measures had to be taken, but he thought it left too large a latitude for the committee. Mr. Swanzey, his partner, voted for it.

Mr. BLOUNT. Is Mr. Walker engaged in business here?

Mr. SCOTT. He is head of the firm of Theo. Davis & Co. Mr. Davis is in England.

Mr. BLOUNT. What sort of business?

Mr. SCOTT. A large importing house; importing goods of every nature. It is as large a store as may be found in San Francisco or New York. They are agents for a number of plantations—sell large amounts of goods for the use of the laborers.

Mr. BLOUNT. What plantations are they agents for?

Mr. SCOTT. I can not give the names of them; three or four in Kohala. I can not name them just now; several in Hamakua, the most productive districts; two in Hilo, very large. He is a shrewd business man—made his fortune out of the bounty of the United States.

Mr. BLOUNT. What bounty do you mean?

Mr. SCOTT. Sugar; the reciprocity treaty. He was as poor as Job's turky when he came here. He is now opposed to everything American. I went home. This was 2 o'clock, Monday. At 7 o'clock at night we had three or four telephonic messages about the landing of the troops. In this connection this committee of thirteen had got together and had asked the minister, I believe, to take precautions against disorder—they did not know what might occur—to take the precaution of landing troops. Some of them went down to Arion Hall. Next morning I came up town about 10 o'clock. I heard they were going to dethrone the Queen and establish the Provisional Government. At 2 o'clock—no, half past 1—I went to the Government building. I then went up to the Rifles' armory. They were piling in arms.

Mr. BLOUNT. Who?

Mr. SCOTT. The supporters of the intended Provisional Government and citizens. I did not know there were so many arms in the country. The people were grouping together.

Mr. BLOUNT. Was it a Government armory?

Mr. SCOTT. No; it had been used for a skating rink and dancing hall. It was the place the meeting was held in the day before. Then I came down town. I was in Fort street. I heard the pop of a gun. Doors were suddenly shut, and there was great excitement. I went to the corner, and was told a policemen had been shot. A loaded wagon with arms from Hall & Sons was going to the armory. The policeman tried to stop it. The fellow (the driver) pulled out a pistol and shot the policeman in the arm or chest, or somewhere.

Mr. BLOUNT. What was the character of the guns at the armory?

Mr. SCOTT. They were guns, I think, that had been carried from their homes during the movement of 1887. Generally Springfield rifles. They had kept them at their homes since that movement. They said they had four or five hundred. They were taken just as soon as they were got in. Zeigler, a German, and two or three others got their companies out and marched out to the Government building.

Mr. BLOUNT. Were these volunteer companies?

Mr. SCOTT. Yes; a great many had belonged to the movement of 1887. They were well drilled men and splendid shots. They marched down to the Government building. I suppose there were 300. They marched down in half an hour. Then that proclamation was read. I stayed around there awhile. Wilcox said he thought there was going to be a fight. He had just come from the station house. They did not know what to do. He said the ministers were all in the building.
They seemed paralyzed; did not know what to do. I said, "Who is going to fight?" He said the police. I said, "Oh, pshaw."

Mr. Blount. Who are you talking about?

Mr. Scott. Luther Wilcox. I stayed around some time. Finally I saw a man from the station house come into the Government building. Then I heard the station house was going to give up. I said to a man afterwards, "What made you fellows give up?" He said, "We did not know how well they were prepared." The fact is, the Hawaiian, when he comes in contact with the white man, looks to be directed by him. He is loath to oppose him in any way.

Mr. Blount. Well, if you will continue with your narrative?

Mr. Scott. I was telling you about this police station. They said they thought it was no use to resist. They put it on the grounds afterwards that it was seeing the Boston's men ashore. The fact is the Boston's presence there was nothing. I talked to the officers. They said they had nothing to do with it beyond a matter of security. They had no intention and there was no possibility of their taking any part any more than they did in 1889 when they were landed for Mr. Merrill. Mr. Soper had taken charge of the marshal's office and things were as quiet next day as they had been before this whole thing so far as the movement goes. Then three days after they sent this commission to Washington. That is all I know about this.

I will say this in passing, Mr. Blount: It is the people who want to make a living and bring up families who favor annexation. They recognize the Hawaiian as going. He will be nil. They recognize the fact that this country, left as it is, would become Asiaticized. With the dying out of this dynasty it must become Asiaticized or Americanized. There are eighteen or twenty thousand Japanese here—the very worst class. Now, Mr. Blount, if you want to know anything about the Japanese—

Mr. Blount. I do not care to go into that now. I may later.

Mr. Scott. I want to say in regard to the report about the Boston's men bringing this about, that the Boston had gone to Hilo ten days before this—I am not sure how long—taking Minister Stevens and his daughter, who was drowned, and the Boston did not get back until Saturday morning. I think it was 11 o'clock when she entered—11 or after. The fact is no one expected this. It came like a clap of thunder, except to those on the inside.

Mr. Blount. Do you think the absence of the Boston had anything to do with the Queen selecting that time for the purpose of proclaiming the new constitution?

Mr. Scott. I have heard it said. It was generally believed around here at that time that it was so. If it had remained here perhaps she would not have taken that course. I can not say, however; I do not know.

Mr. Blount. I ask you for this reason: I happened to take up this book (Senate Ex. Doc. No. 76, Fifty-second Congress, second session). In a letter dated Honolulu, January 18, 1893, from Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, Mr. Stevens says: "Immediately after the Boston and myself had left Honolulu the unscrupulous adventurers around the Queen improved the opportunity to push through the Legislature an astounding lottery franchise, with the obvious intent to sell it out to the Louisiana lottery men."

Mr. Scott. I went up to Mr. Stevens. He said, in speaking of Capt. Wiltse, that he talked a good deal, but, after all, he was a man of unusual information here. He (Capt. Wiltse) said they were going to
pass the lottery bill and put out the ministry. He (Mr. Stevens) paid no attention to it. He hardly thought so, because if he had thought they were going to pass the lottery bill he should not have gone. He said Capt. Willse was perfectly sure—talked about it all the while up. When they got back to Lahaina they heard they had passed the lottery bill.

Mr. Blount. Why would they do it in the absence of Capt. Willse and Mr. Stevens?

Mr. Scott. Mr. Stevens told me that in view of the fact that the United States Government had forbidden lottery literature to circulate through the mails he should have protested against that bill. He told me that himself. I am satisfied that there was a settled intention on the part of the Queen to get this constitution and appoint that house of nobles.

Mr. Blount. Do you imagine they would take advantage of the absence of Mr. Stevens to do that? Did they apprehend anything more than a protest; or what is your opinion; or have you any knowledge on that point?

Mr. Scott. I have no knowledge. I am inclined to think that in view of the relations of the two governments that any protests made by the United States ought to have a decided influence upon anything of that kind. That is what I judge. I know nothing, of course.

Early in the session Mr. Macfarland, who is a member of the Legislature, got up and asked the ministers if they had taken any measures to rebuke something the American minister had said at a Grand Army of the Republic meeting. They voted to table it almost unanimously.

Mr. Blount. What was the point of offense?

Mr. Scott. He spoke about the civil war. He referred to the action of the South; that they deemed their cause good; that the United States Government did not arrest men for treason, or something of that kind. Anyway, Mr. Macfarland thought he saw an allusion to the condition of things here. No one else seemed to think so.

Mr. Blount. What is the condition of opinion in the islands as to the Provisional Government?

Mr. Scott. Of course it has the support in Honolulu and in the other islands of the property owners generally and the more stable and responsible elements of the people. There are certain men, quite a number, who were adherents of the Kalakaua régime who do not indorse the Queen's action. There is a good deal of bitterness here against what is called the missionary element. "Missionary" is a very vague term. It has no significance at all. It is the responsible element in a community like this. They are not liked by the natives, who prefer to follow demagogues who give them fair promises. They are easily led.

Mr. Blount. Do they always follow that class?

Mr. Scott. They follow it implicitly. I assure you.

Mr. Blount. Who, then, would you say were the leaders of the Kanakas?

Mr. Scott. There is White, of Lahina; Mr. Parker, Mr. Nahawi, of Hilo; Mr. Bush, the editor of Ka Leo; and, I might say, Mr. R. W. Wilcox. There was one time when he was the greatest leader among them.

Mr. Blount. What influence has he now?

Mr. Scott. I think he has espoused the side of annexation now, and perhaps he is not so popular; but I think they are all what might be termed annexationists, or a majority.

Mr. Blount. A majority of what?
Mr. Scott. Kanakas.

Mr. Blount. In favor of annexation?

Mr. Scott. Yes; I said once to White, "What is your opinion on the subject?" He said all were for annexation, but they did not wish to be disfranchised. That is what they fear. They do not care for the Queen. I believe two-thirds would be in favor of annexation if this matter of the franchise could be satisfactorily explained to them. The Princess Kauiilani is not a favorite with the people; they do not want her to reign. They have said we only wish the Queen to reign her reign out and then we want the United States to take care of us. The English would like to have Kauiilani reign. They are a very responsible set of men—large property owners. They wish to see good government. None of the Queen's friends wanted Kauiilani. They say the English will have all influence with Kauiilani. The old Hawaiian is an excellent man. You put him in certain relations and let the white man give him advice. He is a noble fellow, and looks up to the white man as to a feudal lord. He wishes to know "What am I to do?" He wishes to be taken care of.

Mr. Blount. What do you mean by "old Hawaiians?"

Mr. Scott. I mean those not mixed with foreign blood; those who have something of the old native character. He is as simple as a child. There are about thirty-five or forty thousand.

Mr. Blount. Do you mean when you speak of the native Hawaiians, that there are thirty-five or forty thousand?

Mr. Scott. Yes.

Mr. Blount. That is what I want to get at.

Mr. Scott. I think probably great many of them have a tincture of foreign blood in them.

Mr. Blount. Let me ask you: Is it generally true that the controversies with Kalakaua prior to 1887, subsequent to 1887, and up to the revolution largely followed the lines of a racial division?

Mr. Scott. Yes; he began that after——

Mr. Blount. I am not asking about the time when they began to talk cheap politics. What I want to know is this: Whether or not prior to 1887, subsequent to 1887, and down to the revolution the controversies followed racial lines.

Mr. Scott. This present revolution?

Mr. Blount. Yes; were the contests generally parallel with racial lines?

Mr. Scott. They were.

Mr. Blount. Did these contests, parallel to what we have termed racial lines, grow out of difference of opinion on questions of taxation or questions of taxation and legislation? How did they grow?

Mr. Scott. No; they grew out of office. Mr. Gibson advised it.

Mr. Blount. Please bring that out.

Mr. Scott. In the spring of 1882, when they held the election here, he advised it. He was the originator of the phrase "Hawaii for Hawaiians." He was a man of marked ability. He was the president of the board of education. He made speeches couched in careful language when the foreigners would see or hear them. He spoke Hawaiian well. His cry was "Hawaii for Hawaiians." He said to the people, the missionary has not been your friend. He leaves no opening for you. He leaves no outlet for you. He does not wish you to hold office. He (Gibson) puffed up Kalakaua with the idea that he could be emperor of all the Pacific islands. The planters and commercial community generally were against Gibson as being an unsafe adviser.
On leaving Mr. Scott spoke of certain statistics he had prepared and which had been sent to Washington. Col. Blount did not care to go into it.

APRIL 14, 1893.

I have read over the foregoing report and pronounce it to be a correct one in every particular.

M. M. SCOTT.

No. 47.

Interview with Admiral Skerrett, April 8, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 2 dated April 8, 1893.

No. 48.

Statement of W. O. Smith of events prior to January 17, 1893.

Mr. Smith. About 11 o'clock on Saturday morning, the 14th of January, I went into Mr. Hartwell's office, the corner of Fort and Merchant streets, and found Mr. Hartwell, L. A. Thurston, and John F. Colburn, minister of the interior, in the back room talking very earnestly. They requested me to sit down. Mr. Colburn was very much excited. They stated that Mr. Colburn had just come to see Mr. Hartwell and Mr. Thurston and they asked him to remain, and Mr. Thurston stated very briefly what Mr. Colburn had told them, and Mr. Colburn proceeded to state himself that the ministers had been informed by the Queen that she would promulgate a constitution immediately after the prorogation. Mr. Colburn was very much excited and evidently alarmed.

Mr. J. B. Castle. Did he say when the Queen gave this information for the first time—that morning, was it?

Mr. Smith. His conversation and statements gave me the impression that, as far as he was concerned, the first they had heard of it was that morning, but subsequently he told me himself that he did know of the existence of the constitution the night before, and on another occasion he told me that he had known of the existence of the constitution about a week prior to that, but that he did not know until that morning that she was about to promulgate the constitution, and that she expected her ministers to support her in it and for him to sign it. Colburn's manner was that of a scared man—frightened—very much in earnest. The conversation that was conducted after that lasted perhaps fifteen minutes after I got there, between Mr. Thurston and Hartwell on one side and Colburn on the other. Mr. Thurston and Mr. Hartwell advised him, by all means, that they should not consent to the promulgation of the constitution, and that if they would stand to that they would be supported by the community in that matter.

Mr. J. B. Castle. In their action?

Mr. Smith. In their action.

Mr. Castle. Let us go back a little bit. Had the trade, if there was such a trade, in the Legislature between the opponents to the ministry and the advocates of the lottery bill, grounded within it anything whatever about a constitution?
Mr. Smith. I did not know, but believe, from my knowledge of the facts at the time and the subsequent events, that all, or nearly all, of the native members of the Legislature were informed in regard to the matter of the constitution and of its promulgation. I judge this from their conduct in the house, and from the reports which I afterwards learned of a meeting which a number of the native members of the Legislature had held Friday night. It was reported that John Kaluna, representing the district of Makawao, among others, was very violent in his speech, stating that he could kill five or six men and would be perfectly willing to be hung for it, or die, if he only had the opportunity to kill five or six or more, in defense of the constitution.

Mr. Castle. One of the members made a distinct reference in the light of subsequent events to that action to be taken on Saturday, didn't he?

Mr. Smith. I so understood.

Mr. Castle. You don't remember hearing it in the house? It was alluded to afterward?

Mr. Smith. Well, I say this: At various times during the session there were at times allusions to the matter of a new constitution and a constitutional convention and constitutional amendments. These statements would generally be made when the subject of some one of the constitutional amendments was brought up and with more or less feeling, and at certain times there was some excitement; there were insinuations, references, to something that was to be done, but we didn't attach any special importance to it. I do not believe myself, from what I know of the circumstances, that most of the members—in fact, I do not know any of them had any definite idea of a plan of promulgating a new constitution until very late in the session. There were a number of amendments pending which had not been disposed of—the question of a constitutional convention had not been disposed of until quite late in the session.

Mr. Castle. Have you any doubt that when the election, one year ago this month, took place that part of the programme of the liberal party, so called, was a new constitution, mainly on the lines desired by the Queen, Wilcox, Bush, and the rest?

Mr. Smith. Speeches made in public and reported in the papers of the camp meetings of the liberal party certainly quoted—

Mr. Castle. You have no knowledge except from these general sources?

Mr. Smith. No.

Mr. Castle. And Mr. C. A. Brown told me one year ago last month that that constitution was entirely prepared and engrossed, ready for signature, and it awaited nothing but the opportunity. I suppose that he gained his knowledge from the inside affairs at the palace.

Mr. Smith. I don't know.

Mr. Castle. I want to establish, if possible, what connection there was between, you might say, four important bills—four important things in the legislature—the constitution, the opium bill, the lottery bill, and, it may sound paradoxical, but the registration act.

Mr. Smith. You want to what?

Mr. Castle. I want to establish the relation that existed between them. The registration act was desired of course, by the planting interest, the lottery and the opium and the new constitution by the other other interests.

Mr. Smith. Well, there was undoubtedly some connection; it was connected with a general dissatisfaction with the result of the legisla-
tion; the natives had not been able to carry their measures as they had hoped. The Queen was disappointed in not being able to command and control the public affairs to the extent that she had wanted, and it became very manifest after the appointment of Judge Frear to be judge of the circuit court under the new judiciary act that the Queen was determined to have a different state of affairs. She had advocated strenuously the appointment of Antone Rosa to be judge of the circuit court with Whiting. Rosa's habits were such that the ministers would not consent to it at all. While that very matter was pending he went to Lahaina to attend circuit court at the December term and was intoxicated publicly in Lahaina and the ministers would not consent. She felt that was a check to her power, and from conversations with those ministers since they have stated, and it was apparent to us, that from that moment her determination was to have a different state of affairs at whatever cost.

Now, going back to the events of Saturday, Mr. Colburn had to leave Mr. Hartwell's office, because the prorogation was to take place at 12 o'clock and the ministers had to be there, and he hurried away. You asked me about being present at the chamber of commerce. I was there, certainly. What was the subject of that?

Mr. Castle. Why, I understand that the first inkling in the chamber of commerce to such portion of the business community as was there was that this thing was on the tapis. The object of that meeting was to take action on the signature of this lottery bill, to pass that memorial which was sent by a committee to the Queen.

Mr. Cooper. That was what I understood from Mr. Glade.

Mr. Smith. Immediately after this interview in Mr. Hartwell's office with Colburn I went up to the chamber of commerce, at which a meeting of the merchants was being held, and stated to the meeting that I had information that a constitution was about to be promulgated by the Queen, without giving my source of information. I told them that I had authentic information, so authentic that certain actions which they had before them at that time were deferred in consequence of my statement to that effect.

Mr. Castle. Did you go to the prorogation?

Mr. Smith. No; I did not go to the prorogation.

Mr. Smith. No white members did except Berger and Peterson, did they?

Mr. Smith. I do not know who went; I did not go myself. In the neighborhood of 1 o'clock on that same Saturday, John F. Colburn came to my office again in very great excitement. He was dressed in full dress with a silk hat, and still had his blue sash on, which ministers wear on state occasions. He came along Merchant street in the direction of Bishop's bank, and came right to my office and asked me in a very exciting manner to come at once to the attorney-general's office, in the Government building. I said that I would, and offered to get in the same hack with him. He said it would be better to take another hack, and immediately told the driver to drive on, and drove with speed to the Government building. I immediately entered another hack and came up to the Government building, up to the attorney-general's office, and it may then have been half-past 1. In the attorney-general's office upstairs, in Aliolani Hale, were the attorney-general, A. P. Peterson, minister of finance, W. H. Cornwell, and Minister of the Interior, J. F. Colburn. There were also present L. A. Thurston, F. W. Wundenburg, E. C. MacFarlane, and myself. Mr. Colburn was the chief spokesman at first.
Mr. CASTLE. Sam Parker was not there at that meeting?

Mr. SMITH. No; Sam Parker, the minister of foreign affairs, was not at the attorney-general's then at that time. Mr. Colburn, in an excited manner, told about an interview at the palace with the Queen after the prorogation, in which she had produced the proposed new constitution and demanded that the ministers sign it with herself, and that he as minister of the interior should sign it, I do not recollect definitely which, and narrated how he and Mr. Peterson and Mr. Cornwell had escaped from the palace. Mr. Thurston spoke very emphatically, although calmly, advising that by no means should they sign the constitution or consent to her proposition.

Mr. COOPER. Was there not something said about their resigning at that time?

Mr. SMITH. There was, both on that occasion and at Mr. Hartwell's office at 11 o'clock. We advised Mr. Colburn that the ministers should not resign, and that if they resigned it would give the Queen an opportunity to appoint new ministers who would accede to her wishes, and the complications would be greater than they otherwise would be. While we were in the attorney-general's office, John Richardson, in the uniform of an officer of the Queen's staff, came with a message from the palace requesting the three ministers to go over there. At that time the whole of the Queen's guard was drawn up in front of the palace on King street side under arms. On the Waikiki side of the main entrance to the palace, and on the Ewa side of that entrance, was a large crowd of natives—two or three hundred, probably.

Mr. CASTLE. Half as many more on the Makai side?

Mr. SMITH. Yes. The band was at the palace and there appeared to be a large number of people in attendance around the palace, all the officials and attendants that were generally about the sovereign on an occasion of prorogation. We were also informed that the chief justice was at the palace at the request of the Queen waiting to administer the oath to her upon her signing the new constitution.

Mr. CASTLE. Is that the way that was?

Mr. SMITH. He was there all the afternoon.

Mr. CASTLE. He was there for that purpose?

Mr. SMITH. He was there for that purpose.

Mr. CASTLE. And he knew there was to be a new constitution?

Mr. SMITH. I was informed that he knew there was to be a new constitution, and on that account he remained there.

Mr. CASTLE. To administer the oath.

Mr. SMITH. That was what she wanted him for.

Mr. COOPER. Bickerton was also there?

Mr. SMITH. Bickerton was there. When Maj. Richardson came with the message for the ministers to go over, some one or more of them asked us who were present what they should do. We told them not to go, Mr. Thurston explaining to them that so long as they, the three of them, were there, they constituted a majority of the Government, and that it might become important for them to act in regard to public affairs, Colburn expressed his unwillingness to go, stating that he feared what the excited mob might do. He felt that their lives were in danger if they went back to the palace again. It was then decided by them to send back a message by Richardson to Samuel Parker, minister of foreign affairs, to come over to the attorney-general's office from the palace, and shortly he did come, and the whole situation was again discussed. Mr. Parker urged that the other ministers return to the palace with him. It was deemed inadvisable for them to do so, but
Mr. Parker, who made light of the danger, said that he would go back again and try and dissuade her from pursuing the course which she had mapped out. There was a good deal of conversation about the matter, and shortly after that, during Mr. Parker's absence, Thurston and I left the Government building to return to our offices down town.

Mr. CASTLE. Where were Colburn and Cornwall at this—?

Mr. SMITH. They were here in the attorney-general's office.

Mr. CASTLE. Now, then, tell me the connection. At half-past 2, or very close to half-past 2, you came out of the Government building in a hack, and I jumped in with you. At that time Colburn and Cornwall were crossing the street.

Mr. SMITH. That is later. Thurston and I left the Government building to go to town, and we walked along as far as Richard street, when we were overtaken by a messenger requesting Mr. Thurston to return. He did return to the Government building, and I kept on to my office. Arriving at my office I found a large number of people—?

Mr. COOPER (interrupting). No, you met Mr. Neumann and myself on the corner and we went into your office, three of us; that was the first time I came down Merchant street.

Mr. SMITH. Near my office on the way I met Paul Neumann and Mr. H. E. Cooper, and I asked them to go into my office. In my inner office Mr. Neumann and Mr. Cooper and myself discussed the situation and discussed the danger of disturbance.

Mr. COOPER. And that the ministers should be supported against the Queen.

Mr. SMITH. And that the ministers should be supported against the Queen. We also discussed the question of under what circumstances the troops of the American ship of war Boston would be justified in

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Neumann stated that if the Queen persisted in carrying out her object that it would be warrantable for foreign inter­ence. Mr. Neumann stated that.

Mr. SMITH. He took the ground also that they could not land except­ing only upon the request of the minister of foreign affairs.

Mr. CASTLE. The minister of foreign affairs only?

Mr. SMITH. The Government. While we were talking this matter over, perhaps ten minutes, several people came to this inner office, and we requested them to retire.

Mr. COOPER. I never left the office at all from the time I first went in until the committee of safety had been formed and finally adjourned.

Mr. SMITH. People began to crowd into my office shortly after that, and there was very deep feeling and considerable excitement and very determined expression of opposition to the proceeding of the Queen, and individuals began signing the paper.

Mr. COOPER. I will show you how it was. Mr. Thurston wrote down seven or eight names who were gentlemen present at that time in his own handwriting; we did not sign it; and then he says, "I am going out to see others, will you take this chair and take care of this paper and get their signature?" I said, "yes," and when he went out several of us got into a discussion with Mr. Neumann, and he took the ground that the Queen had not yet committed an overt act which would amount to treason or revolution. On our part we contended that she had, and he then left the office.

Mr. SMITH. The expression was very strongly expressed that the ministers should be supported in their attitude toward the Queen in refusing to accede to her request and that they ought not to resign, and it was requested to return to the Government building and so state
to the ministers that that was the sentiment of citizens so far as we had been able to ascertain. I immediately returned to the Government building. On entering the yard and before reaching the front door of the building I met the ministers going over to the palace with Messenger Richardson.

Mr. Castle. All the ministers?

Mr. Smith. My impression is they were all four. I stopped and gave the communication to them to that effect that they should be supported by the community in refusing to accede to the Queen's wishes, and they proceeded on and went into the palace yard, and I returned to my office. At my office I found there was still a large number of people.

Mr. Castle. That was the time you picked me up?

Mr. Smith. Yes. It must have been in the neighborhood of an hour and a half after that——

Mr. Castle. I got on to the quarter-hour car that goes down town from Thomas Square at quarter past 2. It was just about half past 2 by the clock of this building when I noticed the crowd there in the Government building. And looking on I saw there was one white man here and saw that it was McStockler, and I jumped out to ask him what was up when you drove out of the yard and beckoned to me before I had a chance to ask him, and I jumped in the hack with you and went down town. Colburn and Cornwell were at that moment crossing the street. The whole affair, of course, became so tense and exciting that I could not swear now whether they were going this way or that way.

Mr. Smith. They were going toward the palace gate. My conversation with Coburn was just before he left the Government building yard. We returned, and down at the office were a large number of people going and coming; a great deal of excitement. I noticed on my return there was quite a list of names signed at the desk.

Mr. Castle. Mr. Cooper was at the desk with that list.

Mr. Smith. Mr. Cooper had charge of that matter of the signatures, and people were asking him about it and what was to be done, and what was going to be done, and various statements, and the offices, both front and rear offices, became filled with people. After a little I volunteered and did return again to the Government building to ascertain how matters stood, so as to communicate with the meeting, and at the Government building there were a good many people. Upstairs, I noticed after awhile, there were several of the foreign representatives and Mr. J. O. Carter and others. I understood afterwards that they had been in consultation with the ministry. We waited around the building here an hour or so, and watching the palace to see what was to be done.

At this time some of the troops had stacked their arms and were lying around on the grass. The crowd of spectators on the left-hand side had diminished. The people at the palace, attendants, seemed to be about the same as ever; there were people going from the interior on to the veranda, they all seemed to be waiting. Finally there was a move and commotion, and the soldiers returned and took their arms and were drawn up in line. The crowd of people in the Government building yard all crowded toward the gate, and many went into the yard. I, with others, went to King street on the inside of the Government fence opposite the palace yard gate to see what was going on. After some further delay, there was evidently some passing to and fro and some commotion in the palace, we saw a train of ladies pass from the rooms on to the west side of the palace towards the throne room,
and there was another little delay for some little time. And then the Queen and some ladies came out of the throne room and went upstairs and came out on the balcony, and from there she made remarks. We could not hear what she said.

Mr. Castle. But it was undoubtedly the speech which was afterwards published?

Mr. Smith. Yes. Shortly after that there was a number of representative and others came out of the palace on the front steps and there several speakers harangued the audience. The meeting at the palace seemed to be at an end, and this was now about half-past three or a little later.

Mr. Cooper. Colburn came in and took his seat right opposite where I was sitting; and as soon as Colburn showed himself in the door and commenced to speak Peterson went out.

Mr. Smith. Mr. Calburn overtook Mr. Thurston and myself returning to my office and told us the situation, how the Queen, in great anger, had stated to the people who were assembled that she had been unable to carry out her wishes and the desire of many; that it was her wish to promulgate a new constitution, but that she had been prevented, but she would shortly do it; and that we heard from various sources of the violent speeches of William White, representative from Lahaina, and others, threatening bloodshed and generally of a most violent character, and we returned and reported this to the meeting. My offices were crowded with people, so that it was with difficulty that we could get into the room at all, and Mr. Colburn worked his way in. Mr. Peterson appeared about that time or a little later, and Mr. Colburn made this statement briefly. What occurred was about as has been published, and it was generally known. There were a few short speeches made by different persons present. I made some remarks, and one or two others, finally Mr. Thurston spoke very briefly, and then on Mr. Thurston’s motion those present organized themselves into a meeting. Mr. H. E. Cooper was chosen chairman and W. O. Smith secretary.

Mr. Cooper. Then the motion was to appoint a committee of nine, the first motion was, and then it was afterwards made thirteen, and then by a vote of the meeting I was made a member of the committee.

Mr. Smith. It was voted that a committee of thirteen be appointed to form plans for action and call meetings, report any time, at their discretion, and be called a committee of safety. At that time there was some serious apprehension, we could not tell what, that disorder might follow; what steps might be taken next; whether the constitution might not be promulgated that very afternoon or the next morning, or at any time; there was simply an intense feeling of uncertainty and a feeling that danger to the community was very imminent. She had practically promised it in a few days. The remarks and action were very short—right to the point; intense feeling and determination was manifested, and meanwhile from those present the following committee of thirteen was appointed: L. A. Thurston, W. R. Castle, C. Bolte, W. C. Wilder, W. O. Smith, J. A. McCandless, H. F. Glade, A. S. Wilcox, T. F. Lansing, H. Waterhouse, Andrew Brown, F. W. McChesney, and, by special vote, H. E. Cooper. Mr. Glade was not present, but was communicated with—asked if he would be willing to serve.

Mr. Cooper. After the committee was formed the other gentlemen were requested to retire. Then a message was sent for Mr. Glade and Mr. Wilder and they came.

Mr. Smith. And they signified their willingness to serve on the com
mittee. After further delay, almost immediately the others present were requested to retire and the committee held a meeting. The situation was briefly discussed—the imminence of danger and the safety of the city; what action should be taken for protection was the main subject of discussion. And in view of the fact that at the station house there was a large armed force and at the barracks, and that nearly all of the arms were in possession of the supporters of the Queen, and there was no organization at the time outside of those forces, and it was simply unknown how many arms were available, the question was at once discussed whether a protectorate should not be sought from the United States steamship of war Boston; that question was, of course, first raised, whether the United States would render assistance, or what their attitude would be, and then a special committee consisting of L. A. Thurston, W. C. Wilder, and H. F. Glade were appointed to wait upon Mr. J. L. Stevens, United States minister, and inform him of the situation and ascertain from him what, if any, protection or assistance could be afforded by the United States forces for the protection of life and property, the unanimous sentiment and feeling being that life and property were in imminent danger. By that time it was so dark that I lighted the electric light. We had to have light before we concluded our meeting and deliberations.

Mr. Cooper. My first acquaintance with the affair was when I met Hartwell on the street. I met him coming out of his office.

When this question came up as to whether or not what assistance the United States troops might give, I made the following statement to the committee: That I had gone, at Mr. Hartwell's request, to see the captain of the Boston, Capt. Wiltse, about half past 11, and I informed him of the situation, and he immediately sent for Commander Swinburne, who, in turn, sent for the officer of the deck, and all necessary preliminary preparations were made, and that was Capt. Wiltse's first news of it. He didn't know anything about it before I came there. And Capt. Wiltse said that he was there for the purpose of protecting life and property of American citizens, and if called upon he would do it. I afterwards came ashore and met Mr. Smith and Mr. Neumann and retired to Mr. Smith's office.

Mr. Smith. During this meeting of the committee of thirteen and the discussion of the situation, it was made manifest to us, from what had transpired during the day and the action of the Queen, that she was in a condition of revolution, that is, her act was entirely revolutionary; that there was a feeling of perfect uncertainty of what would take place or how great the danger was, but we were simply convinced that established government was at an end, that we were in a state of revolution, and with the forces in her command, and the utter disregard for the constitution and laws, that we as citizens had simply got to look to ourselves for safety and protection, that the intelligent part of the community had got to take matters in their own hands and establish law and order. The probabilities of what the Queen would do were discussed; there was no certainty in regard to that, excepting that she would undoubtedly persist in her revolutionary intentions; what would be done, how soon martial law might be declared or any other course would be taken, what steps would be taken, we simply could not tell, and after discussion Mr. Thurston made the following motion: "That steps be taken at once to form and declare a provisional government."

The seriousness of the step was considered, but it was deemed, decided unanimously by the committee that some such steps had got
to be taken for protection of life and property, and it was then, and after Mr. Cooper's statement in regard to his visit to the Boston, that the committee consisting of Thurston, Wilder, and Glade were appointed to meet the American minister, and were instructed to report the next morning at 9 o'clock, at a meeting to be called at the residence of W. R. Castle.

I went home about dark or a little after, and just had dinner when Mr. Thurston called at my house on his way home, asking me to meet the committee and one or two others at his house at 8 o'clock. I went there and found Mr. Thurston, W. R. Castle, F. W. Wundenberg, A. S. Hartwell, S. B. Dole, and C. L. Carter. Mr. Thurston stated that the committee had waited upon the American minister, and that he had said that the United States troops on board the Boston would be ready to land any moment to prevent the destruction of American life and property, and in regard to the matter of establishing a Provisional Government they of course would recognize the existing government whatever it might be.

Mr. Thurston stated to Mr. Stevens the proposition that was under consideration, of establishing a Provisional Government, and in case those steps were taken, he asked Mr. Stevens what his attitude would be, and Mr. Stevens had told him whatever government was established, and was actually in possession of the Government building, the executive departments and archives, and in possession of the city, that was a de facto government proclaiming itself as a government, would necessarily have to be recognized. Everything had culminated in a few hours, we were laboring under intense feeling, and it was arranged that different ones of those present should begin drafting papers. Mr. W. R. Castle undertook to draft something in the nature of a brief historical statement, which would be for a preamble to the declaration. Mr. Thurston was to work upon the matter of the form of the Provisional Government. Judge Dole quietly stated that he was not prepared to take part in the movement, but that he would assist, at Mr. Thurston's request, in drafting the declaration. I was requested to draft papers to be submitted to the American minister requesting the landing of the troops, in case it became necessary. At a late hour we retired, and the next morning at 9 o'clock the committee of thirteen met at W. R. Castle's residence.

