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THE FILIBUSTER OF WALTER MURRAY GIBSON

By JAMES WARREN GOULD*

One of the most fascinating characters in Hawaiian history is Walter Murray Gibson, premier of the independent kingdom of Hawaii from 1882 until he was forced from office five years later. Before he went into Hawaiian politics Gibson was a Mormon missionary and world traveller. Little is known about his early life. This is partly because we have two versions of his story, the one written by his enemies—he had many—who paint him as a villainous adventurer, and the other written by himself. His own story of his early life, *The Prison of Weltevreden*, is a romantic tale of injured innocence. The writer of this article has gone to the diplomatic files of the foreign office in The Hague and in Washington to trace the official story of Gibson’s adventure in the East Indies. It is presented here in the hope that it will throw new light on his later career.

Filibustering Origins.—The history of American filibusters has omitted the story of Walter Murray Gibson. This is undoubtedly because of a lack of knowledge of American interests in Sumatra and in Southeast Asia generally. The fact that Gibson’s case does not fall within the traditional area of Latin America may account partially for its having been overlooked. Possibly that geographic limitation of filibustering is too narrow, as Gibson had all the other earmarks of an American filibusterer. He fitted the description of being ambitious and romantic and interested in ruling a tropical government. He had an egotistical confidence in his own rightness, and he was a Southerner. Like others of his kind, he seems to have been motivated basically by that romantic spirit of adventure which, after the end of American territorial expansion in 1848, found continued expression in filibustering.

Gibson’s early experiences were suggestive of filibustering as a review of his early life reveals. The place and date of his birth have always been in doubt. In later years the story that he was born of American parents in 1822 aboard a Spanish vessel in the Bay of Biscay was generally accepted. But he celebrated his sixtieth birthday on January 16, 1884, with an elaborate and largely attended reception fully reported at the time in the Honolulu newspapers and in his youth he once swore in court to having been born in Keerslaw or Courtlow, Northumberland, England. Some of his discussions

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with the State Department also indicated British birth. Whatever his nativity, it is agreed that he was brought to the United States as a small boy, and that he lived in New York, New Jersey, and South Carolina. Whatever his nativity, it is agreed that he was brought to the United States as a small boy, and that he lived in New York, New Jersey, and South Carolina. He was married at fifteen, but his wife died five years later leaving him with three small children. He soon left them to go adventuring. During most of the 1840’s he was interested in Central America. He planned an expedition to Mexican California in 1843, lived with the exiled Mexican dictator Santa Anna after 1845, and followed General Scott’s Army from Vera Cruz to Mexico City in 1847. After making some money in California he returned to Washington where, through Chevalier Gomez, he became Consul General for several Central American states. In those days that meant diplomatic representation. Attracted by the idea of forming the nucleus of a Guatemalan navy for General Rafael Carrera, he bought a schooner from the American Minister to Mexico, James Gadsden, for $3500. Ironically, the vessel was the former United States revenue schooner Flirt which had been active against the first Lopez filibustering expedition to Cuba. Because Gibson armed the schooner in New York City, the United States Marshall declared he had violated American neutrality laws, and forced Gibson to abandon both the arms and the Guatemalan scheme. Gibson then headed for Brazil with an innocent cargo of ice. An exciting trip involving mutiny and charges of piracy ended at Maceio, Brazil, where he tried to sell the Flirt. Gibson does not seem to have been concerned whether the buyer was legitimate or a rebel government. Offers of charters to run the Brazilian blockade into Buenos Aires and to run up the Amazon were frowned upon by the Brazilian government, and Gibson only escaped arrest by taking refuge in the British Vice Consulate at Maceio.

Up to this point, Gibson’s career shows close resemblances to that of a filibusterer. Was he likely to change merely for the lack of opportunity in Latin America? In Pernambuco he met a Scot, Charles Graham, who had served in British India and had sailed in the Far East. Gibson claims to have been inspired to go to the Indies by boyhood stories told by a seafaring uncle and a wealthy planter, but Graham’s practical knowledge was probably the major stimulus to their departure for the Indies.

Arrival in Sumatra.—Gibson first saw Sumatra on December 25, 1851, as the Flirt entered the Straits of Sunda, and he acted like a conquistador when he set his foot on Sumatran soil on New Year’s Day, 1852. His first port of call was Muntok, Banka which he was forced to enter on January 5 due to a storm. Gibson frankly admitted that he was unlike other Americans, for he “saw more in these islands than cargoes for ships.” What were his ambitions? He tells us this was a time when “the world had heard of the
labors and wise policy of Sir James Brooke.” Even old maids could say: “Many a youthful heart . . . beat with the desire to imitate the Rajah of Sarawak.” Persons who knew Gibson in later life described him as politically ambitious. Did he decide to try for his own Sultanate? Gibson tipped his hand to the Dutch Resident of Banka, Schaap. He defended the Lopez filibuster in Cuba and talked about his “kingdom” in the Indies. While in Banka, Gibson met a half-breed Balinese, Captain William Valberg, who invited Gibson to accompany him to Palembang whence he was transporting Dutch troops to suppress a rebellion. Considering Gibson’s background it is not unreasonable to assume that he saw in the revolution an opportunity to fulfill his ambitions.

This revolt had begun in January 1850 in the Marga (tribal district) of Bulan Tengah, Musi Hulu. The Dutch admitted (to themselves, of course) that their own maladministration had caused the revolt. Specifically, the natives lacked respect for the local Dutch administrator, Captain Meyer, who ruled the area as a military governor and in ignorance of local customs and language. He had blunderingly changed local rulers. The second reason was the Dutch demand of December 1851 for delivery of 150 forced laborers. This meant seven per cent of the males in a total population of 5,380.

Once started, the revolt “spread like fire” throughout the area, and particularly to the Ampat Lawang district. The revolt became so serious that when the hated garrison commander was besieged, the Indies government had to take “stern measures.” An expedition to suppress the revolt in late 1851 failed due to serious illness among Dutch troops. By early January of 1852 the Dutch position was desperate. The rebels controlled the interior of Sumatra while the Dutch military governor de Brauw waited powerless until reinforcements arrived from Batavia. Thus, Gibson arrived at a time when the Dutch position was most critical.

Gibson’s “Treason”—Gibson arrived at Palembang on January 17, 1852, and within a day allowed himself to be seen with a native who was an old enemy of the Dutch, and who appealed to Gibson for aid. Although Gibson protested the innocence of such meetings, he openly admitted that he was aware that his arrival “prompted overtures of desertion and rebellion on the part of disaffected soldiers and vessels.” He studiously ignored all friendly warnings that the visits of the natives, who were begging for his aid, were interpreted by the Dutch as an effort to extend American influence in Sumatra. In fact everything he did seems to have encouraged Dutch fears that the Americans were going to place obstacles in the way of increased Dutch power, a suspicion which the English had been trying to arouse since 1850 at least. Gibson let the Dutch know his adulation for Rajah Brooke,
for he said later that he indulged "in bravadoes that I would become a potentate in the east."\textsuperscript{33} He really made the Dutch furious, he later told a correspondent of the New York Herald, by running the American flag up on a 120-foot pole over the residence of a native chieftain, "unquestionably the first time the stars and stripes were displayed in this part of Sumatra."\textsuperscript{34} Gibson's final undoing was putting his thoughts into writing. On February 4 he dictated a letter to be sent to the Sultan of Djambi. The following text of that letter may be considered authoritative since it is the English translation which Gibson later sent to President Fillmore, admitting that it corresponded with the original:

\begin{quote}
I am able to assist you Sultan in all your wishes, as the American government has abundance of powder, shot, muskets and blunderbusses. I want to make all the Malays free, and I do not like all the Dutchmen . . . the American government has plenty of steamers and ships of war: there are plenty of both; You need not fear Sultan—The whole upper districts of Jambie and Palembang I will put in good order. If it is possible all Dutchmen must be killed. In a few days I can be with you and take possession of this Empire.\textsuperscript{35}
\end{quote}

Gibson later denied having dictated this particular letter, saying he had dictated only a letter of introduction for his mate, Graham. Several things argue against such a story: 1) He did not deny the authenticity of the original in sending it to President Fillmore in April, 1853. 2) It is improbable that he signed a forgery since he said he had the aid of a Malay dictionary and therefore knew the portent of the words.\textsuperscript{36} Gibson maintained that the "inflamatory" words were inserted by his scribe, a Dutch spy, and that he signed the forgery when drunk. Some credibility was given to this story by the decision of the Dutch Council of the Indies that he had been the victim of a plot of his scribe to betray him.\textsuperscript{37} Even so, the scribe could not have been the sole author, for the document showed too remarkable a knowledge of Gibson's ambitions to have been made up out of whole cloth. It is probable that Gibson did dictate a letter offering assistance which the scribe touched up for the benefit of his masters, the Dutch.

Graham was sent off to Djambi on the night of February 4 in a most surreptitious fashion to be carrying a mere letter of introduction.\textsuperscript{38} He got no more than ten miles up the Musi River, to Pulo Karta, when the Dutch police, tipped off by the scribe of course, caught him and brought him back to Palembang. Armed with the tell-tale letter, the Dutch boarded the Flirt the next day and arrested Gibson as its author. He later claimed that, at the time of the arrest, a Dutch lieutenant cried "Haul down your flag, you
damn Yankee insurrectionaire," and when he refused to do so, tore it down and threw it into the river. The account is rendered suspicious by the fact that secret Dutch files, which might contain an admission of any such action, show complete innocence of the incident. Furthermore, Gibson completely failed to mention this incident to the American Consul or to an American naval officer during his later trials. If the event occurred at all, it may have happened when he ran up the flag on Dutch soil.

Colonel de Brauw concluded from looking at the letter that Gibson's object in coming to Sumatra was "to play the role of James Brooke." Pointing to the dangers if he had ever reached Djambi or Ampat Lawang, the Colonel concluded that Gibson was guilty of "high treason against the Netherlands Government and deserves the death penalty." The Colonel had a friendly chat with Gibson in jail the next day and claims to have induced him to confess his ambitions. Gibson supposedly admitted that he was a member of a group of roving youths out for adventure, and when he learned in Banka of the Palembang rising decided to try for adventure there. The Colonel said, "He told me that he always wanted to enter into the service of a native prince, in order to help him against his oppressors" and play the role of James Brooke, if not in Sumatra some other island.

Gibson's Trials

The first release.—Gibson was placed aboard the Dutch government steamer Ardijeno and shipped to Batavia to be tried for treason. The Dutch case was made difficult by the drowning of ten government witnesses. An account of this, the details of which could have come only from Gibson, says that Gibson's friend Valberg hired himself as a steersman of a government boat on the Musi, tipped it over and drowned ten of the highest Dutch officials in Sumatra, including a major, three captains, the Treasurer of the Province and the Commissioner of the Sumatra Army.

When the case came up for trial on February 21, 1852, before the Batavia Court of Justice, it was thrown out because of the illegality of Gibson's arrest by military authority, and he was released. It could hardly be expected that he would not be rearrested under proper procedures, but Gibson ignored advice to escape during his short liberation, choosing to wait and attempt to get back his schooner. Warned by the Dutch of his imminent rearrest, he was led to believe that if he signed an appeal of clemency he might be pardoned by Governor-General Duymaer van Twist. Accordingly, on February 25, 1852, he signed a confession, the heart of which was that he had acted rashly in talking with the natives and signing the letter and indulging "in bravadoes, that I would become a potentate in the east." I have seen the original of this document, and it certainly looks genuine enough
as it is in Gibson's own hand and signature. Gibson never denied its authenticity, and in fact showed how much importance he attached to it by having a copy secretly removed from State Department files, as we shall see later. However, we cannot feel confident that the Governor-General acted fairly in this instance, for the confession was later used to convict Gibson.

Second acquittal.—Formal trial commenced on the day Gibson signed the confession. After review of the case by the highest authorities in the Indies, Governor-General van Twist reluctantly agreed with his Council on March 24, 1852, on what was a very generous appraisal of the case. They believed that Gibson was probably a victim of the Dutch spies and that he did not understand the contents of the letter he signed. They felt he probably had sinister designs, but since the schemes did not succeed, no crime had been committed.

The Governor's orders to release Gibson turned out to be a mere formality, for the Governor-General wrote to The Hague on the same day that "it is time to make an example, if possible, so that adventurers of such ilk are induced to more prudence." Accordingly the Governor-General had the case appealed to the Supreme Court which involved further delay. This was an extremely unfortunate decision since it substantiated Gibson's claims that the Dutch were out to get him under any circumstances.

