SINCE its coming into being as an independent state, the United States has, as a result of its geographical position, had three possible choices for its foreign policy: isolation, imperialism, and world co-operation. In American history, all three of these possibilities have played a role; indeed, one might say that they are latent in every American. The country's foreign policy depended on which of the three principles predominated at the time. Woodrow Wilson represented world co-operation. From 1919 to 1938, the isolationist mood dominated and was expressed, for example, by the neutrality legislation of the thirties. When under Roosevelt's influence America took an active part again in world politics, the people themselves followed hesitatingly. After Pearl Harbor, isolationism disappeared.

At first, many Americans actually regarded the war as an altruistic crusade against evil, and they enjoyed the feeling of a common cause with the United Nations. Just as at the outbreak of a war the individual cheerfully joins the ranks of his nation, so the Americans, after twenty years of isolation, were uplifted by the feeling of being part of a world community. They felt the urge to glorify their partners and enthusiastically did so. England, which they had so often regarded with distrust, now became the "tall little island" which had heroically withstood the German onslaught; even the Bolsheviks, whom they had hated for two and a half decades, turned into heroes and glorious allies. In 1917 the United States had entered the Great War under the slogans of "The War to End All Wars" and "Make the World Safe for Democracy." Twenty-five years later these slogans were not employed as such, but in principle the feeling was much the same.

But three years have passed since Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Moscow.

**IMPERIAL BRITAIN**

The Americans have discovered that, instead of the experiences of 1940 and 1941 chastening the British, the latter have remained the same egocentric imperialists America knew before. The attitude of London toward India and the Near East, in particular, has led to much tension. As long as the English were on their last legs, the Americans were prepared to disregard the cost of saving them. Today, however, the American taxpayers do not see why they should finance the further existence of the Empire without any compensation. In their eyes, for instance, the cession of British bases in the Western Hemisphere in return for American lives and goods would be no more than fair. And if Churchill said in spring: "There is not the slightest question of any cession of British territory—not the slightest," the Americans know that this was addressed to them, and they resent it.

The two publications which have done much to crystallize the American distrust of England are Wendell Willkie's *One World,*
with its accusation of British imperialism, and that much-quoted editorial in Life of October 12, 1942, which clearly expressed that which most Americans were already feeling (see Appendix).

THE SINISTER BEAR

America went to war against the idea she had formed of Germany and against the claim to European hegemony that she believed to see embodied in Germany. For some time now, she has begun to realize that, in the case of victory, she will be faced by a claim to world hegemony in the form of the Soviet Union. The illusion that Stalin’s intentions were limited and that all he wanted to do was to drive out the Germans from the Soviet Union, in order to be able to devote himself again to the welfare of his subjects, has received crushing blows. Just as England was closest to the hearts of the Americans in the days of Dunkirk, so the Soviet Union was at the peak of its popularity in the USA during the weeks of Stalingrad. Today, however, when the Red flag is waving over large parts of Eastern Europe and the Russians are making not the least provision for a halt in their advance, the old suspicion of the Red peril is rearing its head again. With consternation the Americans are looking on while Stalin, paying no heed whatever to the Atlantic Charter, and not bothering to ask anyone else’s opinion or to enter upon discussions, is steadily pursuing the path which he deems the right one and which the Americans are coming more and more to dislike.

The Americans used to claim that, in dealing with Hitler, there was only one choice: endless appeasement or force. Now they have realized that this actually applies to their relations with Stalin, and that they must either let him have his way or oppose him with force. No wonder that in America one hears more and more mention of a third world war, among others from the mouths of Henry Wallace, Wendell Willkie, Sumner Welles, William Bullitt, and Norman Thomas. The words of those who, like Karl H. von Wiegeod and Demaree Bess, have raised their voices in warning of the Soviet Union, are being paid more heed than a year or two ago. “Is it not tragicomical,” wrote the New York Mirror a few weeks ago, “to see Russia as our partner while the mouth of the Russian bear is dripping with Polish and Finnish blood and its rapacious claws are stretching from Alaska to England’s throat?” The Soviet press is indicating growing concern over the American criticism of the USSR; and Time reports the symptomatic fact that Cornell University, whose Russian Department was hitherto in the hands of professors with Communist leanings, invited the journalist William Henry Chamberlin, well known for his critical attitude toward the Soviet Union, to give lectures during the past summer term.

