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Supreme Court of the Hawaiian Islands.
In Re: The Heia Sugar Plantation Co., Plaintiff, vs. The Heia Sugar Plantation Co., Defendant.
The Heia Sugar Plantation Co., Plaintiff, vs. The Heia Sugar Plantation Co., Defendant.

The Heia Sugar Plantation Co., Plaintiff, vs. The Heia Sugar Plantation Co., Defendant.
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ED. C. ROWE.
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Contracting and Building.
No. 101 King Street, Honolulu, H. I.

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PRACTICAL PLUMBERS,
GASFITTERS AND COPPERSMITHS.
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HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

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Enterprise
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No. 101 King Street, Honolulu, H. I.

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Insurance Notices.
Boston Board of Underwriters.
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J. M. KAENA, MINISTER OF FINANCE, VS. EMMA KAMEHAMEHA, QUEEN DOWAGER, HOE. MRS. B. P. BRIDGEMAN AND C. H. BRIDGEMAN.

Opinion of the Court.

The following is a simplified statement of the essential allegations in the bill: I. Certain promises on Merchant street in Honolulu, known as "Honolulu Hale" and well known to the public, were the property of Kamehameha IV in his private capacity, and were not a part of the Royal Domain commonly known as "Crown Lands."

II. An Act of the Legislature passed January 3rd, 1865, entitled "An Act to relieve the Royal Domain from encumbrances," authorized the Minister of Finance to extinguish such mortgages on the Crown Lands which remain unassisted after the administrators of Kamehameha IV's estate had exhausted the estate belonging to their deceased intestate in his private capacity.

III. The property described in paragraph I was not sold by the administrators, because it was believed to be a part of the Royal Domain and not the private estate of Kamehameha IV.

IV. The premises above described as "Honolulu Hale," as well as certain "Crown Lands" had been encumbered with a mortgage by His Majesty the late King, through the intervention of Wm. Webster as trustee, and this mortgage amounting to \$7,752, was paid off by the Minister of Finance in pursuance of the said Act of the Legislature of January 3rd, 1865, under the belief that all the private estate of Kamehameha IV had been sold, and the Minister of Finance paid other mortgages and debts amounting to the sum of \$27,000 towards discharging the debts of Kamehameha IV.

V. The plaintiff is the Minister of Finance and in behalf of the King and people of this Kingdom asks this demand and asks for the relief prayed for. The defendant Emma is the widow and statutory heir of one half of the estate which was of Kamehameha IV.

VI. The premises above described as "Honolulu Hale" were held by the Commissioners of Crown Lands as part of the Royal Domain from the time of the termination of their trust by law until the termination of a suit on the equity side of this Court brought by defendants against the Commissioners of Crown Lands, by which the said premises were decreed to belong to the plaintiff.

The bill prays that the premises known as "Honolulu Hale" may be decreed to be chargeable with the amount of the mortgage paid off by the Minister of Finance and that they be sold to satisfy the same.

Both defendants demur. The questions raised are (first) the Commissioners of Crown Lands necessary parties to the bill either as plaintiffs or defendants. I cannot see that the Commissioners of Crown Lands have now any right or interest in the premises sought to be charged with the payment made, or in the fund sought to be recovered by the Minister of Finance. Their claims have been considered and adjudicated by the Court and they cannot be again heard.

If the Minister of Finance has paid from the public treasury a greater sum than he would if the land in question had been sold to extinguish the mortgage upon it, his right to recover this sum from the owners of the land is unaffected by the fact that the Commission of Crown Lands have had possession of the premises and collected its rents, for they are accountable for these rents, not to the Minister of Finance, but to the holders of the title. The diminution of the supposed extent of the "Crown Lands" by the decree above referred to in favor of defendants, is a matter not relevant to the issue before me.

I do not think the bill is demurrable on account of the non-joinder of the Commissioners of Crown Lands. The second question is, should the executors of the will of the late R. Keekiohala be made parties instead of her heir and devisee.

It is elementary law that it is not necessary to make the personal representatives of a mortgagee a party to a bill for foreclosure of a mortgage upon real estate. See Story's Eq. Jur. Sec. 175. The learned author says this is not necessary even though the mortgage is primarily a debt chargeable upon the personal assets.