Gibson lost confidence in the American Commercial Agent in Batavia, A. A. Read, after he heard that he had said "We have too many of these revolutionary fanatics in America—hang him." Read left Batavia shortly after Gibson's arrival, and his successor, a Dutch citizen, had no power to exercise consular function because of being unrecognized by the Dutch government. Finding his government so poorly represented in Batavia, Gibson then sent every American authority in the Far East a story of injured innocence. One of these appeals reached the East India Squadron Commander John H. Aulick in Hongkong. Showing that reluctance of naval officers to leave cooler waters that has been previously mentioned, Aulick thought of several excuses not to go to Batavia. Then, as an afterthought, he decided to send the sloop St. Mary's. Aulick ordered Commander George A. Magruder to investigate Gibson's case and "use every proper effort to relieve him from his difficulties—or at least see that he has justice done to him." As soon as the news reached Batavia that the Navy was coming, Gibson detected a marked difference in the Dutch attitude. The Dutch released Gibson's crew and gave him more liberties. He claims it was hinted that if he escaped the government would be happy and only a "sham search" would be made. However, he refused his chance again, counting on naval support to get his schooner back.
During his visit at Batavia from July 7 to 17, 1852, Commander Magruder was received by the Dutch with such obsequious gestures as an offer of coal for Commodore Perry's expedition to Japan which the Dutch were known to oppose. Finding Gibson in "comfortable quarters" in prison, contrary to Gibson's later allegations, Magruder then went to Bogor to visit the Governor-General. Although Duymaer van Twist professed to be willing to give all the facts, he suppressed from Magruder his determination to make an example of Gibson and concealed the way Gibson's "confession" had been obtained. Although Magruder left Batavia convinced of Gibson's innocence he had a Dutch assurance that the case would be decided quickly and "without the least influence of anyone whatever." In the fulfillment of these promises the Governor-General was greatly remiss. When a second trial resulted in acquittal on August 25, 1852, Gibson was rearrested. The hypocrisy of the government was apparently not lost on the Dutch in Batavia. One may doubt the reliability of Gibson's statement that his counsel F. A. Mees said that he had never seen "such arbitrary proceedings." However, these sentiments are supported by Magruder's statement that public opinion in Batavia favored Gibson.

Meanwhile, in Washington, the State Department found no reason to take action. The first official news of Gibson's case came from the American Legation in The Hague which delayed action by promising further information. The information finally supplied by the Dutch gave such an unfavorable impression of Gibson that the American Minister could only recommend no "interference at present." Reports from Aulick passed to the State Department indicated at first that the Navy was going to investigate and later that Magruder had assurances of Gibson's being fairly treated. Thus, there was no reason for Washington to do anything.

Final trials.—When Gibson had been in jail for a year without being legally sentenced, and in fact had been acquitted for the third and fourth times, on August 25 and December 22, 1852, his appeals reached Humphrey Marshall, American Commissioner in China. Marshall examined the papers Gibson had sent him and concluded that they "afford strong persuasive evidence that if his hand has not executed, his heart conceived, a course of action exceedingly reprehensible upon the part of an American citizen." Marshall nevertheless discussed with Aulick the sending of another warship to Batavia. Aulick used the old Navy excuse of having to leave for home.

The fifth decision, on February 25, 1853, was again in Gibson's favor. In what can be justified by no interpretation of a system of appeals, since there were only two courts involved, Gibson was arrested a fifth time and the case sent to the Supreme Court. Gibson's counsel explained the reason
for this as being Duyamaer van Twist's determination to sentence him to death lest his acquittal encourage rebellion in the islands. The counsel learned that the Attorney General had told the Indies Council that Gibson was a secret agent of the American Government and "hence it was the more important to make a signal example of this first attempt of the American Government or American people to encroach upon the dominions of the Netherlands in the manner of the Cuban invasion."  

Duyamaer van Twist finally got a decision against Gibson by the Supreme Court of the Indies on May 3, 1853. The court found him guilty of "high treason" and condemned him to twelve years imprisonment after half an hour exposure on the gallows.  

Gibson feared, with apparent good reason, that the Dutch might hang him, and did not wait to hear the sentence. On April 25, 1853, he escaped from prison to the American ship *N. B. Palmer*, on which he returned to the United States.  

*The status of Djambi.*—Although circumstantial evidence pointed clearly to Gibson's intention to filibuster in Sumatra, the Dutch courts had a difficult time convicting him legally. First of all, it was rather questionable whether an alien could commit "treason." Secondly, although there was plenty of evidence that Gibson planned a filibuster, he never carried it out. Under the Dutch law, intention was not a crime. Thirdly, the Sultan of Djambi, with whom he conspired, was not under Dutch sovereignty. At the time of Gibson's arrest, Colonel de Brauw referred to Djambi as a kingdom (ryk). The Dutch had no troops or government there and the only sovereignty they exercised was collection of customs. The relations between the Netherlands and Djambi were governed by the Treaty of December 15, 1834, which Michiels had extorted from the Sultan. Under Article three of that treaty, the Sultan had placed himself "under the immediate protection and authority of the Netherlands Indies Government, and promised to enter into no friendly relations with enemies of that Government." The Dutch later admitted that this obviously did not prevent Djambi from making treaties with friendly powers or individuals such as Gibson. In fact the Dutch claim to sovereignty was admittedly so weak that it was only with the aid of military force that they were later able to obtain an explicit admission of subjection from the Sultan.  

*The Prodigal Son Returns.*  

*Gibson's claim.*—On July 27, 1853, Gibson returned to New York and started to work to get reparation. The best prediction of Gibson's chances were made by a British citizen: "though Mr. Gibson, has certainly received such treatment from the Dutch Authorities as should not be permitted to
pass unnoticed, he would do well to confine himself to facts, as otherwise it will prejudice his claims..."

Word of Gibson’s fifth successful trial having reached the United States before his return, Secretary of State William L. Marcy had instructed the new American chief of mission in The Hague, Chargé d’Affaires August Belmont, that one of his first acts on arrival in The Hague was to take up Gibson’s case, and to make an “earnest demand... for the immediate trial or discharge of Mr. Gibson” if he had not yet escaped. Before Belmont reached The Hague, Gibson had escaped, and had presented his grievances to Marcy. The Secretary gave him full access to State Department and Navy reports, and on August 22 Gibson came up with a claim of $100,000, half of it for the loss of his $3500 schooner. Marcy sent Gibson’s statements off to Belmont with orders to request indemnity if the claim were found correct.

Marcy may have regretted his support of Gibson. Soon afterward, he heard from a New York friend that Gibson was “totally unworthy of the protection of his government.” Marcy then asked the persons listed by his informant for an estimate of Gibson’s character, and received a rash of unfavorable replies describing Gibson in such terms as “unprincipal[ed] villain,” “pirate” and “swindled.” Gibson at once came back with a recommendation from James L. Orr, the influential United States Representative from South Carolina and later Speaker of the House. Within the State Department, Marcy was advised that Dutch persistence in trying to convict Gibson rendered the allegiance of Djambi suspicious, and their case questionable. Therefore the case was continued, and Gibson had won the first round.

Meanwhile Belmont had presented the claim during his first business meeting with the Netherlands Foreign Minister van Hall on October 12. Van Hall said he knew of the case, but wanted to get all of the details. He assured Belmont that the case would be fully investigated and justice done if Gibson had been wrongly dealt with. Belmont took little hope from these promises, judging from American experience with Dutch delays on previous claims. After getting the American charges in writing, van Hall passed the papers on to the Minister of Colonies, C. F. Pahud, suggesting that the matter be disposed of quickly to avoid difficulties with the United States.

Dutch delays.—With what can hardly be considered speed, Minister of Colonies Pahud finally got off a request to the Governor-General on November 15, 1853. In his letter he did ask for examination of the American charges with “the greatest care” and speed. He was careful to avoid criticism of the Indies handling of the case but suggested that possibly the Indies
officials should be just a little more careful in handling strangers. This cautious attitude is indicative of the remarkably independent power of the Governor-General.

Belmont hardly guessed how long a wait he faced, and was back at the Plein (Foreign Office) on October 24 for a reply. Van Hall told him, incorrectly, that Batavia had been instructed to inquire about the matter and that they could do nothing until they received an answer.

Belmont also brought up the question of the absence of consuls in the Indies, a deficiency that had been emphasized by the inability of the unrecognized agents to give Gibson any official support. Van Hall gave no encouragement, citing the traditional Dutch arguments of consular “influence and interference” and abuse of privileges that would do credit to a Russian argument for the “Iron Curtain” today. Belmont settled down to a wait of at least four or five months. He confided to James Buchanan, his friend and colleague in London, that the Dutch would probably drag the thing on for years—maybe twenty, like the previous claim. He remarked, “The Dutch are slow in everything, but particularly when it comes to paying.”

Commodore Perry’s reaction.—Belmont’s letter to Buchanan suggests that he was a bit bored with the letdown of business after his first diplomatic adventure. He decided to write his friend Commodore M. C. Perry to suggest that he go down to Batavia to get the facts on Gibson while waiting to go back to Japan in the spring of 1854. Belmont became rather annoyed about Dutch obstruction of Perry’s visit to Japan and suggested that if it came to war the United States might liberate the Indies from the Dutch. What he said exactly was that,

*with half a dozen American ships of war it would be an easy thing to revolutionize the whole Dutch Archipelago, the unfettered trade of which would be at least fully worth as much for our countrymen, as what we may reap from the opening of the Japanese ports.*

He went on to mention the iron and coal deposits of Sumatra as an attraction.

Perry did not go any farther south than Macao in 1853, but Belmont’s appeals apparently found some sympathy. In his documents we find the following statement:

*the day will however arrive, and at no distant period, when political events and the unanimous and urgent appeals of our commercial men, will make it obligatory on the United States to look with greater solicitude to our eastern commerce, and to extend the advantages of our national friendship and protection, as well to Japan and Lew*
Chew as to other powers but little better known to Western Nations. I may refer to Siam, Cambodia, Cochinchina, and parts of Borneo and Sumatra.\textsuperscript{87}

He went on to scoff at European claims to dominate broad areas of the world, and with clear reference to Balestier’s Borneo Treaty and Gibson’s connection with Djambi, said:

\begin{quote}
It should not be admitted because England, Holland, or Spain may hold an insignificant part of a kingdom or province, that their lawful sovereignty should be extended by consequence over the whole country. And so in regard to Borneo and Sumatra; have we not the same right to negotiate with the native princes as England and Holland claim to have?\textsuperscript{88}
\end{quote}

While Belmont waited for a reply from the Dutch, Gibson went around the eastern United States drumming up support for his claim, and spreading a great deal of information about Sumatra.\textsuperscript{89} He went down to the grass roots, and induced the citizens of his old home towns, Anderson and Pendleton, South Carolina, to petition Congress for action on his claim.\textsuperscript{90} Representative Orr presented the petitions in a speech to the House of Representatives on May 25, 1854, and they were referred to the Foreign Relations Committee.\textsuperscript{91} Gibson also was engaged to the daughter of the influential Dr. Lindlay and was getting considerable congressional support.\textsuperscript{92}

Van Hall finally got around to handing Belmont a tentative reply on March 1, 1854, which in effect rejected the claim, but still held out hope of getting final word from the Indies.\textsuperscript{93} At the same time van Hall started other methods to dispose of the claim. He sent one of his most promising young diplomats to Washington in the new position of Minister, when the post had only been held by a \textit{charge}. Belmont was inexperienced enough only to be flattered that he would receive a commensurate promotion to full Minister.\textsuperscript{94} Van Hall also held out some hope of admission of consuls to the Indies, which he later made contingent upon abandonment of the Gibson claim.\textsuperscript{95}

\textbf{Gibson’s “Mission” to Europe}

Anticipating that the final Dutch reply would be negative, Belmont pressed the Secretary of State for further instructions. Marcy assured him that he wanted the wrongs “adjusted . . . speedily and amicably.” He said, “You are now instructed to press the matter temperately but resolutely upon the Dutch Government, urging immediate and ample reparation for the outrages committed.”\textsuperscript{96} Marcy accepted a suggestion from Gibson that he personally carry these instructions to The Hague and help Belmont with the
claim. Before leaving, Gibson got a letter of introduction (from President Pierce, he claimed) to Judge Don Pyott, then Secretary of Legation at Paris. It was solely on the basis of this that Gibson later let it be understood that he was sent to Europe as a special agent of President Pierce.

Gibson arrived in The Hague soon after the trial documents had come in from Batavia, and van Hall presented his final rejection of the claim to Belmont. Gibson probably helped Belmont draft the reply to this rejection. It was a very well-reasoned, if somewhat inaccurate, note. It concluded with Marcy's own words that the American government expected a "speedy and amicable adjustment of this claim." Fully expecting a negative reply to this, Belmont again asked Marcy for further instructions. He suggested that arbitration seemed the most likely prospect.

Van Hall had softened the refusal for Belmont by presenting a draft of a convention admitting American consuls to the Indies. His gesture to Gibson was returning his private papers. Ever since his return home, Gibson had been storming for the return of the private papers which the Dutch had retained after his trial. Marcy had acceded to Gibson's demand that the Dutch be asked to return them, and Belmont had presented the request to van Hall. The Minister of Colonies sent the papers to van Hall with the trial documents. But in a colossal blunder, van Hall had given Gibson all of the trial documents and secret letters of the Indies Government. Each minister apparently assumed that the other had taken out all official documents and did not bother to look over the contents himself. One can imagine Gibson's delight to find all of the Dutch evidence of the use of spies and the administrative interference for his conviction. The blunder was not discovered by the Dutch for over a month. Van Hall was then put in the awkward position of having to ask for the return of the incriminating documents.

Gibson had in the meantime left the Netherlands. He apparently feared that he might be arrested by the Dutch if he remained in The Hague alone. In a typically Gibsonian act, he left his card with the Minister of Colonies as he departed. Pahud interpreted this as an act of defiance and then did threaten to arrest him if he returned. Gibson went to Paris, where, by "attaching" himself to Secretary of Legation Don Pyott, he fraudulently assumed the title of "attaché." By getting an official denial of Gibson's attaché title from Paris, van Hall was able to prove to Belmont that Gibson was not reliable and to weaken Belmont's confidence in Gibson's claim.