In December 1943 the USA and the USSR concluded an agreement according to which America would grant the Soviets a 10-billion-dollar postwar credit, chiefly in the form of industrial plants. At first the American business world hailed this plan as an important step toward combating unemployment in postwar America. But it was not long before the first doubts began to appear. Walter Bosshard, the Washington correspondent of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, reported that the American experts examining the orders planned by the Russians found that these orders went far beyond the requirements of actual reconstruction. “Not without anxiety,” wrote Bosshard, “is the question being weighed as to whether Russia, whose labor is far cheaper than American labor, may not within a comparatively short time appear as an unwelcome competitor, especially on the Asiatic markets.” Hence there was little mention in American trade journals of recent months about the 10-billion-dollar credit. First they spoke of 5, then of 3, and most recently even of only 1 billion dollars. And the time can be foreseen when the fact that a large part of the Soviet industry was destroyed by the war will fill the Americans with a feeling less of pity than of relief.

PANGS OF CONSCIENCE

The press and radio of America have during the last two years become more and more critical toward Chungking, and during 1944 the American journalists reported little that was good from Chungking. While the Chungking Government is being called undemocratic and corrupt, the reports cabled home by American journalists last summer about their prolonged stay in the Communist parts of China were filled with praise. The professorial manner in which the American short-wave radio seeks to advise Chungking every day represents a continuous interference in Chungking’s domestic affairs. The recall of General Stilwell and departure of Ambassador Gauss have openly revealed the existing conflict.
The long series of defeats suffered by the Chungking armies during the last few months is causing anxiety to the Americans, who are plagued by a guilty conscience toward China. And when we have a guilty conscience toward someone, this generally does not make him any more likeable to us. On the contrary, we look for anything to assuage our conscience and emphasize the unfavorable traits in the other in order to take comfort in the thought: he isn’t worth being treated differently.

NO SANTA CLAUS

As a heritage from the unpaid debts of the first World War, the Americans have retained a justified suspicion that they will not be paid the debts of World War II either. In the first exuberance of their war enthusiasm they gave little thought to this; nor were the amounts involved very large. Meanwhile, however, they have mounted to many billions, and the early enthusiasm has cooled off. Americans are beginning to worry whether Uncle Sam is not being played for a sucker or regarded as Santa Claus by the United Nations. In October, Congressman A. L. Miller voiced the suspicion that the 10-billion-dollars’ worth of Lend-Lease deliveries would never be paid back by the British who, by figuring every slightest British delivery or help, even in England, as “reverse Lend-Lease,” consider their debts as already more or less canceled.

When Roosevelt made his report to Congress on Lend-Lease activities in August 1943, it contained a cautious intimation that the Allies would not have to repay this debt. But Congress and the public responded so antagonistically to this that Roosevelt quickly retracted, declaring he knew nothing about the disputed paragraph and that it had probably been inserted through the negligence of a secretary.

THE EUROPEAN JUNGLE

The feeling toward Europe has also changed. When they entered the war, the Americans had figured out things very nicely: the Germans would be defeated, Europe would be liberated, and everything would be fine. Instead of which they are now beginning to realize that everything is going quite differently. In southern and central Italy there is a depressing chaos from which so far only the Bolsheviks have benefited; in the Balkans the Soviets seem to have come to stay; and France and Belgium are disrupted by internal conflicts.

The American is accustomed in his vast continent without traditions to tackle things according to the maxims of common sense. Europe is to him a jungle of traditions, ideologies, and contradictions which tire him out, annoy him, and make him long for the wide open spaces of his own continent. Add to this the American’s increasingly guilty conscience toward Europe on seeing how, with the aid of his armies and his Lend-Lease goods, Stalin is dying one piece of Europe red after another. The reaction is, as in the case of China, to run down the object of the guilty conscience: Europe is a hopeless case, say the Americans the more distasteful they find the job of “liberating” Europe. May the devil or Stalin take the Europeans, the whole lot of them! They don’t deserve any better!

EXIT WILLIKIE

The contest between the late Wendell Willkie and Thomas E. Dewey for the Republican Presidential nomination supplied an interesting barometer of the mood in America. Willkie, whom Time called “Wendell (me too) Willkie,” because he imitated Roosevelt on all essential points, had committed himself to an idealistic international co-operation in his utterances, and had adhered to this even after Roosevelt had long abandoned it. His series of articles appearing in a large number of newspapers in June 1944 culminated in the words:

Our sovereignty is not something to be hoarded, but something to be used. The United States should use its sovereignty in cooperation with other powers to create an effective international organization for the good of all. Small nations should have a say; their destiny should not be decided by the great powers. The Republican platform should state the conviction that, Mr. Churchill to the contrary, the ideologies for which we fight have not become blurred for us . . . . We are fighting a war for freedom . . . not only at home but everywhere in the world.

