Internal Surveillance of O‘ahu’s Japanese Population During World War II: The Honolulu Police Department’s Special Detail Unit and Contact Group

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We explained to them that [we] assist the people in every way to keep them out of trouble . . . and to show them that we were, actually, their friends . . . as long as they abided by the law, they didn’t have to have any fear . . . Of course, if they undertook to violate the law, we explained that we would have to deal with them severely.1

During World War II, Honolulu Police Department (HPD) Special Detail officers visited Japanese families under the pretense of identifying martial law violations and conducted informal investigations at their homes, extensively questioning residents. These visits were part of HPD surveillance of urban Japanese communities on O‘ahu that extended from preexisting concerns by military and civilian authorities who feared the Japanese “threat” that was presumed to exist in neighborhoods where Japanese congregated in large numbers. Thus, these visits were not an aberration of martial law but replaced inves-

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tigations conducted by the prewar Espionage Bureau led by Captain John A. Burns, future Hawai‘i governor, who served as the liaison between military intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the HPD. Although Burns’s career in the HPD has been detailed in numerous historical accounts, the specific activities of Special Detail officers who worked with members of Burns’s Police Contact Group to identify and investigate certain individuals have not been fully examined.

Thus, the opening statement written in a report filed by Honolulu Police Department (HPD) officers Ernest Nowell and Eichi Hongo detailed a conversation Nowell and Hongo had with McCully resident Tadashi Yamashita on 12 August 1942 at his home after checking his compliance with short-wave radio regulations. For forty-five minutes, officers questioned Yamashita about his personal background, political sympathies, and the amount of war bonds he had purchased, explaining that it was his “feeling of cooperation that counted.”

Although Nowell and Hongo described these visits as part of their “Good Will tour” throughout Japanese neighborhoods in Honolulu to ensure the loyalty and security of residents, the underlying threat of non-compliance with martial law regulations challenges this characterization. Yamashita and his family, however, were not the only people HPD Special Detail officers called on, as police visited other Japanese families under the pretense of identifying martial law violations and conducted informal investigations at their homes, extensively questioning residents. While conducting regular police work such as citing traffic violations and preventing truancy, police also actively promoted Americanization efforts in the Japanese community, suppressed rumors, and advocated the discarding of Japanese heirlooms. The personalized nature of surveillance by HPD Special Detail officers not only encouraged extreme demonstrations of loyalty in record war bond purchases, substantial blood donations, and ultimately voluntary military service, but in part also contributed to what scholar Yukiko Kimura described as a period of “extreme insecurity” in wartime Hawai‘i. Although the police material that comprises part of the Romanzo Adams Social Research Laboratory collection that is the basis for this analysis is incomplete, it offers a revealing look into the police activities in 1942 that had significant implica-
tions in the political future of Japanese Americans and the postwar career of Burns.

Prewar Military Concerns of Japanese “Undesirables”

Long before the outbreak of war, there was concern that the large number of Japanese in Hawai‘i posed a danger to territorial and national security, and this became one justification, among others, for the enactment of martial law and internment in Hawai‘i.\(^5\) To some, military control over the Islands was warranted by Hawai‘i’s strategic importance in the Pacific, an argument that was also recognized well before World War II. Due to this prevalent belief among military personnel—in particular among Army commanders—Hawai‘i was preparing for war years before the Pearl Harbor attack. However, this was a war to be waged within Hawai‘i by the Army and other military forces, and they identified the enemy as local Japanese. Suspicions about Japanese loyalty and tractability had been earlier confirmed by Japanese labor activism in the 1909 and 1920 strikes, which the media portrayed as nationalistic activities by a distinctly un-American ethnic group who resisted assimilation efforts. Additionally, the involvement of Japanese defendants in two high-profile crimes—the Jamieson murder and the Ala Moana case—seemed to reflect the threat Japanese posed to the white elite and military population. In 1928, a young Japanese man, Myles Fukunaga, kidnapped and murdered ten-year-old Gill Jamieson, the son of affluent white parents. This crime, which sparked a community-wide manhunt for the perpetrator, allowed the latent fears of the Japanese to rise and pervade a public debate in the media. Widespread concern over the Japanese in Hawai‘i once more became a flashpoint in local and national news in the Massie case, when a young Japanese man, Shomatsu Ida, was among those accused of assaulting and raping the young wife of a navy officer in the Ala Moana case. Although Ida was found innocent of these allegations, he was beaten and left for dead along a dirt road after a mistrial was announced. One of his Hawaiian companions, Joseph Kahahawai, was later kidnapped and shot by white navy officers and the victim’s mother to ensure that “justice,” at least for whites, was administered. Collectively, these incidents raised anxieties about the large number of Japanese in Hawai‘i.
When the Ala Moana assault trial ended in a mistrial on 6 December 1931, many members of the white community and the military regarded the decision as a miscarriage of justice. Criticism of the mistrial was widespread and bitter, as many perceived that whites could no longer be protected under the system of justice in Hawai‘i, which had once presumably privileged and protected them. The Navy Subcommittee of the United States House of Representatives accused Judge Alva E. Steadman of delivering to the jury thinly veiled instructions to acquit the defendants. The Navy’s Admiral Yates Stirling, however, attributed the mistrial to the racial bias of the jury.

The naval hierarchy in the nation’s capital shared Admiral Stirling’s conviction that the mistrial was a travesty of justice. Admiral William Pratt, chief of naval operations, sent a letter to the Navy Department stating, “American men will not stand for the violation of their women under any circumstances. For this crime, they have taken the matter into their own hands repeatedly when they have felt that the law has failed to do justice.” The alleged rape of Thalia Massie and the resulting mistrial heightened pre-existing antagonisms between the military and the local population that now threatened to boil over and endanger Hawai‘i’s status as a territory of the United States. There were renewed calls for the imposition of martial law in Hawai‘i since it was seen as a place unsafe for white women and inimical to the United States military, despite the efforts of the territorial government to keep the publicity surrounding the trial as low key as possible.

Governor Lawrence M. Judd even asked Admiral Stirling to make an official denial of the rumors surrounding Hawai‘i as unfit for women, which he refused to do “until I could see some evidence that the rotten police situation had been cleared up.”

