only surprise Senator Campbell had for the Congressmen that day.\(^{15}\)

Kamokila's fear of the Big Five was matched, if not surpassed, by her fear of the coming political domination of AJAS. Senator Campbell, like some conservative haole opponents of AJA power, pointed to the phenomenon of bloc-voting for particular candidates. What was surprising was that she cited her own election in Maui as proof of this. She testified that she "crawled" into a camp of AJA workers on a plantation owned by the Baldwin family. A Japanese contact there promised her 4,000 votes if she ran against the Baldwin candidate. Those votes were "produced," she noted, thus ensuring her election. The votes of the AJAS in Maui in no way secured the legislator's loyalty to the ethnic group of her constituents. She told the committee that it had been the local AJAS who betrayed the islands at the time of Pearl Harbor. Kamokila said she was unimpressed with the much-acclaimed war record of Hawai'i's Japanese Americans in the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, the most decorated unit in World War II. She asserted that people on the mainland "have inflated the ego of Americans of Japanese ancestry through overindulgence of publicity." The Honolulu Advertiser reported that comments such as these were met with silence from the group of approximately 200 young AJAS in the audience.\(^{16}\)

Senator Campbell produced elaborate charts showing the numerical growth of AJAS in Hawai'i's population. To sound the alarm over their increasing economic power she produced statistics on the rise of AJA savings accounts in local banks, which amounted to about $35 million. Committee members were curious about Kamokila's concern with savings deposits and asked
her if land ownership was not the true mark of economic power in Hawai‘i. Amazingly enough, Kamokila denied that land ownership was the primary source of wealth in the islands. Two days later Advertiser publisher Lorrin Thurston stated that the value of the Campbell Estate alone was equal to one-half the value of all savings deposits by AJAS in Hawai‘i.17

Kamokila did not explain why remaining a territory would be better than becoming a state. Exactly what would change? She did not seem to be of one mind on the issue herself. As noted earlier, she endorsed statehood at the time of a successful 2–1 plebiscite favoring statehood in 1940. She told the committee that in 1940 she had only recently returned to Hawai‘i from California and did not understand the true situation in the islands. Like other opponents of statehood, Kamokila’s stand was not so much an opposition to statehood as an opposition to the groups she thought were for statehood. She disliked the AJAS and the Big Five; hence she disliked statehood. As she told the committee, “Who is it that has put us in the position we are today but the people who are asking for statehood? We, the real people of Hawaii, are perfectly happy, just as we are.”18

If not statehood, then what did Kamokila want? This was more difficult to discern. Early in her testimony she announced, “Please take this message back to Congress: Hawaii and Kamokila ask nothing else but to be left alone.” Later she tried to be more specific. She asked for an independent form of government, but one in which “the Congress of the United States would have a slight hold on us, so that we could not go absolutely haywire.” What would happen under such a mildly controlled independence? Would the Big Five and the AJAS go away? This Senator Campbell did not pursue. If her logic was strained, her feeling of aloha was not. After extensive questioning by Hawai‘i’s territorial delegate to Congress, Joseph Farrington, who politely tried to refute most of her positions, Kamokila rose and presented him with a lei and a big kiss on the cheek to the applause of the crowd and the cameras of the press.19

As an exercise in logic or racial tolerance, Kamokila Campbell’s testimony left much to be desired. It was an embarrassment
to many statehooders who were trying to present the territory in the most positive light to the Congressional committee. After her testimony Delegate Farrington asked the committee for time to respond to Senator Campbell’s comments on the role of Hawai’i’s Japanese American community during the war. The press was also perplexed with how to deal with the senator. Her performance made excellent copy. “Kamokila Pulls No Punches” ran the Advertiser’s headlines on January 18. But the next day Lorrin Thurston, in a decidedly pro-statehood mood in early 1946, editorialized that her logic was lacking and doubted that “Hawaii wishes to be left alone.” Nonetheless Thurston could not deny that her presentation was “the high spot of the entire hearings on statehood” and an “event none of our visiting Congressmen will ever forget.”

