The beautiful Hawaiian word “Aloha” cannot be translated. It means love, friendship, sympathy, farewell, and much more. The following lines are an Aloha in two ways. They are a friendly farewell to the hospitable islands on which I lived for four years, and they are also a good-bye to old Hawaii, which toward the close of my stay was undergoing a rapid transformation, and which, if this development should continue, will disappear, never to return.

Hawaii’s transformation from a south sea paradise to a naval and military fortress of first magnitude seems inevitable. The time may soon come when people, who now associate the name of Hawaii with Hula-girls and palm trees in the moonlight, will link the islands with nothing but coast artillery, bombers, and naval battles, as if Hawaii were another Gibraltar or Singapore. This is sad. There are many—too many—Gibraltarls. But there was only one Hawaii. This I feel more strongly than ever in this hour of my departure from Honolulu as the Japanese liner slowly makes its way through the reef.

DEPARTURES

Many departures have I had in my life of wandering, but never was one like this. If, for instance, a person says, “I am now leaving Germany,” it really does not mean very much. He is perhaps looking at a railway station on the Belgian border, or at the banks of the lower Elbe, or possibly at the mountains of the Brenner Pass, and each time he sees only an infinitesimal fragment of Germany. Germany itself is much more, nobody has ever seen it as a whole. But here the entire island lies before me. From the lighthouse on Barber’s Point to the crater of Koko Head I can see every ridge of the two parallel volcanic mountain ranges and the broad valley lying between them, filled with sugar cane and pineapple fields. In the fiery sunset the mountains and valleys are indescribably green and seem very near as the deep shadows accentuate every line. White and pearl-grey clouds float over the ranges; a pale rainbow stands over Manoa Valley, and above everything is the clear blue vault of the sky.

I have hiked in Germany more widely than the majority of my countrymen, in the Black Forest and in the Heide, on the Rhine and in Upper Bavaria, in the Harz Mountains, along the Baltic coast and the river Main, yet I have only seen part of Germany. But on this island I know almost every square foot. There is no village where...
I do not have some friends, no peak or vale that I have not seen from a car, on foot or from a plane, no beach where I have not played with the surf.

When you leave Stuttgart the train takes you through a tunnel, and by the time you come out of it you find yourself in Cannstatt. When you depart from Chicago you travel between high walls obstructing the view and past drab and impersonal railway stations. But here there is nothing between the radiant and many-colored island and myself—nothing but the slowly widening blue ribbon of ocean. In another nine days it will be more than three thousand miles wide.

Since the beginning of the war more Europeans have passed through Hawaii than ever before. The closing of the Atlantic through blockade and counter-blockade has made the route across the Pacific the only reliable one between the Old and New Worlds. Hundreds of European refugees look at the Hawaiian Islands from every eastbound ship, and from westbound ships returning citizens of the Axis Powers gaze upon them. But if, in transit, you spend a few hours in Honolulu, if you have a swim in Waikiki and then do some sightseeing, you have seen about as much of Hawaii as someone who has visited Shanghai has seen of China. Hawaii is more than Honolulu, and more than Oahu, the island on which Honolulu is situated. Hawaii is a complete world in itself.

PARADISE ON A FAULT

While Eden was lost due to the sin of our ancestors, the Hawaiian paradise only exists because of a fault. From a fault in the ocean's bed the chain of volcanoes that forms the Hawaiian archipelago has worked itself up in millions of years. Omitting the smaller and more distant islands such as Niihau or Midway, the Hawaiian archipelago consists, from west to east, of six main islands: Kauai, Oahu, Molokai, Lanai, Maui, Hawaii.

The farther east they are, the younger are the islands geologically. Old Kauai has been eroded by wind and rain to such an extent that craters can no longer be found on it. It is slowly disappearing. But at the other end of the chain, Hawaii still has active volcanoes and continues to grow. Its two volcanoes, thirteen and fourteen thousand feet high, are proof of our earth's tremendous strength, which has raised their snowy summits 35,000 feet above the bottom of the sea, and goes on thrusting them ever higher.

CANYONS AND HARBORS

The differences in geological age explain the great variety among the six islands. It is as if you had to deal with six people whose ages vary between ten and seventy-five years. Kauai, for instance, can prove its great age by its possession of a canyon of huge proportions, which in its beauty rivals the Grand Canyons of the Colorado or Yellowstone. The next island, Oahu, is old enough to have two good ports, Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. Yet anyone who sees the volcanic forms of Diamond Head, Punch Bowl, Koko Head, and other craters, will recognize from afar that Oahu is younger than Kauai.

Before the coming of the white man and his ships, Hawaii had been the main island, but, being geologically too young to have good harbors, Hawaii lost its supremacy to Oahu with its convenient port of Honolulu. Likewise, the first-rate naval port of Pearl Harbor accounts for the presence of tens of thousands of sailors, soldiers, and airmen on Oahu to-day.

The island of Molokai is famous for its leper home, Kalaupapa, where several hundred lepers spend their last years on a spot so lovely that it has few rivals in the world. Kalaupapa seems to have been fashioned by nature for its tragic purpose. It is a peninsula situated a few feet above sea level and can be reached only by a narrow trail, which leads from the high plateau.
of Molokai almost perpendicularly down more than two thousand feet of cliff. At first sight the settlement hardly differs from any other: the patients live in single or group houses, they have their cinema, post office, and school, and some even bring their Fords along to amuse themselves by driving the jeeps over the few square miles of the peninsula.

For a long time Lanai was hardly inhabited, until one of the big companies of Honolulu decided to plant pineapple on it. Today Lanai is an example of planned economy. The town, Lanai City, is built according to a clear plan; on every side extend the blue-green fields of pineapples; in a small, cliff-bound port large barges wait to carry their fragrant freight to the Honolulu canneries, and from a primitive airport planes fly daily to the other islands.

LIFE AND DEATH

Maui boasts of the largest dormant crater in the world, Haleakalā. Never have I seen life and death closer together than when I stood on its 10,000 foot rim: behind me lay the ever-moving blue ocean, its distant surf encircling the deep-green western part of Maui with a collar of fine white lace; and farther west the chain of the other islands, all green and all with white, shaggy clouds on their mountain peaks—a picture alive with charm and color. But ahead of me extended the enormous crater, the bottom of it more than two thousand feet below. The entire picture was one of deadly emptiness—one might have been staring at a landscape on the moon or into the end of all things.

Finally there is Hawaii, which, though the youngest of the islands, has paradoxically retained the most of ancient Hawaiian life. There, living in tents, we spent an entire summer with a group of students. In a Hawaiian village we led for a while the life of the natives, existing on fish, and fruit which dropped into our laps, playing in the surf for hours with the village children. In a Hawaiian canoe we sailed to Kealakekua Bay, once a large settlement. There, a hundred and sixty years ago, the angry Hawaiians killed their discoverer, Captain Cook, when they began to suspect that he was not their god Lono for whom they had taken him. For many days we hiked over the tremendous lava flows, and through forests of fifteen or twenty feet tree-ferns; in a plane we flew over the crater of erupting Maunaloa; and we pitched our tents under the palm trees of the City of Refuge. Here on the most romantic spot on Hawaiian soil, on a tongue of lava reaching into the ocean, stands the sacred Heiau (temple) which in olden days offered refuge and shelter to anyone who was persecuted.

MOUNTAINS AND BEACHES

As a German I love to hike. Shortly after my arrival in Honolulu I joined a hiking club, and often on Sundays I took to the mountains. Off the broad and excellent motor roads, built partly for the sake of the army’s quick movements, lies the real Hawaii. You can set foot with confidence into every jungle, you need not fear snakes or poisonous insects. The trails lead through tropical valleys with banana trees and heavily fragrant guava trees, and the slopes, even where perpendicular, are overgrown with green. The trails lead over narrow ridges from where, thousands of feet below, you can see the Pacific on all sides. They lead through canyons and to foaming waterfalls gnawing their way through the rock. To swim naked in a cool mountain pool under a waterfall surrounded by tropical growth: this to me will always be the quintessence of my wanderings on Oahu.

I developed in Hawaii an entirely new relationship to water. The much-praised beach of Waikiki is, of course, as is everything of which advertisement has taken a hold, a disappointment. But elsewhere swimming on Hawaiian beaches with their perfect
water temperature is an unforgettable experience. If you wish to have the full enjoyment of it, you must live for some time right on the beach where you do not have to make up your mind, "Now I shall go swimming," or make any other effort such as getting a car out of the garage. I remember Mokuleia where I frequently participated in student camps. The camp site is on a lonely part of the island, with no good roads leading to it. There you live all day in your bathing trunks, and between every game or meeting you run into the ocean with a sensation of jumping into champagne. The coral reef is some 200 yards from the beach. There the waves break, and hurl themselves with foaming crowns thunderingly against the sand. There is no happier animal sensation than, with your skin aglow from the rays of the sun, to run into the surf, to be seized by the mighty yet friendly giant arms of the waves and to be thrown in somersaults through the breakers. And to those who with diving-glasses explore the depths near the reef a new world of forms and fish is revealed.

NO WORD FOR WEATHER

The old Hawaiians had no word for "weather." For them it was as small a problem as his liver is for a healthy person. They simply knew that it rains in the mountains where the high altitude condenses the moisture of the trade winds to clouds and rain, and that on the beaches the sun shines. From the ranges to the coast the annual rainfall gradually decreases, and you can have a house with any amount of rainfall you may desire. Hence the islands possess the second wettest spot in the world, Mt. Waialeale on Kauai with more than 400 inches of rain a year; yet at the same time you might think you were in the deserts of Arizona when you pass through coastal areas where only cactus grows. On the whole, the weather is so reliable that a man in our valley used to direct guests who came to him for the first time by saying, "You will find the white house on your left just after the second shower."

There is a Hawaiian word for only one type of weather. In "Kona"-weather (Kona—south) the refreshing trade winds from the northeast cease to blow and the warm and moist equatorial wind brings high humidity and fatigue. Fortunately the Kona is an exception. This last year the trade winds blew with hardly an interruption from November to June. Apart from the Kona the weather is practically the same all year round, a warm spring lasting twelve months, with the average temperature in August only six degrees above that in January. When I took my house near the university a few years ago the first thing I did was to remove the glass windows which ran all around the house. Since then my walls have consisted mainly of mosquito screens. Day in, day out, Hawaii falls asleep under the stars and awakes in sunshine.

MELTING-POT OF RACES

As to the people? Nowhere in the world can you study race problems better than in Hawaii, where you have not only Hawaiians, whites of all nationalities (called haoles), Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Filipinos, and negroes, but also their increasingly mixed descendants, all of them living peacefully side by side. Even between the older Chinese and Japanese—not to mention the young ones—the present bitter conflict in the Orient has had no more serious consequences than a fight in an old men's home.

Apart from the races, the population of the islands consists of three groups. First there are the inhabitants of the city of Honolulu, 150,000, a third of the archipelago's entire population. This group includes, as in every town in the world, rich and poor, big merchants and little shopkeepers, workmen, officials, shoeshiners, and a hundred other professions. Surprisingly many people are, in one way or another,
part of the enormous educational system. The islands are full of public and private schools in which 110,000 pupils are taught by 4,000 teachers. The university alone has 2,600 students.

**THE “BIG FIVE”**

The second group of the population lives in the country and consists mainly of the employees and laborers on the large sugar cane and pineapple plantations. Capitalism in Hawaii is decidedly monopolistic. Five large firms (“The Big Five”) control almost the entire economic life of the islands, from plantations to department stores, hotels and shipping lines. Yet the standard of living of the largely Oriental laboring class compares favorably with the standard of living not only in the countries from which most of these laborers came, but also with that of plantations on the American mainland.

The laborers, to be sure, as long as they remain in the islands, are dependent on their employers and have little say. But in return they are, it seems to me, well provided for with living quarters, cheap stores, free hospitals, and with movies, sports grounds, and dance halls. Because Hawaii is in the hands of a few closely interrelated families and firms, and because it is a small and easily controllable group of isolated islands, it is an example of a well-organized planned economy. It may offer little freedom to the individual; but it holds itself responsible for him and looks after him. The planning of employment (particularly important in periods of economic crises), the conservation of the water resources of the entire archipelago, the development of new types of sugar and pineapple, the systematic combat of insect pests or similar dangers on an islandwide scale, the very serious problem of feeding the islands in case of war and blockade, these and many other tasks the large firms, in close co-operation with the Government and the armed forces, are trying to accomplish.

**KAPU**

Honolulu and the plantations might have continued to live in their old style for a considerable time to come. It is the third population group which is responsible for the rapid transformation of the islands’ character. To this group belongs everyone having to do with defense. Already Hawaii is by far the most heavily fortified place under the American flag. If this development continues at the speed of the last few months the changes will be enormous. One part of Oahu after another—and lately even of the other islands—is being taken over for military reasons. The number of beaches available for swimming is shrinking steadily.

For years there was a standing joke for newcomers. They were shown the innumerable “PRIVATE KAPU” signs all over the islands, particularly in front of beautiful estates, and they were told that Kapu was the name of a wealthy doughboy who owned huge properties in Hawaii. Of course, Kapu is the Hawaiian word for the better known Tabu (forbidden) and the signs simply mean “PRIVATE PROPERTY. KEEP OUT.” Now it seems that the joke might become a bitter truth. More and more land is being closed to civilians, and the military might put a “GENERAL KAPU” in place of the Private.

Every ship is bringing more troops, tanks, engineers, and laborers for military construction. An entire new city has grown, almost overnight, around Pearl Harbor, to house part of these ever-arriving masses, and the shelves of the new department store of Sears Roebuck are half-empty due to the difficulty of obtaining shipping space for non-military purposes. A few years ago there was nothing in Pearl Harbor but a few submarines and destroyers which looked as if they were on vacation. Today you can see there, packed in close ranks, the gray bodies of the main portion of the U.S. fleet. And if in the evenings you walk through
the streets of downtown Honolulu you might think that a snowstorm had hit the city, so numerous are the white uniforms of the sailors.

BLACKOUTS IN PARADISE

The spirit of Old Hawaii is desperately trying not to be overrun and crushed by this new development. The people pretend that all this does not concern them, that a clear line can be drawn between the civilian and military worlds, that these two can live peaceably side by side. But how much longer will this be possible? Is Old Hawaii fighting a losing battle? For instance, two years ago, for the first time in America, an entire area, the Hawaiian Islands, had a blackout. The spirit of Hawaii won the first round and turned the evening into a gay celebration. All over Honolulu "blackout parties" were given. I too was invited to one of them. We played various blackout games: the person who could guess most accurately the exact moment at which the blackout began (the authorities had not divulged it before) received a prize; during the blackout every guest was given a dish with ten different things and a set of five drinks all of which he had to identify in the dark. Some young girls used blackout parties as an opportunity to announce their engagements — these were the "blackout brides." So many thousands of people had driven to the hills, the better to view the blackout spectacle, that it took hours to solve the unexpected traffic problem.

The second blackout a year ago was celebrated much less gaily, and the third, before my departure, had almost completely lost the glamour of the first. There were not even any "blackout brides," for the women of Honolulu had been organized into Red Cross units and were mobilized for the duration of the blackout. And while they were dressing imaginary wounds, they discussed the number of cans they had stored or the vegetables they had planted against a possible blockade.

PARADISE LOST?

Hawaii has succeeded in conquering and assimilating with its charm those people from outside who have made the islands their home during the last century and a half. On the whole the influx was so slow that usually one group had been "Hawaiianized" before the next arrived. Even with regard to the Orientals this was the case to a surprising extent. But at the present pace this will hardly be possible in the future. Larger and larger masses of people are being brought to Hawaii from the American mainland. These do not come to stay and to abandon themselves to the Hawaiian atmosphere. They come for a short term of military duty or to build airports and subterranean oil tanks. Old Hawaii puts up a spirited fight. Well-meaning people have started a movement of inviting sailors and soldiers to local homes to acquaint them with the ideals of Hawaii. This will be a difficult task.

I have particular reason to wish for the preservation of the spirit and charm of Hawaii. Its hospitality and broad-mindedness are unique in the world today and I have enjoyed them to a special degree. While the attitude of the United States towards Germany from month to month became more hostile and bitter, Hawaii allowed me, the only German citizen on the islands, peacefully to continue my work at the university. Among more than two thousand students who have taken my courses during the four terms since outbreak of the war, there was not one who ever showed any sign of hostility. After my last lecture, in which I explained my resignation from the university by my loyalty to the German people and by the unfortunate, growing German-American tension, the students put a flower lei around my neck and heartily applauded. Such is the spirit and the Aloha of Hawaii.

THE MESSAGE OF HAWAII

So it is with a sad heart that I watch the mountains of Oahu disappear into
the dusk. Will the steadily mounting waves of fear, suspicion, and hatred eventually inundate even this island paradise, forcing it to abandon its mission as the meeting-ground of nations and races, as the cross-roads of civilizations and cultures?

I sincerely hope this will not happen.

Today more than ever the world needs a symbol of peace and fairness, of the will to understand other people and of the ability to get along with them—the symbol of Aloha.

In Hawaii I have found it. I will treasure it as the most valuable gain of my stay in the islands. I will try to carry its message abroad by making it a part of The XXth Century, the new magazine I plan to publish in Shanghai.

Will it not be an experiment to publish—on the second anniversary of the greatest of all wars—a magazine devoted to genuine understanding rather than hatred, to fair and sane discussion rather than one-sided argument? The walls of political, ideological, and economic differences between the nations have grown to terrifying height. It becomes daily more urgent that an increasing number of people should be bold enough to penetrate these walls of hatred and suspicion, wise enough to know that our world is formed by divergent forces and not by one-sided decisions of any single group, and keen enough to see not only the urgent today but also the great yesterday and the still greater tomorrow. For one day this war will end, and what will follow must be based on knowledge which the war has obscured and on thoughts which in the present overemphasis on action have not yet been voiced. It is to such knowledge and thought that The XXth Century will be dedicated.

The ship's gong calls for supper. Into the sea I throw dozens of leis given to me by friends on the pier according to the island custom. If I may believe the promise of Hawaiian legend, this means that I shall see the islands again.

Aloha, Hawaii.
RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR, 1914–1917

By Dr. OSKAR P. TRAUTMANN

The generation which still remembers the Great War frequently looks back and compares or contrasts the events of then and today. Future historians, we may be certain, will devote much time and energy toward the investigation of the similarities and differences between the Great War and present events.

The following story of Russia and the Great War is of particular interest as it was written shortly before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war. The author intended it to be a historical study and not a parallel to the present war. All the more interesting are the thoughts provoked by it when we read it now. Even the Russian names for the war of 1914 and 1941 are identical—“The Second War for the Fatherland.” (The first was that of 1812 against Napoleon, the second in Tsarist terminology was the one of 1914. That war, however, is denounced by the Bolsheviks as an “Imperialist” war, and hence according to their reckoning the present war is the second one.) The present problems of Poland, of the Balkans, of Turkey and the Straits, of Russia’s relations with Great Britain—they all loom closer when we remember their role in the last war.

The author is particularly well-equipped to write on international affairs as he has them at his finger-tips, being himself an eminent diplomat with almost forty years to his credit in the German diplomatic service. His first foreign post was the capital of the Tsars, St. Petersburg, and all through his career, be it in the Foreign Office in Berlin or in diplomatic positions abroad, he has preserved his enthusiastic interest in Russian problems and his knowledge of the Russian language. Last year, Dr. Trautmann published a book on the history of Russian foreign policy, for which, due to his position, he was able to use many official and private sources. The title of the Book is “The Singers’ Bridge” after the colloquial name for the Tsarist Foreign Ministry located at the so-called Singers’ Bridge in St. Petersburg.

Since 1921 Dr. Trautmann has been intimately connected with events in the Far East, first in Japan, and since 1931 as Minister and later as Ambassador to China. In the winter of 1937/1938 his prominent role in the discussion for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict created much attention.—K.M.

CHANCE AND NECESSITY

A well-known surgeon, when lecturing on injuries to the arteries of the neck, used to tell his pupils that the World War might have been avoided if there had been a surgeon in the retinue of the assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo who had known how to stop a carotid haemorrhage by quick action. This anecdote shows the entire absurdity of placing importance on mere chance in history.

Ortega y Gasset has made some excellent observations about chance and history. He considers it impossible to foresee whether lightning will strike a tree with its fiery sword, “but we know that cherry-trees will never produce poplar-leaves.” It is indeed an accident that a man of Caesar’s peculiar mentality should have lived in the first century before Christ. A Roman of the second century B.C. could not have foreseen the individual destiny represented by Caesar’s life; but he could
RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR

well have prophesied the dawn of a Caesarian era in the first century. Cato predicted quite accurately what was about to happen at that time.

According to Ortega we have grasped a situation historically if we have seen it arise of necessity from a previous one. This conception of necessity can be given not only a psychological but also an astrological-fatalistic meaning. Spengler quotes Napoleon's words: "I feel myself driven toward a goal that I do not know."

The historian is a "reversed prophet," and Spengler has predicted that the World War was only the preparation for a new Caesarian era for mankind. The accidents leading to its outbreak have no special significance; nevertheless the entire course of events has something psychologically inexorable. In this sense the words of the President of the Imperial Duma (the Russian Parliament), Rodsianko, are particularly characteristic. At the beginning of the war he addressed the historic meeting of the Duma on August 8, 1914, as follows: "We all know very well that Russia did not want a war, that designs of conquest are foreign to the Russian people, but Fate itself has chosen to involve us in war."

SAZONOV

The man who held the tiller of Russian foreign policy when the Empire of the Tsars entered upon its greatest catastrophe, the World War, was Foreign Minister Sazonov. He impressed foreign diplomats with whom he came in contact as a sober, deliberate man, who, without wishing to shine by his wit, knew exactly what he wanted. On the other hand we know that he was a sickly, excitable man, filled with a burning Russian patriotism which almost bordered on fanaticism. He is credited with intellect—he had the face of a fox—but at the same time it is emphasized that he lacked judgment, admittedly a desirable attribute in a Foreign Minister. His career allowed him to develop in the seclusion of rather insignificant positions. It is possible that he was only made Vice-Minister and later Foreign Minister because he was a brother-in-law of the Russian Premier Stolypin. He lacked knowledge of the Balkans and the Near East—the main issues of Russian foreign policy.

Probably he was excellent as Vice-Minister, just the man to deal with foreign diplomats: "Tel brille au second plan, qui s'éclipse au premier." But he did not possess the strength and the spiritual independence which the helmsman of a great empire should have had in such fateful times. Soon foreign policy under him was no longer determined in his Ministry, but by his Ambassadors and Ministers, Hartwig in Belgrade, Tcharykov in Constantinople, and Isvolsky in Paris.

THE STRAITS

Did Sazonov really have no great leading idea for the foreign policy of Russia? This one cannot maintain, but his thinking lacked originality. He wanted to let the political situation mature gradually, and to prepare everything for the day when Russia could carry out her historic task, that is, control of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. First of all, Germany had to be rendered innocuous by discussions of a political nature, which, however, remained vague, and by economic concessions. Meanwhile the Balkan territory was prepared in such a way that Russia had only to press the button for the Balkan nations to march against Turkey. When this coincided with a complete understanding of Russia with France and England, the moment of realization had, according to Sazonov's ideas, arrived.

Sazonov was counting on the inner weakness and early disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The Tsar was apparently of the same opinion. He once spoke to the British Ambassador Buchanan on this subject and divided up the inheritance. For Germany he had reserved the German pro-
vinces of Austria as booty. Buchanan ventured to say to him that such changes in the map of Europe could hardly be made without a general war. It seems that the Tsar had never thought out the final consequences. Of all the leading men, the Russian Prime Minister Kokovzov was the only one to consider a European war as the greatest possible national disaster for Russia. He did not manage to stay in office very long; hence in the end there was no counter-weight to the patriots. As for Sazonov's feelings towards Germany, he has said in his memoirs that no one can love Germany: it is sufficient not to hate Germany. On the other hand Buchanan has testified that he was a staunch friend of England and a loyal and enthusiastic collaborator in the Anglo-Russian Entente.

HEAD FOR THE CATACLYSM

Such was the man Sazonov who guided Russian foreign policy at a time when the French Ambassador in Vienna wrote illuminatingly about the state of Europe: “The feeling that the nations are moving towards the battlefields, as if driven by an irresistible force, grows from day to day”. Sazonov, too, yielded to this mood. Even the German Ambassador at the Court of the Tsar expressed the opinion that, of all personalities who could be considered for the post of Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov was still the best. This shows that by now circumstances had become more powerful than the men who guided the destinies of the nations.