In response to the negative publicity about Hawai‘i and to the calls for military rule following the not guilty verdict, the business leaders of Hawai‘i exerted pressure on Governor Judd to convene a special session of the legislature to remedy the perceived problems of the police department and law enforcement in general. When news broke of this development, the Hawaii Hochi, a prominent Japanese newspaper, decreed that Hawai‘i and its citizens were now faced
with an ultimatum made at the “point of a gun by a little group of clever business men” such as Walter Dillingham: “Pass the Chief of Police Bill or have a commission form of government forced upon you.” Despite public outcry at this measure, which was rejected at the last meeting of the legislature as unnecessary, at its special session in January 1932, the legislature considered reforming the police department, the public prosecutor’s office, the prison administration, and jury procedures. The police reform bill creating an appointed police commission quickly passed, and Governor Judd, with Senate approval, immediately named five business leaders as commissioners. This commission appointed Charles F. Weeber, who for ten years had been Dillingham’s “confidential man and Secretary” as chief of police. Under the commission, Honolulu’s police system was thoroughly reorganized, and William A. Gabrielson was brought in from California to be the permanent chief of police because local officers were perceived as incompetent. Despite the restructuring of the HPD, military concerns about the local population, that it was dominated by Japanese, remained unabated. Throughout the 1930s, the military conducted various investigations of the Japanese community and established military-civilian partnerships including the HPD to monitor the internal Japanese threat.

The Search for “Enemy Espionage and Sabotage” in the Japanese Community: The Police Espionage Bureau

As early as 1935, the Army established the Army Service Command, which created a partnership between “civil control forces” and the military to prevent sabotage and local uprisings. The Army’s plan for civilian warfare in Hawai‘i also led to the creation of a paramilitary organization called the Provisional Police in July 1940. Led by plantation manager T.G.S. Walker, its mission was to prevent and suppress any emergency, such as “sudden and unpredicted overt acts by disloyal inhabitants.” Through the efforts of the Army, the Honolulu mayor, the chief of police, and plantation managers on O‘ahu, the Provisional Police was established to allow civilians to participate in defending Hawai‘i against possible attack. Throughout the fall and winter, plantation employees, members of the American Legion, and utility workers were trained in guard duty around the island. By April
1941, some 1,500 guards were ready for action; by May, more than one-third of them had participated in Army maneuvers. The idea was to free the regular militia from guard duty by utilizing plantation laborers who were familiar with local faces and terrain and could be efficiently managed and mobilized through Hawai‘i’s existing plantation hierarchy.

In addition to the Army, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also became interested in looking for subversives within Hawai‘i’s Japanese community. In August 1939, just before war broke out in Europe, the FBI reopened its Honolulu office, which it had closed years earlier. FBI agents joined the efforts of Army and Navy intelligence staffs, which had been compiling lists of anti-American suspects, mainly those of Japanese ancestry. Together, they developed more detailed information regarding the Japanese population in the Islands, focusing surveillance on both the older group of 35,000 aliens and the younger 120,000 Japanese Americans, many of whom held dual citizenship.

The FBI also gained the assistance of the HPD, which at the FBI’s request formed an Espionage Bureau. This entity was established in December 1940, following the approval of Police Chief Gabrielson, the mayor, and Board of Supervisors. The police bureau employed a Japanese, a Korean, a Hawaiian, and a “Hapa-Haole” (Japanese-White), all of whom spoke Japanese, to investigate matters for the FBI, Army, and Naval Intelligence to engage in undercover activities within Hawai‘i’s Japanese community. Police Captain John A. Burns served as the head of the Espionage Bureau from 1 January 1941 and was the liaison with certain Japanese who advised United States military and civilian intelligence bureaus on Japanese activities. Throughout 1941, a total of 550 investigations were made by the Bureau with the majority of cases (86%) referred through the FBI. Much of what the Espionage Bureau did, Burns recalled, was in response to questions raised by the FBI about people’s background, general reputation, and activities to determine personal loyalties. Espionage Bureau personnel also examined general Japanese sentiments and potential racial tensions.

Kanemi Kanezawa, a member of Burns’s staff at the Espionage Bureau recalled that their work was much different from regular police work. “The investigations,” Kanazawa pointed out, “were done
discreetly and indirectly . . . Our investigations were based upon second- or third-hand hearsay evidence. It would never have stood up in a court of law.”\textsuperscript{22} However, these investigations were critical in the “Preparedness” of the HPD to counter a potential wartime emergency.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, Gabrielson himself advocated that police departments should “have a record and also a cross index of all aliens so they could be apprehended on very short notice” during times of war.\textsuperscript{24} Although how the FBI utilized the evidence gathered by the Espionage Bureau is unknown, as relations between the United States and Japan deteriorated in 1941, demand for intelligence on the Japanese community increased. Fortuitously for Burns, six months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese community leaders of the O’ahu Citizen’s Committee for Home Defense called a public meeting at McKinley High School, where they proposed an organization of Japanese Americans to police the Japanese community in the event of war.\textsuperscript{25} The FBI and Chief Gabrielson agreed that such an organization was not acceptable. However, they did consent to an alternative proposal to create an organization called the Police Contact Group, a network of loyal Japanese Americans who would report regularly to the HPD through Burns.\textsuperscript{26} Gabrielson asked Burns to coordinate efforts and to submit names to the FBI for clearance. The first meeting was scheduled for Monday 8 December and canceled after the 7 December bombing of Pearl Harbor.

However, one week before the attack, investigations into the Japanese community had already begun. Burns recalled that Robert Shivvers of the FBI called him into his office and with “tears in his eyes” confided that “we’re going to be attacked before the week is out.”\textsuperscript{27} Burns reported that Shivers asked him to “try to see if you can get your men without letting anybody know it, see if there is any kind of signs in the community” of any “abnormal feeling” that would indicate prior knowledge of the attack.\textsuperscript{28} According to Burns, he sent out four men under his command; despite “meeting ten or fifteen guys and observing their conversations” every day, “we found nothing that gave use any [hint]” of local collaboration.\textsuperscript{29} While Shivers never revealed the source of his information, before the week was out, his prediction came true. By noon, 7 December, mere hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, Burns was closeted in meetings with Shivers and Colonel George W. Bicknell, head of counterintelligence for the U.S.
Army in Hawai‘i. Together they went over lists of possible security risks and each of the three men had a vote. “If two of us voted yes,” Burns recalled, “he was a risk.” Burns noted that these individuals had been “completely investigated” partly through the efforts of the Espionage Bureau. Thus, as arrests began that day of suspected individuals in the community, HPD officers provided critical manpower. “I had asked the chief for one hundred cars and one hundred men when we went to start this pick up business,” Burns recalled. “So we generally had one policeman driving the car, or reserve policeman, one federal government guy . . . sometimes there were three” as suspects were arrested. Although some could argue that a selective infringement on the civil rights of certain individuals that was the basis of these arrests was a more reasonable response than the incarceration of the entire Japanese community in Hawai‘i, Burns’s own findings that “there would be no sabotage by the Japanese” contradicts the necessity of these actions.