At the request of the Dutch, Belmont wrote Gibson to return the Dutch official papers and got the answer that he wanted a list of those desired. He hoped, one may suppose, to get an official authentication and admission of
the existence of the documents which he intended to copy before returning.\textsuperscript{111} The Dutch had to admit that they did not even know the contents of the file since even the inventory had been sent to Gibson. They suggested that Gibson go over the papers together with them.\textsuperscript{112} The documents never were returned.\textsuperscript{113}

**The United States Threatens War**

Between July 4 and September 7 Belmont had no reply to his last note to van Hall for "speedy" adjustment. Finally, on September 1 van Hall told him to expect a reply. Belmont still had no instructions from Marcy about what to do in event of a refusal. In the meantime Gibson was exerting pressure by sending scurrilous attacks against Belmont and Marcy to the American newspapers.\textsuperscript{114} Although Gibson was apparently satisfied when he left The Hague, he was annoyed by Belmont's refusal to give him a loan of $500 on the strength of his claim.\textsuperscript{115}

The United States Threatens War

The arrival of Assistant Secretary of State Ambrose Dudley Mann in Europe on August 19 must have been an answer to Belmont's prayers.\textsuperscript{116} Mann's principal purpose in coming was the settlement of the Soule affair, which led to the famous Ostend Conference. However, American newspapers hinted that Mann was concerned with the settlement of other matters including the Gibson claim.\textsuperscript{117} The truth of these reports is suggested by Marcy's statement that Mann took Gibson's dossier with him to Europe.\textsuperscript{118} Upon his arrival in Paris, Mann wrote Belmont that he would like to see him in Paris, although he had no official instructions to give him. Belmont replied that he could not come since he was expecting van Hall's reply.\textsuperscript{119} It was probably in this letter that Belmont mentioned his anxiousness to receive instructions from Marcy.\textsuperscript{120}

About September 3, Mann had a talk with Gibson, who gave the impression that Belmont was criticising the State Department for not instructing him to be "more exacting" with the Dutch and thus settle the claim. Mann wrote to Marcy that he would only refer Belmont to his previous instructions which he "considered sufficiently explicit."\textsuperscript{121}

At just this time Belmont was called to Paris by Daniel E. Sickles to receive a personal invitation from President Pierce to attend the Ostend Conference.\textsuperscript{122} Despite Mann's promise to refer Belmont to previous instructions, the latter seems to have left Paris with a new idea of throwing down the gauntlet to the Dutch on the Gibson claim. After meeting Sickles on September 4, Belmont said he saw only Mason, Mann, Pyott, and Gibson. He said he received no advice or instructions from anyone.\textsuperscript{123} Had Mann forgotten to advise Belmont as he had promised Marcy to do, or did he advise Belmont differently? Belmont's correspondence shows a reluctance to act
without official approval, so it is probable that Mann approved Gibson's demand to threaten the Dutch. The diplomatic language in which Belmont phrased his note also suggests Mann's experienced guidance. That Mann did not refer Belmont to his previous instructions is suggested by external and internal evidence. In the letter to Marcy Mann expresses what appears to be his own opinion that the Dutch "will yield if pressed." External evidence is the lack of frankness with which Mann dealt with Marcy during this trip over the Soule and Ostend affairs.

On his return from Paris, Belmont was handed the Dutch reply to the note of July 4.124 To this Belmont replied that he saw no point to further correspondence since his latest note was "quite as unadmissible" as the others. He concluded, "it now only remains for my government to take such measures for the enforcement of Mr. Gibson's claim, as it may deem fit and proper in the premises."125

Belmont was quite aware that the tenor of his note suggested war. He told Marcy that he "hinted most unequivocally to your determination to resort to ulterior measure, in order to obtain redress for the wrongs suffered by Mr. Gibson."126 Why would he say "your determination" when he had received no instructions from Marcy, unless someone who had come from Marcy (like Mann) had given him this impression? Belmont seems to have had some doubts about Marcy's support, since he wrote Marcy privately that the "energetic note, which while it contains a sufficient threat, does not hamper in any way your private action in the matter."127

The implied threat of war not unnaturally caused a stir in the Dutch cabinet. After consulting the King, van Hall decided to call Belmont's bluff. Pretending that his knowledge of English was too poor to understand what the threatening words meant, he politely asked Belmont for a clarification. He said that he certainly did not think that the words implied a threat, considering the ancient friendship between the two countries.128 The ruse worked. Still without written instructions from Marcy, Belmont backed down, saying that he did not see how his note could possibly have hurt Dutch feelings.129 However, to Marcy, Belmont continued to urge the necessity of "coercive measures" to enforce the claim. Another reference to Marcy's determination "to resort to reprisals" implied Mann's intermediacy since Marcy's instructions are non-existent.130

Back in Washington Marcy finally heard from a "private source" (probably a private letter of Mann's) that Belmont was waiting for instructions. Marcy decided to take up the matter with President Pierce, but was surprised to find that Gibson's dossier was missing from the files.131 He then had to
wait until the return of Mann who had "principle management of Gibson's claim."  

When Marcy received Belmont's complaint about lack of instructions on October 3, he replied in annoyed tones that he had not expected to send Belmont any instructions until the Dutch refused finally, and that he felt besides that the Dutch had made some pretty strong arguments. Marcy gave no instructions for strong measures, and did not even hint that he knew he was expected to suggest such measures. Marcy's skepticism of Gibson's claim, his annoyance with Belmont's eagerness, and irritation with Mann's removal of the dossier strengthen the supposition that Mann pushed Belmont to write the threatening note.

Van Hall's sigh of relief at Belmont's backing down was almost audible in his grateful reply of September 22. Even the king of the Netherlands obliquely suggested to Belmont how relieved he was about the outcome. But the battle was only half over. News of the threat of war had leaked to the Dutch press and the fate of the Ministry seemed in doubt for a while. When the Ministry's speech from the throne, which is like the State of the Union address in the United States, on September 26 referred to amicable foreign relations, opposition delegates in both houses of parliament took exception to the statement on the basis of the Gibson case. Van Hall saved his own skin by saying that Belmont's letter was not hostile and "enforcement" did not mean force or violence. As far as Belmont's present views were concerned, van Hall was right. The Ministry was also attacked for what one Dutch paper called "stupidity" of giving Gibson the official papers. Van Hall admitted this was an error but blamed the bureaucrats. After all, he said, you could not blame a minister for such a thing or else clerks could give away documents and get ministers into trouble all the time!

In attacking the Ministry, the opposition was far from favorable to Gibson. They criticized the government for allowing him to escape from Batavia and for not arresting him in The Hague. Van Hall's reply to this last criticism incorrectly implied that he had frightened Gibson off with a threat of arrest. This brought Gibson back to The Hague in defiance. Although Gibson made sure he was not arrested by staying only a day, and then in Belmont's house, he found a way to retaliate against van Hall. He turned over to the opposition press copies of the belligerent correspondence between Belmont and van Hall. However, in doing this, Gibson did himself a disservice, for Belmont regarded it was a "flagrant betrayal of confidence." The scurrilous reports which the New York Herald was then printing about Belmont's doing banking in his Legation, which Gibson did not deny came from him, lost Gibson any chance of Belmont's further support.
There appears to be only indirect connections between the Gibson case and the Ostend Conference which took place at this time. Despite news reports that the conference did take up the Gibson case,\textsuperscript{141} there is no evidence of this in the correspondence of the participants. Considering the notoriety of Gibson's case, it would be surprising if it did not come up in the course of conversation, but Belmont's confidence in Gibson was so weakened after the incident of the correspondence that it is doubtful if any decision was requested or made at the Ostend Conference. However, it is significant that Belmont's visit to Paris to receive his invitation to the conference was the occasion of his meeting Mann and instruction or encouragement to threaten the Dutch. Belmont's threatening note to the Dutch on September 7 is an excellent example of the militia diplomacy which characterized American relations with several European powers at that time\textsuperscript{142} and which reached its climax in the Ostend Conference.

**The End of the Case**

_Gibson's claim falters._—Having lost Belmont's confidence, and the ultimatum having failed, Gibson started for home in October, 1854. He stopped off at Liverpool and so beguiled the famous author Nathaniel Hawthorne with his Sumatra yarns that he lent him thirty English pounds for his passage home. This sum had not been repaid in 1863.\textsuperscript{143} Gibson next intended to "report" to President Pierce and Marcy about the next step in his claim. However, Marcy remarked, "I know Gibson better than Belmont did and Gibson knows I know him."\textsuperscript{144} Marcy probably was referring partly to the reports from Europe about Gibson's dishonesty and partly to Marcy's general dislike of filibustering. This was so strong that Marcy actually tendered his resignation when President Pierce forced him to recognize Walker's filibuster government of Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{145} Part of Marcy's knowledge was certainly Gibson's "base and annoying" treatment of Belmont.\textsuperscript{146} In addition the Dutch Minister in Washington had succeeded in increasing Marcy's doubts. He had even succeeded in persuading Marcy to admit that Gibson's confession to the Governor-General was "rather awkward" and that Gibson was "Quite as troublesome to me, as he may be to your Government."\textsuperscript{147} Gibson was in for a cool reception from Marcy at any rate, even if the President, Attorney General Cushing, and Assistant Secretary of State Mann did support him.\textsuperscript{148}

When Gibson arrived home, suggestions, obviously originating with Gibson, began to circulate that the United States would bombard or blockade the Dutch Indies to enforce his claim. This was immediately denied by administration sources.\textsuperscript{149} In Congress, Gibson began to encounter opposi-
tion. During the debate on the Ostend Conference on December 5, Representative Thomas M. Taylor of Ohio criticized Belmont's appointment and the general practice of writing "'filibustering' letters to foreign nations."

Gibson took the idea of war to Marcy himself, suggesting that a recommendation to that effect be included in the annual message to Congress. When Marcy refused, Gibson persuaded Representative Orr to go to Pierce and Marcy. The result was that extracts of the Gibson files were sent to the House of Representatives on December 16, 1854. These were ordered printed as the first prerequisite of Congressional action. On December 19 and 20 the Cabinet discussed whether to mention the Gibson claim in the Presidential Message. Attorney General Cushing opposed it on the grounds that the United States could not question the operation of the Dutch judicial system. President Pierce, who favored Gibson, gave in and the message said nothing about his claim.

The astuteness of Dutch minister Gevers finally killed the Gibson case. As soon as the Gibson files were printed by Congress, the Dutch minister checked through for completeness. Finding Gibson's incriminating confession missing, he sent a note of complaint to Marcy on January 10 and enclosed a new copy of the confession. Marcy invited Gevers to the State Department on January 11, and called in Mann to ask why the confession had not been sent to Congress, since he had ordered all the papers to be included. When Mann said the letter was not in the files, Marcy asked for the dossier. He and Gevers went through it together and could not find the letter. At that moment President Pierce happened to walk in. When the story was told to him, Pierce agreed that the letter should be printed. Gevers obtained permission from Marcy to give a copy to Representative Baily, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and used the opportunity to win him to the Dutch side. Gevers' whole conduct indicates a superb piece of diplomacy in presenting pieces of evidence against Gibson to the proper persons. Of course, the truth of Gibson's mistreatment became more and more obscured by the progressive discrediting of Gibson.

Marcy sent an official copy of Gibson's confession to the House of Representatives on January 19, 1855. In doing so he declared that the Department's copy had disappeared while Gibson was examining the files, clearly implying that Gibson had had it removed because it was too damaging. This marked the end of administration support of Gibson. Gevers soon convinced the influential men in Congress to drop Gibson's claim. On February 10 he got Baily's assurance that "you will have no further difficulty" and Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Mason's good natured congratulations for his handling of the case. As the opposition press dug down into the
printed documents, they found more and more to Gibson's discredit. By March 1, 1855, Gibson's claim was almost dead.

**Gibson persists.**—Gibson did not give up his case easily and was able to enlist support of his claim in the next congress. He drew up a new defense of his conduct based on the strong argument about the weakness of Dutch claims to Djambi. This he had presented to the House by Representative Abram Wakeman of Connecticut on April 15, 1856. His old friend, Representative Orr, resubmitted the South Carolina resolutions in his favor. The House Foreign Relations Committee, to which these were referred, asked Marcy to obtain a copy of the Djambi Treaty of 1834. As a result of the investigation, the Committee reported on August 2, 1856, in Gibson's favor. The report presented Gibson's filibustering background, but concluded fairly that he had not violated any Dutch treaty or law by corresponding with the Sultan of Djambi. Finding that Gibson's arrest and confiscation of his property were a "gross violation of his rights," the Committee asked that the President again apply for indemnification. The Dutch were relieved to be informed that the Department had no intention of taking up the case again, and that Congress had no time for it in the session of 1856.

While Congress recessed, Gibson went to Boston. As Boston's interests in Sumatra were then the greatest of any American city, he was able to get the Board of Trade to memorialize Congress to send an envoy (himself, of course) to investigate Dutch claims of sovereignty in the Indies and conclude treaties with independent countries there. Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts presented a resolution to this effect to the Senate on January 28, 1857. This was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations for investigation, as was a new memorial of Gibson for indemnity. However, the Committee returned the petition without ever reporting on it.

Although Gibson's scheme of a treaty with Djambi never came to any serious conclusion in the United States, the Dutch took it very seriously. Admitting that the Treaty of 1834 allowed the foreign relations with Djambi for which Gibson had been convicted, Pahud, now Governor-General, sought to obtain a new treaty with absolute submission of Djambi to Dutch sovereignty. When the Sultan of Djambi refused to sign the treaty, the Dutch invaded his domains and forced him to accept. To have blamed the United States for this aggression, as the Dutch did, was ridiculous since the Dutch files show that they were perfectly well informed that Gibson had no chance of official support. This was not the last time that the United States was made the scapegoat for Dutch aggression, as we shall see.