The meeting continued until noon. The committee appointed to wait on the American minister made a report to the committee similar to the report made to us the night before. Among the various propositions and matters discussed was a matter of calling a public mass meeting, and it was decided to call a meeting at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the next day, Monday, to be held if possible at the old rifle armory on Beretania street, near the corner of Punchbowl street. Mr. Andrew Brown was appointed a committee to procure the armory, make the arrangements for the meeting, and to see to the publication of the notice, which notice was prepared there during the meeting, and a committee of three, consisting of L. A. Thurston, W. R. Castle, and W. O. Smith, were appointed to arrange a programme for the public meeting and secure the speakers. During this meeting Mr. A. S. Wilcox stated that as he had deemed it important for him to return to Kauai that he thought it was his duty to resign from the committee.

While he was in perfect sympathy with the movement, he felt that in the excitement which might be created it was very important for those who had their homes on the other islands to return and endeavor to maintain peace and quietness in the other islands. His resignation
was accepted, and Mr. J. Emmeluth was elected to take his place. Mr. Glade stated that owing to his position as German consul he deemed under his instructions that it would be improper for him to continue a member of the committee and tendered his resignation, which was accepted, and Mr. Ed. Suhr was appointed to fill his place. At this meeting Mr. L. A. Thurston was appointed to draw the resolution to be presented at the mass meeting and the report of the committee.

Mr. COOPER. That was just after Glade and Wilcox had resigned; just when we were going to break up it was suggested as to whether we should not go on and perfect the organization of the Provisional Government and the form that it should take. Mr. Castle presented his historical preamble, which was not read, but Mr. Thurston had stated the general plan that he had in mind as to the form the Provisional Government should take, stating that it should consist of an executive council and an advisory council. The mention of names was suggested by the meeting, that Mr. Thurston should be the leader and the head of the Government. Mr. Thurston questioned the wisdom of that on two grounds: First he had business arrangements which might call him away, and on the further ground that he was considered such a radical mover that he believed it was wise to have some one who was more conservative. That was dropped right there. Mr. Dole's name was not mentioned at that meeting.

Mr. SMITH. At that meeting and the previous and subsequent meetings most meager minutes were kept, because of the possible danger of our being arrested and of these records being used against us. The night before Mr. Thurston requested Mr. Wundenberg to ascertain as far as he could what arms were available and how many men with arms could be depended upon. Just at the close of the meeting on Sunday, about noon, at W. R. Castle's, Mr. Wundenberg came with Mr. Soper, and they reported that the prospect of obtaining arms was very discouraging, but that after making a thorough search of the town only about sixty stand of arms were found that were not in possession of the Government.

After we adjourned Mr. Thurston and I called upon the American minister again and informed him of what was being done. Among other things we talked over with him what had better be done in case of our being arrested or extreme or violent measures being taken by the Monarchy in regard to us. We did not know what steps would be taken, and there was a feeling of great unrest and sense of danger in the community. Mr. Stevens gave assurances of his earnest purpose to afford all the protection that was in his power to protect life and property; he emphasized the fact that while he would call for the United States troops to protect life and property, he could not recognize any government until actually established. He repeated that the troops when landed would not take sides with either party, but would protect American life and property. Thurston and I then began to arrange in regard to the speakers, who to see. Thurston said that he would see quite a number; among them was Mr. Swanzy, T. R. Walker, Cecil Brown, and some others. I rode down town and found James F. Morgan and asked him to be one of the speakers. He consented to be. And I saw two or three others and then went to the printing office and hastened up the matter of the publishing of the posters.

At the meeting at Mr. Castle's there was considerable discussion in regard to when to have the mass meeting; some were in favor of having it on Sunday; a feeling too had been expressed at the meeting on Saturday afternoon that there should be a mass meeting called
right off on Sunday, and at the meeting some thought better to have the meeting early Monday morning, there being such a feeling of absolute uncertainty in regard to what course the Queen would pursue, whether she would proclaim the constitution and disorder and riot precipitated. It was finally concluded, however, that the meeting should be held at 2 o'clock and that all business houses be requested to close.

Sunday evening several of us met again at Mr. Thurston's. Mr. Thurston did not return from his interview with Cecil Brown and others until about 8 o'clock in the evening. Meanwhile a message had been left at my house by Colburn that the ministers would like to meet a committee of five from the committee of thirteen. We were also informed that the ministers had had a meeting sometime during the day of Sunday, in which several of the citizens were present—Mr. F. A. Schaefer, Mr. S. M. Damon, and Mr. J. O. Carter, and one or two others. At this meeting in the evening the work was further arranged, the different parts of it assigned, and at a late hour we returned home.

The next morning, Monday, January 16, the meeting was held of the whole committee of thirteen at the office of L. A. Thurston over Bishop's Bank, corner of Merchant and Kaahumanu streets. Mr. Thurston was ill, suffering much at times. The meeting lasted nearly all the forenoon, subject to a number of interruptions, one interruption being that of the marshal, C. B. Wilson, who called Thurston out into Mr. W. F. Allen's office and protested against the holding of a mass meeting in the afternoon. This meeting at Mr. Thurston's office during the forenoon was held under great difficulties, there being many interruptions, and different ones having to withdraw at various times for various matters pertaining to the business in hand. The condition of Mr. Thurston's health caused us a good deal of anxiety. He had been suffering before that with a severe cold upon his lungs and from loss of sleep and mental strain he was weak and was attacked with dysentery.

At that meeting it was decided that he should be one of the speakers at the public meeting. He had objected to it, not desiring to take so prominent a part, fearing that it might produce unnecessary antagonism; more than that, his physical condition was such that he hardly felt able. It was deemed very important that he should speak, and the order of business at the meeting was decided upon. Mr. W. C. Wilder reluctantly consented to act as chairman, and the matter of a request of the ministers that a committee of five be sent to wait upon them was considered, and a committee was appointed consisting of C. Bolte, J. A. McCandless, W. C. Wilder, F. W. McChesney, and H. Waterhouse, to meet the ministers. They retired, and during their absence other general matters were discussed. Information was being received in regard to public matters generally.

Mr. Castle. Was Wilson's action there simply a protest; it went out that he had warned them not to have it?

Mr. Smith, Thurston reported it as a protest against this meeting being held. Thurston asked him why, and he said that it would provoke disorder. At this meeting we were informed of the fact that another mass meeting had been called for the same hour, 2 o'clock in the afternoon, to be held at Palace Square, the junction of Richard and King streets, signed by the committee on law and order, and that many of those posters had been placed over our posters, and that there was evidently an attempt to prevent our meeting or create confusion and to mislead. Mr. Thurston had on his own authority before the meeting prepared a poster, and it was in the process of being printed exposing
the fraud, and he had a copy of it then and submitted it to the meeting, but it was of a nature which we considered inflammatory, and on the whole we decided not to have it posted.

The committee of five returned and reported that they had met the four ministers, and the ministers stated to them that they had no communication to make, and wanted to know what the committee wanted. They talked over the situation and showed our committee a proclamation signed by the Queen and the ministers stating that she would never again attempt to force a new constitution. Before the meeting broke up the form of the request to the American minister in regard to the landing of the troops was adopted and signed by the committee of thirteen, requesting the American minister to land troops, and this request was signed by the committee of thirteen, and decided to be delivered to the minister to be held by him but not to be acted upon until a further request was received from the committee.

After the adjournment of the meeting fifteen or sixteen different copies of the request were typewritten and attached with five or six blank pages to each copy, and these were distributed among several members of the committee before proceeding to the meeting, and the request of Mr. Stevens was delivered to him before the meeting was held. By 1 o'clock business began to be closed. Before 2 o'clock a large number of people had assembled at the armory, and by 2 o'clock a very large number was there. After Mr. Thurston had finished speaking at the mass meeting, and while others were speaking, the members of the committee discussed very earnestly what to do in regard to this petition. If it was to be circulated for signatures, some notice to that effect would have to be given before the meeting dispersed; and we were in very great doubt, some being very earnestly of the opinion that they should be signed as universally as possible, the opinion being that they would be signed by nearly all of the twelve hundred present, but it did not seem opportune and we waited. The meeting was finally adjourned, as it seemed to some of us sooner than we expected, and nothing was done about the signing of the petition, and the committee felt somewhat at a loss what to do, but word was passed around among us at once to meet at my office again, and within twenty minutes after the adjournment of the meeting the committee met.

Mr. Smith. There was a short and earnest discussion of what was to be done; it was then nearly 4; our plans had not been perfected, papers had not been completed, and after a hasty discussion, the time being very short, it was decided that it was impossible for us to take the necessary steps, and we should request that the troops be not landed until next morning, the hour in the morning being immaterial, whether it was 9 or 8 or 6 o'clock in the morning, but we must have further time to prevent bloodshed, and Mr. Thurston and I were appointed to proceed at once to the American minister and inform him of our decision. We proceeded at once to Mr. Stevens' house, the United States legation, stated the case to him, and he said that as a precautionary measure, and to protect American life and property, he had ordered the troops to be landed at 5 o'clock, and that they would come. It was then decided to adjourn to meet at the house of Henry Waterhouse at 8 o'clock in the evening. The meeting broke up, and some of us went down to see the troops landed. Thurston gave up—sick. He had to go to bed.

At 8 o'clock in the evening we met at Mr. Henry Waterhouse's. All of the members of the committee were present except Thurston, Castle,
and Wilder, they all being ill. Mr. James B. Castle was present, taking the place of W. R. Castle, and C. L. Carter taking the place of Thurston. There were also present by invitation Alexander Young, J. H. Soper, Cecil Brown, H. P. Baldwin, and F. W. Wundenburg.

Previous to this meeting, beginning with the meeting on Saturday afternoon, the suggestion of sending the Claudine to San Francisco with dispatches to the United States Government was discussed, and at this meeting Monday evening it was moved that she be sent at once to San Francisco. The motion was amended that action be deferred until after the establishment of the Provisional Government. Amendment carried.

A committee of two, consisting of C. Bolte and C. L. Carter, was appointed to make a list to form an executive council of five members and an advisory council of eight members. Before this it had been suggested that Judge Dole be chosen to act as the head of the government. After some discussion Mr. Bolte was appointed a committee to wait upon Judge Dole and to invite his attendance at the meeting, and after an absence of some length Mr. Bolte returned with Judge Dole. And Judge Dole was not willing to consent at that time, stating that he did not favor fully the idea of annexation at this time and asked if it would not be better to have a regent here and Kauli'ani declared the Queen. But after discussion he consented to take the matter under further consideration and let us know his decision the next day at 12 o'clock, the committee endeavoring to persuade him. He recognized that the logical events and manifest destiny of the island was annexation, but he did not know whether it was the wisest step now. There is no doubt that the Queen has vacated the throne.

He said that if he did decide to join us he would first resign as judge of the supreme court. P. C. Jones, S. M. Damon, Cecil Brown, J. A. King, and W. O. Smith were suggested to serve on the executive council, which was contemplated as five. Mr. Cecil Brown refused. Mr. Soper was requested to take the place of commander of the military forces, and he accepted conditionally. A finance committee of three was appointed, consisting of McCandless, McChesney, and J. B. Castle, to collect the lists of arms and ammunition and buy or otherwise procure the same.

At 10 o'clock the next day, January 17, the committee met at the office of W. O. Smith, and Mr. C. L. Carter, on behalf of the committee, reported the names of those who had consented to go upon the executive and advisory councils. It was voted that the advisory committee be increased from eight to thirteen, and additional names be suggested to the committee, from whom they could select the five additional names. Various names were suggested. It was voted that the committee request Mr. Wilder to report if the Claudine could be chartered to go to San Francisco and at what cost. It was voted that the Interisland steamship companies be requested not to allow any vessels to leave for the other islands before 10 o'clock on the next day. At 11 o'clock the judge came before the committee and stated that he would accept the position as chairman of the executive council.

It was voted that the executive council be S. B. Dole, J. A. King, P. C. Jones, W. O. Smith, and C. Bolte, and that the advisory council consist of S. M. Damon, L. A. Thurston, J. Emmeluth, J. A. McCandless, F. W. McCchesney, W. R. Castle, W. C. Wilder, Andrew Brown, J. F. Morgan, H. Waterhouse, E. D. Tenney, F. Wilhelm, and W. G. Ashley. During the meeting in the forenoon Mr. S. M. Damon came in and reported that he had had an interview with the Queen, in which
he had advised her not to make resistance, but to submit, and that she would have every opportunity for presenting her claims, and Mr. Damon stated that he was willing to join the movement. Mr. Dole, before he retired, signed his written resignation as a judge to the supreme court and forwarded it to the minister of foreign affairs.

The meeting adjourned and met again at 1:30. It having been understood that Mr. Dole should have the say in regard to who the members of the executive council should be, he was asked at this final meeting if he approved of the names that had been suggested, and he, upon looking them over, stated that objection had been raised in regard to the name of Mr. Bolte, and that as he himself was not very well acquainted with Mr. Bolte that it would be better that he should not be upon the executive council. Mr. Bolte at once expressed his approval, that he only wished to serve in any capacity which would further the object. And then, after a brief discussion, it was decided to reduce the number of the executive committee from five to four, and that they should fill the offices of foreign affairs, interior, finance, and attorney-general, in the order in which they were named, and it was decided to increase the number of the advisory committee from thirteen to fourteen and add Mr. Bolte's name to the list. The members of the executive council and advisory committee were then finally approved and acted upon.

The committee of thirteen then signed the proclamation, and the executive council then signed the commission of J. H. Soper as commander in chief of the forces, and three copies of the proclamation were completed. The final signing of the papers was completed about twenty minutes past 2, and after a little delay the committee of thirteen, with the executive and advisory councils, started to proceed to the Government building. They had hardly reached the corner of Merchant street before a shot was heard, and it was reported that a policeman had been shot at E. O. Hall & Son's store, and people were seen running from the direction of the Government building towards the spot, and there was considerable commotion. The committee and councils proceeded to the Government building and the proclamation was read. Previous to starting, leaving my office, Mr. Dole requested Mr. A. S. Wilcox to go up to the Government building and come back and report whether there was any armed force at the Government building. He went up and looked through and went through to Queen street, and came back and reported that he did not see any armed men.

After the reading of the proclamation the councils convened in the office of the minister of the interior, and subsequent events occurred and business was done in the following order:

Orders No. 1 and No. 2 were issued.
Liquor saloons were ordered to be closed.
Letters were sent to the members of the diplomatic and consular corps announcing the establishment of the Provisional Government and requesting recognition.

Mr. Wodehouse, British commissioner, and Mr. T. R. Walker, British vice-consul, called to verify the report of our occupation, etc.

Deputy-Marshal Mehrtens came from the police station, and we sent by him a copy of the proclamation to the ex-ministers and an invitation to them to come and see us.

Mehrtens came again, asking us to go to the police station. We declined and instructed him to tell the ex-ministers if they wished to see us they must come to the Government building.

Ministers Parker and Cornwell came.
Messrs. Damon and Bolte returned with Parker and Corn" to the police station to meet the other ex-ministers.

Messrs. Damon and Bolte returned with the four ex-ministers, who requested that the Queen should have an opportunity to make a protest.

Mr. Damon went with them to see the Queen.

Ex-ministers and Damon returned stating that the Queen gave up under protest, and that Marshal Wilson had been ordered to give up the station house. And we sent an officer with a squad of men to take possession of the station.

As to the precise time when the letter of recognition was received from American Minister Stevens I can not be positive. My recollection is that it was about the time that Messrs. Damon and Bolte returned from the police station with the four ex-ministers, but the records of our proceedings at the time, kept by the secretary, place it after the return of Mr. Damon and the ex-ministers from their visit to the Queen. In any event it was very late in the day, and long after Messrs. Wodehouse and Walker had called.

Before the letter of recognition was received from Mr. Stevens, Lieut. Young, of the U. S. S. Boston, called upon us, and stated that he was ordered to verify the correctness of the assurance that we were in occupation of the Government building and departments.

These events occupied the time till after dark; meanwhile many matters demanded our attention.

I sent for the attorney-general and desired to examine him in reference to the events connected with the revolution of the 17th of January, 1893. He said he preferred not to be examined; that he would bring me a paper containing a history of those events, prepared by himself and some other gentlemen. The next day he brought the paper to which this is attached, saying it was a part of the record. I asked him if he would allow me to see the whole record. He hesitated about it and said that he would prefer to talk with Mr. Dole first. While I have seen him frequently since he has never referred to the matter again. When he handed me the paper he said he did not care to be examined himself; that if there was anything in it that I did not understand he would explain it to me.

James H. Blount.

Honolulu, July 15, 1893.

No. 49.

Interview with J. H. Soper, June 17, 1893.

Q. Where were you born?
Q. How long have you lived here?
A. I came here in December, 1877.
Q. Are you a naturalized citizen?
A. Of this country?
Q. Yes.
A. I have taken the oath of allegiance to this Government.
Q. Are you a British subject?
A. I am an American.
Q. How long did you live in the United States?
A. I was 4 years of age when I went there. My father was a naturalized citizen.

Q. What year was that?
A. 1850. I was born in 1846.

Q. How long did you live in the United States?
A. Until 1877.

Q. That would be twenty-seven years?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you take the oath of allegiance here?
A. To this Government?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.

Q. Are you an American citizen?
A. Yes, sir. I didn't forswear my allegiance to the United States.

Q. You came here in what year?
A. In 1877.

Q. Were you in command of the military forces at the time of the dethronement of the Queen?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. How much artillery was turned over?
A. Twelve guns altogether.

Q. What were they?
A. Eight centimeter Krupp guns and four 7-centimeter guns.

Q. Were they German guns?
A. They were Austrian guns, the same pattern as Krupp guns.

Q. How many small arms?
A. I can not say, from memory. I have a record of it over there. I cannot say, from memory. I would have to look over the record, in order to be exact.

Q. Will you furnish me a memorandum soon?
A. Yes.

Q. And of the ammunition?
A. Yes.

Q. How much small arms did the committee of safety get up with a view to the movement against the Queen?
A. I should say we had in the neighborhood of—I think I have a record of that also.

Q. You will bring me that also?
A. Yes.

Q. What sort of arms were they?
A. Springfield and Winchester repeating rifles, called Winchester sporting rifles.

Q. Where did they come from?
A. From hardware stores here.

Q. Were they brought here for purposes of revolution or not?
A. I do not think so.

Q. Brought here for military purposes?
A. I do not think so. I can not say as to that. They were part of the stock in the store.

Q. What store?
A. Castle & Cooke. The largest number came from there—that is, 19 or 20 Winchester repeating rifles, model of 1886. There were quite a number of Springfield rifles from the times of 1887 and 1889.

Q. Where had they been kept?
A. In the hands of individuals.

Q. Where were you when the proclamation was read?
A. In the Government building.
Q. Can you state the number of troops you had there at the time the proclamation was read or within 20 minutes afterwards?
A. I can not say, exactly. I never kept any account. It was not very long before we had in the neighborhood of between 150 and 200 men. I can not say exactly how long after.
Q. What was the first detachment that came?
A. The first squad that came down was about 15 men. They came from the armory on Beretania street.
Q. How long after that before the second squad came?
A. In about 5 or 10 minutes.
Q. How many were there in that squad?
A. I should say about 15 or 20.
Q. Well, the next arrivals?
A. I didn't see them. They kept coming right along at short intervals.
Q. How many were there when they finished reading the proclamation?
A. I should imagine there would be about perhaps 60 or 75.
Q. And how long was it after the proclamation was read before you had 150 men?
A. I can not say, exactly.
Q. Did you have that many in an hour?
A. The proclamation was read about half past two. I do not know how long it took to read it. I was not paying much attention to the time consumed in the reading, but in an hour afterwards, I should say, we had about 150 men.
Q. In an hour after it was finished?
A. I should think so. I have not paid any special attention to that since that time.
Q. Were you at Henry Waterhouse's on Monday night before that?
A. Yes; I was there.
Q. Who else was there?
A. Henry Waterhouse, C. L. Carter, Mr. Cooper, Mr. Wundenberg, W. R. Castle. There were a number of others. I can not say positively now without looking over the list of names.
Q. What list of names?
A. I should have to look over the names of the present Government and supporters of the Government in order to pick out the entire number.
Q. About how many persons were there? A. Probably twelve or fifteen.
Q. What was the object of the meeting?
A. To ascertain what advice or assistance to give to the committee of safety—the committee of thirteen.
Q. What advice to give to the committee of safety?
A. That is what I understood it to be. That is, to work in conjunction with them.
Q. Many of them were members of the committee?
A. Yes; and some of those were people called in by the committee to counsel with them.
Q. Were you offered that night command of the military forces—solicited to take it?
A. Yes.
Q. How was that done—by a vote of the meeting?
A. I went outside for some purpose or other—I think to get a drink
out on the veranda. When I went back the proposition was made to me. What they did while I was out I do not know. I did not go out at the request of any one.

Q. What response did you make?
A. I said I was not a trained military man, and was rather averse to accepting any position I was not especially trained for, under the circumstances, and that I would give them an answer on the following day; that is, in the morning.

Q. You did not give them any answer that night?
A. No, sir.

Q. Did you see Mr. Stevens that night?
A. No, sir.

Q. Did anybody in the meeting go to see him, so far as you heard?
A. Not so far as I know of.

Q. Was anything said about his agreeing to recognize the Provisional Government in the event of their getting possession of the Government building and reading their proclamation—orny hea er building?
A. You mean at this meeting?
Q. Yes?
A. I can not say positively as to whether I understood it at that meeting, or the following morning. I understood he would recognize a de facto government.

Q. What did they say was a de facto government?
A. A Government that was in possession of the Government building, archives, treasury, etc.

Q. The treasury, archives, etc., were in the Government building?
A. Yes.

Q. The understanding was then that if the Provisional Government got possession of the Government building and read the proclamation that then he would recognize it as a de facto government?
A. I believe that was the understanding.

Q. You do not remember whether it was that night or the next day?
A. It is possible that it was at that meeting that evening, but I do not know.

Q. Are you inclined to believe it was that evening?
A. I won't say positively as to that.

Q. It was either that evening or the next morning?
A. Yes.

Q. Until you heard that did you agree to accept the military command?
A. No.

Q. It was after that that you agreed to accept that command?
A. I feel pretty sure it was. The particular point which decided me was the fact of Judge Dole agreeing to accept the position as the head of the Government.

I have read the foregoing and it is a correct report of my interview with Mr. Blount.

Mr. Soper was sent for several times with a view of having him read the foregoing, but up to this time we have been unable to get him here.—E. M.
Interview with Claus Spreckels, Friday April 21, 1893.

Mr. Blount. Please state whether or not you had any message from the American minister and whether any conversation with him?  
Mr. Spreckels. I had.  
Mr. Blount. Be kind enough to state it?  
Mr. Spreckels. He sent down on Tuesday, about 3 o'clock whether I would be kind enough to come up to his house to see him. I took a carriage and saw him at 4 o'clock that Tuesday afternoon. He told me that Mr. Parker had no influence with the Queen, but that Paul Neumann could control her, and, if I would, if I could; control Paul Neumann; that Paul Neumann tell the Queen that she be in favor of annexation, and tell the Kanakas who follow her to go all for annexation. 

He said that he expected to be here only thirty or forty days, and he would like for annexation to be before he left; some words to that effect.

Interview with Claus Spreckels, June 5, 1893.

Mr. Blount. Is this a copy of the contract made with laborers by planters? (Copy attached hereto.)  
A. It is.  
Q. What means have the planters of enforcing their agreements?  
A. The law upholds that contract.  
Q. Suppose the laborer does not work satisfactorily?  
A. That brings him to the police court—make complaint.  
Q. What punishment is inflicted?  
A. I am hardly able to answer that. I do not know how they carry out the law.  
Q. Can you state—is the remedy at law for the enforcement of contracts generally satisfactory to the planters?  
A. I would say, yes. This contract is made first with the Japanese Government. This Government makes the contract, and this Government makes the contract with the planters, and that is the contract you have there between the planters and this Government.  
Q. Does the Government pay any expenses in the matter of the laborers?  
A. No; the planter pays passage money and all expenses.  
Q. Who pays for the officers connected with the inspection of laborers?  
A. I am unable to answer that.  
Q. Are you familiar with the lands in all these islands?  
A. I am.  
Q. Are they suitable for much else than sugar-cane culture?  
A. That is their principal use.  
Q. Could the sugar cane be grown here without cheap contract labor?  
A. No.  
Q. Suppose they could not get it, what would be the condition?  
A. They would have to close the plantations.
Q. What would become of them?
A. They would be cow pastures or something.

Q. The contract laborers that have been brought here, the great mass of them, was it done under the stimulus of the reciprocity treaty with the United States or not?
A. Yes, sir; it was.

Q. Up to that treaty there had been little done?
A. We had the first year the treaty was in force about 16,000 tons of sugar—that is, in 1876; maybe 18,000, but I think 16,000.

Q. And after that it increased to?
A. About 140,000 tons. I think this year there was 150,000 tons.

Q. What amount did these islands get in the way of remission of duties annually up to the time of the passage of the McKinley law?
A. When the plantation is in full blast they got in the neighborhood of $5,000,000 per annum.

Q. What do you mean by plantation in full blast?
A. That is to say, as we find them now. It took some time to get the machinery, etc., ready. They were not ready the first year or so.

Q. Were profits great, then?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Ranging between what figures?
A. In some plantations they never made any profit.

Q. But where they were well managed?
A. I should think some years they have made 50 per cent and even over.

Q. How high would you say—as much as 80?
A. I do not think you could go 80 per cent. Some plantations have not made a cent even with that treaty.

Q. How was that?
A. I should think bad management.

Q. Well, where it was well managed 50 per cent and upward was usual?
A. I would not say every year. It depends on the price of sugar.

Q. Would not the duty itself make a large profit?
A. Yes, sir. A good plantation can hold its own and make money at the present price of sugar.

Q. What is generally the character of the lands in these islands?
A. They are very rich lands.

Q. Is there very much of it waste land—mountain land?
A. A great deal.

Q. Where do these fine lands generally lie?
A. In the valley—sometimes in the interior—most on the coast.

Q. The great mass of lands, are they arable?
A. No; not the great mass. There would be more land for sugar cane if they had water; but the trouble is, shortness of water in places where they have good land.

Q. Are most of the cultivated lands irrigated?
A. Most of them lie on the trade-wind side where they get the rain.

Q. On the island of Hawaii there is no irrigation. On the island of Maui there is most irrigation.

Q. Your lands there are irrigated generally?
A. Yes, and we get some rain.

Q. Have you had to expend much money there to get water?
A. I spent a million of dollars. I have about 40 miles of ditch.

Q. Before you irrigated it, were they useful for any purpose?
A. No; there were a few cattle running on them in winter time.

Q. When was it done?
A. I commenced in 1878 to build the ditch.
Q. Would you have been willing to have invested your money in that way but for the reciprocity treaty?
A. No, sir; I would not.
Q. Has most of the irrigation been brought about under the influence of the reciprocity treaty?
A. Yes.
Q. And the profits, then, have largely come from reciprocity and cheap labor.
A. Yes.
Q. If both of these were abandoned, what would be the material prospects of the islands?
A. There would be no prospects at all. We could get along—the majority of the plantations—without any subsidy if we had labor, but without labor we could not get along at all.
Q. You would have to go out into the world and get cheap labor?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You have been how long here—this last visit?
A. Since April 18.
Q. Have you met with any sugar-planters since your arrival?
A. I have.
Q. Those of them who are declaring themselves in favor of annexation, how do they look at the labor question in connection with annexation?
A. They think that the United States will make a different law for the islands. If they could not get labor they don't want annexation.
Q. But they are satisfied they will get such legislation?
A. Yes, sir; they think and hope the United States will do that.
Q. Tell me some gentlemen who has argued that with you?
A. Glade, of Hackfelt & Co. He is interested in sugar.
Q. Who else?
A. Mr. Shafer; he is opposed, if he can not get labor.
Q. Does he believe he can get labor?
A. He does not think so; not quite so as the others do.
Q. Who else?
A. We have about ten plantations in our control. They all do not want it.
Q. What part of the sugar in these islands do they produce?
A. Our plantations?
Q. Yes.
A. We have 45,000 to 50,000 thousand tons a year—fully one-third—Claus Spreckels, Irwin & Co. We have control of that much. We are agents for 20,000 tons more.
Q. Now, other owners of plantations?
A. Baldwin does not want it if he can not get labor. He has about 20,000 tons.
Q. Does Mr. Baldwin argue that the Government of the United States will relax the laws for these islands?
A. Yes; he believes so. They say where there's a will there's a way. We will get it. Now, Judge Widemann, he is against annexation anyhow.
Q. Is Campbell a sugar-planter?
A. Yes; he has interests.
Q. Is it your impression that the calculation of all sugar-planters who are in favor of annexation believe that the United States will
modify their general laws against contract labor so that they can maintain a system of contract labor in the islands?

A. I would not say contract labor. They say we may have to give up contract labor, but we can get all the labor we want from Japan.

Q. How?

A. They say: We send an agent there and send money and he sends them here, and when they are here then they can make a contract with them.

Q. They think in that way they can evade the labor laws of the United States?

A. Yes; they think they can get around it. My opinion is that they can not, but they think they can get around the United States laws. President Dole called upon me the Saturday before last and asked if I would not be kind enough to go before the ministry and talk the labor law with them on Tuesday. I went there and I asked President Dole whether he had studied the immigration laws and whether he found that I was correct. He answered that he found that I was correct in that way. "But," he said, "I have-belief that the United States will give us a separate law that we can get laborers here."

Q. Did that idea seem to be in the minds of other members of the cabinet?

A. Yes; that the United States will give them anything they ask for.

Q. You have been talking politics with these people here. What sort of idea have they as to the kind of government they want and expect for these islands in the event of annexation?

A. Their idea is that when they are annexed to the United States they will have a governor—some of them will be appointed by the President—and leave it to them, so to say, to rule these islands.

Q. Do they ever speak of the Washington, D. C., form of government as suitable?

A. Some speak about that; that they would like to have a government like that.

Q. Are they in favor of a system of government that allows the natives generally to vote?

A. They do not want the natives to vote.

Q. Would they be in favor of any form of government that would leave the natives a majority of the voters?

A. No, sir; they would not.

Q. Would they consider any such government a stable government?

A. They think it would be stable with the United States cutting out the Kanakas so that they could not vote.

Q. This is, then, largely a struggle to take political power from the natives and put it in the hands of the whites?

A. Exactly.

Q. And that is what they hope to get in the event of annexation?

A. Exactly.

Q. What is the feeling of the natives on the subject of annexation?

A. I think that seven-eighths at least would be opposed to it. Some are employed by the Provisional Government. They had to sign the annexation roll or be discharged.

Q. And they signed to hold their places?

A. Yes.

Q. Is the argument made to the native that if he is annexed to the United States his right to vote will be preserved?

A. That I can not say.

Q. What is your opinion on this question: If a vote was had by
persons who are qualified under the constitution just abrogated to vote for representatives under the Australian ballot system, in what proportion would annexationists appear to anti-annexationists?

A. I think they would be only one-fourth against three-fourths, if left to a vote.

Q. Have you been studying the question since you have been here?
A. I have studied it very much.

Q. What about whites in the islands—what proportion for and against annexation? I mean Europeans and Americans.
A. That is hard to say; I do not think the people would be more than half for annexation in Honolulu, but in the other islands very few.

Q. What would be the proportion in Honolulu, do you think?
A. In Honolulu it might be three-fourths in favor of annexation, for the simple reason that they are afraid of each other. If he did not do it he would lose trade. He is at heart the other way.

Q. Would you say that there are as many as one-third of the whites—Europeans and Americans—that would be against annexation?
A. I should say so.

Q. Where people had surplus money have they been pretty generally investing in sugar stocks in past years?
A. I do not think they have.

Q. Is there much sugar stock owned in Honolulu?
A. Yes; there is a great deal owned.

Q. Is President Dole interested in sugar stocks?
A. I hardly think so. He may have a few shares.

Q. I notice at the mass meeting held here January 17 several persons made speeches, among them W. C. Wilder. Has he interest in sugar at all?
A. I do not think so. He may have a few shares.

Q. What is his occupation?
A. They run this Wilder Steamship Company. They sell lumber.

Q. They are interested, therefore, in handling sugar?
A. Yes.

Q. Mr. H. F. Glade; is he interested in sugar?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. He is consul-general of Germany?
A. I believe so.

Q. I see Mr. Young making a speech—what is he?
A. He is a sugar-planter.

Q. Is he president of the Planters' Labor and Supply Company?
A. No; I think Mr. Irwin is.

Q. Has Bolte any interests in sugar?
A. Yes.

Q. Mr. H. P. Baldwin made a speech. Has he any interest in sugar?
A. Yes.

Q. Large interests?
A. Yes.

Q. Mr. J. Emmeluth?
A. No; he is a tinsmith.

Q. A man of any means?
A. I do not think he has.

Q. A man of education?
A. I do not know.

Q. Mr. R. J. Greene. Is he interested in sugar?
A. Not that I am aware of. I do not know him. He can not be of much consequence.