Kamokila Campbell’s 1946 performance marked the peak of her political career and her stand against statehood. Though she ran again for the legislature in 1948, 1954, and 1958 (alternately as a Republican and a Democrat), she was never reelected. Her attentions turned to her recordings and promotions of Polynesian music and dance. When statehood came in 1959, the newspapers found her again. On March 17, five days after the statehood bill passed the U.S. Congress, Kamokila celebrated her seventy-fifth birthday with a lavish party. Bedecked in leis and finery, she greeted her guests with hugs and kisses and later danced a hula “that made sparks fly.” During the evening she told her guests that her greatest compliment was being called a Hawaiian. Then she toasted statehood saying, “I have always been opposed to statehood, but now it is here and many of my friends like it, I shall try to like it too.” Did Kamokila’s toast indicate that she and the rest of the Hawaiian community had come to terms with statehood since 1946, or did her old anti-statehood sentiments still linger below the surface? The answer was difficult to discern in 1959 and has remained elusive in the ensuing decades.

While Kamokila prepared for her birthday, the Reverend Abraham Akaka, minister of Kawaiahao Church, addressed his congregation on March 13, the day after the statehood bill passed. Akaka supported statehood and hoped that all Hawaiians would
give it a chance in the spirit of Aloha. But his message clearly acknowledged an ambivalence in the minds and hearts of his audience:

There are some of us to whom statehood brings great hopes, and there are those to whom statehood brings silent fears. . . . There
are fears that Hawaii as a state will be motivated by economic
greed; that statehood will turn Hawaii (as someone has said) into
a great big spiritual junkyard filled with smashed dreams, worn
out illusions; that it will make the Hawaiian people lonely, con-
fused, insecure, empty, anxious, restless, disillusioned—a wistful
people.\footnote{22}

The fears that Kamokila Campbell raised in 1946 were echoed
by Abraham Akaka in March 1959. The successful plebiscite vote
in June appeared to put those fears to rest. The elections in the
first years after admission seemed to confirm that statehood
would be good for native Hawaiians. The new state’s first lieuten-
ant governor was native Hawaiian Jimmy Kealoha, who served
with Republican Governor William Quinn. The political mo-
mentum for Hawaiians gained greater force in 1962 with the elec-
tion of Democrat John Burns as governor and native Hawaiian
William S. Richardson as lieutenant governor. This seemed to
spell a new day for Hawaiians and other “have-nots” against the
old order. Four years later in 1966 Richardson became chief jus-
tice of the Hawai‘i Supreme Court.

How did Kamokila Campbell react to these gains by Hawaiians
under statehood? Despite her willingness in 1959 to accept state-
hood, Mrs. Campbell still harbored fears for Hawai‘i’s future. In
February 1960 Kamokila reported to the Hawai‘i State Senate
that she had experienced a vision of the goddess Pele, who had
spoken to her the previous November. Pele told Mrs. Campbell,
“Affairs of State are in such a tangled mess that governmental
organizations and departments must now begin from new roots
with less talk and more constructive action.” Kamokila added
that Pele concluded the vision by saying, “Now that we are at the
crisis of our destiny are we to fall into oblivion?” Senate President
William Hill instructed the clerk to enter Mrs. Campbell’s report
in the official Senate record.\footnote{23} Two years later Kamokila seemed
supportive of statehood when she agreed to serve as honorary
chair of John Burns’s 1962 inauguration. But as in the past, her
political positions vacillated. In 1964 she returned to the Republi-
can party. Subsequently she left Hawai‘i altogether and returned
to California to live near her two sons. She died there in 1971.
With the death of Kamokila Campbell one may well wonder if any continuing legacy from her stand against statehood would remain. Like Dillingham and Stainback, was she merely representative of a small, older group of prominent islanders whose thoughts evaporated as soon as they were no longer alive to express them? Were Kamokila’s fears as easy to dismiss in the years after admission as Stainback and Dillingham’s anti-communism? Indeed, Kamokila Campbell might well be grouped with Ingram Stainback and Walter Dillingham were it not for the fact that the time of her death in California coincided with the emergence in Hawai‘i of the Modern Hawaiian Movement. Fears and concerns similar to those that Mrs. Campbell once expressed suddenly came alive again.