The thirty-fifth Congress (1858) was the last one in which Gibson...
succeeded in getting consideration of his claim. He persuaded Representative Stanton of Ohio to resubmit his petition for indemnity in the House and Senator Pearce to do the same in the Senate. Both of the petitions died in the foreign affairs committees, ostensibly because no new facts were presented.

Gibson then turned to religious groups as a means of getting his kingdom in Sumatra. As early as 1856 he had contacted the Utah delegate in Congress, Dr. John M. Bernhisel of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints (Mormons) to suggest that his church migrate to the Indies. This proposal may have been particularly well received since the Mormons in Utah were subjected to pressure by the United States in 1858. In the following year Gibson formally proposed to Brigham Young to make the migration under his own guidance. Making the overland trek to Utah in 1859, Gibson was baptized a Mormon on January 15, 1860. His scheme of migration was rejected and when his idyllic accounts of the South Seas caused unrest among a segment of the Mormon people, Brigham Young on April 25, 1860, had Gibson set apart for a mission to the eastern part of the United States with headquarters in New York. Although Gibson was now a High Priest he spent less than six months in the east defending Mormonism for he returned to Salt Lake City on November 4, 1860. At a meeting in the Mormon Tabernacle on November 18, President Young mentioned his “call” to Gibson to do missionary work in the Pacific and the latter left for “Japan” on November 21. But for the next seven months Gibson was lecturing on “Malasia” in San Francisco where he denied that he was a Mormon. To his call to go to the Pacific, Gibson tried to add several non-religious commissions. Before he left San Francisco, the Civil War had broken out and Gibson became a Confederate agent in the Pacific. An attempt to get himself appointed Commercial Agent for California to report on trade between “the Malay Islands” and California failed and he left San Francisco for Singapore in June of 1861. Arriving at Honolulu on July 4, Gibson apparently concluded that it was a fruitful field for his ambitions and eventually he settled down on the island of Lanai. When Gibson’s perversion of his Mission, among other events, resulted in his excommunication from the Mormon church in 1864, he turned to politics. In fact, in his newspaper, Nubou, on April 18, 1873, Gibson said that his “temporary connections” with the Mormon community had been “for a political object,” and while he did not say in so many words what that object was he finally achieved his dreams of power under King Kalakaua from 1882 to 1887. That his thoughts often turned towards Sumatra we have evidence in his plan to make Hawaii the leader of a confederation of independent powers of the Pacific.
Conclusion

Gibson's later career would seem to confirm Dutch suspicions that he was seeking to duplicate that of Brooke. Dutch documents show, however, that he had a perfect legal right to treat with Djambi. Had he been a little more discreet about his intentions, and gone directly to Djambi or to a more northerly Sultanate of Sumatra, he might have set up an American Sultanate there. Having failed to do this, Gibson did stimulate more American interest in Sumatra during the 1850's than there was at any other period in American history. His attempt also had the important result of obtaining the admission of Consuls to the East Indies. It stimulated American demands by calling attention to the inadequate protection of American interests there, and hastened Dutch concession by exerting the uncomfortable pressure of his claim.

The Gibson affair was probably the most important political event in the history of American relations with Sumatra. At no time did an American citizen come closer to obtaining dominion over a portion of Sumatran soil. Because of his indiscretions, Gibson's chances of success were remote, but his ambitions there were certainly greater than any American before or since. Congressional consideration of a Djambi treaty is the closest the American government came to making active political ties in Sumatra. However, the lack of widespread support in Congress or in the administration made its approval improbable, as the Dutch well knew. The United States government had an active interest in Sumatra because of Gibson's mistreatment there, but it had no political ambitions there which endangered the Dutch. The attitude of the United States government throughout this case was its traditional one of protection of the legitimate interests of its citizens, and not of territorial aggrandizement.

As far as the impact of the Gibson claim upon Sumatran history, it was of the greatest importance. The Dutch were so frightened by Gibson's filibuster and the possibility of its repetition, that it set off a chain of Dutch preventative conquests. This chain of conquests did not stop until 1908 when all of Sumatra had been reduced to bondage. By stimulating Dutch paranoia, Gibson certainly did no service to the Sumatrans, but this should not obscure the fact that Gibson was the excuse, not the cause, of Dutch imperialism.

NOTES

3 The best biography is Walter W. Wright, Jr., "Walter Murray Gibson" in *Dictionary of American Biography*, VII, 257–258, which, however, has the weakness of having relied solely on secondary sources, most of which are highly biased.


5 See the *Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, Jan. 16, 17, 18, 1884; *Daily Bulletin*, Jan. 16, 17, 18, 1884.

6 He gave the location of Keerslaw very accurately in his testimony of February 28, 1852, encl. 14 to Exh. May 22, 1852, No. 21 in Exh. June 19, 1855, No. 27 in Netherlands, *Ministrie van Kolonien*, Algemein Ryksarchief, Dept. Schaarsbergen, Netherlands (hereafter cited as *Depot*). He gave the location more generally as Kourtlaw in the decision of Feb. 25, 1853, p. 1, in U.S. Dept. of State, *Netherlands* (hereafter cited as *Neth.*), Vol. 15, enclosed in Belmont to Marcy, March 5, 1854, No. 16.

7 The following biographic details cited by Pack, "Sandwich Islands," p. 582, and Jenson, "Gibson," p. 6, were drawn from an interview with the San Francisco *Bulletin* in 1860.


10 Gibson, *Prison*, p. 32.


19 Ibid., p. 80.


25 de Brauw to Duke of Saxe-Weimar, July 3, 1851, No. 54, encl. in Saxe-Weimar's No. 20, July 11,1851, in Batavia's No. 470/20, July 16, 1851, in *Depot*, Jan. 8, 1852, No. 11.

26 Batavia to The Hague, Aug. 12, 1851, No. 15 LaS1 Geh. in *Depot*, Oct. 18, 1851, No. 271 Geh.


28 de Brauw to Batavia, Jan. 6, 1852, No. F/B in *Depot*, March 17, 1852, No. 89 Geh.

29 Gibson, *Prison*, p. 128. A link between Gibson and the Ampat Lawang revolt was provided by the fact that aid was given by Djambi nobles to the rebels: E. S. de


35 Enclosure 3 to Gibson to the President, April 10, 1853, in *Batavia*, Vol. 3.

36 Gibson, *Prison*, p. 204.

37 Council of India, March 16, 1853, in encl. 4 to file of May 22, 1852, No. 21, *Depot*.


39 Files May 12, 1854, No. 24, and June 8, 1854, No. 202 Geh. in *Depot*, June 19, 1855, No. 27.

40 For example, the statement of American Consul A. A. Read, March 6, 1854, encl. 8 to file April 29, 1854, No. 1 in *Depot*, June 19, 1855, No. 27.

41 De Brauw to Batavia, Feb. 6, 1852, Y/18, pp. 2–3, encl. 1 to April 14, 1852, No. 127 Geh., *Depot*.

42 De Brauw to Batavia, Feb. 7, 1852, Z/18 Geh., encl. 12 to April 14, 1852, No. 127 Geh., *Depot*.


44 Decision of Feb. 21, 1852, is encl. 2 in file May 22, 1852, No. 21, *Depot*, June 19; also Batavia to The Hague, Feb. 25, 1852, No. 36 LaR Kab. in file April 14, 1852, No. 127 Geh., *Depot*.

45 Gibson to the Governor-General, Feb. 25, 1852. The original is encl. 5 to Batavia, No. 151/1, March 9, 1854, in file April 29, 1854, No. 1 in *Depot*, June 19, 1855, No. 271.

46 Decision of Governor-General, March 24, 1852, No. 2, encl. 1 to file May 22, 1852, No. 21, *Depot*.


50 Aulick to Magruder, May 24, 1852, in *Aulick*, p. 469.

51 Gibson to W. W. Shaw, May 22, 1852, in *Aulick*, p. 543.

52 Magruder to Navy Dept., Dec. 8, 1852, in *Aulick*, p. 721.


55 Gibson to Aulick, Sept. 26, 1852, in *Aulick*, pp. 650, 659.

56 Magruder to Navy Dept., Dec. 8, 1852, in *Aulick*, p. 721.

57 Minister Folsom to Secretary Webster, May 19, 1852, No. 28, p. 2 (received June 12) in U.S. Dept. of State, [Despatches from the] *Netherlands* (hereafter cited as *Neth.*), Vol. 14.

58 Folsom to Webster, June 11, 1852, No. 29, pp. 2, 3 (received June 28) in *Neth.*, Vol. 14.


Sentence of the Supreme Court, May 3, 1853, in file Aug. 1, 1853, No. 91 Geh., in Depot, Jan. 19; also Neth., Vol. 15, encl. 6 to Belmont's No. 16, March 5, 1854, and in U.S. Congress, House Exec. Doc. 16, 35d Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. No. 782.

The statement in H. T. Colenbrander, Koloniale Geschiedenis (3 Vols., The Hague: Nyhoff, 1925–6), Vol. 3, p. 217, that Gibson delivered arms to the rebels is nowhere asserted or charged by the prosecutors, so must be considered a figment of historical paranoia.

De Brauw to Batavia, March 3, 1852, in file May 24, 1854, No. 184 Geh. in Depot.


Neth. Minister in Washington to The Hague, June 2, 1858, No. X, p. 7, encl. 4 to file June 3, 1858, No. 220/Q in Depot.


Gibson to Marcy, Aug. 19, 1853, Batavia, Vol. 3.


Marcy to Belmont, Sept. 6, 1853, in Neth., Instructions, Vol. 14, p. 107, and House Ex. Doc. 16, p. 3.


Memorandum on Gibson's Case following A. A. Read's letter of Nov. 22, 1853, in Batavia, Vol. 3. Although undated and unsigned, its filing among documents of Nov. 1853 gives an approximate date of writing. Since its author was clearly in the United States, and the document was not partisan and was submitted in the form of Dept. of State memoranda of advice, it was probably written by one of Marcy's advisers, possibly A. D. Mann or a subordinate on the North European Dock.


The Hague to Batavia, Nov. 15, 1853, LaA, No. 414/R1, Buiten., Vol. 2738, Jan. 5, No. 1 Geh.

Belmont to Marcy, Oct. 24, 1853, No. 5, in Neth., Vol. 15.


Ibid., p. 3.

Belmont to Marcy, Oct. 24, 1853, No. 5, in Neth., Vol. 15.

Belmont to Marcy, Dec. 6, 1853, No. 9, in Neth., Vol. 15.


He spread a good deal of misinformation too; for example, The East Indian Archipelago (Amer. Geographical Society of N.Y., Report 4, New York: Godwins
Co., 1854) is full of nonsense about white Nias beauties and hairy Kubus. Also in Daily National Democrat of New York, May 17, 1854.


93 Van Hall to Belmont, Feb. 25, 1854, in Neth., Vol. 15, and House Ex. Doc. 16.

94 Belmont to Marcy, March 5, 1854, No. 16, and May 5, 1854, No. 17, in Neth., Vol. 15; extracts in House Ex. Doc. 16, p. 25.

95 Belmont to Marcy, Feb. 15, 1854, No. 15, in Neth., Vol. 15.


97 Mason to Marcy, Nov. 13, 1854, in Marcy Papers, Vol. 54.


100 Van Hall to Belmont, June 29, 1854, in Buiten., Vol. 2738, June 29, No. 4 Geh.; Neth., Vol. 15, and House Ex. Doc. 16, p. 96.

101 Belmont to van Hall, July 4, 1854, in Neth., Vol. 15.

102 Belmont to Marcy, July 7, 1854, No. 20, p. 3, in Neth., Vol. 15.

103 Belmont to Marcy, June 24, 1854, Private, in Marcy Papers, Vol. 50, and Belmont to Marcy, July 7, 1854, No. 21, in Neth., Vol. 15.

104 Gibson to Marcy, Aug. 19, 1853, in Batavia, Vol. 3.


106 Gibson to Belmont, Sept. 29, 1854, in Buiten., Vol. 2739, Sept. 25, No. 9, Geh., and Neth., Vol. 16.


109 Ibid., pp. 8-9; Gevers to van Hall, Aug. 10, 1854, in Buiten., Vol. 2734, Aug. 30, No. 4 Geh. Gibson's presence in Holland caused a flurry of indignation that had repercussions in the Dutch parliament: Netherlands, Staten Generaal, Handelingen, 1853/4, Vol. 2, pp. 1223-1225 (July 26, 1853, Second Chamber).

110 Belmont to Marcy, Sept. 15, 1854, pp. 5-6, in Marcy Papers, Vol. 52. Gibson perpetuated the myth of his being an attaché for many years, for example, Pack, "Sandwich Islands," p. 583.

111 Gibson to Belmont, Sept. 29, 1854, in Buiten., Vol. 2739, Sept. 25, No. 9 Geh., and Neth., Vol. 19.


113 Gevers to van Hall, March 5, 1855, No. 30, in Buiten., Vol. 2741, March 21, No. 4 Geh.


117 New York Herald, Sept. 20, 1854.


120 Mann's words in letter to Marcy, Aug. 31, 1854, p. 4, in Marcy Papers, Vol. 52.

121 Mann to Marcy, Sept. 4, 1854, p. 3, in Marcy Papers, Vol. 52. Belmont's letter shows no such criticism: Belmont to Gibson, Sept. 1, 1854, in Neth., Vol. 15.
Belmont to Marcy, Oct. 18, 1854, Private, p. 6, in Marcy Papers, Vol. 53.