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Q. Mr. P. C. Jones; has he any interest in sugar?
A. Yes; some.
Q. Mr. J. A. King; any?
A. I do not think he has.
Q. Mr. W. O. Smith?
A. He has an interest.
Q. Mr. Henry Waterhouse?
A. He may have a small interest.
Q. Mr. Damon?
A. I don't know.
Q. Mr. Tenney any?
A. Some.
Q. Mr. McChesney any?
A. No; he is a groceryman.
Q. A man of any means?
A. I do not know.
Q. Any education?
A. I do not think he has.
Q. Was Mr. Young at one time president of the Planters' Labor and Supply Company?
A. Yes; I think so.
Q. Has there been any idea here of trying to get a treaty so as to let pineapples come into the United States at a low rate?
A. Yes.
Q. Do they hope to get much out of that?
A. I really don't know.
Q. Has there been any idea here among people as to any advantage coming out of annexation in connection with the Pearl River Harbor?
A. Yes.
Q. What do they look forward to in this connection?
A. They think the United States would take Pearl Harbor and improve it and buy their property there for big prices.
Q. Who are interested?
A. Dr. McGrew is about the principal owner there.
Q. Any of the Waterhouses interested there?
A. Yes.
Q. Is Mr. Henry Waterhouse?
A. Yes.
Q. Any others?
A. There is another, named Jake Brown, married to a native woman.
Q. Is he for or against annexation?
A. For annexation.
Q. Is there an idea amongst these people that there would be a cable built to San Francisco if there was annexation?
A. Yes.
Q. Pretty strong feeling of that sort?
A. Yes.
Q. What is the impression amongst business people—planters—as to the increase of the value of property in the islands by annexation?
A. The idea is that property will advance about treble, and a great many are waiting to sell it. They calculate there would be a big boom.
Q. They are holding their property with the idea that there will be big profits in the event of annexation?
A. That is the idea.
Q. The Planters' Labor and Supply Company is under the control of the planters, is it not?
A. In some ways it is, but they have made a political machine out of it.

Q. But I mean to say that the stock is owned by planters, mostly?
A. No, sir.

Q. How is that stock generally held?
A. I really do not know.

Q. Then what is it used as a political machine?
A. Well, they use the agents for their ends. The agents give the managers directions for the natives—how they shall vote.

Q. The way it is generally done?
A. Yes. And the managers will do what the Labor Supply Company say. Since 1886 I have never worried about politics. Stood entirely clear.

Q. Please tell me the members of the Wilcox cabinet that was voted out before the prorogation?

Q. What is Robinson's business?
A. Hes with Allen & Robinson. They deal in lumber.

Q. Is he interested in sugar?
A. Very little.

Q. Is he interested in bananas?
A. Yes.

Q. Interested in the labor question mainly in that connection?
A. Yes.

Q. Wilcox—is he interested in sugar?
A. Yes.

Q. Largely?
A. Not very largely.

Q. Jones—has he any sugar interests?
A. Some.

Q. Cecil Brown?
A. I do not think he has any. He may have a share or two.

Q. There is no indication at present of any hostilities between the people and the Provisional Government, so far as you have been able to observe?
A. None whatever.

Q. What is keeping the people quiet?
A. They are waiting to see and hear the Commissioner's report that justice may be done to them by the President to put the Queen back, who would have stayed there if it had not been for Minister Stevens sending the troops ashore. I was not here, but am expressing the mind of the people as I understand it. Samuel Parker and others have told me.

Q. And that is what keeps them quiet?
A. Yes; they think justice will be done them when Cleveland hears the report, and the truth of how the Queen was dethroned.

Q. Suppose the Government of the United States were to decline to annex the islands, would the Provisional Government be able to maintain itself without outside aid?
A. If the money would hold out and the people were willing to pay what they pay for soldiers they could hold it.

Q. You think, with an army maintained here, that the natives would stay quiet for all time?
A. They can not help themselves. They have nothing. All ammunition taken away from them. Everything like weapons forbidden. I
can not bring a rifle here. No native allowed to buy any firearms or powder.

Q. Suppose they had arms?
A. Then this Government could not stand. They would bring the Queen back to the throne. That is my idea. The Provisional Government would never be there if the United States troops were not landed, and they knew that long before they landed.

Q. What class of people make up this army?
A. As far as I know, many who were in the chain gang—many who were in prison; fellows of character you would not like to meet after dark.

Q. The people of intelligence and wealth here don’t participate much in hostilities; they hire these fellows?
A. Yes; they leave it to them.

Q. There are very few firearms in the island other than those possessed by the Government?
A. Very few. The natives are forbidden to have them.

Q. The people, therefore, remain quiet because they have no arms.
A. Yes; they think it better for them to leave it to the President to decide when he can see how they were wronged by Stevens.

Q. What is the weight of public opinion here on the question as to whether or not the landing of the troops and the posting of them at Arion Hall had to do with the success of the revolution?
A. It had everything to do with it. If the troops were not landed there would be no Provisional Government today.

Q. Is that public opinion here?
A. It is; but, of course, the other side would say different.

Q. The wealth of the city of Honolulu—was it not largely built up after the reciprocity treaty with the United States?
A. Yes, about three-fourths after the treaty.

Q. Most of the nice homes built since then?
A. Oh, yes; I should think something like three-fourths have been built up since that treaty.

Q. Well, property holders as a general thing are in favor of annexation because they believe a great increase in the value of their private estates would ensue, and that large improvements would be made at Pearl Harbor by the United States?
A. That is what they calculated.

Q. And the cable?
A. Yes.

Q. Well, then you would say that this is a movement on the part of property holders to enhance their private interests?
A. Yes, and a certain desire to rule this country.

Q. Mr. Spreckels, do you know Mr. Samuel Parker well?
A. I do.

Q. Do you know his general reputation for truth and veracity?
A. I do.

Q. And from that would you believe him on oath?
A. I would.

Q. Do you know Mr. Cornwell the same way?
A. I do.

Q. Would you from his general reputation believe him on oath?
A. I would; yes, sir.

Q. Do you know Colburn?
A. I do not.

Q. Do you know Peterson?
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

A. I know him by sight.
Q. You know Parker and Cornwell well?
A. Yes; I have known them since 1876.

I have carefully read the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of my interview with Mr. Blount.

CLAUS SPRECKELS.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,

June 12, 1893.

In pursuance of the agreement hereto attached, the said laborer did arrive in this country on the —, 1892, and in accordance with the said agreement has been assigned to labor for — — as a laborer at — —, and has accepted such assignment.

Now, therefore, the said employer stipulates and agrees to and with the said board of immigration of this Kingdom, that he will faithfully pay to the said laborer twelve dollars and fifty cents per month for said period of three years, beginning from the commencement of such service.

And the said employer hereby stipulates and agrees that he will faithfully keep and perform all the other stipulations in the said agreements set forth, to be kept and performed by the said board, in favor of the said laborer.

And the said employer agrees with the board of immigration, that the contract for the service of the said laborer shall not be transferred to any third party during the term of this contract without the consent of the said board of immigration or its agent.

And it is further understood, stipulated, and agreed, by and between the parties to this agreement, that it shall be the right of the said board of immigration, at any time, during the time in this agreement stipulated for its duration, upon the representation of the said laborer, to cancel this contract for any cause deemed by the said board to be sufficient, refunding the said employer such proportional sum of the amount advanced by the said employer as the unexpired portion of the time of service agreed upon may bear to the whole time herein above set forth.

But if the agreement shall be cancelled by a magistrate, for nonfulfillment or violation of any of the conditions thereof on the part of the said employer, then no refunding will take place.

And it is further understood and agreed that all personal taxes levied by the Government shall be paid by the employer, without deducting the same from the wage stipulated. And further, during the continuance of this agreement the said laborer is to be properly lodged and provided with good medical attendance by the employer.

In testimony, we have hereunto set our hands, at Honolulu, Oahu, this — day of — —, 1892.

THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION,

By — —

President.

This memorandum of agreement between the Hawaiian Government, represented by Robert W. Irwin, Her Hawaiian Majesty's minister resident and special agent of the Hawaiian bureau of immigration, party of the first part and — —, a Japanese subject, party of the second part: Whereas, the said party of the second part has expressed a desire to proceed from Yokohama to Hawaii as an agricultural laborer; and, whereas, His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Government have given their consent thereto; and whereas, the Hawaiian Government has agreed to furnish the wife and two children of the said party of the second part, if they accompany him, free transportation to Hawaii, and upon arrival there to secure for the said party of the second part agricultural employment, and employment for his wife; and whereas, it has been determined by and between the parties hereto, in order to avoid any misunderstanding which might otherwise arise, to conclude at once a contract for the purposes hereinafter recited. Now, therefore, this agreement witnesseth:

The Hawaiian Government, in consideration of the stipulations hereinafter contained, to be kept and performed by the said party of the second part, covenants and agrees as follows:

I.—To furnish free steerage passage, including proper food, from Yokohama to Honolulu, to — —, his wife, — —, and to his two children, if they accompany him, which fact is to be noted at the bottom of this agreement, and also to procure proper transportation for the said party of the second part and his family from Honolulu to the place where such labor is to be performed. The vessel in which
such passage from Yokohama to Honolulu is furnished to be subject to the approval of the Chiji of Kanagawa.

II.—On arrival at Honolulu, the Hawaiian Government agrees to obtain employment for the said party of the second part, as an agricultural laborer, for the full period of three years, from the date such employment actually begins, and also, proper employment for the wife of the said party of the second part. Until such employment is obtained, the Hawaiian Government will cause to be provided for the party of the second part, and his family, lodgings commodious enough to secure health and a reasonable degree of comfort. The Hawaiian Government will, during the continuance of the contract, cause to be furnished to the said party of the second part and his family, fuel for cooking purposes free of expense.

III.—The Hawaiian Government guarantees to the said party of the second part wages at the rate of twelve dollars and fifty cents per month, and to his said wife ten dollars per month, payable in United States gold coin, with lodgings, and an allowance of one dollar per month for each of the said two children. The said party of the second part shall furnish blankets and bed clothing for himself and his family.

IV.—The Hawaiian Government agrees to cause to be provided for the said party of the second part and his family medicines and good medical attendance free of cost.

V.—The Hawaiian Government guarantees that twenty-six days of ten hours each actual work in the field, or twelve hours each in and about the sugar mill and sugar house, shall, within the meaning of this agreement, constitute one month's service as an agricultural laborer. Work overtime exceeding thirty minutes to be paid for at the rate of twelve and one-half cents per hour to the said party of the second part, and eight cents per hour to his wife.

VI.—The Hawaiian Government guarantees to the said party of the second part and his family the full, equal, and perfect protection of the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and agrees that, during the continuance of this contract, the said party of the second part and his family shall be exempt from all and every kind of personal tax.

VII.—Fifteen per cent of the sum payable to the said party of the second part, and to his wife, as wages, shall be remitted monthly by the employer directly to the branch of the specie bank (Shōkin Ginkō) established at Honolulu in the name of the said party of the second part, and for all amounts so remitted the said bank shall issue receipts to and in favor of the party of the second part.

VIII.—The Hawaiian Government, having guaranteed employment and wages to the said party of the second part, shall have the right to assign, withdraw, and reassign the said party of the second part to such plantations for labor as it may see fit. In case of such withdrawal and reassignment, all the expenses incidental thereto shall be paid by the Hawaiian Government.

IX.—The said party of the second part agrees to proceed to Honolulu by the vessel provided for him in accordance with this agreement.

X.—On arrival at Honolulu, the said party of the second part agrees to accept such employment as the Hawaiian Government may, under this contract, assign to him, provided no valid objection thereto exists. In the matter of any such objection he agrees to abide by the decision of the bureau of immigration.

XI.—The party of the second part acknowledges to have received from the Hawaiian Government the sum of fifteen dollars and fifty cents silver yen to meet his necessary expenses and for other purposes, and he agrees to repay the said sum in monthly installments after his employment actually begins, not exceeding fifty cents silver yen each month until the said sum is paid, which payments shall be made by the employer to the board of immigration; but in the event of sickness, protracted over twenty days in any one month, the installment for such month shall be deferred.

XII.—During the continuance of this contract the said party of the second part agrees to fulfill all the conditions of this agreement, and to observe and obey the laws of Hawaii, and he further covenants and agrees to diligently and faithfully perform all lawful and proper labor which may, under this agreement, be assigned to him by the Hawaiian Government during the full period of three years from the date such labor actually begins.

Signed and sealed in quadruplicate in the English and Japanese languages, at Yokohama, this November 14th, A. D. 1892. Two copies to be retained by the Hawaiian Government, one copy by the party of the second part, and one to be left in the custody of the Chiji of Kanagawa.

One man
No woman
No children

R. W. IRWIN,

Her Hawaiian Majesty's Minister Resident and Special Agent of the Bureau of Immigration.

Voluntary Emigrant.
I hereby certify that the foregoing agreement was executed by both parties in my presence, and that by virtue of the authority in me vested by his Imperial Japanese Majesty's Government I have approved the same.

(Attached to this is a Japanese translation.)

Kanagawa Ken Chiji.

No. 52.

(Statement of Lieut. Commander William Swinhurne, May 3, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 4, dated May 4, 1893.)

No. 53.

(Statement of L. A. Thurston, March 16, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 2, dated April 8, 1893.)

No. 54.

**Dr. Trousseau's statements.**

MAY 16, 1893.

Hon. J. H. Blount:

SIR: As you are not acquainted with me, I take the liberty of stating who I am. Born in Paris, France, in 1833, I am now a little over 60 years of age. I graduated in Paris as a physician in 1858. If you ask who is Trousseau, you will be probably answered, why, he is one of the Royalists.

In 1848 when 15½ [years] old I enlisted in the first battalion of the Mobile under the Republic and fought under the presidency of Cavaignac on the memorable days (three) of June, 1848, when the young citizens of Paris, three battalions, under command of McMahon, afterwards President of the Third Republic, defeated the insurgents.

In 1852, at the coup d'état, I was a medical student, was caught fighting against Napoleon III, narrowly escaped being court-martialed and shot or sent to New Caledonia.

I have been and am to this day a staunch believer in republican institutions, always fought against monarchy, so did my father; I am a great admirer of the United States Republic. Was I not a Frenchman, I would like to be an American. Indeed, if you decide on annexing the islands, in the straightforward, dignified way in which I know it will be done, I will probably be one of the first to swear the oath of allegiance to the United States.

This is, Mr. Blount, the kind of royalist I am.

From that point de vue I entreat you to consider my memorial, and if I have bored you, as I am afraid I have, please consider that all I am after is justice and fair play and you will bear up with me.

Yours, most respectfully,

G. TROUSSEAU.
SUNDAY MORNING, May 21, 1893.

MY DEAR NORDHOFF:

Inclosed please find a rectified list of taxpayers.

Take for granted—

(1) That all Chinese and Japanese are against annexation.

(2) That no corporation can have an opinion, as no one knows in many cases who are the shareholders; in cases where it is known I have stated it.

(3) That no native estate, such as Lunalilo's, Mrs. Bishop, Queen Emma Kalakaua, although they may be administered by annexationists, can be considered as such as far as the capital is concerned.

This list, therefore, is grossly misleading and insulting to the memory of the chiefs. Now we have all the natives who pay a large amount of taxes, some quite a sum.

The 35,000 Asiatics pay $5 apiece, say (the laborers alone) $185,000. Some own property; anyhow they pay licenses to the extent of over $50,000. You can, therefore, form your opinion of who really pays the expenses of the Government mostly since Spreckels has declared himself to you as against annexation.

Now about my memorial to Mr. Blount.

After inquiry yesterday I find that I had no right to give it to you to read just now. Therefore you will please not mention to anyone that you have read it, except to Mr. Blount, as you would put me to serious trouble indeed. It has for the present, anyhow, to be considered as of a strictly confidential nature, and therefore you will please do so, and not use any part of it.

When the time comes I will be glad to let you have it.

Very truly yours,

G. TROUSSEAU.

Hon. J. H. Blount,
United States Commissioner:

SIR: In reference to your inquiries at the hotel this morning, I beg to state: That I was downtown on January 16, 1893, a little before 5 p.m. There was a large gathering of foreigners about Fort and Merchant street corners. I inquired and was told that the United States forces would be landed at 5. Soon I saw C. L. Carter ride towards the wharf. I followed. Boats were landing troops, guns, and ambulance material; they were in undress campaign uniform. I saw C. L. Carter hand a letter to the commanding officer. The forces formed, marched up Fort street, then into Merchant street. I met Wideman; we jumped into a hack and drove at full speed to the palace, ahead of the forces. We met the Queen; she was composed; had already heard of the landing of the men, and said the United States minister means to support the committee of safety. Wideman and I said at once it must be the case; but it would be such an outrage that surely your Majesty will get justice from the United States Government. We stood on the veranda facing King street. Soon the forces advanced and formed in this manner:

We comforted the Queen; I left Widemann and others with her; drove hastily to the club. Met Wodehouse, Canavarro, and Vezzavona
coming from Mr. Stevens’s. They told me they had just seen him about his reasons for landing the forces. Wodehouse said to me: “I told Stevens that the town was as quiet as a Quakers’ meeting. I asked him (Mr. Stevens) if the Queen’s Government had asked for the landing of the troops. He answered no. What is the object then? Protect law and order. But there is no breach of law and order. Answer: Ladies about town are very nervous and fear trouble. Why, said Wodehouse, ladies are driving about as usual with their children. No answer. We left, said Wodehouse.” What is your impression, I said. Why, said the three, no doubt but that Stevens means to help the committee of public safety. At the same time happened the incident with Mr. Giffard and an officer of the Boston, fully related in my memorial. That same evening after seeing Chairman Carter at the hospital, as related also in my memorial, say about 9 o’clock, I went by request to the Government building to meet the ministers and a number of persons friendly to the Queen’s Government.

After some discussion it was decided to make no resistance, as all of us understood that the United States forces who had then taken possession of Arion Hall were there to support any movement contemplated by the committee of safety. Therefore, I can assure you in perfect good faith that there was no doubt in anybody’s mind but that if resistance was shown the United States forces would take the part of the revolutionists. Chairman Carter’s statement was enough to prove that. The next day, January 17, only 25 men took possession of the Government house. When Mr. Cooper read the proclamation hardly that number were present. I was leaning on the fence of the Government building and saw the whole performance as related in my memorial.

The United States troops were under arms in Mr. Nacayama’s yard, guns in position ready to advance, some of the men drawn up under the veranda of Arion Hall, and some with, I think, one gun in the alley from Nacayama’s yard to Arion Hall.

This is, Mr. Blount, a succinct report of what I know of the facts on January 16 and 17, 1893. For more details, I beg to refer you to the last part of my memorial.

The men who had been instructed to provide the necessary force for the taking of the Government building are Mr. P. Gardiner, an Englishman, and Mr. Harry Von Verthern, an American by birth, of German origin. They are willing to give you full information about their action, the assurance they had of the support of the United States forces, etc.

Respectfully submitted.

G. TROUSSEAU.

Hon. J. H. Blount:

Sir: I beg to be excused if, unbidden, I take the liberty of addressing you. I understand that you wish to make a thorough investigation of our situation, and my position as a physician and old resident perhaps enables me to throw light on some obscure points. For over twenty years I am connected professionally with all political parties and the royal family.

I arrived here in 1872, under the reign of Kamehameha V. His prime minister, Dr. Hutchinson, was his physician as well. The King was not well, and shortly after I was called to see him. I soon found out that his condition was critical. I told his ministers that his days were
counted, and shortly after he was himself acquainted with his own condition.

According to the constitution, which he had himself promulgated in 1864, he had the right to appoint his successor. Urged to do so, he demurred. His nearest kinsman was Lunalilo, a Kamehameha by his mother. But he was addicted to drink, and somewhat of a wag. The King hated him, the feeling being reciprocal. How well I remember the scenes at the old palace the day before the King's death. Most of the chiefs were there, all of the pretendants to the throne. The dying King was urged to make an appointment; Mrs. C. R. Bishop (Pauahi) urged her own claim. Friends of Kalakaua, of Queen Emma, widow of Kamehameha IV., urged their respective claims. Lunalilo kept silent, never went near the King's room. At last, in my presence, the King said: "The throne belongs to Lunalilo; I will not appoint him, because I consider him unworthy of the position. The constitution, in case I make no nomination, provides for the election of the next King; let it be so." He died the next morning. Thus ended the hereditary monarchy in the islands.

To this very important point I beg to call your special notice, as I will refer to it hereafter.

After a short interregnum, just long enough to get the Legislature together, Lunalilo was elected unanimously, and his election indorsed by public opinion, foreign as well as native. For the first time in many years our missionary friends and their sons and relatives mustered courage to recover their long-lost power. They used flattery, claimed recognition for their support towards the election, and Mr. E. O. Hall, father of the present W. Hall, had the formation of the new cabinet. I was the physician and friend of the King. I did not interfere in politics, and limited myself to my duties as such. I had a good deal of influence with him, but often, when I would be away, he would start drinking again in spite of me. Some good qualities in the man had strongly attached him to me.

One night, after a bout on board one of the American warships in port, he returned to Waikiki, went to sleep under his veranda, with thin underclothing, exposed to the strong trade wind. Within twenty-four hours pneumonia set in and for days his condition was serious. He recovered, however, but remained suffering from chronic pneumonia and pleurisy.

We decided on going to Kailua, Hawaii, a splendid health resort specially for lung troubles, and a favorite place of the Hawaiian chiefs. As soon as I decided to take the King off to Kailua, the chiefs and pretendents understood that his condition had become critical, and all insisted in following the King.

Mrs. Bishop (Pauahi), Queen Emma, now dead, Liliuokalani, the deposed Queen, her sister Likelike, now dead, Kapiolani, wife of Kalakaua, and others, came along with us, and none left the King's side either by day or night. We lived in a very large native hut, and I dare say not less than 30 or 40 people slept there at night. I was the only white man there, and it was, I assure you, interesting to watch the chiefs, their rivalries and intrigues.

Lunalilo was constantly urged as Kamehameha V. had been, to appoint his successor; he had a great regard and perhaps a softer feeling toward Queen Emma, and would, I think, have married her, had it not been the influence of an old mistress, a half-white, who was also there with us. Mr. C. R. Bishop, Dominis, Kalakaua, the cabinet ministers, and the chief justice made flying visits to us, never remaining more
than a day or two. All made me promise not to let the King die at Kailua, but to bring him back in time to Honolulu. The King often pointed out to me the maneuvers of the chiefs. He often said to me: "If I appoint any one it would be Emma, but I shall leave it to the people. I have been elected and the next King must be elected." As he did not ask me to keep the secret, I would often say to the chiefs, to the cabinet ministers: "Please do not bother him; his mind is set; he will make no appointment." But they mistrusted each other and kept at him. In the meantime he kept failing, and I saw and told him he was nearing his end. I also said that I had promised to bring him back to Honolulu. He said: "Why won't they let me die here?" I answered: "You have appointed no successor; the ministers say that there are many things to settle, signatures to give, and so forth."

Yielding reluctantly to my entreaties, we started, the whole crowd of us, and safely reached Honolulu, where the greatest ovation was made to the dying King. He lived one more week, during which I never left him either by day or night. The very same scenes that had taken place when Kamemeha V died were renewed with perhaps more insistence.

The premises—his father's house—were thronged day and night by natives and foreigners. At last the King asked me to allow no one to bother him and no one in his room except his immediate attendants and Queen Emma. They made sure that Queen Emma would be appointed, but being appealed to constantly, I repeated, which I knew to be a fact, that he would make no appointment.

Nearly the whole of the natives were in favor of Queen Emma. The whole of the foreigners, with few exceptions, were in favor of Kalakaua—the whole, anyhow, of the so-called missionary party. The King died without appointing his successor.

The same interregnum took place. The legislature was called together and the election got through during the greatest excitement.

All of the native members were instructed to vote for Queen Emma by their constituents. But for the first time in Hawaiian history bribes were used by the missionary party and only 6 Hawaiian members stood fast for Queen Emma; the rest followed the lead of the missionary party and Kalakaua was elected. When the result was proclaimed from the balcony of the legislative hall, a mob of natives invaded the house to punish the native members for the treachery, and had it not been for the United States marines, commanded by Captain, now Admiral, Skerrett, the native members would have been killed. As it was, three or four fared rather badly. No violence was manifested toward any white member. And here I make another strong point, that it would be impossible to mention one single case of violence committed by a single native against a foreigner in the whole history of the islands, even when foreigners were absolutely at their mercy. Capt. Cook was the first and only victim, and he surely brought it upon himself.

Probably Kalakaua never would have reigned, and no one can possibly deny that his ascension to the throne was due to the foreigners' influence and the quelling of the riot by the United States and English forces.

I wish you to make another point of this well-known fact, which could be vouched for to you by Admiral Skerrett himself. Is this an hereditary monarchy?

Kalakaua always thought, wrongly however, that my influence over Lunalilo had prevented the latter from appointing Queen Emma. Lu-
nalilo's mind was settled on the subject. Kalakaua showed the greatest friendship to me, and was, up to his death, quite confidential.

He soon found out that the missionary party who had put him in power wanted to get the upper hand and drive the natives to the wall, as has always been their wont.

Several times he appealed to me to form a cabinet, once coming all the way from Kona, Hawaii, all alone, but a native retainer, to my place 5,000 feet up Maunaloa, where I had retired for rest.

I returned with him to Honolulu, and not wishing to enter into politics, advised him to call on Mr. S. G. Wilder, now dead (brother of Mr. W. C. Wilder, one of the commissioners of the Provisional Government at Washington), to form a cabinet.

This was done in the middle of the night after our return from Hawaii. Wilder was a friend of the King, just to the natives, popular with all parties.

But although himself quite the reverse of a missionary, his family associations (he had married a daughter of Dr. Judd) prevented him from fully renouncing the party.

He was a clever man, but used his power mostly for his own benefit. However, it is under his ministry that an impulse was made in improvements that did benefit him personally, but benefited the country as well.

But the King still resented the missionary influence and at last discarded it by appointing Mr. Gibson at the head of a new cabinet. The missionary influence ceased from that time, and Mr. Gibson became a great favorite of the King and the natives. He was a man of undoubted ability, a thorough politician, but a dreamer.

Hawaii for the Hawaiians was his motto. The missionary party hated him, but until 1887 he matched them in every move. He pondered to every whim of the King, encouraged him to extravagant and useless schemes; hence his power in retaining office.

Nevertheless, no one can deny that it is under his detested rule, under the Kamajamela constitution, that the prosperity of the islands came to its height. The reciprocity treaty, the higher price of sugar, enriched everyone, and, although the missionary party kept active and anxious to regain power, the mass of the people did not otherwise object to Mr. Gibson's rule and to the extravagance at the palace by which the whole retail trade of the islands was largely benefited.

The King was fond of display; had the military craze for show more than anything else. He organized several military companies. Our missionary friends did not lose their opportunity.

Selecting officers that neither the King nor Mr. Gibson suspected, they asked for the organization of the "Honolulu Rifles" and obtained it. Mr. V. V. Ashford was the chief of the organization.

The secret object was the overthrow of Mr. Gibson and of the King himself and the proclamation of a republic.

A secret league was formed; I was asked to join, but refused. The price of sugar went down gradually from $120 to $80 a ton. This created some discontent and helped to make successful, in a certain degree, the revolution of 1887.

The move was an overt act of treason. The "Honolulu Rifles" had sworn allegiance to the King; had received from him presents, favors, and their flag. He had encouraged and helped them in every possible way, was proud of their appearance, and reviewed them often himself. When I was asked to join the league and refused I knew what was coming; I knew that a constitution establishing a republic was prepared.
In refusing I had assured the leaders that I would not betray them in giving their names, but that I was opposed to the movement, to the overthrow of the King in particular, and that I would use whatever influence I might have in bringing about a compromise.

I advised the King to dismiss Mr. Gibson and appoint a ministry more in accord with public opinion, and warned him that in not doing so he was taking great risks. He thanked me but assured me that he was prepared; that he would make no attack, but if attacked would defend himself. I once more asked him to dismiss Gibson but failed to persuade him. In the meantime the fighting enthusiasm of the "Honolulu Rifles" cooled down considerably when they heard from their spies and myself that they would get a rather hot reception at the palace.

I then volunteered to bring about a compromise and was authorized to ask the King to sign a new constitution. I advised him to yield, representing to him that personal government was a thing of the past; that if he resisted, although I did not doubt but he was able to do so, there necessarily would be bloodshed between natives and foreigners, and that he risked interference from the United States. He told me that he would sign a new constitution if presented to him. I so reported to the leaders. The constitution was hurriedly recopied, substituting monarchy for republic, and the King signed it, and Mr. Thurston was intrusted with the formation of the new cabinet.

In the meantime, although I admit that the power of the King required to be curtailed, the reading of the enactments of the Legislature under this detested administration will convince you that no measure was ever neglected or opposed that possibly could assist or forward the interest of the foreign residents. The motto, "Hawaii for the Hawaiians" never infringed on our rights except in the appointment to Government offices.

In fact the Hawaiian statute book will show from the earliest period to this very time that always due regard has been paid to the prosperity of the white settler, and that every care had been taken to secure their comfort and happiness. I do not hesitate to say that the laws of this little country, although enacted with a constant majority of native representatives, can compare favorably with those of any other civilized country. From 1887 has begun the real period of unrest.

The establishment of a republic with the intention of immediate annexation to the United States was the object of the revolution. Ever since the missionary party, encouraged more especially by the attitude of Mr. Stevens, has been conspiring against the monarchy.

Coming now to more recent events, I will consider them with absolute impartiality.

The Legislature of 1892 was protracted and agitated by constant changes of cabinet. However, two measures only were passed that may be considered as harmful. I refer to the opium license bill and the lottery bill. All other measures demanded by the foreign residents as necessary to their welfare were passed without opposition by the native members. The missionary party alone used bribes to recover power with the well-known object of using it to do what they succeeded only in doing by revolution and treachery on January 16 last. Hence the resistance of the Queen and her friends to let them gain and retain their power.

The opium bill was carried not only by the natives, but by a majority of the whole of the members.

When I arrived in the country, opium was licensed. Any one acquainted as I am with the Chinese will know that the license is the best
and the only way to stop smuggling. Several foreign citizens, now strong supporters of the Provisional Government and strong annexationists, whose names are in every body's mouth, have been more or less connected with opium smuggling, and although the Provisional Government itself had nothing to do with it, I am sure their chartered vessel, the Claudine, on which the commissioners went after the revolution, although manned by none but picked supporters of the Provisional Government and none but white men, returned chockful of opium.

Anyhow, as I said before, the opium bill was supported by some of the best white members, strong annexationists. I now come to the lottery bill. I believe you have seen the petition. I have seen it, as it was brought to me to sign, which I declined to do. You will notice that it was signed by nearly every shopkeeper in Honolulu. The missionaries proper did not sign it.

I, for one, as a Frenchman, had no particular dislike to the bill, accustomed as we are in Europe to the working of it. Portugal, Spain, Italy, Austria, Prussia, and other continental nations have state lotteries. France has no state lottery, but any one for a charitable or national purpose can be authorized by the Government to draw a lottery.

The City of Paris, the Credit Foncier, have drawings of their bonds every three months. Furthermore, the Louisiana lottery is still in existence in the United States and $1,000 worth of its tickets are sold here monthly by the employés of some of our best mercantile firms. The natives were all in favor of it. Chinese lotteries are in full swing every day in Honolulu, and are patronized by foreigners as well as natives. Why in presence of a petition in favor of the bill should the Queen, who had vetoed no bill during the session, veto this particular bill?

Now, the new constitution that the Queen wanted to promulgate is supposed to have precipitated the crisis. The constitution of 1887 in partially disfranchising the natives and giving a vote to all foreigners, without even a residence clause, has always been distasteful to them. This you will readily understand. They wanted the old Kamehameha constitution back, the one indeed under which everyone in the islands except the natives themselves became rich and prospered.

When it was abrogated in 1887, taxation, even with the acknowledged extravagance of Mr. Gibson's regime, was only ¾ of 1 per cent on the value of real estate.

In the year 1887 only it had to be raised to 1 per cent—a low enough rate you will admit. But even these low rates never have been paid, mostly by the planters, who always managed to have their friends appointed as tax assessors, and I have known plantations which only paid the rate on their income, or dividends, instead of on their capital.

Even then another fraud has been constantly committed with the tacit consent of even Mr. Gibson's administration. It consisted in this: Declarations of value have to be made on July 1, of each year; during the last part of June all the available vessels in port would be loaded and cleared at the custom-house before the evening of the 30th of June. Thousands of tons yearly escape taxation this way.

Returning to the new constitution, the queen was constantly pestered by the native leaders to promulgate a new one.

Her advisers, even Mr. Wilson, who, as you probably heard, had a great deal of influence with the Queen, entreated her to give up the idea. Her excuse was in the constant verbal and written demands of her people, who as a whole have no objection to personal government
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as long as it is exercised by their own chiefs. The prime and perhaps only real objection to the constitution of 1887 on the part of the natives is that it was exacted from the King by an armed force and in a revolutionary manner.

However, granting that the queen was wrong in asking her ministers (she did nothing more) to help her in proclaiming the new constitution, she had abandoned the idea and made, I believe, a sufficient public retraction.

No, Mr. Blount, these were not the causes of the revolution.

The Missionary party, backed by Mr. Stevens and Capt. Wiltse, made the revolution to regain lost power.

They were at the time backed by the planters and business men on account of the low price in sugar and the McKinley bill.