According to Hawaiian historian Haunani-Kay Trask, the Modern Hawaiian Movement began in the Kalama Valley of O‘ahu where a group of low-income Hawaiian families leasing land from the Bishop Estate and practicing a traditional rural lifestyle were threatened with eviction in 1970 to make way for a modern suburban development called Hawaii Kai. Residents of the valley and university students joined in protest of the evictions. The controversy continued over the next year and at times included the human opposition to bulldozers. The climax came in May 1971 when 32 protesters were arrested and later tried for trespass.24

The initial protest over the loss of land was unsuccessful, and the Hawaii Kai development went ahead as planned. But the level of consciousness that was raised blossomed over the next decade into the Hawaiian Movement that reasserted Hawaiian cultural values. The writings of Hawaiian author John Dominis Holt, particularly On Being Hawaiian, are often credited with sparking the cultural side of the movement. Groups advocating Hawaiian rights such as A.L.O.H.A., ‘Ohana O Hawai‘i, and Project Kaho‘olawe ‘Ohana, soon emerged in the 1970s to further the cause of cultural renewal and to make demands on both state and federal governments. Hawaiian rights groups have asked for a return of lands and varying forms of political sovereignty ranging from “nation within a nation” status similar to that of some American Indians to a restoration of an independent Hawaiian
nation. In 1987 the sovereignty group Ka Lahui Hawai‘i held a Constitutional Convention for a Hawaiian Nation in Hilo. Honolulu lawyer Mililani Trask was elected as president. The group then held a second convention in 1989 and claimed a membership of 3,000 by 1990.\(^{25}\)

The Hawaiian Movement began over specific issues of land, but it was buttressed by a general fear and concern over the dispossession and declining influence of the Hawaiian population. In the 1970s social indices indicated that Hawaiians fell far behind other ethnic groups in the islands in terms of income and education; they were overrepresented in the prison population and in the vital statistics for suicide and disease. The fears of disillusionment that Abraham Akaka warned of in 1959 were still alive in the 1970s. For some Hawaiians, statehood had become a spiritual junkyard.\(^{26}\)

The concerns expressed by the various sovereignty organizations obviously raise the question of whether these Hawaiians are the same people who vigorously supported statehood in 1959. According to two advocates of the sovereignty movement, Michael Kioni Dudley and Keoni Kealoha Agard, the answer is No. As they announced in *A Call for Hawaiian Sovereignty*:

Hawaiians who are seeking sovereignty and the return of their lands are not the same people who were so anxious for admission into the Union a generation ago. Those seeking statehood then have mostly profited from it. Native Hawaiians seeking sovereignty generally have not. They look around them today and see many of their Hawaiian brothers and sisters and children without food, without shelter, without skills, education and jobs. . . . Those seeking sovereignty are native Hawaiian people “dispossessed” in their own homeland.

Dudley and Agard go on to note that some Hawaiians have accepted Americanization and have succeeded by American norms, but “As a whole, native Hawaiians clearly are not making it in modern American society.”\(^{27}\)

The statements of Agard and Dudley certainly raise questions about the 1959 plebiscite and indirectly about Kamokila Camp-
bell’s legacy. If Hawaiians did not support statehood, then how can one interpret the solid majorities for statehood in Hawaiian precincts with the exception of Ni‘ihau. Dudley and Agard claim that the vote in 1959 “did not allow one to choose between having a Hawaiian nation or having Statehood.” It thus did not accurately reflect the will of the Hawaiian people. The two then go on to say, “While Statehood has profited almost every group in Hawai‘i, it has brought little for the Hawaiian.” The juxtaposition of these two statements may well cause one to wonder if there is a difference between what Hawaiians wanted in 1959 and what they want in the 1990s. Just what were Hawaiians trying to say in the 1959 vote? Were they truly for statehood as their votes indicated? Or like Kamokila Campbell, did they just agree to accept it as an inevitable event despite their true desires?²⁸

The public record offers few if any clues to these questions. How can we know now what went on in the minds of Hawaiians more than thirty years ago? Haunani-Kay Trask, professor of Hawaiian Studies at the University of Hawai‘i and a leader of the Hawaiian Movement, noted in a 1988 interview that the hopes some Hawaiian political leaders held for statehood in 1959 had temporarily masked their fears. She remembered that her own family had been divided at the time. Her politically active father and uncle favored statehood as a vehicle for freeing Hawaiians from Big Five dominance. But her mother, a school teacher from Maui, did not view statehood with favor and feared that Hawaiian culture would be further submerged. In the years after statehood, the teaching of Hawaiian traditions by Japanese American teachers within the public school system caused her particular concern. Professor Trask thought many other Hawaiian families were similarly divided and speculated that the Hawaiians who participated in the plebiscite vote of 1959 may not have reflected the sentiments of the broader community. Many Hawaiians may well have registered their fear or aversion to statehood, she thought, by not voting at all.²⁹

