To a world which, close to the fourth anniversary of the war, had grown accustomed to more or less stabilized political and military fronts, the recent events in Italy have provided as great a sensation as any period since the beginning of hostilities. At first it was impossible to gather what had taken place, as the only news—and even this very scanty—was issued by the Badoglio Government. The days since September 8, however, have brought some clarification, although there are still many inconsistencies and gaps and Mussolini has not yet given his own account of the events. Yet it is possible to combine the many small, often disjointed, fragments of news, which the world has been given, into a plausible mosaic.

JULY 25, 1943, will go down as one of the important dates in Italian history. We have two versions of the events: the reports of Stefani, the official Italian news agency (at that time controlled by the Badoglio Government), on the meeting of the Grand Council of Fascism; and a DNB telegram of September 9 regarding the events in the royal palace. Some additional minor points were provided on August 11 by Ryosuke Hida, Domel staff correspondent in Berlin. According to these accounts, this is what happened on that fateful day.

**STEFANI VERSION**

At 5 p.m. on July 24 a meeting of the Grand Council of Fascism, attended by Mussolini and twenty-seven other members, took place at the Palazzo Venezia. Premier Benito Mussolini made a report on the country’s political and military situation. Thereupon Dino Grandi, the President of the Chamber of Fasces and Corporations, submitted to the members of the Council a motion signed by nine-tenths of them and proclaiming a necessity for “immediate resumption of all state functions.” The motion also requested that “the Crown, the Grand Council of the Government, Parliament, and the Corporations, be given tasks and responsibilities as fixed by our constitutional stipulations,” and concluded with the declaration that the Grand Council of Fascism “asks His Majesty the King to take over supreme command of the land, sea, and air forces, in accordance with Article 5 of the Constitution of the Royal House of Savoy.” Dino Grandi’s motion was approved with nineteen votes to seven and one abstention. The meeting ended at 3 a.m. On the strength of this decision Mussolini handed in his resignation to the King, who then entrusted Marshal Badoglio with the post of Prime Minister.

**DNB VERSION**

After a session of the Fascist Grand Council, Mussolini called on King Victor Emmanuel III at the King’s private residence on July 25. During this conference, Mussolini asked the King for full powers to institute severe proceedings against the sabotage of war efforts systematically carried out by certain Italian circles; against the desertion of generals and high officers of the armed forces which had been particularly noticeable in Sicily; against the lack of comradeship shown by superior Italian officers toward the men and noncommissioned officers; and against the corruption existing in the Army and in the war economy. But the King did not consent to this, and he
finally told Mussolini: "I must inform you that your successor as Prime Minister has already been designated, in fact has taken over office. This man is Marshal Badoglio. Put yourself at his disposal." As a matter of fact, Badoglio had already assumed power in the country while the conversation was taking place; and on leaving the Villa Savoia Mussolini was seized and taken in an ambulance first to the Carabinieri Barracks on the Piazza del Popolo and later to other destinations.

WHICH TO BELIEVE?

There is practically no connection between Stefani's version of the events and that of DNB except that they are supposed to have taken place within the same twenty-four hours.

Stefani, no doubt at Badoglio's orders, made a special point of stressing the fact that the change of government in Italy was not a coup d'état. If this were so, why was Mussolini never heard of again till he was freed by a daring German action? Why did Mussolini leave a post he had held for twenty years, a party whose building up had been his lifework, without a single word of his own? The only statement ever made about him by the Badoglio Government was that he remained a knight of the Annunciata Order, which tells us nothing.

Thus the evidence we have up to the present seems to support the DNB version, which describes the events of July 25 not as a normal constitutional change in government but as a coup d'état.

The next question is: Why was Mussolini forced out of office and imprisoned? On August 1, Stefani declared that the reason for the downfall of Mussolini's Government was not the war itself but the way in which it was prepared and conducted. This would mean that Badoglio, in agreement with the King, intervened in order to improve the conduct of the war. According to DNB it was just the other way round: it was Mussolini who asked the King for greater powers for that very purpose.

If Badoglio's version were correct, one would expect him to use his powers after July 25 to improve the conduct of the war. Did he do that?

