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विश्वनाथपञ्चाननकृतसिद्धात्मकताकथासूत्रित—
भाषापरिवर्धि: ॥

DIVISION
OF THE
CATEGORIES OF THE NYA'YA PHILOSOPHY,
WITH A COMMENTARY

BY
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EDITED, AND THE TEXT TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL SANSCRIT,

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PREFACE.

The Asiatic Society accepted already in 1847 my offer to publish the text of the Nyáya with a translation, but only the Introduction to this work appeared in the Journal of the Society, the MS. of the translation having meanwhile been lost (vide Journal of the Asiatic Society, July, 1847). The present translation is based upon a rough copy of the former, which I afterwards found among my papers. The notes are entirely new, and the introduction has received so many additions, that it is almost a new essay. The Sanscrit text, in accordance with an enlarged plan, is now accompanied with its commentary; it will thus form another edition of the one published by the Committee of Public Instruction, which is out of print, and satisfy thereby a desideratum, long felt in the Government Sanscrit Colleges, where the Bhásha Paricchédha is introduced as a class-book.
INTRODUCTION.

In the following introduction to a translation of the Bhāsha Pari·
Pari·cchēda,* one of the most celebrated works of the Nyāya philosophy, it
has been my endeavour to subject the logic of the Nyāya, as well as
the leading ideas of this and the Vaisēshika systems, to a critical re-
view, in order to bring the discussion about the merits of the philo-
sophical researches of the Hindus more to a point. Colebrooke's ex-
position of those systems, though founded on the ablest and most exact
researches, as well in a philosophical as in a critical point of view,
does not suffice for this purpose, as it is a mere abstract from the
works of those schools, and does not enter upon the discussion of the
position they are to hold as systems of philosophy.

It is well known, how difficnlt it is to write a history of ancient India,
only a few strictly historical records having been left to us by the
Hindus themselves. The same difficulty obtains with regard to the
history of their philosophy, as in the mind of the Hindus philosophy
was associated with the idea of being raised above change, and no
regard therefore paid to the social and intellectual condition of the
time, in which lived the founder of a system or his successors who more

* I have translated Bhāsha, in deviation from its ordinary sense "speech," by
"categories of the Nyāya philosophy;" for Bhāsha means here evidently not
"speech" in general, which would give no sense whatever, but "Nyāya Bhāsha,"
speech in the Nyāya, that is to say the philosophical language or terms of the Nyāya.
In the Sabda Kalpa Druma, "Bhāsha" (under the head of Bhāsha Pari·cchēda)
has the meaning of Paribhāsha, which is explained by the authoritative language
of the teachers which considers the meanings of the words (Padārtha). This sense
agrees essentially with the rendering which I have given.
developed it. Still it is not impossible to write a history of Indian philosophy, if it be limited to the task of tracing the gradual development of philosophical principles and modes of thinking, without reference to a strict chronological order; for the internal nature of a doctrine will point out its more ancient or modern date. At the same time we must admit, that even in this attempt, we can only partially succeed. The doctrines even of those who are considered as the founders of the different schools, bear the marks of a far advanced progress in systematical arrangement, and must therefore have been the result of a long series of preceding philosophical enquiries.* Hence it would be preposterous to expect, that we should be able to discover the first steps of their researches. We, however, decline here embarking upon a historical research of such a kind, believing, that under the present circumstances, when only so few of their philosophical works have

* Lassen's Indische Alterthumskunde, vol. ii. p. 477. His (Páñini's) text-book continued to be the norm of the whole following time, and the labours of his successors were limited to the task to narrow or amplify his rules or more lucidly to arrange them. From his work the same effect results, as from other pursuits of the Hindus on the field of science. By a person of superior talent the labours of his predecessors were rendered more perfect and brought to a close; he united them in a system of rules, or Sútras, which he condensed as much as possible. This exposition remained the standard of all later times, and formed the foundation for the succeeding teachers of the same science, whose efforts were in general directed to the correct explanation and elucidation as well as to the emendation and perfection of the fundamental work, and by whom the science was carried to a higher degree only as to its extent, but not as to its contents. We may discover a double motive, from which this manner of exposition took its rise. First, the sum total of the results which had been gained, should be condensed in the shortest form and hence the learning by rote facilitated...... Secondly, this mode of exposition rendered the understanding of the text difficult and often impossible, unless it was accompanied by an explanation. Such an explanation was at the disposal of the teachers, and by their guidance alone the pupils were able to comprehend the obscure sense of the text-books. The Bráhmans, the only possessors of the sciences, thus secured for themselves the privilege of communicating them only to those whom they thought worthy of this information, and of preventing the other castes from an initiation with them. It is only in this sense that a secret doctrine of the Bráhmans can be admitted. From the circumstance, that for each single science text-books of this kind were generally acknowledged as standards, it was a consequence, that the works of the first founders and of the predecessors of the person who brought a science to perfection, were forgotten and frequently lost.
been published; and in general so many more materials are required for the task than we can boast to possess, it is more important to place an original work of Hindu philosophy before the public, and to examine the principles under which it has been constructed. For this end we consider the Nyáya in that shape, which it has acquired by its amalgamation with the doctrines of the Vaiséshika, since we are of Colebrooke's opinion, that both sprang from the same root, and are but branches of the same school; the one being directed more to the explanation of material, the other of logical forms.* Or to state it more exactly,—to the Nyáya belong the logical doctrines of the forms of syllogisms, terms and propositions; to the Vaiséshika the systematical explanation of the categories (the simplest metaphysical ideas) of the metaphysical, physical, and psychical notions, which notions are hardly touched upon in Goutama's (the supposed founder of the Nyáya) Sútras. They differ in their statement of the several modes of proof; the Nyáya asserting four modes of proof—from perception, inference, analogy, and verbal communication; the Vaiséshika admitting only the two first ones.†

The name of logic, usually applied to the Nyáya, does not correctly define it. It does not treat of the theory of syllogisms and the notions connected with them, as its direct object, but only as a component part of its investigation. It rather aspires to the distinction of giving a complete system of philosophy, based upon the most elementary metaphysical notions, and the division dedicated to the explanation of syllogistical forms, is not even more explicitly treated than other parts of the system. To call the Nyáya logic, would be the same as to assign this name to the philosophy of Aristotle. There is no doubt, however, that the Nyáya has first among the philosophical systems of the Hindus thoroughly examined the art of reasoning, and shaped it into its present form. Hence it gained such ascendancy among the learned Hindus, that all of them, however they may deviate from other doctrines of the Nyáya, refer to it as to their standard in logic, and deem its study necessary for the purpose of giving a firm basis to their reasoning.

† The view above given, was based upon the Sútras of Gautama, without a reference to a work of the Vaiséshika school. I have since compared the Sútras of Kaágáda and found my view completely confirmed.
Introduction.

It is indeed one of the principal merits of the Nyāya, that its progress is marked by an admirably exact division of the topics, treated in it, and in this respect it is not only superior to all other systems of the Hindus, but even modern philosophy might, with advantage, study it on account of its clearness and exactness. Though none of its investigations has been carried on to a satisfactory end, the Nyāya has, with the means at its command, fully described the circle within which it moved. We must at the same time admit, that notwithstanding its exactness, there is one inherent fault in its exposition, viz. the neglect of all analytical method, a fault of all systems of the Hindus, which has, perhaps, more than any thing else, contributed to the narrow limits of their mental horizon. This fault, which, however, it shares with many other expositions of philosophy, for instance, to mention a celebrated name, with Spinoza's system, is rather a fault of exposition than of the system itself; for no synthesis (in science) is possible without analysis, and having well understood the leading notions of a system, we can easily trace the analytical way by which they were obtained. This apparent absence of analysis in the construction of the philosophical systems of the Hindus is the reason why so many enquirers have done injustice to their philosophical talent. For want of a clear analysis, unable to understand the aphorisms of the Hindu schools, composed in a language in form as well as in thought, foreign to them, they thought the philosophical productions of many centuries and of an ingenious people, a web of either abstruse or puerile notions. On a closer examination we shall come to a juster opinion of them, and although we find a limit as well in the range as the depth of their enquiries, we shall come to place them among the nations which advanced the intellectual progress of mankind.

That Hindu philosophy will, however, have any great influence upon the development of European philosophy and mediately of European civilization, must be denied. Why should this be the case? Although we must admit, that the philosophical researches of the Hindus are as worthy of attention as those of the Greeks, still it is at the first glance evident, that the philosophical works of the former are unfit to be transferred to another soil, while those of the latter will have always the same influence upon every rising generation in every clime and age. This difference lies not so much in the development of the system
as in the form. You are compelled to think by reading the works of the Greeks, they introduce you into the process of their thoughts, and by this force you to accompany them with your own thoughts, until you arrive as it were by your own mind at the principles of their systems, from which point it is easy either to look back upon the way you have made or to advance further. The Hindus, on the other hand, are dogmatical. They commence synthetically with a statement of their principles, yet do not condescend to unfold the train of thought which has led to them. Hence it is impossible for any one to understand their writings who has not previously, to a considerable degree, been practised in philosophical enquiries. The punishment however of this mystery and exclusion is the want of interest, felt in the study of their writings. The same doctrines which might have been instrumental in enlightening thousands, are now forgotten, or in the possession of a few who are hardly able to comprehend them.

Among the general metaphysical notions, the notion of substance is the most important one, as upon it all other notions are either founded or are closely connected with it, and whatever may be the solution of all other metaphysical problems, it must be influenced by the notion of substance.

Substances are, according to the Nyāya, the substrata of qualities and actions,* a definition, which is the right one, as the basis of further investigation—it is the right one, because founded on experience. Substance, we add, is in so far the substratum of qualities and actions, as the existence of qualities and actions depends upon the existence of substance; if quality were independent of another, it could not represent another, whose quality it is. The existence of substance must therefore be absolute, that is to say, not dependent upon the existence of another; for in this case, it would be comprehended, not by the notion of substance, but by that of quality. And consequently, to think the idea of substance by any notions including dependance, is a contradiction. This contradiction (of comprehending substance under the notion of quality, and therefore of dependance) was committed by the Nyāya by the distinction between eternal and non-eternal substances, because the

* Or rather of qualities alone according to the modern school of the Nyāya. The definition, that substances are the substrata of qualities and actions, belongs to Kaṇāda.
existence of the latter is not independent. In the notion of eternal substance, however, the true notion of substance is included, which is to be independent of time and cause.

Another question is, how a substance is united with its qualities? That a substance should have qualities, appears a matter of course, and to question it, shows a vast progress in metaphysical thinking. Although the Nyāya entered not expressly into the discussion of this subject, it must have felt its weight, as they found it necessary to invent a contrivance for such a connexion. A substance is, according to them, united with its qualities by a relation, called intimate relation, which is something real, and is neither in substances, nor qualities, nor actions. We do not intend here to analyze this notion any further (stating, however, that the difficulty is not really removed by it.*) but we turn to a third point in the notion of substance. Substance, according to the Nyāya, is not only united with its qualities by the relation, just mentioned, but all substances are united with the general notion of substance, and single substances in the same way with the notion of their own class. This general notion is rather a common property; for it does exist, independent of the mind which may conceive it, in the substances (also in qualities and actions) themselves, and is even eternal in eternal substances, not eternal in transient substances. This notion exactly corresponds with that of the so-called realists among the scholastic philosophers, who maintained the reality of general notions. Duns Scotus, for instance, asserted, that general properties (notions) were not only in objects potentia, but acta, and that generality was not only formed by the understanding, but that it existed previously to the mental conception per se as a reality, viz., the quiddity itself, which was

* For if it is necessary, that qualities require some link to unite them with substances, it is also necessary, that this link should be united with them by a similar link, and so on. The difficulty, as regards the connection of qualities, is briefly stated, thus. The existence of qualities is dependent upon the existence of the substance, whose qualities they are, but not vice versa. Substance in accordance to its notion, is independent of qualities. Substance therefore is something of itself, and also something on which qualities are dependent, and in this latter respect it is not substance, which is to be independent of qualities. That is to say, the notion of substance in this form is contradictory, and should be abandoned for a notion which is consistent.
indifferent to general or individual existence. A cause, however, was required to remove this indifference, viz. another more extensive quiddity, closely united with the first, and with the principle of indivi­duity. (afterwards called haecceity.)*

In one point the Nyāya went a step in advance of most of the ancien­t systems of philosophy, viz., in its assumption, that the special qualities of substances are effects; for instance earth is the intimate (or material) cause of smell, the soul of knowledge, &c. They were no doubt urged to this assumption by the contradiction, which arises, if beside substance, a quality which is necessary and therefore belongs to the quale of the substance, is admitted. If quality is an effect of substance, its existence is evidently derived, and the contradiction re­moved. Although, however, this hypothesis is a step in advance, it is not the complete solution of the difficulty; for here again the question will arise, how it is possible, that a substance can become a cause, that is, produce something, which is foreign to itself.

Substances, as before said, according to the Nyāya, are either ete­rnal or non-eternal. Eternal are space, time, ether, soul, and the atoms of mind, earth, water, fire, and air. Non-eternal are all compounds, or the things which we actually perceive, and which must have a cause of their existence. Thus substances are divided into those which are without cause, and those which have a cause.

There are three causes;—1. The cause of intimate relation, or material cause, as yarn is the material cause of cloth;—2. The proximate cause, or the actual union of the parts which are to form a compound; —and 3. The instrumental cause, viz. the cause by which this union is effected.

This is similar to the doctrine of Aristotle, who admitted four causes; a material cause, a moving cause, a formal cause, and an end cause. The instrumental cause includes Aristotle's formal, moving, and end causes.

The notion of causality is certainly well considered, and infinitely su­perior to the notions which other Indian systems formed of it; for there are already made some steps in advance towards the proper discussion of this notion, if a difference in causes is acknowledged. In the enume­ration of causes—the cause of motion appears to have been omitted; it is,

however, contained in the notion of instrumental causality. All activity according to the Nyāya is limited to motion, acts of the mind being considered by them as qualities, and as all actions abide in substances, we must think every substance as a cause of motion (viz. the last cause). They did not, however, discuss, whether motion was necessary to all substances, or only to some or to one, that is to say, whether there is a primum mobile or not; they did not discuss the question, whether or not different motions require different causes; nor did they lastly enter into an explanation of the notion itself.* They appear in fact not to have been aware of the intrinsic difficulties of the idea of causality, which undoubtedly is one of the most difficult metaphysical notions.† The contradictions in the notion of cause and effect appear with special force to apply to such causes, by which a change in the qualities of a substance is effected, as chemical, animal, and psychical effects. Such effects are, however, denied by the Nyāya. Material causes must be understood as only the substrata, or the materials for a new union, as for instance, the two halves from which a pot is produced, are the material cause of the pot. There are therefore no real changes, but only changes of the accidental form, which substances may assume in their connexion with others; and there should not be changes at all we add. Every compound substance, according to the Nyāya, is ultimately produced from simple substances. Simple substances, however, are eternal, and all their qualities are also eternal. If this is the case, there is also

* The contradictions which Zeno found in the idea of motion, are well known, and without fully acknowledging their weight, it is impossible to obtain a correct notion of it. Aristotle was well aware of this, and endeavoured to remove Zeno's objections to this notion. How important it is, correctly to define this notion, is evident even from the influence, which it exercised on the Nyāya, where motion is considered as an act, and even as the only act.

† Vide Sext. Emp. Adv. mathem. in Ritter's History of Philos. Vol. iv. p. 339. That cause could not be later than effect, is evident; but also the effect cannot be later than the cause; for if so, the cause, being antecedent to the effect, would be without effect, and a cause without effect, is a contradiction. And if the effect would be consequent to the cause, it would be, when the cause is no more, therefore an effect without cause. Both therefore must be necessarily together. If this be conceded, then there is the difficulty, why the one more than the other is producing (or cause). These are only part of the difficulties, and without solving them, the objections made against causality, are quite just.
no change of qualities in any compound substances, because by any connexion between them, different from an accidental relation, they would assume changes, contradictory to the notion, under which they are conceived. As the Nyáya, however, admits an actual change in compound substances, in which qualities, not to be met with in the simple substances, are produced, and moreover admits a compound, in which there is a comparatively firm connexion of the parts with each other, it has deviated from its notion of causality, and is hence guilty of the contradiction which it first endeavoured to escape. Notwithstanding these deficiencies of the Nyáya, we still maintain, that it approached nearer than any other Hindu system, to the true notion of causality, causality being, according to Pantheistic, not less than to skeptical idea, a product of habit in the association of our ideas.

In passing from the general metaphysical (ontological) to more special investigations (comprehending natural philosophy and psychology), we may first observe, that the same clearness obtains in the latter as in the former. Existence, or rather that which exists (τὸ δύτως δύναται), in its connexion with material and immaterial phenomena, is much more distinctly conceived than in other systems of the Hindus. We find indeed the same material elements as in the latter; viz., earth, water, light, air, and ether, and also the same qualities; but while in all others they are only generally described, here there is made an attempt to explain the special phenomena as well as the sources of our perception of them, or in one word, we find here the basis of observation, and of the first lineaments of the consequent reflection upon the results of that observation. We meet here also with the first remarks about space and time, and even with some correct notions of their nature, and although both of them are placed among the substances, we must not forget the intrinsic difficulties of this subject, which in our times only has been more satisfactorily investigated by Kant, Fichte, and Herbart. The error of considering space and time as substances, is a consequence of the notion the Nyáya had formed of substance, viz. as the substrate of qualities and actions. This idea would, indeed, have been correct, had the notion of existence been preserved. The Védánta certainly had a much more exact idea of existence, maintaining, that which exists (τὸ δύτως δύναται) must be simply existent, without any attribute whatever, and should strictly not be even considered by a plurality of notions. The Védánta,
Introduction.

However, by denying the reality of phenomena, had nothing to explain, while the Nyāya, retaining the crude notions, given by observation, had no principles whereby to explain them. The most interesting point in this part of the system is the investigation into the nature of matter, an investigation which was indeed entered into by other Hindu systems, yet not with the same success. The Vēdānta, for instance, reduced the objects of the senses, or the things composed of the gross elements, to elements which are finer and imperceptible to the senses, undoubtedly for the same reasons as the Nyāya, viz. because the origin, the changes, and the destruction of the material things compelled the mind to fix the notion of existence upon some other natures, not affected by those conditions. But according to the Vēdānta, the simpler elements are only simple, because they are unmixed with others. As regards space, however, no reduction was made, and their view on this point is very like the doctrine of Anaxagoras, who also started from an original identity of the elements with space. The Vēdānta indeed did not confine its thoughts to those elements, but proceeded to the supposition of a substance, in which there is no difference whatever, but for what reason this supposition was here made, it would be difficult to give a satisfactory reply, and as regards the principal point, space filled out by matter, it was not even touched upon. The Nyāya, on the other hand, has examined matter under this point of view, and arrived at the theory of atoms,* in the same way as Leucippus and Democritus. It proceeded even further. With Leucippus and Democritus atoms have some, though imperceptible, extent, and also different figures and mo-

* It is astonishing, that the Nyāyaikas made the supposition of such a substance as the ether, which, like space and time, is pervading and infinite. It is not space itself, but a kind of matter, filling out space, and can therefore be distinguished from it merely by a less degree of density. If so, the consequence should have been, that it was also composed of parts, the last elements of which are atoms. Instead of this, ether is some thing analogous to space, by its being infinite, and yet filling out an infinite space. In fact it appears, they assumed this notion of ether only historically, or as a part of the views on matter which had been formed previously to them. The doctrine of the five elements (ether, air, fire, water and earth) is one of the most ancient hypotheses of Indian philosophy. It is taught already in the Upanishads, and probably more ancient even than the doctrine of the soul. Hence it passed over into the different systems, viz. the Vēdānta, Sānkhya and Nyāya, modified according to the different views they held of substance.
tions, while the Nyáya held them to be absolute units of space, without any dimensions and motions, that is, mathematical points as regards space. They are eternal and unchangeable, and while they are without cause themselves, they are the cause of the material universe. They are imperceptible to the senses, and the knowledge of them is obtained by inference.

The system of Democritus is throughout a crude materialism. The last elements of existence are with him atoms which have no qualities whatever beside form and motion. The soul itself is merely a compound of round atoms, and a deity is of course impossible. A theory of atoms of such a kind is contradictory in its principle, and in its results leads to an annihilation of truth in general. The Nyáya is vastly superior to Democritus' theory; for atoms are first conceived in their real notion as units of matter without any extent, and secondly the theory of atoms forms only a subordinate part of their researches.

The same clearness and to a certain degree comprehensiveness is met with in their psychological enquiries. The faculties of the soul and its relations to the material things and other objects of knowledge, are methodically described. The Nyáya draws a marked line between matter and spirit, by distinctly stating the notions, under which either is perceived.

The soul has, according to the Nyáya, qualities, opposite to the qualities of the substances perceived by the senses, and is therefore distinct from these substances, that is to say, as regards special qualities; for as to qualities, ascribed to substances as far as they are substances, both must of course agree. Qualities of the soul are the emotions and desires, volition and aversion, etc. and knowledge. Knowledge is produced by intellect, which is one of the qualities (faculties) of the soul. Intellect is again fourfold, it is perception, inference, analogy and verbal knowledge. Perception (viz. perception generally, as well of external as of internal objects), is the source from which all other knowledge flows, or rather, without objects of perception the other faculties of intellect have no materials to work upon. All knowledge, that is perceived, is perceived through a medium, through an instrument, by which the soul is in communion either with objects from without or from within itself. External objects are perceived through five external senses, these being in contact with the mind, while internal objects, and
by them the soul, are only perceived through the mind. The doctrine of the communication of the soul with external objects is very curious and interesting, not only because it is original, but because it shows a remarkable acuteness in overcoming difficulties, met with in every system, which considers substances not only as individual beings, but also as a common essence that exists, although dependent upon the individual substances. To perceive individual external substances, and their properties in common with others, it is necessary that the intercourse of the senses with the external objects should take place accordingly, that is to say, that individual substances should be perceived by the connexion of the senses with these individual substances, and the common properties by the connexion of the senses with these common properties. Substances are then perceived in their different relations, viz. first, in the relation of this individual substance and this individual quality, or of this individual substance and this individual act; further, in the relation, which this individual substance has with its class (general essence) or with its generality; and lastly, in the relation, which this individual quality or this individual act of this individual substance has with its class or generality.

This, however, is not sufficient; for a full comprehension, there are required also general notions, corresponding with those relations. A tree for instance would not be perceived, without the general notion of a tree, by which a tree at any place and at any time is perceived. This general notion requires again a kind of special knowledge, by which the general notion of a tree is referred to a certain tree. This kind of knowledge, though corresponding with the relations of all substances, which have both general and special properties, and though (implicitly) contained in every object of perception, still differs from the general properties of the things. It is a conception of the soul, produced by its own activity. This knowledge then is internal perception, that is to say, it is not produced by inference, or analogy, or verbal communication, but it is immediate and complete, as all knowledge by perception. Every perception of external objects then, according to this exposition, is based upon two elements, an external and an internal, or as these expressions do not exactly represent their notions, an immediate and mediate, an objective and ideal knowledge. In the same way are the objects of the soul perceived, viz. its different qualities, as aversion,
volition, &c. are called. Though the soul is the object of the mind, it is not directly perceived by it, but is inferred from its qualities. It is not necessary here to explain the other faculties of intellect, viz. inference, comparison, and verbal communication, as they are discussed in another part of this paper. We here only add, that they must be considered as parts of the quality of knowledge, or, as we would express it, as modified operations of one and the same activity of the soul.

The mind, by which all knowledge is perceived, is not a quality or faculty of the soul itself, but an independent substance, atomic in its nature. Hence only a single perception or idea is at one time perceived by the soul.

The soul itself is eternal, and therefore so also are its qualities, we should say, also its knowledge, although this knowledge be not perceived by the soul itself. It is at the same time everywhere, not, however, as an infinite soul, as the universal soul of the Védánta, where all things constitute the pervading soul, be it even a piece of matter, though bound by ignorance to a state of apparent material existence, but in the same way as space and time are connected with everything. There is a general soul, and there are individual souls. The general soul has the same qualities with the individual souls, with the exception of aversion, pleasure, pain, merit and demerit, because these qualities would involve imperfections. The individual soul is subject to the law of transmigration, and happiness and misery are the consequences of its good or bad actions. It is, however, possible for the individual soul to emerge from the vicissitudes of worldly existence by the attainment of true knowledge.

Here it is necessary to point out what place the notion of the general soul or the deity (Īśwara, the Ruler) holds in the system of the Nyáya.

The Védánta denies a personal deity. There is a supreme soul, but this soul is all in all, individual souls are emanations from it, as sparks from fire, and are essentially identical with it. Nature in its first elements as well as in its development depends upon it. The

* How is mind united with the soul? Not by any act of either; for they are independent of each other. They are united by something without them, viz. by the power of God, in the same way, as atoms are united with each other; for these latter, although the material causes of compound substances, are not causes of their connexion.
Védánta in fact destroys the distinctions between God and nature; every distinction is delusion, and there is nothing but one all-pervading, knowing and blissful being, and even such distinctions as of existence, knowledge, bliss, are not real distinctions, they are but contrivances to approach to the true idea of the One.—If there is nothing but existence, but knowledge, but truth, there should be no difference whatever, and least of all any delusion, on the contrary, there is with man almost nothing but delusion; only few approach the true notion of God, and but inadequately; in most men there is only difference found, and nature is altogether opposed to it. Nay, this is not only the case in the last emanation of this deity, but if we comprehend nature in its principle, where all differences of substance, quality, form, &c. disappear, if we comprehend it as dependent upon the soul, it is ignorance, that is to say, indiscreet matter, it is non-existence, non-knowledge, &c. but this, Proteus-like being, of which it cannot be said, that it exists, nor, that it does not exist, is to be placed upon the soul, to be understood by it. This is to say: in theory the Védánta acknowledges but one principle, the infinite soul, in fact, however, two, soul and non-soul, ignorance or matter.

With reference to God, the Sánkhya is divided into two sects, the theistical and the atheistical.*

* Col. M. E. pp. 251-2. God, Iśwara, the supreme ruler according to Páñjáli, is a soul or spirit distinct from other souls, unaffected by the ills with which they are beset, unconcerned with good or bad deeds and their consequences, and with fancies or passing thoughts. In him is the utmost omniscience. He is the instructor of the earliest beings that have a beginning (the deities of mythology) himself infinite, unlimited by time.

Kapila, on the other hand, denies an Iśwara, ruler of the world by volition, alleging, that there is no proof of God's existence, unperceived by the senses, not inferred from reasoning, nor yet revealed. He acknowledges, indeed, a being issuing from nature, who is intelligence absolute, source of all individual intelligences and origin of other existences successively evolved and developed. He expressly affirms, that the truth of such an Iśwara is demonstrated, the Creator of worlds, in such sense of creation; for “the existence of effects,” he says, “is dependent upon consciousness, not upon Iśwara,” and, “all else is from the great principle.” Yet, that being is finite, having a beginning and an end, dating from the grand development of the universe, to terminate with the consummation of all things. But an infinite being, creator and guider of the universe by volition, Kapila positively denies.

See also Wilson's Sánkhya Kárika, pp. 166 to 168.
Kapila denied altogether a deity; the Iswara whom he admits, is only a finite being; for although he assumes a being, whose intelligence is absolute, yet this being issues from nature, and is again to terminate in nature. It is very much to be regretted, that of Pātanjali's doctrine nothing as yet has been published. It is difficult to form an exact idea of his being from the words, quoted by Colebrooke. According to them he has some attributes of the deity; he is of the utmost omniscience, infinite, unlimited by time; but how he is connected with the creation and ruling of the universe, it is impossible to conceive. If his doctrine in other points agrees with the atheistical Sāṇkhya, all the development of the world in its different forms is independent of him; for it is the necessity of nature, that certain emanations are issuing from it, and returning to it after certain periods. It would rather appear, that he is a kind of Epicurean deity, blissful in himself and unconcerned with the affairs of the world.

The Nyāya is essentially theistical. According to them, God is personal. He is not, as it expressly asserts, mere existence, mere knowledge, mere bliss, but he is a substance, of which existence, &c. are attributes; for it is impossible to think of existence, knowledge, &c., without referring them to a subject which exists, which has knowledge, &c. He is not the supreme soul of the Vēdānta which is the whole universe, but distinguished as well from the world as from finite spirits. He is not a mere emanation from nature, as Kapila asserted, but altogether different from nature, and self-existent. He is also not, as appears to be Pātanjali's opinion, a merely omniscient being; but he is of infinite power, the Ruler of the universe, and nature could not exist independent of a God, or could exist only without order, harmony and object. And this idea is not only a fortuitous addition to the system, but one of its chief springs; for all the substances in the world, without God, remain unconnected. There may be atoms, but they do not constitute a world, they are solitary, unconnected, without any apparent difference; of themselves they have no action, produce no effects, and not even the simplest compound of two atoms can arise from them alone, much less a compound of a certain form and for certain objects, not the world in its unity, harmony, and infinite variety of forms. There may be souls, independent of a creator, but without conscience, without enjoyment, without development and without a final end, for
they are not united with mind, the instrument, by which they are connected with the world, among themselves and with the creator. Because this connexion exists, because there is form, because individual souls have conscience, therefore it is necessary to assume a God who by his infinite power and knowledge is the author of this connexion, of the all-pervading harmony of the world. This argument for the existence of a deity is essentially teleological or based upon final causes in nature. The deity is the creator of the world as to its form, not as to its matter.

The Nyāya approaches most closely of all Hindu systems the Christian notion of God, as its deity is an infinite spirit and at the same time personal, as it is wholly distinct from matter, and the creator and ruler of the universe.

It would be superfluous to point out the marked distinction, drawn here between body and soul. Though a higher development of philosophy may destroy the distinctions between soul and matter, that is, may recognise matter, or what is perceived as matter, as the same with the soul (as for instance, Leibnitz did), it is nevertheless certain, that no true knowledge of the soul is possible, without first drawing a most decided line of demarcation between the phenomena of matter and of the soul. In the Nyāya there is even an approximation to the doctrine, that soul and matter are as to their principles one and the same, viz. in the theory of atoms, according to which atoms are the negation of space. From this notion we may draw the inference, which has not been drawn by the Nyāya, it is true, but which would have been only a necessary consequence from the premises, that matter, being a compound of atoms, is only a phenomenon, as regards its extension through space. Where then is here shown the difference between the soul and the true substratum of matter? Let us see then, what is the soul? The soul is different from matter, as this last is perceived by the senses as extended through space. This distinction is true, but further to conclude, that the soul is also different from matter in its real nature, where matter is not extended, is certainly hasty, and does not follow from the premises. What then is the soul according to them? It is all-pervading, infinite, like ether, space and time. This answer, though far from satisfactory, shows, that they felt the difficulty in determining the notion of the soul, when their other notions had undergone a decided alteration. The most peculiar notion in their psychological theory is the existence of
of the mind independent of soul, although most intimately connected
with it; for through the mind only the soul perceives, as well its own
qualities, as the qualities of external substances. How could the Nyāya
have made a supposition in which the contradiction is so evident? For
it is easy to conclude, that if the mind is independent, its perception is
also independent. If the mind perceives, this perception is not in the
soul, and if this perception is in the soul, it is not perceived. The soul
then has knowledge, which is not real knowledge, because not perceived,
and the mind has no knowledge, though it perceives.

We may solve this difficulty at least in some way. The mind was
first undoubtedly considered as an internal sense according to the ana-
logy of external senses, in order that there be a unity of perception, and
that, as the external objects are perceived through different media,
the objects of the soul be perceived through an analogous internal
medium, a supposition, which has also been made in modern (English)
philosophy. So far the Nyāya might have considered the mind as
an internal sense, but they met with a difficulty, which was not felt in
the same intensity by modern philosophers. If knowledge be per-
ceived by the soul through the medium of the mind (the internal sense),
why is it not always present in the mind? why does it disappear
and give place to other objects of perception, etc.? Locke was surprised
at the narrowness of the human mind, without being able to account
for it; the Nyāya in endeavouring to account for it, invented an inde-
pendent substance, the mind, which is an atom, and according to its
atomic nature only able to represent or to perceive one object at one
and the same time.

This, I think, is the solution of the difficulty, and though it is cer-
tainly only an evasion, because its supposition creates greater difficulties
than the former one, it still gives evidence of a spirit of enquiry in the
school.

In comparing the psychological theory of the Nyāya with more
modern doctrines (with the exception of the latest period) we must
admit, that in a metaphysical point of view there is no great difference
between them. The same objections are to be made to either, the
doctrine of faculties being involved in the same contradictions as that
of qualities. In either case, if you are to explain, what the soul is, you
have to state, what it is, independent of its qualities or faculties, and
also to enumerate the latter. Your explanation will thus point out a quale, which is not a unity, but something defined by a variety of notions. This, however, is not the place to discuss the matter, and we wished only to remind the reader, that modern philosophy in this respect cannot boast to have advanced one single step beyond that of the Hindus, that is to say, in the metaphysic of the soul, although it would be absurd to deny, that modern psychology, as to the observation of psychical phenomena, has made rapid strides towards perfection.

In passing over to the strictly logical enquiries of the Nyāya, we have to premise, that we cannot view them with the same satisfaction, and although we may make ample allowance for the different forms of language, in which they are explained, we are compelled to confess, that they are neither exact nor complete.

The Nyāya has treated the logical topics in the inverse order of that adopted by us, viz. first inference, then ideas, and lastly propositions. This order is followed, not in consequence of a different method of arrangement, but in consequence of the subjects being based upon different grounds, and flowing from different sources. Logic might undoubtedly be treated analytically and commence with the exposition of syllogistical forms. Considering argument as a fact, we might analyse various arguments, and proceeding to their elements, that is to propositions, gradually arrive at ideas or notions. But the Nyāya, far from following such an analytical course, holds inference to be a quality (or modification of a quality), different from the quality of forming names and notions, and discusses inference before verbal knowledge, evidently with the purpose of showing, that the latter in some way depends upon the former.

We, however, treat these doctrines in their common order, with no other intention than to make ourselves better understood.

Verbal knowledge is one of the divisions of intellect. The first act or the first condition of understanding words, is the forming of the name! A name is corresponding to a certain object, and this object is connected with the name by the power of the name. A name which has such a power, is a word. The clear and distinct knowledge of what is implied in a word, is produced by a third act, and is the meaning of a word. This latter is in fact identical with idea or notion, as is evident from the examples given, as for instance, a tree is a thing which has root, stem, branches, leaves, etc.
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... Here again is the order perverted, the name is certainly not the first operation, and the object to be named, the second, but just the reverse. There must be objects to be named, and though we may admit, that the clear idea of a subject often succeeds a name, still the object, of which the notion is formed, is the first, and we must assert, that what precedes the notion, also precedes the name.

The enquiry, how ideas are formed from a variety of similar objects, belongs to psychology, and however interesting this question otherwise may be, logic has nothing to do with the psychical process, by which ideas are produced. If this were the case, we might still have to wait for a logic, as a psychological theory has not yet been established to general satisfaction, while logic as a science has been complete for more than two thousand years. By the considering first of the names and afterwards of the corresponding notions, the real character of a notion has been at least obscured. From the given examples we see, that a notion, instead of being defined by the genus, under which it is contained, and the specific difference, is explained by a genus, which is distant from it by a number of intervening notions (for instance, genus of tree=thing) and by a specific difference, which besides its own difference, enumerates properties which it partakes with others (for instance root, stem, leaves, etc.=specific difference).

The meaning of a word or idea, ought to have been considered in its connexion with other ideas, as made up by genus and differentia specifica, and as excluded from them by their compatible, contrary, and contradictory opposition. Here, however, are genus and species raised to categories under the names of generality and particularity, being there the common properties of substances, qualities, and acts, while the opposition of ideas or terms is treated in the seventh category, that of negation. Negation is the category which arises, if the categories are mutually denied of each other. It is the mutual difference of the categories and therefore the same with logical opposition. Negation is again of four kinds, mutual negation, antecedent negation, (negation of a thing, that is to be,) emergent negation (destruction) and absolute negation. Of them antecedent and emergent negations are not logical, but metaphysical negations, viz. the relations which a thing may have with regard to its origin or cessation in time. Mutual negation corresponds to contrary opposition (oppositio contraria) of terms. For instance:
black is the negation of white, of red, &c. and vice versa; here the one is not denied in an absolute, but in a relative manner. Absolute negation* would correspond to contradictory opposition (oppositio contradictoria) as is evident from an allusion to it in the explanation of a negative inference. Here it is said, that a notion is the negation of its absolute non-existence, for instance cloth is the negation of its absolute non-existence, non-cloth, or A = Non—Non— A, that is to say, A is the negation of what is in contradictory opposition to A.

From this arrangement then did not only result an imperfect exposition of the logical relations among ideas, but an important metaphysical error, by which logical relations of ideas are considered as real properties of substances.

In finding the logical treatment of notions by no means satisfactory, we may at the same time observe, that there are many valuable remarks on some psychological and grammatical relations of ideas which we do not recollect to have found elsewhere. These we have given in a note to the text, where this subject is explained.

A proposition to convey a distinct meaning, must, according to the Nyāya, have four qualities:

1. Contiguity, which, according to some, is the uninterrupted succession of the words pronounced in a sentence, so that for instance, the first word of it be not pronounced in the present moment, and the next half an hour afterwards, according to others, the arrangement of the words according to their grammatical connexion, for instance, that a preposition be placed together with the word which depends upon it, and not with a word, to which it does not refer.

2. Consistency, or the mutual agreement of the words, according to their sense, so that contradictory terms be not connected.

3. Structure, or the grammatical (terminations) forms of the words, which correspond in their meanings (for instance, that the verb agrees with the subject in number and person.)

* There is a difference of opinion in the Nyāya with reference to absolute negation. Some appear to conceive it merely as a negation of present existence, others as the negation of a contradictory notion. In this last sense Colebrooke understood it, (Misc. Essays, Vol. I. p. 288,) and this is also the interpretation of the Mīmāṃsā. (Wilson’s Sāṅkhya Karika, p. 19.) That the author of the Bhāṣa Paricchéda adopted also this sense, appears to me evident from the above explanation.
4. Intention, that is, the meaning which the speaker wishes to convey by a sentence.

There again the logical characteristics of a proposition have been omitted, as all those points, with the exception perhaps of consistency, belong to the grammatical structure of a sentence.

The logical explanation of propositions, as a matter of course, passes over any grammatical form a proposition may assume; it treats only of the relation between two ideas, and its simple question is, whether two ideas can be connected or not.

It is evident, that in this way neither quantity, nor modality of propositions could have been discovered. We might, however, dispense with them, as these forms are not strictly logical; but not even the division of propositions according to their quality has been made by the Nyāya.

The theory of ideas and propositions is the weakest point in the logic of the Nyāya; they are more successful in explaining the form of arguments; for though the theory of syllogism is far from exact and complete, we must admit, that they understood the general character of a syllogism.

According to Gautama a complete syllogism contains five members (Avayava = proposition). 1. The proposition (pratijña, that which is to be proved by the argument). 2. The reason, argument (hētu). 3. The instance (Udāharana, drishtanta). 4. The application (upanaya). 5. The conclusion (nīgamaṇa), for instance:

1. This hill is fiery,
2. For it smokes,
3. What smokes is fiery, as for instance, a culinary hearth.
4. This hill smokes,
5. Therefore it is fiery.

The modern school of the Nyāya reduced the syllogism to three, and even to two members, and this last reduction appears to have been most generally adopted,* as it is in the Tarka Sangraha and Bhāsha

* Colebrooke (Mis. Essays, Vol. I. p. 292), adverted only to Gautama's Sūtras, and not to a more modern work of the Nyāya, when he asserted, that the regular syllogism of the Nyāya consisted of five members. The modern school of the Nyāya (vide Dr. Ballantyne's Lectures on the Tarka Sangraha, p. 31), declares the five membered form rhetorical in distinction from its logical form, which contains only two members. Dr. Ballantyne has clearly pointed this out in his trea-
Paricchéda. In this form the two premises, viz. major and minor propositions are condensed into one premise, of which we shall now give a description.

That a syllogism be correct, two things are required. 1, a general proposition, in which the subject (reason) is invariably connected with a predicate (conclusion), more comprehensive than the subject, and 2, a minor term, with which the subject of the general proposition is connected. That there is this double connexion of the minor term with the reason, and of the reason with the conclusion, is to be decided by consideration, which is the intercourse between the minor term and the reason, as connected with the general predicate or the predicate of the conclusion. This consideration is only one, and therefore the form of the antecedent of the conclusion can only be one, or: there is only one premise, by which the minor term is expressed as determined by the reason in its invariable connexion with the conclusion.

For instance: let a man from former observation know, that smoke is invariably connected with fire, as for instance on a culinary hearth;

tise on the Nyáya system, and also in his Lectures on the Nyáya philosophy. He says, (Nyáya system of philosophy, p. 5.)

"Now, in this form of the syllogism (which we do not find alluded to in Mr. Colebrooke's essay), there is neither more nor less than there is in the Aristotelic syllogism. The wonder would be if there had been. The first formal difference observable is, the wrapping up of the premises in one logical datum. The reason for preferring to regard these as two inseparable members of a single statement appears to have been this, that it is only when simultaneously present to the mind, that the premises suggest the inference, and this simultaneousness of cognizance is secured by combining the two assertions in a period, or sentence, of which the whole becomes intelligible only when the last word in it has been uttered.... If we separate the two members of the original datum in the example above cited, we obtain the following:

Whatever smokes, is fiery;
The hill smokes,
Therefore the hill is fiery;"

and p. 9. "To return to our text-book. The author tells us, that a man, after having, to the satisfaction of his own mind, inferred the presence of fire from the perception of smoke, may wish to impart his conviction to another. In other words having ascertained the truth as a logician, he may wish as a rhetorician, to establish it to the satisfaction of somebody else. Here we step distinctly out of the province of logic, and enter that of rhetoric."
let him see afterwards an uninterrupted column of smoke rising from a hill, he will recollect the general proposition, that smoke is invariably connected with fire. Hence the knowledge arises: This hill is possessed of smoke, which is invariably connected with fire. This knowledge, this one act, by which there is a progress from one object to a third by a second, is consideration, from which the conclusion arises: This hill is fiery.

This is in its principal points the theory of the Nyāya of the form of the syllogism. It is essentially the same with that of Aristotle. The differences are two. The first is a difference in the form, or rather in expression, viz. that the two premises are combined into one. The exposition is certainly not simple, for the different combination of the ideas, forming a syllogism, ought to be represented in their natural form, which is the connexion of two in a proposition, and the same principle ought to have been applied to the conclusion; for if it is true that two premises must be combined into one, the conclusion also should not be stated in a separate sentence, but the whole syllogism should form one sentence, for instance, in the example: This hill, determined by smoke, which is determined by fire, is determined by fire. Yet the difference is only apparent; for the Nyāya, as Aristotle, connects one notion with the other through a third with which the latter is connected, or excludes it by a third, from which the second is excluded.

The second difference is, that the Nyāya wanted not only to give rules for the correctness of the logical operation in arguing, but to guard against false premises, and for this purpose the consideration was also to establish the truth of the major proposition by a reference to an instance, in which the truth of the preposition was exemplified. Their consideration was therefore not only directed to the logical operation of arguing, but also to the truth which may result from it, and both the truth of the conclusion, and the correctness of the argument should be the result of one and the same operation, which of course is impossible.

With the exposition of the form of syllogism the logical theory of the Nyāya is nearly completed. Gautama divided inference into three kinds; 1, inference of an effect from a cause, as if rain is inferred from a collection of clouds; 2, inference of a cause from an effect, as if rain is concluded from an increase of the water in a river; and 3, inference from general notions, as if earth is inferred to be a substance from its
having the quality of smell. This division, it is hardly necessary to remark, is not logical, as cause and effect are metaphysical notions and have no relation whatever to the different forms of syllogism. The modern school of the Nyāya has therefore not adopted this division, but acknowledges three kinds of syllogisms; which are: only affirmative inference, only negative inference, and inference, at the same time affirmative and negative. From the examples, given in illustration, it appears, that the latter includes two moods of the first and second figures, Barbara and Camestres; Barbara being the type for all general affirmative conclusions, and Camestres for all general negative ones. Here, however, is their theory finished, and we find no trace of the different moods the syllogistical forms can enter into.

It is a remarkable circumstance, that the general form of syllogism should have been found by the Hindus, and yet that they should not have discovered the different figures and moods, the diversities of which are the result of mere combination. We think, this deficiency was the consequence of two causes especially,—first, of their technical language, which although precise, is yet cumbrous and not comprehensive, and secondly, of their pious regard for every thing traditional, be it in political institutions, in religion, or in science. The Sūtras, which are the foundations of their systems, have always remained text-books, and any discovery that had been made in theory, did not prompt them to attempt a new exposition of science, but gave only occasion to a new interpretation of the school.

The Bhāsha Pariccheda itself is a work of the modern Nyāya. The author Viswanātha Panchānana Bhaṭṭa, the son of Vidyānivāsa Bhaṭṭa, accompanied the text with a commentary under the title “Siddhānta Muktāvali” (the pearl-wreath of truth), and he is known also by his commentary to Gautama’s Sūtras, which bears the title “Nyāya Sūtra Vritti.” According to the statement of the Pandits he lived about two hundred years ago. The Bhāsha Pariccheda is a text-book in the schools of the Nyāya in Bengal. There is no Pandit of any repute who does not know it well, and many know the whole of it by heart. And indeed it is admirably adapted for the purpose of introduction into the study of the Nyāya philosophy. It is a succinct exposition of the principal topics of the whole system, and may easily be committed to memory. It is written in the well known Anusṭup metre. The style,
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However, is not poetical at all, but that of the most sober prose, and nowhere is the attempt made to combine the graces of imagination with philosophical method.

The course, followed in the work, is simple. The author gives first the leading ideas of the system, that is, the most comprehensive metaphysical notions, viz. the notions of substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, intimate relation and negation. He then enumerates the various substances, qualities, actions, &c. and defines the properties common to all categories as well as those common to more or less of them. After this exposition the different substances in their relations to themselves, to other substances and to their qualities and actions are explained. In the same way the author discusses the qualities of substances, and his work is finished, when he has treated on the last quality, enumerated at the commencement of his treatise.

The commentary is in thought and language a very different composition. It is written with the object of supporting the views of the author and of the school in its controversy with other doctrines, and enters therefore frequently into intricate discussions in establishing the fundamental tenets or defending disputed points of the system, and makes use of the whole armory of the sometimes very abstruse technical language of the Nyāya.

This commentary has again been commented upon by Mahādēva Bhaṭṭa, but I received a MS. of his work too late to make any other use of it than to compare it with the text.*

The Sanscrit text of the Bhāsha Pariccheda was first printed in Bengali characters in 1821, with the addition of a Bengali translation of the text and of the commentary. The translation of the latter, however, is rather, a paraphrase, as the alterations are sometimes considerable.†

* The MS. is in the Library of the Sanscrit College of Calcutta, of which, however, I was for a long time not aware, as it is not mentioned in the list of books in that Library, printed in the Sanscrit Catalogue of the Asiatic Society. It has two titles, "Mahādēva Bhaṭṭa-krīta Muktāvali Prakāsa:" and the shorter one, "Dinakarī Tīkā." In his introduction, the author mentions also the name of his father, Balakrishna.

† The title is, "A system of Logic, written in Sunscrit, by the Venerable Sage Booodh, and explained in a Sunscrit commentary by the very learned Viswonath Tarkalancar, translated into Bengalee by Kashee Nath Turkopunchanun. Calcutta, 1821."
Another edition of the Sanscrit text together with the commentary, appeared in 1827, under the auspices of the Committee of Public Instruction. The text is correct, but not so the commentary. It is full of mistakes, omissions and interpolations. The interpunctuation is either faulty or entirely disregarded, and the numbers of the successive Slokas are not attached to the corresponding portions of the commentary, so that an easy reference of the one to the other is impossible.

The present edition has been carefully revised partly by comparison with Mahádéva Bhaṭṭa's commentary, partly by a reference to the corrections in the copy of Jayánáráyana Tarkapanchánana, the professor of Nyáya in the Sanscrit College, which he had the kindness to lend me, and for which I offer my grateful acknowledgments.

The notes which I have added to the translation, are chiefly given for the purpose to elucidate the principal points of the system of the Nyáya, in accordance with the object of this work to contribute to a fair estimate of the merits of Hindu philosophy, and are therefore more copious in such parts as contain the distinguishing features of the Nyáya, for instance, the ontological portions, the doctrine of atoms, their notion of the deity, and their logical theory. They are less copious in portions which contain their explanation of the differences of matter; for as natural science with the Hindus has hardly made its beginning, their explanation is without any value. I would, however, guard here against the misconception, that their failing to explain the phenomena of matter, affected also the correctness of the principles, by which they tried to explain them. Natural science with reference to those phenomena is quite distinct from the philosophical theory for the interpretation of them. Democritus' explanation of natural phenomena may be entirely false, and still his theory of atoms may be correct, (although it is not in our opinion,) which is at least partly borne out by the fact, that in modern chemistry the theory of atoms has been adopted, although no one would admit the application of it which Democritus made for the explanation of the phenomena. The cause of this is a double one: first, philosophy is quite distinct from natural science, the latter being based upon observation and experiments, the former upon the relations which notions have among each other. Secondly, a philosophical system may have obtained the true principles for the explanation of intellectual and material phenomena, but at the same time
not have fully investigated the intermediate notions which may be necessary for explanation. A hasty application of these principles without due regard to such notions and to the results of natural science, is very apt to throw discredit upon the previous researches by which a system arrived at its principles, and also upon philosophy itself.

To mark the more the method of the philosophical discussion of the Nyāya, I have generally preferred to give their interpretation in their own words, and therefore made large extracts from the commentary in as literal a translation as possible, which I hope, will be found also useful to the student of the Nyāya in general, as facilitating the reading of the commentary and the understanding of the technical language of the Nyāya.
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DIVISION OF THE CATEGORIES OF THE NYA'YA PHILOSOPHY.

SALUTATION TO GANE'SA.

1. To Krishna, radiant like the new cloud, the thief of the clothes of the milkmaids, to him, who is the seed of the tree of the world, be adoration.

2. There are seven categories, substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, intimate relation and negation.

1. Padártha is explained in verse 13, as that which is object of knowledge, the commentary adds object of proof, of nomination; but as this applies to every idea, the definition is too wide, and ought to have been restricted to the most general objects of knowledge.

I have followed Colebrooke in translating Padártha with category, although that term somewhat differs from the idea which Aristotle expresses by the same. According to him, categories are the most extensive classes of what is denoted by the simple word (the word in no connexion with another), Cat. 2. τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκήν λεγομένων ἐκαστὸν ἦτοι ὁδὸν σημαίνει κ.τ.λ. He enumerates ten, viz. essence (ὁδός), quantity (πόσον), quality (ποίον), relation (πρὸς τι), the where (ποῦ), the when (ποτὲ), position (κεῖσθαι), to be possessed of (ἔχειν), action (ποιεῖν), and passion (πάσχειν).

Ritter in his history of philosophy (English Transl. Vol. III. p. 66) remarks on them: "If the categories had been put forward as an accurate and exhaustive division of the modes of being, it would be open to many objections, but Aristotle does not usually ascribe much importance to this enumeration of the most general notions, so that we may regard it as nothing more than an attempt to exhibit in a clear
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light the signification of words taken absolutely in order to show, how truth and falsehood consist in the right or wrong combination of these elements.”

However, as most of Aristotle’s categories refer to classes of existence or to what is most nearly related to them, and as in modern philosophy, the term of category expresses almost universally this meaning, we may safely adopt it here, viz. as referring to the notions, which express the general forms of knowledge, or what is the same, the general modes of existence. It will be interesting to compare the categories of the Nyāya with those of Kant, with which they have a curious resemblance.

They are:

1. Quantity.
   a. Unity.
   b. Multiplicity.
   c. Totality.

2. Quality.
   a. Reality
   b. Negation.
   c. Limitation.

3. Relation.
   a. Inherence and subsistence (substantia and accidens).
   b. Causality and dependence (cause and effect).
   c. Community (Mutual causality).

   a. Possibility (impossibility).
   b. Existence (non-existence).
   c. Necessity (accidentalness).

The categories may be divided, according to the commentary, into two classes: into categories of affirmation, and negation. It was, however, not necessary, expressly to introduce this division in the text; for, the seventh being the category of negation, it is self-evident, that the six preceding must be categories of negation. The number of seven categories is adopted by the Vaiséshikas, and also acknowledged by the followers of the Nyāya, as established in the Bhāshya.

Kanāda acknowledged only the six first categories, excluding negation. Gautama, the founder of the Nyāya, enumerates under the head of objects of proof (categories) soul, body, sense, object of sense, intellect, mind, activity, fault, condition of the soul after death (transmigration), retribution, pain, deliverance from pain. Two more categories, power and similarity, adopted in the Upamána Chintamani, are contained in the first six categories, and must therefore be rejected.
3—5. Substances are earth, water, light, air, ether, time.

2. The definition of substance is to be the substrate of qualities, and to have substantiality (v. v. 24). To explain this more fully, it is said in the commentary to be the substrate of qualities either in the relation of intimate union (Samavaya Sambandha) or in the relation of antecedent negation (Prāgabhāva) that is of future existence. The latter definition is given to obviate an objection which may be raised from the condition of substances at the time of their production. When substances are produced, they have according to the Nyāya no qualities. If they have no qualities, they are no substances according to the definition, that substances are the substrates of qualities. By the second definition, that they are substrates of qualities either in the relation of intimate union, or of future existence, this objection is removed.

With regard to substantiality or the genus of substance the commentary remarks: If somebody (this is the statement of the Charvākas) would say: There is no proof that substantiality is a genus; for it is not proved by perception, as melted butter or lack (according to your own admission) have no substantiality,—we contradict, because substantiality is proved by the necessity, that there should be some distinguishing attribute of the intimate cause of an effect, or some distinguishing attribute of the intimate cause of the connection and separation (between the parts composing a substance). This argument is founded on the supposition of the Nyāya, that every cause must have some distinguishing attribute (कारणं चतुर्विद्यद्वारावस्थितं) under which it is comprehended; it is a cause, because for instance, it has the general attribute of earth, water, &c. Substance therefore, as the cause of qualities, for instance earth of smell, must be conceived by the distinguishing attribute of substantiality. The genus substantiality depends therefore not on perception, but on inference.

Some suppose, continues the commentary, darkness to be also a substance; for, they argue, it is proved by perception, it has colour and action, and is neither earth nor any of the other substances. Its organ is the eye, at the time that it is without light. This argument is not valid;

* Kanāda gives the following definition of substance, Vid. Vaisēshika Sūtra. 1st Adhyaya. 11th Sūtra. " Substance is the substrate of qualities and actions, and has intimate causality."
space, soul and mind; qualities are colour, taste, smell, touch, number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction, priority, and posteriority, intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, gravity, fluidity, viscidity, faculty, fate, (merit and demerit) and sound.

6. There are five actions: throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding and going.

7. Wandering about, evacuating, trickling, flaming upwards, moving crookedly, are included in going.

8. Generality is considered two-fold, extensive and non-

for, darkness being produced by the absence of light, it is unnecessary to assume the existence of another substance. The supposition of its colour arises from delusion, as does also the supposition, that it has action, viz., from the cessation of light. If darkness were a separate thing, and not included in the category of negation, as gold is included in light, an infinite number of substances, (viz. in accordance with an infinite number of negations) must be assumed.

3. The definition of quality, which is given in verse 89, is: Quality is, whose substrate is substance, and which is without quality and action, that is to say, there is no quality of a quality, nor an action of an action, or the notion of quality would be changed to that of substance. The argument, by which it is proved, that quality in a class, is the same as that, which proves the same of substance.

4. Action, according to the Bengalee translation, is the special category, which in the relation of intimate union is present in a substance which has velocity, or the category, which after a duration of five moments is subject to destruction, viz., at first, there is contact; 2, Separation; 3, Destruction of a former connection; 4, A new connection; 5, Cessation of the action.

5. *Commentary.—Generality (or class) is intimate union of many

* Kanâda’s definition of quality is: [Verse 89] A. 1. that is, quality is sited in substance, has quality and does not depend upon conjunction and separation without cause.

† A. 1: action is, whose site is substance alone, which is without quality, and does not depend upon conjunction and separation without cause.
extensive. Existence, as including substances, qualities and actions, is called extensive.

9. The class which differs from this is called non-extensive; substantiality and similar notions are extensive and non-extensive.

10. By its including many things, it is extensive; by its being included in a more extensive class, it is non-extensive.

in something eternal, or is eternal and the intimate union of many. It is said, "in something eternal," because intimate union of many exists also between things in contact. "Of many," because intimate union in something eternal exists also in such infinite quanta as the sky, "in intimate union," because the existence of many in something eternal refers also to absolute negation. Consequently there is no generality or genus, where only one individual exists, or where there is no difference of individuality, or where there is confusion, or where there is a retrogress in infinitum, or where an idea is changed to its contrary, or where there is no relation. For instance, the sky forms no class on account of its individuality. The notions of a donkey and of an ass (in Sanscrit the terms: छोट; and क़ब्ज़ा; are selected, either of which means a jar) are no class. The notions of element and form are no class, because the value of these notions is confounded. Generality is no class, because, there is no place of support for it, (it would require a retrogress in infinitum; for if there is a class of a class, or a notion of a notion, there must also be a class of the class of the class and so further) particularity is no class, because it would thus be changed to its contrary. (Particularity by becoming generality would be the contrary of its notion.) Intimate union is no class, because it is not in the relation of intimate union (in the relation of intimate union are only substances, qualities and actions).

According to their definition of class only substance, quality, and action, further the general notion of those three, which is reality, the notions of the substances, with the exception of sky, space and time, the notions of the different qualities and actions as well as the notions which are included in them, form generalities or classes. The other four categories are not classes, but as the Bengalee Translator calls them, Upadhis, titles, general characteristics.
The ultimate condition of eternal substances is called particularity.\(^6\)

11. The connexion of a substance with its componing parts, as of a jar, &c. with its two halves, &c.; further the connexion of substances with qualities and actions, and lastly the connexion of substances, qualities and actions with their respective classes is called intimate relation.\(^1\)

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6. Comm.—The ultimate condition of eternal substances is particularity.* The ultimate condition, viz., the condition, which remains ultimately, last after all (according to the Bengalee translation, the condition which remains until the general conflagration of the world), than which there is no further particularity, that is to say, the condition, abiding in one substance only; for in compound substances from a jar down to the union of two atoms there is mutual difference, by means of the difference of all their respective parts; but the mutual difference of atoms is particularity; this is a difference by itself, and a particularity further than this does therefore not exist.

