In the Allied camp there are two powers completely overshadowing all others, even Great Britain, in political and military importance—the United States and the Soviet Union. For the further course of the war and its final outcome, the relations between these two states are of paramount significance. These relations, which began officially exactly ten years ago, are analyzed in the following pages.

The author has spent most of the years between 1928 and 1941 either in the USA or in the USSR and has observed their interrelations at close range. It has been his endeavor to write this article with a long view and with such historical accuracy that it may stand the test of time.

LUNCH AT SPASSO HOUSE

In the fashionable Arbat quarter of Moscow there stands a palace known as Spasso House. It had been built in flamboyant style by the Russian millionaire Vtorov, who was murdered by his illegitimate son during the early part of the Revolution. This was a great day for the newsboys. Instead of calling out “Nikolai Vtorov murdered!” they yelled “Nikolai Vtoroi [Nicholas II] murdered!” and sold their papers like hot cakes. The Bolsheviks confiscated the palace and celebrated their annual reception on the anniversary of the Revolution there, till they placed it at the disposal of an American millionaire, William C. Bullitt, the newly appointed American Ambassador, as his private residence.

It was here that I met Mr. Bullitt for the first time, when he invited me to lunch shortly after his arrival in Moscow. I found in him an enthusiastic admirer of the Soviet state. He was inclined to see everything through rose-colored glasses, far more positively than the Bolsheviks themselves, who in private often enough expressed sharp criticism. From me, too, he only wished to have his own opinions confirmed. When I said anything negative, he argued heatedly against this.

At that time the Soviet Union and the USA were experiencing their diplomatic honeymoon. A few months previously, on October 10, 1933, President Roosevelt had surprised the world by writing a letter to Kalinin, president of a state which had not yet been recognized by the USA. In this letter Roosevelt suggested that a Soviet representative be sent to Washington for the purpose of discussions. Only too pleased, the Kremlin had dis-
patched its Foreign Commissar, Litvinov, and on November 16, 1933, Roosevelt announced the recognition of the Soviet Government.

Alexander Trotskyansky became Soviet Ambassador in Washington. In 1902, at the age of twenty, he had joined the revolutionary movement and was rewarded for his services to the Bolshevik Party with the post of Ambassador to Tokyo in 1927, and now to Washington.

GLAMOUR BOY IN MOSCOW

Roosevelt appointed a personal friend Ambassador to Moscow. At that time Bullitt was forty-two years old. During the Great War he had held a job in the State Department, and in 1919 the State Department had sent him on an information trip to Russia, from which he had returned with strong sympathies for the Bolsheviks. During the ensuing twelve years or so he had led the life of a millionaire without any fixed occupation. The post of ambassador in 1933 was the reward for personal services he had rendered Roosevelt.

David R. Francis, the last American Ambassador in the Tsarist Empire, had been a typical American businessman, a successful grain dealer and banker, of whom even his own Secretary of State said that "he had too keen a scent for commerce to make an ideal diplomat." Bruce Lockhart tells the following story of him.

Ambassador Francis was a kind old gentleman, who was susceptible to flattery and swallowed any amount of it. His knowledge of anything beyond banking and poker was severely limited. He had a traveling spittoon—a contraption with a pedal—which he took with him everywhere. When he wished to emphasize a point, bang would go the pedal followed by a well-aimed expecoration. One afternoon Norman Armour, the secretary of the American Embassy, suggested a visit to the Moscow Opera House, where Eugene Onegin, the immortal work of Russia's greatest poet, Pushkin, with the music of Chaikovsky, was to be given.

"Governor," he said, "would you like to go to the opera tonight?"

"Nope," was the reply, "I think I'll play poker."

"Do come, Governor," said Armour. "You really ought not to miss it. It's Eugene Onegin."

"Evgeny what?" said the Ambassador.

"Oh! you know," replied Armour, "Pushkin and Chaikovsky." There was a crash from the pedal of the spittoon.

"What!" said the Ambassador ecstatically. "Is Pushkin singing tonight?"

William C. Bullitt, the first American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was no "Babbitt" like Francis. He was a real man of the world and during his first year there one of the most popular diplomats in Moscow. Everyone knew him and his luxurious Cadillac. The Soviet newsreels showed him often, and the newspapers reported on his trips and especially on his journeys in his own plane, which was piloted by a very good-looking young American. He was the only diplomat with any personal contact with Stalin.

In his striving for popularity he went much further than any other foreign diplomat. Himself an excellent horseman, he and his military attaché, Lt. Col. P. R. Paymonville, taught a cavalry detachment of the Red Army how to play polo. His magnificent parties were very popular, especially when he showed Hollywood films, which were otherwise prohibited in the Soviet Union, thereby giving the proletarian dignitaries an opportunity to catch a glimpse of the sinful delights of the outside world. The fact that he had married the widow of John Reed, the American communist poet and writer, surrounded him with a special nimbus in Soviet eyes.

IDEOLOGICAL FOES

All the other great powers had recognized the Soviet Union some ten years previously. Why had Washington hesitated so long, and why had recognition
come about so suddenly in the autumn of 1933?

There is a curious parallel that strikes one here. A hundred and fifty years earlier it had been just the other way round. At that time the Tsarist Government had been the only great power which refused to recognize the Government of the United States. Not until 1809, thirty-three years after the Declaration of Independence, had recognition been granted. Another twenty-three years were to pass before the first trade agreement between St. Petersburg and Washington was concluded, after negotiations had collapsed, and even diplomatic relations been temporarily disrupted, as a result of the arrest of the Russian Consul General in Philadelphia on a charge of rape.

The reasons which caused Washington to refuse recognition of the Soviet Union for sixteen years were to be sought chiefly in the absolutely opposed political and economic ideology of the two states. While the Soviet Union, the champion of Bolshevism, collectivism, and atheism, was seriously worried that America might become the leader of a hostile capitalist coalition, the USA, the outstanding exponent of capitalism and individualism, looked with suspicion toward the cradle of world Bolshevism and the home of the Third International.

The many outrages of the Bolsheviks and the reign of terror of the Cheka; the defamation of religion and the destruction of the Church; the brutal liquidation of the well-to-do class; and the dreadful acts of violence committed by the Red Guards in the Ukraine, Poland, Rumania, the Baltic States, and Finland—all this filled America with horror and disgust. When the American Government took military steps against the Bolsheviks, it did so with the overwhelming support of public opinion behind it.

The two attempts at intervention—from Arkhangelsk into northern Russia (August 1918 to June 1919) and from Vladivostok into Siberia (August 1918 to April 1920)—were miserable failures, politically as well as militarily. The Bolshevik regime remained; indeed, it was strengthened by the arousal of national instincts against foreign invaders and even infected the American soldiers with its ideas. The Bolsheviks never forgave the Americans for their intervention. What particularly annoyed them was that it stood in complete contrast to the attitude of the Russian Government during the Civil War in the United States, when, as opposed to England and France, Russia had taken political sides with the northern states.

WHO OWES WHOM?