Dewey, on the other hand, did not commit himself to any definite foreign policy. It is true that, in order not to appear as an isolationist, he made a few statements expressing his willingness to support international co-operation. But he did this in an incomparably more cautious form than Willkie; and the foreign-policy plank of the Republican Party was purposely kept extremely vague.

When Willkie, after his ignominious defeat at the Wisconsin Primaries in April, with-
drew from the race, Time wrote (17.4.44): "Everyone suddenly realized that this was a most significant election—most important occasion since Pearl Harbor. . . . Wisconsin had clearly voted no confidence in global good will and foreign policy of generalities. They had voted against the 'crusade' kind of internationalism." And the internationally minded New York Times wrote sadly that with Willkie "the only able Republican" had withdrawn from the campaign.

Dewey's victory over Willkie was a proof of America's disillusionment over world politics; and among the millions who gave their vote to Dewey on November 7 there were many who did so because they knew that he wanted to be President of the United States and not a world messiah.

Another symptom of the change in American feeling is Roosevelt's attitude. Roosevelt has often been compared with Woodrow Wilson. But in character they are as different as can be. Wilson was a professor with his head in the clouds who failed miserably when he attempted to cling to his ideals. Roosevelt is a thoroughly accomplished politician who, for reasons of political expediency, likes to act the part of an idealist without being one. His velvet glove hides a deliberate imperialism. Just as he has turned the majority of the Central and South American states into vassals of the USA by his so-called "Good Neighbor" policy, so he would like by means of an apparently altruistic policy to make large parts of the world dependent on Washington.

Time and again, Roosevelt has shown himself to be a master of psychology. Three years ago he won the hearts of the Americans for himself and his plans by the idealistic formulations of the Atlantic Charter, in which he himself, being the shrewd realist he is, can never have believed. Today he is trying to exploit the disillusionment of the nation for his world plans. Those of his friends and collaborators who, like Henry Wallace and Sumner Welles, had committed themselves too strongly to the idea of altruistic world co-operation, were ruthlessly thrown overboard; and since 1943 the strains of the Atlantic Charter are no longer to be heard in his public utterances.

WHY "UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER"?

Symptomatic of Roosevelt's attitude is the "unconditional surrender" thesis. "Unconditional surrender is an American idea," wrote the London Observer a few months ago, "dating from the U.S. Civil War, a conflict in which one side or the other had to give in completely. Europe offers no U.S. parallel." Stalin has never agreed to this thesis and has ostentatiously chosen another path in his negotiations with Rumania and Finland. Churchill, too, has been cautious. The "unconditional surrender" thesis belongs to Roosevelt. He first formulated it in Casablanca, and he re-emphasized it in mid-August 1944.

Roosevelt has often been reproached in the Allied camp with forcing the German and Japanese nations to a fanatical resistance by this thesis, thus prolonging the war. It has been suggested that, like Wilson, he should have either persuaded part of the enemy population by means of friendly peace prospects to discontinue the war or attempted to shorten the war by a reasonable negotiated peace. These critics do not grasp the fact that in 1943 and 1944 Roosevelt was not in the least interested in shortening the war. Had peace come before the autumn of 1944, Roosevelt would have lost his main argument in the election campaign, namely, that he was irreplaceable for the victorious continuation of the war. (A poll of public opinion in July revealed that if the war were still on by November 7 Roosevelt would get 50.8 per cent and Dewey 42.2 per cent of the votes, but if the war were over Dewey 49.6 per cent and Roosevelt 40.4 per cent!) Furthermore, the longer the war lasts, the more will Germany—so bitterly hated by Roosevelt—be transformed into a pile of rubble; the more will America's allies be weakened; the greater will be the weight of America, the last great power to enter the war and the one to dispose of the greatest reserves; the more extensive will be the destruction of large parts of Europe and Asia, whose reconstruction is to offer America unlimited markets and a far-reaching control of these regions.