7. Comm.—The relation, of parts with things possessed of parts, of generality with single objects, of qualities with things possessed of qualities, of actions with objects possessed of actions, is intimate relation. Intimate relation means constant relation. It is proved by the fact, that the intellect, when determined by qualities and action, is in the relation of what is determining and what is determined (predicate and subject) for it is a determined intellect, as the sentence: The man bears a stick, is the result of a determined intellect. Hence, since in this case neither the relation of contact nor any other relation is possible, intimate relation is proved.

As the Bengalee translation expresses the meaning much more clearly, I have given it here instead of the explanation of the original. Intimate relation, excluding distinctive relation, is constant relation of only one thing which regulates a condition. By the term “constant” the relation of contact is excluded, by the term “excluding distinctive relation,” the relation of distinction, by the term “which regulates a con-

\(^*\)Both, generality and particularity depend on intellect. The commentator, Sankara Misra adds, “generality is the intellect, which is found in many; particularity, which is separated from others.”
12, 13. Negation is two-fold, universal negation and reciprocal negation. The first includes three kinds, antecedent

dition,” the relation of identity, as for instance of the sky; for the relation of identity (the relation, that a thing is to be comprehended under its own notion) is not regulating a condition, by the term “of only one thing,” the notion of mutual negation. In the relation of contact, is for instance, a jar with the ground. The class of distinct

tion is three-fold, viz. as referring to time, space and place. In the distinctive relation of time and space are all things. The distinctive relation of place is again two-fold, the distinctive relation of negation, and the distinctive relation of identity (of a thing with itself). The distinctive relation of negation is the site of negation. In the distinctive relation of identity is for instance the notion of the sky with the sky. In the relation of identity remains every thing with itself. In mutual relation is the notion of the jar with the ground.

8. Comm.—Negation is the reciprocal negation of the six categories, that is to say, negation arises from the six categories, being denied of each other. Negation is two-fold, universal negation and mutual negation. Universal negation is negation, different from mutual negation. Mutual negation is the negation of identity. Universal negation is of three kinds, antecedent, emergent, and absolute negation. Antecedent negation is a negation, which is afterwards removed, for instance, if it is said, in this half a jar is to be produced, there is a negation of the jar, which is to be produced. Emergent negation or destruction is a negation of what is produced, for instance, in the sentence, in these parts a jar is destroyed, there is a negation in the cause (the parts) subsequent to the production of the effect. Absolute negation is constant universal negation, for instance in the sentence, here is no jar. Here, this objection may be made: If a jar or any other thing is removed from a certain place, and again brought back to it, the notion of absolute negation cannot be applied; for, absolute negation being constant negation, the notion of absolute negation is not produced, when the jar is brought back. Hence they have assumed a fourth kind of negation, referring to the liability of a thing to be produced or destroyed, excluding absolute negation. For instance, in the notion: a black pot is not red, and a red not black, there is antecedent and
negation, destruction and absolute negation. The common notion of all seven categories is object of knowledge, and similar ideas.

14. The five first categories are positive, many and in the connection of intimate relation. The three first (substances, qualities, actions) have the attribute of existence; qualities and the subsequent categories are without qualities and actions.

15. Class (generality), and the subsequent categories are considered to be without generality; causality is a predicate of all substances which are not atoms (whose measure is not an atom).

emergent, but not absolute negation. The modern school, however, reject this view, because they deny, that a contradiction has been proved; according to their opinion absolute negation is met with in emergent as well as in antecedent negation.

Negation is assumed as a distinct category; for in denying it, an infinite number of negations, corresponding to the things, whose negations they are, would be necessary.

9. Object of knowledge, &c. viz. capable of being known, named, proved, &c.

10. Comm.—The general notion (definition) of substances, qualities, actions, generalities and particularities is multiplicity, positiveness and connection by intimate relation. Multiplicity is also found in negation; therefore the distinction of the five is: the state of position in many. It is said, "which are in the connection of intimate relation," and not, which have intimate relation, because otherwise the categories of generality and particularity would be excluded.

11. Comm.—Causality is an attribute of all substances, whose measure is not an atom (पारिसाप्तक means, whose measure is an atom.) Or: Atoms, considered as a measure, have no causality. A substance whose measure is an atom, cannot be the cause of any thing; for a measure commences things, which are included in its notion (as for instance the half of a jar is the measure, from which the jar is produced) but this is impossible in this instance; for a measure produces a measure, exceeding the measure, contained in its own notion (that is from a measure is produced something greater than itself) hence as the greater is
16. The notion of the necessary previous existence of a thing, which has not the fault of superfluous causality, \(^{12}\) is causality.*

17. Of this three kinds are specified, viz. causality of intimate relation, of non-intimate relation (the connexion of the produced, if the measure commences from the great, so from the infinitely small (the atom) would be produced something smaller (more an atom). This is impossible (hence the measure contained in the conjunction of two atoms, is not produced from the measure of an atom, but from number). For the same reason causality must be denied of substances which are infinite, further of any class, transcending the senses, and lastly of particularity. (The reason for this is clear; any thing infinite which can be exceeded, must have become finite; there cannot be any thing which exceeds the senses more than another thing, both being thought under the same idea, viz. to exceed the senses. Particular are the distinctions of eternal things; they cannot be distinguished by any thing else, because they are the last distinctions.)

12. I give here a note of the Bengali translation. The category, which has not the fault of superfluous causality, and whose existence constantly precedes, is causality, or cause is, by the existence or non-

* The principal Sūtras of Kanāda, referring to causality, are:

कारणाभवात् कार्योभावः 1 1st Adh.
कार्योभावात् कारणाभवः 11 1st Adh.
कारणपूर्वः कार्योभावः 1 1st Adh.
कारणसमिति इद्धे कारणसमवायः 11 10th Adh.
कारणेः समवायात् कम्पार्थः
(िष्ठयात्साध्यायराण्याः विश्वः 11) 10th Adh.
तथापि कारणेकारणसमवायः 10th Adh.

If there is no cause, there is no effect.
If there is no effect, there is no cause.
The quality of the effect depends upon the cause.

The cause, which refers to substance, is intimate cause, because substance is intimately related to effects, (viz. compound substances, qualities and actions.)

Action is a non-intimate cause, because they are intimately related to the cause (the intimate cause.)

In the same manner are qualities intimately related to substances; therefore they are also non-intimate causes.
Division of the Categories

component parts), and instrumental causality is mentioned as the third by the followers of the Nyāya philosophy.

18. That from which in its intimate relation an effect is produced; (for instance thread from which cloth is made,) is causality of intimate relation; that which is proximate to this, (the conjunction of the threads) is the second cause, (of non-intimate relation), and as the third (instrumental causality) must be considered what is different from either, (for instance the loom of the weaver.)

19. There are five classes of superfluous causality, viz. existence of which the existence or non-existence of an effect is necessary. If there is no thread, there is no cloth; if there is no conjunction of the two halves of a jar, there is no jar; if there is no virtue, there is no happiness, &c. There are three kinds of causes, intimate, non-intimate and instrumental causes. Such things as, intimately united, (that is, such as are in the connection of intimate relation) produce an effect, are intimate causes. Two atoms for instance are the cause of a bi-atomical compound, threads of cloth, the two halves of a jar. Non-intimate is a cause, which is proximate to an intimate cause, that is, which is connected with the intimate cause; for instance the conjunction of two atoms is the proximate cause of the bi-atomical compound, the conjunction of threads of cloth, the conjunction of two halves of a jar. Instrumental is the cause, differing from either; for instance, the instrumental cause of a jar is the stick, of cloth the loom, of a bi-atomical compound god. It must here also be borne in mind, that an effect may be destroyed either by the destruction of the intimate cause, or by that of the non-intimate cause, as a jar is destroyed by the destruction of the two halves, and a bi-atomical compound by that of the conjunction of the two atoms. The intimate, non-intimate and instrumental causes are called special causes; God, the omniscience of God, desire, endeavour, time, space, antecedent negation and fate (virtue and vice) general causes.

13. A cause is called superfluous (अन्यथाबिंद्रः) if, without its co-operation, the effect is produced in another way. Commentary. Faults of superfluous causality are: 1. The notion, under which the cause is per-
1st.—The general idea (class), under which the former state of a cause is perceived; 2nd, that the existence or non-existence of which can only be comprehended by the existence or non-existence of the cause; 3rd, that of which the previous existence is applied to the effect, when its previous existence is already applied to another (effect).

20. 4th, that the existence of which is applied to the effect, because it necessarily precedes the existence of the producer of the effect; and 5th, that which is superfluous beside the thing whose former existence is necessary.

21, 22. Of the first class is an example the notion, under which the stick (by which a jar is made) is perceived, of the second the form, &c. of the stick, of the third the ether, of the received, as for instance the idea of a stick (०षाव the class of a stick) by which (stick) for instance a jar is produced. 2. Such things as cannot be thought of themselves as causes of the existence or non-existence of an effect, but are causes of the existence or non-existence of an effect only by means of the real cause, as for instance the shape of a stick; (for it cannot be said, that, if this or that shape of a stick is given, the effect, viz. the jar, is given, nor, if this or that shape of a stick is not given, the jar, is also not given.) 3. The application of a cause to an effect, if this cause has been already applied to another effect, for instance, if the ether should be considered as the cause of a jar. The ether could be only the cause of a jar by its being perceived under the notion of ether; this, however, is the intimate cause of sound, and it is therefore first taken as the cause of sound, and secondly as the cause of the jar. 4. The application of a cause to an effect, by which (cause) the (actual) cause of an effect is produced; for instance, if the father of the potter would be considered as the cause of the jar; for the potter only is the producer of the jar. 5. The application of any thing (as cause of an effect) which is not necessary to the production of the effect, as for instance the donkey, carrying the earth, &c., of which a jar is made. Of all the kinds of superfluous causality the last alone is necessary, as including the other kinds.

C 2
fourth the father of the potter, of the fifth the donkey, &c. Among those superfluous causes the last alone is necessary (because the others are included in it).

23. Intimate causality belongs to substances, non-intimate causality only to qualities and actions."

24. Dependence is the attribute of every thing, save eternal substances. The property of all nine kinds of substances is: to have substantiality and qualities.

25. Earth, water, light, air and mind are the sites of comprehensive and non-comprehensive generality, form, action and velocity.

26. Time, ether, soul and space have the attributes of ubiquity and infinity. Of the five elements, viz. earth and the subsequent four substances (water, light, air, and ether), are the first four the sites of touch.

27. The commencement of things takes place in the four first substances. The special qualities of ether and soul are: limitation to space, and momentary duration.

14. Intimate causality belongs to substances; non-intimate causality to qualities and actions, that is, intimate causality is the common attribute of substances, non-intimate causality that of qualities and actions.

15. Comm.—Dependence in the common attribute of all things except eternal substances; it is to be thought under the idea of intimate relation. Eternal things are only dependent on distinctive relation (vide p. 7) as for instance on the relation of time. Eternal substances are atoms, (viz. of air, fire, water, earth) ether, time, space and soul. The common attribute of substances is, substantiality and substrate of qualities.

16. Form (सृंगार) is, the measure of which is limited.

17. Infinity (परम सच्चत) is, the measure of which exceeds every other measure.

18. Comm.—The special qualities of the ether and soul are: a state which does not pervade (is limited), and a state which has only momentary duration. (A state which does not pervade is such as is produced only in one part, and is not present in another. And a thing has momentary duration, if in the third moment after its production it is
28. Earth, water and light, have the properties of colour, fluidity and perceptibility by the senses; earth and water have gravity and taste; the fluidity of earth and light is a derived one.

29. The soul and the elements have special (contrary) qualities; that which is considered the property of the one, is the opposite of the others.

30. The qualities of the air are touch, number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, velocity and faculty. The same first eight qualities together with colour, fluidity and velocity are assigned to light.

31. Water is the site of 14 qualities, viz. of the eight, before mentioned, and further of velocity, gravity, fluidity, colour, savour and viscosity.

32, 33. Earth has the same qualities, with the exception of viscosity, and the addition of smell.——The 14 qualities of the soul are intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, number, quantity, severalty, conjunction and disjunction, faculty, merit and demerit. The qualities of time and place are number, quantity, severalty, conjunction and disjunction. The same qualities together with sound belong to the ether.

34. Those five qualities, together with intellect, desire and volition are sited in God, the same five qualities, with priority and posteriority and velocity, in the mind.

destroyed.) The special quality of the ether is sound, which does not pervade: for it is produced in a small part only of the ether, and not found in a different portion. It has only momentary duration; this means, it is destroyed in the third moment, after it has commenced to exist. Because the respective special qualities of pervading substances are destroyed by the same qualities which are afterwards produced, therefore the first sound is destroyed by the second. The same is the case with knowledge, &c.; for knowledge is produced in the soul, which is a pervading substance, within the limited space of the body, and it is absent in any other part of space, for instance in the part belonging to a jar. In the same manner knowledge continues only for two moments, and pervading substances are therefore those whose special
35. The earth is the cause of smell (the intimate cause), and the site of the various colours. Savour is of six kinds (sweet, bitter, pungent, astringent, acid and saline), smell two-fold (fragrance and stench).

36, 37. It has three kinds of feel, hot, cold and temperate. It is twofold eternal and non-eternal; eternal as considered in its atoms, non-eternal as being composed of parts; this latter is threefold, organism, organ and object (inorganic matter).

38. Organisms are viviparous, oviparous, engendered in filth and vegetative; organ is the sense of smell; objects are all compound substances from the smallest, of two atoms, to the largest, Bramhá’s egg.

qualities are: existence that does not pervade, and momentary duration. The special qualities of earth, &c., are: existence which does pervade, and continuance for a longer time.

19. Comm.—Earth is two-fold, eternal and non-eternal, eternal in its atoms,* non-eternal, if different from atoms, viz. if consisting of two, three, &c. atoms. Earth, if non-eternal, is composed of parts.

If it is said: ‘What evidence is there, that earth is composed of parts; (viz. a part being already a compound of two, three, &c. atoms) for you obtain the same notion, if any earthly substance, as a jar, is thought to be composed of the totality of the single atoms. Under this supposition you need not fear, that the invisibility of each single atom implies the invisibility of a jar, &c., which consists of atoms; because, although each single atom is invisible, yet the totality of them is visible, as from a certain distance the hairs of the head together are visible, although none of them alone is visible. Moreover we arrive at the idea for instance of one extended great jar, as we arrive at the idea of one great heap of rice.’

We reply: If one atom is no object of the senses, a totality of atoms is also beyond the perception of the senses. As to your example,

चतो विद्विभवविद्विभ । 4. A.

An atom is, what exists has no cause, and is without commencement and end; an atom is contrary to what has a measure (अन्तरमात्रे चात्तरितिदोहचाश्च)
39. Water has white colour; its taste, and feel, are sweet and cold; it has also viscidity, and its fluidity is innate.

40. As to its eternity and non-eternity the same holds good as before; its organisms are not born. Its organ is the tongue; its objects are the sea, snow and similar substances.

41. Light is hot to the feel, its colour white, its fluidity not innate, but an effect from some cause; eternity and non-eternity are attributed to it in the same way as to the earth.

42, 43. Organ is the eye, objects are fire, gold, &c. The feel in the air is considered as natural; it is temperate, neither hot nor cold; its motion is crooked; its qualities are touch, &c.

we maintain, that a hair, although at a distance, is not beyond the perception of the senses, because it will be perceived, if brought nearer. Nor can you say, that from a totality of invisible atoms a totality of visible atoms is produced, on the ground, that it is not contradicted by perception; for visible things are not produced from invisible things; otherwise heat of the eye for instance would one or the other time become visible. If you say, that a quantity of invisible heat, contained for instance in very heated oil, may produce a visible burning, we object; for the visible burning arises from the visible parts, contained therein.

You can also not maintain, that from the invisible compound of two atoms the production of a compound of three atoms (which is visible) is impossible; for we do not say, that the visibility or invisibility of a thing arises from its own nature but from its necessary causes, as greatness, manifest form, &c. A compound of three atoms for instance is visible on account of its greatness, but not a compound of two atoms, as it has no greatness. This, however, is according to your view, impossible, because there is no greatness in an atom.—As in this manner it is proved, that earthly substances as a jar, are composed of parts (a part, as above already reminded, is a compound of at least two atoms) so it is clear, that they are not eternal, in consequence of their production and destruction. And there is no difference between the mountain Meru, and a mustard seed, because in either there is the same composition of parts after parts. Therefore it is necessary, that there should
Eternity and non-eternity are assigned to it as before to the other elements. Its organ is the skin, which extends over the whole body; objects are all substances, intermediate between the vital air and the great element.

44, 45. The distinguishing quality of the ether is sound, organ is the ear. Though one, it has many titles. Time is thought the producer of all that may be produced, and the support of the worlds; it is the cause of the knowledge of

be somewhere an end (in the division of parts). To say; that the point, where the end is obtained, is not eternal, would be to admit the production of an effect from a thing which is not in the connection of intimate relation. Therefore this point is eternal. As the continual progress from one great thing to another still greater, finds its end in the assumption of the sky and other infinite substances, so there must also be ultimately a cessation of the progress from a small to a smaller thing. Thus the necessity of atoms is proved. There is certainly no end of the division, if one has arrived at the compound of three atoms, because a compound of three atoms as an object of the eye, has parts like a jar, &c.; for from the argument, that the parts of a compound of three atoms have parts on account of its size, like the half of a jar, it is evident, that such a compound has parts. Nor can you say, there is no necessity for this (for assuming parts of such a small compound as that of three atoms) because many things (atoms) are required to produce a magnitude for so small things. This, however, does not prove the necessity of a continuation of parts after parts, because thereby a regress is infinitum would become necessary.

20. Comm.—Time, the producer of all productions, is the substrate of the world. This is proved by the perception of the "now." If for instance the perception: here is now a jar, is given, there exists a union between the motion of the sun and the jar. This is not conjunction (vide p. 7) or any other relation (for conjunction is between the parts of two or more things,) but it is a relation of a different kind, which is produced by time.—That time is to be thought under the notion of a substrate, is evident from its being the cause of priority and posteriority. Time is the special (non-general) cause of the perception of priority
priority and posteriority; though one it has many names as that of moment, &c.

46. Space is the cause of the notions of distance and proximity; it is one and eternal.

47. Though one, it obtains various designations, as east, west, from the division of its attribute. The soul is governing the and posteriority. Or if both definitions are combined: Time is the substrate of the special union, which is the non-intimate cause of priority and posteriority.

21. Comm.—Although one, it has many names, viz. moment, hour, day, &c., past, future and present time. Past is the time, whose destruction is present, as yesterday; future is the time, whose future existence is present, as to-morrow, and present is the time, whose future existence is destroyed and whose destruction is (to come to pass) future, as to-day. There will, after every future moment, be another moment, because there will be always another action (the junction of which with other things produces the relation of time); this will be the case at the general conflagration, where also the terms of "moment," "day," &c. are applied.

22. Comm.—"The soul is ruling the senses and the body."—The class of soul is the class, by which the intimate cause of happiness, and unhappiness, &c. is comprehended (or: soul is the intimate cause of happiness and unhappiness, &c. and the substantiality of the soul is proved by its being the substrate of the qualities: happiness, unhappiness, &c.) Iswara (the ruler, God) is thought under the same notion (class); but since such causes as merit and demerit do not exist with regard to him, he is not subject to happiness or unhappiness; for we do not admit the invariableness of the rule that, that which is a consequence from the nature of a thing, will necessarily exist.*

Others† say: The notion (class) by which the soul‡ is thought, is not applicable to Iswara, as there is no proof for this; yet hence it does not follow, that a tenth substance must be assumed, as the soul is dis-

* Or in other words, for though it is necessary, that when there is an effect, there is also a cause, yet it is not necessary, that, when there is a cause, there is invariably an effect.
† Probably the ancient Nyāya is meant. ‡ The individual soul.
senses and the body; for an organ (instrument) must possess its agent.

48. There is no consciousness in the body, as is proved by its disappearance after death. If such were the case, how could recollection remain, when the senses are destroyed.

Tinguished from the other substances by the idea: to be subject of knowledge. "Is governing the senses," &c., because it successively produces the conscience of the senses and of the body. Although there is in the soul the perception: I know, I am happy, &c., yet it cannot at first be proved against one who holds the contrary opinion, that the soul is something different from the body, etc. To prove this, the text says: "for an instrument must possess its agent." As an instrument, for instance a knife, the instrument for cutting, has no effect without an agent, so also the eye and the other senses, which are instruments for knowledge, have no effect without an agent. For this reason an independent agent is assumed.

23. To show, that the body is not the agent, it is said in the text: "There is no consciousness in the body, as is proved by the disappearance of consciousness after death." If it is maintained: 'Conscience is knowledge, and this in your opinion is not present in the soul which has obtained liberation. Why should it therefore not just as well be absent in a dead body, because, if life ceases, also knowledge ceases?' We answer: this is impossible; for, if consciousness belonged to the body, there could in old age be no recollection of things, perceived in childhood, the body being subject to increase and decrease by acquiring and losing its particles.

Nor can it be said, 'that by an impression, produced in a former body, an impression in the second body is produced,' because this would oblige you to assume an infinite number of impressions.—Further, if consciousness were inherent in the body, a child could not commence to take the milk from the breast of its mother; for the cause of this action is the knowledge of what accomplishes the desire, and at that time there does not exist the recollection of any means, accomplishing the desire. According to my opinion the commencement of the action takes then place by the recollection of the causes of the desires, experienced in a former birth. Nor can it be objected: 'Well, if this be true, let any body
49. The mind is likewise not the site of consciousness, because then knowledge and other internal qualities would remain imperceptible.

recollect any thing else, experienced in a former birth; for there is nothing which calls it into recollection. In this instance there is no other means but to admit of fate for the individual soul. If this is the case, the body is without commencement, and also the soul. Hence the eternity of the soul also follows; for what is without beginning, cannot be destroyed.

'Well, let us then transfer to the eyes and the other senses the notion of cause and agent with regard to knowledge; for otherwise no cause is possible.' The answer is: "If such were the case, how could recollection remain, when the senses are destroyed." If the eyes and other senses were destroyed, how could, by the absence of the eye, recollection remain, as the subject which perceives exists no more, and as it is quite unreasonable, that the same thing should be seen by one, and recollected by another sense, because perception and recollection must depend on the same subject, as being cause and effect.

24. Comm.—'Let then consciousness not belong to the senses (external) but be maintained for the eternal mind.' The answer of the text is: "The mind is likewise not the site of consciousness, because then knowledge and other internal qualities would remain imperceptible;" for as the mind is an atom, and as the cause of every perception is a certain greatness, no perception could take place, if knowledge, happiness, &c. were placed in the eternal mind. How mind is an atom, will afterwards be explained.

If it is said, (by the Védántists): 'The soul is knowledge; for its consciousness is proved by its self-manifestation; but knowledge of this or that object, happiness, &c. are special forms of it. And because this (special form) has only the existence of a production (नामावली; I translated जन्मावली) its duration is momentary. Further, since the preceding knowledge is the cause of the consequent knowledge, and the former again the effect of a preceding, there is even in deep sleep an uninterrupted chain of knowledge down to the time of universal destruction, as the smell of musk remains in cloth. And by the communication of the impressions, produced by prior and prior acts of
knowledge, with posterior and posterior acts of knowledge, recollection and similar acts are possible.

We deny this; for if the object of recollection is the world, omniscience would be obtained (because knowledge is a product of self manifestation); and if the object is something, there is no proof for the second member of the alternative; for hence would also follow, that in sound sleep knowledge were manifesting its object.

And if you say, 'that in this state (in the state of sound sleep) knowledge remains, but without form,' we object also; for you cannot prove, that knowledge manifests itself, as otherwise such things as a jar, &c. would also be possessed with knowledge.

Nor can you say, 'that this would answer your purpose;' for it is impossible to reject the perception of a jar and similar things.

If you maintain, 'that this is a special form of knowledge,' we would ask, what is that form? Is it distinguished from knowledge, we agree with the assumption of something different from knowledge. Is it not distinguished from knowledge, then in accordance with the general notion of knowledge, a jar of blue colour would be the same with one of yellow colour, because by its own nature there is no distinction of knowledge.

If you pretend, 'that any special property of knowledge, as yellow and blue colour, &c. must be abandoned,' we object, because the contrary notions of blue, yellow, &c. cannot be predicated of one and the same thing; otherwise it would be difficult to connect any meaning with contrary ideas.

Nor is there any communication of desires, because the communication of desires even between son and mother is impossible.

You can also not say, 'that there is a rule for things, that are the causes, and others that are the effects of communication,' because there is no communication of desires.

And if you define 'communication to be the production in something else,' there is again a contradiction; for there is no producer.

If you contend, 'that it is produced by another knowledge,' you must admit another knowledge of the same kind, and so on in infinitum.

If you think, 'there is but little contradiction in a momentary knowledge,' you cannot prove such a knowledge, and your assumption is complicated.
For the same reason consciousness in bodies of momentary duration is rejected, because it has the fault of complication and cannot be demonstrated; in the same manner the production of the fruit from the seed and from collateral causes is evident, so that there is no need of assuming a special form of making, &c.

'Let the assumption of a momentary knowledge be complicated, yet you must grant, that the soul is eternal knowledge, which cannot be destroyed; for the Sruti says: Lo, this is the soul, true knowledge, the infinite Bramha.'

We object also to this, because such a knowledge is evidently without object, and because it cannot be proved, that knowledge has no object; in this case it would not have even itself as an object.

Therefore, it has been proved, that the soul is different from knowledge, and that it is eternal.

True knowledge, that is the supreme Bramha, is not found in individual souls, because they are clearly distinguished from it by knowledge and ignorance, happiness and unhappiness and similar qualities, and in consequence the difference of Iswara is established. Otherwise servitude and liberation were names without meaning.

If it be objected: 'The same text of the Veda which explains the difference of Iswara, brings also forward his identity by his indifference; for it says: "Let us strive for the state of indifference, therefore all is placed upon the soul," and also: "In the state of liberation ignorance is annihilated."

We deny this, because, the difference being eternal (constant) its annihilation is impossible. Admitted even, that the difference is destroyed, a dualism is for this very reason established, and it cannot be said, that duality is destroyed. And as it is well said, that to Bramha in his state without qualities, and therefore without the quality of existence, existence is yet attributed, so it is also well said, that although there is no duality, still there are two possessed of duality.

If you say, 'that the absence of unreality which is the place of identity, is there meant with existence,' we say likewise, that the absence of identity which is the state of two possessed of duality, is meant with duality.

Although every unit is comprehended by the notion of unity, still one is not both, as it is said: smell is no attribute of earth and water,
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which is clear to every body. As regards the passage of the Sruti, establishing the indifference at that time (the time of liberation), it establishes in fact an equality by the removal of unhappiness, &c., as it may be said, that this Purôhita by great prosperity has become a King. In this sense it is said in the Sruti: "He who is without sin, obtains the supreme state," meaning equality.

God is not the soul which is knowledge and happiness, but the substrate of knowledge. In such a sentence as: "Brahma is eternal knowledge and happiness," the term "knowledge" means the substrate of knowledge, by the authority of a passage like this: "He who knows all, is omniscient;" hence happiness means also a person who is happy......

Hence is also the doctrine of the Sânkhyas refuted, which is as follows.* Nature, (Prakriti) is the agent; the soul (Pûrusha) remains

* To understand more clearly the argument of the Nyáya against the Sânkhyas, I shall briefly state the principles of this doctrine. According to the Sânkhya there are two kinds of substances which are the substrates of all phenomena, nature and soul. Nature (Prakriti) is one and undistinct in its original state, which is incomprehensible to the senses. As such it is Mûla Prakriti, nature as the root of all things. It is productive, and in its productions various. Nature in its state as production is Vikriti, changed, or derived nature. The first production is intellect (Buddhi) or the great one, Mahat, which as a production of nature has no consciousness.—The soul (Pûrusha) is manifold, or there are many souls. The soul, as contrary to nature, is not active, but it is conscious. Accordingly it has no activity in the production of ideas, which are given to the soul by intellect, and the opinion, as if the soul were an agent, is a mere delusion.

The following quotation from Prof. Wilson’s Sânkhya Kârika will still more elucidate the subject (p. 16.)

... III.—Nature, the root (of all) is no production. Seven principles, the great or intellectual one, &c., are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor productive.

Bhâshya. Mûla (the root) prakriti (nature) is pradhâna (chief) from its being the root of seven principles which are productions and productive; such nature is the root. “No production.” It is not produced from another......“Seven principles,”—Mahat and the rest, from its being the great (mahat) element; this is intellect (Buddhi).

... The seven principles are 1. intellect; 2. egotism 3—7, the five subtile rudiments. These seven are productions and productive, in this manner. Intellect is produced from the chief one (nature) that again produces egotism, whence it is productive (prakriti). Egotism as derived from intellect, is a production; but as it gives origin to the five subtile elements, it is productive. The subtile rudiment
without stain (that is untouched, neither active nor suffering) as a lotus-leaf by water; but it is conscious. It is without causality, because there is no difference between cause and effect (cause and effect are identical) and hence with the destruction of the effect, that which is like the effect, would also be destroyed. This idea (that the soul is conscious) is necessary, because the perception of consciousness which is found in intellect, would be otherwise impossible. Intellect is a modification of nature. Intellect is also called greatness and the internal organ. Under the condition, that it (intellect) exists or not exists, the soul is subject to transmigration or liberation. Its modification has the form of knowledge through the channel of the senses. If it (this modification of knowledge) is in connection with external things, as with a jar, &c., the perception of agency takes place in the soul, and the perception of consciousness in the intellect, on the ground, that the difference is perceived. For instance if it is said: "By me this is to be performed;" the first member of the sentence, "by me," means the perception of the soul, which is without reality, because it is the reflection of consciousness (in the intellect) by the clearness of the intellect, as the reflection of the face in a looking-glass (is without reality by the clearness of the looking-glass). The second member: "this" means the perception of the object, which by its being modified through the channel of the senses, has reality (truth) as the unclearness, produced by breathing upon a looking-glass. The third member: "Is to be performed" refers to the performance of business. Hence is intellect possessed of three parts. The connection of the soul (Pūrusha) with knowledge, which is a modification of intellect, is called untrue, as is the perception of sound is derived from egotism, and is therefore a production, but as causing the production of ether, it is productive. The subtle element of such as generated from egotism, is a production, as giving origin to air, it is productive. The subtle rudiment of smell is derived from egotism, and therefore a production; it gives origin to earth, and is therefore productive. The subtle rudiment of form is a production from egotism; as generating light, it is productive. The subtle rudiment of flavour, as derived from egotism, is a production; it is productive, as giving origin to water. In this manner the great principle and the rest are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions; that is, the five organs of perception, the five organs of action, with mind, making the eleventh, and the five elements; these form a class of sixteen which are productions, the term vikāra being the same as vikriti. Soul is neither a production nor productive.
The site of merit and demerit is perceptible by its being united with distinguishing qualities.

The site of merit and demerit is perceptible by its being united with distinguishing qualities. What has been said about knowledge, &c., is also true with regard to happiness and unhappiness, desire and aversion, endeavour, merit and demerit, because they are evidently identical as being effects of intellect; but intellect is not possessed of consciousness, because it is a modification.

This doctrine of the Sánkhya is refuted on the ground, that consciousness is dependent on the same substrate, as action, fate and enjoyment, because there is no proof, that there is another substrate, different from this.

If you say, 'that from such a sentence as: I, who am conscious, am acting, an error of the part of consciousness is possible in consequence of the modification of intellect,' we reply by asking, whether this is not also possible on the part of the agent. Otherwise, if intellect is eternal, there is no liberation, or, if it is not eternal, there is no transmigration.

If you further contend, 'there is no consciousness of intellect, because it is an effect of unconscious nature, as effect and cause are identical,' we protest, because this has not been shown; there being no proof, that the agent is a production; for from the text, that it is without passion, that it has no birth, it follows, that it is without beginning, and as such it is also without end, as it is unreasonable, that it should be destroyed. Of what use is therefore the assumption of nature (Prakriti) and similar notions?

Nor can you say, 'that our opinion does not agree with the passage of the Bhagavadgita saying: "by the qualities of nature are everywhere actions done; the soul, blinded by pride, fancies: I am the agent;" for its real meaning is: by "nature's," fate's, "qualities," the qualities, produced by fate, viz. by desire, etc., I am agent. If this is the case, the intention of the Bhagavadgita is attained by the words: He, who believes the soul to be the sole agent, is liberated.

25.—"The site," &c., viz. the soul is the site. If the body were the site of them (merit and demerit, &c.), the consequences of the works, done in a former body, could not be experienced by a later body.

26.—"It is perceptible by its being united with distinguishing qualities." The soul becomes perceptible by its being united with its respective special qualities, and not in another way by such an observation: I know, I do.
50. It can be deduced from activity and similar phenomena, as the charioteer from the motion of the carriage. It is the site (substrate) of egoity, and perceptible only through the mind.

51. It is pervading, and the site of intellect and other qualities. Intellect is two-fold, apprehension and remembrance. Apprehension includes four sorts, viz.

52. Perception, inference, comparison and verbal knowledge. Perception comprehends six kinds, in accordance with the six organs of perception.

53. The object of the nose is smell and the notion of

27.—Comm. "It can be deduced from activity, &c." That the soul is in another body, is inferred from activity, etc. Activity means here exertion. As it has been mentioned before, that knowledge, desire, endeavour, &c. do not exist in the body, and further as exertion implies endeavour, it follows that there is a soul which has endeavour, on the ground that there is exertion.

28.—Comm. Perception is the knowledge (apprehension) which is produced by the senses, and the cause of evidence from perception are the senses. Inference is the apprehension, produced by the knowledge of a general proposition (Vyāpti) and inferential proof is the apprehension, produced by the knowledge of a general proposition, which is the cause of the conclusion. Comparison is the knowledge, produced by similarity, and proof by comparison is the knowledge of similarity, which is the cause of comparison. Verbal knowledge is the apprehension, produced by the knowledge of words, and proof by verbal knowledge is the knowledge of words, which is the cause of the former.

29.—&c., means the notion of good and bad smell.

* Similarly says Kanáda: प्राणायामभव्यज्ञानविभिन्नसमतीन्द्रियार्थविकारः दृष्टिकोणोत्तरोपदेशः सत्र. 4th Adh. The vital airs, which go upwards and downwards, the closing and opening of the eyes, life, the actions of the mind, and the modifications of the other senses, happiness and unhappiness, desire and aversion, and endeavour are proofs of the soul.
smell, etc. Thus the object of the tongue is savour, and sound that of the ear.

54-55. Object of the eye is proportionate form. Substances of such kind (of perceptible greatness) individuality, number, conjunction and disjunction, priority, posteriority, viscosity, fluidity, quantity, action, class, and the relations which are appropriate to the respective objects are perceived by the eye through the contact of light with proportionate form.

56. Substances, perceptible of touch, are objects of the skin; the objects of the eye, with the exception of colour, are also objects of the skin.

57. In the perception of substances is the union of the skin with the mind the cause of knowledge. Through the mind are perceptible: pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, intellect and volition.

58. A knowledge which is without determination, is beyond the perception of the senses. Proportionate greatness is the cause as regards the perception of the six classes; organs (instruments) are the different senses.

30.—Further, sweetness, &c.
31.—Sound, articulate and non-articulate, &c.
32.—Proportionate means fit to be perceived. The same proportionate greatness must be admitted also with regard to the objects of the other senses.

33.—Comm. "A knowledge which is without determination, is beyond the perception of the senses." If (for a man who has not the knowledge of a jar) the contact of the eye etc. (with the jar) has taken place, the determined knowledge: This is a jar, viz. determined by the general notion (class) of a jar, does not exist, because there was not before the knowledge of that, which is determining, viz. the general knowledge of a jar, &c.; for the cause of a determined knowledge is another which is determining. For instance at first is produced a knowledge, not determined by the two parts,—that which is to be determined, and that which is determining,—as a jar and the general notion (class) of the jar. Such a knowledge is without determination, and no object of perception; for from perception it is evident that I know
59. The connexion of the senses with their objects is called intercourse; this is also six-fold. 1. The perception of things takes place by contact.

60. 2. The perception of what is in intimate relation with the things, by intimate relation with that which is in contact.

61. 3. The perception of what is in intimate relation with the last mentioned relation, (viz. intimate relation with that which is in contact,) by the corresponding intimate relation, (intimate relation of that which is intimately related with that which is in contact.) 4. The perception of sound, by intimate relation. 5. The perception of what is intimately related with sound, by the intimate union with that which is intimately related, and 6. The perception of every negation by particularity.*

62. If it takes place, it is perceived, at the place where it happens to be. Intimate relation is perceived by particularity.

63. Transcendent intercourse* is three-fold according to its division into intercourse whose character is general, or the jar. In this perception is knowledge the determination of the soul, the jar that of knowledge, and the general notion of jar the determination of the jar. The determination which is in the determination, is called the general notion of determination. The knowledge containing the general notion of determination, is the cause of the knowledge determined by determination. For instance in the knowledge without determination of a jar is the general notion of a jar not determining. Therefore when there is an undetermined knowledge of a jar, there is not such a knowledge, as: I know the jar under the general notion of the jar, (that is to say, not such a determined knowledge, by which the soul is determined by knowledge, knowledge by the jar, and the jar by the general notion of the jar.)

34.—Comm. "Transcendent intercourse." Perception is two-fold, common and transcendent. The intercourse of common perception is of six kinds, which have just been explained. The intercourse of transcendent perception is three-fold.

35.—Comm. If in this definition the term "character" denotes its

* See note to v. 11.
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whose character is knowledge, or which is produced by Yoga.

nature (its identity with itself) the meaning is, that the intercourse is of a
general nature, and this must be understood as the determination of a de-
terminable knowledge which is in connection with any of the senses. For
instance, let smoke be in contact with the eye. Here is smoke the deter-
minal knowledge, and the general notion (class) of smoke, which (gen-
eral notion) forms the intercourse, is a knowledge, whose object is every
smoke whatsoever. If it is then said, that such a knowledge is in con-
tact with a sense, the consequence would be, that, if a cloud of dust by
mistake were apprehended under the notion of smoke, there could not
arise a knowledge, whose object is every smoke whatsoever, as in this
case with the general notion (class) of smoke no connection of the senses
could take place. According to my (the author's) opinion, however,
the cloud of dust is in contact with the eye; the knowledge to be deter-
mind is smoke, and the general notion of smoke, which is here the de-
termination, the intercourse. Its contact with the sense is the common
one, which takes place on the part of the external sense. On the part of
the mind, however, the intercourse is merely general, and determining
the knowledge. Hence if by words any kind of perception of a Pisácha,*
&c. has been obtained, the apprehension of all Pisáchas is produced.

The term "general" means here rather the state of similar things,
and this is sometimes constant, as the general notion of smoke, &c. some-
times not constant, as a jar, &c. For instance a jar is perceived either
in contact with the ground, or in intimate relation with its half. Hence
arises afterwards the knowledge of all such things, as a jar, either in
contact with the ground, or in intimate relation with their halves.
This must be so understood, that the intercourse of similar things
(of things included in the same notion) depends on the same rela-
tion, under which the generality itself is comprehended. On the other
hand where after the destruction of this jar, &c. a recollection arises of
a thing like this jar, there could not, by the intercourse of a general
character, take place the perception of all things like this jar, because
the generality would at that time be not present. Moreover, suppose
the knowledge of a jar to be determined by the contact with any sense.
Here does not exist even the next day a contact with the eye, yet there
arises a knowledge of similar things, because there is a generality which

* A kind of goblins.
64. The intercourse of things, comprehended in a notion, is called general knowledge. It is required a thing which manifests this or that property produced by this or that sense."

65. The intercourse of any thing, of which there is a knowledge, is called the intercourse, whose character is knowledge."—The intercourse, produced by Yoga, is of two kinds, determines the knowledge of similar things. Therefore the "knowledge" of "generality" is the intercourse, and not "generality." With this view it is said in the text:

36.—Comm. Intercourse, "whose character is general." The term "character" means object, and the sense is: intercourse is a knowledge whose object is general.

"But where without the contact of the eye, &c. the knowledge of the common state of similar things (generality) exists, should there not be a perception through the eye of all jars, &c.?"

37.—Comm. To remove this objection, the text says: "It is required something which manifest this or that property, produced by this or that sense."

The meaning of this is: When by an external sense through an intercourse of a general character knowledge is to be produced, there is required an object of knowledge, to be produced by one or the other sense, of this or the other generality, with reference to a thing whose generality it is. This object is the contact (or a similar relation) of the light, further the contact of the eye, &c. Hence such a knowledge is not produced by the eye for instance, when it is dark.

But if the intercourse whose character is knowledge, is an intercourse, whose nature is knowledge, and if the intercourse whose character is general, is defined in the same way, what difference then is between them?

38.—Comm. To show this, it is said in the text: "The intercourse of any thing, of which there is a knowledge, is called the intercourse whose character is knowledge."

Namely an intercourse whose character is general, produces a knowledge of the things upon which it depends; but an intercourse whose character is knowledge, is intercourse of the knowledge with that object to which it refers, (which is comprehended by it.) The mean-
that which belongs to the Yogi who is perfect, and that which belongs to the Yogi, who strives after perfection.\(\text{39}\)

66. The intercourse of the former is a constant manifestation, that of the latter takes place by the assistance of meditation.\(\text{40}\)

The intercourse, as regards inference, is consideration,\(\text{41}\) the (instrumental) cause the knowledge of a subject, invariably con-
ing of this is: A perception does not become manifest without inter-
course. First without an intercourse whose character is general, how could there exist by the mere notion (class) of smoke and fire, an apprehension of every smoke and fire whatsoever? For this reason an inter-
course whose character is general, is necessary. The objection, 'that it does not matter, whether there is an apprehension of every smoke and fire whatsoever,' is not valid; for with the visible smoke the connection of fire is indeed perceived, but no other kind of smoke is included therein, and therefore a doubt, whether smoke is invariably connected with fire or not, could in this case not arise. According to my opinion, however, the doubt, whether smoke, in whatever place or time, is to be predicated of fire or not, takes place through the intercourse of general character, by which every smoke whatsoever is comprehended.

The objection, 'that on the supposition of an intercourse of general character man would be omniscient, because in the notion of all objects of knowledge every single object of knowledge is included,' is also unte-
nable; for although all objects of knowledge may be known by this notion, yet, there is no omniscience, because the differences of all ob-
jects are not known.

Secondly, if no intercourse whose character is knowledge, were assum-
ed, how could there be in the knowledge: "sandalwood is fragrant," also the perception of a thing, which is fragrant? Be knowledge of fragrant things granted through the intercourse whose character is general, but the notion of fragrancy is only possible by an intercourse whose cha-
acter is knowledge.

39.—Comm. "Intercourse, produced by Yoga," that is, a special virtue, produced by the practice of Yoga, (the union of the soul with God by means of abstract contemplation,) in accordance with the evi-
dence of the Sruti, the Purāṇas and other authorities.
of the Nyāya Philosophy.

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connected with a predicate in a general proposition. (The knowledge of the Vyāpti.)

67. The reason which is actually known, is not the cause; in this case, there would be no inference, if the reason had for instance not yet arrived, or had been destroyed.

68. Consideration is the knowledge that a subject in its invariable connection with a predicate is united with the place of conclusion (Paksha, subject of the conclusion).

The invariable connection of a subject with a predicate in a general proposition (Vyāpti) is called the non-connexion of the reason (middle term) with any thing different from the subject of the conclusion, (Paksha, minor term.)

40.—Comm. Manifestation means the perception of all things, meditation is the thinking of the mind, which is separated from all objects.

41.—Comm. "The intercourse as regards inference is consideration."

The special cause (instrumental cause) of an inference is the knowledge of the invariable connection of the subject with the predicate in a general proposition, (बाप्तिचारिणं,*) and consideration is the intercourse. For instance, let a man who from the smoke on a hearth, etc. has become aware of the invariable connection of smoke with fire, see afterwards any where on a mountain an uninterrupted line of smoke. He will then re-

* बाप्तिः (Vyāpti). It is difficult to find an adequate word for this term in English. It means literally, pervading inherence, the inherent and essential presence of any one thing or property in another, (see Wilson's Dict.) but it is used in the Nyāya and other philosophical systems to denote the logical relation of one notion to another in a proposition of such a kind, that under circumstances an inference may be drawn from it; or: it is the relation of the subject to the predicate, and vice versa, as the major proposition of a syllogism. The subject of such a proposition is the याप्ति: the notion, which is pervaded by another (by the predicate) that is to say, which is only a part of the predicate, which is less extensive than the latter, or included in it. The subject is therefore invariably connected with the predicate, and if the former is thought, also the latter is thought. The predicate is the याप्ति: the pervading notion; it has a greater extent than the subject, and the latter is only a part of it. It is, therefore, not invariably connected with it, and if the predicate is thought, the subject is not necessarily thought with it. The Vyāpti is, accordingly, only understood, if the relation of the two notions, to be connected together, on either part is understood. Further, the Vyāpti is a proposition, from
69. Or the perception of the identity of the reason with the conclusion (predicate of) which is not connected with anything incompatible with the subject of the conclusion. Subject (of conclusion, minor term,) is the certainty of the conclusion where the intention to conclude is not absent.

collect the general proposition, according to which smoke is invariably connected with fire. Hence arises the knowledge, this (mountain) is possessed with smoke which is invariably connected with fire. This (the knowledge, that any subject is connected by the middle term with a general predicate, or the knowledge of the two premises) is consideration. Hence arises the knowledge, this mountain is fiery, which is an inference. The ancients held, that smoke, when actually perceived, together with the notion, that it is invariably connected with fire, is the special cause of a conclusion. This is denied, in the text; for if the reason (reason, sign) were the special cause of the conclusion, then inference could not take place, if the reason (sign) had not yet arrived, or had been destroyed, because then the reason, the pretended special cause of a conclusion, were not present.

which an inference can be derived, that is to say, it must be a general proposition, fit to form the major proposition of a syllogism. The names of Vyāpya, Vyāpaka are only used with reference to the general proposition; if a third term (the minor term) is connected with them, they obtain other names, viz., the Vyāpya (middle term) the name of व्याप्य, reason, argument, or विधि, sign, and the Vyāpaka (major term) the name of साधन, conclusion, predicate of the conclusion. The minor term (the subject of the conclusion) is called प्रमाण: place (minor term, subject of the conclusion), viz. the place, to be connected by means of the middle term with the major term, or predicate of the conclusion.—If these names in their literal acceptation appear at first curious to a European student and totally deviating from those, used in the logical terminology of the west, it must be borne in mind, that their literal sense does not in the least affect their value as logical terms, and also, that the European names for the same notions are equally figurative, and the names for instance of subordination, co-ordination, subject, predicate, conclusion, &c., but very imperfectly express the logical relation to which they refer. In fact most of these relations are in all languages taken from relations of space, as almost all terms which are of an abstract nature. As the literal translation of Vyāpti, Vyāpya, &c. might easily lead to false views, I have preferred to give their equivalents in the terminology accepted in Europe.
70.—From the knowledge, that with such a place the reason (middle term) is connected, inference is the consequence.

42.—Comm. "Consideration is the knowledge, that a subject in a general proposition (the reason, the middle term) is united with the subject of conclusion," (terminus minor.)

The knowledge of the determination of the reason (middle term) which is determined by a general predicate, (major term) in connection with the place (minor term) is the special cause of a conclusion. This can be comprehended in a double manner, either, it is the knowledge, that the subject of the general proposition (the middle term) is connected with the place (subject of conclusion, minor term) or, it is the knowledge, that the place (subject of conclusion) is possessed of the subject of the general proposition (middle term.) Accordingly the conclusion takes place either from the knowledge, that the subject of the general proposition (middle term) is connected with the place (subject, minor term) from which follows that the conclusion (predicate of the conclusion, major term) is connected with the place, (minor term,) or it takes place from the knowledge, that the place (minor term) is possessed of the subject of the general proposition (middle term) from which follows, that the place (minor term) is possessed of the conclusion (major term.)

Some think: 'Also from a two-fold consideration ensues the inference, that the place, (subject) is possessed of the conclusion (predicate of.) There is (according to them) no necessity for the knowledge, that the mountain is possessed with smoke, which is invariably connected with fire. First there is the perception, that the mountain smokes; further the recollection arises, that smoke is the subject, with which fire is invariably connected. In this case inference evidently takes place from those two acts of knowledge. A knowledge of something (of the Paksha, the minor term) determined by a notion, which is again determined by the predicate (by a notion, determined by the Vyápti,) can never be the cause, but there takes place the cause by the knowledge, that the place is determined by the general notion of the subject (middle term, for instance a mountain determined by the general notion of smoke) because this is necessary, and because the assumption of a knowledge, determined by what is determined (by the general proposition, by the Vyápti), has the fault of complication.'
71.—There are five semblances of a reason, which are called going astray, contradiction, inconclusiveness, equalization and absurdity.

72.—The fault of going astray is again three-fold, that which is too general, that which is not general enough and non-exclusive.

We deny this; for even if there is no knowledge of the general notion (the class) of the middle term (vyápya, for instance the general notion of fire) the inference takes place from the knowledge, that there is a subject (of conclusion, Paksha) determined by something (middle term) with which fire for instance is invariably connected. And this assumption is also more simple; for the cause takes place by the knowledge, that there is a determination of the subject (of conclusion, Paksha) determined by the predicate of the general proposition (determined by the Vyápti).

Moreover according to your opinion from the knowledge: "The mountain is smoking," the inference (the mountain is fiery) should follow, because there is a knowledge, that the subject of the conclusion (Paksha) is determined by the general notion (class) of smoke, which in this case is the general notion (class) of the middle term (vyápya) but this of course will not be granted by any one.

And if you further say, 'the cause is the knowledge that the subject (of conclusion, Paksha) is determined by the general notion of the middle term (vyápya) when perceived together with the predicate of the general proposition' (Vyápti) the consequence would be, that an inference would ensue, if Chaitra perceived a subject as invariably connected with a predicate in a general proposition, and Maitra the general notion (attribute, class) in connexion with the subject (of conclusion).

If you lastly assume, 'that the perception of the place, determined by a general notion, by A, in conjunction with the perception of the middle term in its invariable connexion with the major term (the middle term, determined by the Vyápti,) by the same A, is the cause of the conclusion, made by this A,' there would appear an infinite series of causes for the same effect.

According to my opinion, the knowledge of the attribute (middle
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73.—It is too general,⁴³ if applied to the subject (of conclusion) and to an opposite one, not general enough,⁴⁹ if excluded from either.

term) of the subject (of conclusion) as determined by the predicate (major term) with which it is invariably connected, takes place through intimate relation, and produces the conclusion by the same relation. In this case an infinite series of causes is avoided. On the contrary, if it is said, that the knowledge of the middle term as invariably connected with a predicate in a general proposition (with the major term, as the Vyāpti) and also the knowledge of the general notion (attribute, middle term) of the subject (of conclusion, minor term, Paksha) are causes, independent of each other, there would be a two-fold state of the cause of the same effect, and a conclusion would follow from the sentences: “There is smoke, which is invariably connected with fire,” and: “The mountain is fiery.” If this is correct, we may say, that if there is a double knowledge, there must be also a determined knowledge, and here at the end of the discussion, where its result is given, a complication is no fault.

(This is on the whole an excellent exposition of the logical relation of the cause of the conclusion. It is here lucidly explained, in what manner the three notions of a syllogism are in relation to each other, and also, that the cause of the conclusion is not the middle term, as separated from the major term, but only in its connexion with it. As this is sometimes not attended to, it is not superfluous to attach importance to it. At the same time it is true, that the logical form of a syllogism does not consist of one premise, and the conclusion, but of two premises with the conclusion; for if one reflects as to the form, given by our author, viz. the minor term in connexion with the middle term, which is itself determined by the major term, it is evident, that there are two connexions, viz. of the minor term with the middle, and of this with the major. That is to say, there are two propositions or two premises.)

43.—Comm.—Too general is a reason, which abides as well in the subject of the conclusion as in an opposite one. (Subject of the conclusion is, where the major term abides, for instance, if fire is the major, smoke the middle, a mountain or a hearth is the subject or the minor,
Division of the Categories

74.—Non-exclusive,* when no other subject (of the conclu-
&c. A subject, opposite to the conclusion, is where it does not abide,
for instance, in the example above given, a tank is a subject, opposite
to the major term.)

That is to say, the reason is too general, when it abides also in a
subject, where the major term is not found. For instance, let a hearth
be the subject (minor term), smoke the major term, and fire the reason,
the conclusion would be: the hearth smokes, because it is fiery, which
would be false, because the reason is too general; for fire (the reason)
is also connected with other subjects, where there is no smoke, for
instance, with an iron ball.

(We would not acknowledge this as a logical fallacy, which takes
place, when the conclusion does not follow from the premises, but as
a fallacy extra dictionem, where the matter of the premises is wrong;
for the conclusion follows here from the premises. In this instance
the major proposition is wrong, which is: where there is fire there is
smoke. The conclusion, however, is quite right as well in form as in
matter, and the example is therefore not judiciously selected. The
fault would, however, be apparent, if iron ball for instance had been
taken for the minor term.

As the Nyāya knows only the two first figures of syllogism, and of them
only the two moods Barbara and Camestres,* we may say, that the fal-
lacy has arisen by the major proposition being special instead of general.)

44.—Comm.—Non-general is the reason, which has no similar sub-
jects of conclusion for the major term† (that is where the major term
has only one subject, or where no similar instances can be adduced for
the reason.) (Thus says the commentary in explanation of the text.

* In Barbara, it is hardly necessary to say, there are all three propositions general
affirmatives, in Camestres the first a general affirmative, the second a general nega-
tive and the third a general negative.

† This is much more clearly stated in the Tarka Sangraha. I quote the passage
in Dr. Ballentine's translation (Lectures on the Nyāya philosophy, p. 41.) "The
pretended reason, which applies neither to similar instances nor dissimilar ones,
is one devoid of community." As, when one says: "Sound is eternal, for it has
the nature of sound." Now the nature of sound resides in sound alone, and is no-
thing else, whether eternal or uneternal.
of the Nyāya Philosophy.

sion) is possible. A reason, which does not abide in the subject (of conclusion) is called contradictory.45

75.—Three kinds of inconclusiveness are enumerated, viz. in-

The latter, however, is here much clearer than the former, because the question is not, whether the major is immediately found in the minor but whether it is found there by the means of another term; in the first case there would be no necessity for an argument. The example given in the commentary is: Sound is not eternal, because belonging to the class of sound. Here is, according to it, no similar instance, in which the reason (the class of sound) and by it the major is found, as the class of sound abides only in sound, and no where else. We should reject this argument at once, as having only two terms; but the Nyāya is obliged to look out for some other appliance, because class is something different from the objects comprehended by it.)

45.—Comm.—Non-exclusive, is a reason, where the major term is the negation of absolute negation (where the major term may be predicated of any other notion). Hereby a general negative is impossible, and a conclusion therefore cannot take place.

(The Bengalee translation gives the following explanation:

"A reason, for which there is only an affirmative, is non-exclusive, that is to say, a reason, whose subject does not exclude any thing, for instance all, &c. Let all be the subject, (minor term) object of proof the major, and fit to be named the reason. This argument is non-exclusive; for here cannot be given a similar instance with regard to the subject (minor term) as it can be given in the argument: "The mountain is fiery, because it smokes;" for here is a similar instance on the part of the subject a hearth, &c. According to the opinion of the modern school a non-exclusive reason takes place, where the major admits of only an affirmative (that is to say, where the major is not excluded from any other notion) for instance in the argument: "a jar is an object of proof, because it can be named.")

(We would not consider either of these conclusions faulty in form, because the middle term is properly connected with either of the extremes. A reason then goes astray, to state it briefly, if the reason is too wide, further if it does not refer to similar instances, and lastly, if it does not refer to dissimilar ones.)
conclusiveness on the part of the subject, inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason, and inconclusiveness from limitation.

76.—Where there is a jewel hill, for instance, subject of the conclusion, there is inconclusiveness on the part of the subject. Inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason takes place, for instance, if the substantiality of a tank be inferred from its having the quality of smoke.

77.—Inconclusiveness from limitation would take place, for

46.—Comm.—"A contradictory reason is one which does not abide in the subject of conclusion," (minor term) that is to say, a reason, whose negation is the major term (a reason which is the contrary notion of the major term). Be cow the subject, the notion (class) of cow the major, and the notion of horse the middle term. Here the reason, the notion of horse, excludes the major, the notion of cow, and therefore does not admit of an inference.

(Here the fault again is not in the reasoning, but the major premise is wrong; it is therefore a fallacy extra dictionem.)

47.—Comm.—I. Inconclusiveness on the part of the subject is there, where the notion of the subject (the minor term) is impossible. For instance, if it should be inferred, that a golden hill is fiery, the conclusion could not take place, because there is no such thing as a golden hill.

(Here also is the conclusion not wrong, the fault lies in the minor premise, where the subject is a notion, not given by experience; and the fallacy is therefore one extra dictionem.)

48.—Comm.—2. Inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason (middle term) takes place, if the reason is not found in the subject, with which a connexion was supposed (if the reason and the subject exclude each other). Let it for instance be argued that a tank is a thing, because it smokes. Tank (or water in the tank) and smoke are contrary notions, and smoke cannot therefore be predicated of a tank.

(Here again lies the fault in the minor premise. We observe, that the second kind of inconclusiveness does not correspond to the first. In the first the minor term was contradictory, and we should therefore have expected, that in the second the reason would have been contradictory.)
instance, if fire should be inferred from blue smoke. Equalization,\(^49\) is called a consideration from contradictory reasons.

49.—Comm.—3. Inconclusiveness from limitation (on the part of the invariable connexion with the predicate). This can be two-fold, on the part of the subject, and on the part of the predicate.

a. First on the part of the predicate. This takes place, if the predicate is a contradictory notion. For instance if the inference were made, that the mountain has a golden fire, the notion of a golden fire (major term) is contradictory. (Here the major premise is wrong.)

b. Secondly, on the part of the reason. (This takes place, if the reason is contradictory, for instance, if the argument were the mountain is fiery from golden smoke. The fault is here again in the major premise.)