To these ideological contrasts was added a very material point of dispute in the form of the debts problem. The United States had given loans to the pre-Bolshevist Russian governments which had not been repaid. Moreover, American citizens had suffered losses as a result of the Russian civil war and expropriations carried out by the Bolsheviks. Washington calculated its total claims on Moscow, including interest, to be some 800 to 900 million US dollars.

The Bolsheviks replied to this with two arguments: (1) they refused to pay the debts incurred by the governments opposed and overthrown by them; (2) they presented a counterclaim for damages caused to Russia by the American intervention troops, a figure amounting to about 500 million dollars.

Consequently, the sharp rejection of the Soviet Government which Secretary of State B. Colby pronounced in the famous note of August 10, 1920, addressed to the Italian Ambassador, remained decisive for Washington's attitude and was reaffirmed in similar official pronouncements on the part of the Secretaries of State Hughes (1923), Kellogg (1928), and Stimson (1930). Up to Roosevelt's time, all the US Governments agreed in that they refused to recognize the USSR.

HELL AND THE USSR

The only thing that appeared to be in favor of the resumption of diplomatic
relations was the claim of numerous American manufacturers, especially the representatives of export interests, that the nonrecognition was interfering with business. One of these businessmen expressed this view in the words: “It is the duty of the US Government to maintain representations wherever American interests are at stake, even in hell, where there are probably quite a lot of Americans, or even in the Soviet Union.”

These men bewailed the decline of American exports to the Soviet Union in the very years in which the world economic crisis was hitting business. Soviet propaganda skillfully used this fact to make the recognition of the Soviet Union by Washington seem desirable to American business circles. But this argumentation was a fallacy. For what the Bolshevik propagandists, as, for instance, the staff of the Amtorg (the Soviet trade organization in America) did not say, and what the Americans did not realize, was that the decline of the American exports to the Soviet Union had nothing whatever to do with recognition or nonrecognition but was purely a consequence of domestic economic developments in the Soviet Union.

A glance at our chart shows that America made large exports to Russia during two periods: (1) during the Great War—chiefly armaments, and (2) during the first Five Year Plan, when the Soviet Union imported vast quantities of machinery in order to build up its own heavy industry. The moment, however, the Soviet Union began to produce its own machines with this imported machinery, its import requirements declined. It was then that an economic development began which was devoted entirely to self-sufficiency and which, though causing the standard of living of the population to drop heavily, turned the Soviet Union into an industrial country with a vast armament potential. Although US exports rose slightly after the recognition, they remained—with the exception, of course, of the years since 1942, on which no figures have been published—far below those of the years of the first Five Year Plan, which preceded recognition. The Americans took Germany’s policy of self-sufficiency very much amiss and declared over and over again: “You can’t do business with Hitler.” In reality, the efforts at self-sufficiency on the part of the USSR are far more pronounced; and as late as 1937 American trade with Germany was three times as great as that with the Soviet Union.

Thus it was a deep-rooted ideological contrast combined with no prospects of improved economic collaboration which explained nonrecognition. The fact that recognition was finally effected in spite of all this is mainly the work of one man—Roosevelt.

PACIFIC RIVALS

Since the Manchurian incident of 1931 and especially in the winter of 1932/33, relations between Washington and Tokyo had deteriorated considerably. In March 1933 Japan resigned from the
League of Nations. London's attitude proved a disappointment to America. So Roosevelt was on the lookout for another counterweight against Japan. Relations between Moscow and Tokyo also being strained at that time, the Soviet Union appeared to Roosevelt as a suitable ally in East Asia.

This meant a complete change in the Pacific sphere. During the nineteenth century, Americans and Russians had been serious competitors here. The Russians possessed Alaska and were moving into California. It was against them that in 1823 President James Monroe proclaimed his famous doctrine which closed the door of the American continent to non-American states. The sale of Alaska to the USA in 1867 seemed to bring about a clear separation: Russia on the Asiatic continent, the USA on the American.

But now American imperialism began more and more clearly to encroach upon the Asiatic continent. In contrast to Monroe's closed-door doctrine for the American continent, in 1899 the US Secretary of State John Hay proclaimed an open-door doctrine for East Asia. This brought the USA into conflict with Russia, who considered herself an Asiatic power. In their hostility toward Russia, the Americans celebrated Nippon's victories in the Russo-Japanese War almost as their own. And yet this war represented the turning point in the relations between America and Nippon.

ROOSEVELT I CHANGES THE COURSE

In my book The Influence of the Russo-Japanese War on World Politics (Berlin 1930) I have told in detail how doubts appeared in America, at first in the mind of President Theodore Roosevelt, as to whether Japan might not become a far more dangerous enemy to America in East Asia than Russia was. In a letter written during the summer of 1905, Roosevelt gave vent to his anxiety for the first time:

I should be sorry to see Russia driven completely off the Pacific coast and driven practically east to Lake Baikal . . . . My move [during the negotiations in Portsmouth] is really more in the interest of Russia than of Japan.

At about the same time, Theodore Roosevelt told a European diplomat of his fears that, if Japan were to obtain an indemnity, she would use it for the expansion of her fleet. In view of these considerations, he threw his weight into the Russian side of the scale in the final negotiations for the peace treaty of Portsmouth. For the first time in the history of diplomatic relations in the Pacific sphere, the possibility of a serious clash between Japan and the USA had made its appearance, and from year to year Japan, in the eyes of America, developed more and more into Enemy No. 1 in East Asia. During the time of the common intervention in Siberia, the contrast between the two powers had already taken on such dimensions that it often seemed as if the American regiments in Siberia considered the Japanese allies as their enemies rather than the Bolsheviks. In her conception of a Greater East Asia, Japan rejected the Open Door Doctrine as an instrument of outside interference and was about to replace it by an East Asiatic Monroe Doctrine.

ROOSEVELT II AND HIS FRIENDS

On January 30, 1933, only a few days after Roosevelt's inauguration, Adolf Hitler had come into power. Very early Roosevelt became inwardly opposed to Hitler; and in the same degree in which the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Germany progressed, while his own measures of a similar nature in America remained without success, so President Roosevelt's hostility grew. He was fully aware of the fact that England and France alone were not able to keep down rising Germany, and that the main thing to be striven for was a two-front war—in other words, the participation of the Soviet Union—against Germany.

The well-known journalist Walter Duranty later told us in Moscow that in July 1932 he had had lunch with Roosevelt, who was then still Governor of the State of New York. Roosevelt had al-
ready shown an unusual amount of interest in the Soviet Union and had labeled as "nonsense" the prejudice against the USSR shown by the then Republican Government. The capitalist Roosevelt considered the Russia of the Bolsheviks more attractive than the Germany of Hitler, just as Woodrow Wilson had tried his hardest to win over the Bolsheviks as allies against the Germany of Wilhelm II. In this respect Roosevelt agreed with a large number of American intellectual and Jewish circles. Many years before the recognition, Moscow was already teeming with American tourists, who were led around by the Intourist organization and influenced by figures and catchwords. Many of them remained to become better acquainted with the land of their dreams. The editorial rooms of the Moscow Daily News, whose editor-in-chief was at that time Borodin, known for his activities in China, always housed a number of Americans who earned the money needed for a lengthy stay in Moscow by taking on jobs as translators or reporters. On their return to America they would write books and make lecture tours, as, for instance, Anna Louisa Strong, who had been converted to communism by Borodin in China. There were many links especially between Jewish circles in the Soviet Union and in America, and Americans of Jewish descent usually felt much more quickly at home in Moscow than others.