Maeterlinck has written a book about termites. In it he describes a species of these industrious insects which, in many years of painstaking toil, ingeniously construct a habitation for their people. Then, more or less periodically, an inexplicable movement appears in the swarm of termites, a kind of revolution, and the whole ingenious construction is senselessly destroyed by the builders themselves.

Mankind, impelled towards the battlefields, was approaching a similar catastrophe. Would things have been different if, in place of Sazonov, there had been some other Russian Foreign Minister? From Gortchakov through Giers, Lobanov, Lamsdorff to Iswolsky and Sazonov there ran a logical chain of development, which at that moment it was no longer possible to interrupt. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had its own life, its own spirit. The men who, some by chance, some by the logic of events, stood at the head of the State, were subject to this spirit.

“C'EST LA GUERRE EUROPEENNE”

When Sazonov entered his office in the Foreign Ministry on the morning of July 24, 1914, Vienna's ultimatum to Serbia, the result of the assassination of the Austrian heir-apparent, had already become known in St. Petersburg during the night. It had caused tremendous excitement. “C'est la guerre européenne,” were Sazonov's words to his aide, Baron Moritz Schilling. These words show something of the astrological nature of the events of those eight fateful days. Everything we see unfolding before us in a breathless rushing back and forth was nothing but the “mise en scène” of a great historical drama, as General Dobrorolsky, Chief of the Mobilization Department of the Russian General Staff, put it. If we take into account that the characters of the chance actors of this drama were already determined, we can understand that the end of the drama was a certainty.

Whole libraries have been written about the question of where the guilt for the outbreak of the war lay. This is understandable, for the guilt-clause in the Treaty of Versailles made a study of this question appear imperative. But in examining the outbreak of the war from the stand-point of Russian politics, we will not discuss the question of guilt. We will simply observe events.

A diplomat once said that there is no such thing as a moral or an immoral
policy, but only a good or a bad one. And only results can decide whether a policy is good or bad. From this point of view the entry of Russia into the European war was the greatest stupidity ever committed by the statesmen of a country in a decisive hour.

RUSSIAN SENTIMENT

Has Sazonov at least the excuse that he only put the match to the fire that others had laid? One cannot deny that the war was popular in many circles of the Russian people. It was called the “second war for the fatherland” and given a similar significance to that of the war of 1812 against Napoleon.

Under the last three Russian Tsars relations with Germany had constantly deteriorated. The creation in itself of a powerful German Empire did not, according to the ideas of many Russian statesmen, correspond to the real interests of Russia; the Austro-German alliance, and the support given to the Austrian policy in the Balkans by Germany, had led to growing ill-feeling toward Germany. This ill-feeling was fanned by France. The Franco-Russian alliance, originally born of Russia’s fear of political isolation, had become, almost from the beginning, an instrument of French rather than of Russian policy. In 1871 Renan had advised the French: “attiser la haine toujours croissante des Slaves contre les Allemands, favoriser le pan-slavisme, servir sans réserves toutes les ambitions russes.” This advice had been followed, and this method had gradually directed Russian thought—formerly by no means anti-German—against Germany.

THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENTSIA

The Russian intelligentsia in its political thinking felt much more attracted to the democratic ideals of the West than towards Prussianism. In the latter the Russian liberals saw a likeness to their own government. The Russian socialists saw in Germany only the stronghold of reaction, which was abetting Russia’s own autocracy. Hence there were no bonds of sympathy to be severed in order to familiarize the minds of the people with the idea of war with Germany. Here, too, the inner-political ideas of liberal Russia must not be disregarded. The manifesto of October 1905, designed to give to the Russians those basic rights which the people of the rest of Europe already possessed for generations, had, through the reactionary measures of Stolypin and his successors, shrunk to insignificance. After a period of dull despair the Russian intellectual saw in war an opportunity to gain for the people through the “Union sacrée” of people and government, that freedom of which they were being deprived. The Bolshevist-revolutionary circles, too, felt that war formed the only possible basis for a revolution; their leaders, however, were abroad and had no influence on the course of events.

The leading circles in society and high officialdom, which influenced foreign policy, had been won over to the extreme course, after the going of Kokovzov had freed them from restraint. Under the pressure of political events even the rightist groups of the Duma gave up their sympathies for Germany.

The old military bonds formerly connecting Germany and Russia had long since been loosened. Military circles looked towards friendly France. Russian Grand Dukes had gone to the French borders and had inspected the fortifications of Lorraine which were directed against Germany. Many years before the war, Russian maneuvers had been openly designed on the plan of a war against Germany and Sweden, and even foreign military attachés had been invited to attend. When a Japanese military commission visited Russia in the spring of 1914, it could observe hatred for Germany everywhere in the officers’ messes.

PAN-SLAVISM

With few exceptions the press had been anti-German for many decades.
It was more or less under the spell of nationalistic and Pan-Slavistic ideas, or it was opportunistic and without convictions. Pan-Slavism, rekindled by the events in the Balkans, had injected into the sentiments of Germans and Slavs a strong feeling of antagonism which really did not exist between the two peoples. One can well say that no one has understood the Slav temperament better than the Germans, whereas it has always remained foreign to the English and French.

Now the loves and hates, antipathies and sympathies of nations, however great the influence they may exert emotionally, are not, as a rule, decisive factors in politics. That they should lead to a war seems absurd. It is the opposing political interests which lead to conflicts between nations. Was it insoluble, this problem of conflicting interests in the Balkans between Russia and Austria, and Russia and Germany? Sazonov apparently thought so. Through his policy he had attained positions in the Balkans the relinquishment of which would have been equivalent to a humiliation. Sazonov was ready to risk a fight, and he believed that the advantages would be on the side of Russia.

WAR AIMS

By the war aims of a country one can recognize whether the war was justified. What were the war aims that a Russian statesman could have in relation to Germany? Giers, one of Sazonov’s predecessors, had realized long ago that the destruction of Germany’s position as a power could never be in the interest of Russia; but Sazonov had forgotten this great truth. Even the question, whether the dissolution of the Austrian Empire were in the true interest of Russia, would probably still have been denied by Gortchakov. Apparently Sazonov never even considered this. The whole war policy of the Entente during the war has shown that Russia, with no political ideas of her own, became in the end entirely the tool of French and English politics.

The best criticism of Russian war aims was pronounced by the great Russian Statesman Witte in his conversation with the French Ambassador Paëologue at the beginning of the war: “And then, what are the conquests that are dangled before our eyes? East Prussia? Doesn’t the Emperor already have far too many Germans among his subjects? Galicia? Why, that is full of Jews, and then, from the day on which we annex the Polish territories of Austria and Prussia we would lose all of Russian Poland . . . What else do they let us hope for? Constantinople? The return of the Cross to St. Sophia’s, the Bosporus, the Dardanelles? That is so crazy that it is not worth wasting time over it.”

The Pan-Slavistic war aims of Russia collapsed immediately, when, at the beginning of the war, the Russian steam-roller failed to make any headway. Nothing more was said of the Slav brothers or of East Prussia. Finally there was nothing left but the Dardanelles and Constantinople. But even this objective became more and more unreal as it could not be attained by Russia’s own efforts. It was necessary to bring in mysticism to justify the continuation of the war for this aim. St. Sophia in Constantinople was glorified as the central idea of Russian religious life, while the purely military fight to win her had to be taken into the bargain—or was even commended—a necessary preparatory step towards the realization of the religious ideals. Russian policy had been sacrificed to a romantic idea which was no longer based on any genuine economic or political interests.

“NOW YOU CAN SMASH YOUR TELEPHONE”

From the confusion of those tumultuous days before the World War we will pick out one single instance. We know that on July 29 partial mobili-
zation against Austria was proclaimed in St. Petersburg. Orders had also been given for general mobilization but were countermanded at the last moment by the Tsar because of a reconciliatory telegram from the Kaiser.

There was great excitement in Russian military circles over this order and counter-order. It was feared that a partial mobilization would only confuse the carrying out of general mobilization. The Chief of the General Staff Yanushkevitch was determined to make one more effort with the Tsar on the following day to obtain a general mobilization.

Since the Tsar did not react to representations made over the telephone and also refused to receive Yanushkevitch, Sazonov came to his assistance and forced from the reluctant Tsar, after an hour's conversation on the afternoon of July 30, the order for general mobilization—which meant war. Sazonov's telephone conversation from the Peterhof Palace at four o'clock in the afternoon, in which he informed Yanushkevitch of the Tsar's decision, has become famous for his last remark: "Now you can smash your telephone." A second countermand of the order was now impossible.

SAZONOV AND THE TSAR

Sazonov himself has described this historic scene, at the same time revealing the motive which caused the Foreign Minister to intercede for this fateful decision of the Tsar. The Tsar was silent at the utterances of his Minister. Then he said, with a hoarse voice that betrayed deep emotion: "This means sending hundreds of thousands of Russians to their death. How can one not recoil before such a decision?" Whereupon Sazonov replied that the Tsar would be answerable neither to God nor to his own conscience nor to the future generations of the Russian people for the bloodshed which would be caused by this terrible war, forced on Russia and the whole of Europe by the evil designs of her enemies. For those enemies were resolved to ensure their power by subjugating Russia's natural allies in the Balkans and by destroying the historic influence of Russia in that territory, all of which would mean abandoning Russia to a miserable existence entirely dependent on the despotism of the Central Powers.

It was a poor cause, especially since Austria had declared that she had no intention of disturbing the sovereignty and integrity of Serbia. The Balkans had already lived through so many phases. There had been a time when Austria had made a political vassal of Serbia under King Milan, and after the assassination of King Alexander a complete reversal had taken place. Why could Sazonov not wait? Had the Austrians taken up arms when Russia had completely changed the status quo in the Balkans in 1877?

Sazonov was afraid that Russia might come too late with her mobilization measures. He did not want to "confuse" his allies. Apparently he was animated by the urge toward the battlefields. So we have to record the case, probably rare in history, where a Foreign Minister—who, after all, should up till the last moment make every effort to avoid war—accelerated the decisions leading to war and released the terrible machinery that started the avalanche rolling.

The American historian Fay, in his book on the origins of the World War, emphasizes in his last chapter that it was above all Russia's general mobilization being carried out while Germany's efforts at mediation in Vienna were still going on, which brought on the final catastrophe by causing Germany to mobilize and to declare war.

Russia saved France by her offensive in East Prussia, which could not be carried out fast enough for the French, and the Russian people were then driven on again and again to greater efforts by the Allies whenever these found themselves in danger. Russia got no thanks for it, only reproaches.
THE LURE OF CONSTANTINOPLE

When in Russia the dream of the march on Berlin had faded, and the sufferings of the Russian people intensified, when the first whispers were heard in Russia that one was only fighting for the Allies, England realized that a new impetus was needed to keep Russia's policy in line. This "stimulus for the continuation of the war till victory," and till the complete exhaustion of Russia, became forthwith the object of the untiring attention of British diplomacy. The King of England casually remarked to the Russian Ambassador Count Benckendorf: "As for Constantinople, it is obvious that it must belong to you." Now began Sazonov's diplomatic task of utilizing this British hint. It was supposed to give Russian diplomacy the possibility of explaining to the people, with a semblance of justification, why it had drawn Russia into this disastrous war.

Sazonov demanded Constantinople and the Straits; he stressed these demands by threatening to resign and by emphasizing the "conséquences incalculables" which might arise from a refusal by the Allies. Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister, who was at first stunned by Sazonov's demands, could not refute such arguments. He was afraid that, if Sazonov resigned, a change might take place in Russian policy, and that the efforts of "German Agents" in St. Petersburg to conclude a separate peace with Germany might succeed. French policy, albeit reluctantly, followed that of England and agreed to the Russian demands.

England had clearly understood the situation from the beginning, and, as we have seen, it was she who had taken the initiative. One could only make the Russians pay as dearly as possible for this unavoidable concession. According to Grey's memoirs, England was convinced that after the loyalty of the Tsar toward the Allies that of Sazonov was the corner-stone of Russian policy. From Petrograd had come the demand for an agreement containing the promise of Constantinople to the Russians, accompanied by a hint that it was absolutely necessary in order to save the situation as well as the policy of Sazonov, and in order to avoid grave complications, i.e. the conclusion of a separate peace. This was no bluff, the danger was real. The force of facts was irresistible.

England knew that, with the bait of Constantinople, she held Russia in her power, and that the latter would soon have to choose between either retaining the advantages of this pact and bowing to the will of her Allies, or betraying her Allies, which, according to Churchill's words, she could not do. That was the vicious circle in which Sazonov found himself.

THE END OF SAZONOV

The downfall of Sazonov was brought about by the Polish question, which was the subject of violent controversy in Russian public opinion, and which Sazonov wanted to solve by declaring Poland's autonomy. He only wanted to forestall the Central Powers, unconscious of the unreality of his idea. After all, Russia had militarily lost the greater part of Poland, and furthermore, leading Russian circles had doubts as to whether the restoration of even a limited Polish sovereignty would really be of benefit to Russia. Many Russians who thought deeply about the Polish problem may have realized that it could really only be solved in co-operation with Germany.

We know that the French and British Ambassadors made an eleventh hour attempt to save Sazonov. Heavy clouds were hanging over Russia, and, even though the Entente diplomats were not afraid that Russia was heading for a separate peace, they nevertheless believed that with the going of Sazonov a new spirit would insinuate itself into the Foreign Ministry. This spirit could, should military successes not be forthcoming, become dangerous to the policy of the Entente.
THE END OF OLD RUSSIA

It is an idle question whether, at this time, Russia could have been saved by a separate peace with Germany. The Tsar, for one, could never have brought himself to make such a weighty decision. He had "vowed before God" not to make peace as long as there was a single enemy soldier on Russian soil, and he was afraid his eternal salvation might be jeopardized if he should fail to keep his word. Moreover he was a fatalist; he believed in the decrees of destiny. When things went wrong, instead of offering resistance he would say that God had willed it so, and resign himself to God's will. He was surrounded by mystics, charlatans, and doubtful politicians; the Tsarina ruled him with her fanatic will; neither in domestic nor foreign politics could he think of anything to save the situation. And even if, after the resignation of Sazonov, he had wanted to change the course of Russia's foreign policy, he could hardly have avoided a revolution, at least a palace revolution. His fate was really inescapable.

The indications that a great revolution was brewing became increasingly serious. The scarcity of food assumed alarming proportions, public opinion became more and more agitated, the Army could no longer be relied upon; there was no possible bridge leading to the Duma and the people, no bridge that could have saved the autocracy. In September 1916 the French Ambassador Paléologue dined with Kokovzov and the industrialist Putilov. Kokovzov declared: "We are facing revolution." The last act of this terrible drama of Russia was approaching:

"Last scene of all
That ends this strange eventful history."

The assassination of Rasputin was the first stroke of lightning which lit up the coming storm. The assassination was staged by the leader of the extreme Right, Purishkyevitch, and by a few Grand Dukes and relatives of the Imperial House. It was a useless, typically Russian effort to save the autocracy.

Rasputin had not only predicted his own horrible death, but also the destruction of old Russia: "I see many tortured people; I see not individuals but whole multitudes, I see masses, mountains of corpses, several of the Grand Dukes, hundreds of Counts. The Neva will run red with blood." His prophecy was to come true.
BOLSHEVISM AND ITS PEDIGREE
By KLAUS MEHNERT

This article is an attempt to analyze Bolshevism at the moment of its most decisive struggle. The analysis is not influenced by the fact that Germany and the USSR happen to be at war. It is rather a result of a study of Bolshevism extending over fifteen years. During this period the author's evaluation of Bolshevism, regardless of whatever the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union were at any given time, gradually developed toward increased skepticism of the Bolshevik experiment.

The author was born of German parents in Moscow and grew up bilingual. Up to 1936 he spent, over a period of three decades, a total of eleven years in pre- and post-revolutionary Russia, travelling extensively in European and Asiatic Russia, including the Soviet Arctic and Central Asia. For a number of years he edited in Berlin the academic monthly "Osteuropa" (Eastern Europe), dealing primarily with the problems of the USSR. He has written several books on Russia, including one that was published in eight languages, and is a sincere friend of the Russian people and an admirer of their national genius.

THE VANTAGE POINT OF 1941

Bolshevism came into power as a result of the defeat of the Russian armies in 1914-1917. Will another defeat of the Russian armies in 1941 cause its downfall?

Should the answer be yes, tremendous problems will arise, much greater than those which are caused by the fall of the other countries during the present war. What form of state or society would take the place of Bolshevism in Russia? Who would be the owner of the vast industries developed during the last twelve years by the Soviet state? What would be the lot of some hundred million peasants who since 1929 have been forced to live and work in large, mechanized collectives, under conditions radically different from those in their old diminutive farms? What would happen to the Orthodox Church, to Islam, to the hundred and fifty national minorities within the Soviet borders, what to Central Asia and Siberia, to Russia's foreign relations, what to several hundred thousands of Russian refugees scattered throughout the world?

It is too early to discuss these questions, although this magazine will be among the first to do that when the time arrives. But irrespective of the outcome of the struggle raging over the largest battlefield in history, one thing is certain: the character and the features of Bolshevism will be profoundly changed by the present crisis, the greatest which it had ever to face.

At this historic moment, at a turning-point in European and particularly in Russian history, we look back over the road which Bolshevism has traveled. From the vantage point of the summer of 1941, with the life and death struggle of Bolshevism against its greatest foe going on before our eyes, we can see this road more clearly than at any other previous time. Countless books and articles have been written about Bolshevism. But their great majority has been devoted too
exclusively to naive praise or emotional condemnation. In this article we are not concerned with moral evaluations. We take for granted the knowledge that Bolshevism has destroyed in twenty-four years millions of lives, and an immeasurable amount of human happiness, and also that it has built immense new industries and made vast experiments in the field of social relations.

THE TWIN ROOTS OF BOLSHEVISM

In trying to understand and analyze the path of Bolshevism, and to discern in it more than meaningless zig-zags or the mystical workings of the law of dialectics, one cardinal fact will be stressed in these lines, a fact rarely recognized by the tens of thousands of admirers or enemies who have traveled through Russia during the past two decades—the fact that Bolshevism is the child of two totally different parents and that its history is an unending struggle between their opposing influences.

On its mother's side Bolshevism belongs to the well-known family "Emancipation." It has among its ancestors Rousseau, the men of the French Revolution, Karl Marx, Trotsky, and John Dewey. The terms and slogans most frequently heard in its mother's family were Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite, Democracy, Liberalism, Human Rights, and particularly Emancipation, Emancipation of the Woman, Emancipation of the Child, Emancipation of the Laborer—Emancipation of Everybody.

Through its father Bolshevism is a member of the old family of "The State." Here its ancestors are such men as Ivan the Terrible, Machiavelli, Peter the Great, Tsar Nicolas the First, and Stalin. In the coat of arms of this family one will find the words: Authority, Power, Discipline, Force, Plan, and above all, The Interest of the State. Hence among its ancestors two diametrically opposed ideas and many nations and races are represented. A study of the genealogical tree reveals that the paternal family is predominantly Russian, the maternal one predominantly Western. If we add to this the fact that the child was considered an extreme, not to say abnormal case by both parents, we can easily realize how many contradictions and complications there must be in the path of its life.

THE DOUBLE HERITAGE

At first the two divergent heritages were less perceptible. It is true that even before the revolution of 1917, while the Bolsheviks were still working "underground" as a small band of mutually acquainted conspirators, there was frequent friction within their ranks. But Lenin's authority was supreme, and Lenin managed with some success to combine the two forces in his person and in his policies. Perhaps he even believed that the Soviet (---council) structure represented a satisfactory compromise between initiative from the free man below and authority of the state from above, and of course he could not foresee what Stalin was some day going to do with the Soviet system. For a while the slogan "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" bridged the gap, for originally it meant a combination of freedom and force: the free proletariat was, through its dictatorship, to force the rest of the population into submission. But by now this slogan has completely lost its original meaning; today the whole of Russia is one huge proletariat living under a dictatorship.

Any number of examples could serve to show that on the whole the history of Bolshevism is the history of the struggle between its two heritages. Let me suggest education and wages, as two which seem to me particularly significant.

THE "WITHERING AWAY" OF THE SCHOOL

During the first years after the revolution the Soviet Union, ideologically
speaking, passed through its liberal era. The strict, conservative Tsarist school-system was turned upside down and the most modern, liberal ideas in education were introduced, largely from America. Emancipation of the child, free development of the child's genius without adult interference, these were the aims. Examinations, school-books, and students' uniforms, customary under the Tsarist regime, were immediately abolished as being strait jackets for the child's mind and body. Education was offered free of charge, the schools were opened to the children of the masses. (For students in higher institutions the government even paid for room and board.) The teachers had practically no authority, for—leaders of Soviet education maintained—their clumsy and unproletarian hands could only harm the harmonious growth of the child.

Extravagant hopes were placed in the children. They formed their own councils, directing the affairs of the school, deciding how the school-hours should be spent or whether the teacher should be purged. School-classes were dissolved. The very word "class," because of its evil connotation with class in the economic and political sense, was replaced by the word "group" (gruppa) and the former class-method by the so-called laboratory-method. Science, Mathematics, Russian, History, these and all other topics were thrown out, as being too narrow, too artificial, too utterly divorced from real life. Simultaneously the pedagogical leaders jubilantly announced the imminent "withering away" of the school (and of the family, for that matter). Neither teachers nor parents were to hamper the glorious growth of the Soviet child.

EFFICIENCY VS. SELF-EXPRESSION

The first break came in 1921. Lenin proclaimed the "New Economic Policy." A number of the revolutionary principles of the first few years were abandoned in favor of a more realistic attitude. The sobering influence of the NEP made itself immediately felt in all other fields, including the school. It was found that the children, although having a riotously good time, were learning very little that would make them useful members of the Soviet state and intelligent workers or engineers in its factories. There was more talk now of the duties of the individual than of his privileges, and one heard more often that Russia demanded efficient mechanics and typists than that she was in need of harmoniously developed young men and women.

"The Interest of the State" set forth its demands. The liberals had to yield. Unwilling to sacrifice the positions of the first revolutionary years, the educational leaders tried to meet the new conditions by closely linking school and factory. Thus they hoped to preserve the essentials of their liberal school-system while at the same time providing the State with the desired workers. But they were never quite happy about it. They felt humiliated that they had been forced to subject their beautiful educational theories to such a banal matter as the demands of the State, and they were only waiting for the opportunity to devote themselves again wholly to the withering away of the school and to the free development of the child.

SOLDIERS OF CULTURE

Their chance came during the early years of the first Five Year Plan which came into being in 1928. Education again acquired an entirely Utopian character. Many schools actually withered away, for hundreds of thousands of "soldiers of culture," mostly students, neglecting their school work entirely, were roaming the country, participating in "culture campaigns," teaching peasants how to read and write, and feeling like heroes of a new age. To be the principal of a school one had to be above all a loyal Communist and preferably a factory worker.

This heyday—so far the last—of the liberal Bolsheviks came to a close in
1931. When the excitement first caused by the Five Year Plan had died down and people began to take stock, they found a most distressing situation: an unbelievable amount of energy and enthusiasm had been spent, but what had been gained? To be sure, more peasants than ever before could read and write and the "soldiers of culture" were filled with extraordinary and valuable experiences, but where were the millions of qualified laborers, mechanics, foremen, engineers, scientists, physicians, accountants, managers, and hundreds of other professions which the rapidly growing Soviet economy needed in daily increasing numbers? Somewhere something was decidedly wrong.

"WE NEED MORE CADRES!"

A new term began to assume ever greater importance: cadres. This French word was originally used for the professional core or skeleton organization in an army and was extended, in the terminology of the Bolsheviks, to the professional and trained core in any section of the economic or cultural life of the state. We need more cadres! So said the speakers, the newspapers, the radios, so said the people when talking among themselves. The pre-war cadres had been largely destroyed or forced to emigrate. Meanwhile a huge Soviet industry was growing in all parts of the Union. Where were the cadres to turn its wheels? By 1931 the lack of cadres had become the central problem of the USSR.