Within a week of the Pearl Harbor attack, federal authorities stopped consulting Burns and his Espionage Bureau about who should be interned; instead, they continued to use this unit to track down a number of rumors of evidence of Japanese disloyalty. None, however, led to any evidence of espionage. Yet, the Police Contact Group, which constituted “over fifty guys, scattered throughout the islands,” continued to be active throughout 1942. Burns noted that while the Group was “never organized,” it became a “hellauva good idea” because it became a good method of “getting information out where the paper didn’t get it, or didn’t put it rightly.” Burns added that it served a critical purpose of “quieting rumors down, because the boys who in one district would pick up that their people in that community got a big rumor they could call me, get the straight information, and take it back and cut the rumor.” Besides promoting blood bank donations and war bond sales, Burns noted that it “furnished a very valuable asset on what’s going on in the community,” giving him evidence of Japanese loyalty while he simultaneously pushed for allowing Japanese Americans entry into the armed services. However, in both his biography and oral history, Burns fails to note the police surveillance of the Japanese community that continued at least throughout 1942 that was in part based on the information obtained by his Police Contact Group. Additionally, from the Contact Group’s more
diligent workers came the leaders of the Emergency Service Committee, which served as the Morale Section of the Japanese community to spearhead various efforts to prove the loyalty of its members.

HPD Special Detail: A “Crime Prevention Agency” Operating in Japanese Communities

In the days and weeks following the Pearl Harbor attack, the military continued to monitor local sentiment. Within two hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, military censors were installed at all communication agencies. The Army and Navy censors handled civilian correspondence until February 1942; thereafter, mail censorship was done under the auspices of the Federal Office of Censorship, though it remained closely allied with the military and the military governor’s office. One responsibility of the censorship office was to monitor morale in the Islands and compile bimonthly reports, which were furnished to Navy Intelligence and focused on topics such as “Racial Problems,” “War Worker Morale,” “Japanese Morale,” and “Interracial Friendships and Marriage” and quoted a selection of “typical comments.” They also compiled statistical reports on the frequency with which issues were mentioned and on changes in the general tone of comments.37

Although the censorship reports provide the voices and private opinions of thousands of anonymous individuals, FBI officials evidently desired more specific knowledge of local Japanese attitudes and sentiment. On 8 January 1942, the FBI inaugurated a course of instruction in “civilian defense” for members of the HPD at Central Intermediate School. At opening ceremonies, Shivers explained to police executives the need for officers to receive FBI training. According to Shivers, “In this war the civilian populace is going to be guided by the man on the beat and by executives of the police department,” as HPD officers were encouraged to “guide” the civilian population through the tumultuous war period.38 In a fulfillment of this prediction, a few months later a select group of police officers was charged with conducting “Special Detail” in neighborhoods in urban Honolulu and visiting island residents. One of seven designated police officers—James Akana, Marcus Colburn, Neil Donahue, James Dulaney, Ansley N. Neptune, Ernest Nowell, and William G. Ross—joined bilingual
officer Eichi Hongo in daily patrols. In addition to enforcing blackout restrictions as part of martial law, they handled traffic and curfew violations, arrested juvenile delinquents, raided gambling dens, and visited community bomb shelters. Reports were sent to Chief Garabelson and Captain Dewey O. Mookini of the Patrol Division, and meetings were also held in Burns’s office as officers recorded their daily activities and candid observations of life in Hawai‘i under martial law.

As part of Special Detail, however, the officers’ responsibilities extended beyond regular patrols throughout O‘ahu neighborhoods. Describing themselves as a “Crime Prevention Agency,” rather than an “Enforcement Agency,” Special Detail officers explained that “our main purpose for patrolling . . . was because of the numerous Japanese residents” residing in neighborhoods like Liliha, Kaka‘ako, McCully-Mō‘ili‘ili, Kaliihi, and Mānoa. According to the officers, the intent of these patrols was not to “pick on them or try to find fault with the people” but to “help them out in their misunderstandings and by our assistance, it would help to a great extent, in keeping them out of trouble.” Despite the innocuous description of their activities, the majority of police visits specifically targeted members of the Japanese population living in ethnic communities who were previously the focus of military and FBI surveillance that had resulted in arrests and incarceration. Reports provided authorities with detailed information gained from these visits about the age, profession, wartime volunteer activities, and attitude about the occupants as well as other members of the household and extended family members.

In response to “numerous” queries whether officers could enter a person’s home without authorization, on 2 March 1942 provost Judge Lt. Col. Neal D. Franklin issued the following statement publicized in the Honolulu Advertiser: “Justice cannot wait now, under martial law for the formality of a search warrant. We don’t have time.” The urgency of Franklin’s statement was reflected in the actions undertaken by HPD Special Detail officers who used martial law regulations as a pretext for visiting Japanese homes and investigating the inhabitants. According to officers Neptune and Hongo, “as usual, we entered the houses with the pretense of checking the radios, and after ‘breaking the ice,’ we made them feel at ease and proceeded to explain our undertakings in that area.” In a report filed by Nowell and Hongo, they explained how their “Good Will tour” served a benign purpose to help people “become better Americanized.”
While officers often conducted regular patrols interviewing residents door-to-door, they also resorted to subversive means of identifying residences to visit. During their patrol of King Street in August 1942, Nowell and Hongo described how they “soft footed it over fences and through back yards stopping from time to time” as they listened to personal conversations or for the illegal usage of radios. When left alone to patrol the McCully area, Hongo mentioned how he “began my work by ‘snooping’ inbetween (sic) houses listening in to the conversation going on in houses” and later talked to residents “explaining my purpose in the area.”

Although officers often traveled in pairs, Hongo was specifically charged with the task of explaining wartime regulations to Issei who did not speak English while his partner spoke to their Nisei children. While trying to “weed out” potential nationalistic sentiment within the Japanese community, the officers suggested to residents that “the First Aid Unit could always stand a few more volunteer workers, and also encouraged the donation of blood” to show their loyalty to America. In many instances, officers explained their activities in the context of preventing potential criminal activity from occurring or from stopping criminal activity that was unknowingly being committed by Japanese residents during wartime. The “help” that the officers provided extended to not just personal visits to ensure compliance with martial law regulations, but personal exhortations of demonstrations of loyalty and support for Americanization efforts in their neighborhoods. During their visits, they also encouraged residents to ensure that others adhere to regulations. While visiting Keisuke Nishimura, officers Dulaney and Hongo “suggested to him that he should talk to his friends and neighbors in regards to our conversation, and should have them to cooperate in everyway with this Government, and to live and think like good Americans” by donating blood, purchasing defense bonds, and volunteering.