Almost daily, to my personal knowledge, meetings were held at Mr. Stevens' house in which the possibilities of a peaceful revolution with the prospects of annexation were discussed. Prominent at these meetings were the Chief Justice, Mr. Dole, Mr. Thurston, Mr. Hartwell, Charles Carter, and others, also Capt. Wiltse.

The latter, for the last three months before the revolution a guest of the Pacific Club, of which I am a member, became so offensive that I and others took issue and expressed it to him and often asked him: "Well, captain, when are you going to hoist the American flag?" Fully six months before the revolution Mr. Stevens asked Mr. George d'Anglade, French commissioner, now consul for France in New Orleans, and my friend Canavarro, the Portuguese chargé d'affaires, to dinner. They went and found the only guests besides themselves Mr. Thurston and Mr. Hartwell. I met them the next day and they expressed their thorough disgust at Mr. Stevens' action.

They soon found after the first course the annexation question was slyly brought about and felt that they were asked there to commit themselves. They kept on their guard and as soon as dinner was over withdrew and left Mr. Stevens and his two other guests.

I now come to the condition of affairs on January 16, the day the forces were landed.

After the two meetings the town was as quiet as ever it had been. The Queen had withdrawn the constitution.

The natives "Hui Kalaiaaina" had peacefully submitted. There was no breach of law and order. Being down town, I noticed some excitement in Merchant street by the post-office and corners of Fort street. I inquired the cause of it: "The United States forces will land in a short while," I was told. A few minutes after, Charles Carter rode down in a hack, I followed and saw him at the foot of Fort street waiting for the landing of the troops. He received the commanding officer, handed him a letter, and showed him where to go. A large crowd gathered. I went back, met Widemann, and we drove hastily to the palace.

Soon the forces with Gatling guns, etc., marched up and formed in the space between the palace, Kawaihae church, and the Government building, and halted there under arms. After comforting the Queen, telling her that the United States could not possibly sustain Mr. Stevens's action, I left at once to find out more about the trouble. I drove hastily to the club, saw Wodehouse, Nanavarro, and Vizzavona in a hack. They alighted to speak to me. As we met, Mr. Giffard, of Irwin & Co. (Sprechels) joined us.

They said: "We just came from Stevens to find out about the landing of the forces. We asked him at whose request they landed." He
said, “Ladies about town are very nervous and feared trouble” “Why,” said I (Wodehouse speaking), “the town, Mr. Stevens, is perfectly quiet, as quiet as a Quaker’s meeting.” Continuing: “Were you asked by the Queen’s Government to land the troops?” “No.” “What is your object?” “Protect law and order.” “Why,” said Wodehouse, “there is no breach of law and order.” No answer. The Frenchman, Vizzavona, said:

“But why are the forces occupying an armed position on the principal square of the town commanding the palace and the Government building?” No answer. “We left” said Wodehouse “and are satisfied that Stevens means to assist a movement from the committee of safety.” The five of us were standing on the sidewalk, corner of Beretania street and Alakea close to the club. All at once rides up an officer from the Boston and asks to speak to Mr. Giffard. After a short conversation with the officer, Giffard returned to us and said, “What do think they want?” Why the use of the Music Hall as quarters for the forces. I have refused.” We went to the club. Within ten minutes the officer returned with a written request to Mr. Giffard for the use of the Music Hall.

The request was from Mr. Stevens himself. Giffard answered “I can not grant the request. The Music Hall belongs to my principal, Mr. Irwin, who is away. And again the Music Hall commands the Government building and the palace. I do not feel justified in giving the United States forces such a commanding position, entrenched at that, as long as I am satisfied that the forces are landed against the expressed protest of the foreign representatives and of the Queen’s Government.” (We knew from the cabinet members that they had protested.) This ended the Music Hall business.

Later on Mr. Stevens also in writing requested the use of Arion Hall, close by, and it was granted for one night only. Instead of leaving on the morning as agreed upon, notwithstanding a protest from Mr. Nacayama and Mr. Waller, the lessees of the premises, the troops held the premises until after the event of January 17. Is it not patent that Mr. Stevens and Capt. Wiltse meant them to support the movement which took place next day at 3 p.m.?

That same evening, January 16, at about 8 o’clock, I met Charles Carter at the hospital. I am his family physician. He asked me to go and see his wife, who was pregnant—close to her confinement—and felt very nervous on account of the part he, Charles Carter, was taking in the movement. He had been to my house and heard that I was at the hospital. I said I would go at once. I asked, “What are you about anyhow?” He said that they had asked Stevens to land the troops; that he would support them; that they were going to depose the Queen, and never stop short of annexation at any cost. I represented to him that I doubted very much if the United States would sustain Stevens. He said, “It is all arranged beforehand, and we can carry our point with Foster and Harrison before the new administration comes in.”

Knowing poor Charley, as I do, from his boyhood (and a big over-fat boy he is still), I did not think it worth my while to argue with him. However, I said, “The Queen will do what is right if asked to do so.” He said, “We will not give her the chance. We will depose her. Annexation is the word.”

The next morning, a patient of mine, P. Gardiner by name, an Englishman, called. He was under treatment. He said, “I am in a hurry to day” (the office being pretty full); “try not to keep me waiting.” This was about 10 a. m. He added, “To-day (January 17th) we
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depose the Queen. I have to be on hand any time after 12 o'clock. The call will be one tap of the bell. "Tower Bell?" Knowing my man well as one of the unemployed, and knowing that his sympathies were the other way, I said, "What do you get for that job?" "One hundred dollars cash, $2.50 a day and board afterwards, and the promise of a billet of not less than $100 a month." "Who made you the promise?" "Thurston." The man is still connected with the revolutionists, and is willing to make the statement to Mr. Blount himself.

I said "Do you mean fight?" Answer: "Why, the United States forces will support us." After 12 o'clock I kept on the lookout for that one tap of the bell. At 2 p.m. my assistant, whom I had sent to pay a bill to E. O. Hall & Son, rushed in and said, "John Good just came to Hall's to get arms, got them into his express wagon; a policeman went to stop the wagon and Good shot him in the breast."

They drove up King street, supposed to go to the armory on Beretania street. I started on foot to the armory, which is close to my office. Saw a few men there, amongst them the man Gardiner, and went to the club, still watching for that one tap of the bell. I got to the club at 2:15 p.m., met there several people, amongst them C. A. Brown, who had been prominent in the 1887 revolution, and who, I knew by Charles Carter and others, to be one of the committee of public safety. He had no arms and wore a morning suit.

I said: "Well, Brown, you are going to depose the Queen at the stroke of the bell." He said: "How do you know?" I answered "Never mind." I added "I understood that you will be supported by Stevens." He said "Well you have got it pretty straight. That's just how it is." "You are waiting for the tap of the bell," said I. (The tower is close to the club.) He said, "Yes."

At half past 2 o'clock I heard the one tap. He (Brown) started at a good pace. I followed. He went into the Government building and I stopped outside the fence in the street leading from King to Queen street. My glance could not count more than 20 people about, outside of the Boston men who were under arms in Mr. Nacayama's yard, in the lane between the said yard and Arion Hall and under the veranda of Arion Hall.

Gatling guns were drawn up in Nacayama's yard.

A few minutes before 3 p.m. an unknown person—Mr. Cooper, I heard since, a perfect stranger—now judge—read a proclamation of which I only heard a part.

I went to the barracks. There were the Hawaiian troops, one hundred or so in number, ready for action if ordered out.

I went to the station house, and saw a number of foreigners rushing in and putting themselves at the disposal of the marshal. Before an hour had elapsed I found out that Mr. Stevens had already recognized the Provisional Government and that the Queen had ordered, under protest, the surrender of the barracks and station house to avoid bloodshed. I can assure you, Mr. Blount, that the Queen's Government was perfectly competent to take care of the situation; that the force in the Government building had no arms nor ammunition to speak of, and that the whole game was one of bluff, a surprise, a coup de main, as we call it in French. Why? The clerks in the Government building were at their desks; the routine of the various departments was going on. A handful of filibusters, backed by Mr. Stevens and Captain Wiltse, did the job, and the Queen and her friends, trusting to redress from the United States, yielded to avoid bloodshed, and with the full knowledge
that if resistance was shown the United States forces would support
the rebels.

I am satisfied that by this time you have formed a correct opinion of
all facts, and perhaps you will find this long memorial rather tedious.

I will now try to conclude and spare your patience. It will be pre-
sumptuous for anyone, Provisional Government, royalists, native, and
so forth, to try to advise the United States about ourselves.

The question, therefore, simplifies itself. If President Cleveland
and yourself have made up your minds about the necessity of annex-
ing the islands, very well; we have nothing more to say, and no one
better than yourself, Mr. Blount, can bring it about.

You must be well aware by this time that the Provisional Gov-
ernment is not a popular government. If you wish to go to the trouble,
procure the roll of the annexation club and the very complete registry
of voters made only a couple of years ago. A short comparison will
show you the comparative number of voters on the annexation roll.
After that, take into consideration that every business firm connected
with the movement has compelled their employés under threat of dis-
missal to sign the roll and you can form a pretty correct opinion of how
the Provisional Government stands.

Therefore, satisfied that the Provisional Government is only a revo-
lutionary government put in power by the United States forces and
without any support from the majority of the population, the United
States can refuse to treat the question of annexation with the Pro-
visional Government.

Let the United States Government put things back where Mr. Stevens
found them on January 17; restore the queen; let her call her Legisla-
ture together and state to them, by special message, that in presence
of the necessity in which the United States are placed to secure the pos-
session of the Hawaiian Islands, she herself is prepared to abdicate in
favor of Grover Cleveland, President of the United States, and expects
the representatives of the people to make no opposition to the measure,
and at once ratify a treaty of cession as agreed upon between yourself
and herself.

Being done in that manner you will find little opposition, and all of
us will assist in bringing the matter to a safe and peaceable solution.

If, on the other hand, the United States only wish to secure supre-
macy and absolute control of the islands without annexation, the same
course can be safely followed.

Restore the Queen and make with her, in accord with the Legislature,
a cast iron treaty to suit yourselves.

Take for instance the treaty between France and Tunis or England
and Egypt; they are not exactly a protectorate, as the flags of the two
countries do not fly either in Tunis or Egypt, but in both countries the
native rulers and legislatures are under the complete and absolute con-
trol of the European powers, and from my reading both systems work
well, notwithstanding the jealously of France in Egypt and of Italy in
Tunis.

Here, where no other power means to interfere, I think such a system
would answer. However, you are the best judges. But whatever you
wish you can get with the almost unanimous consent of this small
nation, when, on the contrary, if you treat with the Provisional Gover-
ment the large majority will feel that a great wrong has been committed
towards a people who have always been friendly to the United States,
are so now, and only wish to be allowed to attend to their affairs them-
selves.
A third solution is a protectorate, same as we (the French) had in Tahiti, until the ruling chiefs became extinct. The French flag was raised, but the Pomares enjoyed the use of the palace, a pension from the French Republic, and a kind of state befitting to the ancient owners of the land.

But I understand that such a protectorate would not be agreeable to the United States statesmen.

Further back I made a strong point of the fact that this was no more on hereditary monarchy. These people are truly the elect of their subjects, Kalakaua by direct vote, and Liliuokalani by his appointing her as his successor under, not only the Kamehameha constitution, but under the constitution 1887 made by the revolutionists themselves which confirmed his appointment. During the King's absence to the coast, when he died, these very people were in power, and Liliuokalani was by them accepted as regent.

A few words now about the capital (American) invested in this country.

I do not hesitate to say that Mr. Spreckels represents the only really American capital invested here.

The loan is English money, so are the tramways, and a large number of the plantations, principally in Kohala, on the island of Hawaii.

The whole of Mr. Bishop's capital is Hawaiian. Mr. Bishop came here as a poor clerk, married Liliu, and out of the Kanaka country made what he owns. He never lived in a house built by himself or owned by himself until his wife died, leaving him all. Not only that, but Mr. Bishop has invested very large sums in the States all out of this country's resources.

Mr. Damon is also a creature of Mrs. Pauahi Bishop.

Mr. James Campbell came here as a journeyman carpenter.

The Il estate—C. A. Brown's wife is an Il.

The Robinsons estate, the Lunalilo estate, the Bishop estate, the Kalakaua estate, and Hawaiian capital represents a very large portion of the tax-paying capital, and are not represented in the annexation party. Take now the taxes paid by the Chinese and the Japanese, and if you will go to the trouble of consulting the tax assessors' books you will find that the annexation club does not represent the wealth and influence of the country.

None of the American firms or planters ever brought a cent from the United States here. In dividends and investments they have exported millions of dollars.

As far as the missionaries proper are concerned, they brought exactly nothing. They were housed and fed by the natives, their children tended for them, and their churches built for them free of expense. They were given land by the people, who served them, nursed them, cooked for them, did all the most menial work without compensation, drew them about in hand carts to church and to their social entertainments, and paid them besides a tax of 10 cents a week per head for each adult all through the districts over which they had spiritual control. When I lived in Hawaii, Mr. Bond, a missionary and wealthy planter, still collected from the natives of his district the weekly 10 cents himself.

The revolution was made by Messrs. Dole, Thurston, W. O. Smith, C. L. Carter, Judd, etc., all sons of missionaries, who owe the whole of their social and pecuniary position to the natives.

In their respective professions as lawyers they never were able to make a living.

Dole, Thurston, and Smith's clearest income has been as trustees of
various native estates, mentioned before. Of course all have interests in plantations, outside, I think, of Dole and Thurston. These people on the whole are good enough people, honest, I dare say on any subject in which their ambition or their interest is not directly connected. But they are all suffering from a very serious complaint, a swelled head, incurable I am afraid. But I must not abuse your patience any longer, and will subscribe myself,

Yours, respectfully,

G. TROUSSEREO.

Since writing the above memorial I have had communication of a pamphlet shortly to be published by Mr. Stevens. I will not discuss the very lame apology he gives for his interference nor the absolutely false statements in which he indulges. These I believe sufficiently elucidated by your personal information. But his slanderous attacks on the private character of the Queen I will not leave unchallenged.

In my memorial I referred to the undoubted influence Charles B. Wilson had over the Queen. I will now explain that influence. Wilson persuaded the Queen, I believe, that she was safe in his hands. He is a determined man, has got plenty of personal courage, and often told the Queen that, had he been marshal of the Kingdom in 1887, the King never would have been compelled by the force of arms to sign the constitution; he would have nipped the conspiracy in the bud. Right or wrong, the Queen believed him, hence his influence.

I have known the Queen intimately for over twenty years. When I arrived here she had not been married long, and her husband, John O. Dominis, an American, and an intimate friend of mine, was fondly beloved by her. John Dominis's character was unimpeachable—ask any one who knew him—Mr. C. R. Bishop, Mr. W. F. Allen, and others. I am now speaking from a physician's point of view. John was, to use a euphemism, rather irregular as a husband—as many husbands in my experience are. He was fond of society, sometimes took more liquor than was good for him, and occasionally (although he never kept a regular mistress) had some love adventures. In this small community they were reported to his wife, and I can vouch to how she suffered by it. She was exceedingly fond and jealous of him. But, like most unfaithful husbands, he would not have for one moment shut his eyes on even any sign of unfaithfulness on the part of his wife. As long as he was alive, any one slandering his wife would have, I assure you, been severely punished. If there has been any failing in the Queen's faithfulness to her husband it never has been known, and as far as Wilson is concerned, it is on the part of Mr. Stevens an unmitigated lie. Did I know that Mr. Stevens would resent it as we do in my country I would to day go and give him the lie. But he would probably have me arrested and convicted, and, busy as I am with my arduous profession, I can't afford it.

Mr. Wilson has a half-white wife, an intimate friend of the Queen. Although not a young woman, she is still attractive, and has been one of the prettiest half-white women in Honolulu. I have also been her physician and known her well. She is, and always has been, of a jealous disposition, and notwithstanding Mr. Stevens' abominable statement, would never countenance an intimacy between her husband and any other woman, even were she the Queen. She is now more attractive than the Queen is or ever has been.

That Mr. Stevens believes these stories I strongly doubt. They suit his purpose. If he is not wholly responsible for them, he has accepted them, without control, from Sereno Bishop, and others who know better.
The whole matter, Mr. Blount, is an outrage that makes an honest man’s blood boil.

G. TRousseau.

May 16, 1893.

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No. 55.

(Interview with Henry Waterhouse, May 2, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount’s No. 4, dated May 4, 1893.)

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No. 56.

*Interview with C. B. Wells, of Wailuku, Maui, May 15, 1893.*

Q. What is your business?
A. I am manager for two sugar plantations.

Q. Where were you born?
A. In the State of New York.

Q. How long have you lived in the islands?
A. Over thirteen years.

Q. Were you here on January 14, 1893?
A. Yes.

Q. Were you here during the revolution?
A. I was not in Honolulu. I was in Maui.

Q. When did you first learn about it?
A. About four or five days after it was over.

Q. Then you could not give me any information about events here?
A. None whatever.

Q. What sort of laborers do you work on your plantations?

Q. How many in all?
A. It varies according to the work we have. We run as high as 425 people.

Q. How many are contract laborers?
A. About half, I think.

Q. What is the character of the Japanese laborer?
A. The Japanese are of very low caste indeed. I think they are the lowest people in this country in every respect—not only in morals, but in their relations to each other—in regard to the bond of sympathy.

Q. Are they a combative people among themselves?
A. Very.

Q. How are they gathered up in Japan—from what class?
A. Those who came to this country first were the riffraff of the cities, but later on they have been gathered from the interior and are a better class.

Q. Are they intelligent?
A. No.

Q. Do they bring their women to any extent?
A. No; not a large percentage. In lots of 50 there might perhaps be 13 women.

Q. What is the character of the women?
A. A majority of them loose in their morals.

Q. Do they work in the fields with the men?
A. We try to separate them; put them to light work, such as irrigating cane. I think a majority of the women who come here are not married to the men; come here merely to live with them.

Q. Loose women?
A. Yes; that is my impression.

Q. Why do you take them out of the fields?
A. On account of their morals. They were likely to entice men to cohabit with them. I have caught several in the act.

Q. Is that the character of the women generally?
A. That is my impression. My impression is that a majority of them are rather loose; that for a consideration they will sell their body.

Q. What about the Chinese women?
A. There are none here to speak of.

Q. What about the character of the men—Chinese laborers?
A. I think as a whole they are a peaceful, quiet race of people and reliable laborers.

Q. Do they speak the English language much?
A. No; a great many of them speak the Hawaiian language. Some speak pigeon English.

Q. After their contract has expired do they remain here in any considerable number?
A. Of late a good many have returned to their own country.

Q. Those who remain here, what do they do?
A. Some remain on plantations. A large majority of them—I don't know how they exist. I think through opium and gambling.

Q. Any engaged in cultivating taro and rice?
A. Yes. Many of them are crowding out the natives in making taro (poi).

Q. Any engaged in fishing?
A. Not to a great extent. They are certainly getting control of the raising of taro and the making of poi.

Q. Do any of them get to be merchants?
A. A great many of them.

Q. Now, the Portuguese.
A. They are the best class of laborers we have here. They are extremely industrious; they are sober; they practice strict economy; they save money and are a very desirable class of people. The only drawback is you have to pay them more wages. They can not live as cheaply as the Japanese and Chinese.

Q. You have quit bringing them here on that account?
A. Yes.

Q. How are the Portuguese, educated or illiterate?
A. As a whole they are illiterate. The rising generation is being educated and is quite bright.

Q. Now, about the Hawaiians. How do they work?
A. They are very good in certain work—irrigating and handling of water and driving bullock teams.

Q. Not as good in cane fields as Chinamen?
A. Well, if they have good overseers and watch them they will do good work.

Q. How about Chinamen?
A. They are faithful workers.

Q. Without overseers?
A. No; no laborers are, excepting Portuguese. If you send 3 or 4 Portuguese a distance to mend a fence or road they will do the work, but Hawaiians will talk and idle. Chinamen about the same. China-
men are very good. I am doing contract work with them. I give them watering and stripping to do at a certain figure. I find it works very satisfactorily. They work hard, and you don't have to have any overseer.

Q. If the question were submitted to the people who voted under the old constitution with the only qualification for a voter that he should read and write, what would be the result—for or against annexation?
A. So far as the foreigner is concerned there would be a very large majority in favor of annexation, and the Portuguese would be a unit for annexation. As to the Hawaiians I think that a majority would not be in favor of it.

Q. What would be the final result of these combined votes?
A. That is a question that would be rather hard for me to answer.
Q. Suppose it was done under the Australian ballot system?
A. I am inclined to think it would be against annexation. It might be in favor of annexation, if the Portuguese were allowed to vote.
Q. They vote whether they can read and write or not; don't they?
A. Yes.
Q. That has been so from the beginning?
A. Since 1887. I am inclined to think if the Portuguese voted under the Australian system, as a large percentage are illiterate, that perhaps they would be voting against annexation when they meant to vote for annexation.

Q. Do you think you could have good government here if you only required of a voter knowledge sufficient to read and write the English language?
A. I doubt it very much.
Q. Why?
A. Because I think we would go back to the old order of things.
Q. What is the old order of things?
A. The state we had under the deposed Queen.
Q. What is that state?
A. The Hawaiians getting control of the legislature and going in for extravagance which the foreigners were having to pay for. The money was not coming out of the pockets of the people who were voting the money. It was coming out of other pockets. The action of the Queen in wanting to spring this new constitution shows her feeling toward foreigners and her deliberate intention of making them pay the fiddler, so to speak, and without giving them any privileges.

Q. What do you mean by privileges?
A. That we could exist here and run our plantations. I have no doubt if she could have her way she would disfranchise every foreigner in the country and put it wholly in the hands of Hawaiians.
Q. Why do you think that?
A. I think we have had sufficient evidence of it in her actions in the Legislature. In removing men from the Wilcox cabinet, men of stability of character and influence, removing them to put in men who were irresponsible and would soon wreck us.

Q. You think then with the privilege of any native to vote who could read and write the English language that you would drift back to the condition of things you have just stated?
A. Yes.
Q. What would you think of the Japanese as voters?
A. I would most emphatically condemn any move toward giving the Japanese franchise.
Q. Would it make the situation you speak of worse?
A. I think it would make it a very serious matter.
Q. The Chinese allowed to vote—still worse?
A. I do not think so. I think the Chinese would be the opposite of the Japanese. I think the Japanese would be controlled by their Government. They would vote as they were directed to vote. The Chinese are not very friendly with the Japanese, and they would vote to the contrary.
Q. Who would control the Chinese vote?
A. I think they would be very largely controlled by their societies.
Q. How many overseers have you on your plantations?
A. Nineteen.
Q. Do you have to have men with every squad of hands during the hours of labor?
A. There is an overseer with every gang of 20 or 30 people. I have a head overseer who looks after all the different gangs.
Q. Suppose a fellow is idling in the field, what do you do?
A. Well, if he is a day man, he is discharged.
Q. If he is a contract laborer?
A. We dock him. We give him half or three-quarters of a day and if they keep it up we resort to the law and have them arrested for refusing to work.
Q. What do you accomplish by putting him in jail?
A. It has been rather unsatisfactory as a rule. The first offense he is merely ordered back to his work and the plantation has to pay the cost of the court and charge it to the man. He does not care. He has to work it off.
Q. Well, what do you do then?
A. If he refuses to obey orders and work he is arrested again. Perhaps a light penalty of two or three dollars fine is inflicted. That the plantation can pay and take out of his wages, or if the plantation refuses to do so he is put on the road to work it out. The third offense he is likely to have three months' imprisonment. That is a new law enacted in the last Legislature. Before that you could go on having him arrested and paying fines. It was better to drop the man than to go on with that.
Q. At this time most of the laborers are Japanese?
A. Yes; almost entirely. A few Chinese come in, but very few.
Q. The Portuguese cost so much you do not get them?
A. Yes. A large number leave the country and go to California. I venture to say that 25 per cent of the Portuguese have left this country within the last eighteen months. The wages have been cut down in order that the plantations might exist, and I doubt if they could exist if they didn't have wives and children to work. By all working they can get along very well. Many more would leave the country if they had means.
Q. Then the sugar-planters' best reliance for labor now is by negotiations with the Japanese Government?
A. That is the only way we have now to speak of.
Q. Are you in favor of annexation?
A. Strongly.
Q. What would be the effect on property here—on values?
A. Outside of sugar plantations I think lands would enhance in value. It would open up our crown lands and bring a desirable class of people here.
Q. Are not the crown lands very largely leased out?
A. A great many of them have not been leased out.
Q. They are good lands.
A. A great many are very good lands.
Q. What is being done with them now?
A. Nothing in particular. A great deal of crown land is idle now for the reason that there is not large enough area for plantations, but it would be large enough for the support of a family. It would be good for raising pineapples, bananas, etc.
Q. Well, that population coming here to engage in that business would be a new condition of things?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What do you think about the value of sugar lands; would they go up or not?
A. I do not think they would go up at all.
Q. Do you not think that this influx of population you speak of would have generally the effect of increasing values of every sort?
A. Well, that would very largely depend on the arrangement regarding our sugar going into the United States. If the plantation was realizing more for sugar it would increase the value of lands. There is no sugar land to take up. It is mostly taken up.
Q. And the additional population that would come here would engage in the raising of fruit?
A. Yes; fruit and coffee. I have great faith in the coffee industry. I think a thrifty farmer coming here could take small pieces of land. I think some plantations would be better off if they could go into some scheme of that character.
Q. That would involve the building of houses for these people?
A. Yes.
Q. Then you would expect men to come with means enough to build his house?
A. Well, I think if they only had partial means that a portion would be advanced to them.
Q. Well, what about his supplies while he was making a crop?
A. I have no doubt the plantation would advance him a certain percentage while he was making a crop.
Q. Charging him interest, of course, on advances?
A. Yes; certainly. I think probably certain portions would be advanced without interest. That would be a matter he would have to take his chances on.

These notes have been read to me by Mr. Mills, and I pronounce them an accurate report of the interview between myself and Col. Blount.

C. B. WELLS.

HONOLULU, May 15, 1893.

This was done because Mr. Wells was leaving the island. He could not wait until the notes were transcribed.—E. M.

No. 57.

Interview with Judge II. A. Widemann, Honolulu, May 20, 1893.

Mr. BLOUNT. Judge, where were you born?
A. Hanover, Germany.
Q. How long have you lived here?
A. Forty-seven years.
Q. What offices have you held in that time?
A. I have held every office this country can give. Sheriff of the island of Kanai in 1854; circuit judge there in 1863, and deputy governor of that island at the same time. I held, also, a great many smaller offices from 1854 to 1865—tax collector, school inspector, road supervisor; chief clerk of the interior office in 1865; associate justice of the supreme court in 1869; minister of the interior in 1874. During those years I have been privy councilor; member of the board of health, and member of the board of education. I was a noble from 1881 to 1887, appointed by the King. I was elected noble in 1887 to 1892. February, 1892, I was taken ill and Mott Smith took my place, and when he went to Washington I got well and took the place back. That brings us up to date.

Q. On January 17, 1893, it is reported that the ministers of Liliuokalani, with the Hon. S. M. Damon, went to the palace and held a consultation with the Queen on the subject of her yielding to the movement for a provisional government. Were you there?
A. I was there at the Queen's request.
Q. Will you be kind enough to tell me in a general way what was said and done?
A. There were present besides the ministers, Samuel Damon, Judge Carter, Paul Neumann, and myself.

Q. What was the subject-matter of the interview?
A. It was a communication from the Provisional Government touching her being turned out of office, her deposition which had been sent her in the course of the day. I objected to reading the document; I didn't know but it might be insulting. The Queen's Government was then in possession of the barracks and the police station where the arms and ammunition were. The question was, whether she should make opposition to the Provisional Government. The advice given was that we were too weak to oppose the United States forces, and consequently that she should surrender. The police station was surrendered immediately after the consultation. We were there perhaps an hour in this consultation. Whilst we were, Mr. Stevens's letter to the Queen's ministers, saying he had recognized the Provisional Government, was read by Sam Parker, Her Majesty's minister of foreign affairs. Mr. Neumann and Joe Carter were appointed a committee of two to draw up a protest for Her Majesty. We waited until they had done so. We all approved of that protest, and then the Queen signed it.

Q. Was it dark then?
A. It was after dark; lamps were lighted.
Q. What was the condition of the city as to quiet when the troops were landed on the day before?
A. There were no people on the street. It was as quiet as things could be. I went to the palace to speak to the Queen. I told her that the soldiers had landed and were coming towards the palace. Fearing lest they should attack the palace, I advised Her Majesty to be ready to go with them if they should come to her and ask her to go with them. I said this in my consternation upon seeing foreign troops landed in a peaceful country when there was no show of any disturbance.

Q. Was that consternation pretty general?
A. Most decidedly it was.
Q. Did that state of mind continue until the dethronement of the Queen and the surrender of the barracks and station house?
A. Yes; until we heard of the establishment of the Provisional Government and then we knew what was what.
Q. Everything quiet after that?
A. Everything was quiet. There was not a dog bark or a cock crow.
Q. Were you in the Legislature in 1892?
A. I was a member by appointment as a minister.
Q. Will you be kind enough to tell me how many parties were represented in that Legislature and by what names they were designated?
A. Three parties and some independents, National Reform, Reform, and Liberal.
Q. How many members had each of these?
A. Nine National Reform; 14 Reform; 21 Liberals, and 4 Independents.
Q. Who were the 4 Independents?
Q. How do those four gentlemen stand on the subject of annexation?
A. At the present moment?
Q. Yes.
A. Marsden is an annexation man. Hind is not, Cornwell is not, and Drier is not. I am sure of those two. I am not sure of Hind.
Q. Twenty-five was a majority of the Legislature?
A. Yes.
Q. Did any one of these parties have that number?
A. No.
Q. How did it happen that so many cabinets were nominated and voted out on want of confidence in 1892?
A. In the beginning of the session there was no possibility for uniting the parties to vote out a ministry. The first cabinet held until September. In September W. A. Whiting, attorney-general, resigned, and Paul Neumann was appointed in his place. E. C. Macfarlane, with several others of the National Reform party, sided with the Reform party, and got also a few of the natives to side with them, and voted out the first cabinet.
Q. Why did Macfarlane make this move?
A. He objected to Neumann, a party member, going into the cabinet without the consent of the party.
Q. What party did Neumann belong to?
A. The National Reform. The Neumann cabinet did not meet the approval of the Reform party.
Q. Who were at the head of the new cabinet?
A. Sam Parker, Neumann, Macfarlane, and a man by the name of Gulick. It did not meet the approval of the Reform party, and, in consequence, after a week or two they were voted out.
Q. By what parties in the Legislature?
A. Then it was a conglomeration, party lines completely gone. Macfarlane burst the party lines. They were voted out after a fortnight. The Reform party laid down the principle that the Queen should appoint a cabinet from the members of the party that voted out a cabinet. The Reform party never voted out any cabinet because they could not on account of lack of numbers. Then the new cabinet was appointed. They lasted about half an hour or twenty minutes. They were voted out again. A new cabinet was appointed which satisfied the Reform party.
Q. Was that the Wilcox cabinet?
A. Yes. When I returned from San Francisco—I was gone about two months—they were voted out. They got just 25 votes to vote them out.
Q. What party voted them out?
A. The Liberal party—the native element.
Q. They must have had some other party to help them.
A. The National Reform party.
Q. Then a new cabinet was appointed?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that ever voted out?
A. No.
Q. It was appointed the day before the Legislature was prorogued?
A. Yes; on Friday.
Q. What was the cause of all this turning out of cabinets?
A. The great desire on the part of a great number of the members of the house to get into the cabinet themselves.
Q. The hope of getting into the cabinet made these combinations possible and successful?
A. Yes.
Q. Who were the members who wanted to be ministers?
Q. Was this last Wilcox cabinet constituted wholly of Reformers?
A. Yes.
Q. This left out of the cabinet and representation from the National Reform or Liberal parties?
A. Yes.
Q. Did that produce any dissatisfaction among aspirants for cabinet places?
A. Decidedly. It produced strong dissatisfaction among the Liberal party. They had been told before they would come in. Bush would have cut his throat before he would have sided with the Reformers but for the idea that he would get in himself.
Q. Is he an annexationist now?
A. No; he is an antiannexationist.
Q. On the voting out of the second cabinet, I think, you said they went all to pieces; there were no parties?
A. Yes.
Q. Am I to understand that they just turned loose in a sort of scramble for cabinet places?
A. That was the simple reason for it.
Q. Was there ever a time when the Reform party had anything like a majority of that body?
A. Not in 1892.

I have read the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of my interview with Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, June 10, 1893.

H. A. WIDEMANN.

Judge Widemann, June 15, 1893.

Chief Justice Judd, who understands the native language, says “he heard the Queen’s speech on the 14th of January. She said to the crowd she would proclaim a new constitution hereafter.” She used the words “ma keia man la.” These words may signify a few days, a few
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

No. 58.

Interview with H. A. Widemann.

I beg to state that I lived in Honolulu in January and February last past and took due notice of all the events that took place during those months. In the latter days of January and on the 1st of February everything was as quiet as could possibly be, and there was no reason whatsoever to fear or be apprehensive of danger to property or danger to life or limb of any man, woman, or child.

I did consider then, and do consider now, that the hoisting here of the American flag at that time for the protection of life and property was absolutely unnecessary.

HONOLULU, July 15, 1893.

H. A. WIDEMANN.

No. 59.