Indeed, asked the people, why do we not have sufficient cadres fourteen years after the victory of the revolution? Why are the graduates of the Soviet school incapable of fulfilling the tasks set before them? The answer, given with increasing vehemence, was: because our school is all wrong, because it has lived in a Utopian world of beautiful liberal dreams instead of in a world of harsh realities. A flood of decrees and laws began to appear. (The first was the party decree of September 5, 1931; a very important one was also that of August 25, 1932.) They sharply criticized the existing school conditions, bitterly denounced the theory of the withering away of the school, demanded more work, less play, and the quickest possible turning out of reliable cadres.

THE FOURTH TURN

Within two years the educational system of the Soviet Union was again completely changed. It is not meant ironically but as a statement of fact when we say that the Soviet school of today is much more similar to the school of the Tsars than to that of the first revolutionary years.

Today there are again examinations (and the scholarships paid are differentiated in accordance with the grades). The authority of teachers and principals is fully restored. The pupils' councils which used to decide on a teacher's suitability merely exist as a relic of the past. The laboratory-method has been abolished, classes have been restored, the word "class" is back in use instead of "group." Specific subjects are taught again, even such subjects as Ancient History. The textbook has returned to favor. In the very characteristic party decree of February 12, 1933, which flayed the "wrong line" of abandoning text-books, forty-five million copies of various text-books were ordered almost overnight, and most of the printing presses of Russia had to stop whatever else they were doing in order to get the text-books out by autumn.

THE CROCODILE CRACKS A JOKE

Soon the ideas of the Soviet pedagogues of yesterday became today's object of ridicule. I remember a cartoon in the leading humorous Soviet magazine The Crocodile which poked fun at the pre-text-book conditions. In Moscow there are two rings of avenues around the city center. On the inner ring runs the streetcar-line "A" and on the outer the streetcar-line "B." The cartoon showed a teacher with a group
of children standing in the street and pointing at a streetcar. "This, children," the teacher said, "is the letter A, and now I will take you to the outer ring and there we will see what the letter B looks like."

"FOR COMMUNIST EDUCATION" TAKES A POLL

In the Soviet Union where the press is completely regimented it can change its tenor overnight. With the same ardor with which it had formerly extolled progressive education it now praised the opposite. For a long time, for instance, the absence of examinations in Soviet schools had been a source of pride and self-acclaim. Now the re-introduction of examinations was praised as a measure of wisdom and revolutionary significance. Children as well as parents came under the influence of this new interpretation and apparently accepted it without qualms. A Soviet newspaper, Za Kommunistitcheskoye Prosvestchenye ("For Communist Education"), took polls with gratifying results. Among other inspiring things it solemnly discovered "that 8.7 percent of the parents would whip their children if they did not pass their exams."

Even the uniforms, it was decided, were to be re-introduced, and lately—this is more serious than all the other changes—free secondary and higher education were abolished. Now the use of these schools is again confined to those who can pay for them.

So we see that education under the Soviets has had four complete about-faces, two under the influence of "Emancipation" and two under that of "The State"—pet all four in the name of the very same Bolshevism. But lest one might think that this is a peculiarity of Soviet education only, let us give another example to show that Soviet life in general went from one extreme of its heritage to the other, the turning-points again being the years 1917, 1921, 1928, 1931. Let us take, for instance, wages.

EQUALITY.

In the first period after the revolution there was among the millions of Russians a degree of equality in wages and standard of living which is unparalleled in modern history. Money had practically no value, what counted was the payok, the ration which was given according to the size of the family and not according to work performed. On the whole, Russia consisted only of two kinds of people, those who were dead, and those who barely made a living with their payok. Within each group there was equality. Equality, to be sure, on a very low level, but equality nevertheless.

CAPITALIST EXPLOITATION

The New Economic Policy introduced a rather timid differentiation of wages. The Bolsheviks found themselves in a dilemma. On one hand the State demanded greater production, on the other hand there was the Marxist tradition which made every device for speeding up work, such as piece-work, smack of capitalist exploitation. What could be done? It was a period when the State was on top: its demands had to be fulfilled. Gradually piece-rates were introduced in addition to wages on a time basis. A new wage-scale came into use which provided different wages for different jobs. The ratio between the lowest and highest wages was at first one to five, then one to eight, finally one to ten. In addition premiums were offered as a special inducement. But as wages and standards of living were slowly growing apart, the protests of those who considered this to be treason and a betrayal of the idea of equality, became louder. Particularly the Trade Unions demanded the return to time-wages with only small differences between the highest and lowest groups. And so again the direction was changed.

"WHY SHOULD WE WORK?"

One does not have to study psychology to know what will be the result if
an entire nation is paid more or less the same wages for any length of time. Obviously what happens is that nobody works. Those who are lazy by nature say, "Why should we work? We would not get more anyway." And the industrious ones will say, "Why should we work? The others don't and yet they get the same."

This attitude may have been all right as long as you looked at it from the point of view of the individual's liberty. But as soon as the requirements of the State were stressed, its demands for more coal and iron, for more tanks and guns, the picture changed completely. It was during the first Five Year Plan that this change took place. Increasingly the emphasis shifted from the individual to the State. And the State above everything else wanted more production. Evidently there was only one way to make people work harder: to pay them more for more work, to pay them less or not at all for less or no work.

"THE SIX CONDITIONS OF COMRADE STALIN"

On June 23, 1931, Stalin made a speech which I consider to be one of the most important documents of Bolshevist history. It soon became known as "The Six Conditions of Comrade Stalin." It was copied in millions of pamphlets and quoted in billions of newspapers. In essence this speech said, "Down with equalitarianism! (Not even the word equality was left, it had deteriorated in equalitarianism, uravnilovka.) Up with inequality, up with determined differentiation of wages! Only if we stimulate the individual worker by paying him higher wages for more work can we expect greater production."

Since this memorable speech things have developed very much in the direction demanded by Stalin. The wage differences have increased from year to year until today you can find people in Russia who earn a hundred rubles a month and others who make a thousand, five thousand, ten thousand, and even more a month. If you work more you get paid more, for the State needs more of everything. The State needs more automobiles, more oil, more planes. The State needs... the State needs... the State... the State... The emphasis has indeed completely shifted.

THE UBIQUITOUS FACE OF THE BUREAUCRAT

In the present period, which is the fourth lap in the course of Bolshevism, the State has won out completely over the individual. Nowhere in the world does the individual have less to say than in the present Soviet Union, where he stands as a helpless dwarf before that horrifying giant, the State, who holds in his hands the powers both of the employer and of the government. People who have not lived in the USSR do not realize what it means if state and employer are the same. In most other countries a man can, if he feels unfairly treated by his employer, go to a new employer or he can appeal to the State. But in the Soviet Union, wherever he goes, to factory A or to factory B, to the employer or to the State, he will find the same face: the face of the bureaucrat who represents THE STATE.

Some observers abroad sincerely believed that the new Soviet constitution with its many guarantees of human rights would change things. These people have been bitterly disillusioned. Under the new constitution more individuals than at any time before have been "liquidated" without due trial or any other regard for their human rights.

WORLD REVOLUTION

We have traced the two parental influences of Bolshevism and their mutual struggle because they help to solve many otherwise unintelligible contradictions and because they bring into focus nearly a quarter of a cen-
tury of Bolshevism which to many seems hopelessly confused.

But our task does not end here. For there is one more trend in Bolshevism which must be mentioned, a trend which it inherited from both its parents and which has remained the same no matter what influence happened to be the stronger at any given period. This is the desire for world domination.

THE RUSSIAN EAGLE

Among its paternal ancestors all the great Russian rulers were in the first place “Collectors of the Russian Earth,” as they were named by their chroniclers. The word “Russian” might as well be left out in this title, for the earth collected was mainly non-Russian when the collecting started. It includes almost five million square miles of Siberia, over one million square miles of Central Asia, not to mention the vast regions inhabited by Caucasian, Turkish, Finnish, and numerous other non-Russian and non-Slavic tribes conquered in the course of Russian history. To Peter the Great not even the Pacific was a barrier. It was he who inaugurated Russia’s march into Alaska and California, and his successors dreamt of flying the Russian Eagle over India, the Persian Gulf, and the Aegean Sea.

Any history book with a map on the growth of Russia from the small principality of Moscow to its greatest size in the latter half of the nineteenth century will bear out my contention that conquest without regard for natural or national limits was the proud tradition of the Russian Tsars. One should not overlook the fact that the Russians were peculiarly well equipped for this expansion over Europe, Asia, and even parts of America. More than a thousand years of life on the borders of Europe and Asia, of wars with Asiatic tribes and of marriages with their daughters, have made Russia a Eurasian nation which speaks the language of the West as well as that of the East.

THE COMMUNIST STAR

Even stronger and certainly more outspoken is the desire for world domination on the maternal side. Neither the men of the French Revolution nor the followers of Marx thought in terms of nations. They all believed that their star should shine for all men and that their program should be accepted by the world as a whole. Read the revolutionary French proclamations or the Communist Manifesto, or the books of the Comintern, and you will find it stated there with candor and vehemence.

It is this combination of national and international urges toward world domination which has caused world revolution to remain the one unchanging part of the Bolshevist plan. Wagescales, school programs, and many other things were radically altered several times during the history of Bolshevism. But no one has ever observed a change in the final aim: World Revolution. There have, of course, been differences of opinion as to the methods, but never as to the aim itself, the aim of a Soviet World, controlled from the “Capital of the World Proletariat,” Moscow.

THE STRANGE WAYS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Because of its close connection with the fixed aim of a world revolution, the foreign policy of the USSR has not followed the swings of the pendulum which have been described here and which can be found in all other spheres of Soviet life.

Take the last ten years of Soviet history for example. During the years 1931-1941 the inner-political development of the Soviet Union has remained essentially the same, yet the foreign policy has passed through many phases. First the Kremlin was on good terms with Germany, denouncing the injustices of Versailles and Geneva. Then it became a bitter enemy of Germany, defending the European status quo.
and joining the League of Nations. Next it made its peace with Germany in order to use Germany’s involvement in the present war for large gains of territory in Eastern Europe, and fought its war against Finland. And now again it stands on the side of Britain and America. Yet during this entire decade the USSR has remained the same dictatorship, as far removed from the ideals of her present allies as anything could ever be.

GERMANY AND THE USSR AT WAR

No one who has followed the political events of the last few years will doubt that everything was done by the opponents of Germany to bring the Soviet Union into their camp. In this they were successful. By the early summer of 1941 the German leaders were convinced that it had become only a question of time as to when Stalin would actively join the war against Germany. When on June 22 the German armies crossed the Soviet border their leaders did not underestimate the Red Army—better than anyone else in the world were they aware of its strength and weakness—but they were determined to strike the first blow in a struggle that had become unavoidable.

There was much rejoicing in the ranks of Germany’s enemies when the Bolshevist armies took the field against Germany. Did they expect the Red troops to defeat the German legions? Hardly. Did they wish them at all to be victorious? I have not been in England since the war began, but I cannot imagine that even the fury and hatred of modern war could cause the British to desire a Bolshevist victory over Germany, which would put the whole of Europe at the mercy of Stalin.

The American attitude has been very poignantly expressed in a recent issue of Time which speaks of “the emotional confusion of most U.S. citizens who looked upon a war in which they wished both sides would lose—but not too soon. It was a troubling experience for those who rejoiced when Nazis smacked into Russia, out of hatred of Communism—but who worried to see how hard they smacked; and for those who could see the logic of U.S. aid to Russia, since Russia was the weaker of two well-hated dictatorships—but gagged at the thought of a Russian victory.”

This is a frank statement which characterizes a strange political situation. Since the joint Churchill-Roosevelt message to Stalin, England and the United States are practically allies of the USSR. Yet all the sane elements—certainly in America and probably in Great Britain—do not want the Bolsheviks to win, as they realize the terrific consequences of such a victory not only for continental Europe but also for themselves. They are hoping for a repetition of the events in the Great War, when Germany and Russia wore each other out and in the end both collapsed. But they are hoping with little confidence. They know that Germany has learned from the bitter experience of the last war and they fear that, as Time puts it, they might be helped out of their emotional confusion by a German victory over the USSR.
HIGH LIGHTS OF THE GERMAN-SOViet WAR

By O. PRINCIPINI

The German-Soviet war is being fought on such a tremendous scale of men and miles that it will for a long time be impossible to obtain a clear picture of the actual course of events. Yet some general outlines are discernible. It is already obvious that the battle between Germany and the USSR differs from the previous campaigns of the present war. Here are the views of a competent observer on the first twelve weeks of hostilities.—K.M.

The Russo-German conflict, in the first twelve weeks of war, has had two essential phases—the “battle of the frontier” and the “battle of the Stalin Line”: battles of giants, the struggle of colossal armies, along frontiers and in war-zones practically unlimited.

While it is still too early thoroughly to examine the various phases of the fighting, certain conclusions are already clearly enough revealed. However, an objective military or political observer, before reaching definite conclusions, must proceed cautiously, limiting himself to a rational examination of the first fundamental aspects of the tremendous struggle and deducting from them the basic elements for a logical and well-based judgment.

Out of the fog of military secrecy the first lights and shadows of the new war have begun to appear.

Russia, upon entering this war, could rely on two sources of strength: the tremendous distances, and the huge reserves of man-power and materials; we shall later see how these have been utilized by the Red High Command.

Initiative and surprise—two fundamental elements of success in war—seem to have disappeared immediately, and perhaps forever, from the hands of the Red Headquarters. Three other elements, however, seem still uncertain to the distant observer: the moral cohesion of the Red troops; the leadership of the Red Command; and the actual provision of adequate, timely and efficient material aid to the Soviet Union by Britain and America.

NO BLITZKRIEG IN RUSSIA?

During the first week of the war there was real fear in London and Washington, perhaps more than in Moscow, of seeing Russia “blitzed” in a few weeks, as had been the case first in Poland, then France, and most recently in Yugoslavia and Greece. And as Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev are today still in Russian hands, the Anglo-American press speaks of a victorious Russian resistance.

The truth may very soon turn out to be quite different. It seems that in the Russian campaign the German Command has again taken the enemy by surprise, not only in the choice of time but also in the choice of tactical methods. It should be remembered that the real military purpose of a war is the defeat of the enemy forces, not the occupation of enemy territories. Victory is very often manifested, it is true, by the occupation of enemy territories, but not unless the occupation of the strategic territorial objectives presupposes the destruction of the defending forces by depriving the enemy of the very sources of his war-power and by striking directly at the heart and will of enemy resistance. All this is only true if, after the objectives have been reached, there are no more
enemy forces left capable of annulling the success already obtained.

From reports known to us up to now — reports that are necessarily fragmentary and incomplete — we are prompted to conclude that the German Command is applying in Russia a new tactical method which is perhaps most appropriate to the particular situation on the Russian front. There has been no spectacular drive, none of those audacious, impressive, arrow-like thrusts, as that on Lemberg in 1939 to cut any possible junction of Poland with Rumania, or as in France in 1940 the thrust on Amiens, Abbeville, and Dunkirk, or that on Athens through Salonika and Larissa. In the Russian campaign, the day-to-day situation of the opposing fronts has on some days shown wide and deep indentations toward the east; but generally the fronts have kept, and are continuing to keep, an almost unbroken line.

Perhaps the German Command, taking into consideration the vastness of the Red provinces and the great numerical strength of the Soviet armies, preferred to thrust directly into separate enemy armies instead of at great territorial objectives. In other words, "blitzkrieg" localized against the defending forces, as at Bialystok and Minsk, at Vitebsk and Smolensk, as recently between the lower Bug and lower Dniepr, and as in many other localities all along the wide Russian front.

**STALIN LOSES ADVANTAGE OF SPACE**

Another of the main conclusions it has been possible to draw immediately after the "battle of the frontier" is that Stalin has been compelled to give up his advantage of space. Enormous Russian land and aerial forces have been compelled to fight and have been defeated, all along the frontier, since the first day of the campaign without being able to withdraw to the main Russian defense line.

The "battle of the frontier" has fully confirmed what the German High Command suspected, namely, that Russia was for a long time secretly preparing for war, massing her forces to strike at Germany while the latter was engaged on other fronts. The tenacious resistance met by the German troops since the first day of this campaign has been possible only because there were already Russian troops and material at the Russo-German frontier practically ready to start the offensive themselves.

Perhaps history will later record that it is just this which has been the fatal self-condemnation of Soviet Russia. The timely move of the German Army compelled the Soviet Command to employ a great quantity of its forces when the Red Army was not yet completely ready to fight. And moreover, to fight not only at a time but also in a territory and in a manner less favorable to the Soviet forces.

In a defensive struggle such as the one now imposed on the Soviet forces, the Russian High Command had probably intended to exploit to the maximum the vastness and depth of the endless Soviet territory: in other words, to give up space in order to gain time; to gain time in order to prepare a fight under the most favorable conditions, namely, where, when, and in whichever way the grouping of her own forces and the general situation makes it advisable to fight, that is, to maintain the bulk of her own forces at a great distance from the enemy with a view to keeping fully her own freedom of action and of maneuver; to withdraw as far as possible from the starting-bases of the German forces in order to compel the German Command to lose time by searching for the enemy, to build new advance-bases for its land and air forces, and to reopen long ways of communication or to bring into use new ones.

We all know today that exactly the opposite happened. The Red High Command had deployed towards the
west all the bulk, and perhaps the best part, of its mammoth war-machine: its headquarters, its mechanized units, its imposing land troops, its airfields, its deposits of supplies. These Russian forces, arrayed for an attack, were now suddenly forced to fight a defensive battle in a most critical situation. Since it was impossible to take up in time positions further back—as would have been advisable in a defensive battle—the Russian Command had to accept open battle from the first day of the war, under conditions of great disadvantage to its own forces. Indeed the German Army was able, from the beginning of the campaign, to develop to the full its unfailing ability for the offensive, operating at short distances from its own starting-bases.

For the Russian High Command the surprise was complete. Not until after the first week of war was it reorganized and the front divided into the three known sectors: northern, central, and southern (Voroshilov, Timoshenko, Budenny).

THE STALIN LINE

The Stalin Line has already given its name to the second phase of the war. The fate of the great fortified lines in this war has been unfortunate. Mannerheim, Maginot, and Metaxas were really ill-advised to give their names to the principal defensive organizations of Finland, France, and Greece. Will the name of Stalin be any more fortunate? The results so far achieved by the Germans justify us in seriously doubting this.

We do not as yet precisely know either the actual course or the constructive details of the “Stalin Line.” It would seem likely that such a line has for its main object the defense of Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov; for its more immediate object the defense of the line of great advance centres: Reval-Smolensk-Kiev-Odessa. A summary glance at the map of Russia is sufficient to make clear that this line is undoubtedly powerful, due perhaps more to its natural advantages than its defensive preparations. Of great value are the supporting wings at the two opposite ends of the line, facing respectively the Baltic and the Black Seas.

In the north, the system seems to have consisted of an advanced line of defense along the lower river Dvina, a line which is completed in the rear by an excellent defense in depth, linked up with the Lake Peipus region and supported at a convenient distance by the naval base of Kronstadt and the great supply base of Leningrad.

In the south, on the Black Sea front, there was another multiple system of defense lines. First, an advanced line of fortifications along the lower Dniestr, well supported by the central supply base of Odessa and by the naval base of Nikolayev. The main defense line was perhaps constructed along the lower river Bug. Still further to the east is a defense line curving back onto the lower Dniepr, whose course at this point turns in again towards the east, which is not very favorable for the economical defense of that territory.

In the centre, the Stalin Line was probably based on the rivers Dvina and Dniepr. Toward its centre the courses of these two rivers (flowing in opposite directions) do not meet but turn off at an abrupt right-angle to the east, forming in that sector a wide corridor, long known as the “Corridor of Smolensk.” The cities of Vitebsk and Smolensk are both within this corridor. This is precisely the most dangerous point of the whole front, for through here passes the shortest route to Moscow, that is to the heart of the whole Russian defense system. Smolensk really deserves the name of the Western Gate of Moscow. Napoleon used this route for his advance on Moscow. In this war, Smolensk has already given its name to what is perhaps so far the bloodiest battle of the war. Both Vitebsk and Smolensk are entirely in the hands of German troops.
THE BATTLE OF THE STALIN LINE

This battle appears so far to be the decisive battle of the whole Russian campaign. War communiques confirm with daily increasing clarity that the Russian High Command has decided to throw into the Stalin Line the greater part of its fighting forces. The battle is still in full swing, but the outlines are visible.

For many weeks the German High Command has been hammering at the Stalin Line at various points, alternating its blows between the centre and the north and the centre and the south; with feints to the right and real blows to the left; with feints towards the Baltic and a terrific blow towards the Black Sea. The Soviet Command has tried to parry these blows as best it could, and to stop up with all possible haste the most threatening gaps in the system, thereby undoubtedly using up tremendous quantities of its land and air forces.

In the south, large Axis forces have got around the Dniestr and Bug from above, so that these two rivers have quickly lost all defensive value. The conquest of Nikolayev has effectively sealed the fate of Odessa, if not the potential fate of the whole rich coastal region facing the Black Sea. In the centre, large German forces have crossed the Dniepr, and turning to the south, already menace the rear of the whole defense system hinging on the great population centre of Kiev. In the northern sector, Leningrad is gripped in a vice, from the south and from the north. The fall of Leningrad would entail that of Kronstadt, whereby the Soviet forces lose their last remaining communications with the Baltic.

THE SOVIET UNION NEEDS MORE ARMS

At the beginning of the war the world was stunned by information published about the Soviet Army: officers, air-planes, tanks, in tens upon tens of thousands, soldiers in tens of millions; and other practically inexhaustible war resources in general. Truly impressive figures, even in comparison with the colossal war machines of the most modern and most powerful countries in the world.

Today, after over two months of war, Stalin has apparently sent out desperate S.O.S. messages to his friends in London and Washington. We do not know yet whether he has asked for aid in the form of man-power; but he has certainly made urgent requests for help in the form of war machinery and munitions, and perhaps of food; and it seems he even needs gasoline and other fuels and lubricants.

Supposing that all these things were available, how are they going to reach Russia? There is the painful question of ships already sunk in huge numbers on all the Seven Seas. This problem of transport was of most pressing urgency even before the German-Soviet war created new demands.

THE SOVIET COMMAND AND THE RUSSIAN SOLDIER

The capacity for leadership of the Russian High Command cannot yet be definitely judged, but it can already be subjected to severe criticism. The Red Army has long been called a “giant with a head of clay.” Years of “Red purges” have wrought havoc in the Army, particularly in the upper command, causing a grave crisis in quantity and quality, which has most certainly had an unfavorable influence on the conduct of the war. Up till now the Russian High Command has had to submit almost entirely to the initiative of the enemy.

Commanders and general staffs are not to be found in a hurry. To prepare good military leaders, just as to prepare good scientists, years of intensive, patient, and conscientious work are necessary; above all today, when technical science pervades and often pre-
dominates in nearly all fields of war activity. The use of large modern armies, provided with complex and delicate instruments of war, requires in the commanders a capacity for organization which can only be acquired after long and assiduous experience of command.

Anti-Soviet propaganda, especially that of England and America, has always represented Russia as a herd of cattle, held together by the whip of the herdsman Stalin with the aid of his faithful horde of vicious watchdogs, the OGPU. With or without a whip, the fact remains that the Red soldiers have certainly put up a good fight these first two months of war. The German Command has not failed to point this out. The younger generation in Russia, having grown up in the atmosphere of the Soviet regime, has learned to obey, to march and to die.

THE RED ARMY AND THE LESSONS OF PREVIOUS CAMPAIGNS

Russia entered the war nearly two years after the outbreak of the present European war. By now the Red Army has had the benefit of utilizing to its own advantage the lessons learned by others through experience. In this war, absolute supremacy in land warfare has until now been held continuously by the airplane and the tank. The binomial term of attack, "planes and tanks," has suddenly altogether ousted the old binomial term of defense, "trenches and machine-guns," which largely predominated in all sectors of the last World War.

Up till the beginning of the present war, the Red Army seemed to be among the best equipped in the world, especially in the fields of aviation and mechanized forces; at least in quantity if not in quality. It was therefore in a position to carry out a rapid adaptation to new methods of land warfare, based precisely on the intelligent use of airplanes and tanks.