“To promote friendship, good will, and Americanism”:

The Encouragement of Americanization

During the course of their visits officers often prefaced their comments with questions to determine the loyalty of Japanese residents such as “What would you do if the Enemy attacked this Island?” or “Would you, as an Enemy Alien, take part for them, or would you fight
These types of questions echoed earlier interrogation questions FBI and military officials asked of Japanese internees as officers took special interest in promoting “Speak American” efforts. When Dulaney and Hongo visited Shigeko Yoshida and her neighbor Yukiko Tamaye in Mānoa following a suggestion from the Reverend Ernest S. Fujinaga, who felt “they needed a good talk from us,” the officers clearly expressed their condemnation of any pro-Japanese sentiment to these two housewives: “We flatly told them that any UnAmericanized thinkings would absolutely not be tolerated. We told them that if they thought Japan was better we wanted them to get out; we didn’t want them here. They would only cause trouble for the loyal Japanese here.” However, if they “showed their utmost cooperation and did their bit,” they would be treated fairly. Thus, officers often encouraged Issei to attend English language classes and support volunteer activities.

During their visits officers also inquired about the amount of war bonds purchased as indications of loyalty. When officers visited the house of Shimeki Masunari, they pointedly explained to Masunari that loyalty entailed action, not just words: “to be a good American did not necessarily mean to be born in America but, rather the attitude taken in the purchase of war bonds and stamps, the working on vital war projects, and spirit in volunteer work, cooperating with the blackout and the General Orders.” Besides Masunari, other Japanese residents were recipients of exhortations by the police who actively monitored and promoted war bond purchases among Japanese families. In one particular instance, Dulaney and Hongo wrote an extensive report about a visit to the home of Shizuo Kimoto of Haoli Street, where they had a “friendly conversation” with his wife, Beatrice Yuki Kimoto. Dulaney and Hongo noted that although Kimoto “felt that it was their duty as good Americans to cooperate in every way with this Government to help win this War,” upon questioning her about her specific activities, officers observed that “she could show no proof that they were actually doing something to cooperate.” Dulaney and Hongo noted that although her husband was a defense worker making $1.25 an hour and that the family had $2,460.86 in the bank, they had not purchased defense bonds. According to the officers, “This all led us to believe that they took no interest in the welfare of this Government.” Thus “we definitely let her know that
they should be ashamed of themselves for being so selfish, and suggested that she start doing her bit,” attempting possibly to appeal to the Japanese value of *haji* or shame to encourage her compliance. After giving her a “good sales talk” about the benefits in investing in war bonds, the officers left after obtaining a promise by Kimoto to discuss purchasing war bonds with her husband. A month later, Dulaney and Hongo returned to the Kimoto residence to determine what progress had been made in complying with their suggestions. To their disappointment, they learned the family had purchased one $25 bond and planned to purchase only one a month. Despite the family’s explanation that they preferred to keep money in the bank in case of an emergency, the officers worked to convince the family that out of the $2000 they had in the bank they could at least invest half the amount in bonds. After giving them a “good talking to in regard to the necessity of their cooperation,” officers also suggested that they purchase defense bonds for their children.54

In contrast to the Kimoto family, Nowell and Hongo congratulated Toshiko Mori of Pumehana Street, for purchasing $5000 worth of Defense Bonds for her and her Nisei children. Officers also commended the actions of Keisuke Nishimura of Algaroba Street, who had led a group of about 400 in the collections of funds for the Victory Kit, visiting 800 homes and collecting $1200 in donations. They noted that two of his sons were block wardens, that everyone in his family had purchased defense bonds, and that Nishimura “participated in the collection of all Japanese literature that were turned in at the [outbreak] of the War and headed the group in the McCully District.”55 While Kimoto and Nishimura’s actions reveal their commitment to the American government, their activities could also reflect efforts to deflect criticism from the police, who promoted the purchase of war bonds to a degree that has not been acknowledged.

**The Suppression of Rumors**

Besides promoting Americanization efforts within the Issei population, police officers also actively sought to suppress rumors that were rampant in Hawai‘i. Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Espionage Bureau investigated rumors that proliferated in the Islands, such as the rumor that Japanese plantation workers had cut
arrows in the cane fields to direct Japanese pilots to Pearl Harbor or had set cane fires as signals. Others had heard that Japanese pilots who had been shot down were found with McKinley High School and University of Hawai‘i rings, implying they were former residents of Hawai‘i.\textsuperscript{56} Newspapers reported that Japanese parachutists had landed on O‘ahu and that the city water supply had been contaminated, along with other general acts of sabotage.\textsuperscript{57} In addition to rumors surrounding the Japanese community, internally the Japanese community faced great anxiety about their future as literally overnight 1,444 Japanese—of whom 979 had Japanese citizenship and 525 were American citizens, though mostly Kibei, or those educated in Japan—were interned.\textsuperscript{58} Rumors became particularly rampant as Issei, many of whom had only a limited grasp of English, were cut off from traditional means of information following radio restrictions that prohibited Japanese news programs and the closing of Japanese-language newspapers. On 24 October 1942, after a meeting in Burns’s office, Dulaney and Hongo went to Kaheka Lane to investigate a rumor that originated in the area in regard to the Japanese people having to evacuate, as they were allegedly being sent to the mainland. Although the officers reported that people there had not heard of the rumor, they made a special effort to suppress it through individual conversations. They also contacted Kazuo Watanabe, Burns’s contact man for lower Mānoa, to relay to others that the rumor was untrue.\textsuperscript{59} A few weeks later on 10 December, officers were dispatched to the Kalihi district to respond to rumors of the dangers of blood donations after a “Mr. Matsumura” had died four hours after donating blood.\textsuperscript{60} Following Matsumura’s death, members of the Kalihi football team refused to donate blood. Officers spent days talking with people, assuring the safety of donating blood. According to an explanation Dulaney and Hongo provided to Noka Shimabukuro, we “informed him that [Matsumura’s] death was not because he had donated blood, but was due to the reaction of the blood vessels after the queer feeling, or shock, that took place after he donated his blood.”\textsuperscript{61} Although they assured Shimabukuro and others that “there were hundreds of others who had donated their blood and had never died,” they also added, “Even if he had died from donating his blood, he was dying for his Country, and they, as well as everyone else, should make up their minds to die for this Country, anyways. It would be a worthwhile death,
we explained.” This type of extreme patriotism expected of Japanese residents, though likely exaggerated, was actively promoted by HPD officers who also sought to eliminate the “Pro-Japanese” threat by the eradication of elements of Japanese culture.62