THE END OF THE SICILIAN CAMPAIGN

In our issue of August/September of this year we traced the development of the Sicilian campaign up to the end of July. After that time it became increasingly clear that the real burden of the fight was being borne by German units. Even the official Italian war communiqués had in many cases more to report about the activities of German troops than of their own. Pressed by a force immensely superior on land, at sea, and in the air, the German defenders fought a heroic delaying and rearguard battle, while the Italian forces, with few exceptions, did not measure up to their task.

The number of Germans in Sicily probably never exceeded 40,000 men. Against them were assembled 6 Allied panzer divisions, 4 panzer brigades, 18 infantry divisions, one marine landing division, and 2 air-borne divisions. Hemming them in from the sea was a huge Allied fleet. Since early in August, men and material were being withdrawn from the Axis fighting lines and ferried across the Strait of Messina to the mainland. The front line was shortened day by day and was at the same time thinned out, leaving at last only a screen of small rearguards. While troops and all the heavy equipment were transported across the strait, these men held the enemy at bay with machine guns. Finally, on August 17, they themselves took to the boats with all their comrades (including 4,500 wounded) and of all equipment. The Sicilian campaign was over, and the battle for the Italian mainland had begun.

On August 29 a minor landing attempt was made on the coast of Calabria, but the British troops who succeeded in setting foot on land were wiped out or
captured. A major landing of the 8th British Army followed on September 3 on the coast of Calabria facing Sicily, north of Reggio and between Melito and Cape Spartivento. The weak German forces withdrew, and Villa San Giovanni, Reggio, and Melito were occupied by the British. Other landings followed on the night of September 3 near Ceramida and on September 8 in the Gulf of Eufemia.

WHAT PROBABLY HAPPENED

From this account we see that the war effort of the Italian armed forces after July 25 deteriorated from day to day and ceased completely within five weeks. It is true that the Italians did not show much fighting spirit during the first two weeks of the Sicilian campaign (July 10 to 24) either; but after the coup d'état they showed even less and finally none whatsoever. Thus there is nothing to support Badoglio's claim that the change in government was directed against the poor conduct of the war on the part of the Fascist Government.

The decisive argument against Badoglio's version is, of course, the fact that on August 3, a few days after his assumption of power, he initiated negotiations with the Allies for an armistice. Is it likely that the King and Marshal Badoglio would have removed Mussolini for his poor conduct of the war if a few days later they were going to begin peace talks with the enemy? It would seem rather that the development was somewhat as follows.

On July 19, Hitler and Mussolini met in North Italy. They knew by then what the rest of the world was to learn only later—that the Italian troops in Sicily were almost bereft of all morale. Entire units surrendered without resistance, and almost all the real fighting was being done by a few German divisions. Mussolini decided to take radical measures in order to eliminate those circles in the Army which were responsible for this state of affairs. When he returned to Rome and demanded additional powers, the King and Marshal Badoglio carried out their coup.

BADOGLIO'S INTERNAL CHANGES

Some indication of what Badoglio was aiming at can be found in the domestic policy followed by his government during its first few weeks of office as successively revealed by his own Stefani service. In trying to understand the meaning of his measures, it must be kept in mind that at that time all Badoglio's actions were influenced by the desire to keep Germany in the dark as to his true intentions. Hence he had to proceed very cautiously, probably postponing the bulk of his measures to the moment when he could drop his mask.

On July 25 the Fascist Militia, an armed force independent of the regular army, was put under Badoglio's command and a state of emergency declared. Then at its first meeting, held on July 27, the Badoglio Cabinet decided on the following measures:

(a) dissolution of the Fascist Party; (b) abolition of the law of December 9, 1928, concerning the Grand Council of Fascism, which was the supreme organ of the Fascist regime; (c) suppression of the Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State, instituted by the law of November 25, 1926; and (d) liberation of all political prisoners. During the same meeting it was decided to suggest to the sovereign the closure of the thirtieth Legislature and the dissolution by royal decree of the Chamber of Fasces and Corporations, instituted by the law of January 19, 1939.

In many other respects, too, the Badoglio Government showed its hostility to Mussolini's work. To mention only two examples:

(1) The Minister of National Education warned editors of schoolbooks that the councils of professors who were charged with choosing textbooks for the new scholastic year would not take into consideration books containing "tendentious interpretations of facts and historic events, or exalting principles that are incompatible with the new Italian situation." As far as history books were concerned, only texts dealing with events up to the end of the last world war would
be permissible. The "School Charter," in existence since 1939, was abolished.

