culture-contact to discover without further ado how the different breeds of humanity have come together and mixed. The success of such a method, it is clear, must depend on the extent to which a given people clings to its tradition; yet this is always considerable. The Englishman carries England with him wherever he goes, and the Frenchman, France. But for loyalty to ancient use and wont, for sheer faith in the sacred past, the savage beats them all.

When all has been said, however, on the primacy of the customary factor in human history, it remains to note that to simplify must always be to falsify, if the elements neglected for the moment be not in the long run given their due. By all means let the anthropologist found on the principle of "one thing at a time." Let him assume, with the modern school, that in the first instance and on the whole the individual, at any rate the savage individual, is but the incarnation, as Durkheim says, of the tradition of his society. But is that a complete account of him? If it is complete for the sociologist, it is certainly not complete for the anthropologist, whose business is to envisage man in all his aspects synthetically and concretely.

A human being, after all, is not a phonograph. He does not mechanically reproduce some inserted "record." When custom is thrust upon him from without, he reacts. The power of assimilation involves a certain dyne of selection. This is a psychological commonplace; yet it is one that may easily be neglected by those who harp overmuch on the "objectivity" of custom—as if custom were not a mere precipitate of the psychic activities of human beings.

I deem it, then, most important at the present juncture that some anthropologist should undertake the supplementary work of showing how, even where the regime of custom is most absolute, the individual constantly adapts himself to its injunctions, or rather adapts these to his own purposes, with more or less conscious and intelligent discrimination. The immobility of custom, I believe, is largely the effect of distance. Look more closely and you will see perpetual modification in process; and, if the underlying dynamic be partly due to physical and quasi-physical causes, such as changes in climate, movements of people following the consequent variations in the food-supply, and so forth, yet, most fundamental condition of all, there is likewise at work throughout the will to live, manifesting itself through individuals as they partly compete and partly cooperate one with the other.

In any case, I am sure that in directing attention to the play of individual choice and initiative, together with the corresponding development of self-consciousness and self-formed character, one is helping to bring anthropology into close contact with the facts of human life. As I have already said, the inert, custom-ridden aspect of primitive society is largely an effect of distance—in other words, the effect of a want of intimate knowledge and sympathetic interest on the part of the civilized observers. We portray the wood after a fashion. It suits our sketchy methods well enough to represent it as a dead mass of color. But we have not sought, so far, to render the subtle values of the individual trees. Yet only by so doing can we hope to do justice to the spirit of the wood, which is a spirit of life and growth.

I WILL enquire here into the nature and severity of the punishment for incest on Yap. Such an inquiry might well entail an extended analysis of a multitude of factors and yield a volume of intimidating proportions, but I will confine myself to one problem among the many which bear on the nature of punishment—the problem of the relationship between political organization and the nature and severity of the punishment for incest. I do not thereby deny the relevance of other factors, but simply set aside their consideration. My intention is merely to demonstrate the relevance of the question of who has the right to inflict punishment to an understanding of the nature and severity of the punishment inflicted.

The exposition which follows proceeds by a method of successive approximations. I will begin with a brief outline of the Yap incest regulations and of the punishment when those regulations are not observed, and follow this with a first approximation of the relationship between political organization and punishment in general terms. I will then analyze the empirical material more fully to see how well the generalizations apply to the data, and will continue to balance generalization against data until I believe that I have developed a set of precisely defined generalizations which apply to these Yap data. I make no pretense of presenting a full and complete theory of punishment.

* * *

The incest taboo on Yap, a high island in the West Carolines, Micronesia, applies to members of the nuclear family, the patrilineal lineage, and the matrilineal clan. The prohibition on sexual relations among members of these groups applies to all and any, regardless of genealogical distance (Schneider 1953).

Diffuse sanctions in the form of disapproval and shunning are applied if incest should occur, but these are actually mild. The guilty pair are not ostracized, but only whispered about and held to have behaved like animals. In the cases which I observed, as well as in reports of other cases, no one seemed severely embarrassed or emotionally upset, and in a few of these cases the relationship was sustained over a long period. The diffuse sanctions certainly did not break up the relationship.

No organized sanctions are ever applied. The events are held to be no one's concern except the kin group of the participants.

Consequences of incest are of two sorts. Where incest occurs between brother and sister, who should normally practice a mild avoidance and respect relationship which is explicitly phrased in terms of minimizing sexual interest in each other, the consequence is automatic and "immediate." The patrilineage
Incest Sanctions on Yap

An attempt to explain the kind and severity of a punishment might well begin by distinguishing the punishment from the definition of a particular act as "right" or "wrong." An act defined as "wrong" may or may not be punished. If it is punished, there is then the separate question of "what punishment?" I am only concerned here with why incest is punished as it is, not with why it is prohibited. Although the grounds for its prohibition may well bear on the nature of the punishment, these are not my concern here.