Others say, that this kind takes place, if the terms are too narrow, as if it should be inferred that the mountain is fiery, because it has blue smoke.

(This division of inconclusiveness is evidently faulty; for the first kind is inconclusive, because the minor term is contradictory, the second, because the middle and minor terms exclude each other. In the third kind two divisions are mixed, in the first of which, both the reason and the major term, are considered as contradictory, in the second the reason and major term are limited in their application by an addition which they ought not to have (in the example the addition of blue).

There are accordingly three different divisions confounded. The first proceeds from contradiction in each of the terms. In this would be included the first member of the author's division, and \(a\) and \(b\) of the third, by which it is complete. The second division proceeds from the contradiction of two of the terms; of this only one part has been given in the second member, viz. where the reason and the minor term exclude each other. Of the two other members of this division, the first, where the minor and major terms are contradictory, has not been touched upon, and the second, where the reason and the major term are contradictory, has been given in another place, viz. under the head of contradictory reason. The third division proceeds from limitation,
78.—Absurdity is called the error of stating a subject in which there is not the conclusion; as if, for instance, smell would be inferred to be a quality of a jar, because it was accidentally perceived at the time of its production.

79.—If a rustic first sees a Gayal (species of ox), &c. his similar knowledge of cows, &c. is the instrument to form his notion of a Gayal.

80.—The recollection of the meaning of a sentence which had been previously pronounced, is called the intercourse in the comparison. The result of comparison is the knowledge of the force of the word “Gayal” and similar expressions.

that is to say, where, instead of the notion in its whole extent, only a part of it is connected with the other two notions (in the examples blue smoke, blue fire).

50.—Comm.—“An equalised reason is the consideration of opposite reasons.”

An equalised reason takes place, if at the time of the consideration of a reason, invariably connected with the absence of the conclusion (major term) the consideration of a reason occurs with which the conclusion is invariably connected; as for instance, if at the time of consideration of water, &c. which is invariably connected with the absence of fire, there is a consideration of smoke invariably connected with fire.*

51.—Comm.—“Absurdity is, if a subject is without the conclusion,”

(which is assigned to it.)

Absurdity takes place, if the conclusion does not abide in the subject (minor term) for instance, if at the time of the production of a jar the jar is taken as the subject (minor term) and smell as the conclusion,

* The Tarka Sangraha (B. I. p. 42.) explains this: a counterbalanced reason is that along with which there exists another reason which establishes the non-existence of what is to be proved. As if one should argue, “Sound is eternal, because it is audible,” as the nature of sound is (by both parties admitted to be) it might be argued with equal force on the other side, that “Sound is not eternal, because it is a product, as a jar is.”
81.—The knowledge of words is the special cause. The knowledge of the meanings of words, is here the intercourse, and the result is verbal knowledge. The knowledge of the power of words assists in this act.

there is an absurdity, because at the time of production there is no smell in a jar, &c. for all things are at that time without smell.

52.—Comm.—"The knowledge of words is the special cause; the knowledge of the meanings of the words is here the intercourse and the result is verbal knowledge."

The cause of verbal knowledge is not a word, when actually heard; for though there be no word spoken, yet there may be verbal knowledge, for instance, if one who has made a vow not to speak, writes down a Sloka.

53.—Comm.—"The knowledge of the meanings of the words is here the intercourse." Intercourse is the recollection of the meanings of the words, produced by the words. Otherwise a person who had a knowledge of words, (who heard words) would have verbal knowledge, if he had obtained the meanings of words by perception or any other evidence. (That is to say, if he heard words, the meanings of which were given to him by perception, inference, etc.; for instance, if he heard the word "tree," while at the same time the meaning of it were conveyed to him by his actually seeing a tree. There would be two kinds of knowledge, independent of each other, and not verbal knowledge which is produced by words alone.) Here it must also be understood, that the effects of words are produced by special relation (समायता:) otherwise the effect of the word "jar" for instance, would be the recollection of ether by intimate relation, and there would be accordingly verbal knowledge of the ether.

Special relation is of two kinds, implication (ellipsis) and power.

The knowledge of the power of a word is necessary; for unless the power of a word is previously apprehended, there cannot be verbal knowledge from recollection, which depends upon that relation (power

* A word is a sound which has a power, as for instance, the power of the sound "man" refers to an animal which has hands, feet, &c. The meaning of a word is the object to which it refers, for instance, the meaning of the word "tree" is a thing, which has a trunk, branches, leaves, &c.
of a word) although there may exist a knowledge of the words (the words may be heard). The recollection of the meaning of the knowledge of a word takes place according to the rule of the knowledge of any object which is in relation.

Power is the connexion of the meaning of a word with the same word. That by such or such a sound such or such a meaning is understood, depends upon the will of God. In names, which are at present given, there is also a power, because the rule: "Let the father on the eleventh day (after the birth of a child) give a name to the child," depends on the will of God. In a sign, however, given at present, there is no power. Such is the opinion of some, but the modern school (of the Nyāyaikas) maintain, that the will of God is not the power, but merely will (of man.) Hence is also power in a sign, which may be given at present.

The apprehension of power depends upon grammar, comparison, dictionary, the instruction of persons worthy of confidence, actual intercourse, the supplying of the sentence, substitution, and the connexion with well-known words.

a. The apprehension of the root, of the inflective base, the derivative affixes, &c. of a word is produced by grammar; it does not take place, whenever there is an obstacle, as there is, if, according to the statement of the grammarians, the power of the grammatical terminations (that is of the verbs and nouns) refers to the agent. In the sentence: "Chaittra cooks" the termination in "cooks" is inseparably connected with the agent "Chaittra."

This connexion, we maintain, does in this case not arise, in consequence of its complication; but in the action (cooks) the power is produced, because this assumption is simple,* for it is manifest, that the action is a determination of Chaittra. . . . .

b. The power which takes place by comparison, has been before described.

c. In the same manner power is also apprehended by the dictionary; if there is, however, any obstacle, it is not apprehended. Thus according to the dictionaries, the adjective terms of "blue," &c. have power with reference to blue colour and to a thing which has

* According to the grammarians it must be said: "Chaittra, not separated from what is determined by the action referring to cooking," while the Nyāyaikas say: "Chaittra, determined by the action, referring to cooking."
blue colour; but it is more simple to say, that this term by its power refers to the quality of blue, and by implication to a thing which has blue colour.*

\[ \text{d. Or the power is derived from the word of a person, worthy of confidence, if for instance it is said, that the word "Pika" (a black cuckoo) is the same as "Kokila," the power of the word "Pika" is apprehended.} \]

\[ \text{e. Or from actual intercourse. If for instance the master who is a grown up person, orders his servant who is also a grown up person, to bring the jar, and the jar is brought by the latter, a boy who attends to this, hence observes that the action of bringing a jar is connected with those words. If he further hears: "Take away the jar," "bring the cow," he understands the power of the term: "jar," &c., to be brought or to be taken away, with reference to a jar, &c. in connexion with an action.} \]

Some say: 'Under this supposition there is no verbal knowledge in the sentence: "There is a blue jar on the ground;" for the power of a jar, &c. is apprehended by a jar, as connected with an action, and the power of any termination of a verb refers to the understanding of an action, but in this case there is no connexion of such a kind, and therefore no verbal knowledge?'

\[ \text{We do not agree, because, although it is at first necessary for brevity's sake to admit a power with reference to a jar, as determined by action, it is right to omit it afterwards.} \]

\[ \text{f. Or from supplying the sentence. (This takes place, if in a sentence a word has a special meaning, while from other sentences it is known, that the meaning is more general.)} \]

\[ \text{g. Or from substitution. Substitution means the definition of the sense of a word by another word of the same sense; thus, if for the word belligerous "warlike" is substituted, the power refers to the word "warlike."} \]

\[ \text{h. Or from the connexion with well-known words, for instance in the sentence: "In this mango tree the Pika sweetly sings," the power of the word "Pika" is apprehended in this manner.} \]

* If a word has several meanings, there is a separate power for each of them.

† In the original the examples are: "ghaṭa!" and "kalasa," either of which means a jar.
Some (the Mimánsikas) maintain: 'The power of a word refers to the class (notion) and not to the individual, because in the latter case it would go astray, and require assumptions without end. And on the first supposition there is also a knowledge of the individual, because without individuals the knowledge of a class is impossible.'

We deny this, because without assuming a power, the apprehension of an individual does not take place.

Nor does implication (ellipsis) refer to an individual; for an individual may be apprehended, although there is no want of apprehension of the literal meaning of a word (an implication is dependent on the circumstance, that a word cannot be comprehended in its literal sense.)

Nor need there be any fear, that by assuming a power, referring to an individual, the fault of an infinite number of hypotheses is committed; for we assume one and the same power for all individuals.

Nor is there (by the assumption, that power refers to the individual) a want of extension; for this extension is effected by the class of cow for instance (when a cow is the individual).

Moreover, if the power is apprehended for instance in cow, possessed of power, the force refers to an individual. If on the contrary the power is apprehended for instance in the class of cow, then there would be a recollection of the meaning of a word, determined by the class of cow, and a verbal knowledge would be impossible, because the knowledge of the power by the same determination would be the cause of the recollection of the meaning of a word and of verbal knowledge. Moreover, if the power refers to the class of cow, we must declare, that the class of the class of cow is the determination of what is possessed of the power. But the class of cow, which is not in intimate relation to any thing that is not cow, is in intimate relation to all cows. Hence your assumption of a determination of the notion of any thing, possessed of power, is complicated, because this notion does not refer to individual cows; therefore in order to comprehend this or that individual, possessed of this or that class, it is necessary to assume a power, which is founded on individuals, determined by class and form.

A word, possessed of power, is either Yaugika, or Rúḍha, or Yoga-rúḍha, or Yaugika-rúḍha.

1. A word is Yaugika, if its meaning is understood by the meaning of its parts; for instance in the word "giver" (in Sanscrit the ex-
82.—Implication, "is the relation of a word which has power, and it takes place when the intention of the speaker is not understood by the literal meaning of a word. The cause of understanding a sentence is contiguity, consistency, construction and intention.

ample is Pachaka, cook) the root giv (e) expresses the action give, and the termination "er" refers to the agent. And the whole expresses the meanings of the parts, viz. an agent with reference to the action "give."

2. Rūḍha is a word, which, independent of the power of its parts, is only understood by the power of the whole, as for instance "go" (cow, for "go" is derived from "gam," to go, which does not express the meaning of go,) "ghaṭa:" (jar) etc.

3. Yogerūḍha is a word, which, beside the power of its parts, expresses a different meaning as a whole, for instance "Pankaja" (from "Panka," mud, and "ja," born) for the word "Pankaja" means by the power of its parts "an agent, born in mud" (which includes any thing, produced in such a manner) but by its power as a whole a "waterlily" (that is only one of the things, born in mud).

4. Yaugika-rūḍha is a word, which is understood either by the meaning of its parts, or by Rūḍha, for instance Udbhid. The power of the word "ud" refers to upwards, the power of the root "bhid" to cutting. Therefore by its Yaugika power it refers to tree, and by its power of Rūḍha it refers to any germ, produced from corn.

54.—Comm.—"Implication is the relation of a word, which has power, and it takes place, when the intention of the speaker is not understood by the literal sense of a word."

For instance, let the sentence be given: "Ghoshadwells on the Ganga." If in this case, with reference to the literal meaning of "Gangá," viz. the current, either the connexion of Ghosha, or the intention of the speaker is not obtained, the meaning of "bank" is understood by implication. This implication is the relation of a word which has power. Here, from the knowledge of the connexion of the literal meaning of the current with the bank, a recollection of the bank is produced, and hence the meaning of the sentence is understood.

Moreover if the want of connexion alone were the cause of implication, there would be no implication in the sentence: "Let the staffs
83.—Contiguity," is called the proximity of words.

enter," because there is no want of connexion with reference to the entering of the staffs. Therefore, because here the entrance of the staffs has no reference to the intention of the speaker, which is the taking of food, the implication refers to the bearers of staffs. In the same manner, in the sentence: "Protect the ghee from the crows" the word "crow" has an implication to any thing which may injure the ghee, because the intention of the speaker refers to the preservation of the ghee generally. In the same manner, if it is said: "The umbrella-bearers are proceeding;" the word "umbrella-bearers" implies the merchants of a caravan.

This latter is called the implication which does not lose its own meaning (Ajahatsáráthá Lakshañá, which keeps its own meaning, beside that which it obtains from implication) because by the term "merchants of a caravan" the bearers of umbrellas as well as those without umbrellas are understood.

Moreover, if the want of sense in the connexion alone were the cause of implication, sometimes the word "Ganga" would imply: "bank," sometimes the word: "Ghoshà," "fish," &c. and there would be accordingly no rule. This, however, must be understood: if the connexion of the meaning of a word, possessed of power, is apprehended by the notion of bank, bank must be apprehended by the notion of bank; if, on the other hand, it is apprehended by the notion of the bank of the Ganga, it must be recollected by that notion: Therefore there is no implication in the general notion of an implication, because the general notion is understood without implication. Likewise, there is no power in the general notion of what has power, because any word is able to remind of the meaning of its general notion.

But if there is an implication by the successive connexion of a word, possessed of power, it is called an implied implication, as for instance in the word "Dwirépha" (literally, that which has two wings, figurative, "black bee") the connexion of: "two-winged," refers to "Bhramara" (black bee) that of "Bhramara" to black bee; this is an implied implication.

55.—Comm.—Contiguity means proximity, viz. the uninterrupted succession of two or more words which have a connexion among each
other. Therefore there is no verbal knowledge in the words: "The by inhabited was Dévadatta volcano;" but if by a mistake in the proximity no mistake in the verbal understanding is the consequence, it does not matter.

But in the sentence: "With umbrella, earrings and clothes adorned is Dévadatta," the recollection of the second word destroys the recollection of the first; accordingly, as there is an interruption, a recollection of the second word is impossible.

We do not grant this, as by the impressions of each word until the last an uninterrupted recollection of all objects is possible; for as by several kinds of intercourse one and the same perception arises, so also one and the same recollection arises by several impressions, and the knowledge of the last letter together with the impressions of all words brings all to recollection. How could otherwise exist the recollection of any word that has many letters?

Moreover; some say, that, as in a field all pigeons are caught in the same net, so by the recollection of all the meanings of words does take place the verbal knowledge of all meanings of words, which is corresponding to the knowledge of the connexion depending upon the object and verb. Others say: if connected with all such words, as are construed, consistent and contiguous, verbal knowledge of all the words (included in the sentence) takes place; for, they say, after the meaning of the single sentences has been understood, the meaning of the great sentence will be comprehended by the recollection of the meanings of the words. Hence the assumption of a total impression of a word, manifesting all the letters, has been refuted, because by the apprehension of the last letter, together with the impressions of all the preceding letters which (apprehension) manifests the word, the word is apprehended. This must be understood, if it is said: "the door," the meaning of the word is obtained by the knowledge of the word "close," but not by the knowledge of the meaning of such acts as closing, &c., because the actual presence of the meaning of a word, which is produced by a word, is the cause of verbal knowledge. Moreover, as the words denoting action and object, are mutually connected, it is impossible, that there is verbal knowledge without a word, denoting a verb. In the same manner, if it is said: "Of the flowers," it is necessary to assume: "he is desirous," because without this the preposition "of" could not be applied.
Consistency is the mutual correspondence of the meanings of the words.

84.—Construction is the selection of such terminations, without which the meaning of a sentence is unintelligible. Intention is based on the wish of the speaker.

56.—Comm.—Consistency is the connexion of the meaning of one word with that of another. Accordingly there is no verbal knowledge in such sentences as: "He sprinkles with fire," because there is no meaning in it. If it is objected, 'that previously to the verbal knowledge there is nowhere a knowledge of this consistency, because there is not before a meaning of the sentence,' we reply: there is a knowledge of consistency which is sometimes doubtful, sometimes certain, if there is a recollection of the meanings of the different words. The modern school, however, says, that the knowledge of consistency is no reason of verbal knowledge. If it is said: "He sprinkles with fire," there is no verbal knowledge, because the inconsistency, which is that fire cannot be an instrument in the action of sprinkling, is certainly an obstacle. Because the certainty of its absence is an obstacle only in a knowledge, which is not produced by common intercourse or by special defects, therefore it is proved, that it is an obstacle with reference to verbal knowledge—although it is not proved, that by the late appearance of consistency verbal knowledge is late.

57.—Comm.—Construction is the connexion of one word with another, without which the former has no sense. The case, denoting agent, has no connexion without the case, referring to action, and with this the former is construed. In fact, however, the proximity of the cases denoting agent and action, is included in contiguity. Moreover, with reference to the objective case, for instance of jar, the cause is the knowledge of the termination of the second case. Therefore there is no meaning in such sentences as: "The jar is the accusative case," "to bring is an action."

58.—Comm.—Intention is the wish of the speaker. Suppose, intention were not a cause of verbal knowledge, and such a sentence as: "Bring the Sāṁdhava" (meaning horse and salt) were pronounced, there would sometimes the meaning of "horse," and sometimes the meaning of "salt," be obtained. It cannot be said, that the circum-
85.—The instrument⁵⁹ in the perception of happiness and other internal qualities is the mind.⁶⁰ The atomic nature of the mind is inferred from the fact that several objects of knowledge are not perceived by it at one and the same time.⁶¹

stances, &c. by which the intention is apprehended, are the cause of verbal knowledge, because they are not included in the definition. And if it is said, 'that they are included as being the cause of the knowledge of the intention,' it is simple to say, that the knowledge of the intention is the cause. In this manner, God is assumed for the knowledge of the intention with reference to the Vedas. It must not be said, 'that the knowledge of the intention of the teacher is here the cause,' because at the commencement of the creation there is no teacher. Nor must it be said: 'there is no general conflagration (destruction of the world,) how can therefore be a commencement of creation?'' for a general conflagration is proved by the Sástra. In the same manner is in the sentence of a parrot the knowledge of the intention of God the cause, but in a vile sentence of the parrot the knowledge of the intention of the speaker.

Others say: If there is a word which has different meanings, the knowledge of the intention is sometimes the cause; moreover, in the sentence of a parrot is also verbal understanding without the knowledge of the intention, and with reference to the Vedas the meaning is apprehended by the discussions, which are purified by the eternal Mímánsa.

59.—Comm.—Intellect was divided into two kinds; viz. apprehension and remembrance (vid. verse 51.) The nature of apprehension has been explained. Remembrance will not be explained, because it is easy to be understood; for the cause of it is a former apprehension. Some say, 'the class (notion) of apprehension is not causality, but the class (notion) of knowledge;' otherwise there would be no remembrance after a remembrance, because the former impression would be destroyed by the remembrance of the common notion. According to my opinion, however, there is by this remembrance through a new impression a new remembrance produced.' This we cannot grant; where after the remembrance of a perception in its totality the remembrance of

* That is to say, apprehension is not the cause of remembrance, but knowledge in general.
86.—Qualities abide in substances, and are without qualities and actions.

The single objects (constituting a totality) as of cloth, jar, &c. is produced, but so that there is no remembrance of all the objects, there it must be said, that, as the impression of every single remembrance is not destroyed, time, or disease, or the last remembrance is the cause of the destruction of the impression. Accordingly, it cannot be said, 'that a gradual remembrance is impossible,' nor, 'that by repeated remembrance, a stronger impression is impossible;' for the word "strong" means here what suddenly recalls to mind. It also cannot be said, 'that the cause is knowledge, as there is no alternative;' for if the special attribute is assigned, there is no going astray; but knowledge has the fault of superfluous causality, as it is a general attribute. How could otherwise a stick be the cause of a jar by being turned round, and not as well by its being a substance or having colour? Nor must it be said: 'There is an apprehension, that the intermediate remembrance will go astray, because the impression is destroyed;' for by objecting to assuming an infinite number of impressions and by assuming the destruction of the impression of the last remembrance, a going astray cannot be apprehended.

60.—Comm.—The existence of mind is proved by the following inference. The perception of happiness, &c. takes place by an instrument, because the perception is a production, as for instance is the perception by the eye. This instrument is the mind. It cannot be said 'that the perceptions of unhappiness, &c. are produced by other instruments,' because the necessity of only one instrument as cause for all similar perceptions is evident from its simplicity. Thus the mind is proved as being the substrate of contact, which is the non-intimate cause of unhappiness, &c.

61.—Comm.—"The atomic nature of the mind is proved from the fact, that several objects of knowledge are not perceived by it at one and the same time."

It is clear from apprehension (perception) that various objects of perception, for instance, objects of the eye, of taste, &c. are not at one and the same time produced; for although there may exist an intercourse of the several senses with these objects, yet knowledge is produced by only one sense, because the mind is in contact with only one
Material qualities are colour, taste, feel, and smell, priority and posteriority, sense, and it is not produced (at that time) by any other sense, as the mind is not in contact with it. Therefore if the mind were to be comprehended by the notion of a pervading substance, it should be connected with every thing; hence (as this is not the case) it follows, that the mind is not pervading. It must not be said, 'that the knowledge of the mind is late (successive) because at that time the special fate (merit or demerit) which reminds of knowledge, is also late;' for, if this were the case, there would be no necessity for assuming such instruments of knowledge as the eye, &c.

Nor must it be said: 'How can the narrowness of the mind be reconciled with the fact, that at one and the same time a knowledge from different senses exists, for instance at the time when one eats a large cake;' for the mind is some thing very subtle, and is therefore rapidly in contact with various senses, so that different kinds of knowledge may arise in the same imperceptible succession, as the hundred leaves of a lotus are pierced; it is a mere delusion, if several kinds of knowledge appear at the same time.

Nor must it be said, 'that both (the atomic and pervading nature of the mind) is reconciled under the assumption, that the nature of the mind may contract or expand,' because the assumption of many parts subject to destruction, &c. is complicated, and on the other hand, the assumption of a mind without parts is simple.

62.—Comm.—“Qualities abide in substances, and are without qualities and actions.”

If it is asked, what proof is there for a separate class of quality? The answer is: The causality, found in what is possessed of generality, different from that (generality) referring to substances and actions,* is determined by some attribute, because causality for a thing which is not determined by some attribute, is impossible; but neither the class of colour, &c. nor the class of existence is this determination, because in the first case it would not comprehend enough (all other quali-

* To understand this, it must be recollected, that generality (class) abides in substances, qualities and actions; the generality therefore, different from the class of substance and action, must be that of quality.
Division of the Categories

87, 88.—Fluidity, gravity, viscidity and velocity.—Merit and demerit, memory, sound, intellect and others of similar nature are called immaterial qualities by philosophers. Number, quantity, separatedness, conjunction and disjunction are considered qualities of either class. 89.—Conjunction and disjunction, the different numbers from two upwards, separatedness found in two things or more, are qualities which abide not in one and the same thing.

ties being excluded) and in the second it would comprehend too much, (viz., also substances and actions.) Therefore it is contained in the 24 (qualities) and is the class of quality.

"It abides in substances." Although it is not its definition: to be dependent on substance, because it would be too wide, as including also action and class, yet it is right to say: it is what is possessed of the class different from existence which class is the determination extending as far as substantiality, because the class of quality is the determination, extending as far as substantiality, and quality is what is possessed of this determination. The classes of action and substance are not determinations, extending as far as substantiality, because substantiality and action do not abide in the sky, &c. and the class of the class of substance, and the class of generality (class) are no real classes.

"Without qualities." Although action, generality, &c. are also without qualities, yet it must be understood as the absence of qualities, found in the category which is possessed of generality and different from action; for class and the subsequent three categories have no generality (class); action is not different from action, and substance is not without qualities. Therefore this definition is not too wide.

"Without actions" is only said to describe it, not to define it, because it would otherwise be too wide, the ether being also without action.

63.—Material substances are: earth, water, light, air and mind (material according to the Nyāya is that the measure of which has a limit, and for this reason, mind which is an atom, is included in it.)

64.—Immaterial qualities are: merit and demerit, memory, sound, intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, and endeavour (vocation). Immaterial substances are: the sky, time, space and soul.
90.—All the remaining qualities abide only in one thing. Special qualities are: intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, endeavour, touch, viscosity, original fluidity.

91.—Fate, memory and sound: General qualities are: number, quantity, separatedness, conjunction and disjunction, priority and posteriority, derived fluidity.

92. 93.—Gravity and velocity. Number, quantity, separatedness, conjunction, and disjunction, priority and posteriority, fluidity and viscosity are perceived by two senses.

Sound, colour, taste, smell and touch, are respectively perceived by one of the external senses.

94.—Gravity, fate and memory, transcend the perception of the senses. The special qualities of the pervading substances are not produced by the qualities of any cause.

65.—Comm.—The remaining qualities are: colour, taste, touch, measure which is an unit, separatedness, found only in one individual, priority, posteriority, intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, endeavour, gravity, viscosity, faculty, fate (merit and demerit) and sound.

66.—The special qualities of the earth are: colour, taste, smell and feel; of the water: colour, taste, feel, viscosity and natural fluidity; of the light: colour and feel; of the air: feel; of the sky: sound; of the soul: intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, merit, demerit and memory.

67.—Comm.—By two senses, viz. by the eye and the skin.

68.—Comm.—Qualities of the pervading substances are: intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, endeavour, merit, demerit, memory, and sound.

69.—Comm.—"They are not produced by the qualities of any cause." Colour, smell, &c. depend upon the quality of the cause (for instance the colour, taste, smell and feel of a jar depend upon the same qualities of the two halves, of which it is formed) the same cannot be admitted with regard to intellect, &c. because there is no cause of the soul, the ether, &c.
95. 96.—Natural colour, taste, smell, feel, likewise fluidity, viscosity, velocity, gravity, unity, separatedness found in individuals, quantity and elasticity are produced from the qualities of causes. Conjunction, disjunction and velocity are effected by actions.

97.—Colour, taste, smell, touch, quantity, unity, separatedness found in individuals, viscosity and sound are non-intimate causes.

98.—Special qualities of the soul have only instrumental causality. Hot feel, gravity, velocity, fluidity, conjunction and disjunction and the other qualities denoting two extremes, are of two fold causality.*

99.—The special qualities of pervading substances, as well as conjunction and disjunction and other qualities denoting two extremes,* are limited.

100.—Colour is perceived by the eye, it manifests substances, qualities and classes, it is the cause of the perception of the eye, and is white, &c., according to the variety of colours.

101.—It is eternal in the atoms of water and light; in all other substances it has a cause. Taste is perceived by the tongue; it is various, as sweet, bitter etc.

(The special qualities of the soul are only instrumental causes; for intellect, &c. is not the non-intimate cause of any thing; but the knowledge of what is possible by action is the instrumental cause of the desire of action.)

69.—Comm.—Viz. the instrumental and non-intimate causes.

70.—Comm.—“Colour is eternal in the atoms of water and light,” because it is there from their nature, non-eternal in the atoms of earth, as by the process of cooking another colour is produced.

* The second distich of this verse in the former edition has been omitted, the whole context showing that it is an interpolation. The same has been done with the first distich of verse 68, for the same reason, so that the present edition contains one verse less than the former.
of the Nyāya Philosophy.

102.—Its instrument (organ) is the tongue; as regards eternity, &c. it is like colour. Smell is perceived by the nose, it is the cause of perception through the nose.

103.—There are two kinds of smell, good and bad. Feel is perceived by the skin, it is the cause of perception through the skin.

104.—It is threefold, tepid, cold and warm. Hardness and similar qualities are in the earth; with regard to its eternity, the same holds good as above.

105.—These qualities as abiding in earth, are produced by cooking, while this is not the case as regards the other elements. The change produced by cooking takes place according to the opinion of the Vaisēshikas in the single atoms.

71.—Comm.—Taste is eternal in the atoms of water, all other taste is non-eternal.

72.—Comm.—Smell is non-eternal (because it abides alone in earth, and in the atoms of earth another smell is produced by the process of cooking.)

73.—Comm.—The feel of earth and air is temperate, of water cold, and of light hot... Feel is eternal in the atoms of water, light and air, non-eternal in the atoms of earth, (for the same reason as before.)

74.—Comm.—These, viz. colour, taste, smell and feel. As abiding in earth, they are produced by a cause, because by the union with fire, the colour, taste, smell and feel of earth are changed; not so as abiding in water, &c. for although water, &c. be a hundred times boiled, yet no change of its colour, &c. takes place. The smell and heat of water, on the other hand, are artificial, because they are present or absent by the presence or absence of artificial means, like the cold feel of air and earth.

75.—Comm.—The Vaisēshikas say, that as to earth the change by the process of cooking takes place in the atoms. Their view is, as follows. As long as the parts are retained in the compound, no change by the process of cooking is possible; but when by the union of fire the compound substances have been destroyed, that change takes place in the
atoms which have become independent of each other. And again by
the union of the atoms which have been changed by the process of
cooking, a production is effected from the compound of two, three, &c.
atoms again to a compound of many parts; for by the extraordinary
velocity of heat the transition from the destruction of one compound to
the production of another is sudden. Then from the destruction of a
compound of two atoms by a new production a compound, possessed of
shape, &c. is formed in a few moments.

For the instruction of the student an explanation of this topic is here
given.

The Sūtra of the Vaisēshikas is as follows: "Action is a cause which
is independent of conjunction and disjunction;" which means, that its
consequent state is independent of its antecedent state; otherwise, as
the action also produces the consequent conjunction, there would be
the fault of too wide a definition, because the action would depend
upon the destruction of the antecedent conjunction.

If here a disjunction, produced by disjunction, is not acknowledged,
nine moments are required. If it is acknowledged, the disjunction,
depending upon something produces disjunction; but if the cause is
something independent, action takes place. If there is a disjunction
produced by disjunction, as depending upon the time, which is de-
termined by the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first ele-
ments of a compound substance commencing perceptible substances (for
which a compound of three atoms is required) ten moments are neces-
sary. If further the disjunction produced by disjunction depends upon
the time or upon part (of a compound) either of which is determined
by the destruction of a substance, eleven moments are necessary.

1. Nine moments.

From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom,
hence disjunction from another atom, hence the destruction of the con-
junction, forming the first elements of a compound substance (which
consists of three atoms,) hence 1. the destruction of the compound of
two atoms, hence 2. the destruction of the quality of blue, &c. in the
atom, hence 3. the production of the quality of red, &c., hence 4. the
action in accordance with the production of the first elements of
things, hence 5. disjunction, hence 6. destruction of the former conjunc-
tion, hence 7. the conjunction, by which the first elements of a com-
pound are formed, hence 8. the production of a compound of two atoms, and hence 9. the production of the quality of red, &c.

If it is objected, 'that in the moment, when the quality of blue is destroyed, or in the moment, when the quality of red is produced, there is in the atom the action, in accordance with the production of the first elements of a compound substance;' we deny this, because in an atom, previous to the destruction of the action which takes place in an atom that is united with fire, and also previous to the production of a quality, there is no other action with regard to the atom possible; for we hold the principle, that in a thing where there is an action, no other action is possible, and also, that in a substance without quality an action, in accordance with production of the first elements of substances, cannot take place.

Nor can in an atom at the same time that the quality of blue, &c. is removed, the quality of red be produced, because the destruction of the antecedent is the cause of the consequent colour, etc.

2. Ten moments. They take place, if by disjunction, depending upon a time, determined by the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, another disjunction is effected.

From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom, which is the element of a compound of two atoms, hence disjunction, hence the destruction of the conjunction, by which the first elements of a compound are formed, hence 1. the destruction of the compound of two atoms and the disjunction, produced by disjunction, hence 2. the destruction of the quality of blue and the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 3. the production of the quality of red and the consequent conjunction, hence 4. the destruction of the action, produced by the conjunction* of the fire, with regard to the atom, hence 5. the action, in accordance with the production of the first elements of a compound substance, like the conjunction of fate with the soul, hence 6. disjunction, hence 7. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 8. the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, hence 9. the production of a compound of two atoms, and hence 10. the production of the quality of red, &c.

3. Eleven moments.

* Nodanam means a conjunction, by which no sound is produced. See v. 119.
Division of the Categories

From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom, hence disjunction, hence the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, hence 1. the destruction of a compound of two atoms, hence 2. disjunction, produced by disjunction, depending upon a time determined by the destruction of a compound of two atoms, hence 3. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 4. the consequent conjunction, hence 5. the destruction of the action with reference to the atom, hence 6. the action, forming the first elements of a compound substance, like the conjunction of fate with the soul, hence 7. disjunction, hence 8. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 9. the conjunction forming the first elements of a compound substance, hence 10. the compound of two atoms, hence 11. the production of the quality of red. One and the same conjunction of fire destroys not the blue colour and produces the red colour, as the intermediate sound destroys the preceding and produces the subsequent sound; for one and the same fire continues not for the whole time. Moreover, if the cause of the production were also the cause of destruction, then, if by the destruction of the colour &c. the fire were also destroyed, the atom would remain for a long time without colour. If on the other hand, the cause of destruction were also the cause of production, then, if at the production of the red colour the fire (the cause of the production) were destroyed, there could not be produced the red colour.

If in this manner the action is considered in another atom, the quality is produced in five and more moments.

In five moments. The action takes place in one atom, hence disjunction, hence destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, and action in another atom, hence destruction of the compound of two atoms, and disjunction, produced by action in another atom. This is one time. Hence destruction of blue, &c. and from the disjunction the destruction of the former conjunction. This is the second time. Hence the production of the red, and the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound. This is the third time. Hence the production of the compound of two atoms, which is the fourth time, and hence the production of the red, which is the fifth time.—If one considers the destruction of the substance at the same time with the action in another atom, then the production of
106.—While the Naiyáyikas affirm,¹⁰ that change is effected also in two or more atoms. The cause as regards the operation of counting, is called number.¹¹

107.—Eternal unity is attributed to eternal substances, transient unity to transient substances.¹² Numbers from two upwards to an indefinite number are produced by comprehending intellect,

the quality takes place in six moments. In this manner. By the action in one atom disjunction takes place in another atom, hence destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound, hence destruction of the compound of two atoms, and action in another atom, hence destruction of the blue and disjunction, produced by action in another atom, hence production of the red, and destruction of the former conjunction in another atom, hence conjunction in another atom, hence production of the compound of two atoms, then production of the red. In the same manner seven moments are required, if one at the time of the destruction of the blue considers the action in another atom, and eight moments, if one considers the production of the red at the same time with the action in another atom.

76.—Comm.—"While the Naiyáyikas affirm." It is the opinion of the Naiyáyikas, that also in compounds, viz. in compounds of two, three, &c. atoms, change by the process of cooking takes place. Their view is this. As compound substances have pores, the minute parts of fire enter into the inside, and therefore change by the process of cooking is possible, although the parts be retained in the compound. The opinion of Vaiséshikas is complicated, as it assumes the destruction of an infinite number of parts. If this is the case, the recognition: "this is that jar," is consistent; but where there is no recognition, there we can admit a destruction of the compound.

77.—Comm.—"The cause as regards the operation of counting, is called number." The cause, viz., the non-intimate cause.

78.—Comm.—"Eternal unity is attributed to eternal substances, transient to transient substances." Eternal substances are the atoms of material substances, further time, space and soul, transient substances for instance a jar, &c.

1 2
108. — And they are collectively apprehended in their dependence upon more than one object. The comprehending intellect being destroyed, those numbers are also destroyed.

79. — Comm. — "Numbers from two upwards to an indefinite number are produced by comprehending intellect, and they are collectively apprehended in their dependence upon more than one object."

Numbers from two upwards, depending upon the addition of one to one, are produced by comprehending intellect.

Although the relation, indicating the class of two, three, &c. abides for instance in each of two, three, &c. jars &c. yet as there is not a knowledge, that one is two, and further as there is the knowledge, that one is not two, it must be assumed a relation, indicating the collective apprehension of two, three, &c. which depends upon more than one object.

80. — Comm. — "The comprehending intellect being destroyed, those numbers, (from two upwards) are also destroyed." First there is the comprehending intellect, then the production of the class of two, &c. then the determining knowledge, viz. the determination of the class of class of two, then the perception determined by the class of two. If the comprehending intellect is destroyed, also the class of two is destroyed.

Although no other knowledge does continue for three moments, because the special qualities of the respective pervading substances are destroyed by the qualities succeeding to them,* yet it must be assumed, that the comprehending intellect continues for three moments; otherwise the comprehending intellect would be destroyed at the time of determination, and thereby also the class of two, three, &c.; for there would be no perception of the class of two, because no object were present, and only when it is present, a knowledge is produced by the eye, &c. Therefore it must be assumed, that the perception of the class of two destroys the comprehending intellect.

It must not be asked, 'how by the destruction of the comprehending intellect the class of two, &c. is destroyed,' because at another time there is no perception of the class of two; for it is clear, that the

* For instance a sound by another, which follows it, or a perception, thought, etc. by a succeeding one.
109.—Comprehending intellect is called the intellect which refers to many unities. Quantity is the cause of the operation of measuring.

110.—Point (atom of space) length, thickness, breadth, are the differences of quantity; in transient things it is transient, in eternal things eternal.

comprehending intellect is the cause of those numbers, and its destruction destroys also them. Therefore the class of two, produced by the comprehending intellect of A, is comprehended by the same A.

Nor must it be said, “that the comprehending intellect is the cause of the perception of the class of two,” &c., because it is right for brevity’s sake to assign it as the cause of the class of two, &c.

The comprehending intellect of the Yogis refers to compounds of two atoms, &c. which transcend the perception of the senses. The comprehending intellect of God (Iswara) or of the Yogis abiding in the mundane egg, refers to the atoms at the time of the creation of the world.

81.—Comm.—“Comprehending intellect is called the intellect which refers to many unities.”

This is the intellect, which apprehends, that this is one, this is one, &c. It must be understood, that, where there is a knowledge of undefined unities, there is produced the number, referring to many, different from two, three, &c. as where there is a forest, an army, &c. This is the opinion of Kandali-kāra. The Āchāryas, however, think, that the class of many, is the class of three, &c. Therefore the class of many includes the class of three, &c. Although the class of three, &c. is included in an army, yet the class of the class of three, etc. is not apprehended, because this would be wrong. If this is the case, the notion is possible, that this army is greater than that, because if the class of many were without number, there could not exist the notion of a comparative and superlative degree.

82.—Comm.—“Quantity is the cause of the operation of measuring,” viz. the non-intimate cause.

83.—“In transient things it is transient,” viz. in a compound of two atoms, &c. “In eternal things it is eternal,” viz. is the sky, &c.
111.—Transient quantity is produced from number, measure, and heaps. Quantity found in two and more atoms arises from number;*

112.—As met with in a jar and similar extended things it arises from measure; the conjunction of so-called loose things, it is a heap. By this (conjunction)

113.—Measure is produced in such things for instance as cotton. If the place, upon which it (the measure) depends, is destroyed, it is also destroyed. Separatedness which is like number* is the cause of the knowledge of separate things.

114.—It cannot be said, that it is included in mutual negation; for it is not the same to say, “this is different from that,” and, “this is not that.”

115.—Conjunction is called the obtaining of two things unobtained before. It is threefold, the first kind is produced from the action of one of two;

84.—Comm.—“Quantity found in two and more atoms.” The measure of one atom is not the cause with regard to the measure of a compound of two atoms, nor a compound of two atoms the cause with regard to the measure of a compound of three atoms, because a measure produces a measure which is greater than its own kind.* But the measure of a compound of two atoms is not greater than one atom, and the measure of a compound of three atoms has nothing of its own kind; therefore the non-intimate cause of a compound of two atoms is the number of two in an atom, and of a compound of three atoms the number of three in a compound of two atoms.

85.—Comm.—“Separatedness which like number,” viz. the non-intimate cause of the knowledge of separatedness is separatedness. It is like number in its relation to eternal and transient things; viz. as the class of unity is eternal in eternal things, and transient in transient things, as transient unity is produced in the second moment after the production of the thing upon which it depends, and is destroyed, when this is destroyed, so the same must be understood with regard to separatedness of two, three, &c.

* Vid. p. 8.
116.—The second from the united action of both, the third from conjunction. Of the first is an instance that of the falcon and the rock.

117.—Of the second, the fighting of two rams; of the third, the conjunction of the tree and the jar which is produced by the conjunction of the tree with one half of the jar.

118.—The conjunction which is effected by action is again two-fold, the one effected by violent, the other by soft motion; the first is the cause of sound.

119.—The second is not the cause of sound. Disjunction comprehends also three kinds. The one is produced by the action of one, the second by the action of two,

120.—The third by disjunction. This latter is again of two kinds; the one arises by the disjunction of the cause only, the other by the disjunction of the cause and non-cause.

86.—Comm.—With regard to the two first kinds of disjunction, the same examples are to be understood as with regard to the two first kinds of conjunction. The third is again two-fold, viz. as produced either by the disjunction of the cause, or by the disjunction of the cause and non-cause.

Where there is an action with regard to one half of a jar, there ensues a disjunction of the two halves, hence the destruction of the conjunction forming the jar, hence destruction of the jar, hence by the action, which consists in the disjunction of the half, the disjunction of the half of the jar from the other part of space, hence a destruction of the conjunction with the other part of space, hence the conjunction with another part of space, hence the destruction of the action.

Where by an action of the hand, a separation of the tree and the hand takes place, there arises the belief that the tree is also separated from the body. Here in the separation of the body from the tree is the action of the hand not the cause, because they are not at one and the same place. Again there is no action in the body, as the action of a compound is regulated by the actions of each of its parts; therefore is here produced by the disjunction of cause* and non-cause also a disjunction of effect and non-effect.

* Cause, as it appears, is here the tree.
Division of the Categories

121.—Posteriority and priority are two-fold with regard to time, or to space, and are only applicable to material bodies.

122.—Posteriority of place (distance) is perceived from a greater space intervening between the conjunction of the sun, priority (nearness) by the perception of less space.

123.—The non-intimate cause of them is conjunction of space which is the substrate of them.* Posteriority with regard to time is produced by the knowledge of the anterior existence of the revolutions of the sun,

124.—Priority (recent time) from the knowledge of what succeeded the former. The non-intimate cause of them is the conjunction of things which are in time.

125.—If the comprehending intellect were destroyed, posteriority and priority would also be destroyed. Intellect has been previously nearly explained.

126.—What is left, will now be explained. Knowledge is two-fold, wrong notion and right notion.

127.—A knowledge, which manifests something where this something is not present, is a wrong notion. Of this there are two kinds, mistake and doubt.

128.—The former is the certain knowledge of a thing where such a thing is not present, as for instance, the notion of the soul in the body, or yellow colour in a shell.

129.—Doubt" is a knowledge in question, whether for in-

87.—Comm.—If a knowledge, which manifests something, is transferred to something else, and represents itself at the same time as certain, it is error; for instance, if the knowledge of the soul in such sentences as: "I am reddish," &c., is transferred to the body, or yellow colour to a shell.

88.—Comm.—Doubt is a knowledge, determined by the contradictory absence or presence (of a predicate) in one and the same subject.

* Their substrate is: near or far with regard to space.
stance a thing is a man or a trunk. A knowledge which does not manifest something, where this something is not present, but, which manifests this something alone, is certitude.

130.—The apprehension of absence and presence in one and the same object is doubt. The cause of doubt is the knowledge of a general attribute, &c.⁹

(The Bengalee Translation explains this as follows: A doubt is a knowledge such as this: Is this a man or a trunk? This kind of doubt is called a doubt of four extremes (चतुर्भाज्य,) because there are four extremes, viz. the notions of a man and non-man, and the notions of trunk and non-trunk. The contradictory notions of presence and absence are called extremes. If it is questioned, whether the mountain is fiery or not fiery, the doubt is, whether one of the two extremes fiery or not fiery abides in the mountain.)

89.—Comm.—There are three causes of doubt.

1. Cause of doubt is the knowledge of a general attribute which is found in two extremes, for instance the notion of height, found in trunk and non-trunk, as if it is doubted, whether this is a trunk or not a trunk.

2. Cause of doubt is a non-general (special) attribute. (Non-general is a predicate, which is not found in the subject of the two extremes;) for instance, if the notion of sound, which is separated from the notions of eternal and non-eternal, (that is the notion of sound is not the general notion, under which eternal and non-eternal are comprehended) is conceived in sound, the doubt arises, whether sound is eternal or non-eternal.

3. Cause of doubt is contradiction (of two extremes,) but not the contradiction, referring to the mere sound alone, because a knowledge of a general predicate of sound is the cause of certitude only; for instance, if it is said: Sound is eternal, sound is not eternal, but the knowledge of the two extremes, which is produced by sound. The doubt takes place by the mind.

In the same way, if there is a doubt, that a knowledge is proved, there is also a doubt with regard to the object of the knowledge.

In the same way, if there is a doubt with regard to a subject in its
131.—Defect produces wrong notion, excellence right notion. There are different kinds of defects as bile, distance, &c.

132.—Excellence as regards perception is the intercourse of a sense with what is determinable, determined by its determination. Excellence as regards inference

invariable connexion with a predicate, there is also a doubt with regard to the predicate. But the cause of doubt is the knowledge of a subject, determined by an attribute, or the intercourse of a sense with such a subject.

90.—Comm.—Defect is the cause of wrong notion, and excellence of right notion. Defects as for instance, bile, &c. are only of a contingent nature; for their causality is established by the argument from a general affirmative and a general negative (Anwaya and Vyātirēka; if the defect is there, the notion is wrong, if the defect is not there, the notion is not wrong). That excellence is the cause of right notion, on the other hand, is established by simple inference; for right notion is produced by a cause, different from the general cause of knowledge, because it is a knowledge that is produced, as wrong notion is. It cannot be said, 'that the absence of defects is the cause.' In the sentence, "the shell is yellow," bile is the defect; from this the right notion of shell is not obtained, because there is no authority to ascribe it more to the one member of the alternative than to the other, and it is right to assume a causality from one excellence in preference to a causality from the absence of numerous defects.

Nor can it be said: 'Let excellence even be granted, there is no perception of white colour in a shell, as bile is an obstacle to it; therefore the causality of the absence of defects, as for instance of bile, is necessary. Of what use is then the assumption of a causality of excellence?' for in this case the causality of excellence is proved by the argument of a general affirmative and negative. In the same way it is well said, that the absence of excellence is the cause of error.

What are those defects? "Bile," &c. Sometimes bile is a defect, when a yellow colour is mistaken for a white one (as in jaundice) sometimes distance, for instance if the moon, sun, &c. by their distance are mistaken for small bodies.
133.—Is the consideration connected with the place (subject of conclusion) which is determined by the conclusion. Excellence, as regards comparison, is the knowledge of similar objects, derived from words possessed of power.

134.—Excellence as regards verbal knowledge is the right notion of consistency or of the intention. Right notion is a knowledge without error.

135.—Or right notion is a knowledge which is of such a kind and accordingly predicated. A knowledge which is undetermined, is neither right notion nor error;

136.—For that which is without determination and determinability is not comprehended under any relation. Right notion is not perceived by itself, but by the concurrence of doubt.

91.—Comm.—"Right knowledge is a knowledge without error." As here the objection might be made, that,—if at the perception of silver and tin, both, silver and tin, are considered as silver,—also on the part of the silver a wrong notion is produced, because that knowledge is not free from error, a second definition is given: "Right notion is a knowledge which is of such a kind, and accordingly predicated." Here it must be understood, that, under which relation the right notion is perceived, under the same relation must be perceived that which is determined, and also the determination. Hence it is not against this definition, if a jar, &c. is comprehended by the same conjunction as the two halves of which it is composed, If this is the case, any thing without determination is no right notion, as there is no general notion, by which it is determined. A notion which is undetermined, is neither true, nor false.

92.—Comm.—"Right notion is not perceived by itself, but by the concurrence of doubt."

Namely, the Mímánsakas say, that right notion is comprehended by itself. According to the Gurus* a knowledge is a right notion by its

* Col. Misc. Essays, Vol. I. p. 298. Next to him (Bhaṭṭa Kumárlaswami) is a writer usually cited under the title of Guru, more rarely under the designation of Prabhákara. His work I had no opportunity of examining with a view to the present
137.—The cause of the apprehension of a general proposition is the non-apprehension of what goes astray and the apprehen-

own manifestation. (Bengalee Tr. They state the object of knowledge, for instance of a jar, to be three-fold, viz. the jar, the soul, and the knowledge of a jar &c. in connexion with that which is to be proved, because by the means of object of the knowledge, for instance of a jar, first the jar, further the soul, and lastly, the knowledge of the jar in connexion with that which is to be proved, form one and the same knowledge, which may be pronounced in the sentence: “I know the jar,” which means, I have a knowledge, which manifests a jar, &c.)

According to the opinion of the Bhaṭṭās* knowledge is beyond the senses; the notion (class) of knowledge, produced by that knowledge (which is beyond the senses) is perceptible; by this (notion) knowledge is inferred (B. T. According to the Bhaṭṭās knowledge, without determination as well as with determination, is beyond the senses; but after the knowledge of a jar there arises the notion of what is known with reference to the jar, &c. then the notion of what is known, viz. by me the jar is known, is perceived, and lastly, “I have a knowledge of a jar,” &c. determined by the notion of a jar, &c.)

According to the opinion of the Murārimisras knowledge is obtained by reflection (B. T. the Murārimisras say, that after the knowledge

essay, and he is known to me chiefly from reference and quotations; as in Mādhava's summary, where his opinions are perpetually contrasted with Kumārilās, and in the text and commentary of Sāstra-dīpikā, where his positions are canvassed with those of numerous other writers.

* Id. p. 297. The annotations (Vārtika to the Commentary of the Sūtras of the Mīmāṃsa, by Sabaraswāmī) are by Bhaṭṭa Kumārilaswāmī, who is the great authority of the Mīmāṃsakā school, in which he is emphatically designated by his title, Bhaṭṭa, equivalent to Doctor. He frequently expounds and corrects Sabara's gloss, often delivers a different interpretation, &c. . . . Id. 298. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa figures greatly in the traditionary religious history of India. He was predecessor of Sankara Kāchārya, and equally rigid in maintaining the orthodox faith against heretics, who reject the authority of the Vēdas. He is considered to have been the chief antagonist of the sect of Buddha, and to have instigated an exterminating persecution of that heresy . . . The age of Kumārila, anterior to Sankara, and corresponding with the period of the persecution of the Baudhās, goes back to an antiquity of much more than a thousand year.
of the Nyāya Philosophy.

sion of what does not go astray; sometimes doubt is removed by discussion."

of a jar, &c. there is the reflection, I know the jar, by this there is a knowledge, manifesting the knowledge of a jar, &c.)

According to the opinion of all of them this or the other knowledge is right notion by a knowledge, manifesting this or the other knowledge; for knowledge is to be ascertained by its object; therefore the object is to be known by the knowledge of knowledge. This opinion is blamed in the text: "Right notion is not perceived by itself," &c. If right notion of knowledge were comprehended by itself, there would be no doubt with regard to knowledge, produced by practice; for if in this case knowledge is known, also its right notion (evidence) is known; hence how could doubt exist? On the other hand, if knowledge is not known, then, in the absence of the knowledge of something determined by an attribute, how can doubt arise? Therefore right knowledge is an object of inference; for instance: This knowledge is right notion, because it is produced by the agreement of those who discuss on it. That, which is not of such a kind, is not of such a kind, as wrong notion. For instance: This knowledge, the general notion of earth, is right notion, because the notion of knowledge, representing the general notion of earth, is found in that which has smell. In the same manner this knowledge of water is right notion, because the general notion of knowledge, representing the general notion of water, is found in that which has viscosity.

93.—Comm.—"The cause of the apprehension of a general proposition (Vyāpti, the invariable connexion of a subject with a predicate) is the non-apprehension of what goes astray, and the apprehension of what does not go astray; sometimes a doubt is removed by discussion."

The invariable connexion of a subject with a predicate (Vyāpti) has been before explained, but not the means of its apprehension. This is now done in the text, viz. "The cause," &c. 1st, The non-apprehension of what goes astray* is the cause, since, if this apprehension takes place, the general proposition (Vyāpti) cannot be apprehended. The apprehension of what does not go astray (of similar instances) is the

* Vyabhichāra: a reason goes astray, if it is connected with any subject, where the conclusion (major term) cannot abide. Sahachāra: a reason does not go astray, if it has similar instances, in which the conclusion abides.
138.—Specification is an attribute which is contained in the conclusion, but not in the reason.* Its chief points will now be explained.

due, as proved by the argument from a general affirmative and a general negative (Anwaya Vyatireka, if there are similar instances, there is also the general proposition; if there are no similar instances, there is no general proposition). Repetition (the repetition of similar instances) is no cause, since, although there be not an apprehension of what goes astray, yet the general proposition (Vyápti) is sometimes at once apprehended. Sometimes, however, repetition is required to remove a doubt with reference to what goes astray. Where by repetition the doubt does not disappear, discussion is required to guard against the contrary supposition. For instance, if there is a doubt, whether smoke be not also found with something; where there is no fire, this doubt is removed by the consideration, that fire and smoke are in the relation of cause and effect. If this mountain is without fire, it must also be without smoke, because an effect is not without its cause. If it is sometimes without cause, it is an effect without cause. In this case doubt arises, which is to be removed from its obstacle, in such a manner: If an effect is without cause, fire is not the invariable means to produce smoke, or food to satisfy hunger. Where doubt does not of itself arise, there discussion is not necessary. With this view it is said in the text: "Sometimes doubt is removed by discussion."*

94.—Comm.—"Specification is an attribute, which is contained in its conclusion, (major term) but not in its reason."

'* If this definition is correct, then in the inference: "This man is black, because he is the son of Mittrá," the notion of the origin of black colour by her eating bad vegetables, would be no specification, because

* The Bengalee Translator says in illustration of this: For instance if hearth is the subject (minor term), smoke the conclusion (major term), and fire the reason (middle term), then is wet fuel the specification with regard to the faulty reason, viz. fire, because it is the condition of smoke, but not of fire; for where there is smoke, there is necessarily also wet fuel; but where there is fire, there is not (necessarily) wet fuel, as for instance a fiery iron-ball; on the other hand, if there is a faultless reason, for instance, if mountain is the subject, fire the conclusion, and smoke the reason, there is no specification, because the attribute, which is a condition of the conclusion, is also a condition of the reason.
of the Nyāya Philosophy.

139.—All admissible specifications abide in the same place with the conclusion. Those, which abide in the same place with the reason, go astray with regard to the conclusion.

it is not contained in the conclusion; (black) for blackness is also found in a jar, &c.

Further: In the inference: “Air is perceptible” because it is the site of touch, the notion of proportionate greatness, would be no specification, because perception takes place also with regard to the soul, &c. where there is no greatness.

‘Nor would the notion of existence (भावना,) be a specification in the inference: “Destruction is transient from its being a production,” because the notion of something transient is also in antecedent negation, and here, without any doubt, is not existence.’

We deny this; for the meaning is, that the specification, which is a condition of the conclusion, as determined by this or that attribute, is not a condition of the reason, as determined by the same attribute; thus for instance the notion of a production by bad vegetables is the condition of the blackness, which is determined by the notion of son of Mittrá. In the same manner is proportionate greatness the condition of the perception, determined by the notion of external things. Thus in the inference: “Destruction is transient from its being a production,” is the notion of existence the condition of the conclusion, as determined by the notion of production.

In a faultless reason, there is no such attribute, viz. something, being a condition of a determined conclusion (major term), while it is not a condition of the reason under the same determination. But in a reason which goes astray, one of the two at least takes place, either that the place of the specification, which is also the place of the conclusion (major term) is the condition of the conclusion and the non-condition of the reason, or that the place, where there is not the specification, which is also the place, determining the absence of the conclusion, is the condition of the conclusion, and the non-condition of the reason.

95.—Comm.—“Specification is necessary to judge, where a reason goes astray.” That is to say, the assumption of specification is necessary to infer, that the conclusion goes astray, which takes place by the
140.—Specification is necessary to judge, where a reason goes astray. It is the opinion of the Vaiséshikas that verbal specification going astray. Therefore, where there is a specification which is the condition of a conclusion without any further addition, there by the going astray of the specification which has no further addition, may be concluded also the going astray of the conclusion. For instance, where it is concluded that something smokes, from fire, there fire (as the reason of smoke) goes astray with regard to smoke, because wet fuel goes astray; for, if the more comprehensive notion goes astray, it is necessary that also the more narrow notion goes astray. But where the specification is of such a kind, as to be a condition of the conclusion (major term) as determined by any attribute (addition) how insignificant soever, there the inference, that the conclusion goes astray, follows from the going astray of the specification in a subject, determined by such an attribute (addition,) for instance, if it is inferred, that this person is black, because he is the son of Mittra, the notion: “a son of Mittra” goes astray with regard to blackness, because with regard to the son of Mittra, goes astray the specification of a product of bad vegetables.

96.—Comm.—“Verbal knowledge and comparison are not different kinds of proof.”

According to the opinion of the Vaiséshikas there are only two kinds of knowledge, viz. perception and inference, verbal knowledge and comparison being included in the latter; for such sentences as: “Drive the cow away by the stick,” or Védic sentences, depend upon the knowledge of the connexion of the meanings of the words, which are recollected by the object the speaker has in view, because all the words, which form a sentence, have intention, consistency, &c., as in the sentence: “Bring the jar,” &c.—Or: These meanings of words are mutually connected, because the words have consistency, &c., like similar meanings of words. The same is the case with regard to comparison. When a Gayal has been perceived, the word Gayal is the cause of the power with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal, because the old have attached this meaning to it, no other kind of proof being admitted, as the word of cow is the cause of the power with
knowledge and comparison, as included in inference, are not different kinds of proof.

141.—This is not correct, as, independent of inference, verbal knowledge and comparison are intelligible.

142.—The connexion of the subject with the predicate is two-fold, one positive and the other negative; the first has been explained, the other will now be explained.

reference to what is determined by the notion of cow. Or: The word Gayal is the cause of the power with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal on the ground, that trustworthy people have attached this meaning to it. By this inference the cause of the power with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal is evident, viz. because there is a connexion of a general proposition with a minor term.

This opinion is blamed in the text in the words: "This is not correct;" for without the knowledge of a general proposition (of the Vyápti) an understanding is possible from the mere words. There is no proof, that after the hearing of words a general proposition is always necessary. Moreover, if it is assumed, that a general proposition (Vyápti) is always required with reference to the understanding of words, why then is it not admitted, that it is necessary to assume a verbal knowledge with reference to the understanding of an inference?