Did not Roosevelt's economic adviser, the financier Bernard Baruch, recently give as a reason for his optimism about American postwar economics the fact that the United States could participate after the war in the reconstruction of half the world? And when the Wall Street Journal writes: "American building experts anticipate large quantities of American machinery such as dredgers, demolition machines, cranes, etc., having to be supplied to the reconstruction areas. American architects, construction engineers,
and other firms connected in one way or another with reconstruction will open branches in the areas devastated by the war or delegate their representatives," and utters a warning against "overhasty reconstruction of the bombed cities according to obsolete plans," does that not sound as if this organ of American high finance were afraid that Europe might possibly do its own reconstructing without profits to America?

FEELINGS TOWARD OTHER NATIONS

To the same extent to which the international idealism is vanishing among the Americans, their realistic imperialism is moving into the foreground.

(1) For the last year or so, the neutrals have not found much sympathy in America. The very conception of neutrality no longer fits into America's present ideology, as is shown in another article in this issue.

(2) The European members of the United Nations are not very highly thought of. The Americans are clever enough to know that refugee governments or governments à la Bonomi, De Gaulle, Pierlot, are unstable institutions which demand a lot but have little to offer or say. France, whether represented by Pétain or by De Gaulle, has been treated by America emphatically as a nonequal. In any case, there is the danger that the United States treats those states not belonging to the small number of great powers in the same way as she has been accustomed for decades to treat Nicaragua and other Central American republics.

(3) The South American states have proved often enough that they have only joined the United Nations with reluctance and are not interested in the war.

So all that remains is the Big Four. And it is to them that the planned postwar organization applies. The League of Nations has had a poor press in the USA. Not only has it been discredited by the abuse of its strength in the twenties and the obvious display of its weakness during the thirties. In an America which rejects even the idea of neutrality there can be no place for an organ like the League of Nations which, at least in its phraseology, was comparatively neutral and democratic.

WORLD ORGANIZATION

The conception formed in America of the organization of the world differs essentially from the ideals of the League of Nations.

Since State Secretary Hull's declaration on March 21, 1944, so much has been said and written about this organization, and the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (August 21 to October 7, 1944) has supplied so much additional material, that it is possible to form a fairly clear idea of the American plans. (See Appendix for a condensation of the Dumbarton Oaks plan.)

According to these, the leadership in the postwar period is to be in the hands of the Big Four: the USA, the USSR, Great Britain, and China, to which France may later be added as the fifth power. We see that the idea of all states being equally subjected to the world organization has disappeared, as has the idea of an independent international police force superior even to the great powers, ideas propagated in the early stages of the war and championed by Willkie up to his death. The role of the General Assembly is limited to an advisory function.

The world organization proposed by the Dumbarton Oaks Conference could easily be transformed into a dictatorship of the four powers, who on the plea of preserving peace could enforce their will on weaker nations," said the US Foreign Policy Association. Well, some people may have no objection to this. But what if the Big Four disagree with each other?

Absolutely essential to the functioning of the plan is unanimity among the Big Four. This exists at present as far as the war against Germany is concerned. But not even optimists believe that it will continue to exist in the postwar world. The Soviets made it perfectly clear at Dumbarton Oaks that they had no intention of submitting to a majority decision of the Security Council directed against them. The commentary of a leading US radio station reprinted in our Appendix shows that the Americans feel likewise. It also brings out the biggest hitch in postwar Big Four co-operation.

SOVEREIGNTY OR COMMUNITY?

Fundamentally, the American postwar plans are concerned not with a world organization of nations but with the continuance of the war-born alliance of the Big Four. The proposed postwar world organization lacks the basic condition which might make it into a true league of nations: the surrender of absolute sovereignty by the member states. Shortly before his death, Wendell Willkie openly spoke of this in Collier's,
when he wrote about the election platforms of the Republican and Democratic Parties:

The platforms of both parties contain an irreconcilable paradox which in its plain implication can only confuse, deceive and disillusion the American people. This paradox is provided by the fact that permanent or lasting peace cannot be attained without what is popularly called loss of sovereignty. We are presented with this extraordinary proposition: we are jealously to guard our sovereignty, but somehow all nations are to be welded together into an international organization with power to prevent aggression and preserve peace.

Whenever a party to a proposed agreement stands pat and refuses to yield any individual right or privilege, there is no agreement. Yet, it is under similar conditions that we talk of creating or participating in an international organization. What we shall create is at best a consultative pact between sovereign states, an arrangement which may be different in words but which, in fact, will not differ at all from most of the alliances in history.