(2) Even more obviously incriminating for the exponents of the previous regime was the appointment of a special commission with the task of investigating the increase of movable and immovable property of persons who held public positions or took part in political activity between October 28, 1922 (the day of the March on Rome) and July 24, 1943. The public was invited to co-operate in this work by reporting to the police or financial authorities those Fascist officials who had amassed property or money for personal use during the past twenty years. All promotions which took place after October 28, 1922, were to be investigated, and property acquired by officials after that date to be examined.

During the following weeks many Fascists were arrested throughout Italy, and the former Secretary General of the Fascist Party, Ettore Muti, was shot "while trying to escape."

THE NEW MEN

Another indication of Badoglio's plans was to be found in the composition of his new cabinet. Marshal Pietro Badoglio himself has been a professional soldier since 1888. When Mussolini's March on Rome took place, Badoglio was not in favor of it; however, he did not actively oppose it, and in 1924 he was sent for some months as Ambassador to Brazil. Later he was Governor of Libya. When Italy entered the war in June 1940 he was Chief of the General Staff, a position from which he resigned in December of the same year.

Some of the members of his cabinet are:

Foreign Minister: Raffaele Guariglia, a career diplomat since 1909 and, under Mussolini, envoy to various capitals.

Minister of the Interior: at first Bruno Formaciari, then Umberto Ricci, a career administrator both before 1923 and under Mussolini.

War Minister: General Antonio Sorice, Chief of the War Cabinet from 1936 to 1941.

Minister of War Production: General Favagrossa; held the same position with the previous Cabinet.

Navy Minister: Admiral Raffaele de Courten; previously Inspector of Submarine Armaments and for several years naval attaché in Berlin.

Finance Minister: Domenico Bartolini; formerly Inspector General of the State and Senator since 1939.

Minister for Exchange and Currency: Dr. Acanfora; previously one of the Managing Directors of the Bank of Italy.

Corporations (later Industry, Commerce, and Labor) Minister: Dr. Piccardi; an expert who has held several important positions in the same Ministry.

Minister of Education: Leonardo Severi; formerly an official in the same Ministry.

Minister of Popular Culture: first Guido Rocco, then Carlo Galli; a career diplomat since 1904.

Minister of Justice: Dr. Gaetano Azzariti; formerly Chief of the Legislative Department of the Ministry.

The choice of these men is characteristic of Badoglio's policy. On the one hand, practically all the new ministers had been members of the Fascist Party and had served during the Fascist regime, mainly as career men, in various capacities in the administration; on the other hand, some of the most important portfolios, such as those of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Popular Culture, were put in the hands of men who had been largely active before the advent to power of the Fascist regime. Compared to the cabinets of Mussolini, the members of Badoglio's had an unusually high average age. With the exception of Piccardi, who is under forty, Sorice, who is about forty-six, and Guariglia, who is fifty-three, all the other members are about sixty or over. The Marshal himself is seventy-two years old. Thus it appears that Badoglio tried to get men for his cabinet who outwardly did not represent an open break with the preceding twenty years of Italian history but who could nevertheless be counted on as being in favor of pre-Fascist Italian conditions.

A CHANGED PRESS

In one field Badoglio's principle of turning to men of the pre-Fascist era was particularly noticeable: that of the press. On August 3, Stefani remarked: "Slowly, but ever so surely, all the principles of the old regime are being either revised or eradicated," adding that "men who have remained faithful to liberal ideas are replacing former newspaper editors."
As a matter of fact, quite a number of newspaper publishers and editors of pre-Fascist days had already been re­stored to their old positions. Among the newspapers that were thus placed once again in the hands of their former liberal or conservative owners and editors were the Giornale d’Italia, the Messaggero, and the Corriere della Sera. Furthermore, Dr. Roberto Suster, who had once before been the Berlin correspondent and the editor-in-chief of the Stefani news agency, reassumed this latter position in succession to Senator Manlio Morgagni, who committed suicide after July 25.

Three leftist sheets, which appeared (or reappeared) on July 26, were prohibited three days later. They were: the Mondo, directed by its former manager Bonomi, who had once been the Berlin correspondent and the editor-in-chief of the Stefani news agency, reassumed this latter position in succession to Senator Manlio Morgagni, who committed suicide after July 25.