In considering the Soviet performances so far one must recognize that "planes and tanks" are primarily used for offensive and counter-offensive. Russia, forced suddenly to fight on the defensive, has not been able to make much use of her great numerical strength in airplanes and tanks; moreover many were quickly destroyed by the German forces. The overrated Soviet parachute troops never put in a serious appearance.

The Red Army does not seem to have succeeded in contriving an "armor of defense" capable of halting effectively the attacking might of modern technical and aerial forces. But it has learned from the French defeat to fight in a very deep front and always to keep sufficient reserves to deal with enemy forces that have succeeded in breaking through.

REPERCUSSIONS

In the general field of the European conflict, the beginning of the Russo-German campaign had tremendous repercussions; it was immediately hailed by the Anglo-American press. London heaved a sigh of relief. The specter of a German invasion vanished once again. At Suez and at Gibraltar anxiety diminished. Traditional British policy could really boast of a genuine success. At last a new ally had joined the British Forces. Stalin was preparing to fight to the last Russian. In the heart of every Englishman was kindled the hope of seeing Germany hopelessly bogged in the Pripet marshes, crushed in the embrace of the Russian giant.

But apparently Stalin was more realistic, directly attacking the vital part of the problem: the active and effective co-operation of England and America. He would not be satisfied with empty guarantees like those given to Poland and others. He wanted not fine words but deeds: airplanes, cannons, munitions; not bombardments by Reuter but genuine and effective-
bombardments against the common enemy; fewer hymns of praise in honor of the Soviet soldiers but effective cooperation of British soldiers.

This new problem soon became a major anxiety for London as well as Washington. Were they to make British troops march on the heels of the Axis? This was without doubt the most propitious moment to date, with the greater part of the Axis troops engaged on the eastern front.

But where were they to march British troops to? The European continent? The High Command in London is still nursing the wounds received by British forces in Norway, at Dunkirk, and in the Balkans. Moreover, to disembark on the Continent would mean ships, thousands of ships.

Perhaps the possibility could be examined of another enterprise where the going was easy, such as the offensive in Cyrenaica against Italian troops who were without mechanized equipment; or the offensive in East Africa against Italian forces who had been isolated from their own country for a year; or the most recent campaigns against Iraq and the French in Syria?

We know now that the answer was Iran. This occupation of a neutral country brings British soldiers to the Persian oilfields and to the gates of those of Baku. How much the Russians will benefit by it, remains to be seen.
INDO-CHINA

Indo-China is one of the most recent countries on which the spotlight of world politics has been turned. A few weeks ago there were many who believed that its strategic importance might precipitate a Pacific war. We here present the personal accounts of two women authors concerning this little-known yet much talked about part of Asia.

The first deals with the coast of southern Indo-China, which has just been occupied by Japan. Who in former years had ever heard of Cam Ranh Bay? None but a few of the French officials, officers, and merchants who had made distant Indo-China, so far removed from the political bustle of the world, their home. Cam Ranh Bay lay peacefully asleep on the south-eastern coast of Indo-China, inhabited by a few Annamites fishermen and rarely seen by white men.

In the summer of 1939 the Bay impinged upon the consciousness of the newspaper readers of the world for the first time, through the disaster that befell a French submarine. But the name of the Bay did not make a lasting impression on the memories of most people.

It was not until the southern expansion of Japan began (about which more will be found in the documentary Appendix) that those interested in politics looked for the first time towards French Indo-China. The term “Cam Ranh Bay” began to appear more often in newspaper articles and in the telegrams of the news agencies. In a pamphlet of the Institute of Pacific Relations, published early in 1941 and devoted to the southward movement of Japan, the author, Andrew Roth, wrote about the Bay: “A Japanese fleet operating from this base could cut British communications between Hongkong and that ‘Gibraltar of the East,’ Singapore, and be in an excellent position to out-flank the defense of the Philippines, the coveted Netherlands East Indies, the British Malay States, and consequently threaten the maritime defenses of India.”

On July 31, 1941, at seven-thirty in the morning, a Japanese warship with the head of the Japanese military mission to Indo-China, Major-General Raishiro Sumita, entered Cam Ranh Bay, and on the afternoon of the same day a squadron of the Japanese Navy followed. In innumerable telegrams the name of the Bay was flashed to the press of the world. But although this name has now become a fixed term in the political vocabulary as a symbol of Japan’s southward expansion, very few people have any conception of the nature of the place. To fill this gap we have enlisted the aid of Mrs. M. Mornand and Mr. W. Lehmann.

Marie Mornand is the pen-name of a world-traveller, who, during the last few years, has many times motored over the road from Hanoi to Saigon, passing Cam Ranh Bay. In this account of her journey and in her photographs she gives a picture of the Bay and the whole strategic southeastern coast of French Indo-China occupied by the Japanese during the last few weeks. Mr. Lehmann is an artist who has rambled far and wide throughout the Orient. His picture in pastel gives his impression of Cam Ranh Bay at sunset.

Mrs. Catherine Lennard is of English-Swedish descent. She has lived much among the French, first studying at the Sorbonne, later making her home in Saigon. At the age of nineteen she published her first book in London. In her “Search of Pompeii” she describes an adventure in the interior of southern Indo-China, in the country of the Mois.—K.M.
"ROUTE MANDARINE"

The "Route Mandarine" connects the two most important cities of Indo-China—Hanoi and Saigon. This motor-road, completed in 1936, travels its whole length of eleven hundred miles through beautiful and extremely fertile country. Moreover, after Vinh it skirts the coast almost continuously. Much labor has been put into it, as parts of it lead through low-lying flood-districts. Even the raised embankments on which it runs in stretches cannot prevent the road being closed, sometimes for several days, during the rainy season because of floods.

The first place of interest, about midway between Hanoi and Saigon, is Tourane, a center of the French administration with an important harbor and airfield. Its museum is famed for its treasures of the Cham civilization, the oldest known civilization of Indo-China, examples of which are impressively preserved in a nearby grotto-temple. Away from the main-road lie the great ruins of Dong-Duong and Mison. Quinhon is a sea-side resort with a good beach and some famous Cham towers. In the neighborhood of the small town of Song Cau the country becomes covered with white salt as far as the eye can see, and attractive Cape Varella has a bay famous for its three picturesque rocks.

NHA TRANG

As far as scenery is concerned, one of the most beautiful spots of Indo-China is Nhatrang, the favorite sea-side resort of Saigon. During the school-holidays in April and May even the smallest room in Nhatrang is occupied. The almost white sand, which in the sun reflects an intolerable glare, makes the sea here seem even bluer than elsewhere. The public grounds are well kept, and there are charming private houses standing in big gardens. The Musée Océanographique shows in its aquariums the denizens of the Bay of Nhatrang, among which are fish of incredible colors. At the end of the town two red-brick towers of a ruined Cham temple stand on a granite rock. The walls of these towers, which have long lost their ornamentations, are now covered with lianas. High up in one of them, in the so-called "cellule obscure," Po Nagar is enthroned, the many-armed merciful goddess so deeply revered by the natives.

We were always very comfortable at the Grand Hotel de la Plage in Nhatrang, famous for its excellent cuisine. As a special favor we were given the "Appartement de l'Empereur," in which the present Emperor of Annam used to stay. (He now owns a beautiful villa in Nhatrang, from which he sometimes goes on shooting-parties in the neighborhood.) This suite has a delightful terrace, where from our long chairs we used to enjoy the sunset, and then lie late into the night, waiting for a cooling breeze.

CAM RANH BAY

From Nhatrang it is only a short drive to Cam Ranh Bay. It is a bay of tremendous extent and of a quiet beauty. Seventeen miles long, it is surrounded by wooded hills averaging thirteen hundred feet and affording perfect protection against storms. The water is anywhere from forty-five to sixty-five feet deep, and the bottom of sand and mud provides good anchorage. Moreover, the Bay possesses two important influxes of fresh water, the analysis of which shows a very low calcium content. This is an advantage greatly appreciated for technical reasons, as the water will then not foul ships' boilers to any great extent. The mouth of Cam Ranh Bay is within
three to seven miles of the commercial shipping route between Singapore and Hongkong.

In the coconut-palm groves near the beach there are a few huts built by fishermen. The beach is of fine sand and washed by clear, deep blue water. These quiet surroundings were the scene of a tragic accident, when, in the middle of June, 1939, a French submarine did not return to the surface from a diving practice. All attempts to save the crew of nearly a hundred French officers and men were in vain.

We never wished for a prolonged stay at this beautiful bay. The lodging facilities in the little hamlet situated on the beach away from the road are exceedingly primitive, and the warm lemonade cannot be considered a refreshment in this very hot place.

ANNAMITES, FRENCHMEN—AND JAPANESE

From here to Saigon the road first passes through palm forests interspersed with great fertile rice-fields, a picture of immeasurable natural riches. Further south we drive for hours along the beautifully cool and shady asphalt road through the rubber plantations of Cochin-China, where in parts the road is agreeably darkened by the high, closely planted rubber-trees, till we reach Saigon.

The entire coastal region we have passed through is densely inhabited. There is one village after another, and many Annamites, especially women in their characteristic pointed straw hats, can be seen working in the rice-fields and rubber plantations. So great are the throngs of people on the road that we had to buy an extra loud horn for our car, for with the standard one we could make no headway at all.

White people are rarely seen. Here and there in the villages there are small military posts, and even in the towns the number of Frenchmen is insignificant. It is usually composed of the highest French administrative official, the so-called Resident, with his assistants; the doctor; the hotel-proprietor; and the postal official.

Since the end of July things must have greatly changed along this coast, and especially in Cam Ranh Bay. An entirely new element appeared when this territory was occupied by thirty thousand Japanese soldiers and many units of the Japanese Navy.

IN SEARCH OF POMPEI

BY CATHERINE LENNARD

Dalat is a mountain station in French Indo-China, high and cool even in summer time. It is a favorite resort for the people of Saigon, although it stands in the very heart of the wild and hardly explored hill-country of the Mois. The Mois are nomads living in unattainable mountain regions. They have very little contact with civilization and are one of the savage tribes anthropologists like to study.

John had been quite ill and for his convalescence we had gone to Dalat. When he felt better, we decided to explore the countryside. According to rumors there existed a Moi village with the peculiar name of Pompei some 25 miles away, but it had not actually been seen by anyone we knew. Although we had had no previous experience with expeditions, we decided to search for Pompei.

We were able to find out on which path to start, but no more. We could not ask the Mois, not knowing their language. Although one saw them mending the roads leading to Dalat, or wandering through the village on their way to the market place, where they barter their oranges and dwarf mountain orchids for other necessities, they never stay long enough in any one place for one to become acquainted with their customs. I had often seen them, walking along in single file, their black bodies doubled up under the weight of
SUNSET AT CAM RANH BAY

Pastel by O. Lehmann
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From here to Saigon the road first passes through palm forests interspersed with great fertile rice-fields, a picture of immeasurable natural riches. Further south we drive for hours along the beautifully cool and shady asphalt road through the rubber plantations of Cochin-China, where in parts the road is agreeably darkened by the high, closely planted rubber-trees, till we reach Saigon.

The entire coastal region we have passed through is densely inhabited. There is one village after another, and many Annamites, especially women in their characteristic pointed straw hats, can be seen working in the rice-fields and rubber plantations. So great are the throngs of people on the road that we had to buy an extra loud horn for our car, for with the standard one we could make no headway at all.

White people are rarely seen. Here and there in the villages there are small military posts, and even in the towns the number of Frenchmen is insignificant. It is usually composed of the highest French administrative official, the so-called Resident, with his assistants; the doctor; the hotel-proprietor; and the postal official.

Since the end of July things must have greatly changed along this coast, and especially in Cam Ranh Bay. An entirely new element appeared when this territory was occupied by thirty thousand Japanese soldiers and many units of the Japanese Navy.

IN SEARCH OF POMPEI

BY CATHERINE LENNARD

Dalat is a mountain station in French Indo-China, high and cool even in summer time. It is a favorite resort for the people of Saigon, although it stands in the very heart of the wild and hardly explored hill-country of the Mois. The Mois are nomads living in unattainable mountain regions. They have very little contact with civilization and are one of the savage tribes anthropologists like to study.

John had been quite ill and for his convalescence we had gone to Dalat. When he felt better, we decided to explore the countryside. According to rumors there existed a Moi village with the peculiar name of Pompei some 25 miles away, but it had not actually been seen by anyone we knew. Although we had had no previous experience with expeditions, we decided to search for Pompei.

We were able to find out on which path to start, but no more. We could not ask the Mois, not knowing their language. Although one saw them mending the roads leading to Dalat, or wandering through the village on their way to the market place, where they barter their oranges and dwarf mountain orchids for other necessities, they never stay long enough in anyone place for one to become acquainted with their customs. I had often seen them, walking along in single file, their black bodies doubled up under the weight of
the heavily laden baskets carried on their backs; a small squealing pig usually bringing up the rear, tugging at the piece of string tied around its neck.

We started out with some provisions, a raincoat, as the rainy season was about to start, a stout walking stick, a torch, and some cigarettes. We loaded all our kit on to the backs of a couple of tiny Moi ponies—smaller than any good sized donkey—sturdy and sure-footed for tricky mountain climbing. At times it was even possible to ride the ponies, although it necessitated sitting on a native saddle made of the hardest possible wood.

It was a bright sunny morning, tempered by a cool breeze. Soon the pine trees gave way to tropical jungle growth. A few hours of riding brought us to the top of a hill where the road forked and we were faced with the problem of which path to take. We tossed a coin and took the lower road. It seemed queer that we had not seen anyone since we started. If we had been on the right track, we should have met a few Mois coming from the opposite direction.

In the next valley we came upon a little river flowing rapidly over large boulders. We tied up the ponies. The midday sun was beating down on us and the pine trees and cool breeze of the morning seemed very remote. We swam and dried ourselves in the sun. The sound of a waterfall nearby reached our ears, mingled with the usual jungle noises—the jungle, that strange combination of intense stillness and palpitating invisible life. We fell asleep, but were soon awakened by the falling on our heads of large drops through the branches.

The rain, looking like large steel needles being thrown from the skies, came down with a violence that left us both breathless with surprise. The path had become a roaring torrent, gushing down from the hills, and we frequently lost it entirely as we struggled knee-deep through the undergrowth. A tickling in my toes made me think the rain must have seeped into my boots, until I saw John's legs which were covered by a mass of small black leeches. We hurriedly searched for matches and cigarettes and, in spite of the rain, somehow managed to light them. Although John expressed a natural, and perhaps justifiable fear, that his legs would be burnt too, I held the burning cigarette end to each leech until it sizzled and dropped off.

The deluge stopped as suddenly as it had started, and we encountered a few Mois, coming along the path towards us. The men were short, with fine looking bodies, very well proportioned and muscular, and they carried their heads proudly. They wore loin cloths and dark blue embroidered jackets of handwoven coarse linen. The embroidery and fastenings were bright red. Their hair was long and done up in a kind of chignon on the top of the head. Some wore necklaces and bracelets of silver tubing. This jewellery is hand-made from melted coins. Others wore crude beads. The women were not as good-looking as the men. They were all naked to the waist and had long skirts wrapped round their loins. Many of them had cut the lobes of their ears and inserted circular pieces of wood, about three inches in diameter, into the opening. This gave the effect of enormous earrings. Men and women alike all smoked long thin bamboo pipes.

The Mois looked at us curiously, but when we smiled and offered them cigarettes, their suspicions were allayed. It was quite useless trying to talk, so I took out my note-book, and drawing a picture of a house, showed it to them. My efforts brought forth roars of laughter. "Show them the house and point in different directions," suggested John. This I did, with the result that they all pointed towards a small path that seemed to lead to the top of a mountain. When I uttered the word "Pompei" they laughed even louder. "That's all you will get out of them," said John. "We had better climb the mountain."
The sight of human life had given us a feeling of reassurance. But it began to rain again and we realized that a long wet spell had set in. By that time it was getting dark and chilly and the thought of tigers, panthers, and other wild beasts was with me constantly, though, having nearly reached our goal, I managed to suppress my fears.

Eventually we reached the summit. We eagerly searched for any signs of village life or cultivation, but we were to be disappointed. We decided to stay the night here—should any Mois pass by, we would see them. Also it seemed safer and drier here than in the hollow. John was still weak and went to sleep, while I kept watch with the lighted torch and a heavy walking-stick in my hands. In four hours' time he should take my place. It had turned cold. The matches were completely sodden and it was impossible to light a fire or a cigarette. The night was very dark.

Nothing exceptional occurred during my watch until a sudden peculiar sound, as of a deer calling to its mate, reached my ears. Something strange and slightly uncanny about this cry disturbed me. Then a vague form leapt across the path. There was no mistaking that agile grace—the two green lights that pierced the darkness of the night could never have been taken for the eyes of a deer. I heard a frantic neighing, followed by the mad galloping towards me of a terrified pony, and it was then that I realized with horror the disaster which had overtaken his companion. The pony and I clung to each other, united in terror. Only when I was reasonably sure that the shadowy form had disappeared down the valley—probably to quench his thirst after his excellent meal—I released the frightened beast.

Dawn was breaking and we were enthralled by the beauty of the rising sun creeping up through the mist that lay over the valley, when my joy was shattered by the sight of the disembowelled remains of the pony lying waiting to be claimed when darkness should descend again.

We hastily retraced our steps the way we had come to find the spot where the road had forked and then to follow the upper path this time. The bright morning sunshine helped us to forget the experiences of the previous day and night. There was no difficulty in finding the fork, though it was hard going with only one pony which we took turns to ride. Finally we espied a small patch of maize and rice growing on a hilly slope ahead of us. Pompei, at last!

The thatched roof of an oblong native hut appeared on the horizon, and hungry dogs, looking more like wolves, came running, barking, to meet us. Native women and children stood shyly near the fence which encircled the tiny village, but most of the men were away, working or hunting. We approached the hut, and after we had indicated that we were hungry, thirsty, and tired, they led the way to the entrance and hospitably invited us to enter. The huts were made of dried earth stuck on to a frame of wooden rafters. The roof was of reed thatching. Our first impression on entering the hut was that everything looked black and smelt of wood smoke. The women squatted on the floor and indicated that we should make ourselves comfortable on the low wooden couch covered with filthy rags.

One of the women was moved by our exhausted appearance and pressed a horn full of bitter rice wine to our lips. It had been used by the entire family and was in need of a good scrubbing. We also ate queer cakes made from maize flour, some over-ripe black bananas and other strange food. The black shiny rafters above our heads were strung with a variety of utensils, such as hunting knives, drinking horns, home-made baskets of every size and shape, long pipes, quivers full of arrows, and the great heavy long-bows that the Mois use for hunting wild beasts—even tigers. All these objects were black with smoke and of a very primitive design.
We had been sleeping for some time when we were wakened by the sound of a horn being blown outside, hailing the home-coming of the male members of the family. They entered the hut—an old woman at their head. She was the Matriarch. The men being so seldom at home, the head of the tribe is a chieftainess, and all business transactions, such as buying or selling land and animals, have to pass through her hands.

As it was getting late we asked our chieftainess to lend us a pony and show us the way home. She appeared to understand and consented graciously upon receiving a gift of money, our remaining cigarettes, and some chewing-gum that we happened to have in our pockets. Their child-like minds were much amused by a demonstration of how to manipulate the chewing-gum and they seemed to attach more value to this strange novelty than to the money. We left them playing gaily with the gum while the senior member of the tribe accompanied us to the entrance of the village. As we walked, he suddenly stopped and bowed down before a totem-pole; it was decorated with deers’ antlers, wild buffalo horns, a strange looking beard that had probably belonged to a goat, and several wooden masks with primitively drawn faces on them.

We mounted our ponies and rode off, while behind us the jungle again swallowed up the little village of Pompei.
THAILAND — OLD AND NEW

By Dr. LILY ABEGG

"The future of the Far East depends at present upon Thailand, which has become the powder-keg of Asia," declared the official organ of the Kuomintang in Chungking on August 8. A few years ago this statement would have made no sense whatever to the greater part of the world, for it was not until 1939 that people heard the word "Thailand" for the first time. That was when the National Assembly at Bangkok decided to change their country’s name from Siam to Thailand.

Since then—this is hardly an exaggeration—the term Thailand has appeared more frequently in the pages of newspapers and magazines than the old name had done in all the centuries of its existence. Particularly during this spring and summer the little country has been constantly in the news. While Thailand emphasizes the friendliness of its relations with all the world, the two countries most concerned, Japan and Great Britain, are watching each other with grave suspicion. Japan’s “New Order” and British Imperialism are now, after the occupation of southern Indo-China by Japan, separated only by the width of Thailand.

What is this country like, that has become such an important pawn in the game of the great powers? It is described in the following pages.

The author, Dr. Lily Abegg, is a writer and journalist of international background. A Swiss citizen, she spent the first twelve years of her life in Japan, went to school in Zurich, Switzerland, and studied at the Universities of Geneva and Hamburg where in 1925 she obtained her doctor’s degree in political science. Since then she has been in journalistic work in Europe and in the Orient, traveling extensively, always trying to come as close as possible to the scene of action and to see things for herself. In this way, although a member of the so-called “weaker sex,” she covered the campaigns in China by visiting both the Chinese and Japanese fronts, and those of Belgium and France by moving with the troops.

Although a highly qualified journalist, Miss Abegg was never satisfied with mere day-by-day reporting. Her desire to get at the root of things more thoroughly than newspaper writing usually permits found expression in two thoughtful books: one on Japan, “Yamato,” the other on China, “China’s Rebirth,” a review of which will be found in this issue. Dr. Abegg has just returned from a visit to Thailand. — K.M.

PEOPLE OF BUDDHA

On the evening of the birthday of Buddha special ceremonies in honor of the Great Master took place in the temples of Bangkok. We were invited to present at the ceremony in the Wat Phra Keo, one of the most magnificent of the temples. It stands next to the royal palace and contains a famous statue of Buddha made of jasper.

Our little group was composed of Europeans, Japanese, and Indians, all of whom were in Thailand for the first time, and I think the beauty and strangeness of the Thai temple architecture made an equally strong impression on all of us. The sky was cloudless, and, although late in the afternoon, it was still very hot. The last rays of the sun reflected from the golden eaves of the roofs and from the many stupas, each of a different
color. The red light of the evening sun lay over the great ceramic figures of the temple guardians, representing ancient seamen of Holland, and over stone statues in Chinese style.

THE RULER AS HIGH PRIEST

There are few trees and plants near the temples of Bangkok and in the temple-courts, so that there is nothing to subdue the shapes and colors of the buildings under the high dome of the sky. The accumulation of tall white columns, pointed iridescent roofs, innumerable green, blue, red, yellow, and white stupas, of galleries filled with images of Buddha, of variegated ceramic panels and statues of stone, bronze, and porcelain, all this at first seems somewhat cold and naked to the foreigner, until he is entirely captivated by the beauty of pure form.

More and more people, with burning incense-sticks in their hands, gather in the courts and galleries. They are dressed lightly in pale colors, as gay and brilliant-hued as the glittering temples and the tropical sunset. A light breeze tinkles the hundreds of little golden bells decorating the galleries and pavilions. Many high officials and officers in white uniforms now appear. This means that the Prince Regent, who is to worship Buddha in this temple today, must soon arrive.

While the last rays of the sun disappear and the moon rises, small candles are lighted everywhere. Which was more beautiful, we wonder: the majestic splendor of the rays of the sun or the tender light of candles and the moon? Although we come from quite different countries, the style of Thai temple architecture impresses all of us with the same surprising force. It is quite different from anything we have seen further east or further west. The Japanese try to grasp the uncustomed height of the temples with their slender, aspiring columns and the extravagant use of varied materials and colors. The Indians are impressed above all by the roofs and the numerous small decorations which betray Chinese influence. One of the Indians cannot get over the fact that the Prince Regent himself will conduct the holy ceremony as High Priest. He holds forth at length about how this demonstrates that Thailand is a Buddhist monarchy—the only one in the world—and that all the people of Thailand, with the exception of a few Mohammedan Malays in the south, belong to the same religion, that of Buddha. Coming from the country of many religions, of innumerable sects, and thousands upon thousands of gods, he can only repeat, "That is interesting, extremely interesting."