Interview with Robert W. Wilcox.

HONOLULU, Tuesday, April 18, 1893.

Mr. Blount. Mr. Wilcox, where were you educated?

Mr. Wilcox. Partly in these Islands and partly in Italy, at the military academy at Turin.

Q. How came you to go there?
A. I was sent by the Hawaiian Government.

Q. In what year?
A. In 1880; the latter part of 1880.

Q. When did you return?
A. In 1887.

Q. Are you a native?
A. I am a native. My father is an American, from Rhode Island—Newport. My mother is a Hawaiian.

Q. Then you are one-half Hawaiian and one-half white?
A. Yes.

Q. You came here in 1887. How long did you remain?
A. About four months.

Q. Where did you go then?
A. I went to San Francisco with my wife.

Q. How long did you remain there?
A. About one year.

Q. And then you returned here?
A. I returned about April, 1889.

Q. Was that the year in which occurred what is termed the Wilcox rebellion?
A. Yes; on July 30, 1889.
Q. You were in what was called the Ashford-Wilcox rebellion?
A. Yes.
Q. In what year?
A. In 1892.
Q. Were you in the Legislature at that time?
A. I was in the Legislature at that time. I was in the Legislature in 1890. I was one of the youngest men from the island of Maui.
Q. Then you have been identified all the while, from 1887, with public affairs in these Islands?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you understand the feelings of the whites and the natives?
A. Yes.
Q. What was the cause, or what were the causes, which led to the dethronement of Queen Liliuokalani?
A. When what was called the Wilcox cabinet was ousted by the House in January—about the 12th—I do not remember the date, and then on Friday a new cabinet was formed by the Queen, composed of Sam Parker, Cornwell, Colburn and Peterson. We met in the afternoon, and members of what we call the Reform party did not come, and we decided that the house should prorogue on Saturday at 12 o'clock. At noon the Queen came in and prorogued the house. A good many members of the house were not there—nearly all the members of the Reform party were not there—and soon the house prorogued. One of the members came to me and told me we were wanted up at the palace. So we all went up to the palace. As soon as we got in there we found a big body of people, what is called Kalaiaina. We stayed in the reception room of the palace, and the English minister was there, the French commissioner was there, the Portuguese minister was there, but not the American minister. He had just come back from Hilo that very morning. So we waited, the Queen was in another room with the ministers.

The rumor was whispered around that there was to be proclaimed a new constitution. The judges of the supreme court, two of them, were there—Chief Justice Judd and Bickerton. Of course we waited there until the foreign representatives went away. We heard the Queen insisted that the ministers should sign and that the ministers would not sign this document. I stayed there until the whole thing ended, because I wanted to know what would happen. We stayed there until between 5 and 6, when the Queen came out and gave a little speech saying she wished to proclaim a new constitution, but was prevented. She would proclaim one in the future if the people would insist upon it. Then we went home. I went out with Mr. Parker and, in the meantime, I heard that they had got up an organization—the committee of safety they called it. I went home and stayed there. I did not care to go into any side, just hold myself neutral.

On Sunday Mr. Colburn called on me. He asked me if I would assist the Government. He said Mr. Thurston had been there and wanted him to sign a document to call the Boston marines on shore and to proclaim the Provisional Government. Mr. Colburn wanted me to help them to stand by the Queen. I told him I had no objection. I would assist them as far as I could. He said their headquarters were at the station house. He went away. I stayed at home. I did not bother myself about the station house.

Mr. Colburn called on me again in the evening. He wanted me to go to their meeting at the Government building. He took me down there. I saw there Dr. Truseau, Mr. Gulick, Mr. Macfarlane, Paul
Neumann, John E. Bush, and Anton Rosa, and some foreigners also were there. They were also consulting over the situation—what to do. Marshal Wilson was there. They stood up and talked. Wilson decided it was proper to arrest the committee of safety, but nobody seconded his motion, and they asked my opinion. I said the only thing was to suppress them before they made any progress. They said they are going to have a mass meeting at the armory on Beretana street, of the committee of safety. Then they came to the conclusion to have a meeting of the people who wanted to support the Government in the square right opposite the Government building, and some one talked about that the Government should proclaim martial law, and stop all these rebels and riots and all that kind of thing. Paul Neumann, who was present, said it would not be necessary; it would only create friction.

I told Paul Neumann that if there was any bloodshed the Government would be responsible for taking such a very weak stand. Paul Neumann said there was a document to be read there to dethrone the Queen, by the opposition party. He said, "that is no treason." I said, "if that is not treason we had better give up the whole thing." Then we came to the conclusion to have a mass meeting at the same hour with the others. That was on Monday. I went home with Mr. Bush. He asked my opinion. I told him, "I think you can not do anything. I am not going to get myself in trouble. I would rather be neutral." So I went home. The next day—the 16th—I was called to make a speech in the meeting. It was merely to get the people to harmonize and keep the peace.

Q. What meeting was that?
A. The meeting of the people to support the Queen's Government. I did not make a speech. I told the people to behave and keep the peace and order, and they passed a resolution and I was appointed to be a member of that committee to see the Queen. So I went up that afternoon to see the Queen at the palace. She received us. Mr. Parker was there. She detained us a little while. Mr. Parker gave us a little champagne, and when we left there we went out toward the Government building. A native came up and told us the Boston men had landed. We went down to see the Boston's soldiers, and when we got around to the consulate we saw the Boston's men marching up. They halted there and divided the men; sent part of them up to the legation. Some stayed, I think, at the consulate. The main body marched up to King street, marched up by Merchant street to the front of the Government building, near the eastern corner of the palace fence. They stayed there awhile and then went as far as Atherton's place.

In the evening Colburn called and asked me to go to the Government building. When we got there they were talking about the landing of the Boston's men. I saw the representatives of other countries there. Finally the Boston's men came back and took a house behind the Opera House near the Government building. They stayed there until the next day. Next day I went down town in the morning. I saw Mr. Damon, the present vice-president. I asked him about it. He told me the best thing was to take no side—neither the Government nor the committee of safety. He didn't want annexation, he said. He had told me himself about that sometime previous to that. I didn't take any part. There were rumors around town that I was appointed commander in chief of the Queen's guard. Many of my friends asked me about it. I told them there was no truth in it. I stayed down the
city nearly all that day. People were running about—all curious about seeing the Boston’s men on shore.

The committee of safety was working hard to enlist men for the new Provisional Government to be proclaimed. Peterson came up to me and asked me if I would use my services and see what is called the “Drei Hundred,” a German element—see them and get them to take part in this movement. I said, “What is the situation?” He said he thought he could eurch the American minister, and it would be all right. I said, “I think we are taking a very weak stand.” I was afraid we were going to have bloodshed—on account of the weakness of the Government. I went home, and then went down the city again. I saw a cart coming from E. O. Hall’s. A policeman tried to stop it. Capt. Good, the present captain of the guard, was on the cart. He fired and hit the native on the shoulder. They then ran up Fort street. There were no police that day—all kept down at the station house, and the soldiers were kept in the barracks. The streets were left at the mercy of anybody. The “Drei Hundred” marched down on Beretania street to the armory. They got ammunition there and went down to Government building. I heard the new government was proclaimed in the Government building and supported by these thirty men. I went home and stayed home.

Q. Were those all the troops that were there?
A. All that were there then. Others came in afterwards.
Q. How long afterwards?
A. About an hour afterwards—about sunset. They kept on coming, little by little. Dole resigned that day as justice of the supreme court and joined in. I went home, but, of course, the news was abroad what they were doing. The Queen and ministers consulting, they gave up the Government under protest, which was published afterwards—next day. Gave up to the superior force of the United States.
Q. Where were the United States troops at the time of the reading of the proclamation?
A. Right behind the opera house, in a building they called Arion Hall.
Q. In the house or on the street?
A. Some inside and some outside. They took possession of that quarter.
Q. Were they formed or not?
A. No; they just guarded the place.
Q. Had they arms?
A. Yes; and one or two Gatling guns—one or two, I am sure of that.
Q. At the time of the surrender of the Queen in the manner you have stated was she not in possession of the palace, barracks, and station house?
A. Yes.
Q. No attempt had been made by the Provisional Government to take them by force?
A. No.
Q. What time in the day did Minister Stevens recognize the Provisional Government—how long after it was proclaimed?
A. Nearly right afterwards.
Q. Now, when the Provisional Government was recognized by Mr. Stevens, what was the effect on the Queen and her followers?
A. They all gave up.
Q. And was it on account of the recognition by Mr. Stevens that
there was no effort on the part of the Queen to take the Government building?
A. Yes; on account of the recognition by Mr. Stevens and the presence of the United States troops.
Q. Was it or not the opinion of both parties that the recognition by Mr. Stevens ended the contest?
A. Yes; the recognition by Mr. Stevens ended the contest, because the Queen’s Government knew they could not go against Mr. Stevens’s recognition.
Q. How many troops did the Queen have in all at the time of that recognition?
A. She had a regular guard at the barracks; I think about 150.
Q. One hundred and fifty volunteers?
A. One hundred and fifty in all; and down at the station house some 200 or 300 men, with Wilson’s police and volunteers. They were armed. They had guns and Gatling guns.
Q. Were you in the palace on the 14th.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What troops were about there?
A. The Queen’s guard.
Q. How many?
A. About 80.
Q. There were certain of the members of a certain political society there asking for a new constitution. Was that a committee from that society?
A. Yes.
Q. Not only from Honolulu but from the other islands?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it a large organization and has it much influence among the native population or not?
A. So far as the question of the constitution was concerned it had nearly all of the natives. At every election that point was talked about by every member to secure election.
Q. Why did they want a new constitution? What was the matter with the constitution of 1887?
A. They felt that they were forced by the constitution of 1887, by the party who got up that revolution, and that the qualification for noble voter barred most of them from voting.
Q. Tell me how that was?
A. To vote for noble on these Islands a voter must have an income of $600. If not an income, a property qualification of $3,000.
Q. Unincumbered?
A. Yes. Then there was a party called the Liberal party. We didn’t mean a constitution giving all power to the Queen. We meant a constitution for equal rights.
Q. Do I understand you to mean this: That there was a large party that wanted to give the Queen power to appoint the nobles, but the Liberals were opposed to giving her the power to appoint the nobles, but wanted freer franchise in the matter of electing nobles?
A. Yes; and the Liberals held that the Queen ought to let the strongest party in the House form a cabinet, and not appoint the favorites.
Q. How was the bulk of the native population on that question?
A. The bulk of the natives were Royalists. They held the old idea; the Queen must have all power.
Q. Is that the general feeling among the native population?
A. Yes, sir; except the enlightened natives. They have a different opinion.
Q. Now, your own idea. What qualification did you want for voting for nobles?
A. The qualification of learning.
Q. What sort of property qualification, or any?
A. I wanted about one-half of the present qualification; and the voter to know how to read and write and understand the constitution.
Q. That was in order to give to the native element a larger liberty in the matter of electing nobles?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In the desire to proclaim a new constitution did the Queen seem to be meeting the wish of the native population?
A. Yes.
Q. She had, then, in her desire to have a new constitution the support of the natives?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you see that constitution?
A. I did not. I only heard from persons who read it.
Q. What did you hear it was?
A. Joseph Nawahi—the Queen gave it to him to read.
Q. What did he report to you?
A. He reported to me that the nobles and representatives should be elected, but one-third of the nobles to be appointed by the Queen.
Q. Who was to elect the other two-thirds?
A. The other two-thirds of the nobles were to be elected by the same people who elect representatives now.
Q. What was to be the qualification of a person who voted for nobles under that constitution?
A. The same as that for representatives. The judges of the supreme court were only for six years, to be recommissioned every six years.
Q. And how about the cabinet?
A. The cabinet was to be appointed by the Queen.
Q. And to go out by a vote of want of confidence?
A. Yes; and I asked him further about the exercise of suffrage. I understood him to say the foreigners must take the oath of allegiance and stay here five or six years, except those foreigners who came here and were allowed to vote by royal signature.
Q. You say that since 1887 the natives have been wanting to restore the old constitution?
A. Yes.
Q. Giving to the Queen more power?
A. Yes.
Q. Have the parties been divided here on that line?
A. Yes.
Q. Why didn't the last Legislature do something in the matter of a new constitution?
A. A majority opposed it. Even some of the natives dodged around. They said they would support the convention for the new constitution, but when the thing came up they tried to dodge.
Q. Why did they try to dodge?
A. I suppose they were influenced by the Reform party.
Q. But if they had voted as they were expected to do by the people who elected them, would they have had the power to make a new constitution?
A. Yes; because there were two bills before the House to call a con-
vention of representative men all over the Islands to come and make a
new constitution, but it was defeated on the compromise in 1890, and
in 1892 they were defeated badly.
Q. What was the compromise of 1890?
A. To go by amendment. In 1890 we passed a good many amend-
ments, and in 1892 those very people who promised to support it—they
went back on their promises—so it was defeated.
Q. What was proposed in these amendments?
A. One proposed to reduce the qualification to $300. That was the
principal point.
Q. Are these amendments in print?
A. Yes.
Q. Will you bring them?
A. Yes.
Q. How did the Liberals manage to get these representatives of this
new constitution movement to vote against these amendments?
A. The Reform you mean?
Q. Yes.
A. They used their influence against it.
Q. What was their influence?
A. They have a good deal of influence. Some of the men depended
upon them. Many of the Reform party were sugar planters. They held
mortgages on the property of some of the legislators; some of them
were dependent upon them for their pasturage.
Q. Tell me about the voting out of the several cabinets in 1892.
A. The first cabinet was called the Widemann-Parker cabinet.
They were only voted out by combining the Progressive Liberals with
the Reform. The Progressive joined with the Reform. They got a
majority and ousted that cabinet. That was how that cabinet was ousted.
Q. Be kind enough now to state to me the parties in the body on the
assembling of the last Legislature, the points of difference between
them, and why the first cabinet was voted out.
A. They did anything to get the cabinet out. They had no confi-
dence in it. Of course the Reform didn’t like that cabinet, and the
Progressive Liberals didn’t. Even the natives didn’t like it. The Pro-
gressive Liberals thought that by having a new cabinet their views
would be carried out. Some of them wanted to form a convention for
a new constitution. That was not brought up before because the Reform
opposed that.
Q. Both the Liberal party and the Reform party wanted a new con-
stitution?
A. The Liberal party wanted a new constitution and the natives did,
but the Reform didn’t want a new constitution.
Q. What is the difference between the Liberal party and the natives?
A. The only difference is the natives wanted to give the whole power
to the Queen. The Liberal party did not believe in that.
Q. Well, please go on.
A. They voted out the cabinet. Then the Queen appointed another
cabinet, what is called the Macfarlane cabinet. It took a week to form
it. That cabinet was voted out.
Q. Why were they voted out?
A. They did not like them; they felt they were ignored. They laid
out a platform for the leader of the house to form a cabinet for the
Queen. Then another cabinet came in—Cornwell, Nawahi, Creighton,
and Gulick. We had a meeting the night before of the Reform and the
Progressive Liberals. Nearly all the men who voted out the former
cabinet were at the meeting. They worked around about using all their influence to work upon the native members by means of promises and money. Then the Macfarlane cabinet was voted out. The natives stuck together to hold that cabinet in.

Q. How was the vote on that?
A. Twenty-seven to twenty-eight.
Q. Who furnished the money?
A. Friends of the Reform people. The Reform knew that their friends were using money to get some native votes to get that cabinet out.

Q. How do you know that money was being used?
A. I was told so, and I know it is a fact.
Q. How do you know it is a fact?
A. It was talked about. It was general belief.
Q. Was it generally believed, as you do, that the majority was gotten by the use of money?
A. Yes. (Continuing.) Then this cabinet of Cornwell, Nawaki, Creighton, and Gulick came in. We had a meeting the previous night. We all decided we would vote them out without ceremony.

Q. Who decided that? Who was the meeting composed of?
A. Reform and Liberal. Because we felt the Queen was ignoring the majority of the house.

The cabinet was voted out in three hours. Then, afterwards, it took two weeks to form the Wilcox cabinet, which was composed of the Reform party. The Liberal was left out this time. I was a Liberal, but I didn’t kick. I said I would keep still; I would pay them back in some way. Bush was a Liberal then; he was kicking. Ashford was at Hawaii. Finally the Queen’s party commenced working against this cabinet. Mr. Parker asked me how I would vote. I told him I was tired about the cabinet, and I asked him if he was going to be in. He said yes. He asked me if I would take some position abroad. I told him I could not take a position except as minister. He said we were going to have a new constitution. He said that as soon as they have a new cabinet they would proclaim a new constitution.

I did not believe what he said. I think he was merely working to get people to vote the cabinet out. I told him there was no need of a new constitution for giving a friend a position abroad. He said they might send me out as consul-general to Hongkong. I said the cabinet did not act right and could expect nothing from me. When they brought the resolution against that cabinet I stood and explained my vote. I explained where they stood, so we had 25 votes when that cabinet was voted out. On the 13th, which was Friday, the new cabinet was formed by the Queen, Sam Parker, Cornwell, Colburn, and Peterson.

I want to explain the influence of the white population here about voting. Macfarlane and Paul Neumann, when their places were vacant—two candidates were put out by the Reform party, called the Missionary party, Mr. Waterhouse and Mark Robinson, and the other party put up—

Q. What other party?
A. The other foreign element here. They put up Mr. Maile and Mr. Hopkins.
Q. What do you mean by this other foreign element?
A. I mean nonmissionaries, as noble voters. They need to get foreign voters to elect nobles. All the missionaries stood solid to vote for their candidate.
Q. Were the whites defeated in that election?
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

A. Yes; they are generally defeated. It is a question of prejudice with them. When the word "missionary" is raised that party would be defeated.

Q. Well, the missionary element is an American element?
A. Yes; Boston men. They are the sons of missionaries from Boston.

Q. Are there any other nationalities; what are they?
A. Some Portuguese, some English, some Germans.

Q. What is the feeling of the people here towards the native Government; take the native population?
A. They are always for the native Government.
Q. Then they are not in favor of this Government?
A. No.

Q. How about the whites?
A. The whites in general do not favor the Government. Some of them are for annexation, and some of them would rather have independence of the country.

Q. Well, now, the annexationists who are not for this Government here, why are they opposed to this Government; are they apprehensive that this Government is not inclined to give the franchise to the native people?
A. Yes; and besides they disapprove of the way it was brought about.

Q. What do you mean by the way it was brought about?
A. The way it was established. They have in mind that this Government was put in by Minister Stevens.

Q. That is the opinion of the native population?
A. A good many whites feel the same way.

Q. There are a great many whites who feel that this Government was set up by Mr. Stevens?
A. Yes; the landing of the Boston's men and the recognition on the same day before they got the station house and the barracks.

Q. Was there any opinion on Saturday the 14th, or on Sunday, that the troops were going to be landed and would be in the interest of the dethronement of the Queen?
A. On Sunday the news came from Colburn. Thurston went up to him with a document to get him, Peterson, and Cornwell to send for the troops to support the Provisional Government. He assured him that Minister Stevens would do what is right to support them if they would only sign the document. Nobody had an idea that the troops were going to be landed, except by the request of the Government, until Monday evening. The 16th the troops were landed, and it was a surprise to everybody. Nobody knows who called them.

Q. What was the condition of the city at the time as to peacefulness?
A. Peaceful; just the same as before. Nobody was thinking about revolution. On Sunday Mr. Parker asked me if I would take the post of commander-in-chief. I told him I would take it if I had the appointment in writing. He told me he had to see his colleague. Cornwell said he would have to consult other members of the cabinet and let me know the day afterwards. I never heard anything from them any more. I met Sam Parker. I blamed them for not acting—suppressing the people before they got in the Government building. They said the reason was they could not do it. I said if they had appointed me I would have suppressed it before anything happened. I would have gone and seen Mr. Stevens myself. Mr. Stevens told them he would not assist them.

Q. Told them on Sunday?
A. No; Monday. That is what Parker told me: the American Gov-
. The government would support the committee of thirteen, because they were the only wealthy people of the country; would not support the Government. He told me he did not know what to do. We could not fight the United States. I blamed them. I attacked them in the newspapers on their weakness. Many of the natives accused the Government of being slow—not energetic.

Q. Going back to the voting out of the Wilcox cabinet—the Progressive Liberal party united with the native element in the Legislature and voted out the Wilcox cabinet because they had no representation in the Wilcox cabinet?

A. They all represented one side—the Reform side.

Q. When that shifting of the Liberal party and the native element took place and the Reform element lost the cabinet, how did they accept it?

A. The Reform—they accepted it in bad grace. They never appeared any more. They quit the house. None of them appeared around there.

Q. Now the Legislature was prorogued, when would another assemble?

A. In 1894; in two years, unless a special session be called.

Q. That would leave the Queen with the last cabinet for two years?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was the situation which offended them?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any understanding between the Liberal element and the native element that if this Wilcox cabinet was voted out that she was to proclaim a new constitution?

A. It was talked over.

Q. By whom?

A. It was whispered around. Sam. Parker said there would be a new constitution. I do not like to talk. He talked confidentially as a friend.

Q. That is all right. This is not for local consumption.

A. And some of the members who had been up to see the Queen told me also about the new constitution; that the wish of the people would be fulfilled by a new constitution.

Q. Now, was the Liberal element favoring a new constitution?

A. They had already done so.

Q. Were they in favor of the Queen doing it by proclamation?

A. Yes.

Q. The Progressive Liberals?

A. Yes.

Q. They were for the native element when it narrowed down to a controversy between the reform element and the native element?

A. Yes.

Q. And they were willing for a new constitution?

A. Yes; the whole thing was promised since after 1887. It was promised by candidates running for office.

Q. Do you mean to say that popular elections were all on the line of a new constitution?

A. Yes. In 1890 the Thurston cabinet was a strong one, but on that alone it was defeated; a majority was elected and the cabinet was ousted out, and of course the members did not carry out the wishes of the people; they tried to promise the people the other way.

Q. Who did that?

A. Those in 1890 who were in the cabinet—Widemann and the others.
Q. What is the reason the whites say they do not want the natives to have suffrage?
A. They have an idea that the natives would have control of the Legislature. That is the whole idea. They wanted to have the whole thing in the hands of the sugar-planters.
Q. The sugar-planters are not many in numbers. How would they have it in their hands?
A. Of course, they have the high qualifications.
Q. Were many sugar-planters elected nobles to the last Legislature?
A. Some of them. I don't know how many. On the islands of Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai the nobles are controlled by sugar-planters. This is the only island they can not control.
Q. All the islands except this elected candidates of sugar-planters—nobles?
A. Yes. Here the most popular would be elected. Generally sugar-planters are not popular on account of cheap labor.
Q. They do not like the sugar-planting interest because it brings cheap labor?
A. Yes; the workingmen are against that.
Q. Do the Chinese intermarry much with natives?
A. Not very much. The Chinese merchants marry natives.
Q. How about the Japanese?
A. Not very much.
Q. Do the Portuguese and natives marry very much?
A. They marry among themselves, principally.
Q. The principal intermarriages are between the natives themselves?
A. They marry sometimes with foreigners—nearly all half-castes are Americans—that is, their fathers are Americans.
Q. What is your attitude in the matter of the present Government?
I mean, how do you feel about it? Do you feel that it ought to be continued or ought to have been established?
A. For myself, I tell you frankly, I am not for the present Government.
Q. What is your objection to it?
A. My objection is that this Government is a government de facto of the Missionary party. It is not a popular one. It is against the wishes of the natives and a good many white people. It was established by Mr. Stevens, and in my heart I could say I am a lover of justice. I do not believe in a government established by a strong hand. If I am defeated I am all right. I am a revolutionist.
Q. What do you mean by saying "I am a revolutionist?"
A. I mean that I have started several.
Q. What was your motive for the revolution of 1887?
A. The constitution.
Q. What did you want then?
A. I felt something like the people here felt about the constitution of 1887, that it was forced upon them. Kalakaua was forced to sign it.
Q. What was your plan to change it?
A. My plan was to restore the old constitution, with some little amendments, to suit the view of the people—not to have a high qualification of voters.
Q. Well, to do that you took the Palace, and then, what was your next step?
A. I took the Palace with a view that I would be supported by the King's guard. Of course, if I had that I would have had everything in my hands.
Q. Why did you think they would support you?
A. I had some understanding with them. The King hinted to join with the matter. Then we were to join with Ashford and have no opposition.

Q. Did you take the Palace by an understanding with Kalakaua?
A. Yes; when I got there Kalakaua went down to the boathouse.

Q. Did you see him?
A. No. He sent word to go—that he would not allow me inside the Palace.

Q. Who?
A. The King. He sent R. H. Baker with a message that I must not go in the Palace—and those in the barracks told me to stay in the yard—but do not take possession of this place. I said to Baker to go and see Kalakaua again. He went down to see the King, and I never heard anything until the rifles commenced around. A party of sharpshooters took possession of the opera house. They were whites. The first thing I was fired upon by them—fired upon without any notice. I had twelve men who took possession of the Government building. When fired upon some men ran away—got shot. My men were unarmed. Had only a few arms. We sent off shell up on the opera house. I wanted to take the Palace at that time. I had no men at that time. My men were scattered.

Q. Why did they scatter?
A. They were fired upon and they all jumped over the wall and went away. I went into the bungalow and stayed there.

Q. What was Kalakaua doing all this time?
A. He stayed down there until I gave up in the evening.

Q. Who was he siding with?
A. Well I do not know. He could go back and take possession of the whole Government.

Q. Did Liliuokalani have anything to do with it in any way?
A. No; she was a confidential friend of mine then. She knew something about it. I told her we had a little difficulty with her brother. I told her to go and see Kalakaua and make up the difference. I told her if Kalakaua got it into his head that the movement was to put her on the throne, I might be in a bad position.

Q. What has become of Baker, the go-between between you and Kalakaua?
A. He is living here.

Q. What is his position in the present Government?
A. Nothing. He was the man who went with Kalakaua, when he died in San Francisco.

Q. There was never any understanding between you and Liliuokalani that she was to take the place of Kalakaua if you were successful?
A. No; but before that the Reform people wanted to put her on the throne. The people talked, but it was all talk.

Q. Is Ashford the man in whose behalf the British minister interfered, in the matter of having him tried by a foreign jury, in 1892?
A. Yes; V. V. Ashford.

Q. Is he here now?
A. Yes.

Q. Where is his brother?
A. Here—Clarence—he was with him in 1892. He was a Liberal.

Q. What was the object of the movement in 1892?
A. The object was to establish a republic, with a view, when the people were educated to it, to favor annexation with the United States.
Q. You proposed to experiment with a republic and in the course of time to get into the American Union?
A. Yes.
Q. As a State?
A. Yes. When I was in prison in 1892 Mr. Stevens made a speech in my favor at some Grand Army affair.
Q. Did he want you discharged?
A. He did his best. He said they did not arrest people in America for such things.
Q. There was no force used in that Ashford-Wilcox conspiracy in 1892?
A. No; it was one object to have equal rights—that was all.
Q. It is sometimes said that natives are signing petitions for annexation here, and that they are in favor of it. What have you to say about that?
A. It is not true; they may sign under some influence against their will.
Q. What sort of influence?
A. They hold positions; they would have to give up positions; they have no other occupation. Besides, they do not like these people to annex them.
Q. They hate the people who want to?
A. They hate the Provisional Government. They remember what the Commissioner said when he went to Washington.
Q. What is their idea?
A. They did not like Thurston speaking against them. He said they were like Indians. It brought great prejudice against them.
Q. Are they suspicious that this is a movement in which they will lose very largely their political power?
A. Yes.
Q. And that it is intended to put the foreigners in control?
A. Some of them think so. They think they would be disfranchised, something like Alaska Indians.
Q. The movement of 1892—did that contemplate the use of force in overturning the Government?
A. No; we talked about education. We thought we had a big following and would be supported by the people. Of course, the Government took an active part in it—took an active part in suppressing it.
Mr. BLount. I think I have asked all I want to ask you. Is there any statement you would like to make yourself in connection with this matter?
A. No.

APRIL 27, 1893.

Q. Do the natives generally have some stock—horses and cattle?
A. Yes.
Q. How do they graze them?
A. On land; they lease it—pay so much a year.
Q. Who are the people who own the land; are they corporations or individuals?
A. Some individuals, some corporations. These sugar-planters, they have long leases on what is called crown lands.
Q. And the natives have no other means of grazing a cow or a horse?
A. Except by letting it go on their land and paying so much a year.
Q. Does this fact enable the sugar-planters and owners of plantations to exert any influence over the native vote?
A. They have great influence on those points.
Q. How?
A. In the election of 1892 at Kauai, Messrs. Gay and Robinson, who owned large amount of property there, told a good many of the natives, who voted against their candidate for representative, to take away their horses and the few cattle they had on their land.
Q. What did they do with them?
A. They sold them—they had no place to keep them.
Q. Does that appear to enable them to control the native vote to a considerable extent?
A. Sometimes, but we have secret vote in this country now. They can not control it so well as they used to.
Q. Would that enable them to get natives to sign a petition for annexation?
A. In that way they sign petitions because they are obliged. They have their horses and cattle.
Q. The only chance the native has to get his stock grazed is on land belonging to large planters; sometimes individuals and sometimes corporations.
A. Yes.
Q. Generally corporations?
A. Yes; planters, generally corporations.

I have carefully read the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of my interviews with Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, April 27.

ROBERT W. WILCOX.

No. 60.


FACTS IN RELATION TO THE REVOLUTION OF 1893, AND THE CAUSES WHICH LED TO IT.

Two years ago the nation was preparing its decorations to joyously celebrate and welcome the home-coming of His Majesty King Kalakaua, who was away on a visit of business to the United States, endeavoring to benefit his country and people by working for a modification of the existing treaty of reciprocity with the United States, in the direction of securing the admission of more Hawaiian products and manufactures free of duty into the United States. He had gone on this errand a sick man—at the direct instigation and strong pressure of the planters and their friends, led by Thurston and others. They hoped that through his royal rank and genial bonhomie to gain those privileges from the American Government which they themselves when in power as the cabinet of 1887 had failed to secure.

On the 29th of January, 1881, the U. S. S. Charleston, bearing the body of the deceased monarch, in charge of Rear-Admiral George Brown, arrived in Honolulu harbor. The Charleston was draped in mourning and her yards were cockbilled, which was the first intimation to the Hawaiian people that their monarch had laid down his life in the attempt to benefit the sugar planters. The arrangements for the celebration of his return with rejoicing were changed to that of mourning for Hawaii's dead.
Hawaiian Islands. 1019

Hurried arrangements were made to carry out the change in the form of government that the sad circumstances had made necessary. His late majesty’s cabinet called a meeting of the privy council of state to be held at the palace on that day at noon. To this meeting the princess regent, now Queen, by hereditary right and the provisions of the superseded constitution of 1865, as well as by the direct provisions of the constitution of 1887, was summoned to be present in order to take the oath of office and to be sworn in as sovereign, as provided for in the constitution which had been forced on her late royal brother at the point of the bayonet during the uprising of 1887, at the instigation of the same Thurston and his associates.

At this meeting her troubles began. Naturally and properly opposed to a constitution promulgated by her late brother under compulsion of force, to which she had never consented, and feeling secure in her right to ascend the throne under the provisions of the superseded Kamehameha constitution, she hesitated to sign the constitution or to take the oath which might bind her to acknowledge the validity of that document. The chancellor of the Kingdom, Chief Justice A. F. Judd, advised her to sign it, as the oath was merely the same as in the previous constitution, and hinted to her that the then ministry could not hold office under the commissions signed by the late King. Thus induced, she reluctantly but finally signed the document and took the oath.

Picture the scene: The dead body of her brother and late sovereign still on board of the Charleston, no definite arrangements yet made to bring it ashore; men at work in the very palace where they were draping it with mourning; no relatives near or far save a child niece 8,000 miles away in England and an invalid husband who died a few months later; a subtle tempter promising—you shall do as you want if you willingly give in on this one point; and a grief-stricken and lonely woman in the first pangs of mourning, bereavement, and the bewilderm ent of a sudden change called upon to assume the duties of head of the nation.

Could anyone doubt the result? The chief justice’s advice was followed. The oath was taken to support the Constitution of the Hawaiian Islands, and immediately on the adjournment of the Privy Council, the politicians both in it and out of it were at work. The chief Justice at once stepped up to Her Majesty and whispered to her that if the ministry resigned, as they could not legally hold their portfolios unless commissioned by her, she should ask them to hold their portfolios until after the funeral. This was indeed a most remarkable action of the chief justice toward a woman thus suddenly called on to attend to matters of the most important and serious nature possible, as well as a singular prejudgment of matters which have to, and did, come before him in his official capacity as head of the supreme bench.

For not without a struggle did the late King’s cabinet give up the reins of power, bowing only to the decision of the supreme court. It was appealed to, as provided for in the Constitution. It will be remembered that Mr. J. A. Cummins was the minister of foreign affairs and nominal premier in this cabinet which was now compelled to retire. This fact accounts for much which happened later, as will be related in due time. Considerable feeling ran through the community at the time of the discussion, on the claim of right by the late King’s ministers to hold office in defiance of the Queen. The Thurston faction saw that their power was slipping surely and slowly from them, and they made every effort, privately and publicly, to prevent the Queen from acting contrary to their wishes and plans.
However, as before stated, the supreme court decided that His late Majesty's cabinet could not hold office by virtue of their commissions, signed by the deceased King, and Her Majesty exercised her undoubted privilege of selecting new counsellors. These were Messrs. S. Parker, H. A. Widemann, Charles N. Spencer, and W. A. Whiting. It was a most conservative cabinet, although not at all favored by or favoring the Thurston faction. Mr. C. N. Spencer, since deceased in February, 1893, the minister of the interior, an American and a very old resident of this Kingdom, was a member of the cabinet appointed by the late King, who had just resigned on account of the decision of the supreme court. He had previously, however, signified both his absolute willingness and his deliberate intention of resigning his office as a matter of courtesy to the sovereign, even though the supreme court should decide that the King's cabinet had the right to continue their offices under the Queen. None of his colleagues had expressed such opinions and seemed determined to hold their seats at all hazard; this no doubt influenced Her Majesty in her determination to select new advisers.