The aversion of some Hawaiians to vote in the plebiscite is an interesting speculation, but it puts a strain on the voting statistics. In order to establish any significant opposition among the 100,000 Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian people in 1959, we would have to
assume that a substantial portion of the 15,000 registered voters who failed to vote were Hawaiian and that they were opposed to statehood. At the time of the plebiscite the *Star-Bulletin* noted that many Hawaiians in the Moloka‘i and Lāna‘i district had been fearful of the fate of the HHC under statehood. Nonetheless that district voted overwhelmingly in favor of admission. It is thus more likely that even those Hawaiians who had doubts about statehood thought it was preferable to remaining a territory. They were willing to give statehood a try.  

The disillusionment for Trask, as for Dudley and Agard, really comes after 1959. While Trask’s comment on the plebiscite was clearly speculative, her statements on the post-1959 mood of Hawaiians were definite. She emphasized that statehood had not fulfilled the dream of freedom from the Republican—Big Five coalition of territorial days. Instead, with the decline of the Republican party in Hawai‘i after statehood, the Big Five cooperated with the AJA-dominated Democratic party in pursuit of a brand of economic development that dispossessed even more Hawaiians, particularly those living in rural areas on the outer islands. In addition to the Big Five and the Democrats, Trask pointed to the surge in the number of tourists since 1959 as yet another wave of people pushing Hawaiians off of their lands.

As in 1959, the current political mood among Hawaiians is not monolithic. The Modern Hawaiian Movement by no means unifies all Hawaiians in a common cause. While most Hawaiians applaud the renaissance of cultural values, there is not agreement on political objectives, certainly not on the issues of separateness or nationhood. Many Hawaiians point with pride to the success of Hawaiians within the existing political and economic system. In addition to the previously mentioned political accomplishments of William Richardson and Jimmy Kealoha, other Hawaiians have achieved local and national prominence. In 1986 Hawaiian John Waihee was elected governor of Hawai‘i, and reelected in 1990. Daniel Akaka was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1977; he joined the U.S. Senate in 1990. Professor Trask concedes that major splits exist in the aspirations of the Hawaiian community based on wealth, urban versus rural residence, and acceptance of Americanization. But she insists that no one in Hawai‘i
today denies the existence and issues in the Modern Hawaiian Movement. Even such a haole establishment figure as retired Honolulu Star-Bulletin editor Adam “Bud” Smyser wrote in 1988, “Hawaii could have more direct control over two important aspects of its development—immigration and external investment—if it again became an independent nation as it was prior to 1898. Some few residents favor this.” Smyser ruled out this possibility as having minimal support and many disadvantages. He did not favor it himself, but he did feel the need to mention it in a report to the East-West Center on the future of Hawai‘i.31

The sentiments of Haunani-Kay Trask and others in the Modern Hawaiian Movement certainly echo much of Kamokila Campbell’s 1946 testimony. The Big Five and the Japanese, both AJAS as well as investors and tourists from Japan, are once again seen as forces dispossessing the natives of the islands. As in 1946, the desire of some in the Modern Hawaiian Movement is to be “left alone” to pursue a different lifestyle from the norm of urbanized America. Kamokila Campbell expressed a desire, though vague and diffuse, for some form of independent government. Those advocating sovereignty today have advanced more concrete political models. But like Mrs. Campbell, they have not yet arrived at one preferred form. And in keeping with Kamokila’s line of argument, the modern-day criticism of statehood is as much against the people who control the economic development of the state of Hawai‘i as it is against the specific political connection to the United States.

Is the Modern Hawaiian Movement then the legacy of Kamokila Campbell’s stand against statehood? Leaders of the Movement rarely mention Kamokila or see her as the inspiration for their organization. Her departure from Hawai‘i in the late 1960s and her 1971 death in California leave her unremembered by many. Since she is not well remembered today, one might also wonder how she would have reacted to the new movement. Would she see herself as someone who had not “made it” under statehood? Would the economic and social prominence of her family, her ties to California, and the wealth of the Campbell Estate have placed a gulf between her and the organizers of the various sovereignty groups? As a mainlander and one who never
knew Kamokila Campbell, I can not even pose an answer to these questions. Possibly readers of this journal in Hawai'i who did know her might want to try.