HORSE TRADE

Walter Duranty, who accompanied Litvinov to Washington in 1933, later had the following to say:

Before leaving Berlin Litvinov had said to the American newspaper men there that as far as he was concerned all outstanding points between the USA and the USSR could be settled in half an hour. This was an incautious and undiplomatic remark, not merely because it happened to be true, but because Washington had staged a somewhat elaborate comedy, the prime purpose of which, I imagine, was to convince the American public that a patriotic and tenacious Administration would fight to the last ditch to extract from the Bolsheviks the uttermost farthing of concession. Within certain limits, as I well knew, Litvinov would have allowed the Americans to "write their own ticket" after the half-hour's discussion to which he referred in Berlin. As it was, the agreement reached after ten days of apparently laborious negotiations, did not overstep those limits anywhere save in one case, for which there existed a precedent.

I "covered" the story of the negotiations from the only angle which seemed possible to me, that is as a "horse trade," which was prolonged somewhat unduly, I hinted, by artful fencing between two shrewd dealers, but whose result was more or less a foregone conclusion.

In other words, Duranty believed that the whole game was "fixed". In order not to endanger the recognition, Roosevelt and Litvinov left the question of debts aside for the time being. But they concluded a number of agreements which, among other things, provided for non-interference in the domestic affairs of the other country.

These were the events which preceded Bullitt's arrival in Moscow.

THE HOUSE WITH THE CORINTHIAN COLUMNS

Where a few years before there had been Mokhovaya Street, known to all intellectually-minded visitors to Moscow by its numerous bookshops, the Soviets had built a magnificent avenue. Anyone walking along it in 1933 was struck by a new building which differed in style from other new erections in Moscow. While the latter were modernistic, this one showed a tendency toward classicism. Its façade was divided up by eight demi-columns with huge Corinthian capitals, copied exactly from a Florentine design. This building, resembling a western European bank more than the latest product of Bolshevist architecture, had been completed shortly before and was to serve as a modern apartment house for thirty of the most important "specialists," i.e., the new Soviet aristocracy. But while the thirty specialists were still looking forward to moving into this luxurious dwelling, the problem arose of housing the American Embassy and its staff. As in the days before the Great War St. Petersburg had been the capital of the Russian Empire, there had never been an American Embassy building in Moscow which could have been made use of now. In their delight over the recognition, the Soviets gave the Americans the specialists' house.
HEATING AND EATING

The house with the Corinthian columns became the center of American life in the Soviet Union. A stream of visitors from the USA—journalists, businessmen, and tourists—passed through its doors every day to have its visas checked in its offices or to be served cocktails in its apartments. Without number are the stories of what happened in this house, stories which will provide future memoirs with human interest.

There was, for example, the marvel of its heating system. In the whole of the Soviet Union this was the only modern apartment house supplied with running hot and cold water. The day after the Americans moved in, the heating worked perfectly. But one fine day there was only cold water in both taps. A flood of American protests descended upon the Russian janitor. The latter passed them on, suitably reinforced, to the stokers. There was great excitement, for the technical prestige of the Soviet Union in the capitalist world was at stake. The stokers developed a notable activity, and the tenants were promised hot water within half an hour. The promise was kept: within half an hour both taps produced boiling hot water, and the tenants had to wash with soda water.

Some unexpected guests from the States had been asked to have lunch with one of the American diplomats at his flat. The food problem was always a difficult one, especially when there was a hurry, so the hostess told the Russian cook to prepare a meal from her stock of canned goods. At first everything went perfectly. But then a dish was served which was unfamiliar to the hostess: a kind of large white dumplings in a cream sauce. Everyone took some. But, try as they would, they could not get at the dumplings either with their forks or with their knives. Suddenly the hostess gave a little scream: she had recognized the dumplings to be tennis balls, of which she had several tins in the storeroom. The cook admitted that even after long cooking the dumplings had seemed tough to her; but she had not been very surprised, for she had already had to serve the most curious things out of tins to her American employers.

UNSETTLED DEBTS

Troubles of this kind were by no means the only thorns in the lives of the American diplomats. This they were to find out—especially Bullitt himself—as soon as their work started in earnest. Aside from countless minor problems, two main sources of conflict gradually outlined themselves, one economic and the other political.

After more than a year of bargaining, first in Moscow and then in Washington, the United States had reduced her claim on the USSR to 150 million dollars. But the Russians wanted to pay only 100 million dollars and, moreover, only if they got a new loan from America with which they could pay this amount. Washington could not agree to this, for in April 1934 the Johnson Debt Default Act had been passed, which prohibited defaulting nations from floating new loans in the USA. On January 31, 1935, Secretary of State Cordell Hull saw himself forced to issue a declaration to the press that, as a result of the Soviet Government’s attitude, the economic negotiations had arrived at a deadlock.

This did not suit Roosevelt in his plans. His hostility toward Japan was growing more acute. Notwithstanding all predictions to the contrary, Germany was becoming sounder and stronger every month. So the negotiations with Moscow had to be continued. On July 3, 1934, a trade agreement was signed by Litvinov and Bullitt. But the debts problem was still unsettled. Therefore the Johnson Act remained effective toward the Soviet Union. The latter was forced to continue to pay in cash, i.e., to make up for its negative trade balance by gold shipments to the USA.

LITVINOV’S PROMISES . . .

Even more serious was the conflict arising in the political sphere. Unexpectedly, and for the first time since 1928, a world congress of the Communist In-
international met in the evening of July 25, 1935 (described in more detail in our article “The Red Road,” November 1942). While Litvinov, presiding over the League of Nations meeting in Geneva, represented the Soviet Union with a jovial smile and in a bourgeois black suit, the true face of Bolshevism was revealed in the sessions of the “general staff of the World Revolution” in Moscow. American Communists also took part in these sessions and distinguished themselves by serious attacks on the domestic affairs in the United States.

On November 16, 1933, as a condition for recognition by the USA, Litvinov had, in the name of the Soviet Government, given a written promise:

to permit in its territory neither the formation nor the presence of any organization or group and to prevent the activity of any organization or group of or representatives and functionaries of any organization or group which has as its goal the overthrow or the preparations for an overthrow or the violent change of the political or social order of the United States or any of its parts, territories, or possessions. (Translation from the Russian text.)

Awful as the style of this sentence is, the legal experts of the State Department rubbed their hands in satisfaction over it. For its wording seemed to them to leave not even the smallest loophole for further revolutionary activities on the part of the Soviet Union in the USA. Consequently, the Comintern Congress came like a bucket of cold water. The Americans felt themselves to have been grossly betrayed in their confidence, and on August 25 Ambassador Bullitt handed to the Foreign Commissariat an extraordinarily sharp note of protest.

... AND THEIR MEANING

It is worth while going into the particulars of this incident, for it shows the American attitude as well as the Soviet tactics and is typical of thousands of similar cases.