If incest is prohibited it will necessarily have some negative emotional quality attached to it. But no society can permit its members to express their emotions in perfectly free and unencumbered ways. This is particularly true where the emotions are of an aggressive nature, and punishment is a form of aggression. Every society must specify when, where, how, and by whom aggression may be expressed and punishment applied.

The socially regulated use of force, or aggression, is essentially political activity. The right to use force under specified conditions is distributed among the groups and statuses of a society. Which social unit holds the right to punish whom and under what circumstances is an aspect of its political organization.

Incest is an intra-kin group offense. The role of the kin group as a political unit of the social structure is thus a critical variable. Where the kin group is an autonomous, self-regulating unit it has a monopoly on the use of force in regulating its internal affairs. No agency outside the kin group can impose punishment on any of its members for intra-group offenses.

If an intra-kin group wrong is to be punished when the kin group is autonomous and self-regulating, there are two alternatives or some combination of these open. Either living members punish the offender, or the punishment is left to supernatural agencies.

These seem to be reasonable formulations, but how do they fit the Yap data?

Incest is prohibited on Yap and clearly negative emotional attitudes are associated with it. The fact that mild diffuse sanctions are expressed makes it clear that these attitudes are not merely neutral but entail attitudes of condemnation and aggression. If the Yap people really felt that incest was no one's business other than the kin group of the concerned couple, they would not whisper and shun the offenders. But a sharp line is drawn between this very diffuse expression of judgment and actually doing something about it. Others may have the right to feel that a wrong has been committed, but only the kin group of the offenders has the right to do anything about wrongs committed within that group.

The Yap patrilineage appears to be an autonomous and self-regulating unit. If a member commits a crime against another member of his patrilineage,
no outsider can automatically interfere. This is true of incest, fratricide, petty theft, insult, and so forth.

Units outside the patrilineage may take action under two conditions. First, where the father's sister's children have been neglected, insulted, or where food which should be reserved for them has not been set aside and kept for them, or where any very serious breach of custom occurs, the father's sister's children have the right to drive the entire patrilineage from its land, or such members of it as they feel to be especially at fault. However, there is grave reluctance to take such action. My informants could not cite a single instance of such an event in their memory. All they could say was that they believed that this had happened long ago.

Second, where patricide or an assault on a father occurs, the heads of the patrilineages of the village may assemble and, if the assaulted father asks them to, or if the father is dead and they deem it necessary, they can force the offending son to leave the village. Here again the right of the assembled heads of the patrilineages to take action was clearly asserted by all informants, but although assaults on fathers were by no means unknown, and patricide had occurred, there was such grave reluctance to take this action that it had never occurred so far as my oldest informants could remember. But again they insisted that in the distant past it certainly had happened.

In discussing fratricide my informants stated that any further action by the father or the surviving brothers would disrupt the patrilineage still more and was therefore not undertaken since the patrilineage should be maintained as an indivisible unit at any cost. Moreover, they argued, it was wrong for brother to attack brother, for brothers should stand together. It would therefore compound the evil should a surviving brother punish the offending brother. What happens, they explained, is that the ancestral ghosts take note of the action and are indignant. But they too feel that the patrilineage must remain intact, so they confine themselves to remaining inattentive to prayers on behalf of the offender. They punish him by not helping him when he needs help and so eventually he dies for his fratricide, for he will one day need them desperately. When they see that it cannot hurt the patrilineage to let him die, they do so.

The offense of fratricide, as the Yaps see it, is an offense against the solidarity of the lineage. But the essential structure of the lineage is that it is the core of a series of linked nuclear families, and the critical relationship is that of father and son. The solidarity of siblings is important, but without a father or father surrogate, according to the Yap view, there can be no lineage.

The role of the son and brother is confined to intra-lineage activity. He plays no part in the affairs of the lineage as they relate with other lineages or with the village. It is the father who is head of the lineage, and it is the head of the lineage who represents it to other lineages, and to the village. His is the status which articulates the lineage with the rest of the elaborate political structure of Yap.

Fratricide is thus very different from patricide in terms of its effect on lineage structure in particular and the political system in general. When one brother kills another, the father-son relationship may still be maintained. When a son kills his father, or attacks him, the necessary link between the lineage and the community is broken. This offense is not merely against lineage solidarity, but is in addition an offense against the village. This follows from the Yap view that when a man acts as "father" he relates himself to members of his lineage; when he acts as "head of the lineage" he is acting toward the outside—toward the village or other lineages. The village is thus directly concerned with delicts against the head of the lineage; it has no concern with sons who are brothers.