Nonetheless, as a historian who has read her 1946 testimony before the Larcade committee and noted her interests in Hawaiian culture, I find an intriguing, even a compelling, intellectual legacy in her thought. To dismiss her testimony, as the statehooders did in 1946, as a crazy quilt of illogical arguments lacking in clear political alternatives is to miss the point. Kamokila Campbell's presentation in 1946 was a statement of feeling, passion, and an overwhelming fear of cultural decline. Statehood, or rather the goals of those advocating statehood, represented to her a continuing loss of influence and position for the Hawaiian community she cherished. The fears of cultural decline and the hopes for renewal that she expressed in 1946 are clearly alive today within a portion of the Hawaiian community. Her testimony provides one of the few documents with which a historian can link today's more publicly stated feelings with the more privately held opinions of some Hawaiians in the 1940s and 1950s. To dismiss Kamokila Campbell as simply one of the losers in the political battle for statehood closes the door on what has continued to be one of the most discussed currents in post-statehood Hawai'i—the future and destiny of the native Hawaiian people.

In the 1990s one no longer hears corporate executives, even older ones, worrying about Communist penetration of Hawai'i's labor unions. Events of the last few years in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe make it unlikely that the rhetoric of IMUA will recapture the attention of the islands. Of all the fears expressed by opponents of statehood, only Kamokila Campbell's have survived to the present day. From her testimony in 1946 to her vision of Madame Pele in 1960, it was Kamokila Campbell—not Walter Dillingham, Ingram Stainback, or IMUA—who truly had a vision of a distant fire coming in the night.

Notes

1 For the 1959 plebiscite vote, see Secretary of Hawaii, "Results of Votes Cast (Three Propositions) Held June 27, 1959," AH. For a discussion of the vote, see


4 The primary source on IMUA is the complete set of *Spot Light* and its successor after 1967, *Fact Finder*, available in the Special Collections Room, Hamilton Library, UH. See also Fuchs, *Hawaii Pono* 412.


6 For the 1984 assessment of IMUA, see interviews with Robert G. Hogan, Dan Aoki, and George Leheitner in *Perspectives on Hawai’i’s Statehood* (Honolulu: Oral History Project, U of Hawaii, 1986) 14, 101, 168. For an assessment of the haole opposition, see interviews with Malcolm MacNaughton and Robert McElrath in *Perspectives on Hawai’i’s Statehood* 53, 112.


8 “Results of Votes Cast,” 27 June 1959; Smyser, “Voters Approve Hawaii Statehood.”


10 For Senator Campbell’s wartime views, see Kamokila Campbell, “Frank Comments by a Feminine Legislator,” *Paradise of the Pacific*, July 1944: 11-12, 30.


13 Larcade Committee hearings 482.

14 Larcade Committee hearings 482-83, 499-500, 503.

15 Larcade Committee hearings 489-91.

16 Larcade Committee hearings 484-88; Burtnett, “Kamokila Pulls No Punches.”

17 Larcade Committee hearings 485, 501-02; Lorrin Thurston, “Kamokila’s

18 Larcombe Committee hearings 493, 497.

19 Larcombe Committee hearings 491, 499, 504.

20 Burtnett, “Kamokila Pulls No Punches”; Thurston, “Kamokila’s Statements.”


26 Dudley and Agard, *A Call for Hawaiian Sovereignty* 77-79.

27 Dudley and Agard, *A Call for Hawaiian Sovereignty* xliii, 77-78.

28 Dudley and Agard, *A Call for Hawaiian Sovereignty* 74.

29 Interview by the author with Haunani-Kay Trask, 2 May 1988, Honolulu.

30 Smyser, “Voters Approve Hawaii Statehood.”

31 The accomplishments of Hawaiians within the existing political system of Hawai‘i were emphasized to me by William S. Richardson in an April 1988 interview in Honolulu. Haunani-Kay Trask’s view comes from the May 1988 interview and her article cited above, “The Birth of the Modern Hawaiian Movement.” For Smyser’s view see A. A. Smyser, *Hawaii’s Future in the Pacific: Disaster, Backwater or Future State?* (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1988) 7.