If the bill sought to charge the personal assets of the deceased defendant with this claim or to recover from it any deficiency over and above the proceeds of the land, her personal representatives should be made parties, otherwise not. It was so held in *Leeward vs. Morris* 9 Paige 89. I think the heir and devisee who holds the title to the real estate sought to be charged with a lien is the proper party defendant. The case of *Conroy vs. Keen* 33 Mass. 347 is in point.

The objection taken by defendants that the administrator of Kamehameha IV had no authority to sell the deceased King's lands in order to pay his debts, I do not think is tenable. The jurisdiction to order such sales when the personal estate is insufficient has been conferred by the Probate Courts of this Kingdom from the time of their creation and a confirmatory statute was passed by the Legislature in 1876. The administrator acted as a matter of fact with the assent of the Probate Courts in pursuance of the authority of the Probate Court.

I do not think that the fact that the law gave to the executor of the will of the Crown Lands to be devoted to the payment of the advances made to the Treasury affords this case.

For do I think the issues raised in this case are affected by the subsequent act of 1866 which discharged the Commissioners of Crown Lands from all liability to repay these advances. This law made the grant in relation to the grant of the land of the Legislature to relieve the Royal Domain of the mortgages upon it and thus benefit the reigning Sovereign by discharging the revenues of the Crown Lands. I can see nothing in the Act indicating that their object was to benefit the heirs-at-law of Kamehameha IV. The reigning Sovereign, Kamehameha IV, was not the deceased King Kamehameha IV's heir-at-law. The statutory heirs of Kamehameha IV were his widow and his father.

The remaining question is whether the bill shows title to the plaintiff to relief in equity.

Is there a lien in equity in favor of the public Treasury upon the premises in question by virtue of the Treasury having paid the mortgage upon it? Is the Minister of Finance subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee?

The decision of these questions involve the discussion of many points not easy of solution. The title was by the law cast upon the Minister of Finance in connection with the Commissioners, to negotiate for the redemption of the mortgages, and he was to issue the bonds and use them to "extinguish those mortgages which the man unassisted after the administrator of his late Majesty's estate has exhausted the estate belonging to his late Majesty, in a private capacity, which the administrator may be legally entitled to use for the payment of the debts of the estate."

The bill alleges that the Minister of Finance, believing that all the private estate of Kamehameha IV had been sold in accordance with the provisions of the law, issued \$27,000 of Government bonds, and extinguished the mortgages, paying the amounts due to the several mortgagees. Subrogation is denied by Sheldon to be the substitution of another person in the place of a creditor so that the person whose favor it is exercised succeeds to the rights of the creditor in relation to the estate in which the debt is put in all respects in the place of the party to whose rights it is subrogated.

"Subrogation is treated as the creature of equity and is so administered as to secure real and essential justice without regard to form and without regard to any contractual relations between the parties to be affected by it." It is broad enough to include every instance in which one party pays a debt for which another is primarily answerable, and which in equity and good conscience, should have been discharged by the latter; but it is not to be applied in favor of one who has officiously and as a mere volunteer, paid the debt of another, for which neither he nor his property was answerable, and who has no obligation to pay; and it is not allowed where it works any injustice to the rights of others." Sheldon on Subst. Sec. 131.

Brigham says, "The principle is a general one, and will apply in every instance (except in the case of a mere stranger) where one man has paid the debt for which another is primarily liable." Brigham Principles of Eq. Sec. 337.

Chancellor Kent in the leading case in America, *Chesbrough vs. Millard* 1 John Ch. 213, says, "It is not necessary to show any private contract between the Minister of Finance and the mortgagee. The debt has been paid and the mortgage discharged. But this is not fatal to the plaintiff's claim, although as between debtor and creditor, the debt may be extinguished, yet as between the person who has paid the debt and the other parties to the debt, it is not so, so long as it is necessary to preserve the securities."