97.—Comm.—"The connexion of the subject with the predicate is twofold."

Namely, there are three kinds of inference, viz. only affirmative, only negative, and affirmative and negative at the same time.

1. The only affirmative kind takes place, when there are no dissimilar instances with regard to the conclusion (major term, that is to say, when the major term is not excluded from any other notion) for instance, if it is argued, that something is an object of knowledge, because it can be named; for here is a dissimilar instance impossible, as every thing is an object of knowledge.

If it is said, 'that the only affirmative kind is impossible, because it is separated from all other notions' (that is to say, such a notion is separated from all other notions, and cannot therefore be connected with all.) We deny this; for what is separated, is common to all, and this is
merely affirmative. Moreover, the mere affirmation is the notion of a thing which is no object of actual absolute negation, and this is proved in the negation of the ether,* &c. (that is to say, as it cannot be proved, that ether, space, &c. are not found anywhere, so it cannot be proved with regard to such notions as knowledge, &c.)

2. Merely negative inference takes place, when there exist no similar subjects (of conclusion) for instance in the inference: Earth is distinguished from all the other elements, because it is possessed of smell;† for in this case there is no similar instance, viz. no instance with which the conclusion is connected, because it was before excluded from the other elements.

3. Affirmative and negative inference take place, when there exist similar and dissimilar instances (of the conclusion or major term) for instance: This is fiery, because it smokes. In this case there are similar instances, as a hearth, &c., and dissimilar instances, as a lake, &c.

98.—Comm.—The cause of the negative conclusion is the knowledge of a general negative proposition. (Vyatirékavyápti). For this reason the text defines the notion of a general negative proposition: "A general negative is the necessity of the absence of the reason, where there is an absence of the conclusion" (major term) that is to say, a general negative is the absence of the reason, which (absence) is included in the absence of the conclusion (major term). Here it must be understood, by what connexion, at what place, and by what notion the more extensive notion is comprehended, by the same connexion and notion is also the absence to be determined. From this knowledge it follows: by what connexion and notion the more comprehensive notion is comprehended, by the same connexion and notion is also the absence to be determined. Accordingly, where the absence of smell expresses the notion of the other elements by distinctive relation, &c. (see p. 7.) there

* Pratiyogi is that of which there is a negation (it is the contradictory opposition to its own negation) for instance a jar is the Pratiyogi of the negation of a jar. Apratiyogi is a thing, of which there is no negation, as for instance space, which is everywhere, and of which it cannot anywhere be said, there is no space.

† Here is earth the minor term, the conclusion the distinction from what is different from earth, and the reason smell.
of the Nyāya Philosophy.

144.—Presumption* is not considered as another proof, because it is included in negative inference. Happiness, the object of desire of all worlds, is produced by virtue.

145.—Unhappiness the effect of vice, is abhorred by all conscious beings. The desire of happiness and of freedom from unhappiness arises from the knowledge of either.\(^99\)

146.—There is a desire of obtaining the means for those ends (avoiding misery and gaining happiness) if there is knowledge

follows the absolute negation of the notion of the other elements by the negation of the negation of smell; but where the more extensive notion of the other elements is comprehended by the relation of identity, there also is the negation of the other elements expressed by the relation of identity. This is reciprocal negation. And lastly, when by the relation of conjunction for instance the more extensive notion of fire with regard to smoke is comprehended, there the negation of smoke, determined by the relation of conjunction, in a tank also follows from the negation of fire, determined by the relation of conjunction. Here is the cause of the apprehension of the general negative proposition the knowledge of what agrees with a general negative. Others say: “By means of the negative the general affirmative is understood, but the knowledge of the general negative proposition, is not the cause. Where by means of the general negative the general proposition is understood, there it is called a negative inference. The necessity of the conclusion (major term, here the difference from the other elements) is first evident from single things, as a jar, &c. and afterwards it is established for the notion of earth” &c.

99.—*Comm.—“The desire of freedom from unhappiness and of obtaining happiness arises from the knowledge of either.”

Desire is *threelfold*, viz. the desire whose object is the last end, (summum bonum, which is not the means to accomplish another object,) the desire whose object is a means (for something else) and the desire of action.

1. *The desire whose object is the last end.* The last end (यत्तत्त्व) is

* Vid. Col. M. E. Vt. p. 303. Presumption (arthápati, one of the five modes of proof of the Mīmāṃsakas) is deduction of a matter from that which could not else be. It is assumption of a thing not itself perceived, but necessarily implied by another which is seen, heard, or proven.
of these means. The wish to act is the desire determined by what may be accomplished by action.

147.—The cause of this is the knowledge of what may be accomplished by acts and what may accomplish the object of a desire. The knowledge, that something is the cause of an object which is strongly abhorred, is an obstacle.¹⁰⁰

148.—According to others the cause of the wish to act is the knowledge of what does not produce that abhorrence. The cause of aversion is the knowledge of what accomplishes things that are abhorred. Endeavour is of three kinds according to philosophers, viz. activity, cessation from activity and vital endeavour.

149.—The wish to act, the knowledge of what may be ac-

happiness and freedom from unhappiness. The cause of the desire of the last end is the knowledge of the same; therefore it is of itself the object of man; for it follows from the definition, that any thing, which, when known, is desired by its own nature, is the object of man, and its full meaning is, that it is the object of a desire, not dependent upon another desire.

2. The desire whose object* is a means (for something else.) The cause of this is the knowledge of what accomplishes an object of desire.

3. The desire of action is the desire, whose object is an effect to be accomplished by action, which (desire) is determined by the notion of what may be accomplished by action. This depends upon an apprehension such as this: I shall accomplish cooking by action. The cause of the desire of action is the knowledge, that an object may be obtained by action, and the knowledge, that the object of desire may be obtained. Therefore there is no desire of action with reference to rain, because it cannot be obtained by action.

100.—Comm.—"The knowledge, that something is the cause of an object which is strongly abhorred, is an obstacle."

* The object of a desire, independent of any other desire, is the last object; this is happiness and deliverance from unhappiness; for both are not desired for the sake of any thing else, but for their own sake. An object of a desire, depending upon another desire, is a secondary object; such are for instance, the fruition of love, eating, the removal of the unhappiness of another, the refraining from desires, &c.
complished by acts and what accomplishes such or such a desire, and the perception of the material causes produce activity.

150.—Cessation from activity rises from aversion produced by the knowledge of what accomplishes abhorred objects.

151.—Vital endeavour is constant, it transcends the perception of the senses;

152.—It is the cause of the flux and reflux of the vital airs in the body. Gravity abides in earth and water, it is imperceptible to the senses;

153.—It is transient in what is transient, and eternal in what is eternal. It is the non-intimate cause of the action which is called falling.

154.—Fluidity is twofold, innate and derived from a cause; the first abides in water, the second in earth and light;

155.—In the atoms of water it is eternal, in every other thing transient. Derived fluidity is produced in clarified butter and similar substances when heated by the union with fire.

156.—Fluidity is the cause of trickling and instrumental cause in a collection (heap). Viscidity abides in water; it is eternal in atoms, non-eternal in a compound.

For instance, there is no desire of action with regard to honey, mixed with poison, because the strong aversion is an obstacle.

(Material or intimate causes are those substances by means of which a desire is accomplished; for instance the material causes of a sacrifice are: the presence of ghee, wood, rice, &c.)

101.—Comm.—"Is constant;" which means, it lasts as long as life does.

102.—Comm.—"It transcends the perception of the senses; for the flux and reflux of the vital airs, when stronger than usually, is accomplished by endeavour, for instance a stronger inspiration (this is evident from perception). If this is the case, then from the inference, that the flux of the vital airs is accomplished by endeavour (for there must be a cause of it) and further from the inadmissibility of an endeavour that is perceived (for in the ordinary function of respiration, &c. it is not perceived) it follows, that the flux of vital airs is accomplished by an
157.—By the abundance of this (viscidity) in oil combustion is favoured. There are three kinds of faculty, viz. velocity, elasticity and memory.

158.—Velocity abides only in bodies, and is twofold, either produced by action or by velocity. Elasticity is according to some only found in earth, according to others in the four first elements.

159.—It is imperceptible to the senses, and is sometimes the cause of vibratory motion. The faculty which has the name of memory, is found only in sentient beings; it is imperceptible to the senses.

160.—Its cause is certitude without inattention. Memory is called also the cause of remembrance and of recognition.

endeavour, which transcends the perception of the senses. This is vital endeavour.

103.—Comm.—"It is twofold, either produced by action, or by velocity." Velocity in an arrow arises from action produced by conjunction without noise, (vid. v. 118,) hence from the destruction of a former action arises another action. In the same manner all the subsequent actions must be considered. And without velocity, since one action is an obstacle to another, the destruction of a former action, and the production of a subsequent one were impossible. Where velocity is effected by velocity, for instance, where the velocity in a jar is effected by the velocity of its half, there is velocity, produced by velocity.

104.—Comm.—Elasticity is proved for instance by the fact, that a branch which is attracted, returns to its former position, when released. The opinion of some, that elasticity abides in the four first elements, is not supported by any evidence.

105.—Comm.—"Its cause is certitude without inattention." If it is said: 'Is certitude, different from inattention, rather not the cause of remembrance? And if this is the case, let us say, that knowledge in general is the cause of memory.'

We object; for as there is no authority of assuming an alternative, it is evident, that certitude, different from inattention, is the cause of memory. Moreover, with reference to inattention, the assumption of
161.—Fate is twofold, merit and demerit. Merit is the means by which heaven, &c. is obtained. It is a practice of ablutions in the Gangá, &c. and of sacrifices, &c.

162.—It is thought perishable by the contact with the water of the Karmanásá. Demerit is the cause of hell, &c. and is produced by blamable works.

163.—It may be destroyed by expiations, &c. Both qualities abide in living creatures. They are produced by desire and destroyed likewise by knowledge.

memory is complicated (superfluous) and hence it is proved, that certitude, different from inattention, is the cause of memory.

The proof of this is given in the words: “It is called the cause of remembrance and recognition.” That is to say, memory produces remembrance and recognition; therefore memory is assumed, for it is impossible, that a former perception produces, without intercourse, remembrance, because a cause is impossible, if it is not in respective intercourse with either of the two (remembrance or recognition.) Nor can it be said, ‘that, as memory, determined by the category of identity, is the cause of recognition, remembrance is obtained, because recognition is produced by memory;’ for there is no cause for this.

106.—Comm.—“Merit is the means by which heaven, &c. is obtained.”

That is to say, it is the means of obtaining the happiness of heaven and all other happiness, and of bodies fit to enjoy the happiness of heaven.

107.—Comm.—“In living creatures,” because merit and demerit cannot be assigned to God.

108.—Comm.—“They are produced by desire, and destroyed likewise by knowledge.”

“By desire,” that is to say, if good or bad acts are done by one who has perfect knowledge, they are of no effect. “Likewise by knowledge.” “Likewise” is said to indicate enjoyment.

“But how (it may be objected) can the knowledge of truth destroy merit and demerit? for this (the destruction of merit and demerit)

* The name of a small river, which separates the territory of Benares, Káśi, from Bihar.—Vid. Lassen’s Ind. Alterth. Vol. I. p. 130.
164.—There are two kinds of sound, inarticulate and articulate; the first is produced by a drum, &c. and the latter, as ka and other letters, by the contact of the throat with the palate.

165.—Every sound abides in the ether, but it is perceived, when it is produced in the ear. Some say, its production takes place like a succession of waves.

would be contrary to the passage (of the Yoga-sāstra): “An action, of which the effect is not experienced (which has not produced its due consequence in the soul of the agent, viz. happiness, if a good action, and unhappiness, if a bad one) does not perish even in a hundred crores of Kalpas.” If this is the case, then the destruction of merit and demerit takes place in this manner, that a person who knows the truth, experiences the consequences of all his works at once by all his bodies.’ (viz. all the bodies which he is to assume in future births.)

There, however, “to experience the consequences of works,” is only given as an example of the various ways, in which works are destroyed according to the Vēdas. How could otherwise works be destroyed by expiations? &c. It is said (in the Bhagavadgīta,) “The fire of knowledge consumes all works.” And in the Sruti: “All his works perish, when the general and individual souls are known.”

If it is said: ‘In this case there cannot exist for him who knows truth, the state of the body, nor happiness, unhappiness, &c. as by knowledge all works are destroyed,’ we object; for only the works different from those which are commenced, are destroyed; for only the work which is the cause of the enjoyment of this or that body, has been commenced.

109.—Comm.—“Every sound abides in the ether, but it is perceived, when it is produced in the ear.”

Abiding in the ether, means, that the ether is its intimate cause. As a sound, when distant, is not perceived, it is said, “in the ear.” As it may be doubted, how a sound, produced in the space determined by a drum, &c., is produced in the ear, it is said: “Its production takes place like a succession of waves,” its sound produces another, determined by a space, external to the first, and the second produces again a third, and so on. In this manner it is perceived, when it is gradually produced in the ear.
166.—According to others, like the bud of the Kadamba plant. pag. From the knowledge, that the letter ka is produced, and that it is destroyed, non-eternity of sound would follow.

167.—The knowledge, that this ka is that ka, depends upon the perception of general knowledge. "This is the medicine," such and other sentences depend upon general knowledge.

110.—Comm.—"Like the bud of the Kadamba plant." In this manner: From the first sound ten sounds are produced in the ten divisions of space. Hence ten other sounds are produced. As this assumption is complicated, it is said in the text: "according to some."

111.—Comm.—"From the knowledge," &c. To remove the objection, that sound is not produced, because it is eternal, it is said: "From the knowledge," &c.

112.—Comm.—If it be objected: 'The eternity of sound follows from the fact, that this letter ka is recognised as that letter ka,' the text gives the answer: The knowledge, that this ka is that ka, depends upon community of class,' &c. Here is the object of recognition, the community of class of this and that object, but not the identity of this and that individual; because it is contrary to the knowledge which has been mentioned. If this is the case, there cannot be a mistake with regard to those two perceptions (viz. sound is not eternal, and this is that sound).
CORRECTIONS AND EMENDATIONS.

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<td>54.</td>
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<td>read innate.</td>
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N. B. The translation counts one verse more than the original, as the invocation, forming the first verse of the former, has not been taken into the text of the latter.
चथ सिद्धान्तमुत्तावलीसहितभापापरिच्छेदः।
भाषापरिचय निष्पादन

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इति भाषापरिच्छेदनिर्देशनन्तर सम्पूर्णः॥
भाषापरिकल्पं॥

मण्डराचरणं॥

ॐ नमः गणेशाय॥

नूतनजलधरस्त्राये गोपवस्तूर्टीदुकुलचैराय॥

सिंध्वानन्तमुकावली॥

मण्डराचरणं॥

ॐ नमः गणेशाय॥

चूड़ामणीकृतविघुर्ववन्दीकृतवासुकिः॥

भवो भवतु भवाय लोकाताःखवपिष्टः॥

प्रतिज्ञा॥

निजनिर्मितकारिकावलोमतिमित्रमितानन्दनाकामिभिः॥

विष्णुदीकरवाणि कौशलकावनु राजीवदयावश्वदः॥

गृहप्रकाशमनन्त तदप्रतिच्छक्यनं॥

वद्यव गुणगुणस्तु सुकृतिनां सत्तर्यां स्वास्तिका

सवासान्यविशेषविशेषदिः शिवाय विशेषम् भवाद्वर्तितवाज्ञवला॥

विग्नोन्तांति विश्वनाथकाव्यिनां सिंध्वानन्तमुकावली

विख्या मनसे मुद्रविन्तन्ति सषुचिनिर्देशः चिरं॥

विन्द्रविप्रवहाय वरम मन्दलं श्रीयशचिये नवप्रभाति।

नूतनेवाद्यः॥ ननु मन्दलं न विन्द्रवह्यं प्रति न वा
भाषा  तस्मि नमः  क्रष्णाय संसारमचिरूचस्य वीर्याय ||

सिद्धार्थम समाप्तः प्रति कारणं बिनापि मन्दिरं नाशिकादीर्गैं
बन्धे निर्विस्मापरिमा-सिद्धमानादिरिति चेतु । न ।
अविगीतश्याचारविश्यालेन मन्दिरान मघलने चिन्हे तत्र च फलज्ञातायां यात्राति दृष्टफलकलेवरूपः
फलकल्पनाया अभावायलात् उपस्थित्तलाच । समाप्ति-
रेव चि फलं कलयते । दृष्टां यथ मन्दिरं न दृष्टे तत्र
वज्रिनी जन्मारायों ततु कलयते । चत्र च सत्यदे
मन्दिरे समाप्तिने दृष्टे तत्र वलबलरे विनो मिलचे
प्राप्तन्ते वा वेद्यं । प्राचर्याधृतेव वलबलं विनो
-निपार्कारारणं । विश्वस्मु सुमन्दिर दारमिवधः ।
न्यायस्तु मन्दिरेण विश्वस्मु एव फलं । समाप्तिः पुदिक
-प्रविषतादिकारशिक्षापाद् । न च नधेम: सिद्धांविश्वविरुचि
वत वतमन्दिर निकालानाप्निरिति वाचे । दृष्टा-
ततः विश्वायं तदायरणात् । तथैव शिष्ठार्थ-
तात । न च तस्त निकाले तदाधिकर्ष्ठायारातु-
मितवेदार्थापनप्निरिति वाचे । सति विनो तन्नादे-
श्याये वेदोपिततात् । चत्र एव पापभेमेण हत्याय-
श्वेतन्त समाचारान्ति न तदाधिकवेदार्थायामण्यां । मन्दि-
रकेन्त उविश्वस्मिः विश्वसिंहेपय कारणं । विश्वस्मिः विश्वेप
विनायकारपाठादि । कविच विश्वायताभाव एव
समाप्तिसाधनं । प्रतिविवकर्मवासाध्यक ज्ञतनक-
भाषा० क्रम्र गुणास्तथा कर्म यामान्य साविकेपकं।

सिद्ध० लात्। दयच्य नाथलिकादिखतमृत्वेशु जन्मान्तरीयम-कलज्यादिरित्यतंस: खतः: सिद्धविरोधायनामाभवो वा-स्त्रायित न वधिचार दयाद्।। संसारैत। संसार एव-नरसिद्धविरोधेऽवतु चचस्सु वोजाय। एतेन द्रैश्वयः प्रमाणमधि दर्शितं भर्तृत। तथापि। यथा घटादिकार्यं कर्त्तज्जनं तथा चित्तह्युरा०रतिकमधि। न च तत् कर्त्तलस्मिराद्रीनां सम्भव्यतित्तत्त्कलर्गलेन्यकर्षिद्व।। न च गरीरोजर्जनेन कर्त्तज्जनलस्माधकेन सम्भवितव दृति वाच।। ऑस्योजतलात्।। सम तु कर्त्तलेन कार्योलेन का०शकारणभाव एव अनुकूलतकः।। शाथवाम्मयो जन-चन्द्रेव एक अश्वो विश्वक कर्ता भुवनाध गोपाल दयाद्रुप आयग्नानांनुमिष्येया।।

पदराः०। क्रम्र गुणा दयाद्रि। दृश्य मथाभावलक्षणादेव धत्रयं भावलं प्राङ्त तेन भावलेन प्रयुक्तपि भावस्य। न छतः।। एतेच पदराः वैश्विकम-किद्वा नेत्रायिकानामामयविष्णु:।। प्रतिपादितचैवमेव भार्ये।। जर एव उपमादिचन्द्राणं सप्तपदराधिभच-न्या शर्क्षानु० श्रायरतिरितंपदक्षणलमाशक्तितः।। ननु कर्त्तल एव पदराः:।। शर्क्षास्थ० शण्डीनामाम्यातिरिक-पदार्थितल।। तथापि।। मथादिकेशमविशिष्ठेन विशिष्टा द्राही न जन्यते तत्क्षये तु जन्यते।। तत्र मथादिना
भाषा । सम्बायस्तथाभाव पदार्थः सप्त कौशिका: ॥ १ ॥
चित्यविज्ञान मश्च्चामकाला दिग्देश्चिनो मन: ॥

चित्यविज्ञान मश्च्चामकाला शर्तिनांशंप्रते उज्जेजके मश्च्चामपरक्षणे च जन्याद्वित इति कस्यते । एवं शास्त्र श्रमयतिरिक्त: पदार्थः । तद्धि न पद्यपरार्थवानान्यार्थात सामान्ये: विप्र सतात । चतुष्ट्व गेलं निलंतथा तथा अस्त्रवर्ममयीति बाद्र्यश्रमपति: । नायभावे । सचने प्रतियोग्याला दिति चेत । न । मश्च्चामभावाविश्वविश्वार्दीधारिकां प्रति स्वात्मस्य मश्च्चामार्दीव वा शैलकल्पननेन सामान्ये: अनन्यशाक्तिवारागार्दाख्यांस्कल्पनान्याचितचार ।

न चेतुखजे वसी मणिप्रार्थवर्मकथायार्दिकौष्ठमयीति कथ धार इति वाच्य । उज्जेजकामभावाविश्वविष्णुमणिवामान्य:भावाकार शैलकल्पनान।

cाद्र्यमणि न पदार्थानारं किन्तु तद्धि-तल वसी तदन्तस्याय्यार्थवाच्य । चतुष्ट्व चन्द्रभिन्नले सति चन्द्रगतास्थायकालादिमचं मुखे चन्द्रया दृष्यमिति ॥ १ ॥

ऋच्याणिः विभजते । चित्यविज्ञान । एततं नव ऋच्याणि इत्यतः । ननु ऋच्यालज्ञाति चिन्मानं । न तत्र प्रत्यं प्रमाणं वृत्तिः भृतज्ञमस्वतंत्र स्थलायन्यादिति चेत । न। कार्यविष्णुकारणातवच्छेदकतथा संयोग-गतिः विभागः वा समवायकारणातवच्छेदकतथा

तवसिद्धिरिति ॥ ननु दश्तस्मि ऋच्यामः कुतो नेतनं ॥
भाषा ० द्वारा यथा गुणा रूप रसो गम्भीरतः परः \ ॥ २ \ ॥
संख्या: संख्या परिमित: प्रयत्नः नत: परः।
संयोगतेऽविभागः परत्वचारपरत्वः \ ॥ ३ \ ॥
जुड़ि: चुक्त्व दुःखीतः हेजो यथो गुरवः।
स्ववः चेतसम्प्रकारवादः प्रज्ञा द्वारं \ ॥ ४ \ ॥
उत्तेजित: ततो वेदेपनमाकुलः तथा।
प्रसारणकः गमनः कर्माणि तु गमनः \ ॥ ५ \ ॥
भमान्य रेतचन्म स्वद्योग्ये च।

सिद्धा ० तद्धः प्रयत्न: ग्रहते। तथा च रूपवचार: कर्मवचारः
द्वारः। तत्र गम्भीरन्यालाम्यः न प्रत्यव्यः। नीलकर्मवचारः
न जलादिकः। ततः च चालोकानिरपेचः चः: कारणः
द्रवत: चेत्। न त्रावधकंजेठो भवेनोपपनृतो द्वारा- 
कलयतः ज्ञाययालाम्। रूपवचार्ततितिकसः भवसु:।
कर्मवचार्ततितिर्पि चालोकापसारीपार्याशी कालिन- 
रेव। तस्माच्छापतिरिक्तेन नावत्वादिकल्याणो गौरवः
खातः। खर्षसः यथा तेजस्तम्भावस्थ: वच्चति। \ ॥

गुणान्य विभज्ञे। चर्च गुणा द्रवत। एते गुणातु- 
विभागमात्रकः। क्षणादेन कष्टतत्वश्वन्द्रेन च दृश्यतः।
तच गुणलादिकातितिसद्वर्ये वच्चते। \ ॥ २ \ ॥ ३ \ ॥ ४ \ ॥
कर्माणि विभज्ञे। उत्तेजितेऽविभज्ञे। कर्मवचार्ततितिकसः
प्रतिवजितः। एवमुख्योपलादिकमपि। नन्तं भम-
भाषा ० तीर्थागमनमय्यच गमनादेव लभ्यन् ॥ ६ ॥
सामान्य दिविष्य प्राप्तं परव्रामभवेव ।
द्रव्यादिविकृतिकत्तु सत्ता परत्यौचिन् ॥ ७ ॥
परमिता च या जाति: सैवापरन्यौचिने।

मित्र।० शाक्तिकमेव पञ्चभक्ष्याधिकतया कुते नेकमत ब्राह॥
भमणमित्यादिद: ॥६ ॥ ६ ॥

सामान्य विद्यमयात्। सामान्यायति। तत्त्वं च नूतने निचले सत्यनेत्रकमेवतलं। चर्नेकसमेवतलं संयोगादिकृतादिहरामखलं । चर्णेकरके ति। निचले सति समेवतलं गणपरिमाणादिनामखलं । चर्णेकरके ति। निचले सति समेवतलं गणपरिमाणादिनामखलं। एकमात्र-चक्रकृत्तिङ्ग स्व जातिः। तथाचोऽनुम्। यथोर्भेद कुल्यनं
शंकरो: च्यापरस्वत हृदयवारिष्टाः। । रूपानिरपूर्णमथे जाति-
वावधकरुकुल:।। एकयत्स्तिकलात्राकाशलं न जाति:। तत्त्वस्तिकलात् घटलं कलमलं न जातिव्यवहारः। काक्षी- श्यालात् सूतलं मूर्तिं न जाति:। चन्द्रभार्यात् सा-
मान्यलं न जाति:। विशिष्टाः चाक्षुसभास्वत रूप-हच्छानि: ख्यातिः विशिष्टाः न जाति:। समवायमम- भाबावात् समवाये न जाति:।। द्रव्यादीर्दिति।
परलं श्राधिकदेशस्तिति। अपरलं श्राधेशस्तिति।
भाषाः द्वारादिकृताङ्कितम् परापरस्याच्छन्ने।
व्यापकलावः परापि शयापायावादपरापि।
चन्द्र नित्यद्विबिन्निक्षेपः परिकौलितं।
घटादीनां कपालादै द्रव्येपु गुपकम्रूः।

सिद्धां। सकलजातवेंचाधिकारवेण्टचितानि सत्तायाः परलं।
एतद्वधनाधृवेद द्वारादिपितचितित्युकं। तद्पेचया
चायासां जातीनामपरलं। पर्यन्त्रा सत्ताभिन्ना।
व्यापकलादृष्टि। ७ ॥ ८ ॥

पृथिवीलाभवेचया व्यापकलादिकद्विपितचितानि
द्रव्यतादेः परलं। चन्द्रपेचया वायुलाभ अन्येष्ठेष्ठेन
द्विपिताच द्रव्यलाभपरलं। तथाच धर्मद्वयभमावी
शासुभवमिद्व।

विशेषं निलस्यार्ति। अन्य दृष्टि। अन्ये अवसाने
बत्ति इत्यवः। यद्पेचया विशेषः नाशीविद्धः। एक-
मात्रचितिति फलितार्थः। घटादीनां श्रणुपर्याब्धेन
नामानं तत्तद्वयभेदात् परस्यं भेदः। परमाणुणां
परस्यभेदको विशेष एव। स तु धृति एव व्याधि।
तेन तत्र विशेषान्तरपेचा नास्ति स्वभाव। ॥ ८ ॥

समवायं श्रेष्ठिति। घटादीनामिति। अन्यवाव
बिन्योज्जातीयश्चोलेण्युग्मिणाः: कृष्णव्रतोपत्तिनिद्राः
विशेषेष्योः च: समव्यः स च समवायः। समवायलं
भागाः तेषु जातेषु सम्बन्धः समवयः प्रकीर्णितः || १० ||
अभावस्तु द्विधा संसर्गायोन्याभावेद्धतः \\

विद्या ० नित्यसम्बन्धः। तत्र प्रमाणेन् गुणकियादिविशिष्यनु- 
द्विविशिष्याविशयसमवयविषयः। विशिष्यिन्द्रियालाभः द्वेषो 
पुष्प इति विशिष्यिन्द्रियवतः द्वायनान्। तत्र संयो- 
गादिवाधात् समवयविषिद्धः। न च खस्मन्देव 
विद्याधार्यं क्रियान्तारं वा। अनन्तक्षेत्रपर्यं समस्म- 
लक्षणेन गौरवत्। लाघवादेकसमवयविषिद्धः। न च 
समवयशैक्षके वाची रूपवत्ताकुम्भिः। तत्र 
रूपसमवयस्थापिके रूपभावान्। न चेवं अभाव वैशिष्यं 
समवयन्तरं सिद्ध्यचित्रि वाचं। तथ नित्यले 
भूत्ये घटान्यन्यन्यन्यन्यसंपि घटाभाववुद्धिमश्नान् 
घटाभावसमस्मे तत्र सत्यत् तस्य नित्यानि 
अन्यथा देशानर्देशिपि तत्रतीतिनें खात्। वैशिष्य कि 
तत्र सत्यत्। समस्म तस्य घटे पाकरकर्तादशार्या 
प्रशास्त्रिक सत्यत्व तद्वताभविः। वैशिष्यकिर्मिले 
लयनवैशिष्यकल्पे तवीव गौरवं। द्वेश तत्तत्वा- 
लीत्तत्त्तज्ञवादिकं तत्तदभावानं समवयं: || १० ||
अभावं विभजने। अभावव्यतित। अभावनं द्रव्या- 
दिष्टकायोन्याभावलं। संसर्गवति। संसर्गभावायोन्या- 
भावेदादिक्यथः: || अन्योन्याभावशैकविधवाचान्द्रि-
भाषा- प्रागभावस्तथा ध्वनिप्रयत्नाभाव एव च। ११।।

सिद्धार्थभागवातू संस्कृतभावं विभजते। प्रागभाव दृति।
संस्कृतभावं ध्वनि-ध्वनिभावांविभज्याभावम्। ध्वनिभावं
तादात्मकम् ध्वनिभावनि-ध्वनिभावां क्षम्याभावम्।
विनाशभावं प्रागभावं। जन्यभावं ध्वनि। निष्ठवसंस्कृतभावं
चतुर्भावां। यत्र तु भूतलादी
घटात्मकप्रयत्नं पुनरावृत्तम् तत्र घटकारतः
क्षम्याघटकतयां ध्वनि-ध्वनिभावं नियमिते। घट-काले न
घटात्मकाभावं पुष्टं। तत्र उत्तरकविनाश-
शाली चतुर्भावमोक्षाभावं दृति केवलं। यत्र धार्म-
प्रागभावोधिकरणेन नायनभावं दृति प्राचोन-
मतं। धार्मिकृते रक्षे नास्ति रक्षे धार्मिकृते नास-
स्ति। धीरं प्रागभावं ध्वनिभावम् गर्भकं न तु नायन-
भावं। नवास्तु तत्र संयोज्यम् धार्मिकृतेन रक्षे
दिकालोधिकरणाभावं वर्ततं दृतिं प्राधः।
नवास्तु धार्मिकरणाभावं धार्मिकरणाभावं
वाच्यकृतं धार्मिकरणाभावं। उपवन धाराधिकरणां
वाच्यसम्पद्योऽभ्यात। इत्यय हृतीर्षयमानसम्प्रदायिकतिः
व्यवस्था एव लघीवलिन। एवव धाराधिकरणां
वाच्यसम्पद्योऽभ्यात। इत्यय विज्ञानं विज्ञानं
दिन्त्रियाधिकरणां विज्ञानं विज्ञानं विज्ञानं। एव
ज्ञानं ज्ञानं...
भाषा० एवं चैविष्णवमापनः संसर्गाभव इथ्यते।
समानामपि साधस्यं चैवलिदिकमुच्यते॥ १२॥
द्वयाद्यः पञ्च भाव अनेक समवायिनः।

सिद्धा० विशेषकालविशेषार्थान्तकलमत्तुतामापवधेति प्रत्येकं।
अभ्यवचलायते॥ १९॥

द्रौपदी पदार्थः साधस्यं वैधम्यं वन्दं प्रकरणं।
समानामितयादि। समाना धर्मी चेष्टा ते सधस्यं-
लेष्यं भावः साधस्यं। समाना धर्मी दृष्टि फलितार्थः।
एवं विषय्द्वा धर्मी चेष्टा ते विधस्यापलेष्यं भावे-
वैधम्यं। विषय्द्वा धर्मी दृष्टि फलितार्थः। चैवलय ज्ञान-
विकयता। श्य क सर्वभेवावहि। देवधर्मि ज्ञानविकयतया:
केवलामापवलाक। एवं अभिधिधार्मस्मै-लालिकं वेद्यं॥ २५॥

द्रष्टव्यति। द्रथे एकश्रमसामान्यविशेषार्थः साधस्यं-
मनेकं अण्वेस्यं भावलं समवायिनः। यद्यनेकं अभवै-
स्थि तथायनेकं सति भावल पञ्चानां साधस्यं।
तयाच अनेकभावञ्जन्तिपदार्थविभाजकोपाधिषेधं फलितार्थः।
तेन घटाम्वा प्रतोक्त नावासि। सम-
वायिलं समवायसमस्यं समविष्णुं न हु समवायवलं।
सामान्यादानाभावात्। तयाच समवेदम्स्तिपदार्थविभा-
जकोपाधिषेधं फलितार्थः। तेन नित्यं चयं नावासि।

* चैवतपण्डितभिरं।
भाषा १० सन्तावन्तक्यस्तवाद्या गुणादिनिर्गुणक्षिप्यः || १३ ||
सामान्यपरिहीनाय सत्ये जाताद्यो मनः।

सिद्धा १० सन्तावन्त इति क्रयगुणकर्षणाः सन्तावचिन्मित्यः।
गुणादिरिति। यथापि गुणक्रियायदुर्लभमाचारेण घटान्तिविधायां क्रियादुर्लभमावधु गगनादुर्लभतिविधाय तथापि
गुणदुर्लभनिश्चयं कर्मदुर्लभनिश्चयं विभाजकोपाधिष्ठर्चतदोऽपि
न च ह घटान्तिकं कर्मदुर्लभं वा गुणदुर्लभं कर्मदुर्लभं वा किंतु गुणदुर्लभं। तथा
श्राकाशभातिकृतं न पदार्थविभाजकोपाधिः। || १३ ||
सामान्येति। सामान्याभिधिकरणं सामान्यद्रोहोनामित्यः। पारिपालनं सामान्याभिधिकरणं।
पारिमाण्डलं अणुपरिमाणं। कारणम् तत्ज्ञानाभिधिकरणं। अणुपरिमाणं न तु कषापि कारणम्। तत्रैः खण्डारण्यं कर्म
परिमाणारंबह कभी। तच न सम्भवति। परिमाणारं सहस्रभावात्योंक्यपरिमाणारंजनकलात्। सह
हारे महंतरवत्। अणुजन्याद्वितरलस्त्रज्ञात्।
एवं परममहत्परिमाणं प्रतीच्छषामां विशेषाः—

* यदा गुणशृष्टिने दृष्टि कर्मशृष्टिने दृष्टि वा सन्तावायाजातिश्रृष्टिसमावेधी निर्मिति वा
गुणकोशोपयायादिपरायणायं सत्याय वाणिज्य
वेदनां विशेषिता हृदयं न दृष्टिः। द्रव्यमण्यतरसमावेदी तत्वित्याय
श्राविषयोपयायादिपरायणायं शास्त्रविशेषितम्। गुण
कदुःतः सन्तावायाजातिश्रृष्टिं तत्वित्यायं पुष्पाकामक्षेत्रः। गुण
विद्याः सन्तावायाजातिश्रृष्टियोंक्यहे महंतरवत्। प्रतीच्छषामां विशेष
पादः प्रश्नानुपालयालाल्यं पुष्पकामालाल्यितायात्माः।}
भाषा । पारिमाणिकमत्विभवनां कारणलमुद्यां ॥ १४ ॥
अन्यथा विद्वंसुवन्धकं नियता पूर्वारम्भितं।
कारणलं भवितस्त्र चैविष्णु परिकौरि ॥ १५ ॥
समवाचिकारणां ज्ञेयमप्रायसमवाचितुम ।
एवं न्यायनयनशैलीयमस्तु। निमित्तचितुम ॥ १६ ॥

बिद्या ॥ चैति बोधयं । द्रुमापि थारिग्रहणे विज्ञानं न कारणलं । ज्ञेयमानसमां यो न श्रवयति । ज्ञेयमानं
बिज्ञ नामुतिकारणं रूपितमार्गेण मानसरायं
श्राक्षमहस्तभकारणलात्म भक्तयोगां काला-
देवैत्यं तथा पि न कारणलमिद्याचारयांशायं
द्वन्द्ये। तत्तः । ज्ञानातिरिक्त गति कारणताया एव
अट्टांकालं ॥ १५ ॥

ननु कारणलं निमत्त ज्ञात । चन्द्रेति । तथा
कारणलं ॥ १६ ॥

तत्त समवाचिकारणं । अश्रुमं प्रत्याशरं कारणं
दूरायमवाचिकारणं बिधयं । अथ यथोऽपि तु-
रोटनुमयोगां पदार्थमवाचिकारणं खातो एवं
बेगादिनामपि भविधातायमवाचिकारणं खातो
एवं ज्ञानादिकमेंच्छायमवाचिकारणं खातो
तथा गति पदार्थमवाचिकारणं शुरू तुरीतनुमयोगमित्तम ।
तुरीतनुमयोगम । तुरीपतमस्वस्त्रम प्रत्ययमवाचिकारणं
भवयेव । एवं बेगादिकं वेगासन्द्राच्छायमवाचिकारणं
भाषा: यद्व समवेतं काय्यं भवति जैयं तु समवायिनक तत्त।
तत्त्वास्त्रं जनकं दिनीयामध्यं परं तत्तिथं स्तान।॥१७॥
येन सर्व पूर्यभावं कारणमाद्य वा यस्य।

सिद्धा: भवतेविति तत्त्वकृत्यायमवायुकारणवचं तत्तदेशभिन्नं न देयं।
आत्मविशेषमुपासानां कुत्रायमवायुकारणां नाति। तेन तद्विक्रमं शास्त्रावलं च देयं।
च लघुसमवायिकारणप्रवृत्त्वं दिविधं कारणेकारणप्रवृत्त्वं स्तो। च च यथा प्रत्रत्वयं धार्त्रिकं प्रिति कपालसायार्गदिनिम।
तत्तकारणं धार्त्रेण च सह कारणसः कपालसायार्गासः एकसिनः कपाले प्रत्यासधिरलसि।
दिनीयं यथा धार्त्रिकं प्रतिः कपालसमप्रवायिकारणम।
तत्त धार्त्रिकं प्रति कारणं धार्त्रेण। तेन च कपालसमप्रवायिकारणं एकसिनः कपाले प्रत्यासधिरलसि।
तथा च कारणसः कपालस्य समप्रवायिकारणसेन 
कवचित् समप्रवायिकारणसेनेनि भवितार्थः।
द्वारार्थं कारणे कारणकारणात्यतप्रवायिकारणम। कारणं धार्त्रिरिकमस्मिनिश्च धार्त्रिकारणसमप्रवायिकारणसेनिः मिलानेन।
एवं कारणं हस्तिय निसिन्दकारणद्विमिद्वचं।॥

dranyaomahyaśāśvatātām kītyata padāryānaṁ tad-
draś. येन श्रद्धेयादिना। बल्क्यां प्रति कारणाः
भाषाः अनयं प्रति पूर्वभावे चारे तन्त पूर्वभावविचारां ॥१८॥
जनकं प्रति पूर्वविचारतामपरिच्छय न यथा युृच्छे ।

सिद्धाः पूर्वविचारता चेन रूपेण युृच्छे तत्कायं प्रति तद्युव-
मन्यथासिद्धमिति भावः । चथा घटं प्रति दशकल-
सिति ॥ दितीयमन्यथासिद्धस्माच । कारणा मिति ।
यथा खातेश्वरन्यथविनिर्कृ न सः किंतु खातेश्वर-
मादाूणू न्यथविनिर्कृ युृच्छे निद्रन्यथासिद्धः । चथा
दर्शक्षुरः ॥ दर्शक्षुरः । अनयं प्रतीति । अनयं प्रति
पूर्वविचारिं युृच्छे वयथायं प्रति पूर्वविचारिं
युृच्छे तस्य तत्कायं मन्यथासिद्धः । चथा घटादि
क्रमं मन्याकाशः । अकाशशः चि घटादिक्रमं प्रति
अकाशलेण कारणलं खात् । अकाशलेण शब्दसमवायिकारणलं ।
अतः शब्दं प्रति जनकलं युृच्छे घटादिक्रमं
प्रति जनकलं ग्राम्यमतस्मादन्यथासिद्धः । शब्दायथलेन
करणले कान्यथासिद्धिरि चेत् । पतञ्जलमिति युृच्छः ।
अकाशशः शब्दं प्रति जनकले किमवेदकामिति चेत् ।
कविलादिकं विशेषपद्धारिं चेति ॥ १५॥

चतुर्थमन्यथासिद्धस्माच । जनकं प्रतीति । यथार्थजनकं प्रति
पूर्वविचारिं युृच्छे वयथायं प्रति
पूर्वविचारिं युृच्छे तस्य तत्कायं मन्यथासिद्धः ।
चथा कुलाचिपितघंटं प्रति । तस्य कुलाचिपितलेन
भाषा । ध्यानितग्रस्तमथापि यज्ञविॖिनियतात्वज्ञकपूर्वभावन्विनः।

परं पञ्चान्यथासिद्धा दुष्पलादिकमादिम्।

घटादैै दुष्पलपादि द्वितीयमपि दश्रिङ्गं॥ २०॥

हन्नियन्तु भवेश्वराम कुशालजनकोपरः।

सिद्धार्थ घटं प्रति जनकलेवन्यथाधिः । कुशालवेन जनकले

लिष्टापनिः। कुशालमाचक घटं प्रति जनकवात्॥

पञ्चान्यथासिद्धुमासः। ध्यानितकामिति॥ नियताव-

वर्गपूर्वभावनः। ध्वजाःकृताणिनयात्पूर्वकर्णिने एव का-

र्यांबमवे तद्विचलमन्यथासिद्धुमित्यः। अत एव प्रत्येके

महतं करणमनेक्रेयवचलमन्यथाधिः। ततो हि

महतमवस्ं भर्षं। तेनेनेक्रेयवचलमन्यथाधिः। न

च वैपरीते किं विनिगमकामिति वाच्यं। महत्तम-

जाते करणतावर्षिदकले शारवात्॥ ९५॥

रामभादिरिति। यहवर्यक्रियं प्रति रामभाक्ष नियप-

पूर्ववाचलमास्ति तत्प्रति घटतातीव यम करणम-

भाववैष्ठादिभिरेऽव तद्दुर्दितौ सम्मवे रामभाक्षण्यथा-

सिद्धु प्रति भावः॥ एतेऽविष्टि । एतेऽपुरीवहन्यथा-

सिद्धुः। नथे पञ्चान्यथासिद्धुः। वर्षवर्षः। तेनेव

परियोऽपि चरिताध्यात्मः। तथा हि दुष्पलादिकरवश्च-

कृताणिनयात्पूर्ववत्सिरभिरथि कार्याढ्यार्थैः दुष्पलादिकम-

न्यायसिद्धृः। न च वैपरीते किं विनिगमकामिति
भाषा० पञ्चमो रासभादि। स्नातनेयावाक्यकस्वै। ॥ २१ ॥
समवार्थिकरणलं। द्रव्यसैदित्विविदेश।
गुणकर्ममात्रन्तृति। ज्ञेयभाष्यसमवार्थिकरणलपुष्करपुष्कर। ॥ २२ ॥
अन्यत्र नित्यदृष्टिबाध्य। आश्रिततबन्धिताचै।
चित्रादिविधानं। नवानातु। द्रव्यमाण्यभुविनिगितः ॥ २३ ॥

सिद्धार्थलोको दुर्गच्छिद्धिर्रमरसाधनाः
समवर्थिकरक्षणवने। जीर्णतात्। एवमसैदित्वेऽविने चरितार्थिकरणवात् ॥ २४ ॥ २५ ॥
समवार्थिकरणलमिति। गुणकर्मणि। ब्रमसैदित्वार्थिकरणलं। गुणकर्मभिज्ञानं। वैभवस्यं नतु। गुणकर्मणि।
साधनं। द्रव्यासैद्या तत्तथं। अघवं ब्रमसैदित्वार्थिकरणलमिति। रणश्रृङ्खलाभिष्टभवातितथं तदर्थं।
तेन ज्ञाताद्रिनामः। ब्रमसैदित्वार्थिकरणलविविधानिः। न चति। ॥ २६ ॥
अन्तः। नित्यादृष्टिवर्णमरसार्थाचेन। ब्रमसैदित्वमितिना।
साधनमितिः। ज्ञेयभाष्यमोचन्त्वं। ज्ञेयभाष्यमितिः।
विशेषतत्वा। नित्यादृष्टिमितिः। कालवेय। दृढः। कालिकभाष्यास्मवेयं। तेषा-
मूलनित्यादृष्टिमितिः। चरितार्थिकरणलं। तेन। चार्थिकरणलं। चार्थिकरणलं। चार्थिकरणलं। चार्थिकरणलं। चार्थिकरणलं। चार्थिकरणलं। चार्थिकरणलं।
उ* भाषा० भाषा०
* नामकरणपुर्वकमिति
भाषा० चित्रितलं तथा तेजः प्रवर्ण मन एव च।
परापर्यमूर्त्तवंक्रियावेगमस्रया चतुर्मी॥ २४॥
कालाकाशमदिशां सब्जेमपलं परस्म मचतं।

बिघा० चित्रितलसिद्धिः। प्रत्ययविज्ञवायुमनसं परला-
परस्तर्य सूर्य्य सिद्धिः वेर्गस्थान सा०ध्यं। न च
चतु घट्टादै० परलमपरं वा नात्मकं तचायातिनिरूप।
परादिसमानाधिकरणेन्द्रामायण-जातिमतलसिद्धिः विविधितताः।
मूर्तिः अधिपरिसमानयां। तत्र तेषांगित गणादिपरिमाणाः
कुलोधपरस्तपालाभावाः पूर्व्वत्तं कर्मवर्तं। वेर्गस्थान कर्मममानाधिकरणेन्द्रामायणीयातिमताः सब्जेढूसिद्धिः वर्गस्थान-
जातिमः बेदाः॥ २४॥
कार्यां। कालाकाशमदिशां सब्जेमतलं सवर्मसूत-
तस्मयोगिं परस्मचाच्च। परस्मचाच्च माति-
विशेषोपकर्ष्णाश्चर्यपरिमाणाः वा। चित्तादीर्थाः।
प्रत्ययविज्ञवायुकाशाः सतताः। तत्र कर्मिन्द्रिय-
वाच्चविशेषमथवनः। चतु याचालं लोकात्मकस्बूच्छ-
पथेयः बेदाः। तैन ज्ञाते घट द्राक्षदिपमये ज्ञान-
स्थायुपल्लीत्रकामाविषयलत् तद्रती आवश्यन नाति-
प्रमुखः। न वा ग्र्याचाविशेषपदिमति परमाणाः।
भाषा ० चित्तारिपन्म भूतानि चलारि सङ्केतनि चि ॥ २५ ॥

द्रव्यारम्भशत्तपु स्याद्याकारसशरीरिणां ॥

सिद्धा ० द्राव्यावलितः । तत्सापि सूचयाप्रमाणस्य सहलक्षणाराजस्मिनां न प्रत्यवच । अत्यन्तः अश्वात्रन्तः तत्त्विवेशमुपवत्तं तत्त्वं ॥ चलारीति । प्रयित्तत्सेषोऽवयवात्त्व चर्च्यवच ॥ २५ ॥

द्रव्यारम्भ दृतिः । प्रयित्तत्सेषोऽवयवपु सङ्केत् द्रव्यारम्भार्थचकलाः । न च द्रव्यारम्भकोषां गठारिवावलितः ।

द्रव्यारम्भार्थसचिद्धां यत्वचायं यत्वचायतार्थ् विविधिलक्ष ॥ श्राकाशशरीरिनामिति । श्राकाशश्राकाशमिना सङ्केतविवेशमुपववच ॥ श्राकाशश्राकाशमिनासङ्केतविवेशमुपववच ॥ श्राकाशश्राकाशमिना च सङ्केतविवेशमुपववच ॥ श्राकाशश्राकाशमिना च सङ्केतविवेशमुपववच ॥

श्राकाशश्राकाशमिनासङ्केतविवेशमुपववच ॥ चायात्त्वतम् ॥ यदा किष्टोऽस्त्रक्तेन श्राकाशमिनासङ्केतविवेशमुपववच चायात्त्वतम् ॥

चायात्त्वतम् वृत्तायण्यमेशभण्डतिष्टितं वर्णितं । योगविबुधविवेशमुपववचायात्त्वतम् वृत्तायण्यमेशभण्डतिष्टितं । योगविबुधविवेशमुपववचायात्त्वतम् वृत्तायण्यमेशभण्डतिष्टितं ।

ब्रह्मादशिकमिव ब्रह्मादशिकमिव । द्रव्यारम्भार्थसङ्केतविवेशमुपववचायात्त्वतम् ॥ प्रयित्तत्सेषोऽवयवपु सङ्केतविवेशमुपववचायात्त्वतम् ॥
भाषा। एष्टरप्रस्तृतिः चणिको विशेषगुण इद्यने॥ २५॥
रूपात्यवल्प्रदेशयोगी खातं प्रथमचरिकं।

चिंतामणि प्रृत्यावदार्थस्य संयोगादिर स्तोत्यात् विशेषगुण
दृश्यं। न च रूपादीनामपि कदाचित् वतीयचने
नागसंभवात् चणिकविशेषगुणवलं चित्रावदार्थविषयानु
मिति वाचं। चतुःचण्डस्तिन्जन्याण्डिनिजातिमद्विशेष
गुणवचस्य विचित्रबलाः। अपेक्षाकुः। चणचर्चय निच
तिति। चणचतुष्ठयानु किमपि चानार्दिकं न नितिति।
रूपलादिकं चणचतुष्ठयाखाविन्यापि रूपादी। वर्तत
दृश्यं।। ईश्वरज्ञानेन चतुःचण्डस्तिन्जात्ज्ञेयस्य
युक्तं। चतुर्घचने दिलादीनामपि नागसंभूगमादृ दिलादीनामपि
तथावलात् तदार
णय विशेषेि विचित्रचतुष्ठद्विलित वा वाचं। देव
लादिकमादाहस्य लघुशास्त्रवादत्॥ २६॥
रूपति। एष्ठरप्रृत्समां रूपस्तं द्रव्यवलवं प्रत्यह
विषयविश्वेष्यं।। न च चचुरादीनां वर्जनकपालस्य
कहीस्मारास्य रूपवचे किंमानमिति वाचं। ततोपि
तेजस्वेन रूपपुनमानात्। एवं वाक्यात्मकः वर्त्तितवृज्ञ
तेजाभागानामपि एष्ठरविलादिना रूपानुमानं बोधयं।
भाषा २७
गुरुणो दे रसचनी दयानिष्टिको त्र्यं ||
चालानो भूतवर्गाय विशेषगुणयोगिनः
यदुक्तं यथा साधन्यं वैषम्यमितरस्य तत्त्वं ||

सिद्धान्त न च पद्यादी दृष्टसुवर्णार्द्धिभि तेजसि च द्रवल- वत्नमित्रास्मिति वाचाः। द्रवलवद्द्रवचन्कर्शयत्वाय- जातिमलखा विवचितरलात्। चूर्ततैप्रस्तिपुष्पी श्री- वीस्य जथेषु दृष्टसुवर्णादिभि तेजसि च द्रवलसचारुत्।
तत्र च श्रीविवलावास्त्रार्थदाभाय स्बंधु स्थान- समन्वयः। न च प्रयत्नचिन्तयो वरमाणात्नावयाः
श्रीतिचन्द्र रूपदार्थिति वाचाः। चालुक्यप्रत्ययचिन- थ्यक्तत्रिको ध्यायात्मलखा विवचितरलात्। श्री- 
भ्रमतिवार्त्तिकारणाय चालुक्यति ||
गुरुणो दृति। गुरु- 
लवचं रसवल श्रीविवलच्योरित्यः। न च ग्राणे- 
वचन्द्रादन्ताः वाज्यानातपार्श्ववादिभागानाश्च रसा- 
दित्से किं मानसिति वाचाः। तत्तपि श्रीविवलाव- 
र्द्विना तद्युमाताः।। यथोरिति श्रीविवलच्योरि- 
त्वः। न च नेमितक्रस्वलवचं घटादौ वद्वादीना
श्रीतिमिति वाचाः नेमितक्रस्वलमानाधिकरण- 
द्यत्वायात्मलखा विवचितलात् ||

चालानं दृतिः। श्रीविवलच्योराकांगात्मना
विशेषगुणवत्स्मित्यः। यदुक्तमिति। श्रीविवलादिकं सिद्धान्त न च पद्यादी दृष्टसुवर्णार्द्धिभि तेजसि च द्रवल- वत्नमित्रास्मिति वाचाः। द्रवलवद्द्रवचन्कर्शयत्वाय- जातिमलखा विवचितरलात्। चूर्ततैप्रस्तिपुष्पी श्री- वी स्य जथेषु दृष्टसुवर्णादिभि तेजसि च द्रवलसचारुत्।
तत्र च श्रीविवलावास्त्रार्थदाभाय स्बंधु स्थान- समन्वयः। न च प्रयत्नचिन्तयो वरमाणात्नावयाः
श्रीतिचन्द्र रूपदार्थिति वाचाः। चालुक्यप्रत्ययचिन- थ्यक्तत्रिको ध्यायात्मलखा विवचितरलात्। श्री- 
भ्रमतिवार्त्तिकारणाय चालुक्यति ||
गुरुणो दृति। गुरु- 
लवचं रसवल श्रीविवलच्योरित्यः। न च ग्राणे- 
वचन्द्रादन्ताः वाज्यानातपार्श्ववादिभागानाश्च रसा- 
दित्से किं मानसिति वाचाः। तत्तपि श्रीविवलाव- 
र्द्विना तद्युमाताः।। यथोरिति श्रीविवलच्योरि- 
त्वः। न च नेमितक्रस्वलवचं घटादौ वद्वादी ना
श्रीतिमिति वाचाः नेमितक्रस्वलमानाधिकरण- 
द्यत्वायात्मलखा विवचितलात् ||
भाषा २१
ख़ार्द़ूङ्गे उंगाख्यासंस्कारे मस्तो गुणाः।
अष्ठि ख़ार्द़ूङ्गे रूपं द्वारे उंगस्व तेजसि ॥ २५ ॥
ख़ार्द़ूङ्गे उंगस्व गुल्लवच दृश्वचं ।
रूपं रससाया चेचे वारिपेयेत्वे चतुर्दशं ॥ २० ॥
खेचर्जिना गन्धयुता: चिन्विते चतुर्दशं ।
बुद्धार्दिपत्कं संख्यार्दिपत्कं भावना तथा ॥ २१ ॥
धर्मीधान्तं गुणां एते चात्मनां स्थुर्तदर्शं ।
रस्मादि पत्रं कालिदिगोऽऽ: श्रव्यं ते च चेम ॥ ३२ ॥
संख्यादयं पत्रं बुद्धविक्षर्या यलोपपि चेये ।
परापरलस्ज्ञानं: पत्रं उंगस्व मानसे ॥ ३२ ॥
तत्र चित्तिर्रितात्त्वनानाख्यप्वती मनि ।

मिला २० हायु दृति वेधयं । तयत्र न कष्ठापि वैधमयै। केवला-
निविलत्त। ते च रज्ज्ञादयं: पत्रं खे आकाके ॥ २८ ॥
२६ ॥ २० ॥ २१ ॥ २२ ॥ ३२ ॥
सधूर्भेवि: निश्चय सम्मति प्रत्येकं प्रश्नवी-
दिकं निश्चयति । तत्र चित्तिर्रितादिना । गम्भेरमु-
रिति गन्धमवायाकाधिकारसमितिर्यं। वर्षापि गम्भे-
पल्लां च सुभमुचितं तथापि प्रश्नवीलजातैः प्रमाणादि-
पञ्चालयऽ कारणलमुचितं । तथांति प्रश्नवीलं चि
गन्धमवायाकाधिकारेतावकेदकतथा मिष्ठ्यति । अनुष्ठा।
भाषा ॥ प्रज्ञाधिकृत रसस्तव गन्धनु ॥ दिविधे मनः ॥ ॥ ॥

शिख्रु ॥ गन्धलावक्रिताभासकासिकलापने । न च पाणासदी
गन्धभावात्राजवलस्मार्गासित वाचन । तत्रापि गन्ध-
सत्त्। ऋणपलकिक ऋणकटलेयायुपपति । कथ-
मन्था तद्यस्य गन्ध उपस्थतसि । भस्मने ति पाणास-
पण्डरिनयवात् । पाणासोपादानोपादेयतं सिध्यति ।
ब्रह्मवं चद्रवंनन्नतं तत्तदुपादानोपादेयमिति
आते ॥ दृष्ट्य नामि खण्डपे सहायतयथस्तति । इत्यर्च
पाणासपरमाणे । प्रमृथन्त्ममन्त्रवकास पाणासपाँचि
प्रमृथविलं । तथाच तत्रापि गन्धवते बाधकाभावः ॥
नानारूढे तय । गृहनीलालदिमभेदन नानाजातियं रूपं
प्रतियामेव वन्नते न तु जलार्दा । तत्र गृहखैव भ-
चात् । प्रतियामेव एकसिद्धापि धर्मिष्णि पाकनशेष
नानारूपस्थवात् । न च यथ नानारूपं रीतिवर्ण ततार-
व्यासतः । रूपवद्धरहस्तिकं वलयाजातितिमलसि रूप-
नाशवद्धरहस्तिकं वलयाजातितिमलसि वा वाचलात् ।
वैशिष्टयनि प्रमृथन्त्ममन्त्राणी रूपनाशसि रूपानारसि
च सत्त्। भावनाय घटादावपि तक्कलापितमकस-
न्यायः ॥ दिन्दिध इति । मधुकरसुखादिमभेदन यः
प्रदिधे रसः स प्रतियामेव । जले च मधुर एव रसः ।
एतापि पूर्ववद्धपद्धतिकं वलयाजवान्यातितिमलं रसः
भाषा० सर्गसमाप्ति विचित्रव द्वनुष्णासिनीपाकज़ निधि निधा निधा स्त्रादपुलचणा।