WHERE INDIA AND CHINA MEET

We foreigners from the Occident, on the other hand, in spite of so much strangeness, feel one step nearer Europe. After Japan and China, lands of massive roofs and horizontal lines, these soaring columns remind us almost of Gothic architecture. When we find ourselves in one of the high temple-halls, with the sacred figure in the background, we are reminded much more of a Catholic church than of a Chinese or Japanese temple. The entrance, too, is at the narrow end of the building and not at the side as elsewhere in the Orient, and the walls are massive and windowed. Strangely enough, in their bizarre forms and glorious colors, the temples of Bangkok offer the European just that which he usually expects to find in the Orient, while in the details of their construction they are more closely related to the buildings of the west than of the Far East.

We are still philosophizing about this "Country where India and China meet," and agree that the Thai race, in spite of influence from the east and the west, has not disintegrated, but rather has developed its own original style. Suddenly we are startled by loud music. The people bow their heads: the Prince Regent is coming! With a friendly smile he walks through the crowd into the temple and bows before the image of Buddha. After a while he appears in the colonnade with a lighted candle in
his hand, and the high officials and officers approach him one by one to light their candles from his. Then the procession, with the Prince Regent at its head, slowly walks three times round the temple. In the meantime the night has become quite dark. The crowd, silent and respectful, watches the candle procession of their highest ruler, the representative of their boy-king. Each time the Regent passes the entrance the music becomes louder, then to die down again.

After the Prince has left with his retinue the whole crowd, with candles and sticks of incense, begins a procession round the temple. Tonight this is happening not only at the Wat Phra Keo, but in all the other temples in Bangkok. Buddhist nation! Buddha is the supreme Lord and Master, and his earthly representative is the King.

DEVOUP THAILANDERS

The Thai are a religious people. Almost every Thai has, as a young man, spent at least two or three months as a monk in a monastery, while many like later on to retire into a monastery for a considerable time. During this period the strict rules of the monastery must of course be observed. Every morning for example, the monks have to go round with their bowls to beg for their daily rice themselves. Moreover, they may eat nothing after twelve noon. Phya Bahol, the leader of the revolution of 1932, now known as an “elder statesman,” recently withdrew into a monastery for some time, while the present Prime Minister and energetic leader of the nation, Luang Bipul, is about to do the same thing for several weeks.

There are no sects in Thailand; all adhere equally to the Hinayana (the southern branch of Buddhism, originated in Ceylon). For this reason all the priests and monks are similarly dressed in yellow, and this yellow of the monk’s robe forms part of the characteristic and everyday picture of Thailand. There is hardly a town or village which does not contain several temples and in which one does not meet innumerable yellow-robed monks. Every day school, too, begins and ends with prayers during which not even the teacher may dare to enter the classroom.

The Buddhist religion forms the basis of this nation’s way of life, regardless of whether it may be the old Thailand or the new.

BANGKOK MODERNIZED

Although the Thai are so deeply influenced by their religion, it does not mean that they have not developed in the course of history. Particularly during the last ten years these people have effected great changes and made the utmost effort to attain universal modernization. Whoever expects to see only fine old temples, bronze statues, and Sawankalok bowls will learn differently the first time he drives through the city.

The city of Bangkok consists of the business quarter, forming more or less the centre of the city, and a large residential district, containing mainly private houses, built in western or Thai style, and Government buildings.

The business quarter reminds one of the large coastal cities of China, from Tientsin to Canton. And not without reason, for this part of the city is built in the Chinese manner and is inhabited mainly by Chinese. Even the western-style buildings, the “New Road” and the foreign business houses, banks, and consulates, fit into the picture, for they too can be found everywhere in China. The economic life of Thailand, especially its commerce and trade, is still largely in the hands of Chinese, who, during the last few decades, have immigrated into Thailand in large numbers. However, the Government is making every effort to change this situation, and today numerous large and purely Thai economic enterprises already exist.

Of course there is no room in the densely populated old business quarter, with its narrow streets and dirty
canals, for new building activities. For this reason the city is extending further and further. Out in the residential district are many new houses: administration buildings, schools, and factories. Right in the country, sometimes in places where the roads have not yet been completed, modern buildings with flat roofs have arisen in the last few years, testifying to the Thais' will to progress and development. One is reminded of Hsinking, the capital of Manchukuo, where a new city also arose quite recently from the fields.

In strange contrast to the modern buildings are the Thai dwellings, standing on piles over six feet high. This way of building resembles that of the Malays and the Filipinos. Only the temples and most of the royal palaces of the Thai are built on firm ground. This can probably be traced to Indian influence, as the Thai religions, Buddhism and Brahmanism—the latter at one time temporarily exercising great influence—came from India.

Looking at the farmers' huts in the surroundings of Bangkok, one can immediately determine whether they are inhabited by a Thai or a Chinese family: one lives on high stilts, the other stays close to the "good earth." The Thais are occupied almost exclusively with the cultivation of rice and fruit, while nearly all vegetables are grown by Chinese.

TROPICAL TRAFFIC

In Bangkok one can never forget one is in the tropics. This eternal heat! Even in the coolest months, December and January, the mercury rarely drops below seventy degrees, and in the hottest period, in April, it often hovers for days at over a hundred. The rainy season begins in May and lasts well into the autumn. During this time it does not, it is true, rain incessantly, however there are showers nearly every day, relieving the heat for a few hours. Life in the city is entirely adjusted to the tropical climate. All the houses, even the foreign ones, are without glass windows; during heavy rain one simply closes the shutters. Also the walls of the houses are provided with numerous slits and openings to let the air pass through.

The trams and buses are entirely open, with no doors or windows. There are no special bus-stops: one can get on anywhere—a pleasant arrangement, for in that heat one is glad to save oneself every unnecessary step. In addition to these means of transportation and to the taxis and private cars, there is a special vehicle in all the larger places in Thailand—the "samlo," meaning "three wheels." It is a tricycle with a fairly wide seat behind the driver with room for two people. It is therefore a kind of rickshaw with a man riding instead of running. These samlos are much faster and more popular than the old-style rickshaws, which are rapidly disappearing.

Of course the work of the samlo-driver causes him to sweat almost continuously. Sometimes there are two grown-ups, one or two children, and a lot of baggage in a samlo, but in spite of the load the driver dashes through the streets with incredible speed. Fortunately nearly all the roads of Bangkok, with the exception of the business quarter, are fine avenues with great shady trees. Many of these avenues were laid out by King Chulalongkorn, who reigned at the turn of the century. His motto was, "My people shall walk in the shade."

"KLONGS," A MALODOROUS SUBJECT

Bangkok has not only streets but also innumerable canals, called "klongs," which carry a large part of the traffic. Many people do not own a house, living instead entirely in their boats, just as in Canton and South China. Every day a large market is held on the water, where mainly fruit and vegetables are for sale. If one wants to buy, one must, of course, go there by boat.

These klongs of Bangkok have been given a rather unfortunate reputation by the authors of many travel-books. The reason for this is their indescrib-
able filthiness; the water is brownish, often even black, and evil-smelling. The foreigner is shocked to see people washing laundry and vegetables in this water, and even bathing in it. Actually the Thai are a cleanly people, a fact that is often not believed by those foreigners who only know Bangkok. I have visited many towns and little villages from the extreme north to the extreme south of the country, and have seen nothing but clean, well-kept houses and huts. I also saw everywhere that the people bathe several times a day in the rivers which, in the country, are clean and limpid, and that they are always cleanly dressed. One gains the impression that the Thai are not yet properly accustomed to life in a city of the size of Bangkok, and that they make the mistake of transplanting rural customs into the city.

Improvements are gradually being effected, and Bangkok has had a water system for many years, so that at least for boiling their rice people can use water from the tap and not from the filthy klongs. But as yet there is not enough opportunity for clean bathing. The heat is so unbearable and the desire for a cooling bath so great that people prefer to go into dirty water rather than give up bathing altogether. The Thai really have a craze for bathing; not only do humans bathe continually, but also animals, especially the water-buffaloes. In the evening one can often see humans and water-buffaloes seeking coolness in the river side by side—a picture of peace. Sometimes tiny children, still unable to walk properly, crawl by themselves to the nearest fountain, where they sit under the jet of water, squeaking with joy.

WHERE DO THE THAI COME FROM?

Among the many tribes that, in the course of time, were forced out of the enormous Chinese territory by the astonishing power of expansion of the "Sons of Han," the Thai are the only ones who have succeeded in retaining their integrity, thanks to their ability in founding and maintaining a state. The Thai are a Mongoloid race, related to the Chinese, which has strongly intermixed with other races. In prehistoric times they inhabited the north as far as the Yellow River and later, about two thousand years ago, the present-day provinces of Szechuan, Yunnan, and Kweichow. In the first and second centuries A.D., Chinese pressure forced one part of the Thai toward the southwest, so that they came to the territories of present-day North Thailand and North Burma. From then till the thirteenth century the influx of Thai gradually pouring into what is now Thailand and French Indo-China never ceased. The first small Thai principalities came into existence, and there began the conflict with the Khmer civilization, the greatest example of which is Angkor.

Nevertheless, a large part of the Thai race remained in China until the thirteenth century, mainly in present-day Yunnan, where the Thai occupied the great Nanchao Empire from the seventh to the thirteenth centuries. From here they undertook wars of conquest, which temporarily took them as far as Szechuan, Tibet, Burma, and a great part of French Indo-China. Often, however, the Chinese had the upper hand, and at the end of the ninth century a Thai king, worn out by many wars, declared himself a vassal of the Emperor of China. This had also happened from time to time in previous centuries. After this until the end of the eighteenth century the Chinese considered the Thai kingdoms as vassal states.

The Nanchao Empire was destroyed in 1253 by the assault of the world-conquering Mongols. The Nanchao-Thai followed their brothers, who had been wandering southwards for a thousand years, into the territory of what is now Thailand. Not until then did the real national history of the Thai in Thailand begin. The pressure they exerted on the neighboring Cambodians forced these to transfer their capital in 1431 from Angkor to Phnom Penh.
"THAILAND" AND "SIAM"

The word "Siam" appeared comparatively late in the history of the Thai. Originally it was only the designation for a small district which later (as often happens in history) became the name of the whole country. The expression Thai is in relation to Siamese more or less what the designation Slav is to Russian. With the decision of the National Assembly in Bangkok of 1939 to change the name of the country from Siam to Thailand, Thailand raises the political claim to embody in one great empire all Thai and not only the Siamese.

Among the people belonging to the Thai race, more than half live in neighboring lands. The Laos, inhabiting large territories in French Indo-China, are now called Northern Thai in Bangkok, and the Shan in Burma are called Western Thai. The Thai maintain that there are now forty million people belonging to the Thai race. This figure, however, seems exaggerated. In Thailand itself there are ten to twelve million Thai, in French Indo-China about two million Laos, and in Burma about the same number of Shan. There are only divergent estimates of the number of Thai left in China, but one can hardly suppose that the total number of more or less pure Thai exceeds twenty to twenty-five million.

THE REVOLT OF 1932

Thailand is one of the countries where old-fashioned and modern organizations and customs continue to exist side-by-side. The last decade seems to have been the period of greatest progress. It began with the revolt of 1932, which turned the absolute into a constitutional monarchy. The change of the constitution at that time took place comparatively smoothly and without bloodshed; it had more the character of a reform than that of a revolution. The prestige and popularity of the royal house, which was then robbed of its absolute prerogatives, were in no way diminished by the reform. This was especially apparent three years ago when the King, who is only fifteen and is being educated in Switzerland, came on a visit to Bangkok. The entire population turned out to greet their young ruler. As the King has not yet reached his majority he is now represented by the Prince Regent.

As a result of the overthrow, younger and more energetic men took over leading positions, men who till then had had scant chance of participating in the government. Under the absolute monarchy all important positions were occupied almost exclusively by princes and members of the royal house, while the educated upper class had but little influence. The reform at the time was instigated mainly by the army, and the present Government is consequent­ly formed preponderantly by officers. The leading personality of the Government is the Prime Minister, Major-General Luang Bipul, who simultaneously occupies other important posts. One can say that new Thailand is led by the military. The main efforts of the Government during the last few years have been directed toward the country's economic advance and the raising of a healthy and capable youth.

ECONOMIC EFFORTS

Thailand economically is in a rather difficult position, being still too dependent on other nations. In former times too little was done for the development of the country, and it cannot be expected that this loss should be made up in a few years. Almost as large as Japan (without Formosa and Korea) and larger than Italy, Thailand has only fourteen million inhabitants. While most countries in Asia are overpopulated, Thailand is the only one that is underpopulated. Doubtless many more millions of people could live there.

The main exports are rice and wood, also tin and rubber which are produced in the south of the country on the Malay Peninsula. The export of rice could no doubt be multiplied by the reclamation of large wastelands. In many districts
where only one crop a year is harvested, two crops could be harvested if the irrigation system were improved, so that the rice could also grow during the dry season. Up till now the people saw no necessity for a more intensive cultivation, as they had always enough to live on. Famines such as devastate China and India are practically unknown.

The country needs larger exports in order to acquire the necessary means for building up industry. In Thailand there is even less industry than, for example, in China. Experience has shown that countries without industry can hardly maintain themselves in the struggle for existence, since industry is the basis of defense. It is impossible to raise a formidable army if every piece of equipment, from leather-straps to cannons, must be imported from abroad.

What Thailand needs, and what the present Government is now trying to launch, is a general boom, as all domains of economic life—industry, commerce, trade, and agriculture—are so closely interwoven that one requires the flourishing of the other to exist healthily.

To the industrial backwardness must be added another weakness: the lack of interest, one can almost say the distaste of the Thai for commerce. The Thai really only have two professions—they are either rice farmers or officials. (We need not mention here the more primitive tribes, living in Thailand yet not belonging to the Thai race, as they form only an uninfluential minority.) There is little left of the traditional crafts such as silver and lacquer work or weaving.

Commerce as well as crafts were until recently exclusively in the hands of Chinese, Indians, and other foreigners, i.e. Europeans, Americans and Japanese. The Chinese, however, had a definite preponderance.

**TWO MILLION CHINESE**

Of a total population of fourteen million, there are two million Chinese. Considering their proverbial diligence and business ability, one can readily imagine the influence the Chinese exercise in Thailand. Since economic power may easily entail political influence, the main effort of the Government is directed towards recapturing economic key-positions for the Thai. Consequently very strict measures have been taken against Chinese immigration, which had assumed extraordinary proportions during the last fifty years.

The attempts of the Government to regain the economic lead for the Thai have encountered many difficulties. First there are inhibitions of a psychological nature, innate in the Thai; secondly, the Chinese and other foreigners do not allow themselves to be easily supplanted. One reason that the Chinese regard the Government's efforts at independence with suspicion is that lately the Thai have been trying for a closer economic co-operation with Japan. The Chinese, with their rather anti-Japanese feelings, are resisting this tendency, and often find an ally in the British, who have always had a strong financial and economic influence. Up till now most of the exports went to different parts of the British Empire. In fact the important tin production went exclusively to Penang and Singapore, as there is not a single smelting-plant for this ore in Thailand. Also in their imports—of gasoline, for example—the Thai are completely dependent on England and the Netherlands East Indies.

**EXEMPLARY EDUCATION**

Realizing that the economics of a country cannot, after all, be organized only from above, but that they are dependent on the people, the Thai Government has directed its main attention during the last few years toward the education of youth. I believe that the successful reorganization of education is the greatest achievement of the Government since the revolt of 1932. When one sees the numerous new schools and the present-day youth of Thailand, one gathers the impression
THAILAND—OLD AND NEW

that this people has a promising future, even if, according to our standards, much is still painfully backward.

I have traveled a great deal in China, where, for the last twenty years, new plans for the “final” abolition of illiteracy have been announced over and over again. Although some improvement can be seen, I have found that a large part of these “final” plans is still on paper. In Thailand this is not the case. Today all children, except those of primitive tribes living in distant jungles, go to elementary school.

One should insert here that the Thai, though originating from the territory of present-day China, and with a language of purely Chinese origin, do not use the difficult Chinese characters; instead they have a phonetic system of writing, similar to the Indian and Malay. Without doubt this fact simplifies the struggle against illiteracy. In fact, the proximity of Indian and Chinese influence is one of the characteristics of Thailand. Even the outward appearance of the Thai race reveals that it must have intermixed considerably with Indians, Cambodians, and Malays. A large proportion of the Thai race is today much darker than their ancestors, who were a purely Mongoloid tribe when they emigrated from China to the territory of present-day Thailand.

Furthermore, new middle schools and especially trade schools were founded by the Government in order to train a new generation of tradesmen and craftsmen. It also aimed at directing the interest of young students towards natural science and technology. For hitherto, Thai students, regardless of whether they were studying abroad or in their native Chulalongkorn University, were interested in little but the Beaux Arts. These efforts were successful, for in the last two years the enrolment at the Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok for the courses in engineering and medicine has risen considerably.

THE SYMBOLS OF NEW THAILAND

If I were asked what I considered to be the symbol of the new Thailand, I would answer: the school-house and the Yuvajon, the great youth-organization of Thailand. Everywhere there are new schools. In every town and village they are the most striking buildings. Sometimes they are at the very edge of the jungle, where snakes crawl and monkeys play screaming in the trees. These schools are beautifully built according to sensible plans. I had the opportunity of visiting many schools in different parts of the country, and everywhere I was delighted by the pleasant manners, the discipline, and the eagerness of the children. The young people are quite different from the older generation, much more nationally-mind ed and anxious to serve their country. In every school in Thailand, from kindergarten to the University, the national flag with its red, white, and blue stripes is solemnly raised every morning, while pupils and students stand at attention. Of course, also in the realm of education everything cannot be done at once, so that in practice there are still some things lacking. For instance there is a shortage of modern teaching equipment; in the middle schools the equipment for teaching chemistry and physics is still quite insufficient.

All school-children in Thailand wear the same uniform—the girls usually blue skirts and white blouses, the boys greenish-khaki jackets and shorts. Many boys wear a red band around their caps as a sign that they are members of the Yuvajon.

YUVAJON

It is not every boy who can become a member of the Yuvajon. He must first undergo a test and a medical examination. The membership is voluntary, and greatly sought after. Although the training is very strenuous, every boy wants to become a member.

The organization of the Yuvajon is chiefly the work of Colonel Prayoon Montri, Vice-Minister of Education,
who is the leader of the movement. It may be noted in passing that Thai names are often used incorrectly by foreigners. When I was in Tokyo before leaving for Thailand, I often heard of the Vice-Minister of Education, "Colonel Montri," who happened to be in Tokyo at the time. In Bangkok I immediately made enquiries about "Colonel Montri," but no one knew who I was talking about. Finally it turned out that in his country he is called Colonel Prayoon. The real family-name is hardly ever mentioned in Thailand, and even in the case of well-known men one sometimes does not know what their family is really called.

The Yuvajon is an organization similar to the youth movements in Japan and in Germany. The fact that active army officers are in charge of the training, and not, as in Germany, young leaders from the ranks of the movement, is reminiscent of the Japanese system. On the other hand the Yuvajon, as a unified, national organization, exists independently of the schools, much like in Germany.

The supreme aim of the Yuvajon is to strengthen the young people's national consciousness, spirit of sacrifice, and eagerness to serve. Almost purely military methods are used to reach this goal. First place is given to discipline, drill and athletics. These boys with their marching, drilling, and sharp-shooting seem more like young cadets from a military school. Duty is very strict. Every Saturday, for instance, the Yuvajon have to carry out military maneuvers for three to four hours in full uniform and armed with a carbine. I have seen these boys drilling on a large square in Bangkok with the temperature at 107 degrees. Under the tropic sun the cement square radiated a paralyzing heat. The boys sweated so much that there was not a dry shred of clothing left on them, and the soaked uniforms appeared quite dark.

TANKS AND TEMPLES

It is sometimes said that the Thai have been weakened through centuries of living in a tropical climate and that they have lost their powers of physical endurance and resistance. I believe that this is at most a half-truth, and that their weakness is more of a psychological nature and can consequently be overcome by will-power. In any case, Thai studying abroad, where sport is more popular than was until recently the case in Thailand, have proved to be quite the equals of other students. Incidentally, it is amusing that these children of the tropics make excellent skiers when the opportunity arises.

On June 24, Thailand's National Day, a large military display of the Yuvajon took place in Bangkok. On one side of the square a sort of Maginot Line had been constructed, with several concrete domes and artificial tank-traps. This was attacked by fourteen to eighteen-year-old members of the Yuvajon in a completely modern manner, with motorized troops, tanks, artillery, and airplanes. The "battle" lasted about forty minutes. The thunder of the artillery duel was ear-splitting, airplane-motors roared overhead, and tanks and flamethrowers spat terrifying fire. Finally a large white flag appeared; the garrison surrendered, the fortifications having collapsed under the artillery-fire and the bombs.

The entire maneuver was carried out by boys; only the airplanes were manned by regular soldiers. At the end a parade under the command of Colonel Prayoon was held before the Prince Regent.

As we drove home, the tanks rattled past the walls of the picturesque palace and the Wat Phra Keo, a symbol of Thailand today: old temples and royal palaces with weird, colorful roofs, towers, and stupas—and modern tanks. Thailand too has entered, for better or for worse, the ranks of nationalistic states and follows the familiar modern pattern. The tropic land of jungles, elephants, and beautiful old Wats, is determined to arm, and to maintain its independent position in the present world of tension and danger.
Yellow robed Buddhist high priest at golden lacquer gate of temple

Water buffalo walking in rice fields among sugar palms. The natives tap the palms for syrup

Thailand
Old and New

Life on the "Klongs," the canals of Bangkok

Girl section of the Yuvajon

Samlos in front of modern post office in Bangkok, built by a Thai architect
THE GUARDIAN, by Arno Breker
A modern sculptor's conception of a warrior
Thirty million men march at these men’s orders

U.S.A.:
General Marshall,
(Chief of Staff)

JAPAN:
Lieutenant-General Tojo,
(Minister of War)

Major-General McNair,
(Chief of Staff of the Armies’ General Headquarters)

General Hata,
(C. in C., Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China)

General Drum,
(Commander of the First Army)

General Itagaki,
(C. in C., Japanese-Korean Garrison)

Lieutenant-General Lear
(Commander of the Second Army)

General Araki,
(Former Minister of War)

A comparison of these portraits shows that each group represents a national type radically different from any other. There is as little similarity between the American and the Japanese faces as between those of the Prussian noblemen and the Russian peasants.
Sixteen faces—
four national types

GERMANY:
Field-Marshal von Keitel,
(Chief of the Supreme
Command of the German
Armed Forces)

U. S. S. R.:
Lieutenant-General Rychagov,
(Chief of the Soviet Air Force)

Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch,
(C. in C., German Army)

Marshal Voroshilov,
(Commander of the
Northern Front)

Commanders of the Central Front
Field-Marshal von Bock

Marshal Timoshenko

Commanders of the Southern Front
Field-Marshal von Rundstedt

Marshal Budenny

These men incarnate the spirit of the armies they lead, armies composed of the flower of youth of four great nations.
NO WILD MEN IN BORNEO
By HILAIRE DU BERRIER

Ours is a very serious world. We are living in the crescendo of a great human catastrophe. Yet fortunately there are always some who see the bright side. Their humor, their story-telling talent make us relax and smile. This is what Hilaire du Berrier does with his story of Borneo—Borneo that may well be on the front pages in another few months.

Hilaire du Berrier, born on the edge of the Sioux Indian Reservation in North Dakota, has been a soldier-of-fortune, a painter, a writer, and a wanderer ever since they threw him out of military school in America.

One of his first jobs was demonstrating parachutes and hanging under airplanes on a rope ladder for a flying circus; his most amusing and least profitable one, he says, was representing French arms and Dutch airplanes in the Balkans with a Hungarian Baroness for a business partner. They gave dinners in twenty countries but never sold a gun.

He went through the war '35 and '36 in Ethiopia. He flew a pursuit plane in the Spanish Civil War, has lived in London and Paris and Monte Carlo, written articles on French Somaliland and Morocco.

In Paris du Berrier was a contributor to "Petit Parisien" and "Hebdo III", since then he has appeared in "Ken" and in "Esquire." The latter magazine will shortly publish a series of stories by him on European cities before the war.

Speaking of his experiences, he is immensely pleased when people call him an adventurer. Among princes, he says, it is a title, only among peasants an insult. He became a soldier-of-fortune because it seemed the only thing he could get into without having to join a union. It is really the world's oldest profession, half-way point between a firing-squad and a throne, nobler than diplomacy and fraught with danger, chief of which is always starvation.