**Japanese House Cleaning**

Besides investigating bond purchases, addressing rumors, and promoting English-speaking efforts, officers carefully observed the interiors of residences during their visits and encouraged individuals to remove Japanese objects and heirlooms to prevent potential accusations of disloyalty. Some, such as Helen Shizano Tokuda of South King Street, voluntarily removed or destroyed Japanese cultural artifacts before the arrival of the police. When police officers came to visit her home, she shared a photo album of a trip to Japan a younger sister had taken in 1939 that contained only sightseeing photos. Tokuda also revealed to officers that “about two months after the war they found a Japanese flag that their mother had. They immediately burned [it].”63

When police visited the McCully home of Keisuke Nishimura, they noted the presence of “several articles in their living room that were from Japan, such as bird [miniature] statues, [miniature] houses, etc.” After talking to Nishimura about the importance of abiding by existing laws and supporting the war effort, “We suggested to them that anything they had use for they should keep, but if such things as books, etc., were not going to be used, they should do away with.”64 While Tokuda voluntarily engaged in these actions before the arrival of the police as a demonstration of her loyalty to America, she possibly might have engaged in these actions to prevent the scrutiny to which police subjected the Nishimura home.

As two Japanese authors observed during this period, “The Japanese people at present are subjected to criticism from all sides; every move made by them is observed keenly by the community, and any false move is severely criticized.”65 While the origins of this criticism have been identified broadly in the context of addressing the entire Japanese community, the actions of the police reveal a specific targeting of people in their neighborhoods and homes to ensure community compliance.

Thus, upon visiting the home of Takeo Muraoka of Upper Mānoa
Road, Dulaney and Hongo noted “the bad condition of the home and the 2 Japanese Shrines they had. In this regard, we suggested to her that she put same away if she really did not need it.” According to the officers, “It only tended to create an impression of Japanese Ideals on their part.” Although the impact of the officers’ advice is not known, the officers clearly felt it was their responsibility to encourage the eradication of Japanese items from households. As such, residents in the Sheridan district reported that “they had been turning the house inside out trying to look for, and get rid of, unlawful things. All pictures, books, they disposed of by burning.” Additionally, officers noted that, in a reversal of generational roles, “even the sons and daughters of the Aliens came over to instruct the parents in the law and in getting rid of anything unlawful.”

This transformation of the home was also carried out in the larger Japanese community as following the Pearl Harbor attack, the physical landscape of Hawai’i was dramatically altered. Previously, the Issei had openly embraced their Japanese culture in ethnic enclaves like Mō‘ili‘ili and ‘A‘ala, where visitors to the Islands would have been amazed at the “old world customs” openly practiced by the Japanese: Issei read the news in two large daily Japanese newspapers, the Nippu Jiji and Hawaii Hochi, and sent their children to Japanese language schools. Japanese theaters such as Nippon Kan and Honolulu Za showed the latest films from Japan, and both Issei and Nisei sang Japanese songs they learned through Japanese radio programs and from records available locally.

After 7 December, however, the familiar physical landscape of the Japanese community was radically transformed with the closure of Buddhist temples, Japanese language schools, and Japanese newspapers and radio stations and the incarceration of priests, teachers, and businessmen. As Naval Commander John Ford noted, “They have all taken down their signs and have substituted English lettering. For example; ‘Banzai Café’ . . . is now the ‘Keep ‘Em Flying Café.’” Numerous businesses removed Japanese signage, began selling more Western products, and offered American forms of entertainment. Two Japanese writers observed this transformation during the war: “Today, no one dreams of going to a Japanese movie. Instead, they have turned to American movies. Aged Issei couples are frequently seen toddling into a jammed theater where Hedy Lamar and Spencer
While the transformations were voluntary, these changes in the Japanese community reflected the deep anxieties of the Issei who feared incarceration.

The response of many Issei to this dramatic change was one of “retiring”—withdrawing from public life. The loss of organized community activities, traditional leaders, and social continuity meant “the loss of the guidance on which they had depended in defining the situation of everyday life.” As one Issei explained, “We are afraid. We don’t know what to do. Even our own children don’t let us go out. If we go out, we will be the focus of hate and revenge. So we stay in the house.” Even in their own homes, the Issei were not immune to the changes sweeping through Hawai’i as the private or family sphere was transformed in part through efforts of the police.

**Personal Investigations and Intimidation: Fear of the Police**

This transformation of the physical environment of Hawai’i’s Japanese communities and homes and the upending of traditional generational roles that was facilitated by police visits sparked further mistrust of officials by many Japanese. However, according to special duty officers, many residents appreciated the efforts of the police and their “goodwill” visits, Taro Tasaka of Kapi’olani Boulevard for example, who initially “held back the fear she had inside of her.” But, “after talking to her in Japanese and making her feel at ease,” she was so relieved that she “broke down, expressed her previous emotions, and showed her gratitude by thanking us with tears in her eyes.” To the officers, “such an [incident] as this really shows what good results we can obtain by treating people with Kindness—applying the ‘golden rule’—regardless of Citizen or Alien.” Thus, officers understood their actions as benevolent outreach into the Japanese community to smooth racial differences and encourage Americanization.

Despite the positive perspective HPD officers presented about their actions, there were a number of instances that indicated residents’ fear of police visits. When investigating short wave reception noises at Wiliwili Street, Dulaney and Hongo took the opportunity to question the occupants, Shinichi and Muichi Shimamura. According to the police report filed that day, “We first asked the former whether they
had ever listened to Japan. He immediately replied ‘No!’” Dulaney and Hongo noted that “he was rather afraid of policemen so we told him that he did not have to fear us.” Despite these reassurances, Shimamura continued to be cautious in his responses to the police.

As officers encouraged residents to speak to others about their visits and be “good samaritans” by complying and adhering to the law some possibly apprehensively awaited an unannounced visit by the police. Kamado Uyehara of Fern Street, for example, mentioned to officers that “after receiving information that the Police were checking that district, he wondered why we had not checked his home earlier. He stated he had been expecting our call everyday in the past.” Others seemed overly anxious about the officers’ visit and likely prepared well in advance. Nowell and Hongo noted that Torahichi Suzuki of Date Street “wanted so much to be with the Law, that he insisted, to a point of irritation, that we check his house thoroughly” to ensure compliance with blackout measures. A group of Issei also noted that they all retired into their homes after 8:00 p.m. because they were afraid of being arrested.