Wall vs. Mann 102 Mass. 513. This case is an instructive one. A grantee of land, who, through a mistake of the grantor, has had the land taken from him on an execution issued upon a judgment rendered against his grantor in an action on a debt contracted by the grantor, may maintain a bill in equity against his grantor and the judgment creditor, to be subrogated to, to the extent of his liability to the creditor, the latter under the mortgage, not required for the full satisfaction of the debt. It was claimed in the demurrer that the bill showed that the mortgage was extinguished and discharged, and the levy so that the judgment creditor had no rights to which the plaintiff could be subrogated, or which could be assigned to the plaintiff; also that the plaintiff was not the creditor of the grantor, but that through negligence on the consequences of which he had no ground of relief in equity. Chancellor Kent says, "The doctrine of subrogation is not founded in contract, either express or implied, but is resorted to for the sake of doing justice between the parties. In the present case, the grantor has had the land exposed to be attached and taken on execution by the creditor of his grantor. It has been taken and set off by the defendant, and the grantor has thus paid his grantor's debt which the grantor ought to have paid himself; and it is just that he should have the benefit of the mortgage which he has given to the creditor for the debt." I will again refer to this case later on.

The mortgage upon the land in question subrogated in equity and good conscience have been paid by the defendant, and the estate of Kamehameha IV, out of the proceeds of the land itself, for it was private land of the King. The Minister of Finance, as a volunteer, for it is to be presumed that he was requested to pay this mortgage by the administrator. He cannot be regarded as having made the payment officiously and without any color of obligation to do so. The question placed the obligation upon him to discharge the mortgages upon the Crown Lands. In attempting to do this he acted as a volunteer, for he had not exhausted the private lands of his intestate, and secondly, of paying a mortgage existing upon a private land of the King. But he was not a volunteer, in that the administrator or the heirs at law of the King should have paid, and under the definitions above given of the doctrine of subrogation, he has the benefit of the security given by the ancestor of the heirs at law to the mortgagee.

Where the owner of premises conveyed to him subject to a mortgage, in ignorance of the lien thereon of a judgment against a former owner, subsequent to the mortgage, pays the mortgage and causes the mortgage to be recorded, he is entitled to have the same reinstated as a lien prior and paramount to the lien of the judgment. *Barnes vs. Mott* 64 N. Y. 397. Here the mortgage was not recorded, but the defendant, in ignorance of the fact that the mortgage was restored to the plaintiff, paid off and satisfied by the devisee of Burr, the mortgagee, the mortgage, the same as a lien upon the mortgaged premises, prior and paramount to the lien of the judgment recovered by Orchard and assigned to the defendant, is clearly right. Upon payment of the mortgage by the defendant, under the circumstances, he was entitled to all the rights of the mortgagee and to an assignment of the mortgage; and having caused the same to be recorded under circumstances authorizing an inference of a mistake of fact, equity will presume such mistake and give the party the benefit of the equitable doctrine of subrogation. To do this in this case is to prevent manifest injustice and hardship and interferes with no superior intervening equities."

Here the payment was made in ignorance of the fact of the mortgage. In the case before me, the Minister of Finance was ignorant of the fact that the mortgaged premises were private land of the King. He acted under the mistaken belief that the land was Crown Land. Is such a mistake as will entitle him to relief?

The general rule is that ignorance of law will not furnish an excuse for any person, either for a breach or for an omission of fact will not furnish an excuse, but the presumption is that every person is acquainted with his own rights, provided he has had a reasonable opportunity to know the facts and the law. See *Story's Eq. Jur. Sec. 116*, "that whatever exceptions there may be to this rule they will be found to have something peculiar in their character and to involve elements of decision." Judge Story id. 120 says, "The most general rule of cases relied on as exceptions to the rule, is that class where the party has acted under a misapprehension or ignorance of his title to the property, or where some agreement has been or was supposed to be made, or where the party has acted in good faith and in reliance on the authority of a public officer."

In 15 American Decisions 122, the case of Black and Ward from 27 Mich. 191 is commented upon and all the principal authorities are well reviewed. I excerpt the following: "The case of *Brigham v. Ves*, Sen. 126 is an important case on this side. The plaintiff had purchased an estate which already belonged to him, under a mistaken belief, and the Court ordered the defendant to refund the money, holding that there was a plain mistake, such as the Court was warranted to relieve against."