Down on the Red Sea he became a Mohammedan; he believes the Arabs are right: a man should live by poetry and the sword.

He came to China in 1937 and got a job in the interior. Discharged, he was left to wander back to the coast as best he could when some Chinese decided he was a Japanese spy.

Later he became adviser to a Chinese general whom he worked six months for before he found out who the general was working for.—K.M.

One day I was sitting in the lounge of the Hong Kong Hotel. It is like a mother's knee to a stream of traders, arms salesmen, journalists, missionaries, officers, and wanderers in general, who have found the East hot or long or thirsty or rocky beneath their uncertain feet.

Its yawning doors promise the peace of a cloister and the shelter a portcullis gives. Inside a boy with soft slippers will serve you a drink of anything ice will float in, under an electric fan ("foong tse-tse" to him) for a fraction of what the peace of mind it brings is worth.

As I was sitting, lonely as only a stranger can be lonely in a colony considered so unattractive by its inhabitants that anyone, who came there without having to, is taken for a spy, an American navy-wife came in. She
was also a leper by passport, so we doubled our strength by sharing a table.

A little later a Canadian appeared accompanied by a Scotsman, and since, in a case like this, one has to take the good along with the bad—they couldn’t sit with the navy-wife without taking me into the fold as well—one of the pleasantest experiences of my life resulted.

They were sailing for North Borneo in three days, aboard the *Maw Sang*, a Jardine freighter under the command of Captain Jowett, and while Jack Ellis, the Canadian, was lying to the navy-wife, Bill Mercer, the Scotsman, painted such a desolate picture of Sandakan to me, I immediately wanted to go there.

It was the best investment I ever made. For surely in this warped world where most of a wanderer’s jaunts are among unsympathetic strangers and resemble nothing so much as the promenade of a mongrel dog through exclusive residential districts with a can tied to him, meeting the sort of people you find in Sandakan is worth any price.

The problem of a visa was an obstacle, because unfortunately the old days when all a man needed to gratify wanderlust and ease his itching feet was the price of a ticket are gone forever. In these days you must have an excuse for wanting to go someplace, and just an impulse to take a boat ride and see what some little port in the seas’ by-ways looks like is no longer considered a legitimate one.

The matter was debated for some time, and in all due fairness to the men who sit in hot offices and have to bother with such things, for they could have kept me from that voyage, they at last compromised and gave me a visa. The “loyal opposition” in the visa office was won over with the agreement that they would telegraph ahead and warn Sandakan I was coming. Officials there could watch me so I couldn’t do any harm, and thus a visa wouldn’t matter, anyway.

We sailed out of Hongkong on the eleventh of November. I have never been able to understand why more people do not take that trip, for you could not live in any hotel in Hongkong as cheaply or as well as you could on that boat. Of course the stretch of sea between Hongkong and the Philippines is one of the roughest bodies of water a man with the whole world to choose from could ever hit on for a joy-ride, but life in Hongkong wasn’t any too smooth either. Dooley, the first-mate, an Irishman born in India and hence known as Dooley Sahib, said he had stuck his hand out on the bridge and caught a fish. But after three days of this you go through a passage called the “hole-in-the-wall,” between two Philippine Islands, into the Sulu Sea. Days begin to get warmer, seas bluer, and stomachs less acrobatic.

Along about 4:00 p.m., little Captain Jowett, Commodore of the line and one of the finest skippers that ever wore gold braid, will send a boy down to ask if you would like a drink. This happens every afternoon. It gets kind of lonely up in the Captain’s quarters, and the Skipper can tell a story with the best of them. When he finishes he turns his blue eyes on you and says: “Now what do you think of that, lad?”

And if you are truthful you answer: “Skipper, just knowing you is better than a Cook’s tour.”

Jack Ellis, the second officer, and Bill Mercer, whom I had met in the hotel, each had their own idea of a “NEW DEAL” we were going to work out for ourselves.

After the Skipper went to bed at night, I would climb up on the bridge where Ellis was on watch. From the cabin of Dooley Sahib, back aft, came the strains of grand opera on a gramophone; Dooley had all of them, catalogued and filed neatly in a cabinet facing his library. If there wasn’t music, Dooley would be reading, a drink in one hand, a book in the other, and his bald pate, smooth as a billiard ball,
nodding when it pleased him. Dooley had read everything.

Up on the bridge Ellis would point out the stars, Orion's belt and Aldabaran and Castor and Pollux, and while explaining the mysteries of stellar navigation, he painted a glowing picture of how we would scour the China seas if we could only get the Chinese to let us take over one of those torpedo boats they had stored in Hongkong.

Afternoons while Ellis was sleeping, Bill Mercer, (or Tuan Mercer, hereafter, for Tuan means master and all foreigners are Tuan in Borneo) would lean over a ship's rail, under an awning on the leeward side and tell me how we could make a lot of money without any work, or at least not much:

A prospector's permit only costs five Straits Dollars. We could either shake a pan, like this: he showed me how. Or we could build a cradle: he drew a diagram. Or we could make a box sluice, like this, and I could carry the soil in buckets and dump it in the sluice while he poured water over it from some other buckets and at night all we had to do was pick the gold out. If we didn't want to carry the soil and water, we could hire the Dusans to do it. Dusans are the tribe around Sandakan.

Now between Captain Jowett's stories, Dooley Sahib's humor, Ellis whispering adventure in one ear and Tuan Mercer promising untold wealth in the other, with nothing to interrupt any of it but sleep, good meals, and drinks the ship's officers insisted on paying for, just for someone new to talk to, Raymond Whitcomb never conceived any entertainment program to match it.

After five days land began crowding down on us, islands became more numerous, and turning the bend beneath the leper colony, a beautiful green cliff rising out of the sea, we saw a few brown roofs between sea front and jungle and Tuan Mercer said this was Sandakan.

North Borneo, as few know, is not properly speaking a British Colony. It is the last of the old British Charter Companies, and practically everything in it is controlled by the all powerful Harrison and Crosfield Company. The Governor is chosen by the Charter Company, subject to approval by the British Government. Timber and rubber barons have built huge estates, founded industries, and created employment for the natives.

There are no railways in British North Borneo. Sandakan, the capital, is only a map's pin-prick, a niche for man to anchor a ship in, a clearing, and a handful of homes which a jungle is continually trying to push into the ocean.

Over the town are the same stories and emotions and problems we find over larger towns, only more personal because the radius is so small.

There is a hotel in Sandakan, but hospitable planters rarely let a stranger stay in it. A few hours after the boat docked, the Captain sent word that Tuan Walker, the rubber planter, had invited us to dinner for the following night. I had never heard of Mr. Walker, but he had heard a stranger was in town, and a stranger is better than a batch of new magazines in a place like that.

Sandakan would be an ideal spot for some old-time Western cowboy to ride the grub-line. A man can live there for his first month on invitations.

We came ashore, down a rickety dock and through a gate, up a narrow street to the village square where a Chinese was sleeping in a ramshackle car.

The Skipper majestically beckoned: "Tain Fook, a taxi." I don't know why he said "a" taxi. It was "the" taxi; and another interesting point to Tain Fook's taxi service was: he gave you a detailed resumé of the local gossip while driving. He would be invaluable to Somerset Maugham, if it weren't for the fact that Somerset Maugham has
already gleaned Sandakan of its confidences once and so doesn’t dare come back again.

With Tain Fook telling us who was going to have a baby and who else was contemplating matrimony, the rattling car wound its way up a brown road, stopped for a minute by the entrance to Government House while the Skipper pointed out a small building. Said he: “Now the visitor’s book is in there. You go in and sign it while I wait for you here. They don’t like me around there because I’m not a Christian. No sir, I tell you I am not a Christian. Those Christians would crucify you without a qualm—.”

As the car went on its way again, the road got narrower and more crowded by the jungle. It seems that as the colony was building that road, money got scarcer as the road went inland, and eventually it just dribbled off into jungle. Once in a while a little mouse deer runs across it, about twelve inches high, with legs the thickness of a cigarette and hoofs the size of your fingernail. He is a timid creature who calls to his mate by tapping one hoof. The Dusans will linger over a tender morsel of one and tell you the mouse deer’s enemies are their enemies. A brief look at an intruder and the mouse deer dashes into the dense undergrowth by the road side.

Many of Martin Johnson’s settings were faked on the edge of this road that old-timers in Borneo won’t risk leaving for a short-cut.

From time to time you pass small groups of convicts wearing broad headpieces to protect them from the sun, marching docilely behind a Sikh guard with a rifle and bayonet. They are supposed to be working, pushing back a forest, but as the car passes they lean on their shovels to watch it. Both they and the Sikhs grin and wave to Tain Fook. Once when two groups of convicts were working together the two Sikhs got in an argument and started fighting, whereupon the convicts separated them and marched them back to the prison, complaining that they couldn’t work with guys like that.

Where the side-road turns off to Tuan Walker’s plantation, a narrow-gauge track, about two feet apart, runs beside it. Tuan Walker has a little railway, run by a motor-cycle engine, that he uses when the big rains are on, and at the end of it there is a spacious Borneo house, a box-shaped structure, peaked to cut the rain and with three sides verandah.

A radio blares in the corner, but war and the Japanese are remote things, like the hardships of Napoleon’s retreat from Russia.

When he wants more ice in his drink he asks for “stone water.” If problems arise among the natives, Tuan Walker, who has spent twenty-nine years of his fifty-seven in Borneo, hears the case and pronounces judgment, and just off-hand I should say Tuan Walker must be extremely lenient, for he confided that he had liked every American he ever met.

Whisky and soda in Borneo is called a “stengah,” and drinking it, the favorite indoor pastime of the colony, is known as getting “shikkerred,” so unfortunately I can only give an account of the first part of the numerous dinners that were given for me in Sandakan.

Next morning Tuan Mercer started designing the sluice we were going to build. And that evening I dined at Leila Lodge, the largest home in Borneo, with Tuan Phillips, manager of one of the local companies. A hundred and fifty people at a time have been invited to Leila Lodge for cocktails back in the days when Sandakan was booming.

Now Tuan Phillips has a grand piano in one corner where he stops en route to the bathroom to play a bar or two of Rachmaninoff’s prelude. A firm in England sends him out twenty or thirty pounds worth of books at a time, which he loans to his friends. If they don’t
bring them back it is all right, they can't stray far in Sandakan.

Tuan Phillips has wandered in his day also, through Abyssinia and Arabia and Somaliland. All the legendary figures that have sprung up in the Near East and the Far were friends of his, and sometimes his neighbors will tell you: "You know, Phillips was a spy in Arabia during the war." He wasn't, and they don't mean any harm by saying he was; it just makes him a better story, and everyone takes it as that.

"Colonel Lawrence?" he says. "Why, of course I knew him. But Arabic scholar? My foot! He spoke Arabic like—," and here his eyes wander around the room till they come to rest on Dooley Sahib's bald head: "—like Dooley Sahib speaks English."

Coming back to the docks through the night, a motor-cycle went putt-putt-putt in the distance and Dooley Sahib muttered: "Tuan Mercer calling for a mate."

When one wants a hair-cut one doesn't go to the barber shop in Sandakan. One sends for Lopez, the barber, and he comes on a bicycle. While he cuts your hair he tells you what the Governor thinks of the situation or how the "Affair Gibby" is coming along.

The "Affair Gibby" is an old story, older than Somerset Maugham whom a hundred "Gibbys" have sworn to shoot if he ever comes East again.

It seems that the current Gibby had gone home on leave, leaving a pretty Malayan housekeeper and four little children to keep things going until his return. Back in London, with a new contract in his pocket and a raise in pay, he fell in love with the first white girl he saw and up and married her. Now as their boat approached Singapore tension on the island rose:

"Will he tell his wife? How adroitly will he get the housekeeper out of the house and upcoast before his bride gets there? What sort of a settlement will he make the Malayan girl?" It is a situation most of them have been through themselves, and they chuckle at Gibby's discomfiture. In London it looks easy, a bagatelle, but as the boat nears Sandakan it is not so simple. And if Gibby isn't fair to the Malayan girl and her children the colony will all be with her. They are just people in Sandakan.

What the wife will say when she learns the Dusan language and starts picking up scraps of conversation is the prime subject of speculation among the women. It is a problem most of them understand also. Those who couldn't take it are gone and those who could are always interested in seeing how it works out this time.

From Lopez, the barber, and Tain Fook, the taxi-owner, Sandakan learns what is happening. Incidentally, you never pay Tain Fook cash. You sign a chit for your taxi bill, then forget all about it till the day you leave. Tain Fook will meet you at the dock. Lopez, the amiable Philippino, will have told him you are leaving.

The new lad in the Customs office went to a dinner one night at Government House, and on his way home, just gentlemanly "shikkered," he stopped for a last drink with agreeable companions. Tain Fook knew where; he took him.

And next morning, still in evening clothes, he showed up in church leading a demure little Malayan by the hand, in her best waist and sarong, with all her gold trimmings. She didn't want to come, but the Customs boy told her he would beat her ears off if she didn't go to church on Sunday, like a lady, so she went.

Customs Tuan listened attentively to the service, the little Dusan girl looked at her hands, some of the congregation snickered, and those who weren't there got the details from Lopez.

Customs Tuan went home on the next boat. This was Sandakan.
The American navy-wife we had the drink with in Hongkong hadn’t seemed so beautiful when he was there, but back in Borneo every day made her seem more wonderful to Mercer.

He leaned over the design of the box sluice he was drawing, chewing the end of a pencil and thinking, his mind about equally divided between prospecting and the destroyer commander’s wife.

Suddenly he said: “Yes sir, she is pure gold, no matter where you bite her.”

Days passed. Captain Jowett looked for an alligator skin for his wife. Tuan Mercer changed his mind and decided on a cradle instead of a box-sluice. Dooley Sahib asked the Skipper: “Sure, an’ what would you be wanting with an alligator?” Scornful of alligators was Dooley Sahib, except as pets.

“Ay, if I ’ad one,” he said, “I’d ‘ave his teeth pulled out when ’e reached the age of belligerency. Then I would ’ave him a false set made by a dentist, which same I would take away from him when it came time to sleep.” Good old Irish, bald-headed Dooley!

He took me to a show one night, a cinema, where they showed trailers of all the films for months to come, a Mickey Mouse comedy, a newsreel two years old, and an ancient feature picture all jumbled up together.

As far as the natives were concerned who make up the bulk of the audience, it was all part of one long picture and their interpretation of it was probably better than the original. Trailers are made up of high lights, women slapping each other, men shooting, cars veering around corners; and the quiet natives looking at these things, sort of regard them as “newsreels” of the life wild men live outside of Borneo. Foreigners lost all faith in what they saw in movies after Martin Johnson and his wife made a film on the edge of town, but the natives are still unspoiled because they didn’t recognize it.

Tuan McCloed rubbed whisky on Dooley’s bald head while Mercer tried to sell him some stock in the prospecting company, to which Dooley Sahib replied: “An’ as if it isn’t enough, ’aving to live in a bloody place like this without the likes o’ ye bedevilin’ an’ bewilderin’ me!”

In the end we never dipped a pan. Tuan Mercer agreed we would stand more chance of striking gold if the Rajah of Sarawak had more daughters. Still that ticket to Sandakan was a good investment.

A few nights before I went away, it was the day Americans call Thanksgiving and eat turkey, the natives in Sandakan and all the islands around celebrated the feast of Hari Raya, marking the end of the Mohammedan holy month.

The foreigners in the capital (about fifty) contributed to a fund. The natives cut fronds from the big fan-palms, put up some tents and strung lights in a clearing in the forest. A board dancing floor was laid and some whisky (a taste acquired from pinching odd nips from master’s bottle) set on a table loaded with native fruits and cakes.

A Dusan with a wicked knife-scar on his throat beat a monotonous time on a tom-tom, while another sawed chords on a violin. Dignitaries wearing black, half-tarbush skull caps, sat along one side. Other men stood behind them, women across the tent.

It was like a Gauguin painting: night and a drum pounding in the tropics. Native girls in sarongs and all their jewelry, gliding in a slow, shuffling dance, drugging themselves with music.

You could feel the tom-tom pounding in your temples, little feet hypnotically shuffling beneath a sarong, zig-zagging among the dancers in a long glide, now standing motionless, only arms moving. It went on hour after hour, hypnotic.
Expressionless faces and a beating tom-tom and a violin, and outside was a jungle and up above was a moon.

Tuan Mercer drank with a boy who worked for him, his boy's guest for a night, and the boy smiled. On this occasion he could say anything to his boss he wanted to, but it took some time to get up courage; then he said: "Tuan Mercer, you have best heart, hardest tongue, I ever see."

Profanity is the only form of self-expression most foreigners have in a place like this, but their boys know they don't mean it. All in all, from every aspect, Hari Raya was more fun than any Thanksgiving I ever went to.

But next morning at breakfast Captain Jowett said he was glad we were leaving. He liked Sandakan all right, but the Mau Sang didn't. No mother ever loved a first-born child more than the Skipper loved that wave-scarred, rusting hulk of a freighter. He wouldn't have traded it for the Queen Mary.

Rowing out to it in a sampan with a setting sun silhouetting it against the sea, you could see his lips moving and his head nodding as he admired it. He whispered, as though he were imparting a confidence: "You know, lad, a strange thing happened to me last night. Yes sir, a strange thing, lad. I was coming back aboard ship, and as I looked up at her bow there, like one would look at a lady, I saw her hawser pipe wink at me.

"Yes it did, lad. I said: 'What's the matter, lass?' and she said to me 'When are we going back to Hongkong?'

"I said: 'Sure now, an' don't you like this place, lass?' and proud as you please, she up and answered me: 'Not a bit of it, I don't. There's barnacles on me bottom and blisters on me top, and I want to get away from here, I do.'

"'Ay, lass,' I said, 'as soon as we are loaded we'll be going back to Hongkong, and by Friday night we ought to be on our way.'

"'Are we going back to the old buoy?' she asked, and I told her ay, we'd be back at the old buoy. 'Why, lass, do you like the old buoy?' I asked her, and she answered: 'Ay. I'm well-known there. I know all the big ships and all the little ones and they all know me. I'm happy at the old buoy.'"

The old skipper turned his blue eyes questioningly on me and asked: "Now what do you think of that, lad?"

The last time Ellis and I rode from the Sandakan docks to where the Mau Sang was anchored out in the harbor, it was night, and each drop of phosphorescent water from the boat's oars fell on the black-green surface of the sea like a golden coin on a roulette table.

It was a dark night but the sea was so full of phosphorus it lit up the prow and sides of our boat and left a little gold wake behind us. I reached over and scooped up a handful. It was the nearest I ever came to touching gold in Borneo.

Looking at it I thought: What a shame, Travelogue-Fitzpatrick always says: "And so we reluctantly leave the island behind us," and then sails out in the afternoon. What he misses by never leaving at night!

Early next morning we went away, but some day I am going back to that place.

Besides, I have wondered ever since what Gibby's wife did and what Gibby told her. That affair of Gibby's was a story that Sandakan and I read together, up to the climax. Then I went away and Sandakan finished it alone, leaving me still wondering what happened.
THE MAGAZINES OF JAPAN

By S. TAKAHASHI

The variety and size of Japanese magazines, together with their huge circulation, come as a surprise to the Westerner visiting Japan. Usually considering magazines to be a peculiarly European or American institution, he finds in Japan countless newsstands and bookshops filled to the brim with magazines of all forms and descriptions.

Very few foreigners, even those living in Japan, know anything about the contents of the magazines which pour in a ceaseless stream from the printing-presses of Japan, influencing and shaping the mind of its people. Mr. Takahashi, who has long been connected with Japanese journalism, has kindly contributed an article on this subject.—K.M.

THE MAGAZINE IN JAPANESE LIFE

In Japan's cultural and spiritual life magazines play such an essential part that one can call them one of the most important organs of general education, enlightenment, and formation of public opinion. There are magazines for all ages—from tiny tots onwards—for all classes and professions, and for all demands and interests. The number of Japanese periodicals is extraordinarily large. According to the Magazine Year Book, published last July, there were in 1940 about 3,000 periodicals on sale to the public, over sixty of which were women's magazines. The publishing companies amalgamated in the recently founded Publishers' Association issue about 2,000 magazines. The remaining thousand not affiliated to this Association are probably such magazines as have either, under present conditions, ceased publication since 1940 or are no longer of any importance.

The leading magazines appear on the twentieth of each month. On this day newspapers carry huge publishers' advertisements with detailed tables of contents. A glance at a book-store or at the book-section of a department store will show the great importance of periodicals for the bookselling-trade. Japanese bookstores are, as a rule, entirely open to the street, and on large tables usually projecting right out into the open there are piles of newly published magazines, besieged by people from early morning till closing-time. Before deciding to buy, one is allowed thoroughly to look through every magazine. Unkind tongues assert that there are people who go from bookstore to bookstore and in this manner read through all magazines of interest to them without spending a cent. Some such readers even go so far as to mark the magazine when they go home to lunch, so that they need waste no time in finding the place where they left off when they return later on.

THEY ARE CHEAP

The price of Japanese periodicals is comparatively low. It ranges from thirty sen to one yen (seven to twenty-five U.S. cents at the official exchange rate.) On an average the large popular magazines containing about 300 pages cost sixty sen, while the serious magazines, which are of a much higher intellectual level, cost one yen for 350-400 pages. How can this low price be explained? First of all no importance is attached to outward appearance. The paper is of a very poor quality. The cover, as a rule, only shows the name of the magazine. Only in the case of popular magazines is the cover
made to look a little more colorful and attractive. Beyond that the popular magazines are profusely, but very simply, illustrated. The deciding factors for the cheap price are, of course, the huge circulation of most of the magazines and the large advertising they carry.

Of first rank among the more important periodicals are the four leading serious magazines: *Kaizo* (Reorganization), *Chuo Koron* (Central Review), *Nippon Hyoron* (Nippon Review), and *Bungei Shunju* (Current Literature). I call them serious magazines because of the high level of their political-economic-cultural contents, of which one or the other side is more or less emphasized by the various publications.

**EX-LIBERAL**

In principle it can be said that until quite recently most of the leading magazines were of a strong liberal trend and thereby followed and encouraged the inclinations of the intelligentsia. The four magazines mentioned above are published mainly for the educated classes. This is apparent from the very style of printing. Japan uses the Chinese system of writing, and in addition has developed a phonetic script, called Kana. The popular magazines, designed mainly for entertainment, use only a limited number of Chinese characters, and even these are almost all furnished at the side with furigana, i.e. tiny signs of the Kana script giving the pronunciation and thereby also the meaning of the Chinese character. The four serious magazines, however, contain many more Chinese characters without the explanatory Kana signs. This fact alone is enough to determine fairly accurately the type of reader.

At present the afore-mentioned liberal tendency is, of course, hardly noticeable. The magazines have lately had to change their tone considerably and have thereby lost much of their original character. Today one can already speak of a far-reaching co-ordination of all publications along the lines of the current inner-political reform (*Shintaisei*). Most periodicals have officially abandoned their former stand and consciously placed themselves at the service of the reform. Without doubt the importance of this fact for the future development of Japan is not to be underestimated. If, here and there, something of the former tendency can still be glimpsed, this is because, on the whole, the contributors have remained the same and the final adjustment does require some time.

The magazine *Kaizo* (Reorganization) exists since 1919. Its former trend was rather leftist. It was founded at a time when Marxism happened to be the fashion also in Japanese intellectual circles. At present there is, of course, no longer any trace to be found of such tendencies. The magazine has its own publishing-house. The President of the Kaizo Publishing Company is Sanehiko Yamamoto, himself a well-known writer who quite recently, after his travels in Europe and America, appeared again in the limelight with numerous articles and books describing his impressions and views on the world situation.

**CONTRIBUTORS**

Like nearly all periodicals, *Kaizo* has no fixed staff of collaborators. The articles are written by well-known journalists, writers, university professors, politicians, authors, etc., who publish their works in this or that magazine and are sometimes represented in the same month by different articles in several publications. In *Kaizo* political problems have first place.

A specialty of almost all Japanese magazines are the so-called *Zadankai* reports, i.e. reports on a discussion, arranged by the editors, by a number of experts on some specially controversial topic of political, economic or cultural nature. These reports are often very interesting and revealing. From time to time special supplements about unusually important questions are pub-
lished at a small increase in price of about twenty sen. The literary section of Kaizo is composed of a few poems, several new short stories, sometimes even a play or a novel in serial form. The same can be said of the other serious magazines.