Two days after the receipt of the American protest, the Vice Foreign Commissar sent the following reply:

I deem it necessary to point out with all possible emphasis that the government of the Soviet Union has always treated all obligations undertaken by it with the greatest possible respect, and this applies, of course, also to the reciprocal undertaking of noninterference in domestic affairs provided for in the exchange of notes of November 16, 1933, and dealt with in detail in the negotiations between President Roosevelt and Foreign Commissar Litvinov. Your note of August 25 contains no facts whatever which represent a violation of the undertaking on the part of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, it is doubtless nothing new to the government of the United States that the government of the Soviet Union can undertake no obligations with regard to the Communist International and has, moreover, not undertaken them. For this reason the claim that the government of the Soviet Union had violated the undertakings contained in the note of November 16, 1933, cannot be deduced from the obligations undertaken by the partners to these negotiations. I cannot, therefore, accept your protest and am forced to reject it.

Thus the Foreign Commissariat had slipped through even the fine net of the declaration of November 16, 1933. The latter had, indeed, not contained a single word about the Comintern. A meeting was called at the White House, and Cordell Hull stated publicly that a heavy blow had been dealt the structure of friendly relations between the two countries. But then nothing more happened. Roosevelt wished on no account to see a breach with Moscow; and, as was confirmed many years later (February 3, 1940) by Secretary Hull, no protests concerning Soviet interference in American domestic affairs were thereafter presented in Moscow. Washington had resigned itself to their futility.

BULLITT’S FAREWELL

One positive result had been forthcoming from this conflict: in the eyes of the world, Moscow’s idea of noninterference had become perfectly clear. After this exchange of notes, even the most naïve observer could no longer separate the Soviet Union from the Comintern. Distrust in the fine phrases of the Soviet Government had increased considerably, and in 1939 this fact was to have repercussions of world-wide significance in Poland’s attitude toward the Soviet Union.

For this development, too, there is an interesting parallel to be found in the past, when conflicts on questions of principle arose between the Tsarist Government and the American Republic. At that time the Russian authorities
were conducting an anti-Jewish policy and passed laws against the entry into Russia of Americans of Jewish origin. In doing this they pointed to the fact that America was also discriminating against certain nationalities, as, for instance, Asiatics, in her immigration policy. The Jews of America mobilized American public opinion against this with such success that in 1911 the House of Representatives demanded the abrogation of the Trade Agreement with Russia and achieved this by 301 votes to 1.

The conflict of 1935 had no such drastic results. Roosevelt and the Jews in his environment as well as those in the Foreign Commissariat in Moscow saw to it that no break occurred. But the conflict was not entirely without consequences. Ambassador Bullitt left Moscow soon after.

Before he went he invited me for lunch. He let me know that he wished to discuss my trip to Soviet Central Asia and the Jewish problem with me. We were alone, and I found the Ambassador a changed man. I cannot remember ever having heard a foreign diplomat speak so bitterly or so negatively about the Soviet Union as Mr. Bullitt. One of the things that had personally embittered him was that his best Russian friend, whom he had known for years in America, had been arrested. When I told him about the industrial possibilities of Kasakhstan he would not believe me. He borrowed a book which I had brought along containing details and statistics on the participation of Jews in the various Party, state, and other organizations of the Soviet Union from the beginning of the Revolution up to 1935. He saw in it a confirmation of his own impression of the great role of the Jews. The book evidently interested him very much, for I never got it back.

HOLLYWOOD IN MOSCOW

A film was recently produced in Hollywood dealing with the mission of Ambassador Joseph E. Davies, who did not arrive until one year after Bullitt's departure as his successor in Moscow. Aside from the fact that Walter Houston plays the part of Davies, we know nothing about this movie. But we feel sure that this mission will in times to come supply much effective material to comedy writers. With Mr. and Mrs. Davies, two of the most typical representatives of American high finance moved into the capital of the proletarian world revolution.

Mrs. Davies, the former Marjorie Post Close Hutton, was, at the time when her husband was sent to Moscow, one of the nineteen American women possessing fortunes of more than 25 million US dollars; for she is not only a member of the fabulously wealthy Hutton family but is also the Postum Queen (Postum is one of the best-known health beverages in America). At the Davies wedding, the house was decorated with 5,000 chrysanthemums costing $6,000 that had been dyed blush pink (at a cost of $2,000) to match the icing on the 300-pound wedding cake. When the couple moved to Moscow they took along several carloads of specially prepared foods, refrigerators, and several hundred quarts of frozen cream; and when they undertook a trip through the USSR in the summer of 1937, they had two tons of frozen foods sent from America for provisions on the way. This was the couple who represented the United States at the capital of a people the overwhelming majority of which lived in abject poverty and constant fear.

HOW AMBASSADORS ARE MADE

When Davies departed on June 5, 1938, for his new ambassadorial post in Brussels, fourteen months were to pass before the new Ambassador, Laurence A. Steinhardt, arrived in Moscow with wife, daughter, and a little black Scottie called Bipso, on August 8, 1939. Mr. Steinhardt, himself Jewish, had been for thirteen years a member of the extremely rich Jewish law firm of Guggenheim, Untermyar & Marshall in New York. In this capacity he had made so many business trips that on his journey to Moscow he crossed the Atlantic for the seventy-
third time. Before his appointment to Moscow he had been Minister in Sweden and Peru.

It is a well-known fact that ambassadorial posts in the USA are a part of the “spoils system.” According to the motto, “To the victor belong the spoils,” whichever party happens to be in power may occupy all important political posts in the country with its supporters. Many of these posts represent juicy sources of income from which fortunes can be made. The ambassadorial posts, however, at which expenditures are usually higher than the salary, frequently go to men who, like Francis, Bullitt, Davies, and Steinhardt, have so much money anyway that they are not interested in any additional revenue. Davies and Steinhardt belong into the highest group of the Roosevelt plutocracy: Mr. and Mrs. Davies held fifth place with $26,500 in the subscription list for Roosevelt’s election funds for 1936, and Steinhardt seventeenth place with $10,000.

Men of this kind have, at the outset of their diplomatic activities, no idea of the duties of an ambassador. This is one of the reasons for the vacillation and inconstancy of American foreign policy, which depends on the whims of whoever is president and his inexperienced ambassadors.

THE EMBASSY STAFF

To a certain extent this disadvantage is made up for by the fact that the remaining personnel of an American embassy usually consists of career men. Of those in Moscow, a large number had been specially trained for Russia. To those who had believed that, after sixteen years of disrupted relations, Washington would have trouble in finding suitable men for Moscow, the excellent training of the senior officials whom the State Department dispatched to Moscow came as a surprise.

In the years after the Great War, Washington trained diplomatic specialists for four territories: Japan, China, the Near East and, after 1927, Eastern Europe. For all other territories a general diplomatic training was considered sufficient. The young men who applied for a career in Eastern Europe usually had several years of Russian studies at American universities behind them. Many of these universities possessed outstanding experts such as Professor Samuel Harper (Chicago) and Professor Robert J. Kerner (California). If the applicants were accepted as attachés, they were sent either to Berlin or Paris for a three-year course of old Slavic, two modern Slavic languages, and Eastern European history and geography. During this period they were paid their full salary as well as the costs of their studies. Only after this did their service in Eastern Europe begin, those destined for the Soviet Union being sent first to Riga. From the early twenties up to the recognition, Riga had been America’s window into the Soviet Union. At the US legation in Riga there was a special Russian department employing two or three senior officials and five or six clerks.