Actually it is impossible to imagine a functioning world organization—no more than any organization within the framework of a Grossraum, an individual state, or a family—without the individual or the group surrendering part of their sovereignty. Absolute sovereignty and community are irreconcilable. One must choose between the two, and America has made her choice. Roosevelt made this clear when he declared at a press conference early in June: “The United States has an objective today to join other nations for the general world peace—but without taking away the integrity of the United States in any shape, manner, or form.” For those slow of grasp, Time added: “Integrity was the Roosevelt word for sovereignty.” This makes all the hopes formerly placed by many Americans on a postwar community of nations wholly illusory.

BIG FOUR—THREE—TWO

Among the Big Four, Chungking China, compared to the other three, is only geographically big. Hence America is speaking more and more frequently of the Big Three. The New York correspondent of the Svenska Dagbladet formulated it as follows:

It is becoming increasingly clear that Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin are of the opinion that the postwar world order can best be maintained if the military power remains in the hands of those now holding it, viz., in the hands of the USA, Great Britain, and Russia.

But when the Americans subject the Big Three to a closer scrutiny, they find that they actually only consist of Big Two. For some of them, these Big Two are the USA and the USSR, e.g., for Time, which wrote on May 8, 1944: “The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are unquestionably Great Powers, Britain is a conditional Great Power . . . . China is a potential Great Power.”

Others see the USA and Great Britain in the Big Two. Among them is the well-known American General Patton, who publicly declared in May: “Undoubtedly it is Britain’s and America’s destiny to rule the world.” (Only in the revised version of this statement was the USSR included among the General’s choice of world rulers.)

In the preliminary work for the UNRRA a clear tendency toward Anglo-American exclusiveness was revealed. Walter Bosshard reported from Atlantic City that the impression among the delegates of the UNRRA Conference was that “England and the USA wish to retain the entire relief work in their own hands.” In the Combined Raw Materials Board, which has to supply the raw materials for the UNRRA and on which in consequence all UNRRA activity depends, America and—to a far lesser degree—England are the sole rulers.

BIG ONE

But if one section of the Americans think they can get along without England and another without the Soviet Union, there finally remains only the Big One. Indeed, the Americans are becoming accustomed to the idea of being the “Big One.” And in order to justify a high level of armaments after the war, American leaders are already spreading the fantastic assertion that Germany is even now preparing for a third world war and that General von Stülpnagel has been appointed to work out the necessary plans for it.

By such and similar processes of thought, America is seeking to vindicate her monoinperialism in her own eyes. Although she pretends that it is only the force of circumstance that has temporarily placed the lead among the United Nations in America’s hands, the recent conferences in the Allied camp have shown that the Americans are finding it increasingly strange when other nations want their own way. Yesterday they were accusing Germany and Japan of suffering only puppets around them; today they ought to have a look in the mirror.

The “Big One” attitude finds expression in the most varied fields. During the
negotiations first in London and then in Chicago on the future organization of world air traffic, England represented the view that a supranational organization should be created to run or at least to supervise air communications. America, on the other hand, objected. In her feeling of great superiority in aircraft construction, she wishes to see no barriers raised against her future expansion in the air. The American Office for Civil Aeronautics submitted a gigantic program last summer which provides for the establishment of air lines totaling 140,000 miles to encircle the globe at various latitudes, under American management. Time plastically describes the impression the world map showing the planned lines made upon the foreign representatives: "The British stared when they saw blue lines running through British territories. The Dutch came to worry about their KLM (Royal Dutch Air Lines) interests. The enigmatic Russians came and went, enigmatically."

The demand has been voiced repeatedly in Congress that America must in future have the largest fleet in the world. Naturally, this largest of all air and naval fleets also requires a large number of bases. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, who demands conscription for the time after the war, said in the Saturday Evening Post: "We must have bases wherever our strategists deem them necessary." Roosevelt himself, in his Seattle speech last August, raised a demand for bases in the Western Pacific. As for the South Pacific, he declared:

There are hundreds of small islands in the Southern Pacific which are in British and French possession. We do not want them, but Britain and France might be happy to enter into an agreement by which these islands could enjoy additional protection.