CIRCULATION

The circulation figures of Japanese periodicals are kept secret by the publishers and exact data are unobtainable. Kaizo and Chuo Koron are said to have a circulation of about 140,000 each. The largest circulation of the four magazines is supposedly that of Bungei Shunju. This, apart from its high standard, is probably due to the low price of only sixty sen for an issue of about 400 pages, while Kaizo and Chuo Koron cost one yen.

Since the outbreak of the China incident, the Kaizo Publishing Company, beside its large monthly, appearing every twentieth, also publishes a special number on the first of every month called Jikyoku-han (Current Events) which deals mainly with world-political questions of the day. It is thinner and has a far smaller circulation.

One of the oldest existing magazines is Chuo Koron (Central Review). It was founded in 1887 and is likewise published by its own company. Chuo Koron was formerly emphatically liberal. It has a very high intellectual standard and is addressed to the educated classes. Many Japanese say that one need only read Chuo Koron to be adequately informed on all important topics.

The magazine Nippon Hyoron (Japanese Review) has appeared since 1927. It was originally called Keizai Orai (Economic Review) and was re-named only quite recently. Economic questions still play an important part in it.

THE BEST-SELLER

The most widely read of the four great periodicals, as indicated above, is Bungei Shunju (Current Literature), founded in 1927. It is in spite of its name by no means a purely literary magazine, but is also of political-economic-cultural interest, with emphasis on the cultural side. The essay enjoys special consideration in Bungei Shunju. The President of its publishing company is Kan Kikuchi, one of the best-known and most widely read modern authors, who in addition to his numerous contemporary novels has also published several excellent popular history books. Since the outbreak of the China incident a special number of Bungei Shunju is published every month under the name of Genchi Hokoku (Reports from the Scene of Action), which has meanwhile developed into an independent magazine and which deals mainly with problems of the Asiatic sphere, events in China, and world problems connected more or less closely with them.

In addition to these four outstanding periodicals, a few others deserve mention. One of the newest is Koron (Review). It was founded in 1939 in connection with the great national reform movement and is considered an excellent exponent of the new spirit of Japan. It has quite a high standard and deals mainly with problems of the Japanese and Greater Asiatic spheres.

This spirit of Japan is also strongly emphasized in the magazine Gendai (The Present Day). Although in existence since 1920, it was formerly chiefly devoted to light reading. It is only recently that it has attained a much higher standard, so that it could really be ranked with the four great serious magazines. The contents are mainly of a politico-cultural nature, and it is addressed primarily to university students.

THE KODANSHA COMPANY

Gendai is published by the Nippon Yuben Kodansha Company, the biggest publishing-house in Japan, which issues a number of the best-known children's and popular magazines, starting with picture-books, and all very national and educational. The nine great magazines of the Kodansha Company make up
seventy-five per cent of the total circulation of all Japanese publications. The founder of this company was Seiji Noma, a former elementary schoolteacher, who recognized the great value of magazines for national education, and who, out of almost nothing, created the colossal enterprise of the Kodansha Publishing Company.

The oldest publication of this company is Yuben (Eloquence), which exists since 1919 and is also widely read. It is written more or less in popular style and its contents are partly entertaining, partly instructive.

However, the most important contribution of Mr. Noma to the development of the Japanese magazines was his idea to publish the Kodan Club through which he introduced the treasures of Japanese folklore into the society of printed words. At first, it is true, his plan seemed a failure. While waiting several months for the sales agents to return the unsold copies, he had no idea of how his magazine was selling. In his autobiography he describes how he finally learned the sad truth: “Only 1,800 out of the 10,000 copies of the first issue had been sold, the remaining 8,200 unsold copies poured back upon us like a cloud-burst from the angry heavens and filled our ‘store-house’ up to the ceiling. The second issue had fared no better and we were flooded with five or six thousand unwanted copies. The third deluge of as many returned magazines all but swamped us. It is impossible adequately to convey the black despondency into which I sank at the sight of this incredible pile of unsold goods.”

But he stuck it out. To quote him again: “Call it hope, confidence, vision—what you will—a man who is wholehearted in his devotion to any work has certain convictions that the work will succeed whether or not it seems promising to other eyes. From the start, and in spite of the most forbidding appearances for over half a year, I knew that this Kodan Club would be all right in the end.

“After a year things began to mend. We saw the Kodan Club in the barber’s shop with waiting customers gloatting over its pages; we saw it in the hands of passengers in trams and trains. It was despised by highbrows and superior women at first, but it was read by workmen, rikisha men and shop apprentices. By and by it made an ascent in the social scale. Nurses in hospitals and doctors would recommend it to convalescents. Statesmen and business men whose brains were taxed by grave problems found in the Kodan Club food for mental relaxation. The latest science and philosophy may teach us a great deal, but there is something in the words and deeds of our less sophisticated fore-fathers, as told by the skilled tongues of professional romance-narrators, which can thrill our hearts and make us look back wistfully upon the old days. After a year the Kodan Club was doing fairly well in its sales.” After that, Noma moved from success to success.

POLITICS, LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY

The best-known political monthlies are Sekai Orai (World Review), in existence since 1936, and Nippon oyobi Nipponjin (Japan and the Japanese), like Chuo Koron, one of the oldest Japanese magazines, existing since 1888. It will be noticed that most periodicals are of recent origin; only very few have been appearing since before the World War.

The best-known magazine for foreign politics is Kokusai Hyoron (1936). As leading economic magazines one should name: Jitsugyo no Nippon (Economic Japan), existing since 1897 and appearing fortnightly; Economist, published three times a month since 1913 by the Osaka Mainichi (a daily newspaper); Diamond, also founded in 1913 and published three times monthly; and Toyo Keizai Shimpo (Far Eastern Economic News), the oldest of all, dating from 1895. The English titles of both the newer economic magazines are significant of the hitherto strong Anglo-American ties of Japanese economics.
There are numerous literary magazines. The following deserve special mention: Shincho (New Currents), published since 1904 by the Shincho Publishing-House, and Bungei (Literature), founded in 1933 and published by the Kaizo Company. The aforementioned Bungei Shunju Publishing Company also issues, since 1935, the magazine Bungakukai (Literary World).

The philosophical magazine with the highest standard is Shiso, (Thought), published since 1921 by the Iwanami Company. Another well-known philosophical monthly is Riso (The Ideal), founded in 1927 and published by its own company.

**POPULAR MAGAZINES**

Amongst the innumerable popular magazines some of the best-known may be mentioned here. The largest and probably the most widely read of all Japanese magazines is King, reputed to have a circulation of about 800,000. It has been issued since 1925 by the Kodansha Publishing Company, which should suffice to indicate its patriotic tendency. Apart from the purely entertaining section, King also contains popular and intelligible interpretations of problems touching on the national existence of Japan. This very tendency is even more strongly emphasized in the second great popular magazine Hinode (Sunrise), published since 1932 by the Shincho Company.

**WOMEN AND CHILDREN**

Heading the numerous women's magazines is the Shufu no Tomo (The Housewife's Friend). Founded in 1917, it is published by its own company and, like King, has a circulation of about 800,000. On account of its excellent literary section it is also highly esteemed by the masculine world. Occupying second place is Fujin Kurabu (The Women's Club, club being pronounced kurabu in Japan). This magazine has appeared since 1920 and is another product of the Kodansha Publishing Company. Fujin Koron (Women's Review) has been issued since 1916 by the publishers of the big monthly Chuo Koron, and appeals to more educated women. Fujin no Tomo (The Women's Friend) exists since 1910. It was founded by Mrs. Tomoko Hani, who is very well-known for her part in women's activities; it shows a certain Christian influence and is also much read in educated circles. For the younger, more modern feminine world the Shinjoen (The New Garden) has been published since 1937.

Among various children's magazines there is the newly-founded Shin Wakodo (New Youth) which enthusiastically supports national education of youth.

Finally two periodicals born out of latest political developments may be mentioned: Taikoku (The Mainland) and Taiyo (The Pacific Ocean). The titles are sufficient to give an idea of their contents and readers.

**THE FUTURE**

As in many other spheres the development of the last decade has been towards ever greater numbers. The present political and spiritual coordination will, however, probably bring about many changes and do away with many periodicals not mentioned in this article. For instance, it is already intended henceforth to permit only about ten women's magazines to appear, instead of the sixty now published. For economic reasons and for the purpose of a general improvement in standard, such a step may have its advantages. This movement towards centralization is probably being supported by the recently formed Association of Publishers, which is under the supervision of Government authorities.

The Government's interest in the Japanese magazines is the result of their deep influence on the life of the people. There is probably no country in which magazines play a greater educational or national role than in Japan.
MODERN WAR IN ANCIENT CHINA
By T. F. HSU

The proud Westerner has reluctantly accepted as a fact that the Chinese knew the uses of the printing press, the compass, and explosives long before Europe discovered them. But here comes Mr. Hsu, whose hobby it is to write on things Chinese, to tell us that three thousand years ago the Chinese knew all about dive bombers, flame throwers, chemical and bacteriological weapons, and various other characteristics of modern warfare. However he admits that they existed only in the Chinese imagination. In this, we might say the ancient Chinese were fortunate.

—Our illustrations are taken from a popular edition of the novel described.
—K.M.

When Chinese pick up their morning papers these days, they often pause to pinch themselves to see if they are not dreaming of a world depicted in a popular folk-tale known throughout China for many centuries; for, under big headlines, they find exciting word-pictures of the three-dimensional modern war which seem to have been taken from the pages of the old Chinese best-seller.

There is indeed an amazing resemblance between the technical achievements of modern military scientists and the imaginary contraptions of the inventive anonymous Chinese author.

The novel in question is Feng Sheng Pang (井神榜), which literally means “The Appointment of the Gods,” and tells of a titanic struggle in the last days of the Shang Dynasty about three thousand years ago. In a way, this Chinese novel, generally believed to have been compiled in the Ming Dynasty from ancient legends, is like Homer’s Iliad, with two groups of militant gods and goddesses taking sides with the earthly warriors in a sanguinary war that paved the way for the foundation of the Chow Dynasty. In the numerous battles between these two camps of immortal beings the most fantastic weapons are described. And some of these, the products of the lively imagination of an author of several centuries ago, have been brought to realization by ingenious modern inventors and thrown into the current warfare that has swept across Europe. One might even wonder whether these inventors and the students of modern military strategy may not have obtained some of their inspiration from our Chinese novel.

In its essence the plot of the novel is close to the facts recorded in history. It opens with a long and sometimes gruesome narrative telling of the cruelty and misgovernment of the Emperor Shou (纣) of the Shang (商) Dynasty, who is instigated to many of his misdeeds by his beautiful but venomous Imperial concubine. The events culminate in a revolution headed by the feudal Lord of Chow (周). In his Government is an aged Premier who happens to be the disciple of Yuen Sze Tien Tseng (元始天尊), head of one of three groups of immortals. This group of immortals is allied with another, headed by Tai Shang Lau Chung (太上老君). The third group, comprising the warlike immortals who through prolonged worship rose to immortality from the ranks of lowly animals joins the side of the Emperor Shou.

Long before the revolutionary armies start their march for the capital of Shan, the Emperor Shou has ordered no less than sixteen punitive expeditions, each under the command of a
disciple of the third group of immortals and each aided by one or more of the minor members of a superhuman clique. These expeditions defeated, the revolutionary armies begin their long march, facing one seemingly insurmountable obstacle after another, and finally succeed in surrounding the Shang capital. The Emperor Shou commits suicide after the disgraceful defeat, and the feudal Lord of Chow is installed as the ruler of a new dynasty which was to reign over China for some nine hundred years (1134-247 B.C.)

In the heat of these battles, the author introduces many superhuman characters, each the owner of a secret weapon. What may well be compared to military planes in modern warfare are two prominent figures. One is Lai Tseng Tse (雷震 ), a brother of the Lord of Chow. Born an ordinary mortal, he is said to have been adopted by an immortal, who fed him two ripe red apricots. While the boy was enjoying the fruits, he suddenly felt two flapping wings growing out of his armpits. His handsome features also changed into those of a bird, with a conspicuous bill-like mouth and a hooked nose. He could now fly. His immortal teacher taught him military tactics and also the secret method of using a brass club as a weapon of deadly effectiveness.

Joining his brother’s army, he scores many victories by flying into the battlefield, circling over the enemies at a great height, diving down on a marked enemy warrior and putting the unfortunate one to death with his club. At one time he is assigned to fight a rear-guard action, and he scares the daylight out of the pursuing army by zooming to a great altitude and crushing the peak of a mountain to bits by a single blow of his club.

In the opposing army there is a similar freak warrior. How he earned his wings is not told; apparently the author had to produce a rival for Lai Tseng Tse in haste and neglected a biographical note. This warrior, however, could not fly with the same speed and at the same altitude as his counterpart. In a “dog fight” the two winged warriors engage in a terrific battle resulting in the death of the slower airman, just as in modern war an obsolete plane would be defeated if pitched against a 1941 model.

In fact, the two are not the only “airmen” in this mythological warfare. The “air force” of both armies is formidable. They are not winged superhuman beings but immortals and near-
immortals who, apart from their particular secret weapons, are capable of travel at a high speed on the clouds above or below the stratospheric zone.

In this way, each of them is a parachutist who may drop behind the enemy lines and engage in destructive activities. However, the author did not visualize the effectiveness of parachutists in the same way as modern chiefs of staffs do. He merely put them into use for making quiet raids into enemy encampments to release and retrieve the more important warriors taken prisoner by the enemy.

Modern air-marshal would certainly wish to be the first to lay their hands on such “pebbles,” in order to drop them on enemy production centers instead of raining high explosives and incendiary bombs. And that immortal fighter appears to have had an inexhaustible supply of such pebbles.

Most of the secret weapons described, however, are not designed for mass slaughter but for individual foes. Among these are: scissors which, when released, cut the enemy in two and return harmlessly into the owner’s roomy sleeves; a flock of crows with steel bills to death. Modern air-marshal would certainly wish to be the first to lay their hands on such “pebbles,” in order to drop them on enemy production centers instead of raining high explosives and incendiary bombs. And that immortal fighter appears to have had an inexhaustible supply of such pebbles.

Many battles are fought in the air. As these “cloud-riders” have a huge flying radius, a single air duel is often fought over thousands of miles with every foot of the distance featured by thrilling exchanges. Compared with modern “dog fights,” these imaginary aerial combats are just as colorful and hair-raising. Instead of rapid-fire machine-guns and devastating cannons, these human fighting planes employ their secret weapons and even swords in their duels. Little emphasis is placed on their comparative swordsmanship: the spotlight is turned on their secret weapons. One of them often uses small pebbles which are actually the “essence” of huge mountains. The slightest contact with one such seemingly harmless pebble would instantly crush the victim which are driven into the battle-field to gouge out the eyes of the enemy; and numerous swords which are thrown into the air to kill enemies miles away and which return boomerang-like to their owners.

Gas warfare, though mere child’s play when compared with that of the last European war, is vividly described in the Chinese Iliad. As in the case of winged warriors, both the Government and revolutionary armies boast of a gas expert. They are not chemists, but gifted instead with a superhuman ability to force poisonous gas from their bodies, one through his nostrils and the other through his mouth.

Each of these warriors has a trained corps closely following him whenever he appears on the battle-ground. These
soldiers are trained to tie up the fallen foes. In the heat of the duel, the warrior exhales the gas and puts his enemy painlessly to sleep to wake up twelve hours later in a prison camp! On one occasion, ironically enough, the two warriors meet in battle, and each is rendered unconscious by the other. Their trained followers rush up and retrieve their commanders. Neither the warriors nor their followers had gas-masks, but the latter did not need them since the gas was directed at one person at a time.

Even bacteriological warfare, so far not put to practical use in current wars, is not beyond the author’s imagination. In fact, Chinese legends attribute to that mythological war two of the most deadly epidemics—smallpox and plague. It is said today that, just because these ancient warriors waged this grim bacteriological warfare, the world has now to use serums and other remedies to combat these diseases.

In one of the battles, while the two armies are deadlocked, a member of the wicked clique of immortals descends from nowhere to claim that he can wipe out the entire enemy force in the twinkling of an eye. All he has to do, he tells the down-hearted commander, is to fly over the enemy camps under cover of darkness and drop several bushels of colored beans. He assures the commander that within seven days the enemy force will be wiped out by a strange disease.

Accordingly that night he summons the clouds to convey himself and the bushels of colored beans. Taking off for the night raid without even consulting the weather reports, he is presently circling over the enemy position. He sprinkles the bushels of disease-carrying beans all over their camp; then quietly withdraws and returns to his base.

Next morning only a handful of soldiers in the Chow camp is able to get up. All the others find themselves suffering from an unknown ailment baffling even the army surgeons, who are themselves down with the same disease. In the entire force only one man is immune, and he is a disciple of one of the gods. He immediately flies away on the clouds to consult with his teacher, and is told to go and see the Emperor Sheng Nong ( 神农 ), a prehistoric ruler who is reputed to be the inventor of Chinese herb-medicine. From this great Father of Chinese Medicine he learns that the unknown ailment is smallpox and obtains from him a kind of herb, said to be the best cure.

Recovering immediately through this treatment, the Chow army surprises the enemy and scores a complete victory. However, smallpox prevailed in the world as one of the most deadly diseases until western scientists invented vaccination.

This is not the only bacteriological attack described. In another battle, soldiers of the Chow army are ad-
ministered a similar blow when another member of the devilish immortals showers them with “invisible substances” causing a plague. Before the army is reduced to a mere battalion, however, the Father of Chinese Medicine once again comes to the rescue. The plague is checked, but not exterminated, so that today it still breaks out occasionally.

It was in this battle that the idea of a flame-throwing machine, which caused a sensation in modern war, was first mentioned. To defeat the wicked immortal who staged the bacteriological attack, one of the righteous gods written some three hundred years ago and describing events of the Sung Dynasty (960-1279), a fleet of a thousand tanks and a lone submarine are mentioned in the punitive expedition launched by Government forces against the one hundred and eight bandits of Liangshan.

These “tanks” were, of course, neither steel-plated nor equipped with machine-guns or cannons. How they were propelled the author does not reveal. They are merely described as “wagons covered with leather and padded with hair” to resist the arrows and stones rained against their advance on the side of the Chow army sends a disciple down to earth, armed only with a fan. This fan, however, produces flames, and with it he fans the wicked immortal till he is reduced to ashes.

In The Appointment of the Gods, rich in its description of modern weapons in what may be called their embryo stages, there is a conspicuous absence of the tanks and submarines which figure so prominently in modern wars. What is missing from this tale, may be found in a sequel to the Chinese novel translated into English by Pearl Buck under the title of All Men Are Brothers. In this book, by the enemy. They were also said to be able to span trenches, and their only obstacles were forests and creeks. They were not called tanks, but “thundering wagons,” alluding to the great noise made while rumbling over the battle-field. From slits in these padded vehicles several soldiers were kept busy firing off arrows with deadly accuracy and great speed.

These “thundering wagons” helped the bandits to win several overwhelming victories but met their doom when the adviser of the Government forces perfected what are today called “tank traps.” In one single combat the entire fleet was trapped and destroyed!
The description of the imaginary submarine is more vague. It is merely said to be an ordinary boat covered with boards and sealed with indigo. How it was operated is not mentioned. However, it was successfully used to smuggle troops under water to a strategic spot behind the enemy lines.

Modern weapons, though already much more fantastic and formidable than those of previous decades, are still far behind the imaginary equipment of the mythological warriors of The Appointment of the Gods. Resourceful as they are today, modern inventors have so far failed to equal such imaginary weapons as a four-stringed lute which, when played on the battlefield, will produce a “pea-soup” fog through which only the player and his followers, specially treated with a secret eyedrop, can discern the position of the enemy. The enemy warriors are practically blinded and often caught unawares when the deadly swords or spears pierce their bodies.

Or, how useful would be a yellow flag which produces invisible rays that will ward off practically all kinds of weapons when unfurled over the bearer. This flag belongs to the commander-in-chief of the Chow army, who is therefore immune from the dangers confronting other combatants.

Above all, if modern wars were fought along the lines of that mythological conflict, campaigns could be launched and pressed forward at much lower cost. Unlike bombs, torpedoes, and shells which, once fired, are spent, most of the secret weapons described in The Appointment of the Gods are boomerang-like, returning to their respective owners after having made the “kill.”

The imaginary flame-thrower, for instance, requires no detailed planning regarding the supply of fuel or the training of special crews in asbestos suits to handle the elaborate equipment. The weapon that emits the devastating fire with ease in our mythological war is nothing but a fan made of quills. In appearance it is similar to those still used today by more conservative Chinese gentlemen, who dislike folding fans because they were not originally developed in this country.

The supply of defense materials would no longer be a pressing question to the governments of warring nations, and modern wars would be fought with still swifter decision if all the imaginary weapons described in The Appointment of the Gods were brought into realization by the inventive scientists of the twentieth century.
BOOK


Zarojenev i Razvitie Tikookeanskogo Uzla Protivorechii (The Origin and Development of the Knot of Controversies in the Pacific Area), by V. Motylev. (Moscow, Sotskiz, 144 pp., rubles 1.65.)

Chinas Erneuerung. Der Raum als Waffe (China's Rebirth. Space as a Weapon), by Dr. Lily Abegy, Frankfurt, Sozietaets-Verlag, 1940, 483 pp., Reichsmark 7.50.


The four books reviewed are all closely linked to articles in this issue. However, Mr. Barber wrote his account of Hawaii in a vein quite different from that of our leading article. He is not a European who enjoyed the peace of Hawaii, but an American journalist who came to Hawaii to write at first articles for Atlantic Monthly, later a book. His penetrating and very critical study caused something of a sensation in Hawaii. At times it is rather personal, yet essentially it is based on facts commonly known in the islands. Omitting any praise of the charms of Hawaii, Mr. Barber, after a brief historical introduction, turns the spotlight of his investigation on what he calls the “triangle of forces”—Big Five, Japanese, army and navy. Most of his criticism is reserved for the Big Five, the powerful and closely interrelated corporations which direct the economic life of the islands. In sharp and often ironical words he describes the curious semi-monopolistic policies of the Big Five, their hold on Hawaii, their influence in Washington through “lobbying by remote control,” their struggle for statehood (“Forty-Ninth State”) and in a particularly sarcastic chapter (“Propaganda, Hawaiian Style”) their efforts “to sell Hawaii to the mainland and island monopoly to Hawaii.” At the same he pays tribute to their farsightedness and interest in the welfare of their laborers. (“Physically some of the communities have taken on the appearance of model villages, the equal of any on the mainland… Plantation employees were generally better off than any of their mainland fellows in industry and agriculture, for they were assured through the depression years of free, modern housing, fuel, medical care and hospitalization… During 1934-1937, their average daily earnings increased twenty-seven per cent. This rise brought their average cash wage in 1938 to $2.13 per day—the highest annual average in American agriculture.” p. 74.)

Mr. Barber justly appreciates the inner conflicts in the hearts of the islands’ Japanese between their racial and their political allegiances, and he realizes that much of the responsibility for existing antagonism lies with the white Americans. The two chapters on army and navy—together almost one-third of the book—can count on special interest in our war-minded days. To most readers the extent of military preparations in the Pacific Paradise will come as a surprise. The figures quoted are staggering, from the total military investment of almost a billion dollars down to the 2,000 turkeys which the army in Hawaii eats on Thanksgiving Day. The significance of Pearl Harbor as a naval base is shown and the army's task concisely summarized in the words: “We intend to make the price of taking Pearl Harbor so prohibitively high that no enemy would want to pay it.” (p. 195.) He mentions the growing inroads of the armed forces into the life of the people: “Great chunks of land and valuable shore front… have lately been taken over by the services for military purposes and the end is not in sight.” (p. 251.) This book will do much towards the destruction of Hawaii’s romantic halo, but in this it is unfortunately in tune with the times.