While officers reported that many of the residents were grateful for their visits, others were less than receptive to their efforts. When visiting Rinji Takakawa, officers noted that “he held back and didn’t express his thoughts freely. We had to do most of the talking.” Besides recalcitrance, others were more open in their displeasure of police intrusion in their homes. When Dulaney and Hongo questioned Takakawa about a large radio that was reportedly brought to the home, they noted that his daughter, Joan, “did not like our intrusion and resented, very much, our checking the place. She later left the room, crying, due to being scared, we presume.” Despite the sensitivity the officers tried to demonstrate in these visits, the officers became upset at her reaction, stating, “We let her know, definitely, that we did not visit them just for the fun of it, but rather because it was a necessity, and if were going to be sarcastic, we could make a very bad report about her.” Although the officers explained that “since we did not locate anything in violation of the law, it was for their good,” thereby appeasing her worries, “we let her know that she shouldn’t take the attitude she had at that time.”

Although officers dismissed the younger Takakawa’s response to their visit, many Japanese residents were aware that visits by the police
that were motivated by accusation of disloyalty could serve as the basis for arrest and incarceration. On 5 August 1942, officers responded to a complaint by William Pattison of Lime Street, who claimed that his neighbor, Harry K. Teruya, “had always been listening to shortwave and that he had heard same frequently.” Although no violations were found, officers cautioned the residents in the surrounding area about the volume as well as the “Propagandic nature of the Enemy broadcasts” and continued to patrol the area. Officers also encouraged the owner of the Okumura store on East Mānoa Road to inform them to relay to any “Pro-Japanese” they might know that “those were the type of people we were anxious to meet, to convince them [to become] good Americans,” and if they still harbored anti-American sentiment, the police would deal with them “severely.”

The most revealing example of fear of the police occurred when police visited Teruko Sokabe of Kaʻaloa Street. Early in 1942, police officers asked Sokabe, whose husband Miyuki had been interned, to make a written statement to the police “in regard to her feelings as to this present situation—her opinion of Japan, where she was born, and the U.S. where she was reared.” According to officers, this statement was “for the purpose of letting others know the true feelings of the Japanese Aliens residing here, that is their loyalty for this Government.” Although officers mentioned that writing this statement was “not compulsory, but voluntary,” and for the benefit of other Issei, Sokabe evidently felt otherwise. The following day, Sokabe went to the Swedish consulate, as she “felt that we were trying to incriminate her.” She further stated that “she didn’t know what it was all about.” According to Dulaney and Hongo, Sokabe had taken the “wrong attitude,” and although they felt they were “trying, in every way, to help her, she did not trust us and led us to have no faith in her.” Burns was alerted to this case and the officers were once more sent to her home on 15 December 1942 to resolve this situation, but Sokabe remained undecided about the situation.

Although police officers regarded Sokabe as a “foolish woman,” the activities of the police did not inspire confidence or trust by some members of the population. Sokabe and others had their husbands interned and visits by the police often followed earlier visits by FBI and military officials who had taken their husbands away. On other occasions, officers were more sensitive of the plight of wives and fam-
family members of internees. While officers were suspicious of the “very large safe and an abundance of Japanese books” at the residence of Iwako Koike, at the time of their visit Koike was entertaining guests and “we did not want to embarrass her any further by questioning her in the presence of her visitors.” They planned to visit her later, as “we believed that we had to handle her in a very delicate manner because any harsh undertakings on our part would certainly result in her having a bad feeling for [this] Government.” The officers’ comments revealed their own awareness of the plight of the families of internees who officials earlier visited; they justifiably feared future police visits as their loved ones had been taken away without any explanation.

Collaboration and Internal Community Surveillance: Contact Men and the Emergency Service Committee

While police did likely rely upon army and navy intelligence to identify possible subversive elements in the Japanese community, explaining in part why certain families were visited by both federal and local officials, officers regularly met with Burns to discuss the progress of their work. Additionally, Burns’s contact men encouraged officers to visit certain individuals. Although no official sanction was secured, starting on 14 January 1942 a group of district leaders who had been chosen in November 1941 came into the office of Burns “four or five Contact men at a time” to discuss “setting at peace the minds of the people and the educational feature” of the visits. Police reports mention several contact men who were specifically identified with providing support and intelligence to Burns and the police department to ensure the loyalty of the Japanese community under martial law: “Mr. [Kiyotsuchi] Suehiro” (Mō‘ili‘ili), Harry K. Masuda (Kalihi), “Mr. Fujikawa” (Kaka‘ako), the Reverend Ernest S. Fujinaga (Upper East Mānoa); Kazuo Watanabe (Lower Mānoa Section), “Mr. Kosasa” (Kaimukī), Nelson Kawakami (Pālama), and James K. Fujioka (Kaheka Lane). These men comprised a small number of the forty-three Contact Group members who were responsible for neighborhoods in Honolulu alone; twenty-seven others were responsible for other districts around O‘ahu, including ‘Aiea, Waipahu, Hale‘iwa, and Kailua.

Police particularly praised the efforts of Fujinaga, who had assumed a leadership role in the Japanese community and assisted American-
ization efforts. According to Dulaney and Hongo, many in the community had “a great deal of confidence” in Fujinaga due to his efforts to install streetlights and his implementation of a correct house numbering system in the area. Following the outbreak of war, Fujinaga encouraged women to volunteer for Red Cross work, gathered men to volunteer for Army Engineer work and other projects, obtained gasoline coupons for gardeners, and took care of the tire requisitions. Police noted his efforts to promote blood donations and the selling of $9,000 worth of bonds, and encouraged Issei residents to attend Fujinaga’s English language classes. Additionally, Fujinaga provided names of people whom the police should visit, people he “felt needed a good talking to due to their being more Pro-Japanese, rather than American.” On one occasion, he specifically encouraged officers to visit Mr. Okubo, Mr. Ueno, and Mr. and Mrs. Sumida of Upper Mānoa Road. Other contact men like Kazuo Watanabe engaged in efforts to speak to different businessmen around town to promote Americanism, obtained passes from the military governor for Issei going to early Kiawe Corps work, and similarly encouraged blood donations, the purchase of war bonds, and Red Cross volunteer work.