"The Master of the Rolls, Sir John Leach, in a later case (*Overhill v. Chalmers*) 1 Young and Coll. 418 said that 'no man can be held by any act of his to contract a title, or to be fully aware at the time, not only of the facts, but of the defect of title depends, but of the consequences in point of law; and here there is no proof that the defendant at the time of the acts referred to was aware of the law on the subject.' The annotator adds that he believes the true principle to be one which strongly inclines to our notions of right and justice, and that, in *Down v. Lord Mansfield* in *Blie vs. Dickson* 1 T. R. 285, manifestly if a man has actually paid what he would not have done if he had known that he was not bound to pay, but that he cannot recover it back. But when money is paid under a mistake, which there was no ground to claim in conscience, the party may recover it back again. The Court's decision is in accordance with this view. In *Leitch v. Hume* 548 Scotch Rep. vs. *Graves* 10 T. R. 285, a party who had paid the money paid by a mere mistake in point of law can be recovered back, as if a *rescissio* were, or by a person who the statute of limitation has barred, or by a party when any other merely legal defense exists against a claim for the money so paid, and which right and remedy is not to be lost by a mere mistake of law. But we mean distinctly to say that when money is paid by one under a mistake of his rights and his duties, and his obligation to pay, and which the recipient

discharged by the latter; but it is not to be applied in favor of one who has officiously and as a mere volunteer, paid the debt of another, for which neither he nor his property was answerable, and who has no obligation to pay; and it is not allowed where it works any injustice to the rights of others." Sheldon on Subst. Sec. 131.

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Where the owner of premises conveyed to him subject to a mortgage, in ignorance of the lien thereon of a judgment against a former owner, subsequent to the mortgage, pays the mortgage and causes the mortgage to be recorded, he is entitled to have the same reinstated as a lien prior and paramount to the lien of the judgment. *Barnes vs. Mott* 64 N. Y. 397. Here the mortgage was not recorded, but the defendant, in ignorance of the fact that the mortgage was restored to the plaintiff, paid off and satisfied by the devisee of Burr, the mortgagee, the mortgage, the same as a lien upon the mortgaged premises, prior and paramount to the lien of the judgment recovered by Orchard and assigned to the defendant, is clearly right. Upon payment of the mortgage by the defendant, under the circumstances, he was entitled to all the rights of the mortgagee and to an assignment of the mortgage; and having caused the same to be recorded under circumstances authorizing an inference of a mistake of fact, equity will presume such mistake and give the party the benefit of the equitable doctrine of subrogation. To do this in this case is to prevent manifest injustice and hardship and interferes with no superior intervening equities."

Here the payment was made in ignorance of the fact of the mortgage. In the case before me, the Minister of Finance was ignorant of the fact that the mortgaged premises were private land of the King. He acted under the mistaken belief that the land was Crown Land. Is such a mistake as will entitle him to relief?

The general rule is that ignorance of law will not furnish an excuse for any person, either for a breach or for an omission of fact will not furnish an excuse, but the presumption is that every person is acquainted with his own rights, provided he has had a reasonable opportunity to know the facts and the law. See *Story's Eq. Jur. Sec. 116*, "that whatever exceptions there may be to this rule they will be found to have something peculiar in their character and to involve elements of decision." Judge Story id. 120 says, "The most general rule of cases relied on as exceptions to the rule, is that class where the party has acted under a misapprehension or ignorance of his title to the property, or where some agreement has been or was supposed to be made, or where the party has acted in good faith and in reliance on the authority of a public officer."

In 15 American Decisions 122, the case of Black and Ward from 27 Mich. 191 is commented upon and all the principal authorities are well reviewed. I excerpt the following: "The case of *Brigham v. Ves*, Sen. 126 is an important case on this side. The plaintiff had purchased an estate which already belonged to him, under a mistaken belief, and the Court ordered the defendant to refund the money, holding that there was a plain mistake, such as the Court was warranted to relieve against."