The Tribuna warned its readers that “the legitimate joy of the Italians at having recovered their individual and collective dignity must not distract them from reality.” The paper expressed the opinion that “Italy will give the world testimony that she can emerge from an error of more than twenty years,” and concluded one of its articles by stating that “the Italian people is being given an ethical policy from which it had strayed, the dignity which it had lost, the spiritual values which can be re­pressed but not killed.”

Badoglio’s press was far more outspoken than Badoglio himself. While the new Prime Minister was choosing his words very carefully, realizing what was at stake for his undertaking and willing to go to any lengths to camouflage his real intentions, the press clamored more openly from day to day for the destruction of everything Fascist, be it only the names of the streets.

BADOGLIO NEGOTIATES WITH THE ALLIES

While all these internal changes were of paramount importance for Italy, the world at large was primarily interested in the foreign-political course which Badoglio intended to take. In his very first proclamation of July 25 the new Prime Minister had declared: “The war continues. Italy is gravely affected by the invasion of her provinces and the destruction of her cities; but, jealously preserving her thousand-year-old tradition, she will keep the word she has given.” This seemed perfectly clear, and everybody who read these words must have taken them to mean only one thing, namely, that Italy would continue the war on the side of her Axis partners.

Yet a few days later armistice negotiations were started between the Badoglio Government and the Allies. According to a report from London (September 13) these negotiations began in the first few days of August when Italian diplomats approached British representatives (August 3) in two neutral countries, acting on instructions from the Italian Government and declaring themselves to be authorized
to discuss the possibility of an armistice. They were told that the terms were unconditional surrender. It is very likely that Badoglio’s readiness to surrender was the reason for Churchill’s hurrying to Quebec, where he arrived on August 11. The negotiations took some time, which probably explains the length of Churchill’s stay in America.

In the middle of August an Italian general presented himself to Sir Samuel Hoare, the British Ambassador in Madrid. He stated that he had come with full authority from Marshal Badoglio to say that, when the Allies landed in Italy, the Italian Government was prepared to join them against Germany. He, too, was told that the Allies demanded unconditional surrender. The armistice was signed in Sicily on September 3, in the presence of Generals Eisenhower and Alexander for the Allies and General Castellano for Badoglio, but without any Soviet representatives taking part.

The Allies announced that the USSR had been kept informed about the negotiations and that the armistice had the approval of the Soviet Government. But while England and America loudly celebrated Italy’s surrender, the Soviet press kept its customary reserve about the success of the USSR’s allies. Indeed, through the mouth of its most influential paper, Pravda, it claimed most of the credit for the Soviet Union by declaring on September 10 that the surrender of Italy “is connected in the first place with the heroic struggle of the Red Army on the Soviet-German front.”

THE ARMISTICE

The thirteen conditions of the armistice, which were later published by Reuter’s news agency, stipulate the unconditional surrender of Italy and her armed forces and, as shown by Article 12, her complete enslavement:

(12) Other conditions of political, economic, and financial nature with which Italy will be bound to comply will be transmitted at a later date.

In this Article the Badoglio Government agreed in advance to whatever measures the Allies might wish to take in Italy. In addition to this, the armistice includes several unusual clauses:

(2) Italy will do her best to deny the Germans facilities that might be used against the United Nations.

(6) Immediate surrender of Corsica and all Italian territory, both of islands and mainland, to the Allies for such use as operational bases and other purposes as the Allies may see fit.

(9) The guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all available armed forces to ensure the prompt and exact compliance with all provisions of this armistice.

(13) The conditions of the present armistice will not be made public without prior approval of the Allied Commander in Chief.

This means that Italy agreed not only to desert her ally but also to fight against him, indeed, even to keep him in the dark about this fact until a moment to be chosen by the enemies.

We do not know whether there are not further secret clauses. But even so the armistice of September 3 shows what surrender to the Allies means. This becomes particularly clear if we compare the salient points of this armistice with those of the armistice concluded between Germany and France at Compiegne three years ago (see p.77 of the issue of July 1942 of this magazine.)