The young American diplomats who, after so long and careful a training, moved into the house with the Corinthian columns in Moscow consequently possessed a knowledge of Russia far superior to that of the average foreign diplomat. Some of them, like my friend George Kennan, represented more the scholarly than the diplomatic type. Kennan spoke excellent Russian and had steeped himself so intensively in everything Russian that he knew more about Russian history and literature—he was an expert on Chekhov—that most of the Soviet officials he came into contact with. An equally good knowledge of the country was displayed by his colleagues Loy Henderson and Charles E. Bohlen.

LUCKY UMANSKY

The Soviets made fewer changes in Washington. Troyanovský was not recalled until December 10, 1938, when he was replaced by his counsellor. In this way Constantin Umansky became one of the youngest ambassadors. He owed his career to his Jewish cleverness and to the fact that he was a protégé of
Litvinov's. In Moscow he had been one of the best-known Soviet officials among the foreigners, for he had been for many years the head of the press department of the Foreign Commissariat, which made him the chief censor for the foreign journalists. In this capacity he was constantly at odds with the American correspondents, since it was their job to unearth scoops, while it was Umansky's task to prevent any but the Soviet version of all events from being disseminated abroad. The non-American foreign journalists always got along better with Umansky, as the emphasis of their work was on articles, and only telegraphic news was subject to censorship, articles sent by mail not being affected.

Later too, in America, Umansky did not make himself very popular, as can be seen from the following extract from an article published on November 13, 1939, by the North American Newspaper Alliance Inc. and printed in a large number of dailies:

Ambassador Umansky is a small, sleek, natty man with an amazingly insinuating manner and such a display of gold teeth that his ready smile seems almost ostentatious. No one excels him in the peculiar Communist trick of intellectual acrobatics, by which realism and idealism are exquisitely blended, and the most ardent American liberals are made to feel that a blood purge is a small thing between friends . . . As press censor at the Soviet Foreign Office he had been cordially detested by every Moscow correspondent.

In his career Umansky was favored by luck. While many of his colleagues and friends were liquidated around him in Stalin's purges—among them his closest collaborator, the assistant censor Mironov—his own star rose higher and higher. Indeed, even when, a few months after his appointment to the post of Ambassador, his protector Litvinov fell into disgrace as a prelude to the German-Soviet pact, Umansky's position was not changed in the least. Of course, he too was closely watched. The man entrusted with this task was supposed to have been Dmitry Chuvakhin who, though speaking hardly anything but Russian and a few Central Asiatic dialects, became Umansky's counsellor.

**DISAPPOINTED AMERICANS**

Seen as a whole, the relations between Washington and Moscow throughout these years left much to be desired. There were a few events of positive propagandistic value, as, for instance, the flight of a Soviet plane from the USSR across the North Pole to Vancouver (June 18, 1937); Roosevelt's war-mongering "quarantine" speech (October 8, 1937), which was received in Moscow with great satisfaction; and the ostentatious parties given by the Davies's. But they were outweighed by many unfavorable circumstances. Economic relations did not come up to expectations. The number of American technical specialists working in the Soviet Union was constantly diminishing.

More than anything else it was Stalin's purges and trials which during the years 1936-38 greatly compromised the Bolshevik regime even in the eyes of many of its American friends. The fact that Stalin barbarically destroyed almost all the original leaders of the Soviet state and, in addition, hundreds of thousands of people who had till then been considered good Bolsheviks—not to mention
countless other people—cost him the sympathy of all Americans with the exception of a small group of Communists who were prepared to follow him through thick and thin. The newspapers of America were at that time filled with articles and open letters in which Americans, who had hitherto been enthusiastic supporters of the Soviet Union, publicly dissociated themselves from the Bolsheviks.

But there was one man who did not let himself be swayed by this development: Roosevelt. Undaunted, he kept his eyes on his goal of uniting all possible forces, including the Soviet Union, against the Germany and Nippon he hated so much. He worked with a long view. He often put up with insolent treatment on the part of Moscow and refused to let himself be influenced by the preponderantly anti-Soviet feelings of his countrymen. In 1938, at a time when all America was outraged at the Bolshevik terror in the Soviet Union, Roosevelt was the only head of a nation to send a cordial telegram of congratulation to Kalinin on the occasion of the twenty-first anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.

NAME-CALLING

Even Roosevelt’s patience seemed at an end when the most unexpected news of the year 1939 became known: the pact between Berlin and Moscow. Roosevelt must have considered this pact as one of the most serious political blows in his entire career. And as he had been the main champion of collaboration with Moscow and had exposed himself to violent opposition in the USA on that account, he was forced now to be particularly loud in his attacks on the Soviet Union. The next two years offered plenty of opportunity for this.

The Soviet occupation of the eastern parts of Poland and the incorporation of the Baltic states, both in conjunction with brutal terror against the population of these areas, as well as the City of Flint incident at the end of October 1939, roused a storm of indignation in the USA. Next to Germany, the Soviet Union and especially Stalin himself were at that time the main objects of attack of American cartoonists.

In Washington, Roosevelt had done everything in his power to bring America one step nearer to war. He had called a special session of Congress to alter the neutrality law, which prohibited the export of arms to belligerent nations, and to introduce “cash and carry.” Immediately before the decisive vote in the House of Representatives, Molotov made a speech in the Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1939, in which he called Roosevelt a meddler in international affairs and protested against the lifting of the arms embargo. He said:

It can scarcely be doubted that the effect of this decision [to lift the arms embargo] will not be to weaken war and hasten its termination but, on the contrary, to intensify, aggravate, and protract it. Of course, this decision may insure big profits for American war industries, but, one asks, can this serve as any justification for lifting the embargo on the export of arms from America? Clearly, it cannot.

This interference on the part of Molotov in the discussions of the American Congress caused great indignation there. The arms embargo was lifted, and Congress demanded the recall of Ambassador
Steinhardt. Of course, Roosevelt had no intention of doing this. He publicly censured Molotov for his "bad manners," which was gleefully lauded by the Americans as a slap in Molotov's face. The New York Times called Roosevelt's action "apparently without precedent in modern United States diplomacy," but in actual fact it meant nothing.

THE CRISIS AT ITS HEIGHT

The peak of tension came four weeks later when on November 30 the Red Army invaded Finland and bombed Helsinki. The Finnish-Soviet War represented the most serious strain ever placed on American-Soviet relations. As early as December 2, Roosevelt issued a public statement:

The American Government and the American people have for some time pursued a policy of whole-heartedly condemning the unprovoked bombing and machine-gunning of civilian populations from the air. This government hopes, to the end that such unprovoked bombing shall not be given material encouragement in the light of recent recurrence of such acts, that American manufacturers and exporters of airplanes, aeronautical equipment, and materials essential to airplane manufacture will bear this fact in mind before negotiating contracts for the export of these articles to nations obviously guilty of such unprovoked bombing.