Given the interests of the Police Contact Group, unsurprisingly it was part of the Emergency Service Committee (ESC), an organization composed primarily of Nisei who sought to prove the loyalty of the Japanese community in Hawai‘i during World War II. During the war, the Committee promoted racial unity by spearheading a “Speak-American” campaign, organizing blood drives and the purchase of $147,408.75 in war bonds in 1942 alone, and collecting funds for the Red Cross and the Army and Navy Emergency Relief Societies—activities that coincided with police efforts to promote loyalty within the Japanese community. Thus, police were also directed to certain homes by Shigeo Yoshida, a leading organizer of the ESC who had been a visitor when police arrived at the home of Iwako Koike. Yoshida not only asked officers for clarification of policies related to Issei visits but encouraged officers to contact by telephone twenty-two-year-old Thomas Toyofuku of Lot 2 lower Oili Road, whose father had been interned. Toyofuku had tried to volunteer for the armed forces but had been rejected because of his dual citizenship. Yoshida requested that officers “go to see whether we could straighten him out,” as he was evidently discouraged.
fuku to “keep his chin up and make the best of everything, for himself and for his family,” and encouraged him to seek them out if he or his family needed assistance. While Yoshida’s suggestion was likely driven by personal concern for Toyofuku, his actions show the close collaboration that existed between Nisei leaders and civil and military authorities to ensure the loyalty of the Japanese community.

While some may have appreciated the efforts of members of the Police Contact Group and the ESC, others in the Japanese community were not receptive to these efforts. Some members of the Japanese community referred to ESC and Police Contact Group members and Burns himself as *inu* [dogs] and accused them of trying to win favoritism by cooperating with the government as they were regarded as “patriotic zealots” and “self-appointed stool pigeons” for the military authorities. In the mainland incarceration camps, allegations of “informer” and “collaborator” used to identify alleged *inu* sparked beatings and riots at Poston and Manzanar; one incident resulted in two deaths and nine wounded. In Hawai‘i, similar violent incidents did not occur but the use of the word *inu* suggests that some did not fully embrace the Americanization efforts to prove the loyalty of the Japanese community. Possibly these efforts prevented the mass incarceration of the Japanese population and became the basis for the postwar activism of Hawai‘i’s Democratic Party and Nisei politicians who had ties with the ESC and Burns.

Still today, discussion of the motivations of *inu* and cooperation with or resistance against authorities remains a sensitive topic in the Japanese community, especially in Hawai‘i, where the matter has yet to be fully addressed particularly in understanding the action of the members of the Police Contact Group and Burns’s role in the HPD. Proof of the loyalty of the Japanese community came at a very high price, especially for those whose homes and privacy were invaded by interrogating police officers, contributing in part to the atmosphere of fear and anxiety that infused many Japanese communities and residences during the war.

**Conclusion**

The actions of HPD officers during World War II, which have not been examined in the dominant literature, offer critical insights into
the experiences of Japanese in Hawai‘i living under martial law—men
and women military and civilian authorities extensively investigated
throughout 1942. However, these investigations that took place in pri-
marily Japanese neighborhoods and homes were not an aberration of
martial law but a product of the long history between the HPD, FBI,
and military intelligence, as they had examined the Japanese “threat”
for years. Additionally, the invasiveness of these investigations suggests
possible questions about the effectiveness of selective incarceration
in controlling the remaining population in Hawai‘i. Authorities evi-
dently believed a threat still existed that necessitated police visits into
Japanese neighborhoods. Those investigated, however, were from
much different social strata than the educational, religious, political,
and economic leaders who had been interned, indicating that all Jap-
anese were suspect by virtue of their race.

It is important to note that the close collaboration between the
HPD and FBI, who shared and acted on espionage intelligence, was
partly made possible through John A. Burns, who facilitated intelli-
gence gathering on the Japanese community through the Espionage
Bureau and later the Police Contact Group. Additionally, during the
war, Burns worked with both the Police Contact Group and the ESC
members to promote Americanization efforts and the loyalty of the
Japanese. Members of the Police Contact Group met regularly with
Burns, who encouraged officers to visit certain individuals on their
recommendation. Burns attended ESC meetings to assist in coordina-
tion efforts to mobilize the Japanese community—efforts that were
carefully organized to reduce questions about Japanese loyalty. In
effect, Burns ushered in a new leadership role for the Nisei, who were
granted new status with the arrest and incarceration of traditional
leaders. Their English-language skills and ability to communicate
effectively with authorities also gave them a critical advantage over
the remaining Issei, who became a silent generation with admonitions
to “Speak American.”

Thus, the significance of these findings of the activities of the police
goes beyond the recognition of the infringement of personal rights
and the creation of an atmosphere of anxiety and fear in the Japanese
community among those who had not been arrested or interned. The
contributions of Burns and Americanization efforts of the Japanese
community that were supported by organizations like HPD, the Police
Contact Group, and ESC have often been understood positively, as they created a new future for the Japanese community through their demonstrations of loyalty both at home and on the battlefields of World War II. As Burns’s biographers, Dan Boylan and T. Michael Holmes noted, “To understand Jack Burns’s postwar political base, it is necessary to examine the relationships he developed during the war.”

Yet these relationships and implications for certain members of the Japanese community should be critically examined as developing from long-standing fears and suspicions of the Japanese. Possibly these widespread demonstrations of loyalty like bond purchasing, blood donations, and extensive volunteer work were not simply spontaneous gestures that emerged organically from felt beliefs of loyalty to America; they were actions that the police and a select group of self-appointed individuals within the Japanese community closely monitored and promoted. Ultimately, members of the ESC and Nisei veterans whose military participation Burns supported in 1942 would form the basis of the Democratic Party and Burns’s successful political campaign to become governor of Hawai‘i. Thus, while some established their reputation during World War II through their efforts to mobilize the Japanese community by cooperating with authorities, others became targets of police visits to ensure compliance with military and civilian orders revealing the collusion of internal and external interests.

Notes

1 Ernest Nowell and Eichi Hongo, “Tour of Duty—Special Detail #2,” August 12, 1942, the Romanzo Adams Social Research Laboratory (RASRL) Collection, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa Archives, Hamilton Library [henceforth RASRL].

2 Ernest Nowell and Eichi Hongo, “Tour of Duty—Special Detail #2,” August 12, 1942, 1. RASRL.

3 Ernest Nowell and Eichi Hongo, “Tour of Duty—Special Detail #2,” July 29, 1942, pg. 1. RASRL.


8 Marumoto, “The Ala Moana Assault Case and the Massie-Fortescue Case Revisited After Half a Century” 276.


12 “At the Point of a Gun!” Hawaii Hochi, 18 January 1932, 1.


17 Okihiro, *Cane Fires* 196.

18 Allen, *Hawaii’s War Years* 68.


20 Honolulu Police Department, *Annual Report: Police Department, City and County of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii 1941*, “Police,” 31.01, pg. 1. RASRL.