In America's foreign-trade policy, there has always been a contradiction between a desire for her own sphere of influence closed to the rest of the world and for an Open Door policy in the rest of the world. As a principle, the European Grossraum as envisaged by Germany or the Co-Prosperity Sphere in East Asia is no less distasteful to the American business world than the British Empire. As was explained in Gunnar Myrdal's article in our November issue, the Americans will be faced by the alternative in the years of demobilization of either changing their domestic economic and social structure or conquering new markets for a vast export trade. It goes without saying that the latter would be more to their liking. The American trade magazine Iron and Coal Traders' Review recently wrote: "A vast amount of shutting down cannot be avoided in American heavy industry if we do not succeed in achieving an immense expansion of markets in comparison to the peace-time markets." For this purpose the Americans are trying to exploit the positions gained by Lend-Lease as well as their military conquests.

Another paradox: on the one hand the Americans want to export as much as possible, on the other they do not wish to open their markets to foreign goods to be supplied in return, nor have they any idea as to what to do with more gold. It is hard to imagine what the future American foreign trade is supposed to look like.

ROOSEVELT AND CONGRESS

Of the three foreign-political principles we mentioned at the beginning of this article, isolationism and imperialism get on quite well with each other. Both place the interests of the United States before everything else. And just as it is the strong point of US imperialism that it can fall back upon an almost unassailable hemisphere, so is the American isolationist pleased over every increase of America's power in the world—always with the reservation: if one day we should cease to like it we can withdraw again to America. Hence the activities directed at creating an American sphere under the leadership of the USA and those directed at strengthening American influence on a world-wide scale go parallel.

This fact is of great importance to America's foreign policy during Roosevelt's fourth term. If Roosevelt were really the idealist he pretended to be during the days of the Atlantic Charter, he would be so much at variance with the disillusioned American people over questions of foreign policy that last month's election would have confronted him with so hostile a Congress as Wilson had to face in 1919. But Roosevelt is not a Wilson, and the Congressional election results have proved that Roosevelt, intrinsically always a realist, and the disenchanted Americans have met on a middle line as regards foreign policy.

What were the reasons for Congress's opposition to Wilson in 1919? Let us quote from a popular American schoolbook:
The points of complaint were that the sovereignty of the United States was sacrificed, that we were pledged to make war to the bidding of the council of the league, that we would be eternally embroiled in the quarrels of Europe, that purely domestic questions like immigration laws and the tariff were subjected to the interference of other nations, that Great Britain was represented by six times as many voices in the assembly of the league as we were.

The postwar ideas propagated by Roosevelt are enough to show us that none of these points of complaint holds good today. If the Twohey Analysis of Newspaper Opinion calculated in April that "the press approval of Administration foreign policy has declined from 80% support to 20%" this indicated less an opposition to Roosevelt's policy than the reverberations of America's disappointment at foreign-political developments and at her allies as well as a feeling of uncertainty in questions of foreign policy. This uncertainty may also be the result of Roosevelt's increased tactiurnity. At the time when Roosevelt covered his policy with an altruistic cloak of world liberation, there was nothing to prevent him from expressing himself frequently on this ideal. In the present emphatically imperialistic period, however, he deems it wiser to keep silent, as a presentation of America's foreign-political motives would arouse apprehension in the rest of the world.

"EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT"

Although Roosevelt and many Americans thus agree in principle on the aims of America's foreign policy, it is understandable that Roosevelt should have sought to cover himself for all eventualities. The Senate, i.e., the upper house in Congress, has a voice in America's foreign policy. The American Constitution says: "[The President] shall have power by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur."

This paragraph, meant to protect the democracy against too self-willed presidents, is responsible for a well-known paradox within America's foreign policy. On the one hand, the Constitution gives the President and the State Department under him unlimited powers to conduct all negotiations with foreign countries; on the other hand, the treaties concluded by him are not valid without the approval of two thirds of the Senate. This paradox led to Wilson's disaster.

Since a constitutional amendment to remove the demand for a two-thirds' majority of the Senate seems improbable, Roosevelt has endeavored to get his way by other means. Through officials of the State Department and his own publicists, he has had a theory developed according to which the President may also, instead of signing treaties requiring the two-thirds' majority of the Senate, choose the form of an "Executive Agreement," which requires merely a simple majority in the Senate and House of Representatives. The propagators of this doctrine can point to the fact that the annexation of Texas and Hawaii during the last century took place by means of such "Executive Agreements."