"The Master of the Rolls, Sir John Leach, in a later case (*Overhill v. Chalmers*) 1 Young and Coll. 418 said that 'no man can be held by any act of his to contract a title, or to be fully aware at the time, not only of the facts, but of the defect of title depends, but of the consequences in point of law; and here there is no proof that the defendant at the time of the acts referred to was aware of the law on the subject.' The annotator adds that he believes the true principle to be one which strongly inclines to our notions of right and justice, and that, in *Down v. Lord Mansfield* in *Blie vs. Dickson* 1 T. R. 285, manifestly if a man has actually paid what he would not have done if he had known that he was not bound to pay, but that he cannot recover it back. But when money is paid under a mistake, which there was no ground to claim in conscience, the party may recover it back again. The Court's decision is in accordance with this view. In *Leitch v. Hume* 548 Scotch Rep. vs. *Graves* 10 T. R. 285, a party who had paid the money paid by a mere mistake in point of law can be recovered back, as if a *rescissio* were, or by a person who the statute of limitation has barred, or by a party when any other merely legal defense exists against a claim for the money so paid, and which right and remedy is not to be lost by a mere mistake of law. But we mean distinctly to say that when money is paid by one under a mistake of his rights and his duties, and his obligation to pay, and which the recipient

discharged by the latter; but it is not to be applied in favor of one who has officiously and as a mere volunteer, paid the debt of another, for which neither he nor his property was answerable, and who has no obligation to pay; and it is not allowed where it works any injustice to the rights of others." Sheldon on Subst. Sec. 131.

Brigham says, "The principle is a general one, and will apply in every instance (except in the case of a mere stranger) where one man has paid the debt for which another is primarily liable." Brigham Principles of Eq. Sec. 337.

Chancellor Kent in the leading case in America, *Chesbrough vs. Millard* 1 John Ch. 213, says, "It is not necessary to show any private contract between the Minister of Finance and the mortgagee. The debt has been paid and the mortgage discharged. But this is not fatal to the plaintiff's claim, although as between debtor and creditor, the debt may be extinguished, yet as between the person who has paid the debt and the other parties to the debt, it is not so, so long as it is necessary to preserve the securities."

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Gazette Supplement, August 12, 1885.

The British Cabinet.

The following epitome of the careers of the members of the new Cabinet of Great Britain and Ireland, may be interesting, as showing the usual course of education and training which lead to the highest offices of State in that Kingdom:

The public school, the university, often-times a profession, a seat in the House of Commons, is the almost universally trodden road to the Government of Great Britain. The annexed sketch will show how far the members of the present Cabinet have qualified themselves for their respective posts, as to education and general experience of public business.

Lord Salisbury, Prime Minister. Educated at Eton and Oxford, (fellowship) sat in the Commons for fifteen years.

Hardinge Giffard, Lord Halsbury, Lord Chancellor, is an M. A. of Oxford, has been Solicitor-General and member of the House of Commons for eight years.

Stafford Northcote, Lord Eldesleigh, First Lord of the Treasury, Eton and Oxford, a barrister, has been in the House of Commons for thirty years.

Lord Carnarvon, Lord Lieut. of Ireland, Eton and Oxford, (1st class classics) was never in the Commons, but has held office as Under-Secretary or Secretary of State for seven years.

Lord Cranbrook, President of the Council, educated at Shrewsbury and Oxford, a barrister, sat in the Commons for twenty-two years, has held several important offices, Cabinet and other.

Lord Harrowby, Privy Seal, educated at Harrow and Oxford, in the Commons for seventeen years, has held several important offices.

Sir M. Hicks Beach, Chancellor of Exchequer, Eton and Oxford, now twenty years in the House of Commons, has held many important offices.

Sir Richard Cross, Home Secretary, educated at Rugby and Cambridge, a barrister, twenty years in the House of Commons; has held the same Cabinet office before.

Col. Hon. F. A. Stanley, Secretary for the Colonies, educated at Eton, and thence entered the army. Twenty years in the Commons and has held office, but not in the Cabinet before.

Rt. Hon. W. H. Smith, Secretary for War, schools or colleges not recorded. Member for Westminster for seventeen years, has held office in a former Cabinet.

Lord R. Churchill, Secretary for India, educated at Eton and Oxford, has sat in the Commons for eleven years, never held office before.

Lord George Hamilton, First Lord of Admiralty, educated at Harrow, thence passed into the army, seventeen years in the House of Commons, has held various offices before.

Rt. Hon. Ed. Gibson, Lord Chancellor of Ireland, educated at Trinity College, Dublin. Member for Dublin University for fourteen years, and Attorney-General for Ireland for three years.