सिद्धा० नाशवद्वितियाणियाजातिमार्ग वा लचणार्थीवहमेय।

गभून्न्ति। दिविध द्रति। वसुःसिद्धां न तु दिविधगम्यवत् लचणा। दिविधस्य वर्षेतनू। द्वैसवध्याध्य
वैरामासिरभ्रमेदं वेदां। २४।

खरस्द्रति। तस्फः प्रशिक्षा। अनुप्राशीतस्शर्म्भवश्वामार्यापरिप वर्तन तद्रुप्त। पाकज़ द्रति। द्वार्म्य प्रशिक्षा।
केशानुष्णाशीतवाजापनाय तद्द्रुप्त। वसुस्तस्य पाकजस्यवर्षेतमार्ग लचणा। अधिकाक्ष वीर्यवात्। वच्चिपि
पाकजस्या दाता नासितः तथापि पाकजस्य-वद्वृत्तिन्द्रवल्लाणायाजातिमित्रमार्गः बेदाः। निश्चिति।
सा प्रशिक्षी दिविधा निध्या अन्वित्या वीश्यः। अनुप्राशीतवाजापनाय द्वार्म्याय निध्या। तदन्ना परमाणुपलचणा प्रशिक्षी निध्या।
नन्ना परमाणुभिभव प्रशिक्षी व्याकादिरुप्ता स्वायत्नित्वेतियः।
"स्वयं अन्वित्या प्रशिक्षेतव अव्यववतीतियः। नन्ना अव्यव-
वितिः किं मान। परमाणुपूर्वे रेवापन्ते। न च परमाणुनामानंत्रियवलाशं घटादेः। प्रत्यक्ष न स्त्रादिति
वाच्यः। एकः परमाणभोगप्रत्यक्षने परमर्यवत्ति
प्रत्यः। यथा। एकः केषाक्ष दूरेप्रत्यक्षने परमर्यवत्ति
प्रत्यः। न च एकः खूलेऽ महान् घट द्रति वुझे-
भाषा  ऋनित्या तु तद्धन्या स्थान सैन्यवयनयोगिनी।

मिद्दा  रन्पपत्तिसिरिति वाच्यं। एको मद्दन् धान्यराशिरिति-
बदुपपचः। मैवं। परमाणुरतीन्त्रियणेन तस्मृद्ध-
खापि प्रत्याचायोगयावत्। दूरश्यकेशम् नातीन्त्रिम।
सतवधाने सत्सैव प्रत्यषष्यात्। न च तद्धन्यो अधृशय-
परमाणुप्तात्। दूरश्यपरमाणुपुप्पुष्यत्वचलात् न प्रवाश-
चले विरेध द्रति वाच्यं। अधृशय दूरश्यानुपादान-
लात्। अन्यथा चचिह्नार्दिसिनतै। कदाचिं दृश्यम-
स्यात्। न चातिसभतीजी। कथमद्दूरश्यहनस्यते-
इण्डुपश्यत्वसिरिति वाच्यं। तत्र तद्धन्यायात्ति-
बृण्डश्यहनात्यवचक्। भूलश्यहनात्यत्वेष्टमात्। न चाह्-
मीन्नुष्योन् चथं चधरोपनसमसिरिति वाच्यं। यतो न
वयं इण्डुश्यमदूरश्यं वा कक्षचित् सम्भवदाचचाहि
पर्यन्त महच्चुक्त्यकसिद्धं परमाणु सुदृढ़यवशशृं दृष्यम
तथाच। चधरोपनान्तः प्रवचं न तु इण्डुकादेशको-
विज्ञान। न द्वच तस्मात्प्रेतियं शब्दपति परमाणूषो महच-
च्चावजात्। इत्यावर्तिमविषिक्षा तेषसुत्पादविनायकोऽः।
प्रत्यकलाद्वादेशतं तेषवा चधरवाक्यवचधाराय अनं-
काने मेहसर्वयोयारिप सम्प्रभुः। यत: कचिद्रि-
श्यामो वाचः। यत्र च विश्रामसहस्तानियले तस्मवेत-
भावकार्यत्वसम्प्रभः: काणं। अतस्यष सित्यलं मद्द-
भाषा । सा च चिथिदा भवेद्वेद इत्यर्थ विषयस्तथा ॥ २४ ॥

योगनिष्ठादिभवेद्वेद इत्यर्थ ग्राणलचण ॥

चित्र । नापिरमाणकारांतमस्य । गणसदैशा विश्वासानालविवात्सप- रिमाणकारांतमस्यापि। काविदिवासानालविवात्सि। तस्य 
परामाणलसिद्धि । न च चारणशेष विषयामात्स्विति 
वाच्य । चारणः साववध्याचुष्ट्रवालादव घटवदिल्व-
नमाणन तद्रववसिद्रि। चारणः वेदवचवा। साववध 
महत्त्ववचवातु कपासववदिल्व नमाणन पादववसिद्रि।

न वीदमप्रयोजकं। अपकारध्वमां प्रति अनेकद्वात्मक 
प्रयोजकालं। न वीदं करणं तद्रववधारापि मिष्ठे- 
दिति वाचं। अनवसामवितं तादित्रि। 

सा कार्यंह्या प्रथिती चिथिदा ग्वरवेदिक्विषयमेव- 
दादित्वं ॥ २५ ॥

तथ देचमुद्राहरिति। योगनिष्ठादिति। योगनिष्ठाय- 
विंजस्वबधि। योगनिष्ठायिष्टी स्वरुपद जरायुजमण्डजह । जरायुज 
मानुषादीनां । अष्टांवर्णां । अत्यन्तः खेमन्यानम । खेमन्यानम 
खेमन्यानादिपि। खेमन्यानादिपि। कामन्यादिपि। उद्धृदशांसम- 
क्षणां। नाचकिण्याः श्रीरसश्च अत्योपितः। न च मानु- 
ष्ठांश्च ग्राणलचणाः पार्थिवां किं मानस्वति वाचं। गन्धा-
दिमलखीव प्रमाणलचण । न च जीवत्सदेश्वलस्मादाराय-
वान्दिकमपि खादिति वाच्यं । तथा मति ज्ञानलक्ष्यः-
भाषा० विषयो भगुकादित्य वद्वारपाण्य उद्दाहरणः ॥ २३ ॥

सिद्ध० लादिना सह्यरमस्कारः। न च तद्विं जखळादिकमेवासु
न तु पार्श्ववलिमति वाच्यः। स्त्रीदिनां निमित्तािषीयं
शरीरलेन प्रत्यभिजनानां। गन्धारुपलेष्य प्रवीनल-?
सिद्धः । एतत् पार्श्ववादिशरीरे जलादीनां निमित्तािषीयं
शरीरलेन न जातं प्रवीनलादिना
साक्ष्यायत् किनं चेष्टाययल्। उत्तरदीनामपि चेष्टाय-?
लाभायति । न च चुकादीनां शरीरः निमित्तािषीयं
गाथातिकवायुसमवेत्र ग्रामाणलात्। तदैव
किं मानमिति चेतु। भगुजतश्रेणिरादिना तदनुमा-
नानात्। यद्र इस्टादै शरीरवयवत्ने न भवति तदन-
न्यावत्वलेन विशेष्यीयं। न च यच्च शरीरे चेष्टा न
जाता तच्चायातिष्ठति वाच्यः। एतात्त्वे प्रमाणाभा-
वत्। चथवा चेष्टायवधन्यायवविभाचूर्तिधवाय
जातिमतं तत्त्वानुष्ठावलजातिमादाय लच्छसम-
वचः। न च नृमिंदहरीरे कथा लच्छसमवचः। तत्व
सिद्धलखेक्षराष्टिनित्या जातिलाभावात्। जयो-
विदेशशरीरक्षास्तित्वा देवलखापि जातिलाभाना-
नानानात्। कस्मभेदेन नृमिंदहरीरखा नानानानेन
नृसिद्धजायात्या लच्छसमवचायात्। दृश्यमिति । ध्रावी-
भाषा ५५ वर्ष: प्रकृती रससम्भव करे मधुरसम्भव।

विद्या ५५ विद्याय विद्याधारियाँ। विद्याधारियाँ कथामिति में द्विर द्वारा ऐतिहासिक विद्याधारियाँ सत्य गम्भीर व्याख्यात्। कुलमृतमग्नदानां व्याख्यात्व। न च दुःखानेकानन्देकाराद्वितिरिति वाच्यं। परकीय-रुपाध्यायज्ञकलाद्वितिरिति वाच्यं। न च नवशानवानवान-ज्ञातिकलानानीकानामिति वाच्यं। तस्मात शक्रसाम्भवाय-ज्ञातिकलात्। यथापरकीयति न देयं वायुपनीतसुरभिभागख दृढ़तानाशभ्रात्त। न च राजन्यायसिद्धिकर्ष्यं गन्धमाच्छ्यज्ञकलानां व्याख्याय द्विति वाच्यं। इत्यले व्यस्त्योऽदि द्विति विशेषणात्॥ विशेष द्विति। उपविशेषणान्व विशेष। च विभागेति विशेषाणां जाति रुपाध्यायोऽनंतरां यथायथं उपविशेषणान्विन्योऽनंतरां यथायथं उपविशेषणान्व विशेषाणां जातिरीति। तेन द्वारा अर्थात् द्वारा विशेषाणां जातिरीति। तेन द्वारा अर्थात् द्वारा विशेषाणां जातिरीति। तेन द्वारा अर्थात् द्वारा विशेषाणां जातिरीति। तेन द्वारा अर्थात् द्वारा विशेषाणां जातिरीति।

ज़ालं निरहुपयति। वर्ष: प्रकृती द्विति। चेतनसमाविकारणसंवषेकेशकत्वं ज़ालं निरहुपयति। विधाय। चेतनसमाविकारणसंवषेकेशकत्वं ज़ालं निरहुपयति। विधाय।

श्रीरामचरितमाध्यमात्रतस्मिन्तथापि ज़ालं निरहुपयति। विधाय।
भाषा ५० लेखन सामसिद्धिकालमेंत ॥ २८ ॥

मिला न स्वाता । तत्र जन्मेवाभाबात् । निद्धर शुष्कप्रयोगादि ललावर्षभारविशयमार्दिति स्वेच्छ । न। जन्मेवाभाबात विक्रेद्रकतया जन्मजललजाति: निमेनु तद्वच्छिन्नलन-कताव चिन्द्रकतया जलजलक्षणिक्षु: ॥ शुष्कप्रायस्मैव द्राङ्खशिल्पुर्ण । वर्ष: शुष्क द्रति । वस्तुस्वितमार्च न तु शुष्कप्रायस्मैव चच्चन ॥ अभ्यवा नैवस्मितसनकरवलवत्र-चक्रवर्त्तनाक्षरसाचाराणि जातिमार्च भ्रमाष्टरगुणेश्वर-रुष्कप्रायस्मानादिकरणप्रवद्वर्त्तनाक्षरसाचाराणि जातिमार्च तद्नेत्र: ॥ रसश्रीविति । जलख मधुर एव रसः ॥ शीत एव स्वर्णः ॥ तितकाव्यस्थानुमुक्ति द्रष्टे श्वासायत्नाणि जातिमार्च ॥ ननु शुष्कप्रायस्मैवेदिति कु: कालिन्दीजलादी२० नीलाल्पाधिति स्वेच्छ । न। नीलाल्पाण्ड्वकाले दिमानि: प्रियवेरजलातेरभाबात् जले नीला-शुष्कप्रायस्मवात् । कालिन्दीजले नीलप्रातीतिः सादा-दीपाधिकी। चतु एव वियति विवेदी धवलिष्मपलमेषीः। अथ जलमाधुर्यं कि मानं । न वि प्रायस्थेन को० पि रससनातुभूते । न च नारिकेलजलादी२० माधुर्यमुप-स्मत्त एविति वाच्यं । तस्काश्वयोपाधिकलात् । अन्नया जमीररसालालसचल्पस्यार्कादिमचामपि खाद्यिति स्वेच्छ । न । द्वीरक्षादिमचास्थ जलरस्वायणकलात् ।
भाषा १० निखनादि प्रथमवत तिनु देशभयानिनिं।

सिद्धा १० न च चरितकामेव जलोष्यमंडोगास्मानारोपणित्सिद्धि वाच्यं। कल्पनागीरवात्। प्रथितोलखाँदिजनकतावच्छेदकलाच। जले मानार्दिकं जमीररसादैर।

पृष्ठचन्दनादैः तु शैलोपलभिंशं दनानात्सिन्धीतत्त्रसलिखं तेजःसंयोगानले शैश्वप्रतीतिरौपाधिकी

स्फूटव। तत्र पाकास्मणवात्। चेहसचेति। घृतादावपि तद्वल्लेन्तिजलक्षेत्रव चेहः। जलस्य चेहनमवाचिकारणवात्।

तेन जल एव चेह दृति मनलयं एव।

उवल्लमिति। सामिस्थिकृत्वललं जातिविशेषः प्रत्यवस्थितः। तदविचित्रजनकतावच्छेदक्षमपि तदेवतिभावः।

तैलादावपि जलस्य द्रव्यं चेहप्रकर्षणं च द्रुहनानुकुल्कस्मिन च चयति।

प्रथमवत दृति। प्रथितं देबेत्यथः। तथापि जलमेव द्विविधं नियमनित्यं। परमाणुयं नियमं। द्वाणुकार्दिकं सर्वभन्नितं भवप्रवस्मवेत्यं।

अनिर्यमपि चिरिविधं शरीरोद्धितविषयमेदरात्। तिन्नु प्रथितोतो च विशेषक्षमाच। किन्तु। प्रथितोतो चयनिजमिति प्रथणोनिजनिजमेत्यथः। जजीयं शरीरशयोनिजं वसुकीलोके।
भाषा ० द्रौपदी रसन किन्नूर श्रिदेवीदिविशयो मतः || ९८ ||
सर्व उषयस्तोजसंत स्वामिप्रकाशकारां।

सिद्धार्थ प्रसन्नस्मिति। द्रौपदी रसन जलीजमित्यः। तथांवि
रसन जलीज गन्धाच्छेदनकाले गिति रसचन्तकालात्।
श्रुतसाबित्रेश्वरकर्तवे रसनस्मिरिक विभिन्नता-
वारणाय द्रौपदी देवि ॥ विषय दर्श्यति। सिद्धार्था-
दिनिति। सिन्धु समर्थः । हिम-तुषारः। चा१िपदार्थः
सरिता काशीनकरकाराः काळी गाढः। न च ठिक-
करकाराः। काष्ठनलात् पार्थिवलस्मिति वाच्यः। उष्णा
विलोकनस्तकथ जलकथ प्रत्यचास्तिकालात्। यह्र्व यह्र्व-
च्छायानिवायमिति यानरुपादानोपायधलबिष्कः।
हस्त-निर्बन्धितेऽवादवलविरोधात् करकारां नाकाँ-
थ-न्यायस्वाभाव भान्तिलात् ॥ ९८ ॥

तेजो निरुपयति । सर्व उष्ण द्रौपदिना । उष्ण स्वर्णनिधि जातिविशेषः। प्रत्यचसिद्धः। द्रौपदी जनेयस्य-
स्वर्णमन्वायित्करणावच्छेदकः तेजस्य जातिविशेषः।
तथा प्रमाणपदार्जलं हु जलसोवानस्येथः। न चे०-
णस्वर्णवचं चन्द्रेषीरणादावयास्मिति वाच्यः। तचापि
श्रीणाच्छ सचात्। किंतु तदनि: पार्थिवश्रीणाभिमभ-
वादयवः। एवं राधकिरणात् पार्थिवश्रीणाभिमभ-
वाष्ठुरादेः चानुजुलादयः ॥ रूपमियहादि।
भाषा २९ नैमित्तिक द्विनमु नियमांदि च पूर्वजन ॥ ४० ॥
इन्द्रियं नयनं विस्मिषादिनिर्दिष्टिध ॥

सिद्ध २९ बैश्यारे मरकतकिरणादा च पार्थिवुद्धेशाधिभवान
शुज्ञलायव| ॥ ननु तद्वृष्णद्विधि धर्मसु चाचुपुल न
शादित्री चेत। चन्द्रदीयुवेशाधि धर्मसु घचम्ब-वात्
शुद्धु खेव पितापोतिणा। केशु श्रुवं नाभिष्ठां
किन्तु तदर्दीय गुहालमभितिभागवे । नैमित्तिक-
भिनिः सुवर्णादि रुपे तेजसि ताहलात्। न च नै-
मित्तिकद्रवलवं न सचं दचनादावश्यश्चन्तनादा-
वितादिशेषति वाच्य। प्रथिव्वर्वतिनैमित्तिकद्रवल-
वद्व्यतिजातिमचक्ष विचितलात्। पूर्ववदिति। जल-
खेवेलीयः। तथा हि तदश्वदिर्य नितमनित्याच। नित्यं
परमाणुवर्णं। तदद्वसु निदाय ग्रामसवरि। तच निधा शरीरः
द्रव्यविषयन्येद्रा । शरीरमधोविषयन्येवश्च । तच सुर्य-
लोकादै प्रभृहू ॥ ४० ॥

चच ये विशेषैकमाह इन्द्रियमिति। चचुच्छैसं
परकौशलुक्ष्याचाचाचाचले सति परकौशलुक्ष्याचकलान्त्
प्रदीपवत्। प्रदीपकः कौशलुक्ष्याचकलादायं पर-
कौशलेति। घटादे। कौशलुक्ष्याचकलात् वववाचारावा-
रणाय द्विनात्रां परकौशले। श्रधवाः प्रभायाः दृष्टा-
लक्ष्यवात् मरकौशलद्वय न देवयं। चचु: नैमित्तिक}

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Note: The text is in Sanskrit and refers to philosophical or religious discussions, possibly related to Sanskrit literature or Hindu scriptures.
भाषा: अयापकजोऽनुष्णाशीतः सृष्टि सूचारु पवनेन मनः || ९१ ||

सिद्धा: चारवारणाय द्रव्यलं देयं || विषयं दर्शयति। भक्तिः।

ननु सुवर्णिं तैजसले किं मानमिति चेत् । न ।
सुवर्णं तैजसं भ्रमणं प्रतिस्था: अत्यन्तानलसंस्योगे अननुरूपिणायमानत्रवलात् चचेवं तचेवं च प्रयत्निः।
न चाप्राणोपेयं श्रयीवेदर्शलख जन्मजबद्रवलख चालिम्बे-थोगनायलात् ।
ननु पीतिमुग्धालायशस्य पारिवर्णापि
तदानं इन्द्रलाभं वाभिचार दृति चेत् । न जलमेघसं-मधोपदेवन्तु तस्मात्रवलात् ।
वधरे तु पीतिमुग्धालायः
रूढस्य अत्यन्तान्तरिस्यंग्योगि पूर्वपराछर्धातिरूपिनात्त-त्वात्मिवम्बकविजातीयं द्रव्यर्वे कल्यनेन।
तथाविः अत्यन्तान्तरिस्यंग्योगि पीतिमुग्धालायः विजातीयप्रतिविजुक- ।
द्रव्यर्वे युक्तः। अत्यन्तान्तरिस्यंग्योगि पूर्वपराछर्धातिरूपिनात्त- तोयरूढपाणन्धिकरणपारिशिवलात् जलमेघसंपोतपतवत्
तस्य च श्रयीवेदिजलभिवन तेजस्विनियमात् ॥ मयूः
विश्रुष्टिः। अयापकज दृति।
चनुष्णाशीतसंक्षेपं सत्यपदार्थं अयापकज दृति।
अयापकजसं-क्षेत्रं जलाद्भावपि सत्यपदार्थं अनुष्णाशीतं दृति।
तेन
वायतियं विजातीयसंस्वद्धं दृशिः। तत्चनकतावस्थेद्वं
वायुमिति भावः || ९१ ||
भाषा नियंगमनवानेष विभेदः स्वर्णादिलिङ्कः।
पूर्ब्बिनिदित्त्वायतृतं देश्यापि लगिनिद्रियं।॥ ४२॥
प्राणादिलु मधावायुपंचं विषयं नमः।

विद्या एव वायुः स्वर्णादिलिङ्कः। वायुर्द्ध्वास्वर्णश्वरः
० ययायायो एव विलयनश्वरः
दण्डादिवं श्लोका शाखादिवं कस्यन च वायुर्मनमानात्। यथा च वाचिण वख्यं तत्थवं वख्यं तत्थवं। पूर्वः
वायुर्द्ध्वास्वरः विद्यादिलिङ्कः। वायुर्द्ध्वास्वरः विद्यादिलिङ्कः निष्क्रियः सहवेत्ताः। यथपि चित्तुग्धः शरीरः
शरीरस्वरः शरीरस्वरः पन्नु रज्ज् तिज्ज्वायुपिशाचार्यार्थं प्राचिनः
भागोपहादुपभोगवाह्यनलं जलादिवं प्राधान्याः
क्षीरोपयो तत् निष्क्रियः सहवेत्ताः। श्रवणे ठे क्रियेस्मातः । देश्यापि
पीतिः। शरीरस्वरः शरीरस्वरः स्वर्णालिकमिद्रियं तक्षदश तथा वाचिण तथा
रुपादिरु मध्ये स्वर्णयाव चञ्चलाताः।॥ ४२॥
श्रवणस्विधिलृश्यायकम्यजनवात्वदूविज्ञयदर्श्यातिः।
प्राणादिलिङ्करत्। यथपि चनित्यो वायुर्द्ध्वास्वरः
ततं चतुर्थी विधा प्राणादिलिङ्करत्र तत्थपि स्मृतां
धर्मा चतुर्थी वर्तमानायं। प्राणेकस्य एव क्रियास्वरः
नवनामविकृतमादिनानाक्रियायावशाच नामार्थस्त्रां
स्मित्वं नमः॥
भाषा ४। चाकाशस्य तु विन्यासः शब्दं वैशेषिको गुणः। ॥ ४३॥

इद्रियन्तु भवेत् आत्मेकं सच्चायुपाधितः।

विद्वा ५। चाकाशं निष्ठुपथितं। चाकाशं स्थितं। चाकाशकाण- दिगामकैवयथिताद्यूः चाकाशलाविकं न जाति: किन्तु चाकाशं शब्दायुपतं। वैशेषिक इतित्तक्यन्तु विषेष- गुणाणार्थयथिवच्छेद्याय। एतेऽन प्रमाणमपि दर्शितं।

तथा च। शब्दं गुणं च यथिर्विद्याया वाचाय च इद्रिया जातिस्वतात् यथिवच्छेद्। शब्दं द्रव्यसम्बन्धं गुणलात् सं- धोगवर्गं द्वितीयमाणे शब्दं द्रव्यसम्बन्धं सिद्धं शब्दं न यथिवच्छेदायुप्तः। चार्यसंयमेण गाणववाचार्यकारणकला- भावेऽर्थिं च चाकारणगुणपूव्यक्रमं चलात् यथिवच्छेद्। पराकृतार्थी विभचार्यवर्णाय सच्चं पदरहु: तद्यथा विभचारवर्णाय गणवतात्। गणवतात् जलमनोगुणं विषेषगुणलात्। नादमाविशेषां। वची- रिद्रियग्रहं भवत्त। द्वितिः शब्दाधिकरणं नव- मुखं गणणानां निष्ठवित्त। न च वायव्यवेशस्य शुचि- शब्दक्रमेण वाच्यं कारणगुणपूव्यकः शब्दं उत्पत्ति- तामिति वाच्यं। वायव्यवहारविवेन वायव्य-विशेषगुणलाभावात्। तत्च शरीरस्य विशेषस्य चाभावात्। ॥ ४३॥

इद्रियं दृश्यः। इद्रियमिति। नन्दकाणं साधवा-
भाषा० जन्मानं जनकं कालं जगतस्रायो मनं ॥ ८४ ॥
परापरलघिचेत: चणादिः सथापाधितः।

सिद्धा० देवं सिद्धं स्रोतं पुष्पभेदेन भिंचं कथमाकाशं स्थानत चाह। एकः सच्चिपयादि। चाकाश एक एवं सच्चियं उपाधि: कर्षणमुख्यासेनेद्रिाद्रिन्त्रो आचार्य्यं भवती-न्यर्थः।

कांबं सन्दिधेनं जन्मानाधितः। तचं प्रमाणं दश्चितं माह। जगतानाधितः। तथांदि इद्रानी घट दिव्यादिप्रतीतिः सूर्यपरिर्शन्द्रितिः यदि विषयोक-रोति तदा सूर्यपरिर्शन्द्रितिः घटादिः समस्या वाचः

ए च संयोगाचिनं संभवतीति कालं एवं तत्समन्वय-केसाः कुस्तते। ॥ ८४ ॥

द्विजं तस्माश्यत्वलक्षणं स्म्यकं प्रमाणानांर दश-चत्ति। परापरलेति। परलापरलबुद्धद्वार्षाधिरायणं निषेधतं कालं एव। परलापरलायरसमस्यावधीकारर्णं-चंगाश्यो लाघवादितिरिः कस्यत दर्शि भावः।

नन्वेकसं कालसं सिद्धं चणादिन्माकाशवष्ट्रियाणमथेदो न स्थानत चाह। चणाधिरिः। कालस्वेकासः उपाधिभेदेवचणाधिववहिरिः। उपाधियुक्त संजन्य-विभागमः भावावच्छिन्तं कथं पूज्यांगानवच्छिन्तं-विभागे वा पूज्यांगानाशावच्छिन्तं उत्तरसंग्यागः

हावे वा उत्तरसंग्यागावच्छिन्तं कथं वा। न चैत्तयर-
भाषा । दूरान्तिकादिधीरेरेरा नित्या दिगुच्छते॥ ४५॥
उपाधिभेददैरेकापि प्राच्यादिव्यपदेशभाक।

विद्वान । संयोगानन्तरं चण्डवच्चारी न स्वादिति वाच्यं। कर्मोकर्मतत्वादिति। महाप्रवव्य चण्डादित्यवच्चारी चयनिनं
तद्नाष्ट्य धंसेहेष्ट्यादिनी। दिनादित्यवच्चारकृत तत्तद्गुणकृतेऽविषये॥

दिश्र निरूपयति। दूरान्तिकेति। दूरलं अनिति-
कलज्ञ दैशिक परलमपरलं लोकं। तदुद्रेशस्यादारणं
वीजं दिगेव। दैशिकपरलपरलचित्तमवाच्यारणं-
संयोगाश्रयतया दिक्षिततीति भावः॥ ४६॥

नन्देवेद परिव चर्यानु तदा प्राचीप्रतीच्यादिव्यव-
स्फळं कथ्यसप्तवाच्यभावं भाव। उपाधिति। यस्य-
रूपखं उदयगिरिसन्निचित्तम् या दिक्षितं च तस्मान प्राची
उदयगिरिसन्निचित्तम् च प्रतीची। एवं यस्यविशेषस्मी-
रूपं च दिगुदीची तद्याविचित्तम् लवची। सत्यवास-
मेव वर्णार्थं मेलस्थस्यं खितं दितं नियमात्॥

अत्रान्त निरूपयति। अतोन्निचितेष। अत्तमल-
प्राचिन्स सुकृतम् खादिष्मवाच्यारणांतेके देवताकत्वादि
सिद्धिति। ईशशेषिपि नारिरक्षविधाने। अद्रूप्तदित्यप-
कारणाभावां न सुकृतम् खाद्यत्विति। नियमस्य सुकृ-
प्रेमस्य फलावश्यं भावं दितं नियमस्स्यायोजकस्यात्॥
परेन लोकानां नारिरक्षेव प्रमाणभावात्। न च
भाषा: आदिद्वियादिविष्टाता करणं हि सकर्ष्टं। ॥ ५६ ॥
शरीरस्य न चैतन्य समेव यथिचारम्।

सिद्धार्थ दशमद्वयायापन्तिस्मानवचन विभजनादिति वदन्ति।
द्वियादिति। इत्यार्थां शरीरस्य च परमप्रव कृत्वा
चैतन्यनमादकः। चद्यात्त्वमेव च जाने च च भूतेन
वादन्यचविवयवलमक्षे तथापि भिन्निपत्तं नीति
प्रथमं एव शरिराधिशिवायत्वतीतिगत्व दृष्टि
प्रतिपाद्यन्तु न शक्तत द्वयतः प्रमाणं दश्यति।
करणमिति। कुटारादिर्र विराधिकरणाः कर्तौ
रमणरेण फलायुधार्यं दृष्टं। एवं च च रादि राज्य
करणां फलोपधानमपि कर्तौरमणरेण नोपपाधत
द्वयितिक्ति। कर्ता कल्पति। ॥ ५६ ॥

ननु शरीरखेल कर्तौलमस्कृत्वा श्राद्व श्राद्व। शरीर
खेलति। ननु चैतन्य स्फारादिकर्भवेऽ। मुक्ताद्वारं लक्ष्यं
इत्यं न नत्सराधिरायमपि नद्गायं का चतिः प्राणा
भवेऽ भावण भावाभास्क सिद्धिरिति चेत्। न। शरी
रख चैतन्यं वायो विचोकितं स्फारिं धारणानुप
पनि।। शरीराभिरोधायापर्यधारावापृच्छवद्वियाविस्माँ
भाविता।। न च पूर्णशरीरात्वमर्क्ष्यारेण द्रिती
च शरीरं संस्कारम् उपपाध्यं दृष्टि वाय। अनुरम्
स्फारकल्पनेन गौरवत्। एवं शरीरस्य चैतन्यं वालकः
भागोऽ तथालक्षेदित्रियाणामुपवाते कथं कृतं: || ५७ ||
मनोऽपिः न तथा ज्ञानायन्यं तदा भवेत्।

मिहाः खण्डपादैै प्रद्धितिनि खात्। इद्यकाञ्चनताज्ञानख्र
तद्दुःखला। तद्दृषामिश्रणानं शास्त्राकाऒऽवावात्।
मद्देते जननांरान्नभूतेयाधिशानलख तदानीं स्वर-
णादेव प्रद्धिति: || न च जननांरान्नभूतेयाधिशानलख सर्वं
तामिति वा चं। उद्वीक्षणज्ञावात्। च ज लगायता
जीवनापूर्वमेवेदोऽधकं कस्यते। इत्यत्त संवारखणां-
दितं अशाैणं अनुसूक्ति साध्यं वा अनुसूक्ति ज्ञानादिभावसं
नाशकावात् निष्ठलि मित्रतीति वै चं। ननु चुजृरा-
दीनाः ज्ञानादिः करणं कर्तव्यं विरोधे याध-
कामावादत् ब्राह्म || तथालमिति। चैतन्यमिवर्णः।
उपथानि नामी शति अर्धाचुजृरादीनासेवं। कस्यमिति।
पूर्वं चुजृष्णा मानत् कलानाः चुजृष्णा मानवं सर्वं न
खात्। अनुभवितरभावात्। अनुभवशास्त्रं च अनुभवशास्त्रं
कार्यकारणभावादिति भावः || ५७ ||

ननु चुजृरादीनाः चैतन्यं मांसुः मनवसु नित-
वात्स चैतन्यं खाद्य ब्राह्म। मन्ये अपोऽति न तथा।
न चैतन्यं। ज्ञानादीति। मनवसुण्वलत्। प्रत्यज्ञे
च महालख चेतुलात्। मन्ये ज्ञानसुखादिमच्छे तत्-
भाषा  धर्माध्यक्षोंयोग्यतों विशेषगुणावयोगः ॥ ४८ ॥

बिहारः प्रत्यारूपप्रतिदिहतः। यथा मन्मंडलं तथा व-लये। नवसं विज्ञानवें भाषा तथा खतः प्रका- श्रेष्ठस्य चेतनलं श्लोकसूक्ष्मार्दिकलं तस्मातार्थविशेषः। तस्मातः भवलाङ्करं चणिकलं पूर्वपूर्वविज्ञा- नखं च सूत्रविज्ञानं चेतनुलाभं। सङ्गमावपि चालवविज्ञा- नधारा निराकारविशेष वेदग्रंथसंस्कृतवसन द्वार पूर्व- पूर्वविज्ञानज्ञतयं स्कारारासुगतराजराजविज्ञाने सन्धा- वाक्यानुपपत्ति: स्वरणार्थितिः चेतु। न। तस्य व jag- धिनक्षेत वार्त्तं चापनें। अतिक्षिप्तदिधिभवे विनिमयमान- भावः। सङ्गमावपि विज्ञानव्याछासः प्रमाणः। तदानां निराकारां चिन्हानां तिरुवन्न स्वरणार्थित्वं इति चेतु। न। तस्य खग्नकाशे वन्याणाभावः। अनुष्ठा घटादेशीयमश्रणानुपपत्ति:। न चेताप्पनतिविज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तस्मनो भवावदिति वाच्यं। घटादेशीयमश्रणपतिपितु- मशक्कलान।। चारारविशेष एवार्थं विज्ञानखेति चेत।। किममाकारोपतिरिच्चते विज्ञानववै। ताहि समायं विज्ञानव्यतिरिच्चते। नातिरिच्चते चेत। ताहि समूखां वगे नीलाकारोपि पोताकाः खन्। खशुतो वि- श्लोकसूक्ष्मविशेषः। नपराऽभुपे नीलाद्रिविज्ञानधिर्मश्रणे हि चेत। न। नीलाद्रीनां विश्लोकानेवकसंक्षेपमसा-
सिद्धा १० वेशात्। दूतरथा विरोधकृत् दुर्स्थप्रभावलात्॥ न च वासः
नामज्ञम्। संभवति। मादुपञ्चयोरपि वासनामज्ञमप्रस्-
ज्ञात्॥ न च उपादानोपादेयभावानियमक दृति वाचं।
वासनायः। मद्यमासभ्रावात्॥ उत्तरासिद्धतयत्रिरेव स-
ज्ञम् दृति चेत्। न। तदुत्पादकाभावात्। उत्तरविष्णु-
नस्विवादाद्विले तद्रानन्दप्रस्सः॥ चरिन्विज्ञानेनिति-
श्रव्विशेषः। कल्यंत दृति चेत्। न। मानाभावात्। कल्य-
नागाोरवाच। एतिन्चरिकारीरेव। चैतनयमपि प्र-
त्युज्य। गौरवाद्विनिश्चे मानाभावाच। वीजादाशि सह-
कारिसमवधानादेवोपपत्ते।। कुञ्ज्वरपलाक्यनाच॥
अस्तु तद्रिः। चरिकारिन्विज्ञाने। गौरवाद्विनिश्चाविज्ञानेवात्मा-
विनाशीवा। चरे। श्रयमात्स्या सर्वं ज्ञानमवनं ब्रह्मव्य-
ज्ञिताविनिति चेत्। न। तस्य चविषयवलासभ्राव दर्शिन-
तलान्। विरिष्याव। ज्ञाने मानाभावात्॥ चविषयक-
स्यायनभवात्॥ अती। ज्ञानभिची चिन्ता ज्ञाते नियूँ।
सत्यं ज्ञानभिच ब्रह्मपरं जीविशु नेपथुष्यते। ज्ञानस्तान-
सुखिल्लुः। खिलाद्विग्रंजिणवान्स्वसितिः सृंभको-
श्राभेदः।। जनस्यां बन्धकेचायुपपत्ते।। चाक्षिकरमेव-
द्वाध्विषा। वेदः। चारपि तदभेदेन तद्दीयं भ्रत्यपाद-
यन्। कृत्तित। अभेदभावो च अतित्यावमिति वर्त्ति।
अत्र तदैव स्मर्त एव ज्ञातनि समयवित। ज्ञायति। महें-
दग्नायामज्ञानविनिः॥ अभेदेन जायत। द्वाध्विष। न।
भेद्धेन निम्नलिखित नामाचायोगात्। भेदनान्तरं वक्तव्यं स्थायितम्। 
न च दिलामयी नामाचायोगात्। तत्र निर्धारणं स्मार्गं सम्बन्धोपि सत्यस्वरूपं तद्विद्वीक्षितं दिलामयीपि द्यात्मकी तात्त्विक। सुचितः भास्त्राणम् निम्नलिखिताभ्यं च वक्तव्यं स्थायितम्। 
तत्र वक्तव्यं चेतु एकलाभावेत। तद्राहिकं बृहस्पतिना नामाचायोगात्। 
यो अर्थं तदानोभेदम् अधिकार्यात्। वागमात् बृहस्पतिना खलादिना चार्यं वित्तिपाद्यः। 
स्मार्ग्यं स्मार्गाधिके पुराणक्ते राजा संस्थां दृतिवाद्। 
तथा तदर्शनं परमं स्मायमुपेक्षात् नूठति। 
ईश्वरो न ज्ञानमुक्तात्मा किन्तु ज्ञानाव्यायां। 
निद्वं विद्वानमानन्दं वृष्णु देवतैः। विद्वानपदेभु ज्ञानार्थः एवेकः। 
व: सम्वस्ग: द्येवमुरुधाधानः। ज्ञान: द्येवक्षय: ज्ञान: 
उववदिवर्यः। चतुर्णादिकमलालयीर्चितः प्रत्ययः। 
चन्द्र: पुष्किङ्कपोऽपि:। ज्ञानोद्वार: पु: स्मायवे उप- 
ि: करचितः। भारामात्ममे स्वत्वं स्वप्नस्वतेभिमितवर्त: दुःखान्तिभावेन सुखिलप्रभुवतः। 
अभृत वा तस्मिन्नानन्दः न लक्षवानन्द्मित्यस्य मत्तीयक्षणायविरोधाति। 
ज्ञान: ज्ञानस्य विद्वान: विभेदः कदाचनेत्यत्र भेद्धेन स्थायितम्। 
एते विद्वान: ज्ञेन: पुष्किङ्कपलाश्वानिः।
सिद्धार्थ लेख: किन्तु चेतनः। कार्यकारणयोग्यमेत्यात् कार्यः नाशे कार्यकृत्ततः नाशः खाद्यकारणलं तथा। बुद्धिगतचैतन्याभिमानान्यमयाः सूक्ष्ममयाः ततक्ष्यन्तं। बुद्धिम् प्रथमं परिणामः। सैव महत्त्वमनः करणमयुः संहारपरं गौतमः। तत्त्वज्ञानार्थ अध्यायोऽनुभवत् संरक्षणः। घटादिवाः सम्भवः पुरस्ते कार्तविभामानो बुद्धीः चैतन्याभिमानः। षेठायुः। ममेंद्र कार्यः यथार्थतः मद्यं पुरस्ते प्रयोगः बुद्धः। खच्छतयाः चेतना अध्यात्मिको दर्शणाश्च मुखायुः। दृढ़-सिद्धिः विषयेयसत्त्व इत्यन्यायाप्रणालिका परिणामित् दृष्टान्तको नियमाभिभवमुदर्पणाश्च मलिनः। कार्यसिद्धि व्यापरावेशः॥ ततुपरिणामेः मानोऽनुशासनं बुद्धः। तत्त्व-सिद्धिः व्यापरावेशः॥ चैत्याश्च मुखायुः अध्यात्मिकः सम्भवः दर्शण-सलिलः मुखसंपालभिरः॥ ज्ञानावत् सुखदः। खच्छाध्यात्मिकेशु भाषाः बुद्धेन। दृष्टान्तार्थार्थिकाः ग्रहतः॥ नच। बुद्धितत्वा परिणामित वाचकम् लाभदिविः साधारणमनः॥

हर्षदृष्टज्ञानाभिमिव चैतन्यात्मापि सामानाधिकरण्यात्मितेषु निश्चितं मानाभवात्॥ चैतन्यमोऽकारोति मानाभवात्॥ धैर्याश्च भव द्रव्यम् चेतना कर्मस्तमिति प्रति पुरुषार्थिपरिणामिताः॥ चैतन्यांशि भव द्रव्य्यास्ति किं निष्णाते॥ एनयथा बुद्धिन्त्यां आश्चर्यावनि-
भाषा । प्रत्युत्तरायुक्तायुक्तामुनिपरंतु नवयाबिही नायैरस प्रथमसार नायः।

सिद्धार्थ तयास्तु तत्पुरूषसंसारापरपति । चचेतनाया: प्रजाते। कार्यार्थमानु बुधेरचेतनम् कार्यकारणवेदात्मादायार्थिन्ने चतु । न। श्रीमूः। कर्मन्त्र्यमेव मानाभावात्। वीराधु- जयादेशंतदनादिन । चनादेशंशास्मवाकित्यल।।
तत् किं प्रक्ष्यायादिकवनेन। न। च। प्रजाते। जियमारणानि गुणे। कर्म्भूषण शर्यम्।।
श्रीहत्वाति प्रमूनः कर्मग्निनः मथ्ये।}

ृत्यानेव विरोधद्र्ति वाच्ये। प्रक्ष्येकुश्यक। गुणेऽ कृष्यक्षेत्रं। रूक्षादिन। । कर्मां कर्मादंशे।
ृत्यानेव तद्यथानातु।}

तचेव सति कर्मग्रामानमानं केवलनु यः।
ृत्यादि वद्वा भगवता प्रक्ष्येकोत्ड्यंपन्नप्रप्त्रायांविदाभ्रास्य द्र्ति सहूपः।}

धसोधाभ्रास्य द्रात। श्रीसोध्यनुषज्ञते। श्रीरस्य तदावान्धे देशान्तरक्षतसमां देशान्तरेण भोगानुप- पवनः। विशेषकुण्डयोग्य द्रात। धर्मिश्वरक्षुशभ- नेतामन:। प्रवृत्तथर्भवति न लन्या । चं जाने श्रीह-
श्रोभिष्म द्र्यादि भ्राजते।। ॥ ५ ॥

प्रहन्तीति। श्रवणात्मक पद्देशाद्रे प्रत्युत्तरादिना नुमीयेति। प्रदक्षरता चेष्टा। ज्ञानेर्क्रयवायाद्वाराः।
भाषा २९<br><br>विभुविद्यादिगुणणवान् बुद्धिसु दिविध मना।<br>अनुभूति: सृविनो श्यादनुभूतिशत्तविधा।<br>प्रयच्छमायितस्मि सृविनो अस्मितिग्नव्ये।<br><br>बिठ्ठू१० दैवेद्रेष्ट्रभरवणक्रायलावः। वेष्ट्रयायः यद्मायलावः।<br>वेष्ट्रया प्रवर्षवानात्मानुमितयत इति भावः।। तच्च<br>दुर्भान्तमाधिर्य। रच्यते। यथपि रथकर्मं वेष्ट्रा न भवति। तथापि तेन कर्म्यं मारुत्यनुमातियते। तथा<br>वेष्ट्रात्माकोन कर्म्यं प्रतापापोति भावः।। श्रव्हर्कै<br>स्वति। श्रव्हर्कैरहेंगति प्रतयः त्यासुः विषय भावनिः श्रोराराजिरिः। मन इति। मनोभिच्छेदः<br>श्रुजनायचारिणेऽथ मानसप्रयत्चारिणेऽथेऽथ। शुपा<br>समविनेरियानारायणग्यावः।। ४५।।<br><br>विभुरिति। विभुलं परसमहलं तच्च पूर्वीक्षणमपि<br>ययायमुङ्खं। बुद्धारोति। बुद्धुसुखदुः स्वेच्छादिचूर्दंभरणा। पूर्वीका वेदर्थित्य। अचैव श्रस्वामुङ्खे। कतिपयप्रपश्च दर्शयिति।<br>बुद्धुस्विति। दैविध्यं वृत्तादयिति। अनुभूतितिरिति। अनुभूतिश्चतुरिधिति। पतञ्जल-<br>मर्यं करणानि प्रयच्छमायानेपमानशब्दः। प्रभाणा-<br>नीति स्वेच्छाकानिवेदित्वायनि।। ५०।।<br><br>प्रयच्छमिति। दैलिक्रियन स्यानं प्रयत्च्च। यथपि
भाषा। ग्राणजादिप्रभेदने प्रत्यक्ष पद्धिख नतं ॥ ५२ ॥

सिद्धान्त मनोख्यपदिश्रयजन्य सर्वभोज ग्राण तथापि दृश्यलेण रूपेश दृश्यार्थं च ग्राणे कारणं तत्तद्यम्ब-मिति विविचितं। खैयमश्रवणु न लच्छी दृश्यार्थं
पञ्चक्ष्ठन्तालयं ग्राणयपदेशमध्यभिनंतरि विवमाया-त्तकं प्रत्यचमिति खृते तथेवाक्यलात्। अथ वा ग्राण-करणकं ग्राणं प्रत्यक्षं। इदं लच्छी खैयमश्रवणसधारणं
दत्तनुभौतिकाय वाचित्ग्राण प्रक्षतियो शाक्तिग्राणकं शाब्दविशेषं पदानुभौतिकं सारणेनुभौतिकं च हेतुलात तथा
तत्तत्त्वात्यात। ॥ परामर्शजन्यं ग्राणमनुभौतित।। यथपि
परामर्शप्रत्यक्षार्थं परामर्शजन्यं तथापि मरामर्शजन्यं
देशविशेषं यज्ञार्थं तदेवानुभौतित।। न च कार्यार्थक-हेतुविशेषानुभौतिताविवाचतिरित वाच्यं। तात्तुग्राण-
दत्तनुभवलस्याद्यातिसंक्षेपं विविचितलात्। अथ वा
वाचित्ग्राणकरणकं ग्राणनुभौतित।। एवं अहू ग्राण-
करणकं ग्राणमनुभौतित।। पद्ग्राणकरणकं ग्राणं शाब्द-वेधः।।
वस्तुतो उतकिंचिदनुभौतितायर्किमादाय तद्द--
नित्तिर्चितले सति चालिकित्रित्वच्यकिमादाय तदहत-
त्तिजातिमचं अनुभौतितं। एवं चालिकित्रित्वच्यकिम--
मादाय तद्दनित्तिजातिमचं ग्राणचालादिकं वाच्यमिति।।
भाषा । प्राणव्य गाचरो गन्धा गन्धलाविभिरोधि ।
तथा रसो रसायनतथा प्रक्षिप क सुने॥ ५२ ॥
उद्वृत्तपञ्च नवनस्य गाचरो द्रव्य अनौपकर्षित न दहनिय प्रथमारसिको॥ ५३ ॥
किंच जाति योग्यत्विं समवायत्वा तादाहं ।

विद्भा । प्राणजातिति । प्राणज रासन चालुक्य सायनं शैवं
मानस्मिति पद्धिं प्रत्ययं । न चेतरमयचक्षुविभज- 
नात्मूलं । जन्यप्रत्ययश्रौव निरूपणोयवलान्तु उक्ष्ण च- 
नुसारात्॥ ५ ।

प्राणयक्रिया । गाचर दृति प्रायं प्रत्ययं । गायन- 
दिरिति । आदिपदातु सुरभिलासुरभिलपरिययः ।
गभुख्य प्रत्ययमात्र दृक्तिजातिरिप प्रत्ययचा । गन्धार्थय- 
यथार्थं तु प्राणख न सामथेमिति बोधि ॥ तथा रस 
दृति । रसलाविभित द्रव्ययं । गन्धा रसस्य उद्दृतं 
बोधि । तथा शब्दलाविभित ॥ ५ ॥

उद्वृत्तपञ्चमिति । श्रीनाशादानन्दनुदृत्तपञ्चमिति न 
चालुक्य प्रत्ययं । तदनित उद्वृत्तपञ्चमिति ॥ ५ ॥

योग्यति । प्रथ्यावादिकमय प्रायं शुद्धतित्वय सशानं ।
तादं योग्यतिसिविशयं ॥ चंदुयामलसेव कथं त- 
दाहं । यथाततिति । आनंदसंयोग उद्वृत्तपञ्च चालु- 
ष्प्रत्ययं प्रति कारणं । तत्र द्रव्याचारुसं प्रति तथाः।
भाषा। ग्रहणार्थ चतुः संयोगान्तरालोकोऽहूऽन्न्तरपयोः ॥ ५४ ॥
उद्वृत्तसूर्यमंद्व दृश्यं गोविरं सौम्यं च लक्षणः ॥

विद्वा समवायासम्बन्धेन कारणं । द्रव्यमौद्धकगर्भं प्रति
खास्यमवायासम्बन्धेन द्रव्यमौद्धकगर्भं रूपादि:।
प्रत्ये खास्यमौद्धकगर्भासम्बन्धेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेनेचर
भाग ०  
रूपांत च चुः गोगः रूपमात्रापि कारणं।  
प्रयासंस्कारो लचे योगाः मनसा ज्ञानकारणः।
भाषा: मनोयाच्छ चुक्ख दुःखमिक्ष देषेय मति; ज्ञानी॥ ५६॥
ज्ञान यज्ञिन्यक्ष्यायो तद्वींनिद्रियमिथ्ये।

मिठुरा: गख वदी कारणें तदा राधन चाँपादित्रंत्य चकालें
स्थानप्रत्यां खाते। विषयतकसंयोगां लज्जनः संयोगा-गख च सचान्।
परसर प्रतिबन्धां ककधिपं वा न खादिति। चच केचित्त पूर्वोकुलका लज्जनायोगगाख चेतुले
मिथुरा चातुरादिधामय:। स्थानवनादिप्रतिबन्धकलमनु-भवानुरोधात् कवशत दुःख।
चच नु सुदुरुषनुरोधात् चर्ममनः संयोगां ज्ञानेतुलं कस्यं चातुरादिप्रत्यांत्
काले लज्जन: संयोगां गाभावान स्थानप्रत्यांचामितिवद्रूपः।
मनोयाच्छ सुखं दुःखमिक्षादेषयं मति; ज्ञानिति।
मनोज्ञप्रचासय प्रर्थयं। मतव्रजानं ज्ञानं। गन्धः।
एवं सुखलादिकमभिम मनोयाच्छं। प्रवासापि मनो-
प्राप्तं। किनु मनोमाचञ गोचर द्रव्यनेन पूर्वमुक-\ लादू। चच नोकः। ५६॥

ज्ञान यज्ञिन्यक्ष्यायो तद्वींनिद्रियमिथ्ये।
चच: संयोगां च नान्तरं घट द्रव्याकारं घतलादिविष्मियं
ज्ञानं ग सम्बन्धति। पूर्वं विशेषस्य घतलादेशजीवः-
भावात्। विशेषिबुद्धि विशेषेण स्थानं कारणात्।
तथा च प्रथमो घटघटलयेव शिश्वानवगाहिः ज्ञानं
जायते। तदेव विज्ञिणक्ष्यायं तच न प्रश्यन्। तथा
भाषा ्। महत्त्व पद्धति चेतुरिनिर्देश्यं करण्ं मंत्रं।।५७।।

विद्वा ्। चिन्तनानववाशीत्नानन्न प्रत्येकं न भवति। घटमचन्न
आयामीति प्रवत्नत्। हजात्रमवि ज्ञानं प्रकारोधूप्
भाषणे। ज्ञाने घटस्तु घटस्तु च। प्रकारं च। एव विशेष
विशेषेण वक्त्रिशेषेण तद्विशेषेण व्यक्तिशेषेण। विशेषेण व्यक्तिशेषेण
व्यक्तिशेषेन अवलोक्तरस्त्त्वत्र। विशेषेण व्यक्तिशेषेण अवलोक्तः
विशेषेण व्यक्तिशेषकारकः ज्ञानं। अवलोक्तः च। घटादिकः
ज्ञानेन न सम्भवति। *जातीयतिरित्यांर्यानसः क्रिया-
शूर्यप्रकारकर्मिनयामात्।

महत्त्व पद्धति चेतुरिनिर्देशणं। व्रतमहत्त्वं महत्त्वं
समवायवस्थयभेदं कारणं। व्रतसमवेतनां जातिगुणकारणां
प्रत्येक यायमवस्थरस्त्वत्र कारणं। व्रतं
समवेतसमवेतनां गुणकर्षणवस्त्रलादीनः प्रत्येकेः
समवायवस्थसमवेतसमवायवस्थेन कारणमिति। इति-
विशेषेन ज्ञापिती। प्रत्येक पद्धति व्रतमहत्त्वं। इतिश्रविश्व
न ज्ञाति। तृषितीविद्यादिना वाच्यव्रजमेवामात्। किन्तू
श्रविष्टीरास्तुविशेषेण गणानायवले कृति ज्ञानकारेणमेवामात्
संयोगास्त्रं चात्मानादिविवाहाय नभूता॥।उद्वत्तिशेषेन
श्वरुपमेव श्रवणमेव चत्वारायमात्। श्रविष्टीरात्ति विशेषेश्च प्रस्थ

* घटादिकः चेतुरिनिर्देशणं न सम्भवति। इति पूर्कमुद्रितः
पाठेऽनातरः।।
भाषा: विपणेन्द्रसम्बन्धो व्यापार: सेवापि पद्धति।

शिक्षा ० कुपारेश्चुचि यवान्। उद्भूतिः उद्भूतलं न जाति:।

वशस्यादिना सन्धरात्। न च वशस्यादियायां नानात्मकाननत्स:।

वाच्युत्तलमिति वाच्य बहुत्तपलादिना चालुक्यादै।
अनकतानुपर्यः। किन्तु वशस्यादियायायमनुकृततब

नानात्मकाननत्स:। तत्त्व मंगलाराधिपि। तथा

च सब्जेटेरोज्जुत्तेघः संयोगादिश्चुचि चालुक्यादै:।

वि-श्रेष्ठविषेण बालसंयोगास्पि ग्रासः। मते प्रत्यजनकलात्।

द्रव्य-एवः यायावस्मभि कालादै:। रुपाभावप्रत्येके संविकर्षणे

षटतत्थः कारणिर्भूतशुचि संयोगादिश्चुचि चालुक्यादै:

देस्या वारणिय नन्दे झानकरणमिति तद्वारा

वारणिय कारणमिति। चासाधारणः कारणः करणं।

वसा-धारणं आपारवचनं ॥ ५ ॥

विश्वेचन्द्रशस्मभे आपारः सेवापि पद्धति दृति।

आपारः संविकर्षः। पद्धति संविकर्षसुदारकरणदारा

दर्शयति। द्रव्यमेव दृति। द्रव्यप्रत्येकसंयोगकालमः।

द्रव्यमेवत्यायाङः द्रव्यसंयुक्तसम्बन्धवाचनमः।

एवः किमः। वशस्याङः द्रव्यमेवत्यायां प्रति चचुः संयोगः। कारणः।

द्रव्यमेवत्यायां प्रति चचुः संयुक्तसम्बन्धवाचन:।

द्रव्यमेवत्यायां प्रति संयुक्तसम्बन्धवाचन:।

एवः-
भाषा ३०  द्रव्यमञ्चसूत्र संयोगमान संयुक्तसमवायन: ॥ पृष्ठ ॥

सिद्धार्थ विशिष्टविवेच कार्यकारणभावः । परमाणु परमाणुको नीलकं द्विविशिष्टवर्माणी प्रथितवीलक मूर्त न ग्रहणे । तत्र परम्परा उद्देश्यसमवायस द्रव्यसमवायस विद्यमानवाद । तथा च नीलकं जातिरक्षक घटनीको परमाणुको तथा द्रव्यसमवायस द्रव्यमञ्च-भवमादायविव रचने एवं प्रथितवीलक घटादिरकवादाय द्रव्यसमवायस बोध्ये । एवं वाच्ये नास्तानुशरण्देन च संस्कृताम् स्त्रादप हस्तिः॥ स्त्रादपादुत् क्षत्रियविवेच महत्तवविवेच चस्त्रादपसमवायस द्रव्यसमवेतवाचचुष-महत्तवविवेच चस्त्रादपसमवायस द्रव्यसमवेतसमवायस च रित्यभे नादु श्रादपसमवायस द्रव्यसमवेतसमवायस च रित्यभे महत्तवविवेच चस्त्रादपसमवायस द्रव्यसमवेतसमवायस कारणपार धार्मिक । द्रव्यमञ्च परमाणुनि- खात्रि स नीलवादिरहि च। परमाणुचुषः सङ्गोगस्य महत्तवविवेचलभावात् ॥ एवं वाच्यादि स नकारान्तर चाचुषः। तत्र चचुः सङ्गोगस्य क्षत्रियविवेचलभावात् ॥ एवं च चछ: मध्यवेषतेनलोकसंस्यवादु: सङ्गोगस्य वाच्यवेषतेन तत्र पट्टग्रहमनवादालोकसंस्य वाच्यवेषतेनचछः सङ्गोगस्य विशेषणे देवे ॥ एवं द्रव्यसमवेतसमवेतसमवायस सङ्गोगस्य लक्ष्यांग: कारण । द्रव्यसमवेतसमवायस सङ्गोगस्य प्रवाचे लक्ष्यांग वाच्यसमवायस। ॥ द्रव्यसमवेतसमवेतसमवायस सङ्गोगस्य प्रवाचे
भाषा ॥ द्रव्ये यु समवेतानां ग्रन्थयु समवायतः ॥ २४ ॥
तृतीयाः समवेतसमवायनः तु ग्रहः ॥

सिद्धा ॥ लक्ष्मुङकसमवेतसमवायः कारणः। श्रवणि सहलाव-चित्रबं उदृत्यां श्रावच्छिन्नमप्रसंग्यकर्मवेदिे बोधं॥
वनः गणप्रायः प्राणांविभक्तसुप्रयत्नामवेतसमवायः। गणप्रायः प्राणांविभक्तसुप्रयत्नामवेतसमवायः कारणः।
वनः रसप्रायः रसनामुखसुप्रयत्नामवेतसमवायः। रसप्रायः रसनामुखसुप्रयत्नामवेतसमवायः कारणः।
श्लोकाविभक्तसुप्रयत्नामवेतसमवायः। शब्द समवेतशाधारणप्रयत्नामवेतसमवायः।
श्लोकाविभक्तसुप्रयत्नामवेतसमवायः। अत्र संयुक्तप्रत्ययं लैटिकां बोधे।
वनः प्राणांसमैलांकारं दृढ़वेदिे संघागार्डिकं विख्याति। एवमात्रः। प्रत्ययं मनः।
संयोगः। श्लोकाविभक्तसुमानप्रयत्नामवेतसमवायः।
श्लोकाविभक्तसुमानप्रयत्नामवेतसमवायः। श्लोकाविभक्तसुमानप्रयत्नामवेतसमवायः कारणः।
अथवप्रत्ययं समवायप्रत्ययं च इत्य-समवेतिवेष्ठणं चूँ।