Troubles indeed were the scenes at the opening of her reign, and now she had to meet trouble from without as well as from within. His excellency, John L. Stevens, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States of America, had by virtue of his office an official audience of the bereaved and mourning sovereign in the palace on the day following the burial of the body of the late King, on which occasion he addressed Her Majesty as follows:

**MADAM: It is my official duty to offer to Your Majesty congratulations on your accession to the throne, in accordance with the provisions of the constitution of your Kingdom. Turning from the funeral scenes through which we have just passed, I address Your Majesty words of hope as to the future of your reign. Standing on the border land of death and the future world, of which we have been so solemnly reminded by what has just transpired in our midst, and reverent towards the Supreme God, to whom all are accountable, the minister of the United States expresses his earnest gratification that Your Majesty has taken the firm resolution to aid in making your reign a strictly constitutional reign, to maintain the constitutional right of your ministers to administer the laws, and always to acknowledge their responsibility to the Legislature in the performance of their sworn obligations. In the wise and proper respect for the supreme authority of the constitution and the laws, Your Majesty places yourself in the exalted rank of the best sovereigns of the world, and thus will avoid those embarrassments and perplexities which have so often disturbed the peace and crippled the prosperity of countries not blessed with free and enlightened constitutions. It is my earnest prayer that Your Majesty may be able to carry out your noble resolution, and thus have full time and opportunity to discharge the duties which Your Majesty justly regards necessary to the success of your reign and beneficial to your whole people. In endeavoring to make good these auspicious promises, Your Majesty will have the full sympathy and the good wishes of the Government which I have the honor to represent at this capital.**

Picture to yourself the time and scene. An elderly editor of an obscure country journal, accidentally pitchforked into the position of the national representative of one of the greatest nations on earth—and a republic at that—lecturing a monarch born and educated to the purple, a woman in the hour of deepest bereavement, in the style and with the ideas that he would have used to a Sunday school class of little children or possibly to a benighted heathen from the depths of barbarism.

From this time forward he showed by every means in his power at every opportunity the determination to make himself obnoxious to the Queen and her Government by his high-handed and dictatorial actions and speeches, both to herself personally and everyone in her Government that he had to deal with officially.

His mode of doing this was generally characterized by pettiness, as
the following instances will show: He once asked permission of the
Queen to introduce to her two or three friends. What was the aston-
ishment of the officials to see him drive into the palace yard with all
the tourist guests of the hotel, about 30 or 40 in number. As it so
happened the Queen was indisposed, so that they had only the privi-
lege of seeing through the palace. Upon receiving the excuses of the
Queen, Minister Stevens announced the fact to his guests, and in a
few minutes afterwards withdrew, leaving the party in the charge of
the palace officials. On another occasion the Queen was holding a gen-
eral reception. Several influential and wealthy American visitors to the
Islands were desirous of being presented to Her Majesty. Minister
Stevens met them at the palace, and when he got to the door of the
throne room he left the party standing in the hallway while he marched
in alone, and standing before the Queen hastily read over a list of names
and marched out again, leaving his amazed countrymen and ladies to
their own devices, from which awkward position they were rescued by
the courtesy of the Queen's officials, and ushered into her presence.
Again, at a state dinner at the palace, he signalized himself by killing
mosquitoes, clapping both hands together with a loud report, letting
the mosquitoes fall into his soup, from which he afterward picked them
out. The onlookers and others at the table were simply paralyzed by
his coarse breach of etiquette.
Upon another occasion at a luau given on the palace grounds, to
which himself, wife, and family were invited, he created great irrita-
tion by his ungentlemanly and dictatorial insistance on having seats
placed at the Royal table, when a table had been specially set apart
for the families of diplomatic representatives, for his second daughter
and lady friends. He expressed himself in language quite unbecoming
a gentlemen of his position.
When raiding a Chinese gambling den, the police at one time
arrested a murderous-looking inmate of the place, armed with a spe-
cially sharpened immense sheath knife. He was placed under arrest
with a second charge of carrying a deadly weapon contrary to law.
Minister Stevens immediately insisted on his release without trial,
and the return of the deadly blade, as the Mongolian was an attaché
of the legation, to-wit, his coachman, and was therefore privileged from
arrest, notwithstanding the fact that he was not registered at the for-
eign office as such according to international law and custom. To
avoid any further fuss with the American dictator, the murderous
Celestial highbinder and criminal servant over whom had been unwar-
rantably thrown the aegis of the American eagle, was released.
In April last, when V. V. Ashford, R. W. Wilcox, and others were
under arrest on a charge of treason, a vagabond hoodlum, better known
as "the bad man from Alabama," who had been parading up and down
Merchant street, the principal business street, with cartridge belt stuck
full of cartridges, and a Springfield rifle, loudly uttering that he was
prepared to fall in when the word was given for a move to be made, on
which he was promptly arrested by a police officer. Minister Stevens
interfered in this man's behalf also, to secure his release, as he would
no doubt have of the rest could he have even furbished up the slightest
claim to interfere, and thus show his sympathy with revolutions and the
enemies of Her Majesty's throne and life.
When it came to attempting to search for a missing boat from the
wreck of the American ship W. A. Campbell, which contained six or
seven men, a woman, and a young child, he refused to allow the Boston
to go, on the grounds that he feared a revolution and damage to life
and property in its absence. This was during the Macfarlane-Neumann and the Cornwell-Nawahai cabinets regime, when the Thurston faction were in opposition. A few weeks later, when they had got into power, he took occasion to use the Boston to convey himself and family to Hawaii. The incident caused strong comment amongst Americans in Honolulu on his heartlessness and cowardice in taking care of Americans and American interests, and called forth several communications which were published in the Daily Bulletin, a leading newspaper owned by a private corporation. The articles referred to are as follows:

In the legislative assembly on Tuesday, the 27th of September, 1892, Noble Cornwell, under suspension of the rules, moved the following resolution:

"Whereas, information from authoritative sources has been received that an American vessel has been wrecked near the coast of Hawaii, and by reports of one boat's crew of survivors that another boat containing the captain and his wife, and other people, was still missing;

"Resolved, That Her Majesty's Government is hereby requested to inquire into the expediency of assisting the castaways, and is hereby authorized in that behalf to employ the services of one of the Inter-island steamers for the purpose of searching for the missing people, to render assistance if possible;

"Resolved, further, That the Government be authorized to incur the necessary expenses connected therewith."

On motion of Noble Baldwin the words "if deemed necessary" were added, and the resolution passed, and referred to the cabinet.

On the 28th of September the following communication appeared:

Editor Bulletin:

I would like to ask through your columns "of those who have the authority" why the U. S. S. Boston is not sent out in search of the missing boat of the American ship Wm. A. Campbell. I will venture to say that if the U. S. minister's or consul-general's wife and child were in that boat the Boston would have steamed to sea in search of it several days ago.

AN INDIGNANT AMERICAN.

In its issue of the 29th was this editorial:

The U. S. S. Boston leaves port this afternoon on a cruise in search of the missing boat of the lost ship Wm. A. Campbell. This movement is to be placed to the credit of the action taken by the Hawaiian Legislature on a resolution introduced by Noble Cornwell. While there is no certainty that the captain's party have either perished or been picked up, there is a chance that they may be found alive on the wide ocean by the cruiser. Better late than never that the search is instituted.

The above was one of the specifications in Minister Stevens' libel suit. "Another Indignant American," on the 30th says:

Editor Bulletin:

It is just one week ago to-night since the American Minister Stevens, Consul-General Severance, and the U. S. S. Boston were communicated with on the subject of instituting search for the missing boat's crew of the wrecked W. A. Campbell, a report of which appeared in the Bulletin first on last Friday afternoon. The answers were vague and indefinite, except such as received from the Boston which supplied the information that no instructions had been received. Now, this afternoon, the Boston starts on her belated trip in the cause of humanity. The excuse can not be offered that the attention of these officials was not drawn to the need for humane action, nor can poverty of the nation they represent be advanced, in atonement for disgusting acquiescence. If the Boston comes across a ship's boat containing fourteen grinning ghastly corpses, including those of a loving mother and her babe—a woman and her child—it will not be a pleasant picture to contemplate, nor will it be a source of satisfaction to Hubites when they reflect upon the odium which has already been cast upon the namesake of the capital city of the old "Bay State," by the sensibility and Chinese-like stoildity of the man from Maine.

On October 1 "Looker-On" writes:

Editor Bulletin:

Last Friday, news was brought of a terrible disaster at sea. One boat was picked up off the Hawaiian coast, and the exhausted survivors were able to tell of the still more desperate condition of the occupants of another boat, supposed to be following the first. A woman in a delicate condition and a baby were sharing the awful hardships of the open sea in a small ship's boat. The vessel was American. In the port
of Honolulu was lying a ship of the much-vaulted Navy. Moreover, a large number of local steamers were anchored in the harbor waiting for employment. Thanks to private charity and generosity a short ineffectual search was made by the steamer

Kinau, whose owners declined to receive remuneration for what, in their opinion, was the performance of an act of common humanity. Meanwhile, the Boston lies calmly as if nothing had happened. Her searchlights sweep the heavens at night, resting for a moment on the hotel cupola, then another moment on the rising tower of the American church, then flash away to far Waikiki or elsewhere, calculated no doubt to strike terror into the Hawaiian breast, and to show the futility of trying to evade the searching eye, not of Providence, but of Uncle Sam. There were those who said that it had been better if that light had swept the horizon beyond Hawaii for that speck in the wide ocean to which they clinging a mother and her child. However, nothing absolutely is done, except that some theories are propounded by the American consul-general. Besides this, nothing.

It is said on good authority that the captain of the Boston offered his ship, but that the American minister declined the offer. He was afraid, it is said, that something might happen if the Boston were to leave port. Here, then, two reflections arise. First, why is the Boston here at all? and, secondly, is it not manifest now that there are occasions when we are deprived of the maternal protection of the United States and need a small force of our own? Finally, seeing that humanity was being sacrificed to miserable considerations of politics, a member of the Hawaiian Legislature moves that steps be taken immediately to attempt relief to the unfortunate captain and his family. This poor little Kingdom, not in anyway connected with the disaster, was about to rescue citizens of the United States because the representatives of their own country would not move hand or foot. And this is the country to which the Advertiser invites us all to address ourselves for permanent protection and relief. An English man-of-war would have been under weigh within two hours of receiving the intelligence. The fact is, the American Republic has so much to think of at home that it has no time to spend over such trifles as shipwrecks. And, if in an unfortunate moment of mental obstruction Hawaii were ever to seek admission to the Union, she would find that this little Kingdom would be too small to occupy the absorbing interest which, according to the Advertiser, would be directed to her interests.

Minister Stevens took such exceptions to those articles that he forthwith visited the minister of foreign affairs, and stated that he wished a personal interview with Her Majesty, without informing the minister of the nature of his proposed visit. On the appointed day and hour, Minister Stevens, accompanied by Consul-General H. W. Severance, arrived at the palace. He was ushered into the Queen's presence with a document in one hand, which subsequently proved to be the articles that had been printed in the "Bulletin," already referred to, and a volume under his other arm. He was asked politely to take a seat, and did so, flinging one leg over the arm of the chair, and in this uncouth position before a lady he most heately announced to the Queen, and to her amazement, that he was there not as plain Mr. Stevens but as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States of America. Then drawing himself up to an erect posture, proceeded in a very ungentlemanly tone to inform the Queen that it "was the President of the United States of America addressing the Queen of Hawaii." He then went on to say that he was not to be insulted by any newspapers in her realm, and said he referred to certain articles which had been published in the "Bulletin," copies of which he had brought with him to place before Her Majesty. He expected an apology from the Queen, and also that she give him redress for the insult he had received. He then read extracts on "international law" from the book which he had carried under his arm. He also read an "amende honorable," which he insisted should be published in the "Bulletin," but was not. It was as follows:

We desire to express our deep regret for the admission to our columns of communications reflecting on official American representatives relative to the wrecked ship Wm. A. Campbell. We are satisfied that the insinuations and reflections contained in those communications are entirely unwarranted and unjust. The United States officials now at Honolulu are responsible to their own Government at Washington, and not to residents of foreign countries. Nor are they at liberty to explain...
The reasons of their official actions in the public prints. Both the present minister and the consul-general, so far as we know, during their residence here, have always conducted themselves with discretion and propriety. These anonymous assaults upon them are wholly unjustifiable, and if this paper has in any way implied a reflection upon their official conduct we think it just to withdraw all such implication, and frankly make this "amende honorable."

Their excellencies Samuel Parker and Paul Neumann, Consul-General Severance and Her Majesty's chamberlain were witnesses to this extraordinary scene. At the conclusion of this most insane and unheard of proceeding, charging her with something that she neither knew of or had any control over—namely, the conduct of a newspaper with which she had no connection—Her Majesty properly referred him to her ministers.

The cabinet, at Mr. Stevens' request and instance, commenced criminal proceedings for libel against the editor of the paper in question. The suit was afterwards withdrawn at the request of Mr. Stevens, when he found what a scrape he had got himself into, both at home and abroad, by his tyrannical and insolent action towards Her Majesty, and towards suppressing the privilege of free comments of the press on public men, which when an editor himself he had freely availed himself of, and which the Hawaiian, like the American, Constitution, expressly guarantees. His violation of diplomatic etiquette, by going direct to Her Majesty, without first stating the nature of his interview to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and his violent and personally insulting language, would anywhere else have caused his recall, as a persona ingrata to the Sovereign, but the Queen good-naturedly overlooked the insult and forgave his ignorance and ill-temper.

His actions were privately apologized for by Consul General Severance at a social at Fort Street Church, who said that if he had known the nature of the errand he would never have accompanied the minister. Previous to this incident he had been selected by American residents for the honor of giving an address at the decoration-day services. On that occasion he took the opportunity to air his antimonarchical sentiments by condemning all monarchies in general, and greatly reflected on the Hawaiian monarchy. Noble E. C. Macfarlane brought the matter up in the Legislature on a question of privilege, and a resolution was passed calling on Minister John L. Stevens to make an explanation to Her Majesty's Government, but influences were brought to bear, and the subject-matter was dropped from the records, on the ground that America might take it as an ungrateful action on the part of Hawaii, and it might influence the safety of a pending treaty then in the process of negotiation. He had made a somewhat similar public exposé of his sentiments in an address at the Young Men's Christian Association Hall previously. We shall now drop Minister Stevens' peculiar actions, and take up the consideration of Her Majesty's reign from the time when he first began his uncalled for interference with herself and her Government.

After the period of mourning the Queen went on several tours of inspection, visiting all of the islands and the most important districts on each. In every place she was most enthusiastically received by the foreigners as well as by the native Hawaiians. The evidences of her popularity with every class in every place were universal and sincere. The only ones who expressed any dissent were disappointed and disgruntled politicians who had failed to get any office or influence with her, such as Messrs. J. E. Bush, R. W. Wilcox, the Ashfords, and Rev. S. E. Bishop, but even these found the tide of popular feeling in her favor too hard to stem and too openly expressed to be disguised or
covered up. It may be stated here that after having showered on the
Queen the most constant, and unlimited, and unparalleled abuse both
in their newspapers and in the Legislature to which they were elected
members, that towards the close of the session Messrs. Bush and Wil-
cox, with Mr. C. W. Ashford, proffered their services to help her in any
way she deemed advisable, and professsed extreme loyalty to and affec-
tion for her.

In due time the biennial election took place in February, 1892, and
when the Legislature met in May it was found that the house was
divided amongst three parties, the planting missionary element with
Messrs. Thurston, Baldwin, and Smith at their head; the liberals, and
the national reform party. The ministry were supported by the
latter, and Thurston’s party, in order to oust them and get into power,
formed an unholy alliance with their political enemies, the liberals, by
promising them a share of the power so gained and pledging themselves
not to abandon the agreement until the Queen had given into their
desires and appointed a cabinet of their nomination.

In order to give a fictitious color of constitutionality and liberty to
their nefarious office and power-seeking schemes, Mr. Thurston enun-
ciated the astonishing principles, not to be found in the Hawaiian con-
stitution, that the Queen must appoint her cabinet on the dictation of
whomsoever a majority of the legislature should nominate in caucus as
the leader to select a ministry. In pursuance of this object ministry
after ministry was rejected by a vote of these combined parties in the
house, not with any regard to the merits of the gentlemen comprising
them, but solely with a view towards compelling Her Majesty to assent
to their return to full and uncontrolled power, although they repre-
sented but a minority of both the noble and the representative voters
of the Kingdom. To secure their ends and keep their majority together
the Thurston-Baldwin faction entered on a career of the most shame-
less corruption and bribery ever known in a Hawaiian Legislature, and
by so doing defeated cabinet after cabinet. Finally, however, on a
cabinet being selected by Her Majesty, every member of which either
belonged to or strongly favored the interests of their clique, the alleged
principle vanished into thin air, and they basely deserted their quon-
dam liberal allies without compunction, having, as they thought,
secured their return to power untrammeled till the following election
in 1894.

Amongst the cabinets thus unceremoniously overthrown in their
 greed for office was that known as the Macfarlane-Neumann cabinet,
consisting of Messrs. E. C. Macfarlane, Samuel Parker, Charles T. Gulick
and Paul Neumann. This cabinet for talent, executive ability, honesty,
patriotism, and integrity is probably unequaled in the history of the
Kingdom. Every man in it was American, being either an American
citizen or the descendant of one. It had the support and confidence of
the financial and business circles. Yet by unblushing bribery and cor-
ruption, to the disgust of everyone, they were forced out of office on a
second vote of “want of confidence,” after the first one had failed. At
this time, if the Queen had promulgated a new constitution and dis-
solved the Legislature she would have had an overwhelming support
both from foreigners and Hawaiians.

It is to this period that we must also go for evidence that Messrs.
Stevens and Wiltse had been for a long time engaged in conspiring to
overturn the Monarchy here; for on the failure of the first vote of
want of confidence in the Macfarlane-Neumann ministry, and before
bribery had got in its work to secure a majority in favor of a second,
a provisional government was proposed to Messrs. Stevens and Wilso
by Messrs. J. A. Cummins and others of the then united faction of the
liberals and Thurston crowd. They pledged themselves then to sup-
port such movement with all the forces at their disposal if the move
could be made. This statement is made on the authority of a state-
ment under oath by one who was present at a caucus held at Mr. Alex.
Young's place at that time, when Mr. J. A. Cummins announced the
fact to the meeting. The movement, however, was not made, as the
public feeling of all classes at the time was so strong and bitter against
the tactics of Messrs. Thurston and Co. that they knew that they would
have suffered severely from the popular indignation if they attempted
to do anything of the kind. They went as far as to try how many
men they could enlist to serve their purpose, but met with such rebuffs
and rebukes as to cause them to desist. Most of those whom they
approached told them that they had not forgotten their behavior in
the 1887 affair.

In the mean time the bribery had succeeded, the Macfarlane-Neu-
mann cabinet were out, and after a short interval Messrs. Nawai,
Cornwell, Gulick, and Creighton were appointed as the cabinet, but
were promptly voted out in a couple of hours after taking their seats.
Although unwilling to surrender her constitutional prerogative at the
demand of the Thurston faction, the Queen determined, in the inter-
est of peace, to appoint her next cabinet from amongst the more mod-
erate of their number, and did so, in the vain hope that that would
cause them to run the country's business at least fairly to every party
and stop. The ministry now appointed (the Brown-Wilcox ministry)
was entirely satisfactory to the so-called reform party, but as their late
allies (the liberals) had not been consulted in its formation, and were
not represented in its composition, they refused to support it, and a
spectacle was presented of a ministry governing the country who rep-
resented a minority in the house, and these but a feeble minority of
the voters of the country. Such a state of affairs could not last, except
under the peculiar electoral conditions of Hawaii, and only by political
trickery and extensive bribery was it kept up.

Finally, however, the National Reform party and the Liberals coa-
lesced and by the requisite majority, twenty-five out of forty-eight,
voted the Brown-Wilcox pro-missionary combination out of office.
Personally, I was sorry to see them retire from office, as I considered
them moderate men, who would exercise their power in a conservative
way until the following election in February next year, but the actions
of the Reform party had been so unscrupulous that their opponents de-
termined to force them out. They first tried to get them to resign by
passing bills obnoxious to their policy, such as the opium license law,
which was opposed by all but Cecil Brown (attorney-general), and the
lottery bill; but finding them determined on holding office they united,
as I before stated, and by appealing to the patriotic sentiments of the
Hawaiian members prevented the Reform party's gold from having any
effect, and carried the vote of "want of confidence" by a considerable
majority and by the requisite legal number (twenty-five) of members of
the House. I may now here mention the circumstances attending the
formation of the new ministry and the new Constitution proposed to
be promulgated.

My first knowledge that Her Majesty had received at this time any
idea of promulgating a Constitution was about the 8th of January last,
when we had some conversation on the subject, in which I objected to
its suitability and feasibility at the time. Although I knew that she
thoroughly believed she was doing her duty in the matter as a Queen toward her people, her race, and her country, and that she was right in thus acting toward her people, who had come to her as a last resort, having failed to get their desires after trying every other means. I knew that she had received petitions from all sections of the group with over 10,000 signatures, praying her to help her people with their desires for a new Constitution.

The liberal party, which was elected on a platform in which the main plank was the calling of a constitutional convention, were at this time under the perfect control of the missionary wing of the reform party, under Thurston's leadership, had gone back on their pledges and refused to grant a constitutional convention for the purpose of preparing a new constitution satisfactory alike to Hawaiians and foreigners in a proper and amicable manner, and afterwards placing it before the people for its ratification and promulgation, although the petitions in favor of it had over 4,000 signatures of voters. To meet such treatment by the Legislature after these thousands had signified their desire for it, was hard for her people. The people appealed to her for redress, and she, in her sympathy for her people, although in the beginning of her reign was taunted as being too much in favor of and under the advice and influence of the foreigner, and against her own people and race, determined to show them that a Hawaiian monarch's chief care was to redress the wrongs of the Hawaiian people whenever they were in the right, and especially as she was advised that it simply needed the royal mandate to relieve the oppression. To find me, whom she considered would acquiesce to her every behest, opposing her, was a severe strain for a monarch, especially as she knew that I myself was in sympathy with the general idea of amending the constitution by having a new one. To be met with opposition when one expects acquiescence and obedience, is a severe strain to anyone, but more especially to a monarch, who is also a lady, accustomed, therefore, to have her slightest wishes regarded as law.

As nothing further was said until the 13th, I considered that the matter had dropped, but on that day, in talking over the matter of the new cabinet, which was to be appointed in presence of Her Majesty, the matter was brought up again; I again urged the objections which I felt to the step, and, as I thought, successfully.

On the 14th of January, while at the palace waiting with the other invited guests, after the ministers had retired for consultation, owing to the prolonged wait, Governor A. S. Cleghorn urged me to go into the blue room and see Her Majesty, and find out what was the cause of the delay. I saw Her Majesty and Minister S. Parker, and, after hearing the state of affairs, I said: "I'll make this proposition, as you have here only a native copy of the constitution; have you an English version?" She replied: "Yes." "Then send for it," I said, "and send for the rest of the Cabinet and let them look it over, and if they find there is nothing radically wrong in it, you then sign it and we will stand by its results; but if it is not right, you follow the advice of your ministers." To this proposition both Her Majesty and Mr. Parker agreed, and Mr. Parker sent for the other ministers, who returned to the palace. The English version of the constitution was sent for and brought in by a messenger.

The proposition was laid before the cabinet by myself, which they accepted and began to inspect the proposed constitution. Just then I received a message that I was wanted outside. I went out, when a note was handed to me stating that I was required immediately at the
police station. I therefore excused myself and left the blue room. I was met by the chief justice and others, who wanted to know what had taken place. As I was in haste, I simply told them that the ministry had returned and were now in the blue room with Her Majesty, and that the rumor of their resignation was untrue. I then went on to the station house, and on my arrival there I was informed that Messrs. Thurston and W. O. Smith of the missionary party were organizing and enlisting men to overthrow the Queen and her Government. After making inquiry, I found that they alleged they were organizing simply to support the ministry in opposing the Queen, in the event of her promulgating a new constitution, in defiance of the ministry, by force of arms, as Minister Colburn had called upon Mr. Thurston that afternoon for advice, and informed them that the Queen intended to promulgate a new constitution. Mr. Thurston had advised Mr. Colburn to oppose the measure, and not to resign; that they would render all the assistance necessary. Hence they were enlisting the men at W. O. Smith's office for that purpose.

As this seemed to me to be a legitimate purpose I did not make any arrests, but as I saw from the excited condition of these men (Thurston, Smith, etc.) that they saw an opportunity to raise trouble, and now that the news had spread around town and knots of men were discussing the situation on the street corners, I felt it my duty to make every preparation to preserve the peace and safety of the town if they attempted to proceed to any violent acts. I therefore gave my instructions to the police and the specials to be carefully on the lookout for any symptoms of this kind, and returned to the palace to see how matters were proceeding there. On my way there I was informed by those whom I met that the Queen had given way to the advice of her cabinet and that the constitution matter was postponed.

When I arrived at the palace I found all the guests had gone except a Hawaiian social club, who had prepared a "lua" in the basement of the palace to celebrate the prorogation, and that Her Majesty was just seated as I entered. I was shown to a seat opposite Her Majesty, but had no sooner sat down than I was telephoned for to go right back to the police station, as I was wanted on an important matter. On my arrival at the station house I was informed that Thurston and his party were holding another meeting at W. O. Smith's office, and were still enlisting men. This was at 5 p.m. I therefore sent out my special officers with instructions to report at once on the slightest sign of a disturbance, and putting the regular police force on double duty I kept an extra guard all night at the station house, and made every preparation necessary to quell immediately any disturbance which might arise.

Other specials were sent out to shadow the principals in the move, and instructions were given to the police to arrest all persons on the streets found with arms and ammunition, and to keep a strict watch on the dealers in firearms and their places of business until otherwise ordered by myself.

By the advice and consent of the cabinet I ordered the saloons closed at 9 o'clock p.m., two hours and a half earlier than usual, in order to induce the usual Saturday night crowd to disperse to their homes, and so keep the streets clear. These precautions were taken, as I could not foresee what their next move would be. As matters had settled down to their normal condition, and peace and quietness prevailed throughout the city, I could not understand why the Thurston faction should continue to hold meetings and enlist men. Nothing occurred that night to denote any signs of disturbance, except the meet-
ings of the Thurston faction, and on Sunday, the 15th. I received information from one special that a meeting had been held at Thurston's residence the night previous, and kept up until late, at which a majority of those afterwards known as the committee of safety were present.

I have learned since from one of those who were present that the object of the meeting was to overthrow the Queen by force and bring about annexation, Mr. L. A. Thurston being the leader. Mr. A. S. Hartwell, who was present, opposed the move, as he thought it was not the proper way to bring about annexation, but Thurston and the others did not agree with him and ridiculed his objections, in consequence of which Mr. Hartwell had withdrawn from the compact and stated that he could not be a party to any such action, and retired from the meeting.

At this meeting Thurston stated that Minister Stevens had promised to support them, if they proclaimed a provisional government, with troops from the U. S. S. Boston, and that their cause could not be a success without those troops and Minister Stevens's assistance.

Another special brought in word that they were still recruiting and arming, and that they could only rely on about seventy-five men and not over eighty stand of arms. From another I received information that L. A. Thurston, W. O. Smith, W. R. Castle, J. H. Soper, John Good, C. W. Zeigler, H. Waterhouse, C. L. Carter, J. A. McCandless, J. F. Morgan, A. Brown, W. W. Hall, J. H. Fisher, J. Emmeluth, W. Chan, and C. T. Wilder were all out working the matter up round town among people to see how many stood on the matter; that some were on horseback and others in hacks. Other specials reported that some of the above named gentlemen were constantly in and out of Minister Stevens's house (the United States legation), also those of W. W. Hall, L. A. Thurston, F. W. Wundenberg, and H. Waterhouse. Another special reported that Messrs. Thurston and Colburn had visited A. P. Peterson's house early that morning, but could not learn what their course of action was, but something serious was under foot.

On receipt of these reports, more special officers were detailed to procure further information, and report as soon as possible. I then sent immediately for Capt. Nowlien, and telephoned for Mr. Peterson, the attorney-general, and arranged for a meeting of the cabinet at the police station. On Capt. Nowlien's arrival I imparted to him the information I had received, and requested him to prepare and get the barracks and his men ready for active service, as it was evident these people (the Thurston faction) meant business. I also asked him to lay the state of affairs in town before Her Majesty, as I had to go myself to the police station immediately.

On my arrival there, I found everything in regular order and the men fully prepared for any emergency. The attorney-general arrived shortly after, as also did the other members of the cabinet. I laid before them the reports of the situation furnished me by my special officers. They were not much surprised at receiving such information as they were in possession of similar facts themselves and also of documentary evidence of the same, which Mr. Peterson produced and which I considered was sufficient cause for the arrest of these men on a charge of treason.

After a short consultation, I made a proposition to swear out warrants for the arrest of the ringleaders of the plot at once. The attorney-general objected to the proposition, giving the following reasons, stating that he had been called on by Minister Colburn and Mr. L. A. Thurston early that morning at about 6 or 6:30 a. m., who made a proposition to him showing a course of procedure fully prepared, which, if carried out, would cause the overthrow of the Queen and her
Government, and the establishment of a Provisional Government in its place. That Thurston had then stated to Minister Colburn and himself that the American minister, Mr. Stevens, would support such a move with the United States troops from the U. S. S. Boston. And that he had also showed them a form or draft of a letter or request to be sent to Minister Stevens, requesting him to land the troops from the Boston, to assist Ministers Colburn and Peterson under the guise of maintaining order and protecting life and property, if they (Peterson and Colburn) would consent to sign it as attorney-general and minister of the interior.

I could see at once that this was a bait offered them to swallow to legalize the landing of the United States troops, and for them to nominally remain as cabinet officers of the Queen's, but actually seceding from her and thus dividing the executive, so that they being still in authority would support the cause of the rebels, and it would be an easy task for them to accomplish their ends without risking their lives, as their rebellious act would be termed a legal resistance, and thus they held out these inducements to Messrs. Colburn and Peterson to become traitors to the Queen and her Government. Mr. Peterson also said that the arrest of these parties would precipitate a conflict with the United States troops, if Mr. Thurston's statements were true, which he (Mr. Peterson) was satisfied they were, and that the troops would be landed in any case. I then said we can protest against their landing, and if they insist on landing for any other purpose than for that of protecting the United States consulate and legation, that this Government will resist them, and so, in other words, the United States would have to declare war against this Government, and I doubt whether they would fire a shot in that case, as I doubt that Minister Stevens has the authority to declare war against a friendly nation, and furthermore we are in a position to resist all the troops that can land, as their complement, all told, is not over 250 men, and not more than 175 of these could be landed at the outside.

We can oppose them now with over 500 men, two Gatling guns, and a battery of artillery of about 12 pieces (rifled Austrian breech-loaders), with six or seven hundred rounds of ammunition, shot, shell, and shrapnel, and about fifty or sixty thousand rounds for Springfield and Winchester rifles, to say nothing of what the volunteers may have. The ministry then decided to inquire from Minister Stevens himself how far he was supporting the plotters with the United States troops, and to seek advice from and consult with those prominent business men who were friendly to the Queen's government, and also with the consuls and members of the diplomatic corps. Here our interview ceased for that morning, and Colburn, Cornwall, and Parker started off to arrange a meeting with those just mentioned for 2 p. m. that day.

When making my rounds about the city that afternoon in a hack with Mr. S. F. Chillingsworth, who became my deputy on the following day, while on our way down Nuuanu avenue I drew his attention as also that of the hackman when passing the United States legation to the presence of Messrs. L. A. Thurston, W. O. Smith, and A. S. Hartwell inside, and to that of Mr. C. L. Carter on horseback outside in the street apparently waiting for instructions. What were these people doing there, especially at that time on a Sunday, about 3 p. m. or a little after?

After returning to the office Mr. Colburn came along looking for W. O. Smith or Thurston. I told him I had just seen them at Minister Stevens's (the United States legation). About 4 p. m. I saw posters being put up which the conspirators had drawn up and had printed
that day, calling for a mass meeting on Monday afternoon, and signed "committee of safety." I met the cabinet at dinner at the Hawaiian hotel, and they stated to me that the result of their meeting at 2 p.m. had been satisfactory, and that they had decided that the Queen should issue a proclamation in the morning to the effect that she would not attempt to promulgate a new constitution again, as a guarantee of good faith to the diplomatic and consular corps, and that the course of the cabinet had the support of the merchants and business men who had attended the meeting. They also informed me that they had arranged for another meeting at the attorney-general's office for that evening at 8 o'clock.