This so-called moral embargo was applied to a number of war-essential goods and raw materials such as tin. As time went on, the list of these goods grew, because the Soviet Union always seemed to find ways of circumventing the embargo. Thus, for instance, the embargo was extended to pewter, babbitt, and solder in April 1940 because the Soviet Union was buying large quantities of these materials in order to extract the tin contained in them. At the same time, the Finns were granted credits by the US-Government-controlled Export-Import Bank and Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Later they received arms, planes, and other war material. America's public opinion was unanimously on the side of Finland. The Communists hardly dared utter a word. Many leftist intellectuals with Soviet sympathies turned vociferously against Stalin. "The USSR has joined the forces of international anarchy and criminality," wrote Professor F. L. Schuman, one of the most outspoken anti-Fascists, on December 7, 1939, in The New York Times.

But however much the foreign-political attitude of the Soviet Union hindered Roosevelt in the prosecution of his policy toward Russia in the eyes of his countrymen, we feel sure that a future opening of the archives will reveal that even during this time Roosevelt did not lose sight of his real goal, that of winning over the Soviet Union for the fight against Germany. He probably consoled himself with the thought that the differences between Hitler and Stalin which had been bridged by the pact of August 1939 continued to exist and would one day lead to an open break between the two. In January 1941 he lifted the moral embargo.

"A GIFT FROM GOD"

If Roosevelt were to name the five happiest days of his life, I venture to predict that he would include June 22, 1941. When he learned that Germany and the USSR were at war, his thoughts were probably similar to those which his friend, Joseph F. Davies, put into the words: "This is truly a gift from God." What Roosevelt had been working for patiently since he had entered the White House, the aim for which he had suffered much criticism at home and many annoyances abroad—the inclusion of the
USSR in the line-up against Germany had finally materialized.

Two days later, the President pledged all possible aid to the Soviet Union and as a first step freed 40 million US dollars in frozen Russian credits. Yet he was still cautious and refrained from giving any loans. His reserve was partly due to his regard for the Americans' old hostility toward the USSR and partly to the fact that during those summer weeks of 1941 the German armies were winning huge victories and seemed on the way to a swift termination of the war. If the USSR could not hold out, there was no point in giving it large loans.

As long as it did not cost him anything, Roosevelt was willing to go to any lengths to show his sympathy for the USSR. There was, for example, the Neutrality Act in its revised cash-and-carry form. Under this act the President must issue a proclamation as soon as he or Congress "shall find there exists a state of war between foreign states." In this proclamation he must name the belligerents and prohibit American ships from carrying arms to their ports. If ever there existed a state of war between two states, it was between Germany and the USSR after June 22. Yet on June 25 the President declared through Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles that he did not intend to issue a neutrality proclamation; this meant that US ships were to be allowed to carry arms to Vladivostok and Siberia.

PLENTY OF NICE WORDS

Next Roosevelt sent one of his closest friends, Harry Hopkins, head of the Lend-Lease Administration, as his personal representative to Stalin. On July 30 Harry Hopkins, according to his own words, gave to Stalin the highly unneutral message "that the United States considers those who fight against Hitler to be of the right party in the present conflict and that we intend to render assistance to this party." While Hopkins was negotiating in Moscow, Ambassador Umansky and Lieut. General P. I. Golikov, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red Army and head of the Soviet Purchasing Mission in the USA, found a warm reception at the White House.

During their Atlantic meeting in the middle of August, Roosevelt and Churchill sent a joint letter to Stalin (reprinted in The XXth Century of October 1941, pp.77-78) which was full of encouraging but empty words. Again a few weeks later W. A. Harriman—close adviser of the President and US Lend-Lease expeditor in London—went with Lord Beaverbrook to Moscow. His party included Rear Admiral William Harrison Standley (USN ret.) and Ambassador Umansky, who had been called home. Harriman was carrying a message from the President to Stalin. The contents of the message were ascertained by Germany and published by DNB on October 8 during Harriman's stay in Moscow. It promised: "We are going to find ways and means of procuring the necessary materials and equipment to crush Hitler on every front, including that of the Soviet Union," and ended: "I assure you of my utmost determination to render the necessary material assistance."

MARK SULLIVAN PROPHESIES

In addition, Harriman had been asked by Roosevelt to take up the question of religious freedom in the USSR, as Roosevelt disclosed on October 3, 1941. Roosevelt was anxious to remove some of the strongest objections felt by Americans toward the USSR, the two biggest being the suppression of Christianity by Stalin and the existence of the Third International. Mark Sullivan, one of America's best-known writers, commented in the New York Herald-Tribune that Harriman had come to Stalin with the Bible in one hand and billions of dollars in the other. Sullivan expressed his confidence that Stalin would take the hint and replace the famous communist slogan "Religion is opium for the people" with the new one "Religion is a stimulant for the dictator who finds himself in trouble" and that soon he would be singing "Onward, Christian soldiers!" Some of the events
Roosevelt’s Ambassadors to Stalin

William C. Bullitt, first US Ambassador to the USSR. Son of one of Philadelphia’s first families, he is a millionaire whose fortune came from coal. A Democrat, he was employed in the State Department under the Democratic Administration of Woodrow Wilson, was out of office during the following years of Republican rule until the victory of the Democrats under Roosevelt brought him the ambassadorial post in Moscow.

Laurence A. Steinhardt, US Ambassador to the USSR from 1939 to 1942, sitting in the American Embassy in Moscow with plenty of fresh air due to a German bombing attack.
Harry Hopkins, one of Roosevelt's most intimate friends, during his visit to Moscow in July 1941. He is seen in the company of Sir Stafford Cripps, at that time British Ambassador to Moscow, and Cripps' dog, Joe. Cripps is said to have named his dog after Joseph Djugashvili-Stalin. American journalists who prefer not to mention Stalin's name in public usually refer to him as "Uncle Joe," just as they call the dreaded members of the GPU the "YMCA boys."

Links between Washington and Moscow

Assistant Foreign Commissar M. M. Litvinov, best known of the Soviet diplomats. During his career he has twice been demoted. In 1939 he lost his job as Foreign Commissar to make way for the German-Soviet agreement, and in 1943 he was recalled from his ambassadorial post in Washington. He was born with the name of Moses Finkelstein.

Constantin Umansky made his career as Litvinov's protege. His lucky star has never failed him yet. Even after his recall from Washington in 1943 he was not purged, as were many recalled Soviet diplomats before. Instead he was made Ambassador to Mexico, in which capacity he is allegedly in charge of all Soviet envoys in the New World.

W. A. Harriman, outstanding American capitalist, legatee of a great railway fortune, one of the leading stockholders of Time Inc., No. 30 on the list of contributors to Roosevelt's election fund of 1936, for some time Lend-Lease expeditor in the British capital and, since October 1, 1943, replacing Rear Admiral William Harrison Standley, Roosevelt's Ambassador to Moscow.
which have taken place in the USSR during the last few months have proved that Sullivan made a remarkably correct forecast.