Two difficulties with the initial formulation are now apparent. The first centers on the fact that a particular delict cannot be assumed to be purely intra-kin group in nature merely from knowing the kinship categories of those involved. Although at first glance patricide would appear to be a purely intra-kin group offense, this is definitely not the case on Yap. Patricide is in part an offense against the lineage by one of its members, but in part it is an offense against the village. The matter is further complicated by the fact that despite the clear right of the village to act in cases of patricide or assault on the father, there is an equally clear tendency to treat this particular offense as if it were an intra-kin group matter. That is, the village has consistently left the matter in the hands of the kin group and has never taken the action to which it would be entitled.

The second difficulty is closely related to the first. In the case of the patrilineal lineage, the statement that it is autonomous and self-regulating is limited by the fact that it is part of a larger political structure and articulated with it. Its affairs, in certain respects, are the affairs of other lineages and of the village. Hence it is not completely or perfectly autonomous, though it closely approximates this.

The other kinship group on Yap is the matrilineal clan. This is a territorially diffuse unit without corporate organization, internal differentiation, or authority structure. The matrilineal clan requires exogamy, provides for hospitality and help in case of need, and sanctuary in case of war. There is no way of enforcing these obligations beyond expressions of indignation.

The matrilineal clan is autonomous and self-regulating in the sense that members of one clan do not interfere in the affairs of another clan. But the clan's affairs are so limited in scope and the clan is so lacking in internal structure that it is self-regulating more by default than by design. Yet the fact remains that outsiders have no right to take action with respect to events internal to the unit.

The matrilineal clan and the patrilineal lineage approximate autonomous and self-regulating units, but whereas the lineage has a clear authority structure, the clan does not. It is difficult to see how the clan could take action against a member for any delict which might occur within, since it lacks a differentiated authority structure. The fact that supernaturals and not the living people act in cases of incest thus makes good sense in these terms. But this reasoning cannot apply to the lineage. The mere presence of an authority
structure may thus be a necessary but by no means sufficient condition for certain members of a self-regulating kin group to undertake punitive action against offending members.

* * *

The comparison between the general formulation and the Yap data can now be continued. The comparison of incest with other offenses provides further correction of the general formulation.

The Yaps see incest as an offense against the ancestral ghosts, who are treated as if they were a separate unit and in return treat the lineage as a corporate unit. In cases of incest the lineage has collective responsibility. Neither in fratricide nor patricide is any notion of collective responsibility involved.

The ancestral ghosts have formal dealings with the lineage through its representative, the lineage head. When they are offended they retaliate against the lineage through any of its members, but treating any one member as the equivalent of any other. Ordinarily no one prays to the lineage ghosts except the head of the lineage, and he does so on behalf of the lineage, just as he deals with the village on its behalf. When he asks for the help of the ancestral ghosts he does so on behalf of the lineage as a whole, not for the personal benefit of one of its members. It is true that he may pray that one member may not die, or that one member may recover from an illness, or that one member may have children. But the recovery or the children are for the lineage, not for the person alone. If an individual wishes to enlist supernatural aid purely on his own behalf he does so through magical manipulations, not through his ancestral ghosts.

The responsibility of the lineage for the incest of its members is not connected with any mystical notions of ritual pollution or contamination or contagion that I could discover.

Incest is thus seen by the Yaps as essentially sacrilegious in nature. But why it is sacrilegious, why the ghosts are offended, was never made clear to me. Although there was no reluctance to discuss the matter, the whole attitude seemed to center on a kind of simple empirical generalization: incest offends the ancestral ghosts who retaliate for the offense unless properly placated.

If a man from one lineage assaulsts a man from another lineage within his village, the head of the offender’s lineage hastens to bring an appropriate gift and apology to the head of the victim’s lineage. If the gift and apology are not promptly tendered, the lineage of the offended person has the right to retaliate by force against the lineage of the offender. In such a case, someone—and it can be anyone—in the offender’s lineage may be wounded or killed.

The pattern is thus essentially the same in the case of the ghosts as in the case of any extra-lineage delict: a wrong invites retaliation unless an appropriate gift and apology are proffered promptly. Retaliation is by injury or death to any member of the offending lineage.

One significant difference between any other lineage and the ancestral ghosts lies in the fact that when a delict has been committed against a living person, the head of his lineage is always well known and can be approached directly. If the head of the offended person’s lineage deems the gift and apology unsuitable, he can make this known and a more suitable gift may promptly be substituted. But the proper representative of the ancestral ghosts must be discovered on each occasion by divination, as must the propriety of the gift and apology. Divination is openly admitted to be subject to error, but there is no certain way of establishing this error until it is to late.