After dinner, a little after 7 o'clock, we all left the hotel to go to the meeting at the attorney-general's office, excepting Ministers Parker and Peterson, who proceeded to the United States Legation to see Minister Stevens in regard to the situation, and get some definite answer as to his action in the event of an uprising. The meeting did not take place until 8:30 p.m., although Messrs. Parker and Peterson returned from Mr. Stevens's about 8 o'clock, as we waited for the arrival of the Hon. Paul Neumann. On his arrival at 8:30 o'clock the meeting opened for business. Mr. Peterson stated the object of the meeting was to devise ways and means to overcome the action of the conspirators in the event of an uprising. He also stated that he had been to see Mr. Stevens, the American minister, as to the stand he would take in regard to the conspirators, and the reply which Mr. Stevens had given Mr. Parker and himself was that he was ready to support a provisional government with United States troops from the Boston, which meant no doubt that he was against the continuance of the Queen's government, and he also stated to me that I was a scoundrel. When asked the reason of this statement, he said that it was because I had arrested his coachman, a Chinese, and other matters which he did not specify. We then discussed the question of the Boston landing its troops in regard to its legality, violation of international laws, etc. The force we had at our disposal was also discussed, as were other matters, such as the propriety of holding a mass meeting, the proposed proclamation by the Queen and cabinet, the proposed Provisional Government by the conspirators, the subject of arms and ammunition, and other cognate matters.

More information was supplied here, as to the force and strength at the command of the Thurston faction. I proposed that the ringleaders should be arrested at once, and that all arms and ammunition in the town be seized, and the island put under martial law till the arrests were effected. Messrs. Peterson and Neumann both objected, on the ground that it would precipitate a conflict, as Minister Stevens had already declared himself, and that we must at all hazards avoid a conflict with the United States troops. A committee was appointed to draw up a resolution and to call a mass meeting in support of the cabinet's action, and other matters. The meeting then adjourned, and the committee met at once for the transaction of their business.

After the meeting at the attorney-general's office I went to the police station with those of my staff, and prepared a map and an outline of defense showing the outposts and the number of the men required to guard the town in the event of martial law being proclaimed by the Queen. The cabinet had concluded to make the police station their headquarters. The map also showed the number of pickets required for each guard, also the distance to and from all important buildings, as the station house, palace, barracks, Government buildings, and other strategic points, also the U. S. S. Boston from the same points. The police station itself was safe from the line of fire of the Boston, as there
were brick buildings full of sugar or other goods of a similar nature between the two spots, and the building was safe from being undermined, as the foundation is one solid mass of concrete from the coral of bed rock, and it would take months to undermine this, even with the most improved implements. As on the previous evening, I kept an extra guard at the police station all night. That night I received information that a caucus had been held at Mr. Henry Waterhouse's.

The following Monday, the 16th, I received information that the committee of safety were to meet at Thurston's office. I went over shortly afterwards to Mr. Thurston's office and met him and asked of him what they intended to do to-day, and also said to him that they had gone too far, as the matter of the promulgation of a new constitution was now settled and there would be a proclamation issued by the Queen to that effect. Thurston said, "I am sorry for the country, but what guaranty have we that this will not happen again. It is living on a volcano; there is no telling when it will explode." At this, I said if the foreign representatives are satisfied with the proclamation, that you people should be, and also as long as I was there it would not occur again in that way. He then replied: "Suppose you were to die to-night, what then?" I said "That is going to extremes; you are unreasonable, and we can not come to any terms." He said: "Charlie, it can not be helped now; it has gone too far and there is no one to blame but herself." I said: "I am sorry we can not agree about that," and left him. While I was talking with him I could see the members of the committee coming upstairs and going into the office formerly occupied by Mr. Frear, and close the door after entering. I then went over to the police station and gave instructions for the enlistment of men as special constables, and also sent an armed guard to the attorney-general's office in charge of Capt. R. P. Waipa, to receive instructions from the attorney-general, Mr. A. P. Peterson.

At 10 a.m. a committee from the conspirators had a meeting with the cabinet in the foreign office. I sent for Capt. Nowlien and told him to enlist volunteers and to send me 75 stand of Winchester repeating rifles, and for him to take what ammunition was wanted for the artillery (as it was then in my custody), and to get all the powder he required from the Government public powder magazine, and put it in the magazine at the barracks. By 12 m. the above was carried out and I had 700 men and over enrolled, mostly Hawaiians ready to take up arms in support of the Queen's Government, and a reserve of about 500 men, mostly foreigners. At about 12:30 p.m. the Queen's proclamation was printed and circulated throughout the city. It read as follows:

**BY AUTHORITY.**

Her Majesty's ministers desire to express their appreciation for the quiet and order which has prevailed in this community since the events of Saturday, and are authorized to say that the position taken by Her Majesty in regard to the promulgation of a new constitution was under the stress of her native subjects. Authority is given for the assurance that any changes desired in the fundamental law of the land will be sought only by methods provided in the constitution itself. Her Majesty's ministers request all citizens to accept the assurance of Her Majesty in the same spirit in which it is given.

**IOLANI PALACE, January 16, 1893.**

LILIUOKALANI,  
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.  
W. H. CORNEWELL,  
MINISTER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS.  
JOHN F. COLBURN,  
MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR.  
A. P. PETERSON,  
ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
As both mass-meetings were called for 2 p. m., I sent a squad of police to each place to preserve the peace and keep order if necessary. About 3:30 p. m. the meetings had both adjourned, and the city was quiet, there were no signs of any disturbance or disorder of any kind. The attendance at the Thurston meeting was reported to me by count as being between five and six hundred people, mainly foreigners, and that at the Palace Square was estimated as numbering about 3,000. Both meetings were conducted in a very orderly manner, and there was no call for the services of the police at either meeting.

The meeting at the new armory, on Beritania street, was presided over by the Hon. W. C. Wilder, a member of the Legislature, and was addressed in several inflammatory speeches against the Queen by the Hons. W. C. Wilder, L. A. Thurston, A. Young, and H. P. Baldwin, also by Messrs. H. F. Glade (the German consul), C. Bolte, J. Emmeluth, and R. J. Greene. No hint, however, was given of the proposal to change the form of Government, although the Queen's proclamation was read and referred to as being of no value. The following resolutions were passed at the meeting:

1. Whereas Her Majesty Lilinokalani, acting in conjunction with certain other persons, has illegally and unconstitutionally and against the advice and consent of the lawful executive officers of the Government, attempted to abrogate the existing constitution and proclaim a new one in subversion of the rights of the people;
2. And whereas such attempt has been accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed and a display of armed force, and such attempt and acts and threats are revolutionary and treasonable in character;
3. And whereas Her Majesty's cabinet have informed her that such contemplated action was unlawful and would lead to bloodshed and riot, and have implored and demanded of her to desist from and renounce such proposed action;
4. And whereas such advice has been in vain, and Her Majesty has in a public speech announced that she was desirous and ready to promulgate such constitution, the same being now ready for such purpose, and that the only reason why it was not now promulgated was because she had met with unexpected obstacles and that a fitting opportunity in the future must be awaited for the consummation of such object, which would be within a few days;
5. And whereas at a public meeting of citizens held in Honolulu on the 14th day of January instant, a committee of thirteen, to be known as the "committee of public safety," was appointed to consider the situation and to devise ways and means for the maintenance of the public peace and safety and the preservation of life and property;
6. And whereas such committee has recommended the calling of this mass meeting of citizens to protest against and condemn such action, and has this day presented a report to such meeting denouncing the action of the Queen and her supporters as being unlawful, unwarranted, in derogation of the rights of the people, endangering the peace of the community, and tending to excite riot and cause the loss of life and destruction of property:

Now, therefore, we, the citizens of Honolulu, of all nationalities, and regardless of political party affiliations, do hereby condemn and denounce the action of the Queen and her supporters;

And we do hereby ratify the appointment and indorse the action taken and report made by the said committee of safety; and we do hereby further empower such committee to further consider the situation and further devise such ways and means as may be necessary to secure the permanent maintenance of law and order and the protection of life, liberty, and property in Hawaii.

Many of those present did not vote, and I was informed that the enthusiasm and applause came only from those who were previously acquainted with the objects of the leaders and were instructed to applaud at the proper time and place.

At the meeting at Palace Square the assembled multitude were addressed by the Hons. A. Rosa, J. E. Bush, J. Nawahi, and R. W. Wilcox, who severally cautioned the people against any acts of violence or turbulence, and urged them to support the course of Her Majesty's
cabinet. The Queen’s proclamation was read and heartily indorsed by all present, and the following resolution was unanimously passed:

Resolved, That the assurance of Her Majesty, the Queen, contained in this day’s proclamation is accepted by the people as a satisfactory guaranty that the Government does not and will not seek any modification of the constitution by any other means than those provided in the organic law;

Resolved, That accepting this assurance the citizens here assembled will give their cordial support to the administration and indorse them in sustaining that policy.

A committee was appointed to present it to Her Majesty, which they immediately proceeded to do.

The meetings seemed to have been safety valves for letting loose whatever excess of feeling there may have been in the popular mind, for by 4 p.m. it seemed as if the dissatisfaction was all over, as there was scarcely anyone to be seen on the streets. It was like a calm after the storm. About 4:30 p.m. I got information that the Boston’s men were ordered to land. A watch was set to give the signal as soon as signs of activity should be shown on board the Boston, and in the meantime I sent for the cabinet. It was difficult to find them, not having seen or heard from them all day, and they could not be located as soon as they might have been.

About 4:40 p.m. the signal was given that the boats were being got ready on board the Boston, and that the artillery and Gatling guns were being put into the boats, also the men were armed with small arms. At a little before 5 o’clock they were landed at the regular landing near Brewer & Co.’s and Charlton’s wharf. I therefore sent a messenger down to find out who permitted them to land, or requested them to do so. The messenger returned and stated that they did not know themselves, but that they were to receive their instructions from shore, and that Mr. C. L. Carter had just got there and was giving instructions to the officers, as he judged by their actions.

About this time the cabinet arrived at the station house, and I reported what had taken place to them. Mr. Cornwell suggested that Messrs. Parker and Colburn go and see Mr. Stevens and protest against such actions. They started on that errand at once, Mr. Cornwell remaining at the station house. A little after 5 p.m. the American forces marched from the boat landing along Queen street and turned up Fort street and halted at the corner of Merchant and Fort streets, two doors off of which is the United States consulate.

There were three companies of blue jackets with Springfield rifles or small arms, one company of blue jackets with the Gatling guns and artillery, and a company of marines in full arms, having a total strength of 150 to 155 men in all ranks, fully equipped for actual service, with full belts of ammunition, and the caissons attached to the artillery were also full. At this point the company of marines were left to occupy the consulate. A company of blue jackets were ordered to the United States legation, and the remaining companies were marched up Merchant street into Palace Square, thence along King street between the palace and the Government buildings, and were halted in front of Mr. Hopper’s residence, on the south corner of the palace inclosure, in full view of Her Majesty the Queen, about 200 yards away from the palace and the Government buildings. They remained there till after dusk, when they were marched out along King street to Mr. Atherton’s residence, a distance of about 600 yards, and then stopped until they had some light refreshments of bananas and lemonade. Afterwards they were marched back to town and took up quarters for the night at the Arion Hall, a building separated from the Government
buildings by a lane known as Mililani street, about 20 feet wide, and not more than 200 yards directly in front of the Queen's palace.

Messrs. Peterson, Parker, Colburn, and Cornwall, after returning from the Government building, reported to me that Mr. Stevens had stated that he had landed the troops at the request of Mr. Thurston and the committee of safety, and that they (the cabinet) had protested against the landing of the troops, and requested the U. S. minister to withdraw the United States forces from the shore, but were refused or did not get any reply. Then the cabinet left me to attend another meeting of the Queen's friends. After the meeting the attorney-general, Mr. Peterson, returned to the station house, and remained with me there during the night. At 11:30 p. m. a special officer reported to me that the conspirators were now recruiting at Klemme's lodging house on Fort street, and that Mr. J. H. Fisher and J. B. Castle were there. I again proposed to Mr. Peterson to proclaim martial law in the morning and get out warrants for the arrest of the conspirators, and showed him a proclamation to that purpose, ready prepared for the signatures of the Queen and the governor of the island of Oahu. I also proposed placing an armed force in the Government building, but he thought that it was no use to send armed men there, as it was a bad building to defend, especially if Minister Stevens insists on continuing to support the conspirators, as we can not afford to fight the United States of America. Better let the matter rest until the morning and see what may develop.

Perfect quietness reigned through the city, there being a band concert at the hotel, which was attended by a large and peaceable crowd, as usual. The city was patrolled as usual by the regular police force, and, as before, I had a strong guard at the station house in case of a night attack. There were no unusual incidents during the night, with the exception of two fire alarms, neither serious, one a little before 12 m., and the other about 3 a. m., which were promptly extinguished by the fire department, which, by order of the cabinet, had been kept ready for immediate service ever since Saturday night, as also were the waterworks employees kept on duty in case these people might, in the fury of defeat or with a view of creating an occasion for the United States troops to interfere, attempt to create an incendiary scare. Every precaution was taken by Her Majesty's cabinet and every means that lay in their power was made use of to secure the protection of life and property, and nothing was lacking in this respect, so that nothing warranted the landing of troops from the Boston, as the Queen's government was in a position to put down any insurrection if left without interference from any foreign power. On Tuesday, the 17th, everything appeared very quiet, so much so that I dismissed the extra guards at the police station, but I still kept on the watchers on the stores of the dealers in arms and ammunition.

About 9:30 a. m. I received information that a meeting was held at the residence of Mr. H. Waterhouse, at which were present H. Waterhouse, T. F. Lansing, S. B. Dole, W. R. Castle, C. L. Carter, J. H. Soper, F. W. Wundenberg, W. W. Hall, J. A. McCandless, J. Emmeluth, and a number of others. I afterwards learned from one who was present at that meeting that discussion of various plans was had, and a committee of three was appointed to personally confer with Minister Stevens, and received his direct and personal assurance that they would get the support of the United States troops if they went on with the affair. Messrs. Soper, Carter, and Waterhouse were the committee. They went over to the United States legation, which is on the premises adjoining that
of Waterhouse, and returning immediately reported that Mr. Stevens had given them such assurance. At this meeting, also, Mr. S. B. Dole, was offered the presidency of the proposed Provisional Government. He said that he really was not an annexationist, and asked time to consider the proffer. The meeting adjourned to meet again in the morning to discuss matters, and appointed a committee to meet the Queen’s cabinet at 10 a.m. at the foreign office.

The conspirators had agreed to proclaim a Provisional Government to overthrow the Hawaiian monarchy perpetually, and place either Chief Justice Judd or Justice S. B. Dole at its head, and that they were to hold another meeting before noon. At 11 a.m. I was informed that they had concluded to accept S. B. Dole as president of the Provisional Government, and that they had a guarantee from Minister Stevens of his support, backed by the troops, and that they would make a move on the Government House at 3 p.m. and on the police station at 4 p.m. I also received information at the same time that they would rendezvous at the armory on Beritania street. I immediately sent for the cabinet, and also for Capt. Nowlien; Nowlien came, but there were no signs of the cabinet. I gave Capt. Nowlien instructions to have 25 or 50 men in the basement of the palace ready for immediate service, as I expected the conspirators would make an attempt this afternoon. I also explained that I had been waiting for the ministers or a word from them ever since morning, and had sent several messengers to them, but they were closeted in the foreign office in consultation, and had received in return promises to come or send me word, but as yet there had been no appearance of anything of the kind. Capt. Nowlien then went back to the palace to get ready, as I told him his men might be required to be sent to guard the Government building as soon as the cabinet finished their meeting there, and if so I would let him know. I then sent out word for all the volunteers to report for duty promptly at 12 noon at the station house, and called in all of the regular police who were off duty to be at the station house at once.

At 1 p.m. I had 224 men under arms, and more men were coming in than I could find guns for, and fresh volunteers were coming in so fast that I finally instructed my men in charge not to register any more, as we had more than enough already. A little after 2 p.m. the ministers came down to the station house, and a few minutes later word was sent in that a police officer had been shot by John Good. A little later the officer came down the street, supported by a brother officer and Mr. P. M. Rooney to the station house. The officer, whose name was Leialoha, was at once attended to by Dr. C. A. Peterson, the police physician, who was on hand at the time. Leialoha was then sent to the Queen’s hospital. He was one of those who were on special detail, watching the stores of the dealers in arms and ammunition, and was shot in attempting to make the arrest of Mr Good, when he with others was removing firearms and ammunition in a wagon from the store of E. O. Hall & Son, limited, for the use of the insurgents. It was a very fortunate thing for Good and the others that the police on street duty were kept without firearms by my orders, as I had no desire to excite or terrify the people by any display of arms or armed men on the streets.

This occurrence, however, brought the people’s excitement up to fire-heat, and people of both natives and foreigners flocked down to the station house by the hundreds to volunteer, and were in such an excited state that I was compelled to close the doors of the station house, for fear that the mob of volunteers would interfere with the discipline of
the men already under arms, and so begin a disturbance which would end in a conflict which foreign forces would call an opportunity to interfere in, under the pretence of upholding law and order. At 2:15 p. m. I received information that the conspirators were holding a meeting in W. O. Smith's office, and about 2:45 p. m. Mr. C. J. McCarthy came down from the Government building and stated that a Provisional Government had been proclaimed, with Mr. S. B. Dole as president. This was confirmed shortly afterwards by Mr. F. P. Hastings, secretary of the foreign office, and also by Mr. E. Norrie.

Previous to the proclamation of the Provisional Government, the forces from the Boston were drawn up in line of battle under command of Capt. Wiltse, facing the side of the Government building, and that prior to the proclamation, Mr. C. L. Carter, one of the conspirators, afterwards one of the commissioners to Washington, rode up on horseback and handed a large official document to Capt. Wiltse. This contained his orders from Minister Stevens presumably. I received information a little later that the proclamation had been read by H. E. Cooper, a lawyer recently arrived in the country, who had been an unsuccessful candidate for the office of circuit judge, and that thirty-five of the men, known as the "Drei Hundred," were then armed and in possession of the Government building.

After hearing of these actions of the now open rebels against Her Majesty and her Government, I proposed to the cabinet to send our armed forces out from all quarters, surround them, and shoot them down, as they were only a handful. Mr. Peterson, as before, urged that it would only accelerate a conflict with the United States troops, as he and Mr. Parker had been told by Mr. Stevens that the Provisional Government would be supported by the United States forces. On this the cabinet, with the cooperation of Messrs. E. C. Macfarlane, A. Rosa, and others, after consultation, decided to address a letter to Minister Stevens at once, to find out if he had recognized the Provisional Government. The letter was as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
Envoi Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, etc.:

Sir: Her Hawaiian Majesty's Government having been informed that certain persons to them unknown have issued proclamation declaring a Provisional Government to exist in opposition to Her Majesty's Government, and having pretended to depose the Queen, her cabinet and marshal, and that certain reasonable persons at present occupy the Government building in Honolulu with an armed force, and pretending that your excellency, on behalf of the United States of America, has recognized such Provisional Government, Her Majesty's Government asks respectfully: Has your excellency recognized said Provisional Government, and, if not, Her Majesty's Government, under the above existing circumstances, respectfully requests the assistance of your Government in preserving the peace of the country.

We have the honor to be your excellency's obedient servants.

SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
WM. H. CORNEWELL,
Minister of Finance,
JOHN F. COLBURN,
Minister of the Interior,
A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

HONOLULU, January 17, 1893.

The Hon. C. L. Hopkins was the bearer of the above communication to Minister Stevens, and was instructed to wait until he had received a reply. He returned to the station house with Mr. Stevens' reply at
about 3:30 p.m. or later, and handed it to the attorney-general. It was shown me by Mr. E. C. Macfarlane, and was substantially to this effect:

That he acknowledged the receipt of the letter from the cabinet, and that a Provisional Government had been duly constituted in the place of the Queen’s Government, and that that Government was in possession of the Government building, the treasury and the Government archives, and was in control of the islands; and that he recognized that Government as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands. He signed this simply as John L. Stevens, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States.

The governor of the island of Oahu sent the following protest against the landing of the troops from the U. S. S. Boston on the evening of the 16th of January:

**Office Governor of Oahu, Honolulu, January 16, 1893.**

Sir: It is my duty to solemnly protest to your excellency against the landing this evening without permission from the proper authorities of an armed force from the United States ship Boston. Your excellency well knows that when you have desired to land naval forces of the United States for the purpose of drill, permission by the local authorities has been readily accorded. On the present occasion, however, the circumstances are different, and ostensibly the present landing is for the discharge of functions which are distinctly responsible duties of the Hawaiian Government. Such being the case, I am compelled to impress upon your excellency the international questions involved in the matter and the grave responsibility thereby assumed.

While solemnly protesting to your excellency against this unwarrantable proceeding to which I have referred,

I have the honor to remain, sir, your excellency’s obedient and humble servant,

A. S. CLEGHORN,
Governor of Oahu.

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**His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,**
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary United States of America.

Minister Stevens’s reply to Governor Cleghorn was as follows:

**United States Legation, Honolulu, January 17, 1893.**

Sir: Yours of yesterday, the 16th, regarding the landing of the United States naval forces in Honolulu, is received. I have carefully read its terms and import. My responsibility as the United States minister plenipotentiary at this critical time in Hawaiian affairs it is impossible for me to ignore. I assure you that in whatever responsibility the American diplomatic and naval representatives have assumed or may assume, we shall do our utmost to regard the welfare of all present and interests concerned.

Yours sincerely, and with the kindest consideration,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Hon. A. S. CLEGHORN,
Governor of Oahu.

About 4 p.m. a committee from the Provisional Government met Her Majesty’s cabinet, and made a proposition for the settlement of the crisis. After the committee meeting Mr. S. M. Damon, on behalf of the rebels, made demand on me to surrender, which I refused to do. He said that Her Majesty’s cabinet were willing that I should do so on the following terms, which he proposed, viz: That the Queen be deposed under protest, and remain in her palace with her guards until the affair was settled by decision of the United States Government. I stated to Mr. Damon and Mr. Macfarlane, who accompanied him, that if Her Majesty and the ministers were satisfied with those terms I would surrender, but only on the written order of the whole cabinet, approved by Her Majesty; and that unless I received such order in writ-
ing I would fight first, and would commence operations at once and order Captain Nowlien, who was awaiting orders, to open fire at once from our artillery on the Government building, and that the Boston's men must keep out of harm's way or suffer the consequences. They then left me to meet the cabinet again, and said they would let me know later. About 5:30 or 6 p.m. Messrs. Peterson and Macfarlane returned and handed me the following written order from the cabinet:

C. B. Wilson, Esq.,
Marshal of the Kingdom,

You are hereby authorized to surrender to the so-called Provisional Government this day established, headed by S. B. Dole, Esq., the police station and Oahu prison and Government property in your possession or under your control.

Dated at Honolulu this 17th day of January, A.D. 1893.

However, I did not make up my mind to give in finally until about 7 p.m. About 6 p.m. martial law was proclaimed by the Provisional Government. About 6.30 p.m. or later the cabinet returned to the station house in company with Messrs. E. C. Macfarlane, P. Neumann, A. Rosa, and others, and we held a council over the situation, as I was not yet quite satisfied what was the best course to pursue. On the advice of the cabinet and the above-mentioned gentlemen I gave way, and surrendered under the terms of the Queen's protest, which was shown me by the cabinet. It was as follows:

I, Liliuokalani, by the grace of God and under the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a Provisional Government of and for this Kingdom.

That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose minister plenipotentiary, his excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the said Provisional Government.

Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces, and perhaps the loss of life, I do under this protest and impelled by said force yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo the action of its representative and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

Done at Honolulu this 17th day of January, A.D., 1893.

Liliuokalani R.
Samuel Parker,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
John F. Colburn,
Minister of the Interior.
Wm. H. Cornwell,
Minister of Finance.
A. P. Peterson,
Attorney-General.

To S. B. Dole, Esq., and others composing the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

This was received by Mr. Dole on behalf of the Provisional Government, and indorsed as follows:

Received by the hands of the late cabinet this 17th day of January, 1893.
Sanford B. Dole,
Chairman of Executive Council of Provisional Government.
About 7:15 p. m. I disarmed all the volunteers I had under my command at the station house, and in dismissing them to their homes I made a few remarks to them explaining the situation, that in order to save useless bloodshed Her Majesty had, on the advice of her cabinet, determined to submit to the United States force, and that she had ordered me to submit also and surrender the arms, ammunition, and other Government property to the Provisional Government, awaiting the decision of the United States, and that I would recommend them to go quietly to their homes and say or do nothing to cause any trouble to or irritation on the part of those now in power. They promised this unanimously and gave three hearty cheers. Mr. Peterson, the attorney-general, also made a few remarks, showing that it was not cowardice or fear on the part of those in authority that had caused them to take this action but simply the action of the United States representative and troops, with whom we desired no conflict. Mr. Neumann and others also spoke in the same strain, and after giving three hearty cheers again, the men dispersed quietly.

About 7:30 p. m., Messrs. J. H. Soper and J. A. McCandless came to the station house, and I formally delivered to Mr. Soper, as commander-in-chief of the Provisional Government's forces, representing the Provisional Government, the police station and the munitions of war stored therein. At about 8 p. m., a detachment of the Provisional Government's troops took possession. In the meantime, I introduced Mr. Soper to the regular police force as the person from whom they must take their orders in the future, in the following speech, which was interpreted to the men by Capt. A. S. Mahanu:

Officers and members of the police force of Honolulu: It is with deep regret that I have to inform you that I have been requested by Her Majesty the Queen and her cabinet to surrender to Mr. Soper, commander in chief of the forces of the Provisional Government, all arms and ammunition, the police station, and all property under my control.

Gentlemen, it is not because I thought that you would not stand and fight, it is not because I could not trust you, and not because I was afraid that we would not win if we did fight, it was not for any of those causes, but it was in the cause of humanity that I gave way, especially when it was pointed out to me that we would have to fight a great nation like the United States with her millions of men, and to do this would only cause the sacrifice of hundreds of valuable human lives, which this country can not afford to lose without achieving finally the result we hope for. But, gentlemen, I was perfectly satisfied that you were ready, nay, more than ready, willing to stay by me in the defense of our Queen and country. I am satisfied if we had had a conflict to-day with the rebels we would have won, notwithstanding the aid of the Boston's men; but what would have been the result? We would have been forced to give way in the end, after having caused a great loss of life, and among the victims would have been many of our personal friends, and perhaps ourselves. It is better, therefore, to give way to the forces of the United States, and await patiently the time until our Queen's protest shall have been heard by that great and good nation, the American Republic, from which I have no doubt we will receive justice, and that they will have restored to us our country and Government.

In conclusion, gentlemen, I thank you for your attention, and especially for obedience to orders and instructions during my incumbency, and for the loyalty to your Queen and country you have always shown, but especially to-day. And I ask of you all to remain in the police force, to be as loyal to my successor as you have been to me, and to assist him and the new Government in preserving the peace and in maintaining law and order. With these words, I thank you again for your attention.

Aloha.

The men then gave three hearty cheers, after which Mr. Soper took formal charge of the police station and made a short address to the men. This concluded the events of the day as far as I was personally concerned, and I went to my home.

On Wednesday morning Her Majesty received a verbal message from the executive and advisory councils, through her chamberlain, to the
effect that it was the desire of the councils that she should move from the palace to Washington Place, her private residence, on Beritania street; and also, that the royal standard was not to be hoisted. The above action was contrary to the terms of the surrender. At about 11 o'clock a.m. Her Majesty went out for a drive and did not again return to the palace.

Respectfully submitted.

C. B. WILSON.

MAY 15, 1893.

No. 61.

Interview of F. Wundenberg.

Q. What were the reasons which caused the Queen to desire a new constitution?

A. Her native Hawaiian subjects urged the measure. A great number of petitions, numerously signed, from all parts of the Kingdom were presented to her praying for a new Constitution, and delegations of her people waited on her, all clamoring for the restoration of the rights enjoyed and exercised by the native rulers and people under the Constitution of 1864.

Q. What objection had the native Hawaiians to the constitution of 1887?

A. The natives looked upon the Constitution of 1887 as having been illegally forced upon the nation, as it was not submitted to the vote of either the people or the Legislative Assembly. They felt that it was an outrage and denounced it as "the bayonet Constitution." The "Hui-Kalaaina" (National Party) was a native organization started shortly after the revolution of 1887, having branches in the remotest parts of the Kingdom. The avowed object of the party was to oppose the Constitution of 1887, and its supporters and candidates for Legislative honors were required to pledge themselves to work for a new Constitution.

Q. Was any action taken in the Legislature relative to a new Constitution?

A. Several native members presented resolutions in the Assembly having for their object the election of a Constitutional Convention. These resolutions were either ruled out on technicalities or voted down through the influence of the people now in power. Consequently very strong and bitter speeches were made by several native leaders such as Bush, Wilcox, Kaunamano, White, and others, which convinced the Queen that a crisis had arisen which left her no choice but to give heed to the unmistakable wish of her native subjects, or throw herself wholly into the hands of those who had promulgated the Constitution of 1887, and abandon forever her native subjects to their fate.

The murmurs against the Queen were growing louder from day to day, showing a gradual alienation of the natives from their Sovereign on account of her inaction.

Q. Did the natives think the Queen had the right to promulgate a new Constitution at her own will?

A. They most certainly did. They would have been satisfied, in fact would have preferred, that the whole matter should have been handled by a Constitutional Convention; but they could not see why a Constitution proclaimed by their Sovereign would not be fully as legal and
binding (if not more so) as a Constitution proclaimed by a self-constituted committee and maintained by bayonets against the will of both the Sovereign and people.

The committee of safety met at the office of W. O. Smith, in Fort street, Honolulu, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon of Monday, the 16th day of January, 1893, for the purpose of discussing the necessary steps to be taken in forming a new government.

Shortly after the committee met, it was decided that they were not ready for the landing of the American troops, and a committee of three, with Thurston as the chairman, was immediately dispatched to the American legation to prevail upon Mr. Stevens to delay the landing of the Boston's men. The committee returned shortly, and reported that Mr. Stevens had said to them: "Gentlemen, the troops of the Boston land this afternoon at 5 o'clock, whether you are ready or not." The foregoing report of Mr. Stevens' reply to the committee is as nearly literal as can be remembered, and gives a correct idea of the meaning conveyed. The committee of safety adjourned to meet the same evening at 7:30 o'clock, at the house of Henry Waterhouse, in Nuuanu valley. The American troops landed at 5 o'clock, as Mr. Stevens had told the committee they would, and marched up Fort street to Merchant, and along Merchant street, halting in King street, between the Palace and Government buildings.

At the time the men landed the town was perfectly quiet, business hours were about over and the people, men, women, and children were in the streets, and nothing unusual was to be seen except the landing of a formidable armed force with Gatling guns, evidently fully prepared to remain on shore for an indefinite length of time, as the men were supplied with double cartridge belts filled with ammunition, also haversacks and canteens and were attended by an hospital corps with stretchers and medical supplies. The curiosity of the people on the streets was aroused and the youngsters more particularly, followed up the troops to see what it was all about. Nobody seemed to know, so when the troops found quarters the populace dispersed, the most of them going to the band concert at the hotel, which was fully attended as it was a beautiful moonlight evening, all who were not in the secret still wondering at the military demonstration.

The committee met at Mr. Waterhouse's residence, according to adjournment, at 7:30 o'clock p. m. of the same day, January 16. The formation of some sort of government was under discussion and it was decided that a commander in chief of the forces supporting the proposed new government should be appointed. The position was offered to Mr. John H. Soper, who demurred, as he did not see any backing whatever to support the movement. Mr. Soper was answered by members of the committee that the American minister would support the move with the troops of the Boston. Mr. Soper still doubted, so a couple of the committee escorted him over to the legation, which, by the way, was in the adjoining premises, and the three came back after a time, reporting that Mr. Stevens had given them the full assurance that any proclamation of the Government put forward at the Government building, or any other building in Honolulu for that matter, would receive his immediate recognition and the support of the Boston's men. This assurance seemed to satisfy Mr. Soper, and he accepted the position.

On Tuesday afternoon, January 17, the committee of thirteen or Committee of Safety, proceeded from the office of W. O. Smith up Merchant street to the Government building and read the proclamation of a new
government at 2:40 o'clock, there being practically no audience whatever. As the reading proceeded, a dozen or so loungers gathered, and near the close of the ceremony about thirty supporters, variously armed, came running into the side and back entrances of the yard and gathered about the committee.

At this moment the United States troops, in the temporary quarters in rear of the Music Hall (less than 100 yards from where the committee stood), appeared to be under arms and were evidently ready for any emergency.

During all the deliberations of the committee, and, in fact, throughout the whole proceedings connected with plans for the move up to the final issue, the basis of action was the general understanding that Minister Stevens would keep his promise to support the movement with the men from the Boston, and the statement is now advisedly made (with a full knowledge of the lack of arms, ammunition, and men; also the utter absence of organization at all adequate to the undertaking) that without the previous assurance of support from the American minister, and the actual presence of the United States troops, no movement would have been attempted, and, if attempted, would have been a dismal failure, resulting in the capture or death of the participants in a very short time.

Having been present at the several meetings referred to in this statement, I hereby certify that the same is correct in every essential particular.