Yet while many gestures of friendship were made from Washington to Moscow, the actual assistance rendered was negligible. The US Treasury still refused to grant any long-term loans. When on August 15 Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau advanced 10 million US dollars to the Soviets, these had to be repaid in gold within ninety days. So as to take from this transaction any character of a loan, Morgenthau even went so far as to declare: "This is not a loan but a purchase of gold," a fine example of hairsplitting.

ENTER THE SECOND FRONT

A change in attitude came early in November. First, it became clear that Germany would not be able to finish the war during that year; a protracted war was ahead. It appeared likely that the Red Army would be able to remain in the field for a long time to come and that its willingness and ability to fight would depend to a considerable extent on aid from America, for which the Soviets were unable to pay in cash. Secondly, Stalin's dissatisfaction with the absence of any real aid from Great Britain and America became obvious. The recall of Ambassador Umansky for his inability to secure it had been one of the first indications. But that was nothing compared to Stalin's speech of November 6. Here for the first time Stalin brought an issue into the open which has remained one of the paramount political problems of this war and the chief source of friction between the Allies—the Second Front. Stalin said:

What are the reasons for the temporary military misfortunes of the Red Army? One of the reasons is the absence of a Second Front in Europe against the German-Fascist armies. The truth is that at present on the Continent of Europe there are no armies of Great Britain or the United States which could fight against the German-Fascist armies. Therefore, the Germans are not compelled to divide their forces and to carry on a war on two fronts in the west and east. This means that the Germans, considering their front in the west to be safe, are able to move all their armies and the armies of their allies in Europe against our land.

In this speech Stalin asked for the opening of the Second Front "in the immediate future." On the same day Litvinov, Moscow's most experienced diplomat, was appointed Ambassador to Washington, doubtless with orders to urge the earliest possible establishment of a Second Front and to bring about effective deliveries of supplies. By a whim of fate, Litvinov was to present his credentials to Roosevelt at the very moment at which, following upon Pearl Harbor, US Congress was voting war against Japan.

ROOSEVELT FINALLY ACTS

The Allies have never been able to free themselves from the nightmare of a German-Soviet reconciliation. Hence President Roosevelt acted very quickly. On November 7, at a White House Conference, he handed a letter to Edward R. Stettinius, then Lend-Lease administrator, in which he wrote:

I have today found that the defense of the Soviet Union is vital to the defense of the United States. I therefore authorize you to take immediate action to transfer defense supplies to the Soviet Union under the Lease-Lend Act.

It became known on the same day that the amount to be loaned to the USSR was one billion US dollars which was to be returned in the period between the fifth and tenth years after the payment. On June 11, 1942, a more detailed master Lend-Lease agreement was signed in Washington by Hull and Litvinov, which provided for continuance of aid to the USSR and, moreover, for mutual collaboration in establishing postwar economic relations. Finally, early in October, Sumner Welles, Litvinov, and a member of the British Embassy in Washington, signed a protocol in Washington covering the delivery of arms and war material to the USSR by the USA and Great Britain. The value of actual deliveries has never been announced. However, the Soviets have on many occasions indicated that it is far below their expectations.
The change in the person of the Soviet Ambassador was followed by a change on the American side. Ambassador Steinhardt was recalled on January 8, 1942; and on February 9, 1942, the new Ambassador, Rear Admiral W. H. Standley, who had been with Harriman to Moscow, was appointed. At the time of his appointment the Rear Admiral was already seventy years old and more of a sailor than a diplomat.

**MANY VISITS—NO ALLIANCE**

The most important contact between the two governments was the visit of the Soviet Union’s Number Two, Foreign Commissar V. Molotov, to Washington from May 29 to June 4, 1942, where he stayed as a guest of the President at the White House. On his way to Washington, Molotov had stopped over in London to sign an Anglo-Soviet treaty providing for mutual military assistance for a duration of twenty years, that is, even after the conclusion of the present war. It was expected that this treaty would be followed by a similar arrangement between the USSR and the USA. This, however, was not the case. Political circles in London expressed the view that, out of consideration for American public opinion, Roosevelt did not feel that he could grant Stalin’s vast territorial desires in an open treaty. He probably reassured Molotov orally—or possibly in a secret agreement—as to his sympathy toward Stalin’s plans in Eastern Europe. But to this day the two countries are not bound by any alliance.

During the next few months there were three visits to the USSR of high American representatives. On August 4, 1942, Major General Fullett Bradley of the US Army Air Force arrived in the USSR. He was followed shortly after by W. A. Harriman, accompanying Prime Minister Churchill, and, in September, by Wendell Willkie. All three bore personal messages from Roosevelt to Stalin. Simultaneously, there was a constant stream of prominent Bolsheviks going to America and of more Americans going to the USSR. This frequent exchange of visits was not a proof of cordial relations but rather a sign that many problems had constantly to be discussed between the two powers. Eliminating minor issues, the three most important problems were: (1) and (2) two wishes of the USA—in Europe and in East Asia, and (3) a serious complaint on the part of the USSR.

**AMERICAN DESIRES**

(1) There is much indirect evidence that Roosevelt, in his blind hatred for Germany and his desire to keep the Soviets in the war against Germany at the cheapest possible price for himself, has promised Stalin a free hand in Eastern and Central—if not in the whole of Continental—Europe. For, after all, what does Europe mean to a man like the American President? Yet, for purposes of camouflage, Roosevelt is anxious to create the impression that, in the case of an Allied victory, the Eastern European states will be restored to their former independence. The President desires that for the time being the Bolsheviks say and do as little as possible to shatter these illusions. Hence he was much annoyed by the conflict between the Polish refugee government and the Soviets, which reached a climax when, on April 11, 1943, the discovery of the mass murder of thousands of Polish officers in the forest of Katyn was made public by the Germans, thereby leading to a complete break between the Sikorski government and Moscow. It was probably in this connection that, in May 1943, Roosevelt sent Joseph E. Davies to Stalin with a personal message in a sealed envelope, the contents of which were allegedly not even known to Davies himself. Subsequent indiscretions make it appear probable that this letter included two requests to Stalin: to be more careful in discussing postwar plans in Eastern Europe, and to disband the Third International—both in order to facilitate the work of the American propaganda machine. If these were Roosevelt’s requests, Stalin has fulfilled one of them promptly. Davies arrived in Moscow on May 19. On May 22 the proposal for dissolving the Comintern was published.
It was different as regards the other question. Stalin's conflict with the Polish refugee government continues in spite of Sikorski's death, and that with the Yugoslavian one has even increased. Stalin has made no bones about the fact that, at least in Eastern Europe, there is room for only one conception: his own.

(2) The United States has so far found it impossible to attack Japan from the north. In almost two years since the start of the war, she has achieved nothing in the North Pacific beyond the recapture of Attu and Kiska. In order to reach Japan from the American air bases on the Aleutians, an immense distance—notorious for its fogs—has to be covered by American planes. Hence Roosevelt would like very much to obtain bases for American planes—and perhaps even for ships—in Kamchatka and in the Soviet Maritime Province. He thinks that, if Stalin expects him to open a Second Front against Germany, Stalin should help America by opening a Second Front against Japan. But so far Roosevelt has found no response. Japan and the USSR are adhering strictly to their Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941, and Stalin, his hands full with his fight against Germany, is happy that his Asiatic frontier has remained in peace.