Again two difficulties in the original formulation become evident. The first is the question of whether the consequences of incest can properly be viewed as punishment or whether they are more accurately described in simple cause and effect terms. The distinction between the consequences of a particular act and punishment rests on the fact that punishment implies moral transgression of some sort. In one case the consequences are inherent in the nature of the act itself, while punishment is not a necessary concomitant of the nature of the act but only of the value placed on it. It is true that the Yaps are not given to elaborate emotional expressions of moral indignation uttered in pious phrases. They allocate more concern to practical consequences and dwell less on good and evil, but this does not mean that they fail to distinguish between immoral and impractical acts. Both are ill-advised, both have unpleasant consequences; but the consequences of an immoral act follow from its immorality, the consequences of a foolish act follow from the nature of the act itself and no more. For the Yap, the consequences of incest are punishment in this sense.

The second difficulty again centers on the problem of just what constitutes an intra-kin group offense. Although I defined incest as an intra-kin group offense, the Yaps see it as an offense against the ancestral ghosts and treat it as if it were of the same order as any other extra-lineage offense, namely, that the offended unit has the right to retaliate unless placating gifts and apologies are promptly made. Retaliation is in the form of injury or death.

Lineage ghosts are dead members of the lineage who once stood and continue to stand in a parental position with respect to the living lineage, and they represent the only channel through which the lineage as a unit can influence the supernatural. Although various supernatural beings are distinguished, each having a domain and an area of concern—one with the sea, another with the fruit-bearing trees and plants, another with the clouds—they are collectively referred to as “the spirits” (kan). It is the spirits who, long ago, established the social and moral regulations which govern Yap life, who originally forbade incest, and who take action against it when it occurs. The spirits are therefore seen as the source of morality and the locus of ultimate authority.

However, the spirits are amenable to the influence of the ancestral ghosts, who can forestall their retribution or enlist their support for a worthy cause. Although the spirits are the ultimate source of morality and authority, the crucial figures are the ancestral ghosts because it is only through them that the lineage can influence the spirits and because their influence on the acts of the spirits is decisive. It is thus in this narrower sense that incest is seen as an offense against the ghosts; it is really an offense against the spirits.
There are, of course, various ways in which the relationship between moral norms and the acts of the living can be phrased. It is possible to see morality as a part of the self, defined to a degree, but essentially operating as a form of self-regulation. It is possible to see morality as the concrete acts of concrete beings who can see, hear, and discover what human beings do no matter where or when they do it. These beings may be beneficent, punitive, dictatorial, capricious.

The Yap view is that the moral regulations governing intralineage relations emanate from concrete beings, spirits, while the decisive control over the acts of the spirits is personified in the form of the ghosts. This image of the relationship between moral norms and the acts of the living is congruent with the organization of the lineage. It is, after all, the fundamental social unit in which solidarity and unity are the cardinal conditions for its maintenance in that form. That it ought never to be rent by conflict must be balanced against the human beings of which it is composed. Yaps recognize the gap between what people ought to do and the persistent tendency to do wrong. Where unity and solidarity are cardinal conditions of existence, as well as clearly expressed values, the problem is to limit wrongs to a minimum, not to compound them.

But different wrongs have different effects, as well as different frequencies of occurrence. Although the right to punish incest is ultimately in the hands of the spirits and immediately in the hands of the ghosts, the father of a small disobedient child does not depend on the ghosts alone; he reprimands the child or he strikes it, though, of course, his right to do so is clearly delegated to him by the spirits through the ghosts. Nor does the father of a grown, persistently disobedient son depend on the ghosts alone; he may exclude his son from lineage membership and thus deprive him of his rights in land. So, too, the father who has been assaulted has the right, given him by the spirits and backed by the ghosts, to terminate the father-son relationship, thereby excluding the son from lineage membership and terminating his rights in land. Incest is thus different from an assault on the father by the son, or from disobedience on the part of a son. It might be suggested that in this particular case the gravity of the offense depends in part on the probability of its occurrence and in part on the immediacy of the disruptive effects of the crime. Incest does not rend a lineage apart; the failure of a son to perform his role as it is prescribed does so rend it. In the latter case immediate action by members of the kin group is required to maintain the lineage, in the former no such immediate action is required.

But what about the punishment? Is death a more severe penalty than disinheritance? Or does the nature of the punishment depend on still other considerations?