वैश्विकमने तु न समवायः। प्रत्ययः। अत्र यद्यपि विशेषणया जनाविधा तथा हि भूतलादी घटानामः।
संयुक्तविशेषणया श्रुताः। भूतादी बृहदभावः।
संयुक्तसमवेतविशेषणया। भूतादी बृहदभावः।
संयुक्तसमवेतसमवेतविशेषणया। शब्दाभावः। केन्द्रः।
भाषा । विशेषणतया तद्द्रभावानां यद्यो भवन् \n\\nयदि खादुपलभेतेऽवं यत्र प्रसज्ज्ञते।

बिष्णू । श्रावचर्चितविशेषणतया । काली खलाच्छावः
श्रावचर्चितसमवेतविशेषणतया । एवं कलाविखिरा-
भावे खलामावादिकं विशेषणविशेषणतया । एवं घटा-
भावादिक पराच्छावः संयुक्तविशेषणविशेषणतया ।
एवमनाद्यूः॥ तथापि विशेषणातलखुपेनैःकैव सा गण्यते
अनव्या वेदा सन्तोषः द्रति प्राचार्य धर्मास्वाध्याये-
तेति॥ ६४॥ ६५॥ ६६॥

यदि खादुपलभेतेऽव। श्राभावमद्येऽइथ्यानु-
परमिः कारण । तथापि हृतलादिः घटादिः ज्ज्ञाने
जाते घटाभावादिकं न ज्ञाते तेनाभावाप्रथा
प्रतियोगियपलभाभावः कारण । तथापि इथ्यानुपरायणे-
चिता । सा च प्रतियोगियसम्प्रत्यक्षमयामितिप्रतियो-
गितकृत्या । तद्धिः प्रतियोगिणो घटादिः सत्यसत्या
प्रसभ्यत उपलभ्याः प्रतियोगी यथाः श उपलभ्याः-
भावे। भावप्रत्यक्ष देहूः । तत्ते हि । यथालयकसंवरो-
रिक वर्तने तत्र यथा घठः खातू तर्क उपश्चेत
दर्शायद्यूः शक्ति। तत्र घटाभावादिक्यं भवति
अन्यकारे हु नापाद्यूं शक्ति दृष्टि। तेन घटाभा-
वादेरमकारे चाँच्छप्रत्यक्ष न खार्ष्णप्रत्यक्ष भवलेव।
भाषा। प्रत्ययं समवायस् विशीर्षणाय भवेन ॥ ६४ ॥

चलौकिक। सत्त्वकर्षस्थिविधि परिकोर्णिन्त।

चिद्वृत्त। चलौकिकस्य विनापि सार्थस्मृत्याःस्वापदाविचारेण श्रकालात्। गुह्लादिकं यद्ययं तद्भवस्तु न प्रवचः।
तत् गुह्लादिप्रद्यास्वापदाविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थिविचारस्थि
भाग ३ • सामान्यज्ञान ज्ञानज्ञान योगज्ञानः ॥ ६२ ॥
आसन्तिरास्यायाखानु सामान्यज्ञाननिधयने।

सिद्धान्त च यदि द्रव्यसमझणेऽवोखायते तद्रा धूली-पटले धूमलभावानन्तरं सकलधूमविवधं ज्ञानं न खात्। तत्र धूमलं श्रव द्रव्यसमझाभावात्। सचाते
तु द्रव्यमस्मदं धूलीपटलं तद्द्रश्यकधूम इति ज्ञानं।
तत्र प्रकारभूतं धूमलं प्रत्यावचतः। द्रव्यसमझो
वैकिको धातः। दृढ़ विशिष्टद्रव्यक्षणो। मानसवशे
तु ज्ञानप्रकारभूतसामान्यमार्थ प्रत्यावचतः। चतः
शय्यादिश्र चत्त्रिक्षितः पिशाचायुपसितो मानम्: वक-
खण्डक्षिणादिवृहध उपपथः। परमा समानानं भावः
सामान्यं। तत्र कृत्तितं धूमलद्वि कविचारितं घ-धारि। लचीकरा घटं: संयोगेन भूतले समवायेन कपाले
श्चात्सदनातां सेव्यासेव तहदत्तां भूमलद्रीना
कपालद्रीनाः वा ज्ञानं भगवत्। प्रतेकं बौद्ध सामान्य
चेन समवेश ज्ञाते तेन समवेश सूक्ष्मकरणां
प्रत्यावचतः। किन्तु चत्र तहदनाशान्तानां तहदत्तां
खारणं जातं तत्र सामान्यलक्षणा संबंधां तहदत्तां
भानं न खात्। सामान्यख तदनीभावात्। ६२ ॥
किंच द्रव्यसमझणेऽविवधौं घट इति ज्ञानं।
तत्र परिदने द्रव्यसमझें विनापि ताहदश्मान-
भाषा ० तद्दिश्च्यंजनद्वमन्विधसामार्गां प्रेषिते। || ९३ ||

सिद्धा ० प्रकारमेऽभूतसामान्यखूँ बलात् तां दृश्याम् श्रावणं कुतो न जाब्धते। तश्चात् सामान्यज्ञानं प्रयासितिं तु सामान्यसिंत्वाद्। श्रावसतिर्याः श्रावसतिः प्रत्यासितिर्याः।

तथा ० दुः सामान्यज्ञानं च चचन्यश्च विश्वेयाः।

तत् सामान्यविषयं ज्ञानं प्रयासितिर्याः च ।

ननु च चुचुः संयोगादिर् विनायी सामान्यज्ञानं च च च ।

तदिद्धर्यं दृः।। अख्याः च ददा वहितरिधिक्षेपसमान्यज्ञानोऽपि श्रावणं जनविवणं तदा च च च च च च च च च च च च ।

तत्सामान्यखूँ तद्दिश्च्यंजनद्वमन्विधसामार्गां अपेरिता।

तथा च सामाग्नी चुचुः संयोगालेकसंयोगादिरिः।

तेनामुकाराद्रि चुचुः दिनि तां दृश्याम् श्रावणं न जाप्ते। || ९३ ||

ननु च ज्ञानज्ञान प्रयासितिर्याः ज्ञानरूपः समान्यज्ञानापि ज्ञानरूपः तदा तत्त्वेयं दृः।

विषयं यशं तस्यव वायारो ज्ञानज्ञानं दृः।

ज्ञानज्ञानप्रयासितिं तदरूपः ज्ञानं जनविवणं।

ज्ञानज्ञानप्रयासितिं सदिश्चन्यं ज्ञानं सत्त्वेयं प्रयासितिं श्रावणं जनविवणं।

श्रावणं मन्।। प्रत्येके शत्रिवं विनायी भानं न स्वावलं।

तथा ० सामान्यज्ञान विना धूमधूमेन सक्कलधूमां तक्कलेन सक्कलधूमां भानं।
भाषा ० विशयी यस्य नम्ने व्यापरो ज्ञानलचणा।
योगजो दिविध: प्रेतो युक्तयुज्ञानभेदतः। ६४ ॥

सिद्धाव० कथं भवद्व तद्भवं शामान्यलचणं खोक्यित॥ न च शक-लक्षकधृश्मस्मानामार्वे का चतिरिति वाचं प्रवचनभुवे विक्र्षणमस्मय यूजारत॥ अन्यधृम्य चानउपरित-लार्दूमो वज्रियायामय न वेति संशयानुपयिनतः॥ मन्त्रो तु शामान्यलचणं शक्तिधृम्यपरित्वा कालान्तरीय-देशान्तरीयधृम्य वज्रियायाल्यादेहं संक्षवित॥ न च शामान्यलचणास्कीर्ते प्रमेयलेन शक्तिधृम्यें ग्रांति सार्वंव्यपितितिरिति वाचं। प्रमेयलेन शक्तिधृम्यें चा-तेनिवि विशिष्य शक्तिपद्यार्थान्नामश्चात्त्वेन सार्वंस्मात-वात॥ एवं ज्ञानलचणाया यथोक्ते सुरमिसिन्द्-मिति भाने चैरभस्क भानं कथं खात। यथयि शामान्यलचणायापि चैरभस्कं संस्माति तथापि चैर-भस्कं भानं श्रानलचणं॥ एवं च धूमलेन धूलीप-टसं भानं तच्च धूलीपटलश्चान्यविवाये भानं श्रान-लचणं॥

योगजो दिविध द्रति। योगाभाष्यजनिता धर्मविशेष: गृहपुराणादिममार्क इत्यथं। युक्तयुज्ञानभेदतं द्रति। युक्तयुज्ञानहयुगमिद्विविधात्र्वस्मिपि द्रविध-मिति भावः। ६४॥
भाषा। युक्त्क शर्मदर भानं चलिनासहस्तनामसः।
व्यापारस्तु परामर्शः करणं व्याप्तिभीमेवः॥ धृष्ट॥
अनुमायाम् ज्ञायमानं विज्ञानु करणं न चि।

सिद्धा। युक्त्क शर्मदर भानमिति। वेगाभासवशीलतामानः। समाधिसमायान्तिविभिन्निशिष्यायकदुःखते।
अय्मेव विभिष्यिः योगवचाः वियुक्त दृष्टथ्युक्ते। सवळङ्कित।
चिन्तासचकारिणि विनेतरः। भानं स्वयंविषयार्था
पत्यं। अपरी युक्त्काना विषयव्याहतमानं। चिन्ता
ध्यानं मनस्मिद्येकर्यां। ततु बहुकारात् खूलस्व-
चाल्यविशिष्टान्तिष्कृतान्तिष्कृत दशवीकरोरान्तिष्कृतः॥

अनुमित्त युत्पादकः॥ व्यापरस्तिभिः। अनु-
मायां अनुमित्ताः वातिस्रानं करणं। परामर्शः व्या-
पारः। तथावचैः चेन पुष्पं महानासाद्यो धूमे वक्ते
वास्तिस्विकम्बीना। प्रकारानि च एव पुष्पः। कार्यत् पर्यर्तादै॥
अविश्विशिष्यां धूमावेशां प्रक्षां तदनन्त्यां धूमे
विकल्यवाय दृष्टथ्युक्त वातिस्रानं भवति। तथा
विकल्यवायधम्मवान्वयनमिति ज्ञानं भवति स एव परा-
मर्श दृष्टथ्युक्ते। तदनन्त्यां पर्यर्तादैं विकल्यमानिति ज्ञानं
जायते। तदैवानुमितिः। अन्तः प्राचीनास्य व्याप्तेन
ज्ञायमानं पुष्पादिकमानुमितिकरणं। तदृष्टथिति ज्ञाय-
मानमिति॥
भाषा 5
अनागताद्वितिज्ञन न स्थानुमितितदा ॥ ६५ ॥
यास्य पचवाससिद्धी: परामर्श उचये ।

सिद्धा 5
स्थानुमितिकरणेल्युक्तिमात्र॥ अनागताद्वितिज्ञकरणेल्युक्तिमात्र...
भाषा: व्याकरण साधवद्विविधसंगमन उदाहरणः || ६३ ||

सिद्धा: ज्ञानलेनेचारणलं। किंच धूमवान् पर्वत द्रति ज्ञानदुर्मितापति:। वायुत्ववच्चंद्विभत्तधूमलप्रकारकपचध्यायताजानक्ष यज्ञात्। न च तदानं श्रुत्तमाणवायुतवच्चंद्विकारकपचध्यायताजानक्ष हेतुलमिति वाच्यं। यद्य हु तत्पुष्पोपहस्र-हस्माणवायुतवच्चंद्विकारकतत्पुष्पोपहस्रपचध्यायताजानं तत्पुष्पोपहस्र सुनिमिति हेतुरुच्यते तदा ज्ञानकार्यकारकसवारः। मन्त्रात् हु सिद्धान्तवाच्य प्रकारकपचध्यायताजानं सिद्धान्तनामानुमिति जनयतीत्वथं नानाकार्यकारकसवारः। यद्य हु प्रकारकारकसवान पचध्यायताजानं सुनान्त्वत्त्वसिद्धान्तियुच्यते तदा कार्यकारकसवारद्वयं वक्त्वायो धूम श्राथेकवान् पर्वत द्रति ज्ञानदुर्मितानुमिति: खार्डिति। ३२७ च ज्ञान-वद्यं तत्तापि विशिष्टज्ञानं कल्पनीयं। फलसुखावृत्ते-खाद्योपलात् द्रति।

वापिष्ठो नाम वापिष्ठाय: तच्च का वापिष्ठितमल स्थान:। वापिष्ठितम:। साधवद्विवेदि:। वक्तव्यायार्थमुन धूमाव-द्रित्यादे साप्त्या वक्त्वः। साधवान् महानसादिः। तदः नेत्रो जलद्रादिः। तदहस्तितं धूमकृति: लघुप्रमनिः।
भाषा ० चतुर्मिश्वतिविरच्चाप्रतियोगिना ।

विश्रू ० धूमवान् कठेरिलयादै साधवदन्यसिन्धूः पिष्ठाद्विव विक्रिष्ठमात्स्तिवात्। चच चेत समबेन साधव तेन जीव समबेन साधवदन्यवान् वाय्यः। ध्वन्या समवायसमवेन विक्रिष्ठ मकेरवयसद्वर्म महानवादिः। तत्व धूमविश्वमनवलक्ष्याः सृप्रस्तावः। साधवदन्य मात्रेन च चाराविक्षिप्ताप्रतियोगिताकमेवदवान् वाय्यः। तेन चालकार्मिक नाम महानवादि:। तदनिः पर्वतादि धूमवेक चतुर्णापि न चति:। चेत समवेन चेतुः समबेन साधवदन्यान्नवान्नवान्नवान्तिलयान्वादमः। तेन साधवदन्यसिन्धू धूमवानव धूमव च समवायसमवेन चतुर्णापि न चति:। साधवदन्यअद्वाः साधवदन्यसिन्धवान्नवान्नवान्नवान्तिलवाच्चिमानाः। तेन धूमवान् कठेरिलय का० साधवदन्यसिन्धवान्नवान्नवान्नवान्तिलवाच्चिमानाः। वेदनसत्वां नातिनासिं।। चच यथापि द्रवः गुणक्षोभन्न-लविनिष्ठक्षा कोदियादै: विशिष्टसत्याः कत्यादिः। कायम् साधवदन्यसिन्धू गुणाद्वर्मानन्तिल मातिति। तथापि चेतुतान्नवान्नवान्नवान्नवान्नवान्नवान्नवान्नवान्नवान्तिलयान्वादमः। चेतुना- नातिरेकन्त मातृस्तितानवान्नवान्नवान्नवान्तिलमिति फलिताः।।

नन्ते चेतुचान्यमिश्रपि भिरात्तः साधवदन्यसिन्धु-लाद्वात्सिनः।। ६३।।

किव्व चतुर्देश जातीरिवादै साधवदन्यसिन्
भाषा । साधनेन देशोरिकाधिकरणं व्याप्तिरूपमेऽ॥ ६३ ॥

सिद्धा । सामान्यादेति देशतावच्छेदकसमवेति समवायेन चन्द्र-रघुरिज्ञानलालाध्याशिष्यात श्राह ॥ चर्चवा चेतुसभिषिते ।
चेतुभ्रण निषा चन्द्रिष्यसं तथा । विरेचवीभावः ।
तथा च देशलिपिस्त्रिचिताभावः । तदस्त्रिचिताय गहि । साधनेन सद्देते । सामान्याधिकरणं व्याप्ति तदापिवः ।
चित्रमाणसु धूमादित्यादेति देशलिपिस्त्रिचितात्मक-भावाधिकारिगितं तत्तद्वायादेशकीयव्याप्ति । न च
सामान्याधिकरणविधुमोहायेति व्याप्ति वाच्यं ।
तत्तदेश भायवामस्थापनचेति । इत्य नास्नीति प्र- तीति । गृहवान् । द्विवलादित्यादि वाच्येश्व । तदापि
बाध्यतावच्छेदकं प्रतियोगिनाबच्छेदकं तदवच्छेद-सामान्याधिकरणं व्याप्ति वाच्यं ॥ नन्दु ध्वापण-ज्ञातिमानसु
धूमवलादित्यादेति । साध्यतावच्छेदक-ध्वापणज्ञातयात्तथासाभकालादिखुरपाणं नीवाह-टार्थवाच्छेदकलमस्तीत्वा व्याप्तिति
चेति । तज्ज प्रमणवा । ध्वापणज्ञातिभवमेव
साध्यतावच्छेदकानाम। नन्दु श्रमणभव्याश्चित्तभावः
कापि सृष्टिवाच्चिति । ध्वापणज्ञातिमानः नास्नीति
वृद्धापि । साध्याय्यः बच्चेदे । श्रमणभव्याश्चित्तभावः
कापि सृष्टिवाच्चिति । ध्वापणज्ञातिमानः नास्नीति
वृद्धापि । साध्याय्यः बच्चेदे ।
विंदु- नवम्बेदकमिलेभं जघणघटकमिक्यपिवद्वन्ति। पवं
दण्डादिव। साथे परस्परारम्बं दृष्ट्वलादिकेभे साधा-
तावघ्न्दकं प्रतियोगितानवघ्न्दकमिलित वाच्य। देव-
धिकरणश्च देहुतावघ्न्दकविगित्राधिकरणं वाच्य। तेन
वर्षं गुणकम्बोऽन्यन्वितिश्चलादिवादै स्मृत्वचाधि-
करणंगुणादिनिहानाभावप्रतियोगितागितिनं दृष्ट्वलखं ना-
य्याति। देहुतावघ्न्दककरणं देवधिकरणं वाच्य। तेन
श्रमवायभें धूमाधिकरणं दृष्ट्वविदिहाभावप्रतियोगितागिति-
लेवं कर्मभारस्याति। श्रमावभं प्रतियोगिताधिकरणं
वाच्यं। तेन करियंधेयं एतंगचालादिवादै मूलाव-
क्षेत्रेनेव एतंहृषस्तिकरियंगाभावप्रतियोगितागितिनं
संयोगस्य नाय्याति। न च प्रतियोगिताधिकरणं प्रति-
योगनन्दिकरणं दृष्टिलिं। तदा तथैवायाति। प्रतियो-
गिनं करियंगानाधिकरणं गुणादै वर्तते चोजभाव-
वक्षावें मूलावक्षेत्रेन सचात्। चाहौ प्रतियोगियधिकर-
णादृष्टिलिं तदा संयोगस्यचालादिवादावतियाति।
चचाधिकरणं गुणादै च संयोगभाववक्ष धूमाधि-
धिकरणं दृष्ट्वविदिहादिवादावतियाति। च चेवधिकरणं
प्रतियोगियधिकरणं दृष्ट्वविदिहादिविश्च विवचितलात्।
ख्मप्रतियोगियधिकरणं मूलचेवधिकरणं दृष्ट्वभावं दृष्टि
निकरं। प्रतियोगियधिकरणं ख्मप्रतियोगितानवघ्न्द-
ककरणं देवधिकरणं प्रतियोगितावघ्न्दकाधिकारणं
सिद्धार्थां वाच्यं। तेन विशिष्टप्रबन्धानं जातेरसत्यादी जात्यधिकरणगुणादिः विशिष्टप्रबन्धावत्वसत्योपायग्यमनाधिकरणगुणादिः प्रतियोगपालकरणविषयं विशिष्टप्रबन्धावत्वसत्योपायग्यमनाधिकरणगुणादिः प्रतियोगिन्यान्यविषयममः। एवं साधनावक्षेत्रकस्मश्चेन प्रतियोगिन्यान्यविषयममः। तेन ज्ञानवा प्रवक्षीयः सत्यादी प्रवक्षीयविरुपाक्षेत्रकस्मश्चेन ज्ञानाधिकरणविषयं विशिष्टप्रबन्धावत्वसत्योपायग्यमनाधिकरणगुणादिः। इत्यद्र वक्षीय धूमादिः-वाच्यालिकां धूमादिकरणे समवायेन वक्षीयिरचक्षणपरी प्रतियोगिन्यान्यविषयममः। तदुक्तिमित्रविद्याविशेषार्यस्मि। वक्षीयिरचक्षणवाक्षे प्रमाणिणाय वाच्यालिकां धूमादिकरणे समवायेन वक्षीयिरचक्षणपरी प्रतियोगिन्यान्यविषयममः। तदुक्तिमित्रविद्याविशेषार्यस्मि। भवति तत्त्वावलोकनमः। द्वितीये प्रतियोगियालिकाया धूमादिकरणाया भवति तद्नित्यान्यविषयममः। वक्षीयिरचक्षणवाक्षे प्रमाणिणाय वाच्यालिकां धूमादिकरणे समवायेन वक्षीयिरचक्षणपरी प्रतियोगिन्यान्यविषयममः। तदुक्तिमित्रविद्याविशेषार्यस्मि।
सिद्धार्थ प्रतियोगिताविधिकरणांप्रतिदीर्णात्। यदि च घटाभावांद्रव्यमहाभावार्दितिभिन्न दृष्ट्वयुष्टे तथापि धूमभाववान् बद्धभावादित्यादिाववायासि। तत्र साधयतावब्रह्मकथमयः स्फुतप्रच्छणः। तेन समन्धेन सर्वोक्तः भावोऽ पूर्ववेचणेनविशिष्टविष्णुभाववाक्ः प्रतियोगिताविधिकरणां चैव विधिकरणायेचति। दत्तोऽदु त काशं चौगाभाववान् श्राद्वलिदित्यादिाववायासि। ततः श्रवणकुपितपयोगाभाबाभावः करिष्णयोगसः गुणवान् तत्रतियोगिताविधिकरणं गुणाशामान्याभावज्ञहमिष्ठतः गुणविशिष्टाविधिकरणां चैव विधिकरणायासि।)

मैवं। चालूऽ प्रतियोगिताविधिकरणेदावविधिशान्तिधिकरणां चैव तस्मस्तावृः छुस्तियोगिताविधिकरणेदाकल्य विशिष्ट्यकरणां जन्मवाक्षः। नन्द कालेद घटवान् कालपरिमाणादृष्ट्यचावमां। प्रतियोगिताविधिकरणांभावाप्रत्यक्षेदीविशिष्ट्यकरणेदास्य महाकालस्य जगद्धारतया सर्वे प्रामांभावानां साधयताविधिकरणमे प्रतियोगिताविधिकरणान्ति। च च कैव्यम महाकालेदेव सुरशिष्टिकरणास्य महाकालस्य सुरशिष्टिकरणान्ति। महाकालेन महाभावदानाणि। वसूः तस्म न प्रतियोगिताविधिकरणं महाभावप्रतियोगितायामाने यत्-
पद्मपुरस्तातिकृतान्तः द्वितीय विषय मार्गेण तद्विषये विवेचनम्।

पद्मो निलकारिकायां तभिमविकतमात्मकः।

तथा तद्विषये विवेचनम्।

सन्तोषात्मकः।

विवेचनम्।

तथात्मकः।

सन्तोषात्मकः॥

गृहेषुऽवस्थिताः।

गृहेषुऽवस्थिताः॥
भाषा। सिवाधिक्यां प्रमोघसिद्धियं न चिदान्।

सिद्धान् पचाटुरतिलिमित्रं पचवं किं तदार्थं। सिवाधिक्यं दुःखं सिद्धिरिवादिः। सिवाधिक्याविचर्च-विशिष्टवा: सिद्धार्थानं पचतं तदानूऽ पच दत्त्वंः। सिवाधिक्यामात्रं न पचत। विनापि सिवाधिक्यां धनागरितेन मेघानुमानात्म चिंत्यं सत्यापि सिवाधिक्याविचर्च-विशिष्टवं सिद्धां विशेषः। तथा। सिवाधिक्याविचर्च-विशिष्टवं सिद्धान्तं सिद्धान्तं भवेनवेत्ते। तथा च च च सिद्धिनासि च। तत्र सिवाधिक्यां सत्यामस्थामन्न। पचत। च च सिवाधिक्यां सिद्धिनासि च सत्यामस्थामन्न। पचत। च च सिद्धिरिवादिः सिवाधिक्या च नासि। तत्र च न पचत। सिवाधिक्याविचर्च-विशिष्टसिद्धिः। चतात्॥ ननु च च परामर्शान्तरं सिद्धिशतः सिवाधिक्या तत्र सिवाधिक्याकाले परामर्शात्तात्तानुमिति। च च सिद्धिपरामर्शसिद्धाधिक्या: क्रमेण भवन्ति तत्र सिवाधिक्याकाले मित्तुराश्चात्त्र प्रतिभयकाभावादेवामनुमिति।। च च सिवाधिक्याविचर्च-विशिष्टसिद्धिः। चति तत्र परामर्शकाले सिवाधिक्याविभावमासि। एवमयवाच्यां सिद्धिकाले परामर्शकाले सिवाधिक्यां॥ योगिक्षुविशेषगुणानं योगिक्षुविशेषधातृत्वं सिवाधिक्याविचर्च-विशिष्टवमीटूऽ चेतं सिद्धिविशेषः। न। च च वनिक्ष्यामधूम-
भाषा० स पचतांच दुस्तिलछानादृश्यमितिभवेत् । इसे ॥

मिद्धा० वान् पर्व्वतेऽवज्रमाणितार्थमिति । सुखवाधिनमिति प्रत्येक स्वरण वा । तत् सिद्धाधिष्ठित । तत्र पचतामश्चात्मक विवेकित्रविवेकित्रशास्त्रावयवशक्तिरहितशास्त्रानि च नैव । चत्रेः बोधाः यादुश्रयाः बीतियाः विवेकित्रविवेकित्रशास्त्रानि च नैव । चत्रेः बोधाः यादुश्रयाः बीतियाः विवेकित्रविवेकित्रशास्त्रानि च नैव । चत्रेः बोधाः यादुश्रयाः बीतियाः विवेकित्रविवेकित्रशास्त्रानि च नैव । चत्रेः बोधाः यादुश्रयाः बीतियाः विवेकित्रविवेकित्रशास्त्रानि च नैव । चत्रेः बोधाः यादुश्रयाः बीतियाः विवेकित्रविवेकित्रशास्त्रानि च नैव ।

वज्रयाप्पुमवान् वर्षेऽवज्रमाणितार्थमिति । सुखवाधिनमिति प्रत्यज्ञमेव प्रत्यविद्यादिर बीतियाः यादुश्रयाः बीतियाः विवेकित्रविवेकित्रशास्त्रानि च नैव । चत्रेः बोधाः यादुश्रयाः बीतियाः विवेकित्रविवेकित्रशास्त्रानि च नैव । चत्रेः बोधाः यादुश्रयाः बीतियाः विवेकित्रविवेकित्रशास्त्रानि च नैव । चत्रेः बोधाः यादुश्रयाः बीतियाः विवेकित्रविवेकित्रशास्त्रानि च नैव । चत्रेः बोधाः यादुश्रयाः बीतियाः विवेकित्रविवेकित्रशास्त्रानि च नैव । चत्रेः बोधाः यादुश्रयाः बीतियाः विवेकित्रविवेकित्रशास्त्रानि च नैव । चत्रेः बोधाः यादुश्रयाः बीतियाः विवेकित्रविवेकित्रशास्त्रानि च नैव । चत्रेः बोधाः यादुश्रयाः बीतियाः विवेकित्रविवेकित्रशास्त्रानि च नैव ।

वज्रयाप्पुमवान् पर्व्वतेऽवज्रमाणितार्थमिति । सुखवाधिनमिति प्रत्यज्ञमेव प्रत्यविद्यादिर बीतियाः यादुश्रयाः बीतियाः विवेकित्रविवेकित्रशास्त्रानि च नैव । चत्रेः बोधाः यादुश्रयाः बीतियाः विवेकित्रविवेकित्रशास्त्रानि च नैव । चत्रेः बोधाः यादुश्रयाः बीतियाः विवेकित्रविवेकित्रशास्त्रानि च नैव ।
भाषा। अनेकान्तो विश्वास्यसिद्ध प्रतिपादित।

बिष्णु। तचाश्चायामनुमिसिद्धं पुरुषलक्ष प्रत्यं भवति न लनुस्मितिरतो नृमिसिद्धविश्वास्यसिद्धमानविश्वास्यक्रयावस्य- सामयी कामिनीजिन्यायादिवलं खातचेष्ट्र प्रतीत- निखिक। एवं परामद्वीजनन्तरं विनायप प्रत्येक्षां पचादिप्रदिघचाँ नुस्त्रोऽ। प्रत्येक्षाविष्क्षणिनु- मितिसामयी भिन्नविश्वास्यक्रयच्ये प्रतीत-निखिक।

प्रमस्तः भृगु ज्ञेयस्य विभवं अनेकान्ते-द्वारदी। तथवचन्त्र मंडिरयं ज्ञेयानुमितिधिरो- रीरतिं तत्त्वं। तथार्थं अभवंराधिविष्करणस्य ज्ञत- नयानुमितिराधिलिङ्गं तो देशं। मंडिरयक्ष्मानुमि- तिरिक्षितलेपिं तत्र पर्यतो वज्रभावविभवति विशिष्ट- खानलिङ्गमें प्रत्येक्षां देष्टं। न च वज्रभावविभव- पाषाणमयवाणं पर्यतद्विद्धिकाणा वज्रभाव- धूमकेशाराशं न क्षातर्व तच वज्रभावविभवोऽ च दृति विशिष्टखानलिङ्गमें दृतिर्वाचं। दृष्टांपते। चन्द्रया वाध्यमायानन्तिद्वेष्ट्यं। तत्स्तु तच वज्रभानू- खान्यपाषाणमयवाणं दृति परामद्वीजनकाशेवज्रभाय- ध्यूमकेशाराशं नाभासं भ्रामद्विनुमितिप्रतिवभमाण। देष्टं। नं दृष्टे। इत्यथा सायाभववहुतिचेन्द्रादिकं देष्टः। तदनं भद्रवं च वेदैं येन कौन्ते समस्तनित नयः। परेः तु
भाषा ० कालावध्यायपदिपितश्रु देवाभासातु पञ्चथा ॥ ७० ॥

आय्य: साधारणसूत्र खान स्थानसाधारणम नात।

विद्वा ० यद्विगच्छलवन ज्ञानखानुभिमित्विरोधिन्द्रं तद्वच देलाभासलं सत्वमिच्छे विरोधियायकादिकार्यं तथा तद्वच टेनोऽज्ञानकृप्तस्मानं। न च वेदेन्द्रे धूमादिकादिकादिकानुभिमित्विरोधिन्द्रेश्च ज्ञानकृप्तस्मानं। वाध्वक्ये पचे साधवाभविष्यकलेनानुभिमित्विरोधिन्द्रेश्च ज्ञानकृप्तस्मानं तद्वचापि सच्चादुद्देश्यार्थपि वाध्वितलापार्थार्थिति वाच्यं। तच ज्ञानस वसमववाच्यनात। तच सत्वमिच्छति दृश्य अवहार्य तत्क्ष्यनात। तच वाध्वितलापवाच्याभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभावाभाब-
भाषा  तथावानुपसंचारी चिन्हानैकालिको भवेन।

अनु-पसंचारी च अत्यन्तधर्मास्तिप्रतिष्ठानसाधकादिः।
तेन च विविधदेहास्याकाैशगतिप्रतिवत्वः: कियते।
विष्णुस्य साधयकोरुपसाध्योत्तरवर्ष्टीभवाप्रतिस्वरूपि।
अत्र वर्तसाध्यभव-गद्याधिग्रन्थिन प्रतिवत्त्वः।
सत्यप्रतिपचे तु प्रतिशूद्य-साधयभवाधिकः।
अत्र तु शहुरेवेति विशेषः।
साधयभवाधिक एव साधयसंकलने उपमस द्वार-किशिणिशेषेयपंपसाधिकलाच विशेषः।
सत्यप्रतिपचः साधय-भावाथियवान् पचः।
श्रेष्ठोत्तरमाध्यव्यायस्य-वव-विशिष्ट परिशिलकृतिनि साधयभवाथियवव-वचनोपिशिः।
शयखथा दृश्यन्ते।
अत्र च वरसाधयभवाथियवव-स्त्रात्मात्परसाध्यमूलितप्रतिवत्वः: फलं।
अत्र कै चित्तु यथा घटभावाथियवव-ज्ञातः परस्परानुमूलितप्रतिवत्वस्य: पांडः।
अत्र कै चित्तुः यथा घटभावाथियवव-ज्ञातः पिन्दच्छः घट चूँ:।
संयोगे वसि घटवानदः जायते।
यथा च संयोगे पीतवाधयभवाभृतव्यव-ज्ञातः पिन्दच्छः पीतः।
श्रृष्टि दृषि धीरजयते एवं कै कै चित्तुभावाथियवव-ज्ञातः
कै चित्तुवाभवाचुःयुपम:।
संयोगे भवति तथा सत्यप्रतिपचे श्रृष्टि
संयोगे भवति तथा सत्यप्रतिपचे

मैकब्लिटियाभास्वेभच च।
सिद्धार्थ तत्त्वाधिकरणं तद्वितीयकोटिभानप्रतिवभाष्यं सं-शयः। फलवलनं चालीकसमवेदभावं कल्पयत दृश्चि 
 विद्वत्। तत्र। तद्भावधारकान्तान्नि स्वति तदपनै- 
तभानविशेष्ट्वर्षाब्दोथाधाने गुरुद्वारात्। लोकिकर्ष्णक- 
षड्याजयाधेष्याजन्मानान्ये तख्य प्रतिवभक्तः। 
खायबाद्। न देश्वनितभानविशेष्ये शास्त्रेये च प्रथक- 
प्रतिवभक्तः। गोर्वाद्। तथाच प्रतिवभक्तलावत् क- 
थमरमितः।। न हि लोकिकर्ष्णकर्ष्णस्य स्सत्यर्थविचार- 
स्त्रानि रसों निष्ठ्यां स्सत्यर्थविचाराकार्यं। यज्ञां 
कोटिद्रोमध्यायनं भाषान्त च भेदभाषामाणस्य 
विशेषायं विद्वत् जान्यो उत्तोतामाणस्यक्षेष् 
विरोधस्थानान्य प्रतिवभक्त- 
लाद्वत॥

शास्त्रयांश्चाभावतमालविद्वं। शास्त्रयांश्चिद्: 
पचे पचतावं चैकाल्वाभाव:। चत च काश्यनां 
पचे विशेषे जान्याते तत्र पचे तस्य न काश्यन- 
तय दृश्चि जाने विद्वते काश्यनमपव्यस्ते परार-
मग्राधिक्रतिकम्: फलं॥

खर्पासिद्धिकु पचे व्याध्यायभिमतस्याभाव:। 
चत च इदये इदये धुमाधिलिङ्ग च पचे व्याध- 
भिमतस्य दैत्यरामारे जाते पचे व्याधायदत्समस्य 
ज्ञानष्ठपरामग्राधिक्रतिकम्: फलं॥
धात विभिन्नकेषां वायुलासिद्धि: । सा च सबंते
साधुस्वाभावश्रेणिकाके। तथा कालनवपक्षिता-
नित्यादं साधु साधुस्वाभावश्रेणिकाके ज्ञाते साध-
तवच्छेदकविशिष्टतायोग्यायवत्तायणकृष्णपरमश्रणा-
तिबन्धः फलं ॥

एवं चेतो चेतुतवच्छेदकाभावः साधस्वाभावीः ।
सबंते कालनवपक्षिताविनित्यादं छेतुतवच्छेदकविष्टे-
श्रेणिकाके दिग्विजयाभवान् तत्त्वेऽक्ततत्त्वानादीरव्या-
वः फलं । एवं बल्मिकृ नीलधूमादिविधापि युक्तया
नीलधूमां छेतुतात्वच्छेदविशिष्टकर्मी वायुलासिद्धिरि-
क्षयि वदनि ॥

वाधस्व पचे साधुभावादि: । एतज्ञानमितिप्र-
विवम्बः फलं । तत्त्वस्मिन्दं भावाविनियोऽक्षिकाधि-
कर्त्तो ज्ञाताविभेदायत्तुर्वर्द्धकस्ता ग्रामाचे विरो-
भीति न तु तत्त्र श्रवणादारण पच साधुस्वाभावश्रेणि-
नमुनितिकारणं । तविदर्धितवा वाधस्वातिपरं
चोरं लाभायस्मिति युकं । हस्तिचित्रमितनेतर एता-
झानुमित्यानां । पूर्वं पचे साधुस्वाभावश्रेणि-
भावान् अघातिकानुमित्यपकायानां । सा-
ध्यंवरं विनामुनित्यपकायानां ॥ एवं साधुभावादि
प्रमाणनमिति न प्रातिवन्धकं । प्रमाणाभावावदू गौ-
र्वाच । अन्यथा सत्तपितुचारदावपि तद्भावाभायक-
भाषा: ये सप्त विपत्ते च भवेत् साधारणस्तु सः।

सिद्धरः नागाने प्रमालविश्वयकलेन प्रतिवन्धकतापने। किन्तु
वभुवञ्ज्ञानानस्कृति वाधादीवलः प्रतिवन्धकता।
तत्र भमलश्चाविघटने प्रामाण्यानां कालिदुपयुन्ते।
न च वाध्यात्मिन्दे पच चेतुमले वामिराचः पचे चेलभावे खल्पादिशिल्येव दृष्य दृति वाच्यः। वाध्यात्म-
वामिराच्यानादेकः। किच्च यदा परामिरान्तर
वाध्युद्दिक्षत वामिराच्यानादेकः। किथ्यात् तथा मण्डल
वयोजने स्थः। गम्भीरानुपाध्याय तत्र वाध्यात्मिन्दे
प्रतिवन्धकताः वाच्यः। वतः भेदावत्क्षणाः-
वच्चि घटादै। गम्भीरानुपाध्यायोऽगेष तत्र वाध्यात्मिन्दे
प्रतिवन्धकताः वाच्यः। न च पठे गन्धवलात् कत्र वाध
दृति वाच्यः। पुष्पाक्षकेष्कः शकालाक्षकेष्कादिनामुनि-
रनुभवशिक्षाः। *इति वाध्यात्मिन्दे धिमथा से चेला-
भास्मादं धारणा अर्थ तनायं पवानभवेन्ति। शनिया
चेलाभासस्यधिकप्रमादः वाध्यात्मिन्देप्रतिपिता भिन्न
एव। खत्तकेष्कः। सुनिना प्रजायुपादानात्। श्रावतिप-
वध्यायस्तु न प्रतिवन्धक प्रति। प्रकटितोऽवर्तः। १२। इति
य: सप्तच विपचे च भवेत् साधारणस्तु त दृति। सप-
चित्तुपिटितः साधारण दृष्यः। सप्त: भाष्यायान्।
विपच: साध्याभासवान् विन्दुवारकाय सप्तउत्तितिल-

* इति दिनकरोऽयतः पादः। श्रावतिपिताद्विरं ये चे
वास्काभासायत: त तनायं पवानभवेति। इति युक्तपादाः परिवर्तः।
भाषा ॥ अश्यामसिद्धिराच्या यात्र खुपासिद्धिर्मयाय ॥
व्यायामसिद्धिरपराखाद्विधरणलिखित ॥ ३४ ॥
Pचासिद्धिर्मन पचो भवेनाणिमयो गिरिः ॥
ज्ञानो द्वियं धूमबच्चाद्वासिद्धिरयापरा ॥ ३५ ॥
व्यायामसिद्धिरपरा नीलधुमादिके भवेन्।
विषयः परामर्शं चेले: सत्प्रतिपिनिना ॥ ३६ ॥
साध्यायूष्या यद पञ्चशस्त्रा वाध्य उदािहतः।
ज्ञातिनिकालीनघटो गंभीरियं साधते ॥ ३७ ॥

विष्णु ॥ द्रष्टिः विभजते। अश्यामसिद्धिरिवादि ॥ ३४ ॥
Pचासिद्धिरिति। अश्यामसिद्धिरिवादि:। नील-
धूमादिक दृष्टि। नीलधूमलं गुहतया न चेततावच्छे-
दक। समानाधिकरणयायतवच्छेदकधारिनाराघ-
ंगंवेभ वायतावच्छेदकलात्। धूमग्रामभावलम्बमु-
द्ये समानाधिकरणिति ॥ ३५ ॥
विष्णुयथारिति। कपिशेयोगंतदभाववायवकःयारे-
मंशेत्रपिन न सत्प्रतिपिनितं उकों। विष्णुयथारिति।
तथा च समायविष्णुयथाभाववायवकःयारे-
कालोत्सामायवायवत्तारम्भंविशेषं दृष्टिः। ॥ ३६ ॥
साध्यायूष्या दृष्टि। पचः पचतावच्छेदकविशिष्ट
दृष्टि:। तेन घटे गन्धयलेक्षपिन न चति:। एवं सूक्ष्मव-
ञ्चिक्तो दृष्टि: कपिशेयोगीवत्तचापि वेषं। ॥ ३७ ॥
भाषा० शामीपन्न प्रथमतः पश्यन्ते गव्यादिकां।
साधारणगव्यादिकान्यं ख्यातं सा कर्णं मलं॥७८॥
वाक्यार्थस्नृतिर्ग्वायस्सूतिविधापार उच्चते।
गव्यादिपदानान्तु शक्तिधीशरमाफलं॥७५॥
पदार्थानु करणं द्वारं तत्र पदार्थार्थोः।

सिद्धा० उपमिति चुग्नाद्यति। शामीपन्निति। यज्ञावशशेरून केन कोनिंदु शामीपन्न प्रत्युतं गोपक्षेत गव्यपदवाच्च हृति पषाच्छ शामीपन्न आनिद्रक्षे गव्या हृति।
तत्र गोपक्षेत श्रानां यत् तत्र उपमितिकरणं॥७८॥
तदनलां गोपक्षेत गव्यपदवाच्च द्वारितेश्ववाक्यार्थार्थं जायते तदेव चापारः। 
तदनलां तत्र गव्या गव्यपदवाच्च द्रति श्रानां जायते तत्रुपमिति:। 
न तय गव्यपदवाच्च द्वारितं श्राभारेः। गव्यार्थार्थे शक्ति- 
प्रहारभावप्रणालु॥७५॥

शास्त्रेंध्रप्रस्तारं दर्शयति। पदार्थानिविति। न तु 
श्रायमानं पदं करणं। पदाभावविषयं बैतिष्ठ्यकादृशी 
शास्त्रेमाथाः। पदार्थारंतिति। पदञ्ज्यार्थार्थार्थस्त्रं 
वापारः। अन्यथा पदार्थानवतं प्रत्यचादिना पदार्थार्थ- 
स्थिताविषयं शास्त्रेमाथापि॥ तवापि * द्रत्या पदञ्ज्यार्थं 
वोंयं। अन्यथा घटादिपदातां समवायमम्र्सनं श्राका-
भाषा । शाब्दवैधः फलं तनं शक्तिधः सच्चारिणी ॥ ८० ॥

सिद्धा । श्रास्त्रां जायते। आकाशशापि शाब्दवैधापनः। दृविति: प्रक्रियाच्यायतः समम्यः। चत्रेव शक्तिनान्योप-चोगः। पूवेश शक्तियांहाराय पद्यानेव तत्समस्य भूणानूपनः। पद्यानस समाविशायविधयायर्ये-स्वारकल। शक्तिन्द पदेन यद पदार्थस समम्यः। वा चाच्चाच्चव्रद्ध्यमथ्यं बोजुय ददोर्षरेष्कार्कः। आधुनिको नाथि शक्तिरेखः एकादेशनि पिता नाम कुर्माभ्यू ददोर्षरेष्कार्कः सत्याः। आधुनिको तु वद्धेते न शक्तिरिति समद्रायः। तनावस त्रिददर्षरेष्कः न शक्तिः किंविष्किवः। तेन आधुनिकाग्रीयोपि शक्तिरेखोति वद्धि। शक्तिग्रहेन वाकरणादितः। तथा हि।

शक्तिग्रहेन वाकरणाप्रथमात्मिकापत्वावः ज्ञातावहारतस्य।

वाकस्य शेषाविद्येतेवद्दली मानिष्यत: सिद्धवद्द्वारः।

धार्मिकत्रग्निलघायादीनां शक्तिग्रहेन वाकरणांहवी।

कवित् छु सति वाष्पके वद्यतेवः। वथा वैवाकरणे-राखात्स तनर्चर शक्तिस्वयः। चैत: प्रचलितादी कन्तुत्त्विकारङ्गादानायः। तच गौरवावः जनयते किन्नु छतैशेषिर्ग्रहेकालापनः। कवित्तिकार्दी सदार्मिकौ भाष्यते। न च कन्तुरुनिष्ठानाचू वैविद्यवद्दानातरते ददोर्ष शक्तिरिति वाच्यः। कर्णम्बन्धविधायः तच तनविलातः। वैवाकरणाप्रथमात्मिकार्याः कर्मलघायाद्वृत्तः।
भिन्ना । प्रथमान्तरपदोपखाय: कर्मलादौव्यख विशिष्यणलतायः । तेन चैत दृव गच्छनीयादी: न चैते ब्रह्मानवः । चत्र तम्मादी: न विशिष्यणलतायथं तद्व- 
रणाय प्रथमानीति। यदा धात्विदातिरिक्तविशिष्य- 
णं प्रथमदलायः। तेन चैत दृव गच्छनीयावचैव- 
देवरणं। स्लोकं पचतीयादी: स्लोकादेवरणण्य च 
विद्वीरवं। तत् द्विदीयानोपखाय: लाल्यारणं । एवं 
व्यापारेषीपि न शकः। गैर्वानु:। रथं गच्छनीयादै: 
ख्यापरं ग्राममवले वा लचणा।। जानानीयादै: तु 
ग्राममयले नमस्तीयादै: प्रतियोगिले निष्ठुलचणा।। 
उपमानांवया शक्तिग्रहस्थयां।

एवं कौषादृष्पि शक्तिग्रहः। सति वाथके वचिव्य 
वच्यने। चथा नीलादिपदानां नीलच्छपौदै: नीला- 
दिविशिष्टे च शकः। कोपे युतादिता तथापि लाघ- 
वान। नीलादै: शकः। नीलादिविशिष्टे लचणे।

एवमसावादाघृपि। चथा कोकिल: पिकपदवाच्य 
द्विविदिश्वयम् पिकादिशक्तिवः।

एवं व्यवहारादृष्पि। चथा प्रथोजकर्त्रृत्व घटमानय- 
त्वुः। तच्छुर्ला प्रथोजकर्त्तृत्व घट ग्रामीनः। तद्वधार्यं 
पार्श्वस्था वालो घटानयवनः काथं घटमानयेश्वस्य- 
प्रवृत्तमवधारयति। ततथ घटमपरार् ग्रामानय 
द्वादै: छावापेदापाभमं घटादिपदानां कार्यान्वित-
सिद्धोऽ घटाद्वै शरणं सुङ्गाति। दस्य भूतेऽ नीलोऽ घट दस्याः दिश्वद्वै शाब्दविधः। घटादिपदार्नः कार्याल्पित- घटादिपदाधै सामर्थ्यावधारणः। कार्याल्पित प्रति च चिंडार्नाः सामर्थ्यात् तद्भावाच शाब्दविध द्वापि कौचित्। तत्र। प्रथमः कार्याल्पितघटाद्वै शल्बवधार- श्रेष्ठिपि लायवेन पश्चात् तथा परित्यागोऽविधात्। यत्र एव चैत पुत्रसे जातः। कन्या ते गमिभो जाता दस्याः देवुपेक्षामादसुखमालिकायाम्। सुखुः चेतुमाय तत्त- कार्यवेन परिशेष्याचार्याविधायं विर्यायं तद्वैततया तं शंकमावधारणः। तथा च यथाप्रत्यातः कार्याल्पिते न शक्ति। न च तत्र ते पश्चायादिश्वद्रानारमावधारः। मानाभावान चैत पुत्रसे जाता मलेश्वर्दावै तद- भावाच। दस्य लायवादल्पितघटाद्विपि शरीरः त्याका घटपदस्क घटमारे शक्तिवधारणः॥

एवं वाक्यशेषादिपि शक्तिपुरः। यथा चतवस्मिन्नार्म- वतीत्वच यवपदः दीर्घमुखस्विष्टे अर्थार्थं व्याख्: काली च भैरवानां। तत्त चि चथायां चैपध्यो चा- यनि श्राप्ते मोदमाना इवान्त्यतन।

वमनसं सर्वस्मार्थार्थं जायं ते पञ्चशालन।

मोदमानाय तितलितं चतं: कल्पशालिनः॥

इंती वाक्यशेषाद्वै दीर्घमुखं शक्तिनिर्माणेः। काली तु शक्तिभूतः प्रयागः। नानाशक्तिसकलः, मैरवात।
विद्यारत्न इरिपदादेव: तु विनिमयकाभावावात्मानाशक्तिकल्पनः।
एवं विवरणाद्विपि शक्तिग्रहः। विवरणु तस्मानार्थे
पदान्तरं तद्वर्णः। यथा घटांश्चिरयथ: कहः
शोभिषयेन विवरणाद्व घटपदः कहः शक्तिग्रहः।
एवं पचनीयथ: यां करोतीयथेन विवरणादाखः।
तथा च चढार्थनलं कस्यंते॥
एवं प्रविद्दुपद्राच्छिन्नाद्विपि शक्तिग्रहः। यथा दच
सख्यार्थरै मधुरं पिको रेलीयादेवी पिकपदः
शक्तिग्रहः दृष्टं॥
तच जाताचेव शक्तिः तु वक्षी अभिचाराराधान-
क्ष्या:। शक्तिः विना च जानिभावासाम्भवान्नितेरं री
भावाति कौरितं। तचच:। शक्तिः विना च जानिभावानु-
पन्ने:। न च वक्षी क्षातः। श्रुतिपाद्धिताः चतुर्वर्णे
विनायिः शक्तिविवाहः। न च शक्तिशक्तायानं। वक-
खवाक्षेत्राः एव शक्ती: खोकारात्। न चानुनुगं:।
गोलारूपङ्गकलात्॥ किंशु गोः। शक्तेति शक्ति-
प्रहस्ति यदि तदा वक्षी: शक्तिः। यदि तु गोलां शक्ते
स्मिति शक्तियहहस्ता गोलप्रकारकपदरङ्गसरं शाब्द-
वाध्यस्य न खातः। समानप्रकारलेन शक्तिशास्य पदा-
प्रहसरं शाब्दवाध्य प्रति च दत्तात्॥ किंशु गोले
यदि शक्तिशस्ता गोलारः। शक्तावच्छेदः काचं। गो-
लन्तु मवेतरासमवेतले यति सकल्लगांमस्वेतलं। तथा च
सिद्धार्थ गायत्रीसः शक्तितावशेषोऽनूषद्वशेषान् वमेव गीरवः।
तस्मात् तत्र शाश्वतात्मार्जितिविशिष्टतत्ततज्ञकविवेधानुपपत्ता
फल्यमाना शक्तिर्याकारतत्तज्ञितविशिष्टत्वकै विश्राममतीति॥
श्रवं पदनाम कार्यांकेन कार्यात्मक कार्यावस्थिति
कार्यावस्थिति तत्ततत्तमर्यादार्थनां रूपमें महायान्ति।
यथाव्यवस्थां एव वृष्टि तत्ततर्गितानि।

यथा पाणिकारिद्वोऽ॥

यथाव्यवस्थानितेन परेषेन समुद्रायशफलिमाचिघृणे नुभाते
तत्रूढः। यथा गोपरङ्गनारिद्वोऽ॥

यथा तु प्रवाहशस्त्रतिविषेषे समुद्रायशकिरषसि
तत्तथाग्रहं। यथा पद्मार्दिवोऽ॥ तत्र ति पद्मपत्रार्द्ध
व्यवस्थाः पद्मजनकः पद्मस्मृतिवर्ज्जनकः वेदाध्यतः।
समुद्रायशकिरण्यं च पद्मलिन्यं रूपणं पद्मं वेदाध्यतः॥
न च केवलाय
व्यवस्थाः समुद्रे प्रयोगः स्थाप्तिर्राजः। छट्टिज्ञानकन
केवलयोगिः कार्यश्राप्तितन्वस्मकलाशितात्र: प्रापः॥

वस्तुतः समुद्रायशकीयविशिष्टपञ्चव्यवस्थार्थपञ्च
विकुटुर्वचयोऽभवति। भाविष्यत॥ यथा रूपायसु
तदाध्यायः। च च रूपायसु
वाचः: प्रतिशम्योर्वते तच प्रचरणय कुमुदादेवी:।
यथा तु कुमुदलिन्यं रूपणं बोधि च तात्पर्य्यां
च वाण्डयोगिः कार्यश्राप्तितन्वस्मकलाशितात्र: निवर्त्त द्रव्याश्च।॥

यथा तु सहस्त्रपदार्धायशकीयविशिष्टपञ्चव्यवस्थार्थपञ्च
विकुटुर्वचयोऽभवति। यथा तु सहस्त्रपदार्धरूपणं बोधि
च च यथात्तथासमुद्रायशकिरण्यं निवर्त्त द्रव्याश्च॥
भागोऽ

लक्षणां श्रक्षस्म्याब्यायायार्थेऽ: स्त्रात्भों ब्रेषस्म्यवाघिकः

विध्यालं मद्दरिपर्यः तः च हि अक्षमेंदनकर्त्ता

शशुकादितिरपि बुध्यते चावगिशेषापितं ॥ ५० ॥

लक्षण श्रक्षस्म्य द्वादिति। गंगाधार्यं ध्रुव द्वादिति

गंगापदःशक्यार्थं प्रवल्लुपः धोपक्ष्यायामनुपपति

स्त्रात्भों नुस्त्रोभार्थोऽ: च प्रतिस्मविष्यते च च मक्षणां

तीर्थः वैधः। च श्रक्षस्म्यः। तथा हि प्रवल्लुपशक्यार्थं

मक्ष्यन्त तीर्थेः युष्टिलतात्त्तीर्थं मक्षणं

तत: शाश्वेषः। परनु धोपक्ष्यामनुपपितं चणां

वीरं स्त्रात्तदा चयः: प्रवेशचएव च करणं न स्त्रात्

बिष्कु प्रवेशाध्यायामनुपपितेऽर्भावत्। तेन बिष्कुप्रेव्ये

भोजनक्ष्यायामनुपपितं यश्यारेस्लक्षणं। एवं कार्यके

थो दृष्टि रच्यतामित्यादैः काकम्पदः धुष्पुष्पाविके

लक्षणं। रसेतो दृष्टिरच्यााक्ष्यायार्थंविपयति ॥

एवं कार्यके मानोदादैः कार्यपेक्षाक्ष्यायामध्यक्षेत्र

लक्षणं। द्रामेवात्रहत्वायं लक्षणोश्चति। एकार्थाक

वाहिलेन रूपेष्क कार्यवेद्योऽविधात् ॥ यदि चानु-

पपित्वालीसांवीं क्षात्त तदर्धो कार्यियम्क्षापदः

तीर्थे कार्यियम्क्षापदः मक्षादैः लक्षणेति निम्यमेऽ न

स्त्रात्। रामलो वैधं शक्यार्थं मक्षणं यदि तीर्थेति

रूपेष्क युष्टिलतातानि तीर्थेऽर्बाधः। यदि तु गंगाधार्य-
सिद्धान्तः लैंग हृदेण गृहीतसादा तेनिव हृदेण स्वरूपः। तत एवं
लघुतावस्थाके न लघुः। तदाकारकोपः ब्यत लघुः। विनायुपपतः।
परन्तु एवंक्रमेण शक्यतावस्त्रे-
के श्रेयः शरीरं खान्। तदाकारकशब्दार्थस्वरूपः प्रति
तत्पदः सामृथ्यमिवः सुबन्धलादिति विभावनीयः।

यत तु शक्यार्थः स्वायत्पदः चाचवर्मः लघुः
यथा दिरेकादिप्तः रेषद्वय-
मयमेव ब्यततः। अस्मिन्द्रः च सम्बोधः
भमरे ग्यत्ते। तत् लघुतिलच्छाः। किंतु लाचरिकं
पदं नाभावकं। लाचरिकार्थः श्राव्यः सुदृढः तु पदा-
नारं करणं। शक्तिभावान्तरस्मचेरेनेतरपदार्थाः-
निवित्तशक्यार्थः श्राव्यः सुदृढः प्रति पदानां सामृथ्यावधा-
र्णादिति प्रायः। नवीनाय तदयुनभावकेव।
पदार्थार्थपिन्तिः सदाः। अत्यथा तुल्युक्तः शक्तार्थः
पदस्तानुभावकलापनेरित्याः। वाक्यी तु शक्तेर-
भावावस्त्रे समभवर्मः लघुपादिः नास्कः। यत् गभी-
रायाः नदिः घाष पृथुं तत्त नदीपदः नदीतीरे
लघुः। गभीरपदार्थः नदिः साहामेदीनावः।
काचिदेकदेशार्थः स्वाभाविकः। वदि तविदेशार्थ-
रथापि न स्थितयते तदा नदीपदः गभीरनदीतीरे
लघुः गभीरपदः तत्यथा अथाः।

* नवीनमलोकफळः विद्वद्वमानस्त्रायात्सत्तपूर्वमप्याह्रः।
थि

भक्तिकेलके विचारी:: खोडक्ये तथा गौदाखक गांवाणिज्य लक्षण। गवि विचार्यें:: यदि लेखीये साधारण न खोडक्ये तथा गौदाखक विचार्यें।

विचारण:: तात्पर्यवर्तमान।

एवमारात्मकवाने चतुर्दश वास्तवपदे वास्तवा-
रोचकमण्डण लक्षण। शास्त्रविद्या तात्पर्यवर्तमान।
एवमन्यापि।

तत्पुष्ये धु पूर्वपदे लक्षण। तथापि राजपुमपा-
दिपदे राजपदार्थेन पुष्करादिपदार्थः वाचार्यें।
निपातातिरिक्तनामार्थें मधुकरे नामकक्यें वैखान्यु-
त्वलान्। अन्यथा राजा पुष्कर दृश्यापि तथान्य-
वाचः स्पष्ट। परंतु न घट दृश्यादि घटपटाभ्यां नः वाचार्यें वाचार्यें निपातातिरिक्त। नीसो घट दृश्यादि नामार्थचारितेन सामसमन्ताकान्यावन्देनेति।