The new doctrine has two advantages for Roosevelt. First of all, it enables him to replace the difficult two-thirds' majority by a simple majority, much more easily obtainable. And secondly, it contrives the inclusion of the House of Representatives, which was hitherto without influence upon foreign policy, thus getting it on the side of the President. While Wilson waged his battle exclusively against the Senate and was defeated, Roosevelt, by means of the Executive Agreement, is in a position to play off the House against the Senate or vice versa in questions of foreign policy, just as he has already frequently done in the sphere of domestic politics.

It goes without saying that the Senate is observing this development with anxiety and displeasure. One of the results has been that, in order not to lose its influence in foreign politics, the Senate has in turn held out its hand toward the President by nominating a Senate Committee for Postwar Questions, which is to keep in touch with the President and the State Department. This gives Roosevelt the chance not only to influence the Senate just now in the way he wants but also to say later on: "I have done everything with your knowledge and your approval," thus cutting the ground from under the feet of any future opposition.

AMERICAN DOUBTS

The quotations mentioned above as well as all other recent information on American views allow one to draw certain conclusions. In the words of Tom, Dick, and Harry, these might at present run something like this:

"Because we Americans were too self-centered in our period of isolation, the rest of the world made a mess of things and allowed the rise of Nazism and Nipponism. The result was war. We could not idly
Look on while the democracies collapsed, so we were drawn into the war. We have turned the country's economy upside down, we have put twelve million of our boys into uniform, we have suffered more than half a million casualties already—all for the sake of victory. When this victory comes, its fruits must be worth the sacrifices. Above all, there must be the certainty that never again will a situation arise like the one in 1938-41. At first we hoped to obtain this by the co-operation of the entire world (minus Germany and Japan). But we've been let down too often. We cannot really rely on any of the other United Nations: it is up to America to organize the postwar world and to back up this organizing job with the biggest navy and air force and bases at every strategic point. If we cannot build the millennium of human brotherhood, at least we shall give the world an American Century with some good Yankee horse sense. And the United Nations? Well, where would they be without our Lend-Lease, our Eisenhowers, Kaisers, Nimitzes? They'd better comply—or else!"

These ideas are one-sided and confused. But their chief drawback is that the American himself lacks confidence in his ability to live up to them. At the back of his mind there is doubt. How can America, he thinks, solve the world's problems when before the war she had over ten million unemployed herself? "Before they try to establish a new world order, the United Nations should restore order in its own house."

This statement in Dewey's campaign speech at St. Louis on October 17 mirrored the opinion of many millions. (How little the Americans feel sure of the superior appeal of the "American Way" and its effect on other nations is shown by their plans for Germany and Japan. Cut Germany up into three or more pieces, destroy her industry, take away her resources, deprive Japan of everything but her islands—those are the suggestions, not one constructive idea among them.)

There are other doubts, too: "What if the USSR should refuse to take orders from America? What if Germany and Japan refuse to give in, if they keep on fighting for every village and every island? Our losses are mounting steadily, and our leaders tell us that the main fight is still to come. We have been at war for three years. How much longer is it supposed to last?"

It is owing to these doubts that American world imperialism and isolationism (which also includes hemispheric imperialism) are linked so closely together, and that the same US Senate which is making plans for the whole world also advocates "a band of steel around the Western Hemisphere." In the opinion of Walter Lippman, one of America's leading ideologists, this hemisphere should also include the British Empire, Western and Southern Europe—in all 42 states with over 500 million inhabitants—and be called the "Atlantic Community."

In other words, the imperialistic designs which they accused Germany and Japan of having toward Europe and East Asia are being harbored by the Americans themselves toward the entire world, or at least its Western Hemisphere.

"They'd better comply—or else!" was how we paraphrased the American attitude toward the rest of the world. This "or else" can mean two things—force or isolation. Roosevelt is more for the first alternative, Dewey was more for the second. The narrow margin of Roosevelt's victory, counted in individual votes, proves that the second alternative has a strong attraction for millions of Americans.

In considering America's attitude toward the world, one must always bear in mind the ease with which she can shift the emphasis from one to the other of the three principles of her foreign policy. In the summer of 1941, Fortune's poll of public opinion, regarded as one of the most reliable in the country, found a bare 13 per cent of Americans in favor of US participation in any kind of international organization. In March 1944, that figure had soared to 68 per cent. In a country where such a complete about-face has taken place in the last three years, another about-face may take place in the next three years too.

Disgrace

On the way home from a dinner party she said:

"I don't think I've ever been so ashamed in my life, George. You were the only one among the men this evening who did not have a postwar plan."