From the moment he was appointed Prime Minister up to September 8, Badoglio carried on a game that has few parallels in history. Publicly, the new government professed its loyalty to the Axis. On July 28 the Italian Embassy in Tokyo issued a statement declaring that the change in government did not in any way affect the international relations of the country, especially those concerning the war objectives of the Tripartite powers; and similar statements were made by all Italian missions abroad. That this pretense was kept up by Badoglio’s Government to the last moment and even for five days after the signing of the armistice is shown by the documents published by the German Foreign Office on September 12 and reproduced in our appendix. In the desire for camouflage, Badoglio even went so far as to permit the terrible loss of life in Naples resulting from the Allied terror raid of September 6.
GERMANY ACTS

Yet in spite of this endeavor to deceive Germany as long and as completely as possible, the Germans naturally began to smell a rat after the coup d'état. At first they were willing to give Badoglio and the King the benefit of the doubt, in spite of many suspicious indications later mentioned in a declaration of the German Government of September 9. After more than three years of warfare on the same fronts against common enemies and under common commanders, it was hard for German officers even to contemplate the possibility of Italy’s treason. Nevertheless, they felt obliged to prepare for any emergency and to rely less and less on the support of the Italians.

When on September 8 the treason became known through the announcement made on the part of the Allies, the Germans—in spite of the sickening sensation they must have felt—instantly snapped into action. In reading the measures taken by the German High Command during the first forty-eight hours after the publication of the actual surrender, and particularly of the Führer’s speech of September 10 (reproduced in part in our appendix), one is conscious almost of a feeling of relief that the intolerable suspense was ended. The situation had finally become clear. The Badoglio Government had no longer to be taken into consideration. Many Italians, too, must have welcomed the end of this period of camouflage. Now they had a clear choice between Badoglio and the Fascist National Government, the formation of which was immediately announced in northern Italy.

The Germans acted with extreme rapidity and their customary precision. All northern Italy, large parts of central Italy, and all Italian airports, were taken under German military control. Half a million Italian troops in these areas as well as in other parts of Europe were disarmed unless they declared their willingness to continue the war on the side of the German Army. Warships which tried to flee to the Allies were attacked, some being sunk. German troops upset Allied plans when they dealt heavy blows to the invaders in the plain of Salerno. Mussolini was freed and issued his first orders of the day (see our appendix), which breathed his customary energy and personal vigor.

The King, Badoglio, and their clique completed the full measure of their despicable deed: within a few hours after the publication of surrender they fled into the hands of the enemy, sending their families and belongings to Switzerland and leaving their country to reap the terrible harvest of shame and dishonor which they had sown.

TRAITORS AT HEART?

How are we to evaluate these extraordinary events which we have briefly summarized here?

In one of his works, Machiavelli quotes a Bourbon prince of the sixteenth century as having once said that there had never been an example in history of the House of Savoy completing a war at the side of that ally on whose side it began that war—except when it found enough time to change fronts twice. It would, however, be wrong simply to consider the Italians as being constitutionally traitors.

It is true that in 1914 the Italians did not enter the war on the side of their allies Austria-Hungary and Germany; but they had an excuse in the wording of their treaty of alliance, which required that Italy be consulted by her allies before they went to war and that Italy join them only if they had been the object of attack. Technically this was not the case, as Germany and Austria-Hungary had been maneuvered by their enemies into a position in which they had to declare war. But even though, legally speaking, Italy no longer felt bound to her alliance, Germany and Austria-Hungary deeply resented this and considered it as treason when Italy ended up by fighting against them.

However, Italy’s about-face in the Great War cannot be compared with the one in the present war, which is an absolutely clear case of treason in partic-
ularly disgraceful circumstances. This time, the obligations of Italy were perfectly clear and unambiguous. They are laid down in the Three Power Pact of September 27, 1940 (valid for ten years) and, more specifically, in the Three Power Alliance of December 11, 1941 (valid for the duration of the Three Power Pact), of which the first two articles read:

(1) Germany, Italy, and Japan will jointly fight this war forced upon them by the United States of America and Britain, with all the means at their disposal, to a victorious end.

(2) Germany, Italy, and Japan pledge themselves not to conclude any armistice or peace, either with the United States of America or with England, without previous complete mutual agreement.

**HOW COULD IT HAPPEN?**

During the last twenty years, Benito Mussolini has been trying to bring about in Italy what no other Italian had attempted before. The Italian people are admired in the world for their immortal contributions to European language, painting, music, architecture, and law; but it has been much ridiculed for its poor showing on the battlefield and for its lack of industrial enterprise. Mussolini tried to make this people into a nation of warriors and workers.