Mann to Marcy, Sept. 4, 1854, p. 3, and Mason to Marcy, Sept. 5, p. 2, in Marcy Papers, Vol. 54; Sickles to Buchanan, Sept. 23, p. 3, and Belmont to Buchanan, Sept. 25, in Buchanan Papers, June-Dec. 1854 (Letters Received); Belmont to Marcy, Oct. 18, 1854, Private, p. 6, in Marcy Papers, Vol. 53.

Van Hall to Belmont, Sept. 7, 1854, in Buiten., Vol. 2739, Sept. 7, No. 4 Geh., and Neth., Vol. 15.

Belmont to van Hall, Sept. 7, 1854, in Buiten., Vol. 2739, Sept. 7, No. 5 Geh., and Neth., Vol. 15.

Belmont to Marcy, Sept. 9, 1854, No. 25, p. 3, in Neth., Vol. 15.

Belmont to Marcy, Sept. 15, 1854, Private, p. 1, in Marcy Papers, Vol. 52; also in Belmont to Marcy, Sept. 19, 1854, p. 4, in Neth., Vol. 15.

Van Hall to Belmont, Sept. 19, 1854, in Buiten., Vol. 2739, Sept. 19, No. 8 Geh., and Neth., Vol. 15.

Belmont to van Hall, Sept. 22, 1854, in Buiten., Vol. 2739, Sept. 22, No. 2 Geh., and Neth., Vol. 15.

Belmont to Marcy, Sept. 23, 1854, No. 27, pp. 3-4, in Neth., Vol. 15; only partly printed in House Ex. Doc. 16.

Endorsement on Mann to Marcy, Aug. 31, 1854, in Marcy Papers, Vol. 52, which Marcy received Sept. 13.


Van Hall to Belmont, Sept. 22, 1854, No. 28, pp. 3-4, in Neth., Vol. 15.

Sept. 26; Belmont to Marcy, Sept. 25, 1854, No. 28, pp. 3-4, Neth., Vol. 15.


Ibid., p. 6; Belmont to Marcy, Oct. 18, 1854, Private, p. 3, in Marcy Papers, Vol. 53.


Such was the opinion of several European newspapers like the Emancipation Beigle of Brussels quoted by the New York Herald, Sept. 20, 1854.


Marcy to Buchanan, Nov. 3, 1854, Private, p. 3, in Buchanan Papers, June-Dec. 1854 (Letters Received); draft in Marcy Papers, Vol. 54.


Marcy to Belmont, Nov. 5, 1854, Private, Marcy Papers, Vol. 54.

Gevers to van Hall, Oct. 9, 1854, No. 43, in Buiten., Vol. 2740, Oct. 28, No. 1 Geh.

Gevers to van Hall, Oct. 24, 1854, No. 54, p. 3, in Buiten., Vol. 2740, Nov. 8, No. 3 Geh.


Gevers to van Hall, Jan. 15, 1855, in Buiten., Vol. 2741, Feb. 3, No. 3 Geh.


Feb. 10; Gevers to van Hall, Feb. 11, 1853, in Buiten., Vol. 2741, March 8, No. 8 Geh.


Du Bois to Gevers, Aug. 18, 1856, No. 81, and Aug. 27, 1856, No. 84, in Buiten., Vol. 2745, Geh. Verbalen, Sept. 4, No. 3 Geh. and Sept. 5, No. 1 Geh.


Jan. 2, 1858, No. 5 Geh. and June 3, 1858, No. 220Q in Depot.

Note of Sept. 17, 1857, in Depot, file 6, 1858, No. 366/G1 Geh.

July 10, 1857, No. 3 Geh., and July 14, 1857, No. 2 Geh., in Buiten., Vol. 2747.


Andrew Jenson, Latter-day Saint Biographical Encyclopedia (Salt Lake City, 1901-1926), I, 723-724.

Gibson to B. Young, March 30, 1859, in Archives of the Church of the Latter-day Saints, Salt Lake City, Utah.


Sec. of Navy G. Welles to J. F. Schenck, Aug. 31, 1861, U.S. Navy, Area 10 File, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Box 3.


THE MADRAS AFFAIR*

By ERNEST ANDRADE, JR.†

In the spring of 1883, several developments were coming to a focus to produce a minor crisis in the Hawaiian kingdom. The first development was the rule of Walter Murray Gibson, who had been Premier for a year under the rule of Kalakaua. His activities were already causing serious concern among the businessmen of the kingdom. Ambitious, scheming and unprincipled, Gibson had managed to win the favor of the king and much of the native Hawaiian population, and his course as Premier, though only a year old, was characterized by extravagant schemes which pleased Kalakaua but depleted the Treasury.¹

The second development was the growing realization by the sugar planters and others that Chinese were no longer suitable for plantation labor.² By 1883 successful attempts had already been made to encourage immigration from other parts of the world, notably from Portugal, while negotiations were underway with Japan which resulted in the entrance into Hawaii of what was to be its largest racial group. Anti-Chinese feeling was reaching alarming proportions, perhaps because Chinese continued to enter the Kingdom in fairly large numbers during this period. Contributing to the dissatisfaction with the Chinese was the belief that Chinese immigration, if unchecked, would soon "mongrelize" the native population. Added to this was the belief that Chinese had been the means by which leprosy and smallpox had entered the kingdom in recent years. In the former case the charge was probably untrue, but in the latter it was a fact that a smallpox epidemic in 1881 was caused by Chinese immigration, and few fears were more dreaded in Hawaii than the spectre of smallpox. Gibson, Chinese immigration and smallpox—these were the ingredients of the incident which became known as the Madras Affair.

On April 10, 1883, the British steamer Madras, carrying 750 Chinese men from Hong Kong, appeared off the port of Honolulu, preparatory to entering the harbor. When the harbor pilot came aboard he asked the ship's commander, Captain H. W. Bradley, to submit the customary statement certifying that there was no infectious disease on board. This was promptly done.³ However, Bradley also gave the pilot two letters similar in content—one to be delivered to Walter Murray Gibson, President of the Board of Health,

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Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Premier of the kingdom; and the other to Dr. Trousseau, the Port Physician. In these letters Bradley said that he had two cases of smallpox among a group of passengers bound for Victoria, British Columbia. He requested permission to land his Honolulu passengers in quarantine and then to reprovision the ship and continue on his way. Bradley adopted this seemingly contradictory course of action because, as he later stated, he did not wish to alarm the Honolulu populace, which had been subjected to a severe smallpox epidemic brought into the city by immigrating Chinese only two years before.

When Gibson read Bradley's letter, he immediately called a meeting of the Board of Health. A difficult problem presented itself. In a normal situation the Hawaiian quarantine laws required all passengers for Honolulu arriving in an infected vessel to be landed at the quarantine station near the entrance to the harbor, where they would be fed, housed and cared for through an appropriate waiting period, the costs to be paid by the ship's owners. In the case of the Madras however, it was impossible to provide for the passengers as the law provided, because the quarantine station was already full. On March 29, another British ship had landed a boatload of Chinese, who were still at the station to await the termination of that quarantine period. A second British vessel had arrived two days earlier and was waiting off port to discharge its passengers, while yet another British ship was expected within four days. After hasty discussion the Board of Health passed a resolution which was dispatched to Captain Bradley. The resolution noted that the Madras had arrived off port with smallpox on board, then authorized the President of the Board of Health to take steps to avoid the risk of contagion "and consequently to prevent the landing of any passengers from the "Madras." When this resolution was published in the government newspaper, the Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser, public opinion in Honolulu was aroused, for the people remembered vividly the disastrous plague of 1881. It was perhaps the first time since Gibson became Premier that most of the white business and professional community supported him, for they generally had opposed his policies and looked upon him as a clever but unprincipled scoundrel who had played upon King Kalakaua's vanity and prejudices to gain his position as head of the government. But in the case of the Madras there was nearly unanimous approval of Gibson's action, at least for a short time. The Hawaiian Gazette, the journalistic mouthpiece of the business group which usually opposed Gibson, commented:

"The Board are alive to the situation and are evidently trying their best to meet the evil. Under such circumstances party differences should be laid aside on this point, and the Board should be sustained by all shades..."
Unanimity did not continue for long. Within a day or two it became apparent that the government’s action had been hasty and perhaps ill-judged. Captain Bradley was astonished at the government’s refusal to allow him to land any passengers. In spite of the fact that the quarantine station was full, the laws implicitly required the Hawaiian government to make some kind of provision for arriving passengers. This was not done, and the Madras was simply not allowed to land passengers at all. Gibson felt that Bradley should have sailed on to Victoria, carrying his Honolulu passengers with him and landing them in Honolulu on his return trip. On April 19, Gibson wrote a letter to Thomas Howard, the agent for the Madras in Hong Kong, in which he stated that he had suggested to Bradley that he “go forward to Victoria (a course I still believe to be the wisest and least costly) . . .” Bradley did not believe that he could do this and still keep the number of smallpox cases from multiplying and perhaps even infecting his own crew. On April 11, shortly after being notified of the Board’s prohibition, he wrote to Gibson, claiming he did not submit a false report and was sure the Board could not refuse him entry. He stated:

“I beg of you not to overlook the fact of my position at sea, if this disease should break out in a virulent form. At present, my officers and self have no fear of the contagion, but how long this may last the Almighty knows.

“We have no fresh cases yet, and the two old ones are progressing favorably, and what I would beg of you to do, is to take all the healthy people that are for Honolulu on shore and allow me to depart from your port.”

To this letter Bradley received no reply. Feeling that the situation was beyond him, he called on Theo. H. Davies and Company, authorizing the firm to act as his agents and giving to it the task of further negotiations with the Board of Health. On April 13, Davies wrote Gibson, asking him if the Madras was to be considered in quarantine, and proposed a plan for landing the Honolulu passengers on the reef at the harbor entrance. Gibson replied next day, saying that he had “to reaffirm assurances that the Board cannot consent to the landing of the passengers on board Madras affected by smallpox under any circumstances.” In reply to this letter, Davies asked on April 14, that the Madras be allowed to commence quarantine, and threatened to apply to the courts for an order to compel action by the Board. To this letter Davies received no immediate reply, and becoming more perturbed at the
hostility toward the Madras in the community, he submitted the correspondence in the case up to that point to the Hawaiian Gazette for publication.\textsuperscript{11}

Sensing that the Board of Health had made some sort of blunder, the Gazette shifted ground. Its former position had been based on the belief that the Madras was not intending to call at Honolulu but was now there simply to dump some unwanted passengers, regardless of what Honolulu may have thought about it. Upon receiving assurances from both Bradley and Davies that more than half the passengers actually had Honolulu as their destination,\textsuperscript{12} the Gazette came to the support of the Madras and resumed its more accustomed role of denouncing Gibson, while presumably the business leaders also took up the cry. At this point the Madras affair became a political issue. Gibson, who seemed to have been trying to find a way out of the dilemma, became less inclined than ever to be conciliatory. However, increased opposition did prod him into resuming correspondence with Davies. Gibson attempted to clarify his position in letters to Davies on April 19 and 24, in which he said that since the Madras was flying the yellow flag it could be considered in quarantine. However, since the quarantine was intended only for recruits and not for passengers, such a clarification served only to confuse matters, and by April 25 it was clear that an impasse had been reached.

Meanwhile, the Madras continued to languish at anchor outside the harbor while the disease ran its course on board. To the two original smallpox cases there had been added one other, who died within a few days. Another passenger had thrown himself overboard and drowned.\textsuperscript{13} Bradley and his crew had always to be on guard against an attempt to seize the ship or to escape to shore in the ship’s boats.\textsuperscript{14} No doubt the situation aboard the Madras was exaggerated in rumors among the Honolulu community, but it must have been a trying time for Bradley, his crew and the passengers. Gibson authorized the stationing of guards on shore and in small boats to prevent any Chinese from sneaking ashore, but beyond this he would not go, and for two more weeks things remained as they were.

On May 5, a couple of port physicians were sent to board the Madras and examine the passengers. They were able to find that only three cases of smallpox had occurred up to that time, one of whom had died and had been buried at sea, while the other two had recovered. They further stated that since they had found no sickness aboard and the vessel was “in as good a state of cleanliness as can be expected,” they recommended that the Madras be allowed to enter port upon which quarantine activities could begin.\textsuperscript{15} On May 7, the Board notified Bradley that he might bring his ship into the harbor and send his passengers to the quarantine station, provided that he met certain conditions, the most important of which being that he pay ex-
penses of quarantine surveillance and post a bond of $20.00 per passenger landed as required by law. Bradley agreed to these terms and brought his ship into the harbor the next morning.

Perhaps the affair would have ended at this point, but two new developments complicated the proceedings. With the Madras in the harbor, Bradley was notified that he must pay the bond before entering the harbor. Being unprepared to do these things immediately, Bradley turned about and moved back to his former anchorage, whereupon a number of the passengers jumped overboard and tried to swim ashore but were picked up by the guard boats and returned to the ship.

The second development was more alarming. It will be recalled that when the passengers of the Madras were examined, no active smallpox was found among them. The reason for this unusual circumstance was discovered when the crew made ready to take the ship into port on the morning of May 8. In the course of their duties they found nine new smallpox patients who were hidden by their fellow passengers in out-of-the-way places so that the doctors' inspection could be successfully passed. Davies reported this new development to Gibson the next day, and on May 12, the Board laid down new conditions to be met before beginning quarantine. These were generally the same as the previous conditions, except that the required bond was raised to a flat sum of $20,000. In spite of the new demands, Davies and Bradley were willing to abide by them and required the Board to draw up the official bond agreement. On May 14, the agreement was submitted to Davies, who discovered in it some new conditions not previously agreed to, whereupon he advised Bradley to refuse to sign it. With this action negotiations reached a dead end. When Davies made further inquiries, Gibson informed him that the Board of Health no longer recognized the firm of Theo. H. Davies as the agents of the Madras.