व राजपुरायु दृश्यादि स्वस्थिति: क्ररायं कल्याणीति
वाचं। क्षत्रियत्वविहिरेपि ततो बोधायणात्। तस्मादुरा
राजपदादि राजस्वचित्ति। तस्मात् च पुष्करेण
सामसमान्यान्यान्।

इत्यध्यौ भक्तिकेलके विचारी:: खोडक्ये तथा गौदाखक विचारण:: तथा लक्षण। न च कस्मीति लक्षणेति वाचं। सामसम्योधितपि इत्यादि

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सामसमान्यान्यान्।

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राजपुरायु दृश्यादि स्वस्थिति: क्ररायं कल्याणीति
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सिद्धार्थ दर्शनात्। न च एकजीवन्यचिलह्नम् साधित्यम-हैतित्वाय वाचं। किमाहेद्रे धविधद्विरो धित्यमाहितम- 
दर्शनात्। साधित्यानामभवाच। तस्मात् साधित्या- 
दिक्कन वाचं। जत एव राजपुरोपेशिताय साधित्यानामानी 
वजयातामित्याच लचणाभावाय द्वन्द्व वाचित्वे। किन्नु 
वास्तवे भेदे यत तत दद्। न च नोखचात्योरभेदेष्व 
दायादेश कथितित्वाय। तत्र नोखपद्ध नोखन 
घटपद्ध घटलमर्य। नभेदेश दायाकाशयमाहेदेश 
दायार्थात्।

समाहारदेश त यदि समाहारोपणनुभूत्त दायु- 
व्याते तदाधिनकुलमित्याद्रे परस्परं दिनकुलमाहे- 
द्रे लचणाः। पूर्वपं तात्पर्यायाः। न च भेरी- 
स्टुद्रेऽ वादचेतर तथा समाहारसाधित्योपेशाबु- 
दिनिलेप्पलस्ममेन तदन्यात्। एवं पन्नपुलोत्या- 
दावपिः। परे तु अधिनकुलमित्याद्रे अधिनकुलस् 
बुध्ये। प्राकृतिकमेकलावशः समाहारसंध्या च। यवेत- 
कलं नपुञ्चकलं माणिक्याधिकारित्यादिर्भेत्रेणोऽसम्येव। अन्व- 
छेकचाच्छमसाधित्यमेन वदनि।

कर्षाधारायशले तु नोखचात्यलिमित्याद्रे भेदेशम- 
भेदेश नोखपद्ध घटपद्ध प्रकारः। न च तत 
लचणाः। जत एव निषादस्थपतिः याजवेदिध्वच न
भाषा । आस्तिकियाग्नि वाक्यांकारांक विकारायणकारायणसूत्रख्यातिमिलने ॥ ८९ ॥
कारणं सन्निधाननु पद्मासंस्कारितिर्यणे ।

ष्ट्र० तत्पुरुषः। सचचचापने। किन्तु कर्षयार्यों लचणमभावात् ॥ न च निषादस्व सकरजानविशेषस्व वदानधि-कारादृ धाजनास्व द्रति वार्यं। निषादस्व विद्या-प्रयुक्तेभ्य एव कल्पनात्। लाचवेन सुखार्य्यखनी तद्यप्पत्य खचनाया: फलमुखीवानवत्यादीर्धा-लादिति ॥ उपकुस्म च द्रूपिपिपलीवादै। परपदे तत्समाच्यिन लचणा पूर्वदार्यग्रीनतय चानाय-वेधादि द्रति । द्रव्या समाचि न कर्यं शक्ति: । पद्मचाहिने निविष्कारिति ॥ पितृसु सम्रृदीं इत्यादैं। दिंदियों श्रृंगरप्पे जनकराध्योः श्रुंगरप्पे श्रीजनकद्वितालाचिन्ता ।
एववन्यवल्पि। घटा इत्यादैं न लचणा । घटायने रूपण गणात्मकस्मितस्वाभावात् ॥

आस्तिकियामानिवादि। आस्तिकियाने धाग्यताविद्यामाने। आकाशीवानं तत्यप्पदार्यामां शाक्षबाधे कारणं ॥ ८९ ॥

तज्ञायसंस्कारदार्यमां । सन्निधानननिति। यत्व-दार्यमाः यत्वदार्यमाः। प्रेक्षितस्यार्यवत्यानवने।
निमित्ति: कारणं। तेन गिरिभुजमध्रिमान् देवद्रोणी-व्यावही न शाक्षबाध: । नीला घटो । द्वं घट द्वया
सिद्धात्मक द्वारात्मकमाध्यक्षवाचः। प्रामाणिनिमाध्यक्षः
भमाभवियिः न चति।। ननु यत्र कत्री कुण्डली
वास्ती दृवदतात इत्युतं तवेत्तरप्रभारणेन पूर्वपद-
श्ररणस्य नामात्। अध्यवधानेतु उत्तरपदस्करणा-
स्फृवं द्वितीये चेतु। न। प्रत्येकपदस्कारैैः शरणं ताव-
धिष्यकश्ररणश्चाय्यवधानेनेतु। नानायनिकैः
कामन्यं श्रवणं नानायस्कादरुरक्ररणोपायरपि
स्वात्। तात्त्वपदस्कारस्वत्तुमहत्तरमवश्चान्नेकायोत्तमतः।
कथमन्यथा नानावश्चारपदस्करण। चरमं ताव-
त्त्वदायानां स्वरणात्मक्क्व खले कपोतनामात् ताव-
त्त्वदायानां कियाकर्मभविकावचायवचायधायः प्रावबैधा
भवतीति वैशिष्ट्य।। अध्ययनं।
चक्रद्राकादिः थाः येः साधियाः प्रपन्धाते।
तेन तेनान्तिः स्वारः पद्यरूरावगमनं।
तथा च खण्डवार्थस्वार्थवाचाधाननारं तथैव पदार्थस्य ता
स्वार्थवाचाध्यायः इत्यद्याः। तेतेन तात्त्वपदस्कारभिमाध्यक-
व्यः पद्यास्तोरायिः निरस्कः। तत्त्त्वपदस्कारस्वत्तुमहत्तरमवश्चान्नेकायोत्तमतः।
इदमु बोधाः। यत्र द्वारामिल्यकं तथापिधेहति पदादिन्य
स्वार्भामेव बोधः। न तु पिधानाद्वैपूर्वमाचारा। नानादेव
पदादिन्यपदार्थस्वार्थप्रक्तेक्ष्मचार्यवाचः चेतुलाः। किचा

* नील श्रवादिकपाठा दिनकरोष्टतथा विद्वद्भ्रतिः समाहतः।।
भाषा - पदार्थ तत्त्व तद्वत्ता योग्यता परिकीर्तिना || ॥
यत्यद्वै विना यथानुभवता भवेत्।

सिद्धा - क्रियाकर्मपदार्थानि तेन तेनेवं भव साकारलं। तेन क्रि-
यापदं विना कर्त्यां शास्त्रेऽथं स्वातं। तथा पुष्पे—
पदार्थादृश्यता तिलिपिपदार्थावहारं विना चतुर्थुपपणे:
पदार्थावहारं शास्त्राः।

चेयमयां निर्वङ्कि। पदार्थ इत्यादिना। एकपदार्थे
पर्यदार्शभवमेऽ चोगतेंतः। तत्क्रानभावाच
विजन विश्रीतीव्यावह न शास्त्रेऽथं। नववेत्या चो-
गतात्या भान शास्त्रेऽथं प्राक्ष सप्तं न सप्तति
वाक्यार्थावहार्यवृत्ताविदित कते। न। तत्कत्वार्थसारसं
सङ्करि संगवहुपुष्काचार्याभुति चेयम-
गतात्या भान सम्पन्नं।

नवाल्यु चोगतात्या भान न शास्त्राः भाने कारणं।
विजन विश्रीतीव्यावहं चेय विजकरणला्भावहुपुष्काः
चेयमयात्यन्वधेन प्रतिवम्णानं न शास्त्रेऽथं। तद्भाव-
विन्यायसः वैदिकविन्यायसंजन्यायविदेशायज्ञान-
भावे प्रतिवम्णकांतः शास्त्रेऽथं प्रति प्रतिवम्णकां
विजन। चेयमयताज्ञानविलम्बार् शास्त्रेऽथं विलम्बार्यमिद्
दृति वदपिः। \(\ldots\)॥ ॥

शाकार्यां निर्वङ्कि। यत्यद्वैनेयादि। चेय पदेन
विना यत्यद्वेत्यनुभवतां तेन सह तस्मात्—
भाषा  च्याकाड्जा, वत्तुरिक्ष तु  तत्त्वायं परिक्षितं।
सिद्धा  ज्ञा द्ययं। क्रियापदं विना कारकपदं तत्त्वायंबोधं
जनयतीय तेन तख्याकांग। बस्तदस्तु क्रियाकारक-
पदान्तं सत्त्वायंमानसं चरितायं। पर्न्तु घटकर्म्-
तत्त्वायं प्रति घटपदेऽनांतरदितीयाकांक्षांजानं कारणं।
तेन घटं कर्मलमानयनं आतिरिक्ता न शाब्दवोधं।
यथामैति पुनः राजः पुष्पोपपसार्यांतामिलाटे नु
पुष्पणं सच राजपदं तत्त्वयोज्याभावान् न तेन
सहान्यं।

तत्त्वायं नियम्यं। चतुरिक्तं। यदति तत्त्वयोजनां
कारणं न खान् तदा सैन्यमानयवादी कनिद्रेष्वऽ
कानिद्रेष्वऽ वैधो न खान्। न च तत्त्वयोजनाक्रमकः
रणादीनामेव शाब्दवोधे कारणमस्यित वाचं।
तेषामनुगमात्। तत्त्वयोजनाजनननलेन तेषामनुगमे
तु तत्त्वयोजनामेव खादवात् कारणमस्य। द्यौ
वेदादेशं पि तत्त्वयोजनायमेव: कस्यते। न च
तत्त्वायपकतत्त्वयोजनां कारणमिति वाचं। गर्गा-
द्रावयापकाभावात्। न च प्रलये एव नास्तिक
कुत: गर्गादिरिति वाचं। प्रलयश्चायमप्रतिपाठिलात्।
द्यौ शुक्लाकोशं ईश्वरीयतत्त्वयोजनां कारणं।
विमादिकशुक्लाचे तु शिवचिद्धरेत तत्त्वयेश्व ग्रामं
कारणं। अन्ये तु नानायांदी कनिद्रेष्व तत्त्वयोजनां
विद्या १० कारणं। तथाच शुक्राको विनेत्र तात्त्विकानं श्रावन्त- वाघं। वैदेश तु अभन्दिमासापरिश्रममिति तत्त्वाभिकरात-धारणामिहायः।

पूर्णसन्नविर्यास्रासंहदारुहृदः स्वामवमं। तत्तानमव- प्रकार दशिषा: सुगमता सारणं स जारिनं। तत्त छ सूर्यानुस्म: कारणं। ऋत केकिन्द्र अनूषव- लेन न कारणलं किन्तु ज्ञानवेन। अन्यत्य सारणां- नन्तर सारणं न स्वत:। समानप्रकारकस्तरपेन पूर्व- बस्कारस्य विनश्चलर्। सत्तातु तु तेजेव सारणेन सं- ख्यारानारर्द्वारा सारणां जन्यत द्यावज्ञान। वच समुदायानोटरं घटपटातोरं क्रमेन सारणमनोभि मकरिविषयकस्तरपेन साभृतु तच भलख संख्यारनाश- कलारामः कालख रेगलख चरमफलख वा सं- ख्यारानारमशक्तं वाच्यं। तथा च न कृमिकसारणानुप- पतिः। न च पुनः पुनः सारणात् दृढतरसंख्यारानु- पतिः। झटिक्षुदुरोधकस्तरवधानस्य दार्यापरवार्तालात्।

न च विनिगमनविरवहादैव ज्ञानवेनापि जनकलं स्वा- दिति वाच्यं। विशेषदशीष्यावधिचाराराज्ज ज्ञाने सामा- न्यधीर्याधिशास्मिनुस्य। कथमनवथा दश्च सभित- द्वारा क्रृपनेन स्पष्टे न कारणलं। च चान्तरिकसार- णानों संख्यारनारमशक्तसंख्यादृ वधिचारसंश्रय दति वाच्यं। अन्नान्तसंख्यारत्भशक्तचनायत्वा चरमसारण-
भाषाः साचात्कारे खुशाद्रिनां करणं मन उच्चते।
अथोगपद्याज्ञ ज्ञानां तत्त्वाणुलभितेन्॥ ८४ ॥

सिद्धां खैव संस्कारनाशकलक्षणनेन यभिचारसंगवच्याभावत्
॥ ५२ ॥

इदानीं कम्प्राणं मन मिल्पवयति । साचात्कार दुःखि। एतेन मनसि प्रभाणं दृश्यते। तथ्याति सुखाक्षरं
साचात्कारः अयाचार्यकारनाचार्यचुवस्व दृष्यु- नमानेन करणम् मनसः सिद्धे ॥ न चैव दुःखाद्रि-
चालकराणं मिपि करणानारणं सुरिति वाच्यं। चच्चवादेक्षीव तद्दुश्ककलाचालकारकपरणतया सिद्धे।
प्रवं दुःखाद्रिनामसंभवाचिकारणं येगायायथतया मनः सिद्धिनिवाच्याय ॥

मनसंस्कारे प्रभाणमाद। अथोगपद्यादिति ।
ज्ञानाः चच्चुपरास्वाद्रिनां चाचापद्य मेकालकाश्च निंग्नेकीयनुभवसिद्धा । तच्च नामेक्षिणां सत्थं
वित्तपविनिकर्षं चक्मभादेकचिक्षिण ज्ञानमुत्तथते तदस्मभादपि लगादिभि: परौवांग वत्तगहते।
तन्मोणिभुविे चाचकिराणां न सह्‌वतिति न विभु
मनः ॥ न च तदानीद्वृयस्मिवेश्वरिधिश्विलमदिवेन
तद्प्रानविव्यक्ति दृष्यति वाच्यं। तथ्यं दृष्यति चच्चुराद्रिमा-
मपि कल्पनानापने ॥ न च दृष्यम्युखीलोभचणाधैैा
भाषा। चर्च प्रभाषिता चर्चा निगुणा निःशक्तिया गुणाः।

शिल्पा नानाधामाधाम यथाश्रयं यथाश्रयं नानेन्द्रयाग्निमं
वाच्यं। सन्तोषोत्तमाध्वनिस्तर्य नानेत्रला यस्मात्
नानाशास्त्रावधने इति। उत्तरशतप्रत्ययमेव अन्तर्गतः। यथा-
पद्यप्रत्ययमेव तु अन्तर्गतः। न च वाच्यं चक्रोचरि-
काश्यालिला निमित्तवितर्यं वाच्यं। नानाधार्यमेव
वत्ताधार्याधिकरस्ते गौरवात्। भार्ताधार्य निर्वाच्यक्षेत्रं
वाच्यं। वच्यमादित्यमुखात्। इति शिल्पानामनुसारान्न
वृजय्याधार्याधिकारात्।

दृश्यं निहृत्य गुणं निहृत्यविधं। अर्थवादिना। गुण-
लजातो किं मानमिति चेतु। इति। दृश्यकर्माभिव्यक्ता-
मानवत्ता या कारणं सा किंबद्धमाणवस्थितमी। निर-
वच्छिन्नकारणवत्ता अस्मात्। न च दृश्यलेखंकं
वच्चा या तद्वक्ष्यकथितकं। मूतातिरिक्तकं श्रद्धानिष्ठतः।
प्रतत्तुविद्यतं युगं वाच्यं तदेव गुणलमिति सिद्धं।
दृश्याणिता इति। चयपि दृश्याणिततां न सचं यन्त्रा-
द्रावतिश्यामस्य यथार्थ दृश्यलेखकतावथचेव नायन-
जातिमलं तदार्थं। भवति च हि गुणं दृश्यलेखकतावथ-
चेव न गुणािमिति कर्यं दृश्यलं वा न दृश्यलेखकतावथचेव।
गणादेव। दृश्यकर्माणार्य
भावाद्। दृश्यलं सामान्यालाहिं कन जातिरिति तद्यु-
भाषा । रूपरेखा समाजकोष परम्परायुक्त || तथा ||
द्वारा गुरुहर स्वेदन वेगो मूल्यांत घयो।
घर्षाधर्मस्त्र भावना च शब्दा बुधाद्योगम च ||तथा ||
एनेमूर्त्तताहिं सम्भविक निर्दिष्ट परिकृतिताः।
सहाश्चिबिम सिमथानम जर्मेयां गुणो मतः || ७.७ ||
संयोगवस सिमथानम सहाश्च दित्तादिकासथाा।
दिनस्थानकार्यस्तिद्विगुतेनेनकाशित गुणाः || ७.८ ||
अर्धं श्रेष्ठ गुणाः सिम्भव मत एकाकृतितयः।

पित्त्रा । द्राधः || निर्गुणाः द्राधः। चच्चापि निर्गुणां कर्मीदारावरि
तथापि समाज्ञावते कर्मीन्यते च सति निर्गुणां बोधयः।
जायादेवो न समाज्ञावते कर्मेऽपि न कर्मान्यतं क्र-बखं न निर्गुणाल्क्षिति तत्त्ततिवाप्ति: । निभक्ष्यचति
खर्कनकाँतां न तु लच्चं। गगनादवतिभास्त्रेः। || ७.५ ||
मूर्त्ताहिं द्राधः। वेगोन संतिस्वाप्कृष्णपुनलक-षोयः। आरू-तपारः न वर्त्ता द्वायः। लच्चणु ताब-दन्यान्यां न एवभेद्यां || ७.६ ||
उभयेष्यालिति। मूर्तामूर्त्ताहिं द्वायः। || ७.७ ||
चन्द्रेकाशित्रणाः द्राधः। वेगोगदिलादीनि दिवैस्त्री।
चित्रचढ़हारिकं चित्तरादिस्त्री। बोधयः | || ७.८ ||
अर्धं श्रेष्ठ द्राधः। रूपरागमस्ये कलप्यांस्याक-प्रयत्नपरापरलबुध्दिसुखदः: वेच्छादेशप्रयत्नगुहलद्रः -
भाषा ० बुद्धादिष्टार्क सहस्त्राणाः क्षेत्रः सांसिद्धिको द्रवः।
चाणकभावनां शब्दाः चामी वैशेषिका गुणाः।
सहस्त्रादिरपरवानो द्रवः सांसिद्धिकास्तथा।
गुरुस्वामी सामान्यगुणाः एने प्रकृतिनः।
सहस्त्रादिरपरवानो द्रवलं क्षेत्रः एव च।
एने तु वैदिकुष्याद्या च यथा सम्भवानः शब्दकः।
वांकैकैकैनियाद्याद्या गुरूवादाद्याभवनाः।
अन्तोद्विया विभूशनां ये वैशेषिका गुणाः।
अकारणगुणोद्वारं एने तु परिष्कर्तः।
अपाकारस्तु सम्भवः द्रवलच्छ नाथाविर्यं।
क्षेत्रवेगगुरुवादक्षणपरिमाणः।

सिद्धा ० वर्ल्झंस्करादृष्टेण गुणवत॥ द्वीबः द्रववल॥८५॥

वैशेषिका दृष्टि। विशेषा एव वैशेषिकः। खर्च तकः
विशेषगुण दृष्टिः। सहस्त्रादिरिति। सहस्त्रपरिमाण-
पृथ्विकसंयोगविभागपराणपरलानीदृष्टिः।

दृष्टिः। चुरुण लचापि ग्रहणेयोग्यलात्।
वालेति। रूपादोनां चुरुणादिग्रहलात्।

विभूशनाति। बुद्धिसुखुमः खेर्चा दिव्यवप्रवतवध्यमा-
धर्मभावनानाश्वद्र दृष्टिः। आसर्पणः।
कारणगुण-
पूर्वका रूपादयो वच्यन। बुद्धाद्यस्तु न तारुणः।
आत्मादिः कारणाभवात्। पाकज्ञपादोनां कार-
धातुः विश्विश्वापक इत्यते स्थूऽ कारणगुणोऽभवः।
संयोगशः विभागशः वेगशः तु कारणः। ८.४॥
स्थानपरिमाण्यकुण्डलितः च।
भवद्विसमवाचिलमः वेगशः गुणः। ८.५॥
आदमः वाचिलमः मुखः गुणः।
वेगशः पि च द्विवेष्टे च संयोगादिद्रुमे तथा।* ८.६॥
दिव्यव वाचिलान स्थादृश्य प्रादेशिको भवेत्। ८.७॥

विद्वानः पण्डितः कुण्डादिलाभावादृ प्रापकज इत्युकं। ८.१॥ ८.८॥
८.५॥
खार्ष्णेति। खार्ष्णात्राधृतः पारं। एकाध्यथात्वः
लम्बकशः प्रयोऽकम्बन्धादृ एकां ईश्वरं गयां।
प्रथमस्वेते चैत्यश्रं विवचितं॥

भवद्विसमवाचिलमिति। घटादिरूपगमन्सः
कपालादिरूपगमन्नः भवस्ति। एवं कपालाधिपरिमाणादीतः
घटादिपरिमाणायथसमवाचिल-कारणः॥ एवं श्रेष्ठसापि द्वितीयशबंधः ग्रंति। ८.६॥
निमित्तलमिति। वुझारीति द्वार्मादिरितिच-लादिति भावः। ८.७॥

दिव्यव वाचिलमिति। अध्यवाचिलकारणलः निमि-तकारणल distract। तथा हि उपस्थर्थ उपस्थशृणुस-
भाषा० वैज्ञानिको विभूगः संयोगादिविध्यं तथा ॥ ४८ ॥
चूषिणाः भूवेदूपं दृश्यादेशुपलम्बकः।

भिष्का० वादी पाकिने निमित्तं। गुहां गुललवतनयोरसमवायि
प्रतिपावे निमित्तं। वेदगावेदनादयोरसमवायी
अभिदाते निमित्तं। द्रव्यं द्रव्यसन्दयोरसमवायि
वाच्य प्रपूर्ते निमित्तं। महरोदश्योग: शब्दे निमित्तं।
महर्यया कशं योगेगा उसमवायी वंशदलददविभाग: शब्दे
निमित्तं। वंशदलकाशविभागोसमवायीति। * प्रादे-
शिक्माशाश्चर्चि: ॥ ४८ ॥

चूषिणि। रूपलनारि: प्रत्यगसिद्धा। रूपश-
व्यास्कपिनी प्रतिनिखर्ष्यति चेत॥ माकु रूपशब्दप्र-
योगाधापि नीक्षपीतादिव्रुगतजातिविभेदादिनुभव-
सिद्धु एव। रूपशब्दाप्रयोगिपि नीले वर्षं: पीता
वर्षं दृति वर्षश्रेष्ठिद्विनी प्रतितिदिशेऽव। एवं नीक-
लालदुःखपिपि प्रत्यविशेषं॥ न चैकोका एव नीलपता-
दिव्यकष्ठं देवकायविशेषत्वं नीललालदि जाति-
रिति वाच्य। नीले नेत्रा रका उत्पन्न अवादी-
प्रतीतीनीलरेखापद्धविनाशशालित्या चानालात्।
अन्याया एकनौलनागि जगद्नीलमाप्पेश्य॥ न च नी-

* न द्रिष्टि परलयों वाचमाशिकाकरसि न निमित्का सिद्धबंग-
यथा। द्रव्य वाचमाशिकाभमां प्रति बाध्य। हिलदिघुदेन च निमित्का
पादछ। तेन प्रसादप्रतिलिपादिवाराज्ञपरिवारं द्विनेव। न चै।
द्विगुप्तादि: पाठ॥
भाग २
चँचुपः सहकारि ग्यात् प्रकुञ्जादिकमनेकथा II २।-II

सिद्धार्थो लक्षणादिसमवाययोगेव विवैक्षात्मसदनिश्चाराः
प्रत्यय दृति वाच्यं। प्रतीत्या समवायानुस्खात् II न च
मं एवायं नील दृति प्रत्यवाच्यानुस्खातिकथितं वाच्यं।
प्रत्ययवेय तप्यातीबिशिष्टकलात्। सैवेयं गुर्जरीतिनि
वस्थार्धं प्रत्यवाच्यातं। गन्धारा पठारीनामपेक्षाः
प्रवेशात्। उपादिबिनायान्यावेयसुः समवायाभविलम
लाप्तनीति। नातेन राधाद्रिक्षण्यात्। चृङ्गुष्णा
दृक्षिति। चृङ्गुष्णाविशेषज्ञ दृष्ट्यं। एवभेदपि।
दृष्टतिति। उपलब्धकं उपस्थितिकारणं।

दृष्टतिति। चृङ्गुष्णा दृति। दृष्टवेयणम-हस्तम्
सामान्यानां चृङ्गुष्णप्रत्ययं प्रति चृङ्गुष्णं कारणं।
प्रकुञ्जादिकमनेकथाति। तदृपणं क्रमानीलीपितक्रमेयमर
रादिभेदादिकमनेकथार्थं भवति। नं च क्रमेरं कथा
मतिरितकयम् भवति। नातेन नीलपीतादिर्भावविवे
न नातेन्निर्ययः। नातेन प्रस्थापकान्ति। नातेन
प्रक्रमकान्तिः। नातेन नीलायथ्यमृत्तिकम्यतः। नातेन
विवेयः। नातेन नीलायथ्यमृत्तिकम्यविवेयः। नातेन
नीलायथ्यमृत्तिकम्यविवेयः। नातेन नीलायथ्यमृत्तिकम्यविवेयः। नातेन
नीलायथ्यमृत्तिकम्यविवेयः। नातेन नीलायथ्यमृत्तिकम्यविवेयः। नातेन
नीलायथ्यमृत्तिकम्यविवेयः। नातेन नीलायथ्यमृत्तिकम्यविवेयः। नातेन
कारणं। दृष्टति। दृष्टति। दृष्टति। दृष्टतिति।
भाषा  जलादिपरमाणैं तन्मलयमन्वत् सहेतुकं।
रसस्थं रसनामाधृत मधुरादिविरनेकथा || १०० ||

सिद्धा  वमकलकलक्यनादू चतवयसरिन न पीतानुवत्तिः।
एतेन खर्णी चायन्तः। रसादिकपि नायायस्तत्तिः किन्तु
नानाजातीयरसयवेरायस्येवस्यस्यनि रसामवेड़पि
न चते। तत्र रसयथो चतवस्य एव गुद्धेन।
रसोनिन्द्रयादीनां क्षुव्यवसास्याभावात्। चतवयसरिन
नीरसलेपिन चतेरभावात्। नवासु ततचायायस्य
व्यवनानसूर्वः। नीसादे पीतादिप्रतिवन्मयकलक्यनि
गौरवात्। तत् एव।

चोचितो यस्य वर्षेन मुखे पुच्छे च पाण्ड्रः।
श्रुतं रुद्रविषणाभायं स नीसा रूप उच्चे।

इत्यादिशास्त्रमहुषपचते। न च चायन्तयायविशिष्याजातीयवेदीयायार्थाः।
मानाभावात्। न च खर्णवा
क्रूपे। चतवशायराधात्। चतवयसरिनिक हारित्त। एतेन
खर्णादिकं चायन्तभवितविक्षमितिस्तृतिः। ८५॥

जलादीति। जलपरमाणैं तेजःपरमाणैं च क्रूपे
निंदित्वे प्रथीबोरसापूरुषपु० न निंदित। पाकौन कृपाना
रोपिते। न हि घटस्य पाकानतत तदवयवांगपक
उपलमयते। न हि रक्तकपालस्य कपालिका नीसा-
भाषा  

सहकारी रस्मज्ञाय नियन्त्रण च पूर्ववत्।

ग्राण्याद्विच भवेक भवे ग्राण्याद्विच प्रकारक: || १०० ||

सौरभाय सौरभाय स्व देषा परिक्रमितः।

क्षर्षिकनपिकं हिष्टव्यम्प्स्व प्राणुपकारक: || १०२ ||

अनुष्णाश्रीति श्रीते सावधान: स चिनितं त:।

काठिन्यादिः चिनावैव नियन्त्रितः च पूर्ववत्। || १०३ ||

सिद्धार्थ चर्चा भवति। एवंक्षेप परमाणाविपि वाक्षिम्निः। ||

अनुजजलने जप-परमाणुपरमित: सद्भवतं जन:।

रसं निर्जनयति। रसख्सितः || १०१ ||

वहन्दारीति। राशिभर मयम: कारणमित्याय:।

पूर्ववदिति। जलपरमाणृ रसा नियन्त्रणः शब्दादिपि

रक्षानित दत्यतः। || गन्धं निर्जनयति। ग्राण्याद्विच

दत्ति। उपकारको ग्राण्याद्विचाने कारणमित्याय:।

चन्द्रं गाण्यं: शब्दानित एव। || १०१ ||

क्षर्ष निर्जनयति। क्षर्ष दत्ति। उपकारक

दत्ति स्वार्णप्रवच: शर्ष: कारणमित्याय: || १०२ ||

अनुष्णाश्रीति दत्ति। प्रथियाक वाक्षेप स्वार्णप्रवच-अनु-ष्णाश्रीति:। जलकस प्रीतिः। तेजस उषा:। काठिन्येषि

ति। कठिनासुक्तमारस्य: प्रथियाक एवेवितः। कठि-

नलाधिकनु न संयोगनिधि जातिविशेषः। चनुर्धी-ध्वनापने:। पूर्ववदिति। जलजेोजावयुपरमाणु-

अनुष्णाश्रीति दत्ति। प्रथियाक वाक्षेप स्वार्णप्रवच-अनु-ष्णाश्रीति:। जलकस प्रीतिः। तेजस उषा:। काठिन्येषि

ति। कठिनासुक्तमारस्य: प्रथियाक एवेवितः। कठि-

नलाधिकनु न संयोगनिधि जातिविशेषः। चनुर्धी-ध्वनापने:। पूर्ववदिति। जलजेोजावयुपरमाणु-
भाषा। एतेषा पाकजन्यु चित्री नाथ्यु कुञ्जित।

विज्ञा। स्वर्ण निर्यासानन्दश्चर्यास्मानिय द्वारः॥ १०२॥
एतेषामिति॥ एतेषा ऋपसंगमिष्या नायति। श्रोतस्य च ऋपसंगम्या ऋषिद्रात्तिः। पाव-कसंयोगादुपजयते। न च हि मृत्युपादिकं परावर्तते। नौरेशारभाष्यम्। ऋष्यवत्तिरे कथा बौद्धजयित्वं निर्मिते। पव-नाथिक्ष्ये। शीतक्षोखिदितु॥ तत्ततृपि श्रीमतीच्छापि मधे परमाणवेव पाक दृति वैशिष्ट्यमा वदनम्। तेषामसु यमः॥। ऋष्यविनासस्त्रेयथा वधवेनु पाकाको न सम्बन्धी। परस्मा वक्रसंयोगेनावविवर्ते। विनयिते। स्वत्तेव परमाणु पाकः॥। पुनः पकपरमाणुसंयोगादु द्बुधुकादिक्षमेण पुनर्महावान्यविगर्भसंभाह्। तेजसाममिति। श्रद्धतवेगशास्त्र पूर्वकूव्हनाशया झटति। बौद्धसानरेता विभेद्यति॥ यद द्बुधुकादिक्षना ऋषिमार्थं कार्यित्रं च। पुनर्महावान्यविगर्भसंभाह्य (३)। संहार गीताधारोर्वच्चकारां कर्मु दृति वैशिष्ट्यसंख्ये। । खेत्तराधितवान्युत्तराधितवान्यु । भाषाका कर्मचारणाधितवान्यु न पूर्वसंयोगनामविधायते। मात्रति॥ तत् विभागविभागान्तिकारी नववच्च तद्विकारं। एष्टविभाग: किमिद्यस्पेचा विभाग जनवेत् निर्पेच्या।
भाषा: तत्वार्थ परमाणु स्थान पाकर वैश्विकिः नये ॥ १०४ ॥

सिद्धा: तत्त्व कर्माणि स्थानः। तत्र चद्द द्रव्यार्थकर्मेण योगविनाशिनिः कालमपेच्छ्य विभागजविभागः स्थात् तदा दृश्यच्छता ॥ अथ द्रव्यनाशिनिः कालमवयं वापेच्छ्य विभागजविभागः स्थात् तदा एकादशच्छता । तथा चि वक्ष्यः संयोगः परमाणूऽ कर्मः । तत् परमाणुनरेण विभागः । तत्र द्रव्यार्थकर्मेण योगः । ततो द्रव्यकर्माणां ॥ तत्त्वः परमाणूऽ श्रामाद्विनाशः । ततो रक्ताचुत्यत्वः । ततो द्रव्यार्थानुगुणक्रियः । ततो विभागः । तत् पूर्वसंयोगः । तत्र द्रव्यार्थकर्मेण योगः । ततो द्रव्यकर्मेण योगः । ततो रक्ताचुत्यत्वः ॥ ननु श्रामाद्विनाश रक्ताचु निर्भूतः वा परमाणूऽ द्रव्यार्थानुगुणक्रियाः स्वितिचेतुः । न । अभिमयुक्तः परमाणूऽ यत्त चर्कः तदिनाशमन्त्रेण गुणोत्तमचन्द्रकर्मेण च तत्र परमाणूऽ क्रियान्तर-भावत् । कर्मवतः कर्मान्तुत्वः । निन्दृष्टे द्रव्यार्थ-अनुगुणक्रियानुपपत्तेः ॥ तथापि परमाणूऽ श्रामाद्विनास मित्रानित्रित्यमकालं रक्ताचुत्यत्वः खार्दिति चेतुः । न । पूर्व-मुन्त्रविध्यमस्त्युपानारे चेतुः चेतुः चेतुः चेतुः चेतुः चेतुः चेतुः चेतुः चेतुः चेतुः । अथ दृश्यच्छता । च द्रव्यार्थकर्मेण योगविनाशिनिः कालम-पेच्छ्य विभागजने चति स्थात् । तथा चि वक्ष्यः

* खतकः: परमाणू: प्रचन्द दृश्य वैश्विकिः स्वतः । दृश्य अनाकर्षयां समतिरिक्तः पाठः ॥
सिद्धार्थ संध्यागाढू ज्ञानकारक रक्षक परमाणु नियम। तता विभागः।
तत चाराभक्षकं संध्यागाढू। तता ज्ञानकारक विभागः।
तत्त: श्रामणाश पूर्वसंध्यागाढू। तता रक्षकं
तता विज्ञानकारक नर्मान्य परमाणु कारकं।
तता उद्योग रक्षकं संध्यागाढू। तत ौ ज्ञानकारकं
तता संध्यागाढू। तता ज्ञानकारकं। तता रक्षकं।
अर्थाकार ग्रन्थं। तता विभागः। तता देशारक भक्षकं संध्यागाढू।
तता ज्ञानकारकं। तता उद्योगः। तता परमाणु कारकं।
तता उद्योगः। तता परमाणु कारकं। तता ज्ञानकारकं।
तता विभागः। तता देशारक भक्षकं संध्यागाढू।
तता ज्ञानकारकं। तता उद्योगः।
अर्थाकार ग्रन्थं। तता विभागः। तता देशारक भक्षकं संध्यागाढू।
तता ज्ञानकारकं। तता उद्योगः।
अर्थाकार ग्रन्थं। तता विभागः। तता देशारक भक्षकं संध्यागाढू।
तता ज्ञानकारकं। तता उद्योगः।
अर्थाकार ग्रन्थं। तता विभागः। तता देशारक भक्षकं संध्यागाढू।
तता ज्ञानकारकं। तता उद्योगः।
अर्थाकार ग्रन्थं। तता विभागः। तता देशारक भक्षकं संध्यागाढू।
तता ज्ञानकारकं। तता उद्योगः।
अर्थाकार ग्रन्थं। तता विभागः। तता देशारक भक्षकं संध्यागाढू।
तता ज्ञानकारकं। तता उद्योगः।
अर्थाकार ग्रन्थं। तता विभागः। तता देशारक भक्षकं संध्यागाढू।
तता ज्ञानकारकं। तता उद्योगः।
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अर्थाकार ग्रन्थं। तता विभागः। तता देशारक भक्षकं संध्यागाढू।
तता ज्ञानकारकं। तता उद्योगः।
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तता ज्ञानकारकं। तता उद्योगः।
अर्थाकार ग्रन्थं। तता विभागः। तता देशारक भक्षकं संध्यागाढू।
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तता ज्ञानकारकं। तता उद्योगः।
अर्थाकार ग्रन्थं। तता विभागः। तता देशारक भक्षकं संध्यागाढू।
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अर्थाकार ग्रन्थं। तता विभागः। तता देशारक भक्षकं संध्यागाढू।
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अर्थाकार ग्रन्थं। तता विभागः। तता देशारक भक्षकं संध्यागाढू।
तता ज्ञानकारकं। तता उद्योगः।
भाषा० नैयायिकानांनु नये भुङकाद्वापीयते।

सिद्ध० कनादः परमाणुनार्कर्षणज्ञ विभाग इत्येकः कालः।
ततः क्रमार्थनाशः विभागाच जूर्वसंध्योगनाश रैतेकः कालः।
ततो रक्षात्पत्तिः यथार्कर्ष्णथयं गच्छेणेकः कालः।
अथ भुङकात्पत्तिः। अथ रक्षात्पत्तिः पञचचारणम्।
द्रव्यानाशस्मलां परमाणुनारः कर्मैनविनात्तु ग्रेव्यतिः।
तथाशं परमाणुकर्षणं परमाणुनाराविभागः।
अथ क्रमार्थनाशस्मलां। अथ भुङकात्पत्तिः परमाणुनारः
अथ क्रमार्थनाशस्मलां।
अथ भुङकात्पत्तिः। अथ रक्षात्पत्तिः पञचचारणम्।
एवं क्रमार्थनाशस्मलां परमाणुनारः कर्मैनविनात्तु वस्त्रचारणः।
रक्षात्पत्तिः स्मलां परमाणुनारः कर्मैनविनात्तु अष्ट्रचारणः।

d्रव्यानाशस्मलां परमाणुनारः कर्मैनविनात्तु अष्ट्रचारणः।

नैयायिकानां निर्णयः। नैयायिकानां मते भुङकादै।
अध्यात्मिकापि पाको भवितं। तेन्यात्मवाचशः।
अध्यात्मानि सक्तद्रव्यानि श्रृङ्ख्लाधिकारः।
प्रतिप्रस्तृतवेवव्यवस्थायुः।
हृद्यां चान् चेतायं घट द्रव्यादिप्रत्यभिधारपि चकृत्ते।
चर्च तु न प्रायक्ष्यात् तथाचतवविना।
১০৬

ভাষাৰः গণনায়কচারী তু চ্ছিলঃ সংখ্যাভিধিয়ানে || ১০৫ ||

নিত্যপু নিত্যমেকলমনিতে নিতায়হীনে।

দিলাদ্যঃ প্রাণায়ান্ত্র অপেচাবুদ্ধিজু মাতা। ১০৫ ||

অনেকাদ্যপদ্যান্ত্র তু পরিজনিতঃ।

সিদ্ধাং শোভী স্তোত্রিত দৃষ্টি || সংখ্যাং নিত্যপিত্তমাচঃ। গণ-নেতা। গণনায়কচার সাধানায় একার সংখ্যাঃ || ১০৫ ||

নিত্যভিবিধি নিত্যপু পরমাসাধারিণ্য একল নিত্য অনিলে ঘটাঙ্কু একলমনিত্যভিবিধির। || দিলাদ্যঃ ব্যাপ্তিচতুষ্টিঃ সংখ্যা অপেচাবুদ্ধিজুতা। ১০৬ ||

অনেকতি। যাবচ দিলাদ্যসম্বাচ ময়তন্তে ঘৃত-দাবাঙ্ক ব্যাপ্ত তথ্যঞ্চন্ত দৃষ্টি ভাবাচ্ছুল্যে একো ন দৃষ্টি প্রত্যয়সম্বাচ দিলাদ্যান্ত পর্যালোচন-চাষণ। কাশন সমবং অনেকান্ত্রপর্যালোচনাঃ। ১৫৫ অপেচাবু-দ্বিত্তিরামণিত। প্রথমপ্রচাবুদ্ধিব্যাপ্তি তো দিলাদ্যতি।

তনো দৃষ্টিপ্রাঙ্কু দিলবিধিনিমিত্যকর্ষাঞ্চ। তনো দিল-বিধিনিমিত্যখানং। অপেচাবুদ্ধিব্যাপ্তি তনো দিলনাশ 

dীর্ঘত। যাবচ জ্ঞানার্থ ন চিন্তমানসার্থ ঘৃত-বিধিনিমিত্যগুণান্ত কস্তারবিধিনিমিত্যগুণান্ত তথ্যঞ্চ-প্রচাবুদ্ধিব্যাপ্তি সাধারিল কথায়। ১৫৫ অন্যান্ত্র নিমিত্যকর্ষ- 
কারণে অপেচাবুদ্ধিব্যাপ্তি জ্ঞানার্থ দিলের নাম: খান।

* একলামনিত্যভিবিধির মায়তায়নে || ১০৫ ||
भाषा ३ ऋषेचारुबुद्धिनाशाच नास्तिह सन्धिं निरूपिते || १०७ ||
अनेकाकल्पबुद्धिया सापेचारुबुद्धिरुच्यते।

चिद्धर० न तु दिलप्रस्थं। तदानी विषयाभावात्। विचारानं
खैर चचुरादिना नाशज्ञनोपमागमात्। तस्सादृ दिलप्र
त्यचार्दिकमपेचारुवुद्धिनाशक कस्यं। न च ऋषेचारुबुद्धि
नाशात् कथं दिलनाश दृष्टि वाचं। काशानारे दिलप्र
त्यचार्दिकावात्। ऋषेचारुवुद्धिसंक्षुदया तत्त्वाश्चकाशक
दृष्टि कष्पनात्। ऋतं पव तत्त्वसतोपेचारुवुद्धिज्ञेचिति
लादिकं तस्मैव ग्रह्य्यं दृष्टि वस्यं। ऋषेचारुवुद्धिर्चमान
लमनर्यचकारणलम्बस्यिं वाचं। लाभस्मे दिलं प्रति
कारणलखैवोचितलात्। ऋतीन्द्रिये द्वाणुकादायपेचारु
बुद्धियोगिनी। वर्गिकार्यानमपरमाखादादोधरीया
पेचारुवुद्धिश्रेष्ठथापनारविष्योगिनामपेचारुबुद्धिं दि
लादिकारणमिति || १०७ ||

ऋषेचारुबुद्धि केत्यत स्राव। अनेकाति। अथमक
द्वायकारिकाकाम यायः। इदं बोधं यथानितेतकल
ज्ञातं तत्र दिलादिभिन्नं बङ्कलखोपायतं यथा
मेनावनादाहिति कन्नेश्विराः। इदाचार्यस्य चिलादि
दिकमेव बङ्कलं मन्यते। तथा च चिलादिभिया
पिका बङ्कलज्ञाति। मेनादो चतुर्यौ चिलादी चिल-
लालाश्यामद प्रेषात। इद्यश्च इत्ते बङ्कके यं मेनेति प्रती-
भाषा । परिमाणं भवेशान्यवचारस्य कारणं। १०८॥

अन्य दृष्टं मच्छुखिमं तर्कदेन दैवतः।
अन्तः नद्विन्तं स्तनितं निविमुद्राहं॥ १०८॥

सद्यानं परिमाणान्त्र अयादुः जातं।
अन्यं झणुकादाय त सद्याजन्य सुद्राहं॥ ११०॥

झणुकादाय। वश्यि पनदे। वश्यि संध्या आधार्य संध्यात्मकः वश्यमित्वनेतरं।
परिमाणं निविमुद्राहं।
परिमाणिः वयम्वयवचाराध्याय सायतं परिमाणमिः
ययतं। १०८॥

तत्तुरविन्तं झणु मच्छु दृष्टं दृष्टं।
तत्त्र परिमाणं। निविमुद्राहं परिमाणान्त्र निविमुद्राहं। १०८॥

झणुकादाय। वश्यि पनदे। वश्यि संध्या आधार्य संध्यात्मकः वश्यमित्वनेतरं।
तथा चातियः परिमाणं सद्याजन्यं परिमाणिः प्रतः चेत्यः।
तत्क सद्याजन्य सुद्राहं जातं।
झणुकादाय। झणुकादाय। चख्री शोभं परिमाणं प्रति भवभासूपरिमाणं परिमाणिः
परिमाणं वा न कारणं। परिमाणिः शब्दमानजानायोऽयात्मकं परिमाणेन जनकवात्।
झणुकादाय। परिमाणेन शतायो।
झणुकादाय। परिमाणेन शतायो।

* झणुकादायं प्रमाणमिः। वश्यि पनदे। संध्या आधार्य संध्यात्मकः प्रकरणे।

निविमुद्राहं। वश्यि पनदे। संध्यात्मकः प्रकरणे।
भाषा: परिमाण घटाते। तु परिमाणानुसारते।
प्रच्छ्य: विनियासोऽ यः संयोगोऽ जन्यते। || १११ ||
परिमाण तबलकारे। नाशत्ताल्लास्येवनावः।

चिक्षा: वजातीयं। ञत: परमाणोऽ विस्ताराभ्यास: ज्ञात्करितः
माणक ज्ञात: विलिपणाय व च चमरेणुपरिमाणाङ्क:-
मवायिकारणमित्यधः। || १२० ||

परिमाणाङ्कमुद्धारतः। परिमाण्य घटाताविविवतः
परिमाणाङ्कपकालादिपरिमाणाङ्कः। प्रच्छ्याङ्कमुद्धारः
इत्यादिः प्रच्छ्य निर्णयः। प्रच्छ्य दृष्ठः || १२१ ||

नाश दृष्ठः। श्रध्याये परिमाणः। न चावय-नाशः।
कथं परिमाणानाशः। सद्यपवध्वनिन्य चित्रमु
र्पयमाणुविश्वेदः सत्रुपचे चावयविनः। प्रत्यभिन्ने
प्रजः परिमाणानाशः। प्रस्त्यांवध्वनिदिः। वाचः।
परिमाणाङ्कपकालः। ज्ञातः नाशावशेषमभुदम्याङ्कः। च
चमरेणुकः। एवं क्रमेण साहाययस्योऽ नाश:-
ाश्वायिकारणः। शरीरार्यावध्वनिप्रथममाणकः।
वेशाचार्यालाभारीपि सत्रुपचे चावयाङ्कः।
शति च नाशकेनभुः। महावतः चावयः।
शास्त्रीत्वादितः। माणक्यः। शरीरार्यावध्वनिप्रथममाणकः।
न च परिमाणानाशः। तन्यतरिक्ष्योऽगातः। परिमाणाधिपः।
समवायिकारणवानाश्वायिकारणः। पदकानाशः।
भाषाः सह्यावतू पृथ्वी स्तान पृथक् प्रत्ययकारणं।। १९२ ।।

सिद्धां कलात्।। किंचत् तन्त्रनारस तत्परदेशवले पूर्वे
तत्पत्त एव न खात्।। तत्तज्ञापकारणाभावात्।
तन्त्रनोरवचनवलाभावे च न तेन परिमाणाधिकां सं-
युक्त्र्यायान्तरत्। तत्सत् तच तन्त्रनारखवय्ये गति
पूर्वपदनावशेषत्: पटानरेवपनिर्दिष्टवस्त्र स्विकारे।
चर्चविविनः प्रत्यभिमार्गमु बाजालेन दोपकलिरकारि-
वत्।। न च पूर्वतत्त्वादि न तन्त्रनारखिकारत् पूर्वपदे
सत्तेव पटानरेवमारभतारभावित वाचांः। मूर्त्तंये: श्मान-
प्रेमताविरेभात्।। एकदा नानाद्रव्याय तन्त्राचुपलभ
वाधितलाच।। पूर्वपद्रव्याय प्रतिविषयकस्व विनाशे प्रया-
नरोपनिर्दिष्टत्रस्यसम्भवेऽवलात्।।

प्रयां कारणं निरूप्यति। सह्यावदिति। पृथक्-
प्रत्ययाशाधारणं कारणं वृष्णां। तन्त्रतात्त्वर्गं सह्यान-
वत्।। यथा ति निदित्तं एकलं निति: अनिवेद्यनिति
अनिवेद्यसकं आसाधितीमान्येनाद्वते आश्चयना-
शास्त्रं स्तुति तथैपज्ञापमः। दिलाकारं दिव्यस्यका-
दिकपीयस्य।। नन्यथमहात् पृथग् द्रव्यदायकस्यो-
न्यायाबाबो भास्ति तत् कथं पृथ्वी गुणादिर कीर्तिते
न च भस्तु पृथ्वी न लन्यायाभाव दृति वाचां। कथं
न घट दृति प्रत्िवनापने।। १९२ ।।
भाषा। अन्योन्याभावतो नास्त्र चरितार्थलमुच्यने।
अवसात् प्रथमं नैति प्रतीतिर्थि विचारणा। २१३।।
अग्रास्यस्त्रु या प्राक्षकः सेव संयोगं इरितः।
कीर्तितिन्द्रिष्ठितसेव चर्चायान्यतरकर्मण्या। २१४।।
तथोभव्यक्तियाः भवेत् संयोगेऽज्ञपरः।
च्यादिः चेन्नीजाधिसंयोगं परिक्रितिः। २१५।।
मेधयोः सत्त्रपातः ये स द्वितीय उद्दाहरतः।

चित्राः। न हि चुपे घटावधिकं प्रयतं गुणान्यान्तरसः न वा
घटे घटावधिकृप्रयत्नसः बेव प्रत्यरासम्वः कल्य
द्वारः चाह। अन्योन्याभावते द्रातः। विचारणेति।
ननु ध्रुव-वैशालक्ष्मेऽव न वैशालक्ष्मेऽमिति चेत। न। वि-
नार्थभेदं घटात् प्रथयं दृतिवब्रे घटे नेत्रभापि पद्मी
खात। तस्माद् यद्धर्थक्षोगे पद्मी सेत्वा नव्या उन्द्रवाभावते भिन्नो गुणान्तरं कल्यत् द्रातः। २१३।।
संयोगं निष्पयति। अग्रास्यस्त्रु इरितः। तं विभजते।
कीर्तित द्रातः। एष संयोगं। २१४।।
सत्त्रपातः संयोगाः द्वितीय उभयकर्मणः। द्वितीय
द्रातः संयोगजं द्वयं। द्वितीयः खारद्रिः पूर्वेणान-
नितं। २१५।।
च्यादिः अभिचातः। द्वितीयो नादन्याखः सं-
योगं द्रातः। विभ्रमपर्यकारणं विभागं निष्पयति।
२१७

भाषा० कपालसंयोगान् संयोगस्तूकभयोऽ || २१५ ||

तौतियः स्त्रैं कर्म्भेंजिपि दिधाव परिक्षयितः।

अभिधानाते नादन्तच शब्देतुरिविधिम्व || २१७ ||

शब्दाचितविन्दियः स्थादिभागोपि चिथा भवेत्।

एककर्मीब्रम्हस्वामियो इयकात्राजवासपरः || २१८ ||

विभागस्तूतियः स्त्रैं तौतियोपिपि दिधाभवेत्।

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विभाग दृष्टि || एककर्मीति || उद्राहरणं चेतनशैलबिभागाद्विभागादिन पूर्वविद्धाय || २१६ || २१७ || २१८ ||

तौतिया विभागजः कारणमाचविभागजः कारणापारणविभागजन्यतः। आचार्यवत्। यत् कपाले कर्मः। तत् कपालदयविभागः। ततो घटारामकसंयोगानारः। ततो घटनारः। तत्तत्तेन कपालविभागेन सकर्णं कपालस्त्रेशानारविभागो जन्यते।

ततो देशान्तरसंयोगानारः। तत उत्तरदेशसंयोगाः। तत् कर्मानारः दृष्टि || न च तेन कर्मस्त्रेष्व कर्मं देशानारविभागो न जन्यत दृष्टि वाचः। एकशं कर्मान्तः अर्थार्थसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखानार्थकसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। अन्यथा विकारायंतः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। तत्साधि कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखान्तः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। अन्यथा विकारायंतः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। तत्साधि कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखान्तः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। अन्यथा विकारायंतः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। तत्साधि कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखान्तः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। अन्यथा विकारायंतः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। तत्साधि कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखान्तः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। अन्यथा विकारायंतः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। तत्साधि कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखान्तः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। अन्यथा विकारायंतः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। तत्साधि कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखान्तः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। अन्यथा विकारायंतः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखान्तः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। तत्साधि कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखान्तः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। अन्यथा विकारायंतः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखान्तः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। तत्साधि कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखान्तः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। अन्यथा विकारायंतः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखान्तः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। तत्साधि कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखान्तः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। अन्यथा विकारायंतः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलखान्तः कर्मान्तः कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागजनकलविरोधात्। तत्साधि कर्मसंयोगप्रतिद्विभागज

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(Due to the complexity and structure of the text, a direct translation is not provided here.)
भाषा ० चेतुमाचविभागस्य चेतनाचतुर्विभागान् ।
परत्वचारपरत्वच द्विविध परंपरीतिः ।
दैविकं कालिकमापि मूर्त्त एव तु दैविकं ।
परं ख्यासंयोगमूयस्तवचानमो भवेत् ।
यथार्थं तद्व्ययवुचितः स्थाविनृति ॥ १९२ ॥

मिद्या ० नैव रन्धनाचात् पूवं कुतो दैशान्तरविभागो न जन्मत
दृति वाच्यः । श्रामशक्तियोगमार्गदैविकविभागवताव
चतुर्विध भविः क्रृपै दैशान्तरविभागस्यम्भवाः । वच
ख्यातिवियया ख्यातिशतिविभागः ततः शरीरस्य विभक्त
प्रथभो भवति । तत्र च शरीराद्विभागो ख्यातिवियया न
कारणं । व्यक्तिकारणलक्ष्यरूपे तु किंतो नादीक्षि । चू
चार्यविकार्यं यावदव्यवकार्यं नियततात । श्रत्सृष्टिकार
णाविकारणविभागो तकार्याकार्यविभागो जन्मत दृति ।
श्रति एव विभागो गुणानारं । भर्ष्यशाश्ररे विभक्तस्य
त्वयो न स्मात । श्रति ्श्रयोगनाश्च विभागो नाम्यथाभिः
स्थिता भवति ॥ १९४ ॥

परापरवधारानिमित्ते परापरले निरुपत्ति ।
परन्तु ॥ दैविकमति ॥ १९५ ॥

दैविकपरलं बुद्धतरस्थार्थयोगमार्तिलवशानादु
तथाच । एवं तद्व्ययक्ष्मनात्युपरमुपयते । श्रत्चार
संक्षेपलखिनद्वितीयकेशा । यथा पालकुषुचानन कायो-
भाषा तथा समावेश तु दिक्संयोगसङ्क्राम्ये।

द्राक्षरपरिसंध्य पर्यायमेव नामभिन्न। ॥ १२५ ॥

परमपरलयं तद्नात्तरभिन्न।

चर्च त्वसमवायी स्वातं संयोगः कालिकाप्रच्छः।। १२५।।

चर्च तव संवायी स्वातं संयोगः कालिकाप्रच्छः।। १२५।।

नरेशाबुद्धिनाशने नामश्लेषामुदाहरः।

बुद्धः प्रकारः प्रागेव प्रायोगिकविनिश्चिपत।। १२५।।

चर्च त्वसंवायी स्वातं संयोगः कालिकाप्रच्छः।। १२५।।

चर्च त्वसमवायी स्वातं संयोगः कालिकाप्रच्छः।। १२५।।

ताक्तुः तन्मातियाः स्वादःप्रमा सा निष्कपिता।

बिःः तत्पेषि मयाः पथां। परस्परत्रुत्वा कुर्षकःकालिकः

प्रथायागःपरं दृष्ट। ॥ १२५ ॥

तन्मातियाः स्वादःप्रमाः

विकारणं। तद्धास्यं दृश्किपपरलापः प्रायांपरं दृष्ट। ॥ १२५ ॥

चर्च परलप्रायोऽयासः कालिकः याच्छः। यस्य सूत्यं

परिसंध्यप्रायः सूत्यसूत्यपरिसंध्यस्त। स ज्ञेष।।

यस्य मृत्युः स कमियः। कालिकपरलापः पर्यायः।। १२५।।

चर्च कालिकपरलापः पर्यायः।। १२५।।

एवं कालिकःदृश्किपपरलापः।। १२५।।

चर्च परलप्रायः पर्यायः।। १२५।।

एवं कालिकः परलापः।। १२५।।

प्रमांस विभवते।। १२५।।

तस्मां। दृष्ट।। १२५।।

तद्भाववति
भाषा १७८ तत्प्रवचन विपर्यया संश्चयोपि प्रकीर्तितं ||१२५ ||
चाथो देवेष यास्मानुःश्च श्वेतदैव पीतनामवं भवेचिन्वयस्या या संश्चयो यस्य प्रदश्यन्ते ||१२७ ||
किंसिन् नरो या स्माणुचिन्वय्यादिब्रह्मसु संश्चयं ||
तद्भवाप्रकाराचीस्ततप्रकारातु निश्चयं ||१२८ ||
स संश्चयं मनि यो खादैकामावामावयोः ||

भाषा १७८ तत्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं भम द्वर्यं || तत्पर्वः अष्टभाव-ध्वं ||१२५ ||
च्याय देवं || विपर्ययः द्वर्यं || शरीरस्या यदा-श्वेतप्रकारकं ज्ञानं गैरोहिमायकारं एवं श-श्वेतदैव पीतं || श्वेते द्वेकारं ज्ञानं निश्चयं तत्पर्वम देवं ||१२७ ||
किंसिन्दिति || किंसिन्दिति वितक्षो || निश्चयश्च निवृणमाइय || तद्भविति || तद्भवाप्रकारकः यति
तत्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं निर्देशं ||१२८ ||
संश्चयं निवृणति || संश्चयं देवं || एकधर्मिकाविद्या-भावाभवाप्रकारं ज्ञानं संश्चयं द्वर्यं || साधारणति
उभयसाधारणं थो धर्मसम्बन्धानं संश्चयकरणं || यथा उचैयकलं स्माणुसाधारणं ज्ञानं श्रवं स्माणुनं वेदि
सनिदि || एवं अष्टभावाधारणं ज्ञानं कारणं || यथा शब्दलं
निवृणानिवृणां शब्दे गृहोला शब्दे गृहो न वेदि
भाषा० साधारणपदियादिधर्मस्थ ज्ञान संग्रहकारण ॥ १२४ ॥
द्रोषा प्रमाण जनकः प्रमाणात्मू गुणो भवेत् ॥