F. WUNDENBERG.

At about 8 o'clock in the evening of January 16, 1893, a meeting of some of the members of the Committee of Public Safety and a few others, was held at the residence of Henry Waterhouse. As my memory now serves me the following members of the committee were present, to wit: Henry Waterhouse, W. O. Smith, Andrew Brown, F. W. McChesney, C. Bolte, T. F. Lansing, J. A. McCandless, Charles L. Carter, John Emmeluth, and H. E. Cooper. There were also present James B. Castle, Cecil Brown, John H. Soper, J. H. Fisher, and F. Wundenberg, though not as members of the committee.

The discussion was general, no regular organization of those present being formed, the general drift of the conversation showing the object of the gathering to be the overthrow of the existing Hawaiian Government and the setting up in its place of a new one of some sort, not very clearly defined.

The choice of a leader was discussed and after a little conference it was decided to offer the same to S. B. Dole. Mr. Dole was accordingly sent for and invited to attend the meeting, to which he responded in person, and later when the offer of leadership was made to him he said he would take it into consideration and give an answer at noon of the next day.

The position of military commander was offered to Soper as previously described.

The general feeling of the members of the Committee of Safety, as repeatedly expressed by them during the meeting, was that Stevens would recognize any move they made in forming a new government and would support them with the U. S. S. Boston's troops.

The Attorney-generalship was offered to Cecil Brown; he declined, and shortly after left the meeting.

Throughout the whole meeting the discussion was quite irregular, each one speaking and interrupting without order or method.
The principal object of the meeting being the selection of a leader and a military commander, when these two matters were disposed of the parties separated informally.

F. WUNDENBERG.

No. 62.

(Statement of F. Wundenberg printed with Mr. Blount’s No. 3, dated April 26, 1893.)

No. 63.

(Interview with F. Wundenberg May 15, 1893, with Mr. Blount’s No. 9, dated June 6, 1893.)
LIST OF PAPERS—MISCELLANEOUS.

3. Committee of Safety to Mr. Stevens, January 16, 1893.
10. Lilinokalani to S. M. Damon, January 31, 1893.
11. Annexation Club to Mr. Blount, March 31, 1893. Subject: Forwarding resolution.
12. Admiral Skerrett to Mr. Blount, April 1, 1893. Subject: Lowering the flag and withdrawing the troops.
13. Capt. C. L. Hooper to Mr. Blount, April 2, 1893. Subject: Lowering the flag and withdrawing troops.
15. R. W. Wilcox to Mr. Blount, April 7, 1893.
16. Admiral Skerrett to Mr. Blount, April 8, 1893.
17. Mr. Wilcox to Mr. Blount, April 19, 1893.
18. Mr. Wilcox to Mr. Blount, April 25, 1893.
20. J. C. Quinn: Events of May 2, 1893.
22. H. P. Baldwin to Mr. Blount, April 25, 1893. Subject: Annexation.
23. Theo. C. Porter to Mr. Blount, May 11, 1893. Subject: Land ownership, taxes, etc.
25. A. Hassinger, June 20, 1893. Subject: In re Naturalization.
26. Thomas G. Thrum to Mr. Blount, June 20, 1893. Subject: Capital in sugar industry; tabular statement.
28. John H. Soper to Mr. Blount, June 20, 1893. Subject: Arms and ammunition.
29. C. J. Jankeia to Mr. Blount, June 21, 1893. Subject: Public debt.
32. Hawaiian corporation tables.
33. J. O. Carter to Mr. Blount. Subject: Elections prior to 1887.
34. J. W. Jones to Mr. Blount, July 9, 1893. Subject: Census.
35. E. C. MacFarlane to Mr. Blount, July 13, 1893. Subject: Party classification of members of Legislature.
36. E. C. MacFarlane to Mr. Blount, July 13, 1893. Subject: Taxation.
37. E. C. MacFarlane to Mr. Blount, July 13, 1893. Subject: Statement of moneys expended on account of immigration.
40. Memorandum of persons killed, revolution of 1889.
41. Officers of the Planters and Labor Supply Company.
42. Petitions against annexation.
PART IV—MISCELLANEOUS.

No. 1.

Mr. A. F. Judd et al. to Mr. Thurston.

His Excellency L. A. Thurston,

Minister of the Interior:

SIR: Your communication of the 23d January on behalf of the cabinet addressed to justices of the supreme court, is received.

The first question upon which our opinion is asked is:

Whether section 24 of the act of 1888, "To amend and consolidate the election laws of the Kingdom," requires that in order to vote for a noble an otherwise qualified elector of nobles must have resided in one and only one of the "election districts" described in section 13 of the act, or does the context prohibit such sense and does it mean that he must have resided for three months within the district for the election of nobles, i. e., the island of Oahu.

Subdivision first of section 24 contains the proviso that he (the voter for nobles) shall have resided in the country not less than three years, and in the district in which he offers to vote not less than three months immediately preceding the election at which he offers to vote.

The first section of the act defines "district" to mean an "election district" as prescribed in this act, unless the context prohibit such sense. The election districts are defined in section 13; they are twenty-four in number, and one representative is allowed for each district, and can be voted for by only the voters of the particular district.

But the nobles, twenty-four in number, are not apportioned to be voted for singly by the voters of the respective election districts, but nine nobles are to be voted for by each voter (who is qualified) on the island of Oahu, and six by each voter on the island of Hawaii, and so on throughout the group. For the purpose therefore of voting for nobles, the island of Oahu is the "district" as is also the island of Hawaii, etc.

If all the voters qualified to vote for nobles can vote for the number of nobles prescribed for the island on which the voter lives, it can make no difference in which "election district" within the island or group of islands he may reside, and any change from one to another of these districts into which the island is divided can not affect his right to vote for nobles, provided he has resided on the particular island where he offers to vote for three months immediately preceding the election.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the sense requires that the word "district" mentioned in the first subdivision of section 24, respecting qualifications of voters for nobles, means the island or group
of islands from which the nobles are to be elected, and not the "election districts" mentioned in section 13 of the act.

Before answering the second question we desire more time to consider it.

Respectfully submitted,

A. F. JUDD.
L. McCULLY.
RICH. F. BICKERTON.
SANFORD B. DOLE.

—

No. 2.

Draft of constitution of January 14, 1893.

PREAMBLE.

Whereas the constitution of this Kingdom contains many provisions inconsistent, ambiguous and contradictory in its terms, and is subversive and restrictive of civil and popular rights, and incompatible with enlightened constitutional monarchical government; and

Whereas the prayers of my people, coming in the form of petitions from all parts of this Kingdom, to myself and to the Legislature, asking for a new constitution embodying in its provisions equal rights among all my subjects; which prayer to the Legislature of this Kingdom has not been duly recognized by that body through undue and unjust influences; and

Whereas it has become imperative in order to restore order and tranquility, and to gratify the just demand of my subjects for a new constitution to be remodeled upon the most liberal and popular form of Constitutional Monarchical Government, that a new constitution be at once promulgated.

Now, therefore, I, Liliuokalani, Queen of the Hawaiian Islands, in my capacity as Sovereign of this Kingdom, and as the representative of the people, and in accordance with their almost universal desire, and in conformity with their wishes, do annul and abrogate the constitution promulgated by Kalakaua on the 7th day of July, A. D. 1887, and do proclaim and promulgate this constitution.

CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE 1. God hath endowed all men with certain inalienable rights; among which are life, liberty, and the right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.

ARTICLE 2. All men are free to worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences; but this sacred privilege hereby secured shall not be so construed as to justify acts of licentiousness or practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the Kingdom.

ARTICLE 3. All men may freely speak, write, and publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no law shall be enacted to restrain the liberty of speech or of the press, except such laws as may be necessary for the protection of Her Majesty, the Queen, and the royal family.

ARTICLE 4. All men shall have the right, in an orderly and peace-
1048 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

able manner, to assemble, without arms, to consult upon the common
good, and to petition the Queen or legislative assembly for redress of
grievances.

ARTICLE 5. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus belongs to
all men, and shall not be suspended, unless by the Queen, when in case
of rebellion or invasion the public safety shall require its suspension.

ARTICLE 6. No person shall be subject to punishment for any offence,
except on due and legal conviction thereof in a court having jurisdic-
tion of the case.

ARTICLE 7. No person shall be held to answer for any crime or
offence (except in case of impeachment or for offences within the juris-
diction of a police or district justice, or in summary proceedings for
contempt), unless upon indictment, fully and plainly describing such
crime or offence, and he shall have the right to meet the witnesses who
are produced against him face to face; to produce witnesses and proofs
in his own favor; and by himself or his counsel, at his election, to
examine the witnesses produced by himself and cross-examine those
produced against him, and to be fully heard in his defence. In all
cases in which the right of trial by jury has been heretofore used, it
shall be held inviolable forever, except in actions of debt or assumpsit
in which the amount claimed is less than $50.

ARTICLE 8. No person shall be required to answer again for any
offence of which he has been duly convicted, or of which he has been
duly acquitted.

ARTICLE 9. No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.

ARTICLE 10. No person shall sit as a judge or juror in any case in
which his relative, by affinity, or by consanguinity within the third
degree, is interested, either as plaintiff or defendant, or in the issue of
which the said judge or juror may have either directly or through such
relative any pecuniary interest.

ARTICLE 11. Involuntary servitude, except for crime, is forever pro-
hibited in this Kingdom; whenever a slave shall enter Hawaiian ter-
ritory he shall be free.

ARTICLE 12. Every person has the right to be secure from all un-
reasonable searches and seizures of his person, his house, his papers,
and effects; and no warrants shall issue but on probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and describing the place to be searched
and the person or things to be seized.

ARTICLE 13. The Queen conducts her government for the common
good, and not for the profit, honor, or private interests of any one man,
family, or class of men among Her subjects.

ARTICLE 14. Each member of society has a right to be protected by
it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to law,
and therefore he shall be obliged to contribute his proportional share
to the expense of his protection and to give his personal services or
an equivalent when necessary; but no part of the property of any indi-
vidual shall be taken from him or applied to public uses without his
own consent or the enactment of the legislative assembly, except the
same shall be necessary for the military operation of the Kingdom in
time of war or insurrection; and whenever the public exigencies may
require that the property of any individual should be appropriated to
public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor.

ARTICLE 15. No subsidy, duty, or tax of any description shall be
established or levied without the consent of the legislative assembly,
nor shall any money be drawn from the public treasury without such consent, except when between the sessions of the legislative assembly the emergencies of war, invasion, rebellion, pestilence, or other public disaster shall arise, and then not without the concurrence of all the cabinet and of a majority of the whole privy council; and the minister of finance shall render a detailed account of such expenditure to the legislative assembly.

ARTICLE 16. No retrospective laws shall ever be enacted.

ARTICLE 17. The military shall always be subject to the laws of the land, and no soldier shall in times of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by the Legislature.

ARTICLE 18. Every elector shall be privileged from arrest on election days, during his attendance at election and in going to and returning therefrom, except in cases of treason, felony, or breach of the peace.

ARTICLE 19. No elector shall be so obliged to perform military duty on the day of election as to prevent his voting, except in time of war or public danger.

ARTICLE 20. The supreme power of the Kingdom in its exercises is divided into the executive, legislative, and judicial; these shall always be preserved distinct, and no executive or judicial officer or any contractor or employee of the Government or any person in the receipt of salary or emolument from the Government shall be eligible to election to the Legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom, or to hold the position of an elective member of the same, except members of the privy council, notary public, attorney at law, and agent to take acknowledgment. And no member of the legislative assembly shall, during the time for which he is a member, be appointed to any civil office under the Government, except that of a member of the cabinet.

ARTICLE 21. The government of this Kingdom is that of a constitutional monarchy, under Her Majesty Liliuokalani, her heirs and successors.

ARTICLE 22. The Crown is hereby permanently confirmed to Her Majesty Liliuokalani and to the heirs of her body lawfully begotten, and to their lawful descendants in a direct line; failing whom, the Crown shall descend to Her Royal Highness the Princess Victoria Kawaiulani and the heirs of her body lawfully begotten, and their descendant in a direct line; failing whom, the Crown shall descend to His Royal Highness the Prince David Kawanamakoa and the heirs of his body lawfully begotten, and their descendant in a direct line; failing whom, the Crown shall descend to His Royal Highness the Prince Jonah Kuhio Kali- minanaole and the heirs of his body lawfully begotten, and their lawful descendant in a direct line. The succession shall be to the senior male child and to the heirs of his body; failing a male child he succession shall be to the senior female child and to the heirs of her body. In case there is no heir, as above provided, then the successor shall be the person whom the Sovereign shall appoint, with the consent of the nobles, and publicly proclaimed during the Sovereign's life; but should there be no such appointment and proclamation, and the Throne should become vacant, then the cabinet council, immediately after the occurring of such vacancy, shall cause a meeting of the legislative assembly, who shall elect by ballot some native ali'i of the Kingdom as successor to the throne; and the successor so elected shall become a new stirps for a royal family; and the succession from the Sovereign thus elected shall be regulated by the same law as the present royal family of Hawaii.
ARTICLE 23. It shall not be lawful for any member of the royal family of Hawaii who may by law succeed to the Throne to contract marriage without the consent of the reigning Sovereign. Every marriage so contracted shall be void, and the person so contracting a marriage may, by the proclamation of the reigning Sovereign, be declared to have forfeited his or her right to the Throne, and after such proclamation the right of succession shall vest in the next heir as though such offender were dead.

ARTICLE 24. Her Majesty Liliuokalani will, and her successors upon coming to the Throne shall, take the following oath: “I solemnly swear in the presence of Almighty God to maintain the Constitution of the Kingdom whole and inviolable, and to govern in conformity therewith.”

ARTICLE 25. No person shall ever sit upon the Throne who has been convicted of any infamous crime, or who is insane, or an idiot.

ARTICLE 26. The Queen is the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, and of all other military forces of the Kingdom by sea and land, and has full power by herself, or by any officer or officers she may appoint, to train and govern such forces as she may judge best for the defense and safety of the Kingdom. But she shall never proclaim war without the consent of the legislative assembly.

ARTICLE 27. The Queen, by and with the consent of her privy council, has the power to grant reprieves and pardon, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment.

ARTICLE 28. The Queen, by and with the consent of her privy council, convenes the Legislature at the seat of Government, or at a different place, if that should become dangerous from an enemy or any dangerous disorder; and in case of disagreement between Her Majesty and the legislative assembly, she adjourns, prorogues, or dissolves it, but not beyond the next ordinary session; under any great emergency, she may convene the legislative assembly to extraordinary sessions.

ARTICLE 29. The Queen has the power to make treaties. Treaties involving changes in the tariff or in any law of the Kingdom shall be referred for approval to the Legislative Assembly. The Queen appoints public ministers, who shall be commissioned, accredited, and instructed agreeably to usage and law of nations.

ARTICLE 30. It is the Queen’s prerogative to receive and acknowledge public ministers; to inform the Legislative Assembly by royal message, from time to time, of the state of the Kingdom, and to recommend to its consideration such measures as she shall judge necessary and expedient.

ARTICLE 31. The person of the Queen is inviolable and sacred. Her ministers are responsible. To the Queen belongs the executive power. All laws that have passed the Legislative Assembly, shall require Her Majesty’s signature in order to their validity.

ARTICLE 32. Whenever upon the decease of the reigning sovereign the heir shall be less than eighteen years of age the royal power shall be exercised by a regent or council of regency, as hereinafter provided.

ARTICLE 33. It shall be lawful for the Queen at any time, when she may be about to absent herself from the Kingdom, to appoint a regent or council of regency, who shall administer the Government in her name; and likewise the Queen may, by her last will and testament, appoint a regent or council of regency to administer the Government during the minority of any heir to the throne, and should a sovereign decease, leaving a minor heir, and having made no last will and testa-
ment, the cabinet council at the time of such decease shall be a council of regency, until the Legislative Assembly, which shall be called immediately, may be assembled, and the Legislative Assembly, immediately that it is assembled, shall proceed to choose by ballot a regent or council of regency, who shall administer the Government in the name of the Queen, and exercise all the powers which are constitutionally vested in the Queen, until she shall have attained the age of eighteen years, which age is declared to be the legal majority of such sovereign.

ARTICLE 34. The Queen is Sovereign of all the chiefs and of all the people; the Kingdom is Her.

ARTICLE 35. All titles of honor, orders, and other distinctions, emanate from the Queen.

ARTICLE 36. The Queen coins money and regulates the currency by law.

ARTICLE 37. The Queen in case of invasion or rebellion can place the whole Kingdom or any part of it under martial law.

ARTICLE 38. The national ensign shall not be changed, except by act of the Legislature.

ARTICLE 39. The Queen's private lands and other property are inviolable.

ARTICLE 40. The Queen can not be sued or held to account in any court or tribunal of the realm.

ARTICLE 41. There shall continue to be a council of state, for advising the Queen in all matters for the good of the state, wherein she may require its advice, and for assisting her in administering the executive affairs of the Government in such manner as she may direct; which council shall be called the Queen's privy council of state, and the members thereof shall be appointed by the Queen, to hold office during Her Majesty's pleasure.

ARTICLE 42. The Queen's cabinet shall consist of the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of the interior, the minister of finance, and the attorney-general of the Kingdom, and these shall be the Queen's special advisers in the executive affairs of the Kingdom; and they shall be ex-officio members of the Queen's privy council of state. They shall be appointed and commissioned by the Queen, and hold office during the Queen's pleasure, subject to impeachment, or upon a vote of want of confidence passed by a majority of all the members of the legislative assembly. No act of the Queen shall have any effect unless it be countersigned by a minister, who, by that signature, makes himself responsible.

ARTICLE 43. Each member of the Queen's cabinet shall keep an office at the seat of Government, and shall be accountable for the conduct of his deputies and clerks. The ministers hold seat ex officio, as nobles, in the legislative assembly with the right to vote, except on a question of want of confidence in them.

ARTICLE 44. The minister of finance shall present to the legislative assembly, in the name of the Government, on the first day of the meeting of the Legislature, the financial budget, in Hawaiian and English languages.

ARTICLE 45. The legislative power of the three estates of this Kingdom is vested in the Queen, and the legislative assembly, which assembly shall consist of nobles appointed by the Queen, and of the representatives of the people, sitting together.

ARTICLE 46. The legislative body shall assemble biennially, in the month of April, and at such other time as the Queen may judge neces-
sary, for the purpose of seeking the welfare of the nation. This body shall be styled the Legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

ARTICLE 47. Every member of the legislative assembly shall take the following oath: I most solemnly swear, in the presence of Almighty God, that I will faithfully support the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and conscientiously and impartially discharge my duties as a member of this assembly.

ARTICLE 48. The Legislature has full power and authority to amend the constitution, as hereinafter provided, and, from time to time, to make all manner of wholesome laws not repugnant to the provisions of the constitution.

ARTICLE 49. The Queen shall signify her approval of any bill or resolution which shall have passed the legislative assembly by signing the same. If she approve not, she shall return it with her objections to the legislative assembly, which shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, it shall be approved by a two-thirds vote of all the members of the legislative assembly, it shall be presented again to the Queen, and she shall sign it, and it shall therefore be a law. In all such cases the vote shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill or resolution shall be entered on the journal of the Legislature.

ARTICLE 50. The legislative assembly shall be the judge of the qualifications of its own members, and a majority shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties as the assembly may provide.

ARTICLE 51. The legislative assembly shall choose its own officers and determine the rules of its own proceedings.

ARTICLE 52. The legislative assembly shall have authority to punish by imprisonment, not exceeding thirty days, every person, not a member, who shall be guilty of disrespect to the assembly, by any disorderly or contemptuous behavior in its presence; or who, during the time of its sitting, shall publish any false report of its proceedings, or insulting comment upon the same; or who shall threaten harm to the body or estate of any of its members, for anything said or done in the assembly; or who shall assault any of them therefor, or who shall assault or arrest any witness or other person ordered to attend the assembly, in his way going or returning, or who shall rescue any person arrested by order of the assembly.

ARTICLE 53. The legislative assembly may punish its own members for disorderly behavior.

ARTICLE 54. The legislative assembly shall keep a journal of its proceedings; and the yeas and nays of its members, on any question, shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal.

ARTICLE 55. The members of the legislative assembly shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, or breach of peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Legislature, and in going to and returning from the same; and they shall not be held to answer for any speech or debate made in the assembly, in any other court or place whatsoever.

ARTICLE 56. The representatives shall receive for their services a compensation to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the public treasury, but no increase of compensation shall take effect during the year in which it shall have been made; and no law shall be passed
increasing the compensation of said representatives beyond the sum of five hundred dollars each for each biennial term.

**ARTICLE 57.** The Queen appoints the nobles, who shall hold their appointments during life, subject to the provisions of article 53; but their number shall not exceed twenty-four.

**ARTICLE 58.** No person shall be appointed a noble who shall not have attained the age of twenty-one years and resided in the Kingdom five years.

**ARTICLE 59.** The nobles shall be a court with full and sole authority to hear and determine all impeachments made by the representatives, as the grand inquest of the Kingdom against any officer of the Kingdom, for misconduct or maladministration in their offices; but previous to the trial of every impeachment the nobles shall respectively be sworn truly and impartially to try and determine the charge in question according to evidence and the law. Their judgment, however, shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold or enjoy any place of honor, trust or profit, under this Government; but the party so convicted shall be nevertheless liable to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to the laws of the land. No minister shall sit as a noble on the trial of any impeachment.

**ARTICLE 60.** The representation of the people shall be based upon the principle of equality, and shall be regulated and apportioned by the Legislature according to the population to be ascertained, from time to time, by the official census. The representatives shall not be less in number than twenty-four nor more than forty-eight, who shall be elected biennially.

**ARTICLE 61.** No person shall be eligible for a representative of the people who is insane or an idiot, nor unless he be a male subject of the Kingdom who shall have arrived at the full age of twenty-one years, who shall know how to read and write, who shall understand accounts, and shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for at least three years, the last of which shall be the year immediately preceding his election; and who shall own real estate, within the Kingdom, of a clear value, over and above all incumbrances, of at least five hundred dollars, or who shall have an annual income of at least two hundred and fifty dollars derived from any property or lawful employment.

**ARTICLE 62.** Every male subject of the Kingdom who shall have paid his taxes, who shall have attained the age of twenty years, and shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the election, and be possessed of real property in the Kingdom, to the value over and above all incumbrances of one hundred and fifty dollars, or a leasehold property on which the rent is twenty-five dollars per year, or of an income of not less than seventy-five dollars per year, derived from any property or some lawful employment and shall know how to read and write, if born since the year 1840 and shall have caused his name to be entered on the list of voters of his district as may be provided by the law, shall be entitled to one vote for the representative or representatives of that district. Provided, however, that no insane or idiotic person, nor any person who shall have been convicted of any infamous crimes within this Kingdom, unless he shall have been pardoned by the Queen, and by the terms of such pardon have been restored to all rights of a subject, shall be allowed to vote.

**ARTICLE 63.** The property qualifications of the representatives of the people, and of the electors, may be increased or decreased by law.

**ARTICLE 64.** The judicial power of the Kingdom shall be vested in
one supreme court and in such inferior courts as the Legislature may, from time to time, establish.

**ARTICLE 65.** The supreme court shall consist of a chief justice and not less than two associate justices, any of whom may hold the court. The justices of the supreme court shall hold their offices for a term of six years, during good behavior, subject to removal upon impeachment. Provided, however, that any judge of the supreme court or any other court of record may be removed from office on a resolution passed by two-thirds of the legislative assembly, for good cause shown to the satisfaction of the Queen.

The judge against whom the legislative assembly may be about to proceed, shall receive due notice thereof, accompanied by a copy of the causes alleged for his removal, at least ten days before the day on which the legislative assembly shall act thereon. He shall be heard before the legislative assembly.

**ARTICLE 66.** The judicial power shall be divided among the supreme court and the several inferior courts of the Kingdom in such manner as the Legislature may from time to time prescribe, and the tenure of office in the inferior courts of the Kingdom shall be such as may be defined by the law creating them.

**ARTICLE 67.** The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution and laws of this Kingdom and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority to all cases affecting public ministers and council and to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.

**ARTICLE 68.** The chief justice of the supreme court shall be the chancellor of the Kingdom; he shall be ex officio president of the nobles in all cases of impeachment, unless when impeached himself, and exercise such jurisdiction in equity or other cases as the law may confer upon him, his decisions being subject, however, to the revision of the supreme court on appeal. Should the chief justice ever be impeached, some person specially commissioned by the Queen shall be president of the court of impeachment during such trial.

**ARTICLE 69.** The decision of the supreme court, when made by a majority of all the justices thereof, shall be final and conclusive upon all parties.

**ARTICLE 70.** The Queen, her cabinet, and the legislative assembly shall have authority to require the opinions of the justices of the supreme court upon important questions of law and upon solemn occasions.

**ARTICLE 71.** The Queen appoints the justices of the supreme court and all other judges of court of records; their salaries are fixed by law.

**ARTICLE 72.** No judge or magistrate can sit alone on an appeal or new trial in any case on which he may have given a previous judgment.

**ARTICLE 73.** The Queen also appoints and commissions the governors of the several islands; the governors hold office for the term of four years, subject to impeachment.

**ARTICLE 74.** The following persons shall not be permitted to register for voting, to vote, or to hold office under any department of the Government, or to sit in the legislative assembly, namely: Any person who is insane or an idiot, or any person who shall have been convicted of any of the following named offenses, viz: Arson, brawling, bribery, burglary, counterfeiting, embezzlement, felonious branding of cattle, forgery, gross cheat, incest, kidnapping, larceny, malicious burning, man-
slaughter in the first degree, murder, perjury, rape, robbery, sodomy, treason, subornation of perjury, and malfeasance in office, unless he shall have been pardoned by the Queen and restored to his civil rights and by the express term of his pardon declared to be eligible to office of trust, honor, and profit.

**Article 75.** No officer of this Government shall hold any other office or receive any salary from any other Government or power whatever.

**Article 76.** The Legislature votes the appropriations biennially, after due consideration of the revenue and expenditure for the two preceding years and the estimates of the revenue and expenditure of the two succeeding years, which shall be submitted to them by the minister of finance.

**Article 77.** The enacting style in making and passing all acts and laws shall be: "Be it enacted by the Queen and the legislative assembly of the Hawaiian Islands, in the Legislature of the Kingdom assembled."

**Article 78.** To avoid improper influences which may result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in its title.

**Article 79.** All laws now in force in this Kingdom shall continue and remain in full effect, until altered or repealed by the Legislature; such parts only excepted as are repugnant to this constitution. All laws heretofore enacted, or that may hereafter be enacted, which are contrary to this constitution, shall be null and void.

**Article 80.** This constitution shall be in force from the — day of ——, in the year ——, but that there may be no failure of justice, or inconvenience to the Kingdom, from any change all officers of this Kingdom, at the time this constitution shall take effect, shall have, hold, and exercise all power to them granted, until other persons shall be appointed in their stead.

**Article 81.** Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in the legislative assembly, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members thereof, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on its Journal, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to next Legislature; which proposed amendment or amendments shall be published for three months previous to the next election of Representatives; and if in the next Legislature such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of the legislative assembly, and be approved by the Queen, such amendment or amendments shall become part of the constitution of this country.

We have read the document purporting to be a copy of the constitution presented to us by Queen Liliuokalani on January 14th last, and we deem it to be almost identical, except as to Article 62, which, according to our recollection, did not contain any property qualification for voters for representatives.

We are yours, respectfully,

Samuel Parker,
A. P. Peterson,
Wm. H. Cornwell.

Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, July 16, 1893.

The proposed changes to the Kalakaua constitution were these:

**Article 20.** By adding to exceptions: Members of the privy council, notary public, agent to take acknowledgements.
ART. 22. By adding Princes Kawananakoa and Kalanianaole as heirs to the throne.

ART. 46. Changing the session of the Legislature to the month of April.

ART. 49. That the Queen shall sign and approve all bills and resolutions, even to those that are voted when passed over her vote.

ART. 56. Pay of representatives raised to $500 instead $250 for biennial term.

ART. 57. The Queen shall appoint the nobles not to exceed 24.

ART. 60. The representatives may be increased from 24 as at present to 48.

ART. 62. Only subjects shall vote, and the qualification of voters reduced.

ART. 65. The term of appointment of the supreme court judges, not for life, as before, but for six years.

ART. 75. The appointment of governors of each island for four years term.

No. 3.

The committee of safety to Mr. Stevens.

No. 7.] HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, HONOLULU, January 16, 1893.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,

American Minister Resident:

SIR: We, the undersigned citizens and residents of Honolulu, respectfully represent that, in view of recent public events in this Kingdom, culminating in the revolutionary acts of Queen Liliuokalani on Saturday last, the public safety is menaced and lives and property are in peril, and we appeal to you and the United States forces at your command for assistance.

The Queen, with the aid of armed force, and accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed from those with whom she was acting, attempted to proclaim a new constitution; and, while prevented for the time from accomplishing her object, declared publicly that she would only defer her action.

This conduct and action was upon an occasion and under circumstances which have created general alarm and terror.

We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore pray for the protection of the United States forces.

HENRY E. COOPER,
F. W. McCHESNEY,
W. O. WILDER,
U. BOLTE,
A. BROWN,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
HENRY WATERHOUSE,
THEO. F. LANSING,
ED. SUHR,
L. A. THURSTON,
JOHN EMMELUTH,
WM. R. CASTLE,
J. A. MCCANDLESS,
Citizens' Committee of Safety.
Mr. Stevens to Mr. Gifford.

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 16, 1893.

Mr. W. M. GIFFORD:

SIR: Please allow Capt. Wiltse and his men the use of the opera house hall for a fair compensation for the same.

Yours, truly,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

No. 5

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Walker.

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 16, 1893.

DEAR SIR: Will you let Arion Hall for use for the sleeping and lodging of the soldiers and marines of Captain Wiltse, of the U. S. Boston, at a fair price? Let the bearer know.

Yours truly,

JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Minister.

No. 6.

Mr. Parker to Mr. Stevens.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 16, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inform your excellency that the troops from the U. S. S. Boston were landed in this port at 5 o'clock this evening without the request or knowledge of Her Majesty's Government.

As the situation is one which does not call for interference on the part of the United States Government, my colleagues and myself would most respectfully request of your excellency the authority upon which this action was taken. I would also add that any protection that may have been considered necessary for the American Legation or for American property and interests in this city would have been cheerfully furnished by Her Majesty's Government.

With the highest respect, I have the honor to remain,

Your excellency's obedient servant,

SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency, JOHN L. STEVENS,
U. S. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Honolulu.
Mr. Cleghorn to Mr. Stevens.

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF OAHU.
Honolulu, January 16, 1893.

SIR: It is my duty to solemnly protest to your excellency against the landing this evening without permission from the proper authorities of an armed force from the United States ship Boston.

Your excellency well knows that when you have desired to land naval forces of the United States for the purpose of drill, permission by the local authorities has been readily accorded.

On the present occasion, however, the circumstances are entirely different, and ostensibly the present landing is for the discharge of functions which are distinctly responsible duties of the Hawaiian Government.

Such being the case, I am compelled to impress upon your excellency the international questions involved in this matter and the grave responsibilities thereby assumed.

While solemnly protesting to your excellency against the unwarrantable proceedings to which I have referred,

I have the honor to remain, sir, your excellency's obedient and humble servant,

A. S. CLEG'HORN,
Governor of Oahu.

His Excellency John L. Stevens,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America.

No. 8.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Parker.

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

SIR: Yours of yesterday in regard to the landing of the United States naval forces in Honolulu duly received and its import considered. In whatever the United States diplomatic and naval representatives have done or may do at this critical hour of Hawaiian affairs, we will be guided by the kindest views and feelings for all the parties concerned and by the warmest sentiments for the Hawaiian people and the persons of all nationalities.

Most sincerely, yours,

John L. Stevens.

Hon. Samuel Parker,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Stevens to Mr. Cleghorn.

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

SIR: Yours of the 16th, yesterday, regarding the landing of the United States naval forces in Honolulu, is received. I have carefully considered its import. My responsibility as the United States minister plenipotentiary at this critical time in Hawaiian affairs it is impossible for me to ignore. I assure you that whatever responsibility the American diplomatic and naval representatives have assumed or may assume, we shall do our utmost to regard the welfare of all persons and interests concerned.

Yours, sincerely, and with the kindest consideration,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Hon. A. S. Cleghorn,
Governor of Oahu.

No. 10.

Liliuokalani to Mr. Damon.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, January 31, 1893.

Mr. S. M. Damon, Honolulu:

Sir: You having stated that, as a condition upon which you would only authorize the lending by your firm of Bishop & Co. to me of the further sum of $10,000, upon certain securities that I need not specify, I should hand to you the original new constitution that it was my intention to promulgate on the day of the prorogation of the late Legislature, January 14, 1893, I assure you that I am unable to comply with such condition, for the sole reason that such new constitution and all copies thereof and the draft thereof have been destroyed, the original constitution by my own hands and the copies thereof and the draft by my orders.

In presence of—

PAUL NEUMANN,
HENRY HOLMES.

No. 11.

Resolution of Annexation Club, March 31, 1893.

Mr. COMMISSIONER: An association has recently been formed here known as the Annexation Club. The vice-presidents of the club—its president being temporarily absent—its secretary and treasurer, and the chairmen of its regular committees now have the honor to present their regards to you. The first steps to form this association were taken on the 21st of this month, and its membership now includes some 2,000 of the residents of this city, who are, it is believed, fully representative of the intelligence and respectability, as well as of the material interests of this community.