WHERE IS THE SECOND FRONT?

(3) The problem of the Second Front stands out as the chief issue. Since Stalin stated it for the first time on November 6, 1941, no day has passed on which the Soviet Union has not reminded its allies in one way or the other of the urgent need for a Second Front. In particular, the two Soviet Ambassadors in Washington and London, Litvinov and Maisky, have been voicing this demand on innumerable occasions.

The hopes of the Russian people were raised high when on June 12, 1942, after Molotov's visit to Washington, the White House announced: 'The two governments arrived at a full understanding with regard to the creation of a Second Front in Europe in 1942.' All through their defeats and retreats in the summer and autumn of 1942, the Bolsheviks consoled themselves with the thought that a Second Front was bound to come at any moment. But as week after week passed without anything happening, the demands for the Second Front increased in vehemence. On July 22, 1942, Litvinov called on Roosevelt in this connection. When Harriman was in Moscow in August, Stalin put the same request before him and Churchill. And on August 12, Ambassador Standley told foreign correspond-
ents in Moscow: "I am aware of the existence of some disappointment among the civilian population that a Second Front has not yet been opened." But all that Stalin got was the attack on Dieppe on August 18 which ended after a few hours as a complete failure. And as the German armies were rolling toward the Caspian Sea, the discussion over the Second Front increased in bitterness.

STALIN RE-ENTERS THE DISCUSSION

The excitement reached a new peak when, on October 4, 1942, Stalin wrote a letter to the American newspaper correspondent Cassidy in Moscow (reprinted in the November 1942 issue of our magazine, p. 370). In this letter Stalin said that according to Soviet opinion the establishment of the Second Front was extremely important and that Allied help for the Soviet Union had so far not been very effective. He demanded "that the Allies fulfill their obligation fully and punctually." From October 8 a Second Front song, entitled the "Song of Solidarity," was included in the English-language Soviet broadcasts.

Stalin was still more outspoken on November 6, 1942, one year after he had first launched the campaign for a Second Front. He started his speech with almost identical words as the year before, and he came to the same conclusion:

How is it to be explained that the Germans succeeded after all in this year in taking the initiative of military action and in having serious tactical successes on our front? It is to be explained by the fact that the Germans and their allies could gather all their free reserves, throw them on the Eastern Front, and establish in one direction a great superiority of forces . . . . But why could they gather all their reserves and throw them on the Eastern Front? Because the absence of a Second Front in Europe made it possible for them to carry out this operation without any risk to themselves . . . . Let us assume that a Second Front had existed in Europe as it existed in the first World War, and that this Second Front had diverted, let us say, 60 German divisions and 20 divisions of Germany's allies. What would be the situation of the German armies on our front then? It is not difficult to guess that their situation would be deplorable.

Stalin then proceeded to point out that, during the Great War, out of 220 divisions Germany had kept 85 (including her allies: 127) divisions on the Russian front. In the autumn of 1942, on the other hand, Stalin claimed that, out of 256 German divisions, 179 (including the forces of Germany's allies: 240) divisions were to be found on the Eastern Front, viz., about twice as many as in the Great War, while the British troops in North Africa faced only 4 German divisions.

DECEIVED DECEIVERS

A few days later, on November 11, one of the strangest utterances ever to have been made by a responsible statesman came from the lips of Churchill when he explained the failure of establishing a Second Front in 1942. He admitted that the Soviet Government had been given a document which made it clear that an Allied landing was to take place on the European continent in 1942. But, he added, "the communiqué which spoke of a Second Front in Europe during 1942 was meant to deceive the enemy . . . . It is perfectly justifiable to deceive one's enemy even if at the same time your own people are misled."

One can easily imagine the reaction of the Soviets to these words. Nor were they any better pleased when, on March 9, 1943, Ambassador Standley publicly protested that the Soviets were ignoring the aid which America was extending to them. The Admiral's recall became only a matter of time. It finally came about when he left Moscow on September 20 and W. A. Harriman was appointed his successor on October 1.

Neither the invasion of North Africa nor the terror raids on Europe, neither the conquest of Sicily nor the landings in Italy, were considered a Second Front by Moscow, for none of them fulfilled Stalin's definition of a Second Front, namely, that it should force Germany to withdraw 80 divisions from the Eastern Front. On the contrary, on September 16 Pravda declared that since August of this year new German divisions had arrived on the Eastern Front from the west. Just before Badoglio's surrender, the new and authoritative Soviet magazine War and Labor Class published an article which reiterated all the Soviet
arguments in favor of an immediate Second Front. It openly accused the Allies of bad faith when they point to the Atlantic Wall as preventing their landing. "The Atlantic Wall," the article said, "exists only in the imagination of those who want to believe in this fiction."

But Roosevelt knows that the Atlantic Wall is no fiction. He realizes the tremendous difficulties involved in an attack on the Atlantic coast of Europe after having seen how hard the fighting is even in Italy, where the large Anglo-American forces have so far faced only a handful of German divisions. And so he postpones the Second Front from month to month.

STALIN'S OWN WAR

A sign that, in spite of an agreement in principle, there are many difficulties on the road to concerted Allied action was the recall of three ambassadors: Maisky from London, on July 28, 1943; Litvinov from Washington, on August 21, 1943; and a few days later Bogomolov, Soviet Ambassador to the refugee governments in London. Two men, both in their thirties, whose names hardly anybody had heard before, were appointed their successors: Feodor Gusev, former envoy to Canada, to London; and Andrei Gromyko, former counsellor of the Embassy, to Washington (August 2 and 22).

But the clearest proof of Stalin's independent attitude toward his allies is the fact that, in spite of numerous invitations and hints, he has so far refused to meet Roosevelt and Churchill in a common conference. As long as the Russian people are carrying the main burden of the war he apparently sees no reason for such meetings. He is fighting his own war.

* * *

The relations between the United States and Russia/USSR have shown one curious feature ever since the birth of the American Republic up to 1941. Save for a few months of the Russian Republic in 1917 (between the abdication of the Tsar and the coming of the Bolsheviks) the two countries have represented opposites, even extremes, in the political and ideological arena. Their occasional co-operation always took place against the background of deep mutual suspicion and aversion and was only possible because it was directed against a mutual enemy—in the nineteenth century this was Great Britain. Incidentally, their antagonism toward Great Britain has remained strong enough for them to consider the progressive weakening of the British Empire a most desirable by-product of the present development.

Since 1941 the situation has radically changed. While we do not doubt that all real Americans are just as hostile toward Bolshevism today as they have ever been, Roosevelt and his friends have succeeded in the present world conflict in lining up the USA and the USSR in the same camp. It is true that in the long run it will be difficult if not impossible to preserve a common policy. Both aspire to world domination: Roosevelt through dollars, Stalin through soviets. Both wish that the other come out of the war greatly weakened, if not completely exhausted, for both want to be the unscarred spectator who will finally dictate his own terms to the world. But these divergencies have so far been overshadowed by the agreement in Moscow and Washington on one point: to destroy Germany at all costs, be it even at the expense of all Europe.