In 1922 Italy had been at her lowest ebb. Under the leadership of that same King Victor Emmanuel and lured on by British promises, she had entered the Great War against her own allies. She had suffered many defeats. At the peace conference her gains in return for the loss of 600,000 men were meager; and out of general discontent, high cost of living, and heavy debts, chaos had grown and in its wake a very acute danger of Bolshevism. When the King and his circle proved unable to master the situation, Mussolini stepped in. In loyal co-operation with the King, Mussolini restored order, won the confidence of the majority of the nation, and built for Italy a position such as she had not enjoyed since the fall of the Roman Empire.

But the last few months may have indicated that Mussolini had overreached himself and that his nation did not measure up to the demands which his political course made upon it. The strain of two minor wars (Abyssinia and Spain) and one great war seems to have proved too much.

There have always been malcontents in Italy who opposed the Fascist regime. They were to be found among the intellectuals, who desired the return of liberalism; in court circles, who looked down on the upstart Mussolini; and among the generals and high officers, many of whom were hostile to Fascism and fought in the war with indifference, trying even to infect the soldiers with their defeatism. All these people wanted to turn back the wheel of history, to restore pre-Fascist conditions, in which they had had more to say. In their shortsightedness, they felt closer to the Anglo-Americans than to the Axis. They were even willing to sell out to Roosevelt and Churchill, blind to the consequences this would entail for them and their country.

For a long time they found little support among the
masses, who were the beneficiaries of Mussolini’s social policy. But during the three years of Italy’s participation in the present war, dissatisfaction increased. The Italians found war a terribly grim business. It brought them little glory, many defeats, considerable losses in men and territory, and relentless terror attacks from the air. In this situation the enemies of Fascism found many opportunities, particularly after July 25, to slander Fascism and to point to it as the culprit of the misfortunes of the last three years.

**WHAT THEY FORGOT**

People are quick to forget, and many Italians forgot that Italy’s entry into the present war had been approved by their King; they forgot that the army which had suffered these defeats was not an instrument built by Fascism but was directly under the Crown; they forgot that the Italian Army was, to a great extent, the result of Badoglio’s work, who had been its Chief of Staff three times, in 1919, 1925, and from 1933 to 1940—that means, at the time of Italy’s entry into the war—and that consequently it was he who was largely responsible for the poor military preparation of the Army.

Badoglio had acted with considerable shrewdness. By presenting his _coup d’état_ as a normal change of government brought about by the alleged resignation of Mussolini, he achieved the smooth and rapid dissolution of the Fascist Party and all its organs; and by declaring that the war would continue, he rallied the majority of Fascists to his policy, appealing to them to concentrate on the war instead of discussing internal politics.

Of course the Italians want peace. There is no nation on earth today that does not wish for the return of peace. There may even be occasions when the inhabitants of a bombed city, senseless with fear and horror, want peace at any price. And it is quite likely that there were many people in Italy whose first reaction to the news of surrender was: peace at last!

But this was a terrible self-deception which, as Badoglio must have foreseen, could only last for a few hours. It was shattered to bits by the firm determination of Germany not to be drawn into the chaos but to erect a new and more consolidated front.

We do not deny that Italy’s military prospects at the end of July were not very bright. She was facing a military crisis and had to expect that part of her territory would be turned into a battlefield, that many of her cities would be bombed, and that the road to final victory on the part of the Axis powers still was a long and hard one. But today the Italian people are infinitely worse off.

Not only will Italy remain a battlefield, will bombs continue to fall on her cities, but, owing to the actions of men whom she allowed to rule her, she has earned the contempt of the world. She has lost her fleet and her Army; she has lost her control of the Adriatic, of Dalmatia, Albania, and the Dodecanese; she has lost her spheres of influence in the Balkans and other parts of Europe; and—worst of all—she has lost control over her own fate. All these losses are hers unless the loyal, virile elements of Italy who are now gathering around Mussolini are strong enough to wipe out the shame of the last few weeks by deeds.

As we go to press, the Italian people behind the protective wall of German divisions are being profoundly stirred. The _fata morgana_ of a peace by surrender has vanished. Italy’s entire future is at stake. Salvation cannot come from men who have committed treason and fled to the enemy. Only the path of honor and loyalty can lead to victory. For this path, which has been chosen by Italy’s allies—Germany and Japan—there can be no more shining symbol than the courage, spirit of sacrifice, loyalty, and initiative which on September 12 snatched Mussolini from the clutches of the enemy and won the admiration of friend and foe.