Up to this time the British government had not intervened in the case, although it seems probable that John H. Wodehouse, the British consul general in the islands, knew of the general state of affairs. At any rate, when Davies was refused further recognition by the Board he took his case to Wodehouse and asked him to make inquiries as the representative of the British government. At this point the affair became a diplomatic incident.

On May 23, Wodehouse wrote to Gibson, asking why the Board of Health had refused to recognize Davies as the Madras' agent. This direct action brought immediate results. Gibson replied courteously to Wodehouse's inquiry, and said that after the consul general's assurances as to Davies' right to act for the Madras, "I shall be prepared to give the most careful and courteous attention to any communications they may desire to make to me
or to the Board of Health." Soon afterward agreement was reached on conditions to be met by Bradley prior to landing his passengers. On June 2, bond was fixed at $10,000 and government expenses which Gibson claimed up to that time were set at libel. On the evening of June 6, the port physician went on board the Madras and examined all the passengers. The next day, after fifty-eight days offshore, the Madras entered the harbor and landed its Honolulu passengers at the quarantine station. There were nine active cases of smallpox among them; in addition there had been ten cases who had recovered and one who had died.

With the landing of the passengers the Madras case may have appeared to the casual observer to have been closed. There were many, however, who felt that the entry of the British government into the affair spelled future trouble, and their fears were well founded. Strangely enough, it seems that Wodehouse did not contact his government about the Madras affair. Nevertheless, the British Foreign Office learned of the case when the owner of the Madras wrote an indignant letter to the Foreign Secretary on August 23, 1883, setting forth the general state of affairs, condemning the action of the Hawaiian government and asking for redress. In closing he stated, "I trust your Lordship will consider the case sufficiently important to have it specially inquired into."

The wheels of the government machinery commenced to turn, although slowly. On November 29, the Foreign Office referred the complaint to the Board of Trade for an opinion, and after due deliberation the Board replied that the owner had a good case. "It appears to the Board of Trade that this vessel has been subjected by the Hawaiian authorities to arbitrary and inhospitable treatment contrary to the letter and spirit of the Rule no. 2."

The Board of Trade further stated that this claim could be supported by the British government. Meanwhile the Foreign Office had contacted Wodehouse in Honolulu and obtained more information from him. Following the recommendation of the Board of Trade, the Foreign Office advised Wodehouse on December 21, that the British government would support fully the owners of the Madras. Upon receipt of this communication the case became a live issue once more. On January 23, 1884, Wodehouse presented the views of his government to Gibson in no uncertain terms:

"I am instructed by His Lordship, to represent to the Government of His Hawaiian Majesty that the treatment to which this vessel has been subjected appears to Her Majesty's government to have been arbitrary and inhospitable,..."

"I am to add, that any reasonable claim on behalf of the owner of the 'Madras' for compensation for the unnecessary expense to which he
was put through the action of the Hawaiian Board of Health, will meet with the support of Her Majesty's Government.\textsuperscript{28}

The blow could not have been unexpected, for developments had pointed toward such a verdict as soon as the British government became involved in the affair. Gibson, however, continued to support his action, at least publicly. He informed Wodehouse that the British government could have reached such a conclusion only because it was not aware of all the facts, and that a final disposition of the case should be postponed pending the outcome of the Hawaiian government's court case against the owner of the \textit{Madras}.\textsuperscript{27}

The court case had come about when Gibson claimed damages of $1,742.25, this being the cost of maintaining shore and boat guards around the \textit{Madras} from the time it was known the ship had smallpox on board. The basis of Gibson's claim was that the \textit{Madras} had actually been in quarantine since April 10; while the agents of the \textit{Madras} contended that there had been no application of the quarantine laws to the vessel until June 7, when the passengers were landed, hence there had been no quarantine. Chief Justice Judd heard the arguments in the case, and on February 26, 1884, he announced his decision, basing most of it on the correspondence relative to the case, plus testimony. His conclusion was that in order for a ship to be in quarantine under the laws of the kingdom certain acts must be performed both by the ship concerned and by the Board of Health. As far as he could see, the Board had not done what it was supposed to do and had consistently refused to inform the \textit{Madras} of its duties, in spite of repeated requests. Judd noted Gibson's statement to Davies that the ship was in quarantine "for recruits but not for passengers," which seemed to mean exactly what it said. The decision concluded, "As appears by the letter above quoted, the steamer was prohibited from landing passengers purely and simply. Prohibition is not quarantine."\textsuperscript{28}

The Hawaiian government appealed the verdict to the full court, but Judd's decision was sustained. Fortified by the verdict in their favor, the owners of the \textit{Madras} prepared a claim for damages against the Hawaiian Government, which was presented by Davies to Gibson on March 5. The claim, covering cost of subsistence, coal, water, general damages and interest, amounted to $31,201.55.\textsuperscript{29} Gibson continued to defend his action and regarded the claim as unjustified. He said that the only place where the claim could be settled was in the Hawaiian courts. Davies replied that the Supreme Court decision left no doubt as to the justice of the claim. The question of responsibility was settled, and the Hawaiian government should compensate the owners without delay. Receiving no satisfactory reply to his request, Davies took his case back to Wodehouse.\textsuperscript{30} He explained that if a suit in
court should succeed, it would be a needless expense; but should the decision go against the Madras, the owner would lose his right of appeal to the British government since, "we would be appealing to them to interfere with the decision of a Court which we ourselves had invoked."31

On March 15, Wodehouse asked Gibson if his latest letter to Davies represented the official position of the Hawaiian government. Gibson replied that it did. "The question of the liability of the Board of Health to the owners of the Madras is purely a legal one, and has not been touched by the decision given in favor of that vessel in the recent libel action."32 Wodehouse reiterated Davies' claim that the case had already been settled and responsibility fixed. Both he and Davies saw Gibson's attitude as a stubborn refusal to admit defeat, but there was little they could do. If the Hawaiian government refused to pay the Madras claim, there was nothing to be done but take the case to the courts, which was exactly what Gibson wanted done. The reason for his insistence on such a procedure is not documented, but it seems likely that he intended to delay matters as long as he could with the hope that the costs of litigation would discourage the plaintiffs from continuing to press their claim. It is also possible that Gibson was optimistic about the outcome of a court case, should it take place. Many of the witnesses were scattered over the world, and it would be difficult to bring them together for the case in Honolulu. On the other hand, Gibson was not fighting simply the owners of the Madras. Arrayed against him was a large segment of the local business community, among whom the Madras had become a cause célèbre, and in the background lay the threatening shadow of the British government, whose attitude toward the case since the court libel case was as yet unknown.

Wodehouse made one more effort to secure direct action by his government without the necessity of a court case. Mindful of the quick response which the previous direct intervention of the British government had brought, he presented the situation, as far as it had developed, to London once more.33 Once again the Foreign Office asked the Board of Trade for an opinion, and on May 23, 1884, the Board replied that after examining the case it appeared to be as strong as ever. The Board stated that:

"in principle, the claim deserves support by Her Majesty's Government. Whether such support can be best afforded by countenancing the agents in bringing their case before the Courts of Hawaii or by independent diplomatic action seems to be a point for the consideration of His Lordship."34

The Foreign Office then sent instructions to Wodehouse which indicated that the official British position was that a court action should not be under-
taken except as a last resort, and that the consul general should endeavor "to obtain some compensation for the owners of the 'Madras' from the Hawaiian government, or a reference of the matter to arbitration." However, if no success was gained in the matter the British government would take no further action and a court case should be undertaken. Such a qualified stand did not meet with Wodehouse's approval, and he wrote a strong letter to London on July 15, reiterating his earlier position as to the unlikelihood of a successful court action. He claimed that Edward Preston, the counsel for the Madras—who incidentally as Attorney General in 1883 had presented the Hawaiian Government's case in the libel action—stated that the difficulty of producing the witnesses made it almost impossible to press the Madras claim successfully.

Upon receipt of this letter, the Foreign Office decided to consult the Law Officers of the Crown, whose position as a legal oracle was evidently higher than that of the Board of Trade. On August 25, the Law Officers were given the case, and after some study they replied that it appeared that the owners of the Madras were without remedy in the Hawaiian courts. They went on to say: "Under these circumstances, we think that your Lordship may well consider the propriety of making strong diplomatic representations to the Hawaiian Government in support of the claim of the owners of the vessel,..."

Armed with this legal opinion, the Foreign Office then contacted Wodehouse, and assured him of the full support of the British government.

"It appears that the owners of the 'Madras' are advised that they have a good cause of action against the Hawaiian Government, but that they cannot prosecute it with any chance of success owing to the absence of the material witnesses. ... Her Majesty's Government are therefore justified in holding, that the owners are in fact without remedy in the Hawaiian Courts. ... "The 'Madras' committed no infraction of international or municipal law and Her Majesty's Government are at a loss to understand on what grounds the Hawaiian Government refused to admit her to quarantine, and they can but consider such refusal a most unfriendly act." Wodehouse communicated the contents of this note to Gibson on December 6, and when its contents became known to the Honolulu public Gibson's opponents set up a loud outcry. The certainty that the British Government would take a strong stand in the matter served to inspire the anti-Gibson group to further denunciation of his policies. The Gazette stated that in
diplomatic parlance the phrase "a most unfriendly act" was strong language indeed. It could not understand why the government continued to defend an indefensible position. "That the owners of the Madras will be indemnified there can be no doubt, and all the vaporizing in the world will not alter the case."39

The stiffening of the British attitude was so ominous that Gibson was prompted to write an extremely long and detailed explanation of the entire affair from the point of view of the Hawaiian government, together with numerous enclosures in the form of letters and affidavits, which he sent to Wodehouse to be forwarded to London. In his letter of explanation he presented his strongest defense, stating that it "appears to His Hawaiian Majesty's Government that on all the points just recited, Her Majesty's Government has been misinformed."40 Gibson contended that the epidemic which had occurred in 1881 had been due to misrepresentation by ships' captains. "Had His Majesty's Government at that [time] taken the step which in this case has been called an inhospitable action, the country would have been saved from a dreadful calamity." He took special note of the overcrowded condition of the quarantine station at the time the Madras first appeared off port.41

Gibson's defense apparently made a difference, for when the Law Officers of the Crown received it from the Foreign Office,42 they took special notice of the 1881 epidemic and the unruly state of the passengers aboard the Madras as at least a partial justification for the action of the Board of Health. As the Law Officers stated it, these considerations "formed ground for extreme vigilance of action on the part of the Hawaiian Government."43 This was not to say that the treatment of the Madras was acceptable; on the contrary, the vessel had been subjected to unwarranted persecution. The point was that these extenuating circumstances, plus the fact that the libel case had been decided in favor of the Madras, meant that the British government should no longer press for satisfaction outside the courts. Acting upon this advice, the Foreign Office notified Wodehouse of this new attitude with the recommendation that the Madras case be prosecuted in the courts of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

All that now remained was to take legal action, but this was not a simple matter. The plaintiffs had to collect their witnesses and bring them to Hawaii, and it was not until the passage of another year that they considered their case complete. They then petitioned the Hawaiian government to allow suit to be brought against itself in the courts, and on March 9, 1886, the Privy Council granted their petition.44

In April 1887, the final episode in the drama of the Madras drew to a
close when the case was at last taken up by the courts. On April 21, Justice McCully and twelve jurors sat in judgment. The verdict was a foregone conclusion, in view of the previous Supreme Court decision in the case; for in spite of Gibson's contention that the libel case of February, 1884, had no bearing on the damage suit, it proved actually to be the key factor. With the previous decision before it, the court took little time to decide that damages could be collected because of the action of the Hawaiian government. The only problem was in determining the exact amount to be paid. It was finally decided that the original claim by the owners of the Madras, with but a few deductions, should apply. The sum to be paid was fixed at $22,943.25, while the interest allowed on the claim brought the total to slightly more than $30,000.45

Thus ended the Madras affair. In itself a relatively minor dispute in its early stages, it received great attention locally because of the political implications of the case. The key point in the whole affair was the refusal of the Hawaiian government to place the Madras in quarantine as the law required. It was obvious that the crowding of the quarantine station did not permit the carrying out of the letter of the law, but this did not absolve the government from its responsibility to make accommodation in some way, and in fact at least one alternate and workable solution was offered. It is likely that the criticism to which Gibson was subjected by his political enemies played some part in solidifying his stand against all odds— an attitude which, while not perfectly logical, was at least understandable. Although Gibson was able to bring about a lessening of pressure by the British government, in the end he lost the fight. It is difficult to see how he could have seriously considered the possibility of a court victory, especially in view of the decision in the libel case, but he seems to have done so.

On the basis of the evidence, responsibility in the affair was undoubtedly Gibson's, both from the standpoint of the original mistake—which could have been rectified quickly if admitted promptly—and from the standpoint of Gibson's refusal to admit any error in his actions. If he had not disclaimed responsibility, it is unlikely that the case would ever have gone much beyond the Board of Health and the ship's agents and assumed such proportions that it became, for Hawaii at least, a major diplomatic incident and a costly one.