Lord Jno. Manners, Postmaster-General, educated at Eton and Cambridge, has sat in the Commons for forty years and held many important posts, his present one among others.

The Duke of Richmond and Gordon, President of the Board of Trade, educated at Westminster and Oxford, twenty years in the Commons, has held the same and other posts.

Hon. Ed. Stanhope, Vice President of the Council, educated at Harrow and Oxford, (fellowship) a barrister, entered the House of Commons in 1874, has held sundry important offices.

The Cabinet thus consists of sixteen Ministers, of whom seven, including the two recent creations, are Peers, four inherited and three achieved their rank, and six of the seven have represented constituencies in the House of Commons.

The oldest Minister is Lord Cranbrook, aged 71 years, the youngest is Randolph Churchill, 36 years, giving a mean of 54 1/2 years.

Of the great public schools Eton is represented by seven, Harrow by three, Rugby, Westminster, Dublin and Shrewsbury one each.

Of Universities, Oxford claims ten, Cambridge two, Dublin one, and three are non-University men.

Of professions, there are six members of the Bar, and two army men. Seven of the other eight have not practiced any profession, the eighth, Rt. Hon. W. H. Smith is the great news agent, whose name may be seen over every book stall in every railway station throughout the United Kingdom. He was elected by the great city of Westminster in 1868, his antagonist being the late Jno. Stuart Mill, and he has sat for that constituency ever since.

The above is an accurate analysis of the composition of the new English Ministry.

Eskiman Baby Life.

When a baby Eskiman's mother makes the hood for her reindeer suit she stretches it into a long sack or bag that hangs down behind and is supported by her shoulders, and this bag of reindeer skin is his cradle and home, where he lives until he is able to walk, when he gets his own first suit of clothing.

This, however, is while the baby Eskiman is out of doors or his mother is making a social visit. When at his own home, in order not to trouble his mother while she is sewing, or cooking, or doing such other work, the little baby is allowed to roll around almost without clothing among the reindeer skins that make the bed, where it amuses itself with anything it can lay its hands on, from a hatchet to a snow-stick.

You doubtless think little Boreas should have a nice time rolling around to his heart's content on the soft, warm reindeer skins, but when I tell you more about his little home you may not then think so.

"But won't the snow melt and the house tumble in?" you will ask. Of course it will, if you get it warmer than just the coldness at which water freezes; but during the greater part of the year it is so cold that the snow will not melt, even when the Eskimans burn fires in their stone lamps inside these snow houses; so by closely regulating the amount of the fire, they can just keep the snow from melting. In short, it must always be cold enough in their home to freeze.

So you can see that the little Esquimaux cannot have such a very nice time, and you can't see how in the world he can be almost naked all day long when it is so cold. But such is the fact.

Yet, in spite of all this, the little fellow really enjoys himself. He gets used to the cold, and has great fun frolicking around on the reindeer skins and playing with his toys; and when I have told you some other stories about the cold these little fellows can endure, you can understand how they can enjoy themselves in the snow lints, or igloos, as they call them when it is only a little colder than freezing.

At times the fire will get too warm in the snow house, and then the ceiling will commence melting, for you will perhaps have learned at school that when a room becomes warmed it is warmer at the ceiling and cooler near the floor. So with the hut of snow; it commences melting at the top, because it is warmer there, and when two or three drops of cold water have fallen on the baby's shoulders, his father or mother finds that it is getting too warm, and cuts down the fire.

When the water commences dripping, the mother will often take a snowball from the floor, where it is colder than freezing, and stick it against the point where the water is dripping. There it freezes fast and soaks up the water just like a sponge until it becomes full; and then she removes it and puts on another, as soon as it commences to drop again. Sometimes she will forget to remove it, and when it gets soaked and heavy with water and warm enough to lose its freezing hold, down it comes! perhaps right on the baby's bare back, where it flattens out like a slushy pan-cake—or into his face, as it once served me.—St. Nicholas.

Lithography.

The art of lithography, or printing from stone, now so extremely common, was the result of an accidental discovery. Alois Senefelder, a poor musician of Munich, Bavaria, used to engrave his own compositions. As copper plates were too expensive, he tried etching on stone, but was not successful.