21 “General Information, Richard C. Miller Espionage Bureau, December 3 1941,” RASRL.


23 “Address given by Chief of Police W.A. Gabrielson, Honolulu, to the Annual Convention of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, held in Detroit, Michigan, August 9–12, 1943,” 31.01, pg. 1. RASRL.

24 “Address given by Chief of Police W.A. Gabrielson,” 16.

25 Members of the Oahu Citizens Committee for Home Defense who helped to identify “beat leaders” of certain districts included “Dr. [Shunzo] Sakamaki, Jack Wakayama, Lt. [Yoshio] Hasegawa, Mr. W. Amioka, Mr. G. Eguchi, Mr. Masatoshi Katagiri, Mr. M. Maneki, Mr. S. Higashino, Mr. Paul Morihara, Mr. Shigeo Yoshida, and Mr. Clifton Yamamoto,” “Honolulu Police Department Contact Group,” pg. 1, RASRL.

26 John Anthony Burns, *John A. Burns Oral History Project*. Tape No. 4, pg. 5-6.


33 John Anthony Burns, John A. Burns Oral History Project. Tape No. 4, pg. 6.
34 John Anthony Burns, John A. Burns Oral History Project. Tape No. 4, pg. 8.
35 However, this surveillance would not come at the expense of regular police duties as there would be a dramatic growth in the ranks of HPD with the hiring of more than 200 reserve officers, all of whom would be equipped, courtesy of the U.S. Army, which provided each officer with a steel helmet and gas mask. Additionally, “it furnished rifles and shotguns to stock up a large police arsenal.” “Letter to Mayor Lester Petrie from W.A. Gabrielson, January 29, 1943,” RASRL.
36 National Archives and Records Administration, San Francisco. RG 181 Records of Naval Districts and Shore Establishments, Naval Shipyards, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Office of the Commandant, General Correspondence (Formerly Classified), 1940–1946 ARC 29691, NN 373-91 (FRC Accession No. 181-58-3404A), Box 51, 51, 62, 63.
37 “FBI Course For Police Opens Here,” HSB, 8 January 1942, 1; “Police Take FBI Course,” 9 January 1942, 3.
38 “Policemen Can Search Homes,” HA, 2 March 1942, 1.
39 Ernest Nowell and Eichi Hongo, “Tour of Duty—Special Detail #2,” July 29, 1942, pg. 1. RASRL; Ernest Nowell and Eichi Hongo, “Tour of Duty—Special Detail #2,” August 11, 1942, pg. 1. RASRL.
40 Ansley N. Neptune and Eichi Hongo, “Tour of Duty—Special Detail #2,” August 18, 1942, pg. 2. RASRL.
42 Ansley N. Neptune and Eichi Hongo, “Tour of Duty—Special Detail #2,” July 15, 1942, pg. 1. RASRL.
43 Ansley N. Neptune and Eichi Hongo, “Tour of Duty—Special Detail #2,” No date, pg. 1. RASRL.
44 Ansley N. Neptune and Eichi Hongo, “Tour of Duty—Special Detail #2,” July 17, 1942, pg. 1. RASRL.
45 James Dulaney and Eichi Hongo, “Special Detail,” October 21, 1942, pg. 3. RASRL.
47 James Dulaney and Eichi Hongo, “Special Detail, 11-11-42,” November 11, 1942, pg. 1. RASRL.
48 James Dulaney and Eichi Hongo, “Special Detail,” October 17, 1942, pg. 3. RASRL.
James Dulaney and Eichi Hongo, “Special Detail, 11-7-42,” December 8, 1942, pg. 1. RASRL.

James Dulaney and Eichi Hongo, “Special Detail, 12-8-42,” December 8, 1942, pg. 3. RASRL.

James Dulaney and Eichi Hongo, “Special Detail,” September 17, 1942, pg. 2. RASRL.


“Police Say No Evidence Of Parachutists,” HSB, 8 December 1941, 2; “Police Probe Reports of Parachutists,” HSB, 8 December 1941, 2; “City Water Is Safe To Drink, Ohrt Announces,” HSB, 8 December 1941, 2; “Sabotage Reported in Waikiki Area,” HSB, 7 December 1941, 3.

Hazama, Okage Same De 132.

James Dulaney and Eichi Hongo, “Special Detail,” October 27, 1942, pg. 2. RASRL.

James Dulaney and Eichi Hongo, “Special Detail, 12-10-42” December 10, 1942, pg. 1. RASRL.

James Dulaney and Eichi Hongo, “Special Detail, 12-11-42” December 11, 1942, pg. 1. RASRL.

Ansley N. Neptune and Eichi Hongo, “Tour of Duty—Special Detail #2,” July 17, 1942, pg. 1. RASRL.

Ernest Nowell and Eichi Hongo, “Tour of Duty—Special Detail #2,” August 7, 1942, pg. 2. RASRL.

James Dulaney and Eichi Hongo, “Special Detail, 10-17-42,” October 17, 1942, pg. 3. RASRL.


William G. Ross and Eichi Hongo, “Tour of Duty—Special Detail #2,” June 20, 1942, pg. 1. RASRL.


“Anti-Japanese Sentiment of Naval Commander,” JIRHE Item 361.

Kawahara and Hatanaka, “The Impact of War on an Immigrant Culture,” 40.


Ansley N. Neptune and Eichi Hongo, “Tour of Duty—Special Detail #2,” June 5, 1942, pg. 2. RASRL.

Ernest Nowell and Eichi Hongo, “Tour of Duty—Special Detail #2,” August 10, 1942, pg. 2. RASRL.

Ernest Nowell and Eichi Hongo, “Tour of Duty—Special Detail #2,” July 31, 1942, pg. 1. RASRL.

John L. Upton and Eichi Hongo, “Tour of Duty—Special Detail #2,” July 26, 1942, pg. 1. RASRL.
As the Emergency Service Committee was organizing meetings on O’ahu, Hans L’Orange, manager of Oahu Sugar’s plantation at Waipahu refused to allow Burns to organize any meetings on the premises believing that it would be disruptive to his workers. Both Burns and military intelligence felt that Waipahu, “a virtual Japanese ghetto,” strategically located next to Pearl Harbor, had to participate in the program. After personally approaching L’Orange, who remained intransigent, Burns went to the Hawaii Sugar Planters’ Association (HSPA) and urged them to encourage L’Orange to participate. Within days,
the HSPA notified Burns that L’Orange was more than happy to participate in the program. Boylan, *John A. Burns* 63–64.


96 Boylan, *John A. Burns* 63.