NOTES


3 “Testimony of Captain Babcock,” Exhibit "C" in Attorney General’s statement of case to Gibson, Jan. 20, 1855. Contained as Enclosure in Gibson to Wodehouse, Jan. 23, 1885, and forwarded to British Foreign Office in Wodehouse to Granville, no. 2, Feb. 28, 1885. Microfilm F.O. 58/195, p. 134, University of Hawaii Library. Gibson’s letter of Jan. 23, 1885 contains many letters and other documents to present the Hawaiian government’s side of the Madras Case. Any of these documents will hereafter be cited by title & date together with the title and date, Gibson to Wodehouse, Jan. 23, 1885, followed by page numbers.

4 “Health Certificate” (Gibson to Wodehouse, Jan. 23, 1885), F.O. 58/195, p. 135.

5 Open letter to Hawaiian Gazette, April 13, 1883, in Gazette issue of Apr. 18, 1883.

6 Gibson to Wodehouse, Jan. 23, 1885, pp. 324–325. See also reports of ship arrivals and departures, Daily Bulletin, Apr. 13, 1883.

7 Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser, Apr. 13, 1883.

8 Issue of Apr. 11, 1883.

9 Gibson to Howard, Apr. 19, 1884 [sic; actually 1883], (Gibson to Wodehouse, Jan. 23, 1885), pp. 172–173.

10 Bradley to Gibson, Apr. 11, 1883 (Gibson to Wodehouse, Jan. 23, 1885), p. 137.

11 As printed in Hawaiian Gazette, Apr. 18, 1883. Quotations and letters mentioned in this entire paragraph are from this source.

12 Ibid.

13 A detailed summary of the smallpox cases and their disposition is found in Arthur Mouritz [a port physician] to Gibson, June 7, 1883, (Gibson to Wodehouse, Jan. 23, 1885), pp. 145–146.

14 In the early morning of May 12, some passengers took a ship’s boat and tried to get ashore but were discovered by Bradley and the alarm was given to a guard boat, upon which the fugitives turned back to the ship. After this Bradley proposed a system of light signals to improve communication with the shore in case of another such emergency. Bradley to Deputy Marshal Dayton, May 12, 1883, (Gibson to Wodehouse, Jan. 23, 1885), p. 142.

15 Dr. Trousseau to Gibson, May 5, 1883, (Gibson to Wodehouse, Jan. 23, 1885).

16 Gibson to Davies, May 7, 1883, (Gibson to Wodehouse, Jan. 23, 1885).

17 Davies to Wodehouse, Jan. 28, 1885, as contained in Wodehouse to Granville no. 2, Feb. 28, 1885, pp. 152–153. Davies claimed that the notification he received from the Board of Health, a copy of which he enclosed in his letter, stated clearly that the conditions in question applied at the landing of passengers, not at the entry of the Madras into Honolulu Harbor.

18 As contained in Gibson to Wodehouse, Jan. 23, 1885, p. 143. See also Mouritz to Gibson, op. cit. pp. 145–146.

19 Wodehouse to Gibson, May 23, 1883, as printed in Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Legislature of 1884, p. xlii. The most complete record of the negotiations carried on during the period from the Madras’ arrival to its final admission to port on June 7, is in this source.

20 Ibid. p. li.

21 Mouritz to Gibson, June 7, 1883, (Gibson to Wodehouse, Jan. 23, 1885).

22 Wodehouse appears to have felt that he could handle the situation without referral to any higher authority. In his reply to the Foreign Office’s letter, written on Aug. 27, informing him of the complaint of the owner of the Madras, he said, “I do not think it necessary to trouble your Lordship with copies of all the correspondence that has passed between the Agents of the Madras . . . and the Hawaiian Board of Health in connection with this matter, and also between myself and the Hawaiian Government . . . ” Wodehouse to Granville #17, Nov. 20, 1883. British Consulate Correspondence, Archives of Hawaii.


31 Ibid. p. 177.
39 Issue of Dec. 17, 1884.
41 Ibid., p. 114.
43 Law Officers to Granville, May 21, 1885, Micro. F.O. 58/197, p. 213.
44 Privy Council Records, XIV, 85, Archives of Hawaii.
45 The Gazette, April 26, 1887, has a complete summary of the court action. See also Wodehouse to Salisbury #1, May 5, 1887, micro. F.O. 58/220, pp. 293-294.
The annual meeting of the Hawaiian Historical Society was held in the Mission-Historical Library on Thursday evening, March 10, 1960, at 8 o'clock. President William R. Norwood presided. The reading of the minutes of the last annual meeting was waived as they had been printed in the last annual report. The Treasurer, Dr. Jacob Adler, gave a summary of his report and stated that the full report would be printed. It was moved and seconded to accept the report. Motion was carried. The Librarian, Mrs. W. C. Handy, read her report. It was moved and seconded that the report be received and filed.

The following resolution, introduced by Miss Agnes Conrad, was unanimously adopted by the Society:

"WHEREAS, the State of Hawaii has few historic buildings remaining as visual symbols of the culture and history of old Hawaii, and

"WHEREAS, Iolani Palace, built by King Kalakaua in 1882 as the official residence for the monarchs of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and Iolani Barracks, built by King Kamehameha V in 1870 for the Royal Household Guards, were closely associated with Hawaiian history during the last years of the monarchy, and

"WHEREAS, both should be preserved as near as possible in their original form for the enjoyment and education of both residents and visitors,

"BE IT RESOLVED by the Hawaiian Historical Society that the Governor of the State of Hawaii be and is hereby requested to designate by public proclamation Iolani Palace and the surrounding grounds and Iolani Barracks as State Historical Monuments to assure their preservation as historic sites."

Mr. George Bacon, Chairman of the Nominating Committee, recommended the following persons for election:

President (for 1 year)—Harold W. Kent.

Trustees (for 2 years)—Miss Bernice Judd, Miss Marion Morse, Miss Agnes Conrad, and Mrs. Richard L. Summers.

Holdover Trustees are Charles H. Hunter, Meiric K. Dutton, Donald D. Mitchell, and Janet E. Bell.
The report was adopted and the Secretary instructed to cast the ballot, which unanimously elected the officers nominated by the Committee.

Mr. Norwood, President, introduced the speaker of the evening, Mr. Ernest Andrade, who spoke on "The Madras Case."

A social hour followed, during which punch and cookies were served.

Respectfully submitted,

AGNES C. CONRAD
Recording Secretary

MEETING OF THE NOVEMBER 19, 1959

The Hawaiian Historical Society held an open meeting on Thursday evening, November 19, 1959, at the Mission-Historical Library.

Dr. Norman Meller, Professor of Government at the University of Hawaii, was the speaker of the evening, giving an interesting talk on "A Political Scientist Looks at Hawaiian History."

Refreshments were served at the social hour under the direction of Miss Conrad and Miss Bell.
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

TO THE MEMBERS OF
THE HAWAIIAN HISTORICAL SOCIETY:

Achievement of statehood assures for 1959 its place of distinction in Hawaiian history. This event has had and will continue to have impact upon the Hawaiian Historical Society in various ways.

First, as will be noted in the report of our librarian, Mrs. Willowdean Handy, there has been a substantial increase in the number of requests received for information from our files and supply of printed data. This is a reflection of the widespread interest which statehood has stimulated among writers, publications, libraries and various organizations throughout the nation.

Secondly, with every indication that this revitalized interest in Hawaii will continue for some time, our Society’s library and librarian may expect to receive a significantly larger number of inquiries than in previous years. As a result of this broadened interest in Hawaii and Hawaiiana, it is perhaps timely to remind our members—and through them hope that others will be reminded—that our Society solicits and welcomes the opportunity to become a depository of historical data. We perhaps need to remind our friends throughout the community that our interests are not limited to the missionary era or monarchical period, but that the collection of material recording the developing history of Hawaii is a continuing process.

Coincident with achievement of statehood, and partially as a result of it, we are experiencing profound physical changes in the character of our island community. The past year has seen some historical sites come under the pressure of resort development and proposals for providing our new state government with more modern facilities. Here, perhaps, is another challenge for our Society to remain alert for the opportunity to preserve—or join with other interested organizations in helping to preserve—historical sites and structures which may be saved from demolition or obliteration without seriously impeding community progress.

Thus we find the year past has provided the Society with new and expanded opportunities for service. To continue to be effective and to be able to meet this new opportunity successfully will require enlarged membership support and participation. As will be noted in the treasurer’s report the Society’s income from memberships and other current sources was just short of covering our operating expenses for the year. A major achievement in connection with our finances was the establishment during the year of an
arrangement for a thorough reorganization of our accounting and bookkeeping procedures. This was achieved through the cooperation of Mrs. Vivien K. Gilbert, C.P.A., who agreed to handle our books for us for a modest retainer.

At the calendar year's end the Society's roster showed 258 paid up members, including 18 who were admitted to membership during the year. With the recent revival of interest in Hawaiian history, attributable in part to statehood, there probably are many individuals in the community who are membership prospects. Unfortunately the impression is fairly prevalent throughout the community that our Society admits only scholars of academic accomplishment or those who can qualify as "historians." Our present members should help us spread the word that all we require is a genuine interest in Hawaii and its history and the modest membership fee.

Our library was fortunate in the acquisition of a number of valuable additions during the year. We are particularly grateful for the grant of $500 by the S. N. and Mary Castle Foundation for the purchase of books. Acquisitions of particular note and other events in an active year will be covered in the report of our librarian, Mrs. Handy, to whom I am especially grateful for her devoted service to the Society and understanding help throughout the year to me. I wish also to thank the Trustees and members of the various committees for their generous cooperation.

Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM R. NORWOOD, President
Hawaiian Historical Society

REPORT OF THE AUDITOR

TO THE OFFICERS AND TRUSTEES OF
THE HAWAIIAN HISTORICAL SOCIETY:

In accordance with your request, I have examined the documentary evidence of transactions in 1959 for the Hawaiian Historical Society, and the assets and liabilities as of the calendar year-end. The Statement of Financial Condition at December 31, 1959, and the Statement of Income and Expense for the year then ended, which were prepared by me from such data, and from the books of account, are submitted herewith.

Yours very truly,
(MRS.) VIVIEN K. GILBERT, C.P.A.

Honolulu, Hawaii
February 10, 1960
# EXHIBIT A

## HAWAIIAN HISTORICAL SOCIETY

### STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL CONDITION

**December 31, 1959**

### ASSETS

**Current Assets:**
- Bishop Nat'l Bank checking account $194.55
- Bishop Nat'l Bank savings account 1,443.81
- First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n 2,343.77
  \[\text{Total current assets} \quad $3,982.13\]
- Investments at market, 12/31/59 4,782.50
- Books and pamphlets for resale 7,458.53
  \[\text{Total current assets} \quad $16,223.16\]

**Capital Assets:**
- Library of books and pamphlets at cost, including purchases with Special Funds $8,261.24
- Pictures, photographs and maps 1,995.00
- Furniture and equipment, less depreciation 637.61
- Building (1/2 interest) less depreciation 6,800.00
  \[\text{TOTAL ASSETS} \quad $33,917.01\]

### LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL

**Liabilities:**
- Payroll taxes payable, 4th Quarter 1959 $15.00

**Restricted Reserves:**
- Microfilming Fund 12/31/58 $1,247.04 \[\text{Incr.} \quad \text{Decr.} \quad 12/31/59 \quad $1,247.04\]
- M. Jones Fund 216.82 \[\text{Decr.} \quad 146.23\]
- S. N. and M. Castle Fund 138.05 \[\text{Incr.} \quad 487.30\]
  \[\text{Net} \quad 221.34\]

**Capital:**
- Balance at 12/31/58 \[\text{Incr.} \quad 32,400.92\]
- Adjustments, post-closing \[\text{(244.41)}\]
- Increase in 1959 from utilization of Special Funds, incl. M. Dutton 231.64
- Increase in 1959 to greater market value of investments at 12/31/59 222.50
  \[\text{Net Income for 1959 (Exhibit B)} \quad (589.21) \quad 32,021.44\]

**TOTAL LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL** \[\text{$33,917.01$}\]
## EXHIBIT B

HAWAIIAN HISTORICAL SOCIETY

**STATEMENT OF INCOME AND EXPENSE FOR**
**THE 12 MONTHS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1959**

### INCOME:

**Membership dues:**
- 153 regular members: $765.00
- 32 contributing members: 320.00
- 3 sustaining members: 75.00
- 4 life members: 400.00
- 16 prior year's dues: 90.00  
  **Total income** $1,650.00

**Contributions:**
- Annie H. Parke Estate: $338.41
- Dole Royalty: 124.50
- Na Himeni Hawaii: 10.66
- Other: 5.00  
  **Total contributions** $478.57

**Dividends and interest:** $360.08

**Sales:** Books and Publications less estimated cost of sales: 107.56

**Total income:** $2,596.21

### EXPENSE:

**Printing annual report:** $409.87

- less allocation to Inventory of 206 @ .82 each: (168.92)  
  **Total expense** $240.95

**Librarian's salary and payroll tax expense:** 1,230.00

**Building maintenance:** 360.00

**Accounting and auditing:** 300.00

**Telephone expense:** 146.52

**Library and office supplies and expense:** 134.55

**Miscellaneous other charges, including annual depreciation on building, furniture and equipment:** 773.40

**Total expense** $3,185.42

**Net income (to Exhibit A)**: **$ (589.21)**

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REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN

For various reasons acquisitions were slowed down during 1959, but with the receipt of a $500 donation from the S. N. and Mary Castle Foundation for the purchase of books, this program of expanding our collections has been resumed and there will be more to report for 1960.