One morning, his mother asked him to make out the washing bill, and in his hurry he caught up one of his polished stones, and wrote out the bill on that, with the peculiar ink he had prepared for his experiments. Some time after he found that the ink had finally set in the stone.

He then conceived the idea of causing an acid to eat away the stone where it was not protected by ink. One experiment led to another, and the process of lithography was invented. The idea was to make a drawing with a greasy substance. On passing a roller covered with peculiar ink over the stone, the lines drawn took the ink, and the rest of the stone was left clean.

It was in 1799, only three years after the first discovery of the process, that Senefelder obtained the exclusive privilege for lithography in Bavaria, and the venture was highly successful.

There is something remarkable in the fact that if Senefelder had experimented with any other stone, he would have failed, for although there are other deposits in the world that can be used instead of the Keilmann stone, there are none equal to it.

A New Torpedo.

For a year or so past experiments have been carried out to test the extraordinary powers claimed for a new torpedo invented by Mr. Brennan, a young Australian, and offered by him to the British Government. The Admiralty granted to the inventor the use of a casement on the upper tier of Garrison Point fort, Sheerness, and a torpedo factory was erected outside the fort with a tramway running down to the sea beach. With these advantages and ample sea room in front, the preliminary trials have taken place, and the mechanism has been so far perfected as to admit of an official inspection. This has proved so satisfactory that the Admiralty have already agreed to adopt the torpedo as a part of the national armament. According to report, the inventor is to have a very handsome reward, and various sums ranging from £10,000 to £100,000, are mentioned, while it is positively asserted he has been paid £10,000 on account. The new torpedo, which is of the aggressive class, is altogether distinct in principle from the Whitehead, the Harvey, or any other system known in the service. In many trials which have taken place in public, a machine something like the section of a boat has been seen to descend to the water's edge by means of a carriage on the tramway and plunge into the sea, through which it has shot at a marvelous speed estimated by some observers at fifty miles an hour. Its principles have now, however, been explained without reserve to many officials and others, and will shortly be taught generally throughout the navy. There will consequently be no longer any attempt to keep the secret, and it may be explained that the torpedo is impelled by a steam engine, which is stationed within the fort, and acts upon it by winding in very rapidly two wires coiled round reels within the machine. As the wires are independent of each other and actuate different propellers, the torpedo can be steered from the engine with great accuracy it is even practicable to stop the messenger in full flight and send him on again, but this is thought to try severely the endurance of the wires, which are as thin as those of a bird's beak. Jets of light are produced by some chemical agency, and are simply to indicate the position of the torpedo at night, but being screened in front they are visible only to observers in the rear. Traveling with little of its body above water it would scarcely be seen by an enemy until too close for resistance or escape, and as its speed increases the harder it is pulled, the last part of the journey can always be the fastest.—London Times.

A Dinner Suggestion.

At a dinner given lately, each gentleman on entering the house had an envelop handed to him with his on the outside and inside the name of the lady he was to take into dinner. Is not this a rather convenient and pleasant arrangement? Convenient for the hostess, because her guests being placed, in her own mind days before, it still remained for her to communicate to each gentleman her will and pleasure, while the little envelop does most satisfactorily. Pleasant for the guest because, during the few moments spent in the dressing-room, regarding his white tie with joy or chagrin, as the case may be, he has ample opportunity to sketch out his plan of conversation for the evening, suiting it, if he is happy enough to know the fair one who is to be his company for some hours to come, to her tastes and attainments, even indulgently pandering to her hobbies if he be amiable. If the lady is a fair unknown, a guest from another town, a few leading remarks upon other cities always complimentary to the absent, will fit in pleasantly and will soon bring into view the favored place whence she has come after which an inexhaustible subject of conversation will hold the floor until the last course and the rising of the hostess announces the dinner is over.—Philadelphia Call.

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350	1,400 00	2,220	
400	1,600 00	2,490	
450	1,800 00	2,760	
500	2,000 00	3,030	
550	2,200 00	3,300	
600	2,400 00	3,570	
650	2,600 00	3,840	
700	2,800 00	4,110	
750	3,000 00	4,380	
800	3,200 00	4,650	
850	3,400 00	4,920	
900	3,600 00	5,190	
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