If punishment is allocated to supernatural agencies, then certain conditions inherent in this alternative bear on the nature of the punishment. A supernatural sanction which specifies that the criminal’s left arm will fall off at high noon on the third day following the crime cannot be maintained for long except for such crimes as are practically never committed. This is because the probability of anybody’s arm falling off at high noon is very, very low. But a supernatural sanction which specifies that someone will die can be maintained because the probability that someone will die is equivalent to certainty. The events which can be counted on to occur in the natural world are the events which must be used as supernatural punishments where the crime is committed with any frequency sufficient to put the matter to test. The crime which is never committed may be linked with a supernatural punishment that could never happen only because that linkage cannot be tested. The crime which is committed with discernible frequency must be linked with a punishment that is very likely to occur if the punishment is to be regarded as supernaturally caused. The only qualification on this generalization is in the case of an effective counter-spell or neutralizing magic. Here, obviously, the efficiency of the counter-spell depends entirely on the probability of the occurrence of the punishing event.

Illness and death are the sorts of events which human beings the world over can count on to occur. They are therefore precisely the sorts of events which can be regarded as supernatural punishment. On Yap the punishment for incest is death.

A man who returns to Yap from a long overseas voyage and has sexual intercourse during the next three-month period, during which time it is prohibited (by the spirit of the sea), may fall ill unless he has successfully sought the intervention of his lineage ghosts. But such a man is not expected to die of his illness. In one case which I saw, ringworm developed on the man’s buttock. With prayer and propitiating gifts to the spirit, as well as an ointment and numerous food taboos, he recovered.

Illness, death, and bad luck are precisely the sorts of events which human beings can count on to occur and can be expected as supernatural punishments. But within the framework of the kinds of punishments which can be seen as supernatural, there are different degrees of severity of punishment and crimes of different gravity. Both incest and the breach of the taboo on intercourse after an overseas journey are sexual crimes, but the former is the graver offense in the eyes of the Yaps.

In sum, because the Yap kin groups are practically autonomous and self-regulating, no outside agency has the right to punish intra-kin group offenses, and just for this reason any punishment which is administered must be carried out by the kin group itself. Yet the Yap lineage concretizes and personifies authority in its spirits, which are controlled by lineage ghosts, and separates these from its living members. It treats these ghosts as a corporate body and conceives of itself as a corporate body in relation to the ghosts. Although the observer can see incest as an intra-kin group offense, the Yap view is that it is of essentially the same order as interlineage offenses. The punishment for incest is therefore consistent with the punishment for any serious interlineage offense; it is the retaliation by force by the offended group, the consequences of which are injury (equivalent to illness) and death. But another set of conditions limits the kind of punishment which is possible for incest. Since the
punishment is carried out by supernaturals, it must be such that supernaturals can be credited with effecting it. Death is precisely the kind of event which occurs with unfailing regularity in the natural order of things, and it is therefore the kind of event which can be viewed as supernaturally determined.

**DISCUSSION**

The Yap data suggest that it may be useful to separate the problem of why an act is deemed wrong from the question of what is done about it and by whom. It seems that what is done about a particular crime depends very much on who has the right to do something about it. This is essentially a political question and depends on the manner in which the right to use force is distributed throughout the social structure. In the case of Yap, the kin group is practically autonomous and self-regulating and therefore is responsible for the acts of its members and the application of sanctions against them.

I have by-passed the question of what happens when the kin group is not autonomous and self-regulating since this is not the case on Yap. But the question is an important one and any general theory of punishment must cope with it. It may very well be that kin groups are easier on their own members than impartial courts or councils or other kin groups.

I suggest that where the kin group is autonomous it has the choice of applying sanctions against its own members or delegating this responsibility to supernatural agencies. Various considerations bear on whether the responsibility for carrying out punishment is delegated to supernaturals or living members of the group. Among these are the frequency with which the crime occurs and the degree to which it is immediately disruptive. Although this is a very important question in any general theory of punishment, there was no need to go into it here since the critical question is only that of whether humans or supernaturals execute the punishment. It seems sufficient to note here that incest is neither very frequent nor, when it occurs, immediately disruptive on Yap, and that the delegation of responsibility for applying sanctions to the patrilineage ghosts seems congruent with the value of maintaining lineage solidarity at any cost.

**NOTE**

1 This paper is based on field work in 1947-48, which was supported by Peabody Museum of Harvard University and the Pacific Science Board of the National Research Council. I am indebted to my colleague, Robert F. Murphy, for a critical reading of the first draft of this paper and for many constructive suggestions included here without further acknowledgement, as well as to L. Bryce Boyer and Walter Goldschmidt for their suggestions.

**REFERENCE CITED**

SCHNEIDER, D. M.