विश्वास १२४ गन्द्रे। विषयपरिष्कर्त शब्दे निकाय न वेदायिनिश्वदर्शिका न संग्रहकारण । शब्दयात्मकाननादीन्ना विश्व-यमावजनकल्साभायानू । किन्तु तथा शब्दे कोटिद्व-षज्जान्न जन्ये । संग्रहस्त्र मानस प्रवेदित । एवं ज्ञाने प्रामाण्यसंश्चयादिशिर्यमंगन दृष्ट । एवं ध्वनिसंश्चयादिपि ध्वनिसंगद्व द्रव्यादिक विषय । किन्तु संगद्वे ध्वनिस्त्राण्यन धवगीत्विद्विविविकर्त्ता वा कारणसमिति ॥ १२५ ॥

द्रोषा दृष्ट । अत्मात्रा ग्रति द्रोषा कारण । प्रमाण ग्रति

गुणः कारण । तत्चापि पितादिरूपा द्रोषा अनुनुगतः ।
तेषां कारणां अन्यथवतितरिकाभामेव विलुभत । गुणाधर प्रामाण्यकल्सु अनुमानात् पिन्दुः । चर्चा प्रमाण ज्ञान-स्थारणकारणमिक्रकारणजन्या जन्यज्ञानवादू अग्र-मावत ॥ न च द्रोषाभाव एव कारणमक्लिति वाच ।

पीतः शब्दे धर्मान्यस्ति पितादिपरमाण्यमनुत्तप्तिमार्गातु । वितिग्वमाविविधादू अनन्ददृ-वायवशः कारणमपेक्ष गुणकारणताया न्याय-वालेषु ॥ च गुणालेपेषु पितामहविभाष्यन्तु न विश्वासां ग्रति: पितादिरूपाभावानां कारणमवसं वाच ॥ तथ्या च किं गुणाधर इत्यावलम्बोप्यवति वाच ॥
भाषा: पिन्तूरविवादिकृष्ण द्रौषी नानाविद्यः स्त्रतः || १४५ || प्रत्येके तु विशेषण विशेषणनां सभ्य्यः। सन्तिक्षिप्तू । गुणस्तु स्थायो वन्मुदितै । गुणः || १४६ || पचे साधविशिष्ट च परामर्शः गुणो भवेत्। श्रवे साधुवनुस्त्रु भवेदुपमिनः गुणः || १४७ || श्राव्यावधे योगनायासायात्यव्यस्यायवा प्रमा। गुणः खाद् भमभिज्ञनु ज्ञानमर्त्थाचतु न प्रमा: || १४८ || चिथवा तत्प्रकारं यज्ञनां तद्विशेष्यकं।

सिद्धा: तथापनयुक्तिरकारां गुणविशापि चूत्वलख्मिणः। पर्वं भमं ग्राति गुणवभावः कारणमित्रविशापि सुवचलाच। तच द्रोषा: के द्रायाकालानामाय। पिच्छित। कयिचि। पिन्तादिरभो द्रोषा:। कयिचचन्द्रादेः। स्थाय-परिवारभो द्रोषा:। कयिच वंशारगाभो मण्डू-कवसाधनोतिझो द्रोषा: भाविज्ञनका द्रायव्यः || १४५।।

वयस के गुणा इत्याकालानां प्रत्यावादी कङ्गणः गुणानु दर्श्यवतः। प्रत्येके लितः। प्रत्येके विशेषणाश्र-विशेषयास्वक्याः। गुणः। ग्रातिव गुणवालण। वैविश्वायां-वैविश्वायनं गुणः। एववशेष्यमूलः || १४६ || १४७ || प्रमान निश्चयतः। भमभिज्ञनिः || १४८ ||

जनु वच यंत्रकिरजत्योगिराः। रजते। द्रति ज्ञानं जातं। तच रजतसंश्चिपि प्रमान। खातुं तत्द्वस्य भमभिज्ञ-
भाषा। तत्र प्रमा न प्रमा नापि भमः स्थानिविभक्षकर्॥१८॥
प्रकारतादिग्रुष्यं हि सम्यानवगाहिः तत्

सिद्धा। लाभावादु नृत्त नाच। अच्छेति। तद्विद्धेऽकं तद्रकर्कं न्यानं प्रमा दत्यर्यः। ददनु वेधं। येन सम न्येन तदनु। तेन सम्येन तद्विद्धेऽकं तेन सम्येन तद्रकर्कलं वाच्यं। तेन कपालाद्रिः संहागाहिना घटादिज्ञाने नातिवादिः॥ एवं भति निर्विकल्पकं प्रमा न स्थात् तस्म तप्रकारकलाभावादु नृत्त नाच। न प्रभेति॥ ननु दृढे किपियोगज्ञानभमः स्थात् प्रमा च स्थादिति चेत। न। प्रतियोगिवधिकरणसंयोगाभबाववति संयोगज्ञानस्म भमानू। न च दृढे संयोगाभबावववच्छेदकावच्छेदेन संयोगज्ञानस्म भमेः न स्थात् तद्र संयोगाभबावववच्छेदकावच्छेदेन। संयोगज्ञानस्म भमानू। चचः स्थाननुगमात्। चचः स्थाननुगमेऽपि न चति।॥१८॥
प्रमालमिति। मीमांसकाः हि प्रमालं खते याज्ञामिति वदनि। तत्र गुरुंमं मते ज्ञानस्य स्थप्रकाशकस्म पलात् तत्त्वान्वरामास्य तेनेव गुर्जःते दृति। भदारभं मते ज्ञानःतैद्रियं। ज्ञानज्ञा ज्ञात्ता प्रत्याचा। तथा च ज्ञानमतुमित्ते। मुरारित्विवराणाः मतेषुचकस्य ज्ञानं गुर्जःते। स्वरूपामिति मते तत्त्वान्वि-
সিদ্ধাৎ যাথকব্যানেন তত্ত্বান্ত্রামাণ্যঃ যত্নে। বিষয়নিদ্রায় হি

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* বিষয়বিষয়তাকনিথন্তকবিষয়তাপ্রস্থচ্ছক্ত কাঠামোতে।। অন্তর্ভুক্তি প্রকারণে ভাষানির্দিষ্ট বিষয়বিষয়তাপ্রস্থচ্ছক্ত বিষয়বিষয়কসমাবিষয়ক বলে মূল বিষয়বিষয়কালিতে যন্ত্রমাণ্যঃ প্রমাণমূলমিতি ভাষ দ।}
सिद्धार्थ याकलख न खेती याद्वालात्। घटकृत्र घर्षणमुद्यमित्
लादृ घर्षणविशेषक घर्षणप्रकारकथित ज्ञाने प्रामाण्यक
बाधकाभावः। वयस्वत्तपरन्तु प्रामाण्यं न ग्रहयति ।
तत्र संशयसम् सम परसंशयस्विनिलयनः। किं स्वाभास-
द्वारा रत्नोद्वारायुवविशालाना प्रामाण्यं खत्र एव 
रचसम्रावतृ प्रथमानुवविशालाय परं न तद्वद्वारकष्ठिति 
कल्याते संशयानुरोधात्॥ चन्द्र प्रामाण्यसुस्मितै प्रामाण्यानां 
न तथ विषयनिग्रहस्वलाथ तत्र प्रामाण्याय
खूदिः वाचः॥ क्षणपयुमित्वनिरपेयति फलमुखी कार
रणमुखी वा नानविशेष्टित चेन्। चन्द्रचीताप्रामाण्याय
पक्षीविविनयस्वलानां। घरच च प्रामाण्यसंशयस्वल्पैव 
परं प्रामाण्यसुस्मिते रेपेच्या यदावश्च प्रामाण्यसु-
भिनिर्धारयते एव शर्यच तु न सन्धयः। काचिद् कौश-
नुपर्याते: काचिद्विशेषस्त्रांनार्दिति: काचिद्विशालानरस-
चारार्दिति चस्वय॥ ननु गर्भोऽपाने ज्ञानानं यथार्थ-
लात् प्रमाणसचि तद्विशेषकले विशेषानं वाचः॥ न च 
रक्षे रजतार्थिन: प्रतिविध्यमजना न स्तात् तव मते 
भमानाभावार्दिति वाचः। तत्त स्तम् द्रोपालीनक 
पुरतवचिनिः खतवलोपस्थितरजतभेदाय हृद्वलात्। 
शायरजतत्त्छन्ते तु विशेषज्ञानस्वलात् तदैव कारणः 
अक्रु वा तत्रादि भेदाय एव कारणस्मिति। न वाचाय 
था ख्यातं सम्भवति। रजतमत्यचकारणाः रजतमत्याः।
भाषाः प्रमाणं न खलो यथां संभवायुनपपरतं। || १३३४ ||

सिद्धार्थ कर्षाभावात्। रज्जु रज्जुवृद्धरुपपरिवर्तित चेष्टा।
सत्यरजसङ्के प्रदृश्यति प्रति विशिष्टात्मानसं हृदतताया:
कृत्यमात्। अन्यचापि तत्कथनात्। न च वाचानिद्रा-
द्वितीय तत्कारणं विस्मादिद्रा तु भेदायत: का-
रणमिति वाचं। लाघवात् प्रहत्तिमाचेत तथा हृदुल-
कथवात्। 

इत्यतः रज्जु रज्जुविशिष्टात्माः रुपपरिवर्तित ज्ञानलघणारुपायायुक्तिकल्पनेपि न चति:। फलमुख-
गोरवस्थापलानं। किष्क मदु रज्जुरजसङ्किरि रजःते
द्रति भानं जातं तन न कारणवादकापि। अपि च
यच रज्जुरजसङ्किरि मेण्डतरज्जु दुःति भानं तववभयच
युगप्रदेशरिषितिवर्ती स्थानं। रज्जु रज्जुकृत्यादि रजः
रजतभेदायस्य यथायायुतिभवात्। लवते रज्जु रजः-
भेदायस्य रजःते रजतभेदायुस्य च चलात्। दूसादेव
रज्जु रजतभेदायुस्य रजःते रज्जुभेदायुस्य च चलात्।
किष्चानुमि त्विति भेदायस्य चेतुले जलवही विश्व-
वायुधूमवसमेद्रायहादु अनुमितिनिर्विष्यो॥ यदी च
विशिष्टात्मां कारणं तद्रायोगीलके विक्रियाधूम-
ज्ञानमुनित्वपरिवर्तितति। इत्यं अन्यता ख्यातं
प्रत्येकेऽप्रमाणं। रज्जु रजसङ्किरि जनाधीनयुनभवा-
द्रति रज्जुः॥ १३३५॥
भाषा। व्यभिचारसाधारणि सत्यसत्यसत्याय
चेतुन्यस्मिन्देशं तर्कः कार्यिन्यशक्तिनिवर्तकः II १२२ II

चिद्दा। पूर्वे व्यातिरिक्ता तद्र्पेयस्य न दृष्टि द्वार-तमसं दृष्ट्यति। व्यभिचारक्षेति। व्यभिचाराययः सत्य-सत्यसत्यसत्यायकरणमिवर्यः। व्यभिचार-ग्रह्यस्य व्यातिरिक्तव्रस्तमकलात् तद्भवः तर्कः। अवयवातिरेकाभ्यां सत्यसत्यसत्यायि चेतुता। भूय्य-दृश्यनन्तु न कार्यः। व्यभिचारस्थूलो बन्धुशस्त्रेष्ठपि काचिं व्यातिरिक्तः। काचिं व्यभिचारशास्त्रविधुतन-द्वारा भूय्यदृश्यनन्दमपञ्चवज्जः। यत् तु भूय्यदृश्यनन्दपि शक्ता नापैति तत्र वियज्ञायात्मकर्तर्पिलिपितः। तथापि वज्ञविचित्रिःव्यासपि धूमः खादिर्ति यथाशक्ता भवति तद्दा शाबधीषुमयः: कार्यकर्तारभावाभ्यस्तसम्भावनानिवृत-प्रचं। चधचं बक्षि मनः न खात् तद्दा धूमवान् न खात्। कार्यं विना कार्यानुपपत्ति: यदि कार्यं कार्यं विनायं भविष्यति भृहेतुक एव वा भविष्यतीति तच्चा-शक्ता भवति तदा श्रवणादाध्यक्षरणयो। यदि कार्यं विना कार्यं खात् तदा धूमार्थ्यं बन्धुशस्त्रेष्ठं भाजनखयस्यविनयमत उपाधानं तचैव न खादिर्ति। यत् ख्यत एव शक्ता नात्तरति तत्र न तर्कापेश्चात्मिति तद्दृश्यमुखं तर्कः कार्यिन्यशक्तानिवर्तकं दृष्टि॥ १०३॥
भापा। साध्यस्य व्यापको यस्तु चेतोरव्यापकस्थाया।

मिद्द्वा। इत्यादि परकीयवार्तिपथंतयवस्थस्मुपार्थि निक्रुपयिति। साध्यस्मि। साध्यबासितव्यापकलेऽसति साधनसाध्यात्मव्यापकद्रव्यं॥ ननु ख स्मारेस्मिन्धनतयवावच्यदं द्वाय शाक्यकपालं नेपालिः। खान। तस्य साध्यव्यापकस्माभवात्। खामलस्य घटदाराविपि सत्तात्।

एव याहुः प्रत्ययः स्मरोशचर्या द्वाय उद्वृत्तकृष्णकृष्णन्ति नेपालिः। खान। प्रत्यक्षवालकांद्रम्भं सत्तात्। तत्र पुष्पाभवात्। एव अथां विनाशी जन्तादु द्वाय भावनं नेपालिः। खान। विनाशीलस्य सर्गवाभवविने सत्तात्॥ तत्र च भावनाभवावद्रितिः चेत्त। यद्यः बन्धवर्त्त्यायांव्यापकलेऽत्तद्यस्यलक्षणमाध्यायाख्यातिविनतयान्यात्। निमित्तस्मिन्धनवाच्चिन्नखामलस्य व्यापकलेऽशाक्यकपालं। एव स्यात्त्द्रव्याच्चिन्नप्रवच्यायाख्यायिनः सत्त्वो द्वाय बन्धवर्त्त्यायांव्यापकलेऽत्तद्यस्यलक्षणमाध्यायाख्यायापकश्च। एव अथां विनाशी जन्तादुद्वाय जन्तादु-विच्छिन्नमाध्यायापकं* भावनं। यद्यः तु एतादृशो धर्मां नालि। यद्यच्चिन्नखामलस्य व्यापकलेऽत्तद्यस्यलक्षणमाध्यायापकं किमिनि। खान। वाह्यवाच्चिन्न तु

* काक: स्मारेस्मिन्धनतयवावच्यदं द्वायः भावविनेष्टस्मिन्धनतयवावच्यदं खामलस्य व्यापकलेऽशाक्यकपालं दृष्टि बानाकरोः च।
भागोः स उपाधिविवेच्यं निर्माणार्थं प्रदर्शिते || १३७ ||
सभैं साध्यसमानाधिकरणं सदुपाध्यः ।
चेतारेकाथ्यं येषां साध्यविभिन्नता || १३८ ||
व्यभिचारस्यां साध्यसमानाधिकरणं प्रयोजनं ।

विद्या ऋणत उपाधिविवेच्यं यथायथाधिकरणं यथोपाधि-
पूर्तं साध्यविभिन्नतानिर्देशकमधिकरणं तदन्तरला-
वच्चिन्नता साध्यं व्याख्यानं साध्यसं साध्यविभिन्ननु-
गच्छे: सम्बन्धिति || १३७ ||

शर एव सच्चरित्रं रूपमेतदुर्दशणार्थं दर्शयन्ति ।
सबं दर्शनं || सत्सागरं । सं उपाधि: सच्च वस्थासं
सत्सागरं तथायथाधिकरणं दर्शन्यं: || १३८ ||

उपाधिविवेच्यं व्यभिचारश्चिति। उपाधिविवेच्यं वाच्यविभिचारार्थं उपाधि: प्रयो-
जनित्वं: । तथायथं यत् प्रजनेयायांक उपाधि-
स्वरुपं प्रजनेयायांकित्वं वाच्यविभिचारार्थं वाच्यविभिचारार्थं
मानं । यथा धूमवण्ड प्रजनेयायांकित्वं वाच्यविभिचारार्थं
वाच्यविभिचारार्थं वाच्यविभिचारार्थं । यथा धूमवण्ड
प्रजनेयायांकित्वं उपाधिक्षेत्रं धूमवण्डायांकित्वं उपाधि-
विभिचारार्थं वाच्यविभिचारार्थं । यथा धूमवण्ड
मिथ्यत्नायन्यास्तादृश्य दृश्यं मिथ्यत्नायन्यास्तादृश्यं
श्रमविभिचारार्थं ।
भाषा
शब्दप्रमाणान्तर्नैव पुर्वक प्रामाण्यमित्ये। १२५।
अनुमानगतार्थल्यालितित वैश्विकां मन।

सिद्धात्त

चारी। मिच्चातनन्ये शाकपादलवभिचारिवलालिति।
वाधनुप्रतिनवज्ञातसूत सा धार्मिकतायांगकाराणात्मकमात्राजीवातु
स्थायापातकलाच नात्वाधि।। वाधाचितसूत परेत
तर उपारेिभव्येव। यह वत्तियुनुष्ठ: ्ततकलानु दू
त्यादौ धार्मिकणु वक्तर्ज्ञेयहै वक्तृितरसमुपाधि।। यह
साधःवापकलादिक विन्द्राश्वते तथा विन्द्रावधि।। परेत
तरसूत सन्ध्योपाधिर् नाभावनीय: कथकम्प
द्रायानुनेिधारिति।। केचिूँ यवत्रितीणेयायापमुपाधि
विधकलं।। तथाथि अध्योगेकः धूमवदकृतियादिः। अध
्योगेकः धूमसाभावकृ प्राणमनाभवावृ दृतिवनि
तिकचम्पवात्त।। इत्यथा साधनवापकोपाधि। कचिदुपाधि
विधः।। यथा करका प्रधिवित सततन्मंगोस्वत्तादियादिः
वर्ण्याृतीकंसर्ववच्यं।। न चाच ख्रुमपुपिरिव दृष
षमिति वाच्यं। सर्वच्छात्तिसूक्ष्मवाच्यात्त।। अच्छ
च साधनवापकचायात्तिरिति वद्वनि।। शब्देप
प्रमाणयाऽिति।। १२५।।

वैश्विकां मने प्रत्यक्षमुनमानर्ष प्रमाणशब्देप
प्रमाणयाऽिर्नुमानविभेऽव प्रमाणाव।। तथा धी दृष्णै
ग्रामभाजेयादिपदानि वैदिकपुदारि वा तात्पथर्---
भाषा । तन सम्बन्धिना व्याकरणिवेच मन्त्रादिविभागः ॥ १४० ॥

दैविध्यनु भवेद् व्यासरचनयंतिरेकः ।

सूत्रः । विषयस्मारितपदार्थसंस्कृतमानपूर्वकानि श्राकाशग्राहिः-
मत्पदकदम्बलादू घटपतांयतिपदकदम्बवत् । यदा
एते पदार्थे भिष्यः संस्कृतवनः थोगतादिःतपदेषप-
ख्यापितलातः तात्रशपदार्थवत् । द्रूष्क्षालेिपि द्रूष्क्षाना-
कारेण साधसिद्धिरिति । एवं गवययाजातिज्ञानचारे
नारे गवयपदं गवयलग्नह्निभुतिंशिक्तं* श्रमति द्रूष-
नारे द्वृष्क्षाच ग्रहुःमानलात् । यथा गोपदं गोल-
प्रह्नह्निभुतिंशिक्तं । यदा गवयपदं सप्रह्नह्निभुतिंशिक्तं
हाधुयपलादू द्रूष्क्षामानले पच्छांतावलादू गवयलग-
प्रह्नह्निभुतिंशिक्तं भास्ते तथातं दूष्क्षाति । तत्त्र सम्भिदीति
विना व्यासिज्ञान शब्दान्दिती वेदाद्यानुभवकिलात्
न दि सर्वच शब्दस्वस्वाक्षनारं व्यासिज्ञाने मानस-
स्यिति । विच सर्वच शब्दस्वस्वाक्षे यदि व्यासिज्ञानं
कल्यते तदा सर्वचानुभिषिताः पद्धतां कल्यायला
शाब्दबोध एव किं न श्रीभिपल दृति ॥ १४० ॥

दैविध्यमिति । श्रुतमानं शि त्रिविधं केवलान्विची-
केवलायतिरेक्यनयंतिरेके भेदः । तचाधिपि: केवलान्विची
नथा भैंदं च अभिशेषव्यवहिताद्वै । तच
दि सर्वक्षेत्र ज्ञेयलादू विपचास्तः ॥ नौ सर्वेषाः

* गवयलग्नह्निभुतिंशिक्तं प्रकारसिद्धां ॥
ভাষা। চন্ডিযাভাসিতে নিন্ধন চন্ডিরকাদ্ধায়ণে। ১৪১।
সাধ্যাভাবব্যাপকল চেলভাবস্য যথার্থত।

বিষ্ণু। ধর্মাণ। চন্ডিতালাহ। কোভাবাচ্ছিলিরিতি চেল।
চন্ডিতালাহ সর্বসাধারণে তৎস্বত কোভাবাচ্ছিলিরিত।
কিছু গুরুমদ্যনাভাবাপ্রতিযোগিতার্থকাল।
তচ গণানাভাবঞ্চি মসিদু। শৃদ্ধপচেঃ
কোভাবাচ্ছিলি। যথা দ্যায়ে ইত্যাদি বিচারতে
গণবচাধির্যাদে। তচ য়ি জলাণাচর্যচেয়ে এই পূর্বমনীন্ততথা নির্জিতাযকমায়: শপচ্ছাভাব
ধারিত। সদাপচবিপতায়নাচ্ছিলীরিতি।
তথাচ বৈষ্মানু
ধূমাভাব্যাদে। তথাচ পদচ্ছ মহানাদে মহাপচ জল
ধ্রুবাদে সাধ্যায়িত। ১৪১।
তচ চারিকিষি চন্ডিরকাযাদ্ধায়ণ কারণে
তদ্যুন চন্ডিরকাযাদ নিব্যায়ি।
সাধ্যাভাবব্যাপকল চেলভাবস্য চন্ডেতো ধারিত।
সাধ্যাভাবব্যাপকোভূতাভাবাপ্রতিযোগিতমিতি। পশুতে ভাটিয়।
যেন সম্ভবেন যত যেন কুশে যাপনভার ঘুরিতে তাভাবনঞ্চাভাবাপ্রতিযোগিতাধ্যায়ণে
যাস্মূলেন চন্ডিযাভাবস্য যাপনে ঘুরিতে তমেভাবাপ্রতিযোগিতাধ্যায়ণে
ফিড়ি: । ইত্যাদি যত বিশেষণাদিত্রিসম্ভবেনেতারলয়াপ-
भाषा ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्ष ्�
भागो। व्यातिक्यात्मिकवद्या चरित्राधि हि सा यतः।
सुखन्तु जगतामेव काम्यं धर्म्मं जन्यने || १४२ ||
धर्मजन्यं दुःखुः स्थान् प्रतिकृत्यं सचेतसिं।
निदुःखले सुखे चेक्षा तद्ग्नानादेव जायने || १४४ ||

भिवादो एवं पीवे देवादी तो दिवा न भुव्य इयारै। पीलफळ भोजनवह्यालवागमाध्रे मिथति। दिवाहोजनः
वाघे राजभोजनं मिथति। ध्रुवप्रवचनसाहनमुः
विकलानुपश्चाद्ययिपि न प्रमाणान्तरं। किंध्रुपुप्तः
पलबुः ज्ञानसं देतुले ज्ञानाकरणकलात् प्रत्ययचलं।
ज्ञानसं देतुले तु तद्ग्नानुपपुलभानारपेक्षयनवधा।
चेतापि प्रमाणान्तरं न। तथा: सद्यः स्थितायाहकथनः
स्मारकलेन स्मारकलेन मियादिसमशीलवलाच्छन्न पवानभावान्।
चतु तु ज्ञानादिप्रहसर्वमामनुमितिरेविति || १४२ ||
सुखं निर्धपयणि। सुखन्तु जगतामेव काम्यं धर्म्मं
जन्यं द्रति। काम्यमिलापविषयं। ध्रुवति धर्मलेन
दुःखलेन कार्यकारणभाव दृश्यं। || १४२ ||

हुः स्वतिविद्यस्रति। ध्रुवति। धर्मलेन हुः दुःखलेन
कार्यकारणभाव दृश्यं।। प्रतिकृतयमिति हुः दुःखलेन
ज्ञानादेव सम्भवं खामाविकरिविषय दृश्यं। || दृश्यां
निर्दुःखपयणि। निदुःखल द्रति || १४४ ||
भाषा ॥ द्रव्य तु तदुपये स्थाद्रयापायलिकीयद्वि ॥

चिकित्सकः जातिसाध्यत्वप्रकारेऽक्षण च या भवेत् ॥ १४५ ॥

नैदृशयः जातिसाध्यायसाधनत्तंत्रभवेत् ॥
बलबद्विधिशृङ्खलामिति स्थान प्रतिविन्यसिंह ॥ १४६ ॥

नैदृश्यायसाधनत्तंत्रां कायविचित्रे ॥

विद्वा ॥ द्रव्य च हि फलचित्विधिः उपायविद्विधिः च ॥

फलेण तु सहं दुःखाभावश्च। तच्च फलेऽचतुर्थि प्रति फल-

विद्वान् कारणं। अर्थ एव खसं पुष्पार्थं सभावति।

वच्चानं सत्तु स्नित्तियेव तं सत्तं पुष्पार्थं दृति

तबचवानात्। इतरकिर्णानथीस्वार्थविषयं फलितो
र्थं। उपायेऽचर्या प्रतीर्थितसाधनत्तंत्रान् कारणं ॥

चिकित्सेन्ति। जातिसाध्यतप्रकारार्कित्वा जातिसाध्यक्रिया-

विपिणेऽचर्या चिकित्साः। पाकं दत्तं साधारणोति

तद्रुपभवतात् ॥ १४५ ॥

चिकित्सेन्ति प्रति जातिसाध्यतासाधनसम्बन्धताः

शानद्वायन कारणं। अर्थ एव इत्यादि जातिसाध्यताभावचि

कित्साः। बलबद्विधिः। बलबद्विधिशृङ्खलामिति तत्र

प्रतिविन्यसि च। भौतिकोपालोपकोनो न

चिकित्सा। बलबद्विधिः। प्रतिविन्यसि दृति ॥ १४६ ॥

केषुचित्रात् दृति। बलबद्विधिशृङ्खलामिति तत्र

प्रतिविन्यसि च। जातिसाध्यतामाद्विमानि बलबद्विधिः।
भाषा १२६
दित्यसाधननादुनिर्धारितूं देखते कारणं ॥ १४७ ॥
प्रावीद्य निद्रानिर्धारित तथा जीवनकारणं।
एवं प्रयत्नविधिं तान्त्रिकः परिदर्शिनं ॥ १४८ ॥
चिकित्सा क्रियाध्ययं साधनत्रमनित्यम्।

सिद्धार्थ धनन्तरानुमूल्यं बलवदनिद्राजनकल्पां विनापि
चिकित्सा विनाथनारायण कालिन्दित्र दत्तकरो
दर्शिनं ॥ देव्यं निरुपयति । दित्यसाधननित्यः।
दुःखापाय-विषयौ ौ देव्यं प्रमु दित्यसाधननारायण कारणसिद्धिः।
वज्रवदनिद्राध्ययं वज्रनाथ तुत्तिनम् । तेन नानारीयकम: खजनके पाकाय न देशः ॥ १४७ ॥

चिकित्सा \। समुप्ययं धनन्तरानुलिप्तसिद्धिः
चिकित्सा विनापि अन्यायनिर्देशात् प्रयत्नविधिर देयः। ॥ १४८ ॥

चिकित्सा विद्यादी । भवनविश्वसंख्यानाभजनादी । बल-वदनिद्रानुप्रयोगकेलेक चिकित्सा भावः।
चिकित्सा विद्यानाभजनादिर बलवदनिद्रानुरुपसिद्धिनित्यमपि खत्त्वान्यायविद्धिरेकात् प्रमु तू। कारणमित्यः\।
कार्यान्तरानु प्रमुचित्तमिति ् गुरुः।
तथा थी जनवाद नानाः गननीयाः चिकित्सा तिरितीति
नारेरित्तसिद्धिः सा च चिकित्सायणानमात्।
चिकित्सा विद्या: खर्चक्कारप्रकारकथितसाधनविनियमात्।
चिकित्सा विद्या चित्तमान प्रकार-
सिद्धार्थकारण चिकित्सायां तद्विरा प्रष्टती च छेदतः।
न लिङ्गसाधनमाजां तन्त्र छेदतः। कल्याण्येपि प्रश्न-च्यापति:। कल्याण्यसाधनमाजां प्रतिविषयकमिति चेष्ट। तद्न-भावापितत्त्वसंहऽत्त्वानशान्सूर्य कङ्कुलात। न प्रश्नसूर्य रपि छेदतुलं गोरवात्। ननु तद्नेत्रपि मधुविषेन्द्रक-वभेजने वैतवन्द्वने च प्रश्नच्यापति: कार्यालक्ष-सत्यादिति चेष्ट। खबिणो ऊपत्ताप्रतितिमाजननं जङ्क्यार्थकार्य-तान्त्वानन्सूर्य प्रवर्तकलात्। कामस्य हिन्द धारणाकारी काम-नन्त्व खबिणो। तत्त्व बलवदनियानां बन्धनक्रियाक-साधनमाजाननं कार्यालक्ष-तान्त्वानन्सूर्य प्रवर्तकलात्।
ननु तद्नेत्रपि मधुविषेन्द्रक-वभेजने वैतवन्द्वने च प्रश्नच्यापति: कार्यालक्ष-सत्यादिति चेष्ट। खबिणो ऊपत्ताप्रतितिमाजननं जङ्क्यार्थकार्य-तान्त्वानन्सूर्य प्रवर्तकलात्। कामस्य हिन्द धारणाकारी काम-नन्त्व खबिणो। तत्त्व बलवदनियानां बन्धनक्रियाक-साधनमाजाननं कार्यालक्ष-तान्त्वानन्सूर्य प्रवर्तकलात्।
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ननु तद्नेत्रपि मधुविषेन्द्रक-वभेजने वैतवन्द्वने च प्रश्नच्यापति: कार्यालक्ष-सत्यादिति चेष्ट। खबिणो ऊपत्ताप्रतितिमाजननं जङ्क्यार्थकार्य-तान्त्वानन्सूर्य प्रवर्तकलात्। कामस्य हिन्द धारणाकारी काम-नन्त्व खबिणो। तत्त्व बलवदनियानां बन्धनक्रियाक-साधनमाजाननं कार्यालक्ष-तान्त्वानन्सूर्य प्रवर्तकलात्।
ननु तद्नेत्रपि मधुविषेन्द्रक-वभेजने वैतवन्द्वने च प्रश्नच्यापति: कार्यालक्ष-सत्यादिति चेष्ट। खबिणो ऊपत्ताप्रतितिमाजननं जङ्क्यार्थकार्य-तान्त्वानन्सूर्य प्रवर्तकलात्। कामस्य हिन्द धारणाकारी काम-नन्त्व खबिणो। तत्त्व बलवदनियानां बन्धनक्रियाक-साधनमाजाननं कार्यालक्ष-तान्त्वानन्सूर्य प्रवर्तकलात्।
ननु तद्नेत्रपि मधुविषेन्द्रक-वभेजने वैतवन्द्वने च प्रश्नच्यापति: कार्यालक्ष-सत्यादिति चेष्ट। खबिणो ऊपत्ताप्रतितिमाजननं जङ्क्यार्थकार्य-तान्त्वानन्सूर्य प्रवर्तकलात्। कामस्य हिन्द धारणाकारी काम-नन्त्व खबिणो। तत्त्व बलवदनियानां बन्धनक्रियाक-साधनमाजाननं कार्यालक्ष-तान्त्वानन्सूर्य प्रवर्तकलात्।
بتارا نیست. یکتا که در مورد خاصیت مصرف، بایستی می‌شود که در نظر گیری شود. ابتدا
کتاب‌های مالتی‌ورکار و ترجمه‌هایی از ترجمه‌های ترجمه‌های
رایج در زبان‌های مختلف و متنوعی وجود دارد. گوناگونی می‌باشد.

در اینجا، با توجه به اینکه خانوادگی که در نظر گرفته شده است، به
باور هر چه زیادی برای تدوین این کتاب‌ها و ترجمه‌های آنها باید در
نظر گرفته شود. این موضوع واقعاً به دوران‌های مختلفی باید در
نظر گرفته شود. امکانی به خاطر اینکه در هر کتابی دیده نیست.
सिद्धार्थविषयिता यज्ञ दृश्यादित्रा यज्ञ तत्सत्य न श्रुत्ये तथापि
स्त्रेय: फलं कल्याणे। नवहरेः सन्ध्यामुपासितद्रािम्
द्यानुपातं: प्रत्यवेदीः कथं॥ न चार्यवादिकं ब्रह्मलोको-
कादि प्रत्यवायाभवे वा फलसत्ये वाचं। तथा बलि
काम्ये मन्त्रमपवत्सायाभे: कामनाभावे वकरणपाचं॥
द्यायश्च फलश्रुतिसत्यार्थवादाध्याज्ञातमिथि चेष्व। यह-
पश्चाद्यावदी नित्यलैमिनितत्तकल्यायिव भरणीश्चैः
काम्यलैमिभक्तनकल्यायिव निष्कलकशालारुपविनि-
धान्त॥ न च कामनाभावे वकरणपाचं। विकाष्ठजः-
वपातार्थाविव कामनाम्यावस्यैः कल्याणार। ननु
वेदभोधिकायता ताज्ञानार। प्रत्यवेदीः सम्बन्धतीति चेष्व।
द्यायसत्याधनमध्याय तादृशकार्यं तात्ज्ञानन्दष्ठेश्वः
प्रत्यवेदीरसम्बन्धवात॥ इदारए प्रश्नांपूर्वकल्यायिति तदारए
न। कामनाभावे वकरणपाचेऽप्पारः। कामनाक्षणे
लार्यवादिकाद्विकलमेव राजिष्ठचन्याभायु कल्यातामन्यथा
प्रत्यक्षपाचं॥ तेन॥
चतुष कीचिदपातस्य दूरितस्य प्रचलने॥
अनुवलितं तथा बाध्ये प्रत्यवायस्थ सत्ये॥
परं।
सन्ध्यामुपासिते ये तु सत्यं श्रमितमतः॥
विध्वस्तिपायी चान्ति ब्रह्मकमनामयं॥
परं।
उत्तर । दयालदर्श: यादृच्छिक पित्रभ: प्रीतिमाहविन।

इत्यादिकमेव फलमयः।। न च पित्रभीतः कथं फलं वधिकरणालादिति वाचं। गयाश्रयङ्गस्वादावित्र
उदेश्यसमस्मन्यैव फलजनकलख काचित कप्यानात्।
चतुः पुरातं शास्त्रदर्शितफलमनुदानातो रीत्युवर्ग
दृति। विद्यां मुक्तले तु स्वतं खर्जकं वाचनित्यन्मनंटकनुषानास्य धामान्यत्: खर्जकलक्षमात्
प्रणापूज्यार्थग्रहान्तः न सम्भवित।। न च तन्त्रुपक्
दु:खाभावम् खल: पुरुषाः।। न वा तन्त्राधिं।
प्रयवायानुपत्ति कथं प्रश्नतिरित चेत्। इत्यं। चाहा
चि निविविते प्रयवायाभावार्थसहिति तद्भावो तद
भावः।। एवं प्रयवायाभावाः सते दु:खाभावावसं मत
तद्भावे तद्भाव दृति योगवेमसाधारणप्रकरणात्या
दु:खाभावेः प्रक्ष्यमुक्खियाणम्।। एवंयेव याथयति
तक्षार्ये दु:खाभाव्येवतरितमिति।। ननु न कलचं
फलवेदद्वित्यं विश्वतं कथं नवयात्यायं।। द्यत्राधिनत्या
भावस्य क्रियावध्यात्माभावः च बोधयितमशक्याला
दृतिं चेत्। तत्र वाधादिद्ययाध्यात्मां क्रियायत्मक ने
विषयं: किन्तु बलवदनितिसांब्रविशिष्टमां तद्भावस्य
नजा बोधते। चण्डवा बलवदनितिसांब्रविशिष्टाध्यात्मने
सति क्रियायत्मं विषयं।। तद्भावस्य नजा बोधमानो
विशिष्टाभावो विशेष्यं विषयं बोधिष्याम्यत॥
सिद्धांन नन्द श्रीनेनाभिनिरुण यज्ञलिङ्ग कथ वल्लदनिष्ठानुर्जनशीलमः।
श्रीनाथ मरणानुपूजनार्थ हिंसालेश नरकपाधधनलात्॥
न च वैधल्लाचित्रिध इति वाचः।
श्रीविचारे प्रायस्चितिः पदेशिताः॥ न च मरणानुपूजनार्थ
वाचस्य यदि चिंता तदा खड़कारकं कूपकर्तुः शिष्ठलापलिङ्गकलमञ्जरिवशब्दञ्जनमरणमृत्यु खातावधिशीतः वाचाः।
सर्वोदेशं श्रीकल्लापि विशेषणलात्। अत्र एव सत्समीतिवाच्यः न हिंसालं।
श्रीविचारेशकापिनाराजविचाराण्यः तु वाचनिः प्रायस्चितिः पदेशिताः।
श्रीविचारणाय आठुः दीर्घारकलेश विशेषणात्। अत्र एव काशीमरणाय चर्चन्तिशिवपूजादेरापि
न हिंसालं। न च मार्गारणजनकश्वेत हिंसालं
श्रीनस्तु न तथा किंतु तत्जन्मपूर्वमिति वाचाः।
खड़कारकं ब्राह्मणे अवपाक्षकर्तरसं चति हिंसालानां:।
कृत्व श्रीनाथ हिंसाकलभन्त न तु मरण।
श्रीनाथन्यखदप्रलादंदृश्या हिंसा श्रीचित्वारपदार्थः।
तथा च पापजनकलं। अतः श्रीनाथ वैधलात् पापाधकर्तेदेशि श्रायुमपापं प्रतिस्थापण सन्तो न प्रवर्तनेऽ॥
श्राचार्यस्तु श्रायुमभागो विविष्यः।
पारं कुर्यं इत्यादिः श्रायुमकुष्ठो चावाचिलन्मकृष्णाचार्य चाचवाचिलं स्थापत्याः।
एवं स्थानकामो च यज्ञते-त्यादेव यागः स्थानकामकलितार्थतयायादीभोपदेशं। तत्
भाषा । उपादानस्थ चाध्याच प्रवृत्तिः जनकं भवेत् ॥ १४६ ॥

निरुपनति भवेत् देषाद् दिष्ट्वाधनरताध्ययः।

सिद्धा । चायेश्वरेष्वाधनवादिकमन्मय गवर्त्ति। कलंक-भच्चणा तदभवाच प्रवृत्ति। यथा वेद्ये पार्श्वयं नाथपैति तं प्राप्ति विधीर्व तावधर्म द्व्र श्रुतः कु-मार्यः चुंप्योगे मानं ॥ न च कलंकारण वाधायः। कपिलकण्ठं दारादिकमार्शाध्ययः न कलंकारणेष्व स्त्री प्राप्तः-मानवात्। अन्यत्र न्यातीनामकर्षकालापनेः। तथाव कलंकारणस्त्रीति चेष्टेदेशि कबर्दिः जाप्ने तस्मादिष्ट्यालकृतमकरणस्त्रीव। एवं प्राप्त सच्चवनरं चैवा श्रुतिरन्य विधीयत दृष्टपि दृष्टवः॥

खचमुर्येष भवेत् वेद्ये गीतकह्या पुरा।

शिवाया ज्ञेष्ठिपर्यः नार्तारोध्य न कारकः ॥

दति वेद्य श्रुतिमार्था ॥ न च पार्ष्वयं भवमार्थमकामहामार्थमं शास्त्रिति वाच्यं। नित्यस्वभास्यन्निदृष्टतात्। तत्त्वव यस्मानवर्मायकवर्मायकवर्माय कपिलादः कर्ष्टव वेद्यः। कित्व वर्षनामावविलयलखनाः।

उपादानस्थः। उपादानस्थ समाविकर-शाध्याच प्रवृत्ति प्रत्येकं कारणमिति ॥ १४६ ॥

दिष्ट्वाधननतास्थ दुःखाधनविषयविकण्ठश्चिं।
भाषा । यद्य जीवनयोगनित्तु सर्वदायानीत्तिः भवेत्॥ १५०॥
शरीरे प्राणसचारकारणं परिकीर्तितं*।
चन्द्रिनिधिः मुखलं स्वतं प्राणियादिर्द्रोहे तु तत्॥ १५१॥
श्रुनिद्वे नदिनिधिः स्थानिलो नियमुद्धारतं।
नदेवासमवायि स्वातं पतनायि तु कम्भवि॥ १५२॥
सांस्किकद्रव्यः स्थानेमित्तिकम्याधारः।

सिद्धान्तः प्रति जनकलमचन्तयेवां चारकारल्पादोत्तरितमिति भावः॥
यथा दृष्टि। जीवनयोगनित्तु यावज्जीवनस्ववर्त्ते।
ङ् चातीर्थिः॥ १५१॥

तच्च प्रमाणमाधारः। शरीरे प्राणसचारकारणं
परिकीर्तितमिति। प्राणसचारो वि श्रद्धिः शासादिः
प्रवधसाध्यं। इत्यज्ञ प्राणसचारः कन्नसाध्यावनाम-भाषाः।
नानात् प्रवधवि वाधाचातीर्थिः। च एव जीवनयोगनियानं॥
गुहलं निरूपयति। चतीर्थिः।

श्रुनिद्वे द्रुणकारे। तद्हुस्तमालिनिः। निमये पर-ठाणी निर्मि।
गुहलमित्तुनवर्त्ते। तद्हुस्तं असमवायि
असमवायचारकारणं। यतने श्राथ्यपतने इत्यथः॥ १५२॥

ख्रेबलसिरूपयति। चांस्किजिकमिति। ख्रेबलं द्विविच्छ।

* तत्र प्रकीर्तितमिति पधारणः।
भाषा । सांसिधिकनु सिलिले दिनों षिनितरेजी। ॥ १५२ ॥
परमाणू जले नित्यमन्यानित्यमुच्छल।
नैमिन्तिकं वज्जियोगात्मकनीयघृतादिपु ॥ १५३ ॥
द्रवलं स्खन्दनेन चेतुर्निमित्तं स्खुद्देशु ततः।
खेळो जले स नित्यास्पावनिद्रालयविश्विषेष। ॥ १५४ ॥
तैजान्ते तन्त्रप्रकाशादृ दुःधन्यानुकूलन।

पितं । सांसिधिकं नैमिन्तिकखिरित। द्रवलं नैमिन्तिकं पर-
माणाविश। ॥ १५ ॥

जलपरमाणू द्रवलं नित्यं। अन्य च प्रथिवीपर-
माखादृ जल्यम्यकादृ च । द्रवलमन्यिं। कुञ्चितिषेको जसं कुञ्चितं प्रथिवीयादृ नैमिन्तिकं द्रवलं। ततः
को वा नैमिन्तिकार्यसाध्यं ततः। नैमिन्तिकस्यविषयं।
वक्रिति पदलेयार्थं। तथा च तेजः योगाग्रिष्णयो-
गजनं नैमिन्तिकं द्रवलं। ततः सुवर्णादनिः तेजसी
घृतजहाँ प्रस्ततिनिरेत्यां वर्तन दुःध्यं। ॥ १५ ॥

द्रवलं स्खन्दनेन चेतुर्निमित्तं स्खुद्देशं तु तद्वित।
चेतुरिति अध्यमवाच्याकारणिर्मिवः। स्खुद्देशं सत्कार-
दिद्योगार्धियेषय द्रवलं चेतुर्निमित्तं बोधुवथं। तेन
दुःधन्यानुषारां न स्खुद्दः। स्खेळं निक्षुपंतवत। जले
द्रवित। जल प्रेतेचिरः। अन्यों स्खेणः। ॥ १५ ॥

नन् प्रथिवियांमि तैलेष्वेत उत्पल्लवः। न चासी।
भाषा: संस्कारमेंद्रे वेगोऽध्य स्थितिशापकभावने॥ १५४॥

मूर्त्माचे तु वेगः स्तात कर्षणं वेगजः कार्यत ।
स्थितिशापकसंस्कारः चितः केविच्चतुर्वपि॥ १५४॥

अलिनिक्रियासैं विनेषः कार्यत स्नन्देशि कारणं。

विद्वा जलीयः ॥ तथा शति दचन्मातिकृत्यें खातं ब्राह्मः ।
तेजान्तरे तत्प्रकर्षां दचन्मान्यानुक्ततेति । तत्प्रकर्षान्
खेल्प्रकर्षां । तेल उपवेश्यामान्येषापि जलीयं एव।
तत्त्र प्रकदहलांद्रश्रयानुकृतं । चपाद्यकहे ति जलं ब्रजं
नाशयनीति भावः ॥ संस्कारचित्रुपथात । संस्कारं रूपतः।
गेहस्थितिशापकभावनामेद्रात् संस्कारसिविधी दृष्टः ॥ १५४॥

मूर्त्माचे तु वेगः स्तात कर्षणं वेगजः कार्य
दिति । कर्षणवेगजेनेद्रात दिविध दृष्टः ॥ शरादैि
हि नादनजनितेन कर्षणं वेगाः जन्यते । तेन च पूर्वे
कर्षणाश्रद्धतां कर्षणं एवमेघान्ति । विना च वेगः
कर्षणं: कर्षणसाधकतां पूर्वकर्षणाश्रद्धा उततरकर्षणां
स्तनियम न स्तात्तु । यत्र वेगवता कपालेन जनिते
घटे वेगाः जन्यते म वेगजं वेगः ॥ स्थितिशापक दृष्टि।
आकक्षकाक्षवान रामप्रति ॥ पुनर्गमनस्य स्थितिशाप
कर्षणाध्यालात् । केविच्चति । चतुर्यु चित्यादिपु स्थि
तिशापकं केहिनानिः तद्गमापमौति भावः ॥ १५४॥

* प्रतिवाणे दृष्टि साधु ॥
भाषा । भावनार्थस्तु संस्कारो जीवनवार्तनानिद्धियः ॥ १५८ ॥

उपेचानांकल्पस्य निश्चयः कारणं भवेन ।
स्वरुपाप्रत्यभिज्ञायामात्रस्य चेतुस्थितेन ॥ १५९ ॥

सिद्धा । श्रावी ख्यातिनिरपकः । कविक्षृ भाषायामात्र ॥
भावनाख ् दृश्यः ॥ १५९ ॥

ततः संस्कारशः । उपेचानांकल्पानां संस्कारानु-
वत्ते पेचानांकातक द्वयुक्तः । तत्तत्त्वास्तु संस्कारानु-
वत्ते निश्चयः द्वयुक्तः । तेनापेचानानिर्नयनेन संस्कारं
प्रति चेतुस्थिति भावः ॥ नन्द स्वरुप प्रत्येकानानिर्नयनेन
चेतुलं तेनापेचादिकः न स्वरुप द्वयुक्तः संस्कारम्
प्रति स्वानलेनेव चेतुस्थिति चेत्वः । विनिगमनाविशिष्टोऽर्द्धेशापि संस्कारं प्रति उपेचानानिर्नयनेन
चेतुलयाः । विद्वृलात् । किच्च उपेचानाले संस्कारकल्पनाया गुहलात्
संस्कारं प्रति चेपेचानालयेन चेतुलयाः । विद्वृलात् ॥ ततः प्रमाणं दर्शयति । स्वरुप प्रत्यभिज्ञाया-
मयैः चेतुस्थिते दृश्यः । श्रावी संस्कारः स्वरुप
प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् जनयति । चतुः संस्कारः कल्याणः ।
विना यापारं पूर्वानभवस्क स्वरुपादिकानास्मात्
ख्यातायारान्यतराभावे कारणवास्वात् ॥ न च
प्रत्यभिज्ञां प्रति तत्तासंस्कारः चेतुलेन प्रत्यभि-
ज्ञायाः संस्कारानलेन स्मितलापविशिष्टित वाचस्य ॥
भाषा́ धर्माधिकारदय्य खान्त घर्यं खर्गोळ्याधि साधयन।
गङ्गा जानादि यागादि व्यापारः परिस्थितिः॥१६॥

सिद्धान्त प्रमोदकालात्। परे तु चनुदुर्धवस्कारात् प्रथाबिभानुदयादुदहुर्दुर्स्कारखेतुलापेचया तत्तत्सरणेव प्रत्यभिव्रो ग्रहि देहुलं कल्यंत द्वादशः॥

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प्रदूषं निन्द्यकार। धर्माधिकाराभिन्नै। खर्गोळ्याधि-
कलसुखा। खर्गोळ्याधिनीभूतश्रीरीरादिनां शाधनं
घर्यं दुर्घाटः॥ तत्र प्रमाणं दुर्धवाधितमाच। यागादि-तिः।
यागादि व्यापारत्या द्वि घर्यं कल्यंते। अन्यथा या-
गादिनां चिरं बिनययत्या निर्वापारत्या च काळा-
नारभाविखर्गजनकलं न खातं तदन्तमाचायें॥

चिरर्विसं पलायालं न कर्भविशिष्यं विना द्वि दशि ||
ननु यागधंस्य एव व्यापारः खानु न प्रत्यागितिष्ठं प्रथेयोरेक्ताजनकलं। सर्वं च तथाले मानाभावतः॥

न च लब्धते पलायनम् मस्तो चरसमवलखापूर्बनाशक्-
कवात्र० तयाल्पितिः वाच्यं। कालविस्तेष्य सहका-
मिरव० द्वादश ब्रह्म। गङ्गाखानेति। गङ्गाखानस्य
न्यि खर्गजनकलं नामनां जलसंगधमध्वनाः व्यापार-
रत्मपेश्यकपूर्णं कल्यंते लाघवादिः भावः॥

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भाषा। कर्मणाश्रजलयक्ष्मादिना नाश्यरतसा मतः।
अथवा नरकादिना चेतु निन्दितकर्मः॥ १६१॥
प्रायस्थितादिनाग्योक्तैं जीववृत्तिः लिमावुगैः।

सिद्धा। ननु भाषापि न यापारेरसः॥ न च निर्वा-
पारसा चिरंभ्रासा कर्मः कारणलभितं वाच्यं। अन-
न्यायाक्ष्यविन्यतपूर्ववर्तिल्लवा तदापि स्वाल्यः। अव-
बहितपूर्ववर्तिल्लवा हि चचुःमयोगादः कारणं न तु
सर्वंत्य कार्यकालश्चतिल्लवा समवाचिकारणं का-
र्णलभितं ग्राहः। कर्मणाश्रजलयक्ष्मादिना नाश-
खस्यैं मतं द्रतः। चन्द्रः हि अपूर्वः न स्वातः तदां
कर्मणाश्रजलयक्ष्मादिना नाश्यनं धर्मक्ष्य न स्वातः। न
हि तेन यागादिनाः प्रतिबन्धस्या वा कान्तं श्रवयेत्।
ततः पूर्वेऽवेव उत्तप्लादितः॥ एतेन देवताप्रीतिरेव
फलाविहाराः। गजाक्षासनैः सर्वमः देवताप्रीति-
रस्मःवातः। देवसादायेऽनन्दिल्लवा तन्मातिरवज्ञा-
लतः। प्रोतः सुखश्रुप्तेन विश्वप्रीतियदैः तदस्मात-
वातः। जनायश्रुप्तेऽवातासमाभावतः। तेन विश्वप्रीतिजन्य-
लेन पराभिमत्यर्गादिरेव विश्वप्रीतिश्वरे लघ्यते॥
अधेको नरकादिना हेतु निन्दितकर्मः द्रतः। नरक-
दुःखादिकलङ्कुः खानां नारकिष्मोरादिनायाः सा-
धनमधार्यं दत्तः॥ १६१॥

प्रमाणमाच। प्रायस्थितादिनायोक्तैं। जीववृत्तिः
भाषाः इसमें तु वासनाजनीय ज्ञानाद्वि पिनिश्चितम् || १६२ ||

विद्वानः निमित्त गुणाविवितम्। यदि स्थानार्थ न ध्याने तदा प्रायविचित्रतादिनः अर्थत् न ध्याने। न च तेन ब्रह्मचर्य-नादीं नायाम् नामं प्रतिवेच्छो वा विभेदां चर्चं गतें। तत्क पूर्वविनियोग्यात पिनिश्चितम् भावः || जीवति। दैविकः धर्मो-धर्माभावावित्वात् भावः || इसमें तु वासनाजनीय ज्ञानाद्वि पिनिश्चितम् दृष्ट। इसमें धर्माधर्मी। वास-नेति। श्रमो ज्ञानिना हरे सहकर्मकृत्यकर्मणि न फलायते मिति भावः। ज्ञानाद्विपूर्वक प्राप्तेनाभाव-परिप्रेयः।। ननु तत्त्त्वज्ञानम् कर्म धर्माधर्मान्यात्। नामकृते चौिको कर्म कल्पकोषितंतत्त्रिपूर्वीति वच-नविरोधात्। इत्यत्त्वत्त्त्वज्ञानं झटितिः काय-वृहद्विषं कल्पकर्मणि भोगेन चयं दृष्टं चेत्त। तत्र मो-गाथस्य वेदितपि धित्वनाकोपकल्पितात्। कादम्यथा प्रार-धवितादिर्गुणां कर्मणां नामः। तदृर्कः। ज्ञानमिः श्रव्यकर्माणि बीतिति। शूरते च। चौिको चाल्यामुखी कर्मोऽपि तार्किस्वरूपे परावरे दृष्ट।। ननु तत्त्त्वज्ञानिन्सपातांग्रीरावसानं सुखं खाद्यि च य ध्याने ज्ञानं च शर्लिखं कर्मणां नाशावित्वात्। प्रारेरकर्माणामेव नाशात्। तत्त्त्वज्ञानिन्सपातां मद्यि यत्कर्मम् तत्त्व प्रारंभं तदभित्रामेव नाशुक्मित्वात् चचन्नितिः।। १६२ ||
भापा ॥ शब्दो ध्यानिक वर्णेण मद्द्यादिभ्वो ध्यनः॥
कण्डसंयोगार्दिजत्वा वर्णास्ते काद्यो मनः॥ १६४॥
सब्धः शब्दो नभेदान्ति: श्राचैवचर्चा गृहाने।
वीर्यश्रिवाय नदुर्परित्तस्तु कौञ्चित्तः॥ १६४॥
कद्मकोरकन्यायादुपत्ति: कस्मचिन्तः।
उत्त्यतः को विन्दः क्र इति वुहेरनित्यतः॥ १६४॥

सिद्धाः ॥ शब्दं निरुष्य,ध्यनः। शब्दो ध्यानिक वर्णेण मद्द्या-
दिभ्वो ध्यनः॥ कण्डसंयोगार्दिजत्वा वर्णास्ते काद्यो
मनः॥ सब्धः शब्दो नभेदान्ति: श्राचैवचर्चा गृहाने
इति॥ नभेदान्तिराशाकशमवेत्॥ दूरस्काश्रयाश्रय
णादाच। श्राचै। नन्य मद्द्याचवचर्चे वेनारे
शब्दे श्राचे कथमयूतितिरत चाह। वीर्यश्रिवाय नदुर्परित्तस्तु
कौञ्चित्तः। चाचश्रय वाडिरे वार्णिगः
वच्चिन्नोऽन्यः। श्राचोभी शब्दो जनयते। तेन चापरस्क
झापकः। एवं कमेष। श्राचैवचर्चा गृहाने इति॥ १६४॥

कद्मकोरकन्यायादुपत्ति: कस्मचिन्तः। क्र इति। च्या-
चश्रयार्दात दशदिवुः दशश्रय उत्त्यतने। तद्भावे दश-
श्रय उत्त्यतने इति भावः। चक्षुः कस्ये गृहावादुकः
कस्मचिन्तः। क्र इति॥ नन्य मद्द्यस्य नियतादुपत्ति: कथ

* कद्मकोरकन्यायादुपत्ति पाठानाः॥
भाषा १५६

सैतं कृतिव बुद्धिस्तु साजात्मकबल्मने।

तन्द्रवाकाण्डमित्यादृश सजातीयेपि पर्यायम्। ९६६॥

इति श्रीमद्युधनायविद्यानिवासभट्टाचार्यं चुल्लीपृथ्विविभाग्यपञ्चञ्चानभट्टाचार्यं विरचिते भाषा

रिचिंद: समाप्त:॥*॥

सिद्धार्थ मत आच। उत्पत: कौ विनिः क दृति बुद्धिनिवित्वेति। श्रद्धानामुत्पादकर्ममित्र प्रत्येकशालिलादिदिव्यः। ९६६॥

ननु व एवां तकार इत्यदिप्रत्येकित्वानाच्छो-ब्जाओ नित्यल्।

इत्यं चैतपार्द्विनानाध्युद्दिभस्मृत्या चेतत श्राच। सैतं क दृति बुद्धिस्तु साजात्मकबल्मने।

तन्द्रवाकाण्डमित्यादृश सजातीयेपि पर्यायम्। ९६६॥

तत्र प्रत्येकित्वानाम तत्त्वजातियां विषय: न च तद्दाशः कर्मेन्द्रा विषयः। उज्ज्वलोत्तरितवर्धात्।

इत्यत्त्र देयो-रूपं बुद्धिमानं भवमदिनिच्च। ननु सजातीयां तैव च चेतत श्राच।

तन्द्रवाकाण्ड मयां चर्तं तन्द्रहन्तेपानी भवति

इति श्रीमद्युधनायविद्यानिवासभट्टाचार्यं

युध्युतविभाग्यपञ्चञ्चानभट्टाचार्यं विरचिते सिद्धार्थमुक्तावली समूहाः॥*॥
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