However, we did purchase a few interesting items with the residue of a former gift of the Castle Foundation. These were the most noteworthy: "Social Service in Hawaii," by Mary Margaret Catton, from the librarian's point of view is a god-send, for it outlines the history of numerous health and welfare organizations of Hawaii which have no other definite sources of reference. "Anthropology in the South Seas," compiled by J. D. Freeman and W. R. Geddes is a commemorative volume in honor of Dr. H. D. Skinner of New Zealand, to which eleven well-known anthropologists have contributed articles. Mathurin Dondo's "La Perouse in Maui," privately printed by the Maui Publishing Company, is a handy pamphlet covering that portion of the voyage of the lost navigator which especially interests us in Hawaii.

Since I reported to you at the last annual meeting, we have added only two volumes to those purchased by the Maude Jones Memorial Fund. The first is a unique record of a voyage round the world in the ship "Hampton," which left Boston in 1849 with a cargo of lumber for San Francisco as its first destination. It is "Reminiscences of a Voyage around the World" by R. C. Davis, who was only thirteen years old when he accompanied his father, the Captain. His description of his twenty days in Honolulu is refreshing and his account of the ten Hawaiians who shipped on the vessel from our port is revealing.

The second is a beautiful edition by the Antiquarian Press of New York of the "Journal of David Douglas, during his travels in North America, 1823–1827." The second Appendix covers his sojourn in the Sandwich Islands through extracts from his journal of 1833–1834; the third Appendix contains correspondence regarding his death in the bull pit on Hawaii; and the fourth quotes a notice from a San Francisco newspaper regarding the monument erected for him.

Several institutions have donated books to our library, the Bishop Museum and the University of Hawaii presses sending us their publications as usual, and the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, through Miss Hoskins, the librarian, turning over to us twenty-one volumes which were duplicates or outside their field of interest.
Individuals also have been generous. Mr. Robert Clopton gave us a splendid pictorial volume, "Historic Hawaiian Homes" by Edna Williamson Stall. Through Miss Janet Bell, we received English and Swedish copies of O. A. Bushnell's "The Last Days of Captain Cook." Mr. Meiric Dutton not only sent us his Christmas brochure, "The Case of the Elusive Hubs and Dies," but purchased for us a volume of the Transactions of the London Missionary Society for 1825 and 1826. Mr. Curtis Cluff is giving us copies of "Hawaii Industry" and "Builders Report" as they are issued. Mrs. Simes Hoyt, another perennial donor, has added to our collection of clippings, pictures and magazines. Col. Harold W. Kent gave us his "Charles Reed Bishop of Hawaii." Robert Van Dyke brought us from Europe three autographed books from royal personages. First, "The King's Story, the Memoirs of H. R. H. the Duke of Windsor," an autobiography, which is especially valuable because it is made out to the Hawaiian Historical Society and signed "Edward" on his personal bookplate. The other books are: "Helen, Queen Mother of Rumania, Princess of Greece and Denmark," and "Crown Prince against the Sickle, The Story of King Michael of Rumania," both authorized biographies by Arthur Gould Lee, both autographed by their subjects.

Occasionally we receive objects which embody history. Now we have been presented with a souvenir spoon designed to celebrate Statehood. This came from Mrs. Ivan Rainwater, who helped with the composition of the pattern. Loan material of value was brought in by Mr. Van Dyke, first hand data on the Revolution of 1893, and N. B. Emerson's collection of affidavits on the Rebellion of 1895.

Research undertaken by the Librarian for inquirers is of interest when analysed. We wondered whether the achievement of Statehood would affect these requests. It would seem to be so. In 1958 there were 17 requests for information from 10 states. In 1959 there were 67, four times as many, from 15 states. In addition there were queries from 15 schools in 1959 as compared to three the previous year.

Some of these inquiries were definitely inspired by Statehood itself, since they were concerned with the various insignia of Hawaii; and some called for Hawaiian data to be included in books covering all the states, such as Railroads, Covered Bridges, German-American Newspapers in the various states.

On the other hand requests for information revealed the usual types of interest, genealogies and biographies, Hawaiian money (how I wish we could reprint our 48th Annual Report containing Mr. Billiam-Walker's article on that!). New fields of research were also opened: Austrians in Hawaii, the first basketball played here, early circuses, and finally Hawaiian
buttons which lead us into a dozen or more civilian and military organizations.

Again my sincere thanks go to my volunteer helpers, Mrs. Agnes Bickerton who keeps the clipping files in order, and Mrs. Helen Lind who assists me in work for the Treasurer.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLOWDEAN C. HANDY, Librarian
LIST OF MEMBERS
July 1, 1960

HONORARY
Kuykendall, Ralph S.

LIFE
Alexander, Mary C.
Ashford, Marguerite K.
Baker, Ray Jerome
Brown, Zadoc White
Burns, Mrs. Fritz B.
Cades, J. Russell
Cades, Milton
Cooke, Mrs. George P.
Cooke, Mrs. Maud B.
Cooke, Mrs. Theodore A.
Cox, Joel B.
Damon, Ethel M.
Damon, Mary M.
Dillingham, Walter F.
Dillingham, Mrs. Walter F.
Earle, J. C.
Gilbert, Mrs. Vivien K.
Hoyt, Simes T.
Hoyt, Mrs. Simes T.
Judd, Bernice
Judd, Walter F.

Luahine, Iolani
MacNaughton, Boyd
MacNaughton, Malcolm
Midkiff, Frank E.
Midkiff, Robert R.
Mitchell, Donald D.
Moses, Alphonse L.
Phillips, James Tice
Pukui, Mrs. Mary Kawena
Schubert, Anthony
Sinclair, Gregg M.
Spaulding, Thomas Marshall
Towill, Roswell M.
Towill, Mrs. Roswell M.
Von Holt, Mrs. Herman
Waterhouse, John T.
White, Mrs. Robert E.
Wilcox, Gaylord P.
Wilcox, Mabel I.
Young, Alfred C.

SUSTAINING
Castle, Alfred L.
Greenwell, Mrs. Arthur L.

Wilson, Mrs. Clarence H.
Wright, John

CONTRIBUTING
Adler, Jacob
Anthony, J. Garner
Awai, George E. K.

Bartow, Thomas P.
Bell, Janet E.
Brooks, Dorothy
Budge, Alexander G.
Caldwell, Mrs. Henry
Castle, Harold K. L.
Collins, George M.
Conrad, Agnes C.
Damon, Cyric Francis, Jr.
Dutton, Meiric K.
Gast, Ross H.
Greene, Ernest W.
Handy, E. S. Craighill
Harding, George L.
Hunter, Charles H.

Korn, Alfons L.
Macintyre, Mrs. Malcolm
Morse, Marion
Russell, John E.
Sevier, Randolph
Smith, Arthur G.
Spurrier, Joseph Howard
Walker, Margaret J.
Wiig, Mrs. Jon
Williams, Mrs. Edith B.

Ahrens, Wilhelmina I.
Ai, C. K.
Aitken, Robert
Anderson, Bruce
Anderson, Mrs. Eleanor
Armitage, George T.
Ashford, Clinton R.
Bacon, George E.
Bacon, Mrs. George E.
Bailey, Mrs. Alice Cooper
Barrere, Mrs. F. Waldron
Barrett, Gwynn W.
Bickerton, Mrs. Agnes C.
Billson, Marcus K.
Bingham, Woodbridge
Bishop, Brenda
Blaisdell, Richard K.
Bown, Helen May
Braunshweiger, T. E.
Brown, George Ii
Bryan, Edwin H., Jr.
Bushnell, Oswald

Cloward, Dr. R. B.
Cogswell, W. O.
Cooke, Mrs. Harrison R.
Corbett, Mrs. Gerald R.
Cox, Mrs. Isaac M.
Crellin, Curtis V.
Davis, Carl D.
Davis, Mrs. Carl D.
Day, Josephine
Dunkhase, Mrs. Carl
Dutton, Mrs. Meiric K.
Ecke, Gustav
Edwards, Webley
Elbert, Samuel H.
Emory, Kenneth P.
Ewart, Arthur F.
Fennell, Dolla
Fisher, Mrs. Gerald W.
Fitzpatrick, Floyd W.
Forbes, David W.
Fraser, Juliette May
Fraser, Mabel
Frazier, Harold V.
Frazier, Mrs. Harold V.

Carlsmith, Wendell
Carney, Mrs. J. J.
Carter, A. Hartwell
Carter, Mrs. Reginald H.
Cartwright, William Edward
Chaffee, Mrs. W. N.
Charlot, Jean
Christian, Mrs. George R.
Hague, James D.
Hall, Charlotte V.
Hamilton, J. W.
Handy, Mrs. Willowdean C.
Hansen, Dagny B.
Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Ass'n
Herman, F. B.
Hinkley, Mrs. Vern
Historical Society, Island of Hawaii
Holden, Margaret E.
Halloway, Mrs. Ethel S.
Hoskins, Charlotte M.
Humme, Charles W.
Henry E. Hutington Library

Iolani School Library

Jabulka, Mrs. Jan
Jackson, Mrs. Ellen S.
Jackson, Frances
Jaggar, Mrs. Thomas A.
Jenks, Mrs. Livingston
Joesting, Edward H.
Johnson, Donald D.
Johnson, Mrs. Rockne H.
Judd, James R., Jr.
Judd, Lawrence M.

Kahn, Paul Markham
Kamehameha Schools, Boys' Library
Kamehameha Schools, Girls' Library
Katsuki, Dr. S. S.
Kauai Historical Society
Keller, Arthur R.
Kent, Harold W.
Kimball, George P.
King, Davis M. K.
King, Pauline
King, Samuel P.
Krauss, Noel L. H.
Kreiger, Robert
Kuck, Loraine E.

Larsen, Dr. Nils P.
Larsen, Mrs. Nils P.
Lee, Shao Chang
Leebrick, K. C.

Lincoln, Mrs. William Ames
Lind, Mrs. Helen Ames
Loomis, Albertine
Lucas, Mrs. Clorinda Low

MacArthur, D. M.
MacNaughton, E. B.
McClellan, Edwin North
McKelway, Mrs. Estelle
McNeilly, Mrs. Mildred M.
Mann, John Cline
Marcus, A. G.
Marshall, Mrs. Donald C.
Maui Historical Society
Meller, Norman
Miller, Carey D.
Milne, Robert Scott
Molyneux, Mrs. Jane K.
Moore, Francis J.
Mowat, Mrs. Jan
Mueller, Bertha
Murdoch, Clare

Newberry Library
Nickerson, Thomas
Norwood, William R.
Norwood, Mrs. William R.

Oliphan, C. T.

Peterson, Margaret L.
Plews, Mrs. Edith J. K. Rice
Podmore, Mrs. Geoffrey
Poole, Mrs. Alice F.
Poole, Mrs. Charles F.
Porter, Norris W.
Prendergast, Eleanor K.
Provincial Archives, Victoria, B.C.
Punahou School, Cooke Library

Rainwater, H. Ivan
Rea, Charles Pedric
Reist, Birdie
Rodiek, Eva Anita

Sakamaki, Shunzo
San Francisco Public Library
Schaefer, Mrs. Gustav E.
Scott, E. B.
Shower, Hazen
Sinclair, Miriam
Smith, Emerson C.
Smith, Gordon
Smith, Margaret
Smith, Raymond P.
Soehren, Lloyd J.
Sousa, Esther F.
Sparks, Robert W.
Spoehr, Alexander
Sterling, Elspeth P.
Stokes, John F. G.
Struve, Mrs. Karl H.
Sultan, Mrs. Edward D.
Summers, Mrs. Richard L.
Swenson, Mrs. Eric P.
Taylor, Mrs. Clarice B.
Taylor, Stanley S.
Terry, Seymour
Thurston, Lorrin P.

Titcomb, Margaret
Tracy, Clifton H.
Twigg-Smith, Thurston

University of Hawaii Press

Van Dyke, Robert E.
Walker, Dr. Hastings H.
Warinner, Emily V.
Watanabe, Shichiro
Waterhouse, N. Warren
Watson, Lorinda E.
Watson, Mrs. Lorna K. Iaukea
Wheeler, Richard H.
Wiig, Jon
Williams, Robert T., Sr.
Wilson, Robert F.
Wilson, Willard
Winne, Jane L.
Wong, Kaupena

DECEASED

Cooke, George P.
Houston, Victor S. K.
Marx, Benjamin L.

Morris, Penrose
Steadman, Mrs. Alva E.
Walker, Charles D.
SOCIETY PUBLICATIONS

Members of the Society are entitled to receive the current Annual Reports and to purchase all publications at one third discount.

Non-members receive one third discount on bulk purchases of $15.00 or more.

Sets from 1893 to date, except for a few missing numbers which are out of print, can be made up. Address inquiries to the Librarian, P. O. Box 2596, Honolulu 3, Hawaii, or telephone 57-271.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Through the kindness of the author, the Society is privileged to offer:

Na Himeni Hawaii, by Ethel M. Damon, for $1.00.

MEMBERSHIP DUES

Life Member ..................................................... $100
Sustaining Member ........................................... 25 a year
Contributing Member ....................................... 10 a year
Regular Member ............................................. 5 a year

Make checks payable to The Hawaiian Historical Society and mail to P. O. Box 2596, Honolulu 3, Hawaii.

Names of persons whose dues are in arrears by more than one year do not appear in the Membership List. Reinstatement may be effected by contacting the Membership Committee.