In the dictatorial Soviet State everything can be taken to indicate the general situation of the country, even a historical treatise. Mr. Motylev’s book is a disappointment to the reader expecting something startlingly new in this first Soviet book on the recent history of the Pacific area. It is on the whole a conventional account of Far Eastern history from the opening-up of Japan to the present war. Of course the terminology is slightly changed (off-hand one might not recognize the “War of the Eleven Powers against the Chinese People” as the Boxer Rebellion, p. 3) and there are the customary frequent quotations from Marx, Lenin, and Stalin; also the
Marxist over-emphasis on economic factors. But no new material is presented, although the Russian archives hold stacks of hitherto unused documents on Russo-Par Eastern affairs. In one of the few instances where Molynev offers a slightly newer interpretation (on the subject of Japan's attitude towards Korea in the seventies and eighties, pp. 14-16) he bases his views on a book published in 1900. It appears that even in the writing of history the Bolsheviks are becoming increasingly conventional.

* * *

The many books written on the Sino-Japanese conflict would fill a large shelf; yet few can rival "China's Rebirth" by Dr. Lily Abegg (the author of our "Thailand—Old and New") in wealth of information and calm objectivity. It is to be regretted that the book has not been translated into English, for it is written by a person who combines a thorough knowledge of the Far East with independent and clear reasoning. Although written by a woman, it does not betray any emotion save that of profound sympathy for the rebirth of a new China that is taking place on the battle-fields of the present war. In contrast to the vast majority of western books on the Sino-Japanese conflict which present only one—and usually the Chinese—side, Miss Abegg has an extraordinary understanding for both, and her book is one of the few that have been appreciated by Chinese as well as by Japanese. Dividing her book into four parts (The War Enforces Progress, Western China and the War, Eastern China and the War, China's Future), the author places her chief emphasis on the second and gives its 250 pages to the description and analysis of Chiang Kai-shek's struggle for China's rebirth and freedom. The third part, on Eastern China, deals with the various peace movements, particularly in Peking and of Wang Ching-wei. The sub-title, Space as a Weapon, indicates where the author sees Japan's greatest difficulty: in the enormous space of China, densely populated with a hostile population which completely engulfs the Japanese forces. The book is well illustrated and has an excellent cover design which strikingly matches the title: the face of a young steel-helmeted Chinese soldier, boyish, not yet fully awake, yet defiant. "China's Rebirth!" is not easy reading; but it repays the effort, for it is packed with facts and thought.

* * *

Mr. Noma's autobiography should be collateral reading to Mr. Takahashi's article on Japanese magazines. While the article speaks of the magazines of today, the book describes their history. It is true, Mr. Noma only deals with the history of his own magazines. But we learn from Mr. Takahashi that they make up 75% of the total circulation of Japanese magazines.

Mr. Noma, who died recently at the age of sixty, was born at the beginning of the Meiji Era, which brought such enormous changes to Japan. Through both his parents he was the descendant of Samurai families, victims of the abolition of the feudal order. His father, to combine the noble traditions of his ancestors with the sad necessity of making a living, set up as a traveling fencing instructor. As a boy, young Noma fled from the poverty of his home into the delights of imagination and in one year read the one hundred and six volumes of the "Romance of the Eight Dog-Heroes," thereby obtaining his lasting interest in good stories. He earned his first money—one and one half dollars per month—as an assistant village teacher. For a number of years he remained in the teaching profession, spending a delightful time in that sunny possession of Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, which he describes as a "paradise for male debauchees." When he received an administrative position in the Imperial University of Tokyo, he was seized by the general craze for speech-making prevalent among Japanese students at that time and conceived the idea of publishing a monthly magazine, embodying the speeches of University professors and students. After many vain attempts he found a publisher for his first magazine, Yuben (Eloquence) which is still in existence. The hunger for serious magazines was already so strong in Japan that he sold 14,000 copies of his first issue.

His most successful brain-child was the magazine Kodan Club with which he returned to the interests of his early youth. "Kodans," are the popular historical romances recited by professional story-tellers. These were now put into print for the first time. At first he had no success. His losses were much greater than the profits brought in by Yuben. He was on the verge of bankruptcy, and a quarrel with the Kodan story-tellers led to their strike. How he extricated himself from this awkward situation, at the same time creating a new literary style, should be read in his own words.

Other magazines followed in quick succession. Noma's technique in the preparing and launching of new magazines improved with each new effort, and he took it for granted that, for the large-scale success of a magazine, losses must be expected during the first one to three years. He developed new methods of advertising and distribution. He carried on even under the conditions of the 1923 earthquake, and eventually entered the fields of book-publishing and the newspaper. At the time of his death Noma was the undisputed king of the Japanese magazine world.
MAGAZINES

During the past decades magazines have attained an ever-increasing importance in the field of public opinion, which they both shape and reflect. In the following pages we present reviews of articles from two groups of periodicals. The first are English language magazines published in the Far East or dealing with its problems, the second are magazines in Japanese language. Instead of giving tables of contents or reprinting excerpts we have decided to review individual articles. The articles reviewed are, of course, only a fraction of those published. They are selected with a view to their importance or significance.—K.M.

FAR EASTERN MAGAZINES IN ENGLISH

India

It is to be expected that articles dealing with present political affairs bring the problems of the Far East into the limelight of controversy. The China-Japan conflict, of course, plays its role in sending its ever-increasing rays to the south. And it is deserving of notice that quite a number of writers are scrutinizing reactions in India.

Pacific Affairs, the anti-Axis quarterly of the Institute of Pacific Relations edited by Mr. Owen Lattimore, contains in its last issue an article India in a Changing Asia by Krishnalal Shridharani, written in New York. After a lengthy examination of nationalistic currents in India, and avoiding taking a stand on the all-important Indo-British issue, Shridharani comes to the conclusion that the Sino-Japanese conflict provoked anti-Japanese feeling in India and led to a Chinese orientation of Indian nationalism. Ever since 1904, he writes, Indian Nationalists have felt that Japan alone could challenge the West. The most reassuring factor in the eyes of India’s political realists, however, was the conception of an Asiatic island empire pitted against a European island empire. To them Japan is the natural enemy of Great Britain. Sooner or later there was bound to be a clash between the two island empires, and India would benefit by the upheaval. Asiatic countries were to cooperate under the guidance of Nippon. Japan’s “Asia for the Asiatics” also appealed to India for a time; but now, as events in the Sino-Japanese conflict prove, the Japanese doctrine is “Asia for the Japanese.” Coupled with Japan’s march into the Asiatic mainland, it brought Japanese aggression almost to India’s eastern door. Hence an anti-Japanese feeling began and crystallized into action. On the other hand, British Pacific policy aims at the preservation of the status quo in the Far East. A strong and independent China, Britain seems to realize, would be a factor in speeding up the evolution of a strong and independent India. Indian leaders got in touch with General Chiang Kai-shek with a view to Indo-Chinese collaboration. The possibility of half the world’s population collaborating under the leadership of China and India to preserve the peace in the Pacific area is to the author one of the most promising prospects of permanent peace, not only in the Far East but also in the whole of Asia.

An opposite point of view is stressed by several Indian writers in the periodical Asiatic Asia. This is the organ of the Pan-Asiatic Association in Shanghai, which looks toward a solution of the Asia problem under the leadership of Japan. Under the title India Fights for Freedom, Mr. A. M. Sahay stresses the fact that, since the war in Europe, India has received renewed attention by the world powers as an important factor in international politics, since her attitude toward the war is bound to be of significance. Mr. Sahay complains that India is misrepresented and that the world misled by British propaganda. He wonders why, despite overwhelming proof to the contrary, the world does not reject the wholly untruthful and insincere claims of Britain that she is fighting the present war for freedom from aggression. India’s war against tyranny and exploitation began in 1857 and has at present reached the point where she sees an opportunity of achieving her final goal—complete freedom.

In the same periodical Mr. D. S. Deshpande writes on India and the Russo-German War. He describes the war as the furious battle of two giants. Although opinions vary as to the ultimate outcome, nobody, except perhaps the Kremlin authorities, seems to entertain the idea of a Russian victory. In a National-Socialistic victory over the old plutocratic as well as over the communist order, the writer sees aid for India’s cause to achieve freedom from British domination.
To the voices of Indian writers about Indian affairs we may add a critical observation by an American, Mr. Eric Estorick, at present instructor in sociology at New York University and during 1938 and 1939 correspondent of the London Tribune. His article appeared in the illustrated monthly Asia and is called Britain's Blind Spot. As proof of Great Britain's unwillingness to meet India's demands even half-way he cites Prime Minister Churchill's statements and says: "It didn't matter, then, that despite Churchill's willingness to go a long way in domestic reform, his record on India was as reactionary as any Old Guard imperialist's could possibly be. It is, however, a matter of great importance at the moment when England fights to expunge Fascism from the earth, that her colonies should begin to share in the democracy which the mother country professedly fights to preserve, and that these democratic privileges should be extended to the masses of the colonies as the situation warrants. The evidence to be found from the speeches of Prime Minister Churchill leads us to believe, unfortunately, that he considers the very thought of democracy for India anachronistic. Speaking through the years, Churchill has said the following: 'Sooner or later you will have to crush Gandhi and the Indian Congress and all they stand for.' (January, 1930.) 'The British nation has no intention whatever of relinquishing effectual control of Indian life and progress. We have no intention of casting away that most truly bright and precious jewel in the Crown of the King, which, more than all our other Dominions and Dependencies, constitutes the glory and strength of the British Empire.' (December, 1936.)"

Japan and China

The fourth anniversary, July 7, 1941, of the Sino-Japanese conflict is dealt with by Mr. H. G. W. Woodhead, British editor of Oriental Affairs (Shanghai), in an article Four Years of Sino-Japanese Hostilities. Woodhead draws a gloomy picture of Japan's position in China. Says he: "The stiffening of Anglo-American policy towards Japanese aggression, and the pledge of increased assistance to the only Chinese Government recognised by Britain and America, has exasperated Japan, but encouraged the spirit of resistance at Chungking. If China's loss of territory and wastage of man-power continue at the same rate as during the fourth year of hostilities there appears to be no reason why she should not be able to resist for another ten or even fifteen years....The problem of ending Sino-Japanese hostilities today appears insoluble."

In the Japanese inspired Far Eastern Review, Mr. Inpei Fukuda, criticizing the present Japanese policy, views the situation on the fourth anniversary of the Sino-Japanese conflict in his Whither China War? He writes: "Now that the futility of drawing Chungking into a roundtable conference to discuss peace is brought home to the Japanese Government, the only course left open for it is to stage an armed sit-down strike against....General Chiang Kai Chek.....So far the usefulness of Mr. Wang Ching-wei's Government at Nanking in bringing about peace has been practically nil....The Ambassador (Mr. Honda) pointed out that Japan would never be so faithless as to abandon the Nanking regime and enter into direct peace negotiations with Chungking for the time which, in his opinion, had definitely passed." Mr. Fukuda states that the four years fighting have cost Japan 109,250 men killed, including the Changkufeng and Nomahon incidents with the Soviets in 1938-39.

Leaving the subject of the war, we turn to a historical study, Cultural Relations between Japan and China, written by the Japanese Board of Information and published in the Tokyo Gazette. As early as 286 A.D. Chinese culture began to influence Japanese life. When in 1636 the Tokugawa Shogunate closed the country to foreign intercourse, Japanese were prohibited from crossing over to China. But some political refugees from China came from time to time to Japan, the most notable of them being the famous Chushun-shuei, a learned Confucian scholar. The first official contact was re-established after two hundred and twenty-three years of seclusion, when in 1862 the Itosu Maru made her first voyage to Shanghai.

In Contemporary Japan, Mr. Shinnosuke Abe, long connected with the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shim bun as chief editor, director, and now as adviser, draws a vivid picture of Japan's new Foreign Minister, Admiral Teijiro Toyoda. Mr. Abe's reflections follow: "There is no manner of doubt that Prince Konoe has chosen Admiral Toyoda as Foreign Minister, actuated by the desire to preclude any possibility of friction between Japan's foreign and military policies....Of the outstanding diplomatic questions, the future relations between Japan and the United States command public attention, first and foremost....Japan and the United States will gain much by adjusting and ameliorating their relations, but lose everything by going to war with each other....Under such a delicate situation the writer discerns something more than a mere coincidence in the selection of Kichisaburo Nomura as Japan's Ambassador to Washington and Teijiro Toyoda as new Foreign Minister, both full Admirals, hailing from the same Province of Kii. Most people hailing from Kii Province are mettlesome with a savour of prejudice which characteristics are at once their strong and weak points. Admiral Nomura is an exception to Kii people, because he is possessed of a generous and amiable personality.
Common with the Kii folks, Admiral Toyoda has the mettle in him, but he is free from prejudice and broadminded enough to listen to other's advice."

The Oriental Economist (Tokyo), of which Mr. Tanzan Ishibashi is both president and editor, contains a survey of the North China Development Company. This is a Japanese Government enterprise, created by special authority of the Japanese Diet and founded in November 1938. Its aim is, with Chinese co-operation, to exploit the transportation and communication as well as mining, electricity, and other industrial enterprises in North China. The journal remarks: "The immediate problem confronting the company is the acquisition of capital within North China. The policy of raising funds jointly by Japan and China has been adopted but the co-operation from China in the existing enterprises has only been extended by Government. To effect real Sino-Japanese co-operation, popular support of Chinese capital is necessary... The associations have not yet been organised into companies. Their operation is under military control for the time being as a transitional measure."

In Japan and Vladivostock in his Oriental Affairs, Mr. Woodhead discusses the problem of this important port as a place of transit for war materials to the USSR. In claiming that Japan has no right to obstruct such shipments he cites the Portsmouth Treaty of 1906, reaffirmed at Peking in 1925, according to which Japan guaranteed not to impede the free navigation through the Strait of La Perouse (between the islands of Hokkaido and Sakhalin) and Tatar Strait (between Sakhalin and the mainland).

The Eight Points
The China Weekly Review, registered as an American paper but known to be an organ of the Chungking Government, analyses in critical vein in its issue of August 23 the Eight Points of the Roosevelt-Churchill Atlantic declaration. To the British-American promise not to seek any territorial or other aggrandizement, the article says: "Neither Britain nor France fought for new territory in World War I. Yet Britain acquired more than a million square miles of additional territory as a result of the Versailles Treaty. France also added something to her Empire."

The article is skeptical as to the free access to raw materials promised in Point 4, saying: "Such access will be allowed only with 'due respect' for the 'existence of the British Empire and the United States. The word 'interests' would have been more appropriate than 'obligations.' After the victorious powers have satisfied their own needs the other fellows will have their chance." As to the point dealing with disarmament, the article states: "It is noteworthy that the Eighth Point of the Roosevelt-Churchill declaration provides for the disarmament of the vanquished but not of the victors. This is quite a contrast with the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, wherein the victorious Allies provided for the disarming of Germany but also promised to disarm themselves." The severest criticism is reserved for the slogan of self-government in Point 3: "Why cannot the principle be put into practice now—say, in India? The 350,000,000 people of India are forcibly deprived of their sovereign rights and, far from having chosen the form of government under which they are presently obliged to live, are vigorously opposed to it. The British are in India by right of conquest. The Japanese are in Manchuria and China and French Indo-China, not to speak of Korea and Formosa by exactly the same right. And the Germans are in Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, eastern Europe and the Balkans with similar justification, if justification it can be called.

"What's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If the principle of self-determination is good at all, it is good for universal application. The enslavement of hundreds of millions of people in British colonies and possessions squares ill with a declaration of respect for the principle of self-government. It is this which has made many Americans extremely skeptical of the genuineness of British war aims. It is this which constitutes one of the most powerful weapons in the arsenal of the Nazi propagandists."—H.F.

JAPANESE

As has been pointed out elsewhere in this issue, practically all Japanese magazines are in line with the present ideology of Japan. Hence most of the important articles represent more or less the attitude of the Japanese Government. We believe it is interesting to know what the Japanese public reads in its influential magazines.

The German-Soviet War and Japan
The German-Soviet war and its significance for Japan occupied much space among recent articles published in Japanese magazines. A detailed article was published on the Soviet Union and another on Germany. Mr. T. Shigemori writes about the USSR in Soviet Russia of Today in a very critical vein in the magazine Gendai. From October 1940 until June of this year he stayed in Russia as private secretary to the Japanese Ambassador, and he is at present considered one of the best Japanese experts on Russia. He has a favorable opinion only of the great technical development of Russia and her strong national unity. His remark is interest-
ing that in the Russia of Stalin there is hardly anything more to be seen of the principles of Marxism. In Soviet Russia there is a stronger tendency toward "bourgeois" standards of life than in any other country. The peasants are least sympathetic toward Bolshevism. They have, for instance, to hand over their eggs to the State at 20 kopecks each, and then to buy them back at 80 kopecks. In the cities one sees richly uniformed officers of the Red Army side by side with miserably dressed laborers. There are special cheap shopping facilities for "privileged classes," i.e., certain categories of workers, members of the OGPU, etc. Working hours have been increased by one hour since June 26, 1940; it is forbidden to change one's place of work; and being late three times is punished with deportation and forced labor. Officials with an income of 20,000 rubles live in four-room apartments and lastly can even afford a car, while a large part of the population has to go without shoes and stockings. Mr. Shigemori thinks, however, that Stalin saw in this deviation from the principles of Lenin his only means to achieve the urgently needed increase in industrial production. Mr. Shigemori thinks that the war did not come unexpectedly to Russia, although she tried to avoid it as long as possible. He mentions a sharp speech against Germany made by Stalin on May 6 on the occasion of the graduation ceremonies of the Red Academy of War. When Minister of War Timoshenko, following the speech, called for a toast to the "peace-policy" of Stalin, the latter is supposed to have corrected him with the words: "To the war-policy of Stalin."

The article on Germany, My Visit to the Axis Powers, is written by Lieutenant-General Yamashita in the magazine Katō. He had spent some time in Germany and Poland as leader of a Japanese military delegation and had left Berlin just a few days before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war. He was impressed by the personality of the Führer and his understanding of Japan. He admires the attitude of the German soldiers in the occupied territories, whose behavior is not that of conquerors, and who let it be seen that this war does not mean a revenge for the defeat of 1918 but rather something far higher. Lieut.-General Yamashita calls the actions of Hitler and his soldiers the birth of a new spirit. He is equally enthusiastic about the German economic system and its achievements, and the whole-hearted cooperation of the entire German people. He closes with the remark that since the Great War he has visited Germany every ten years or so and distinctly felt the growth of the nation's strength. He had always been of the opinion that a people like the Germans would never perish. The author has recently been appointed to the Supreme War Council.

Interesting opinions on developments in Europe in relation to the present war are voiced in an article by Mr. Y. Kuboi, The Future of the New European Order in Gen- chi Hokoku. Mr. Kuboi is a very well-known member of the Japanese Parliament. Together with the former Foreign Minister Matsuoka he visited Germany and has only recently returned from Europe. He was surprised to hear from Prof. Schmitt of the Berlin University in the beginning of May that Russia could not longer be considered as a great political sphere in the planned new order of the world because she lacked the necessary qualifications of leadership. Kuboi believes that Russia did not want the war to come so soon, because she wished the capitalistic states first to exhaust one another before hitting out herself. A possible Bolshevist Government beyond the Urals would be of no importance if only because it would have scarcely forty million people behind it. The plan for a new order in Europe has undergone a great change through the German-Soviet war. The leading country is the Reich. It will undertake the responsibility for the defense, the foreign policy, and the economies of the other countries included in the order. In the Greater East Asiatic sphere Japan will assume a corresponding role. War as between the former states will end with the present war. Warlike actions between the great spheres of influence will be made practically impossible by the tremendous distances, for the American and the Euro-African spheres are separated by the Atlantic, and the American and the Greater Asiatic spheres by the Pacific.

Japan and her Southern Problem

The magazine Nippon Hyoron contains an article on the influence of the German-Soviet war on the southward expansion of Japan, The New International Situation and the Southern Problem by the well-known writer Mr. T. Taira. He reviews the Japanese southern problem from its beginnings in the Great War to the present shape given it by the defeats of Holland and France. Mr. Taira is of the opinion that the southern problem can only be solved in connection with the other problems of the world. The great importance of this problem for Japan lies above all in its close connection with the China conflict; for the South offers the absolutely necessary source of raw materials and the markets for the planned economic bloc Japan-China-Manchuko. America has cut off Japan's supplies of raw materials and now wants to prevent her from obtaining raw materials in the southern Pacific, so that Japan must take measures to help herself. Japan must also begin to think of obtaining a firm economic position in the southern Pacific in order to meet the sharp competition to
be expected after the war from American industry, at present being built up so tremendously for the purpose of armaments. Considering the southern problem as a question of life and death, Mr. Taira closes with the observation that Japanese policy has hitherto always swung between the northern and the southern problems. Today, however, it should be directed not only towards the north and south but also towards the east and west.

Thailand is a sub-division of Japan's southern problem. It is discussed in Koron by Mr. Y. Miyabara's Modern Thailand. Thailand, he writes, is the only independent state in the southern part of the Far East and belongs to the Greater East Asiatic sphere. The rice crops of Thailand are of greater importance to the future economic bloc Japan-China-Manchukuo. Thailand possesses many other raw materials indispensable to this economic bloc, as for instance rubber, tin, teakwood, etc. There are also possibilities for the growing of cotton, etc. Hence Japan must promote the development of Thailand. Thai economics are entirely in the hands of foreigners, members of the white race as well as Chinese and Annamites. Taking taxes as an example, Miyabara demonstrates the negligible Thai capital. The greater part of the national income goes abroad, a circumstance disadvantageous to cultural and economic progress. The revolution of 1932, which was to effect changes in this situation, so far has not shown the desired results. There is also a deep-rooted suspicion of Japan. Japanese culture is hardly known in Thailand, while other nations have already gained a firm footing through the founding of missions and the establishment of schools, hospitals, etc. Since the revolution and the current economic and political reform Thailand has been looking to Japan, which went through a similar development and now has much to offer to Thailand especially in the scientific and technical spheres. Japanese cultural propaganda should bear in mind that 95% of the Thai are Buddhists, for this is probably one of the most important points of contact with Buddhist Japan. The author is a member of the Bureau for Economic Research of the South Manchurian Railway.

Japan's Leaders

Two interesting articles are devoted to men at the helm of Japan's ship of state. The first one is by Mr. K. Sumimoto, The Tasks Facing the Third Konoye Cabinet, in Jikyoku Jocho. He observes that the foreign policy fixed in a meeting of the Imperial Council would, of course, remain the same in spite of a change in ministers. In the present situation the opinion of the navy plays an important role, and it is taken into account by giving the post of Foreign Minister to Admiral Toyoda. The ideological leadership of Hiranuma in the new cabinet has been greatly strengthened by his appointment as Minister without portfolio. The inclusion of seven members of the armed forces and not a single member of the former political parties is significant for the new "war cabinet." The policy of the new Government remains basically unchanged. Its main tasks are the creation of a highly armed military nation, the early settlement of the China conflict, the organization of a Greater East Asiatic sphere, and the preparation and execution of measures called for by the international situation. Important conditions for the solving of its tasks by the new Government are a stricter inner alignment toward war, especially in financial and economic circles, and a firm national unification of the people. The faster execution of the plans of the former and the present cabinet require the strengthening of the political power of the Government. Until now its task in many cases is confined to the simple ratification of the decisions of the different ministries.

The other article on Japanese statesmen, published in Jenchi Hokoku, deals with Admiral Toyoda, the Foreign Minister, and is written by Mr. J. Matsubara, Foreign Minister Toyoda. According to him, the powerful Japanese navy has in no way been weakened by the China conflict. It is therefore not without significance that at the present moment an Admiral has taken over the tiller of Japanese foreign policy, who was furthermore until recently Vice-Minister of the Navy. Prime Minister Konoye has learnt to appreciate the new Foreign Minister as a clear-thinking and prudent man, and last April had called him into his Government as Minister of Economics. Toyoda made the sacrifice of doffing his beloved uniform. He quickly got into his stride in his new office and worked with great success. His strong character was esteemed as well as his habit, in cases which did not seem quite clear to him, of at first observing carefully and then acting with determination, after having thoroughly studied the matter in question. He is attributed with a decisive influence in the reorganization of the Government. Mr. Matsubara ends his article with the observation that the Tripartite Pact continues to form the basis of Japanese foreign policy and that the latter has also not changed in relation to the solving of the China conflict. But he believes that the Pacific of today cannot be compared with the Pacific of former days, and that Japan's destiny, irrespective of the result of the German-Soviet war, lies in the Pacific, and that this would undoubtedly soon be proved by Toyoda's foreign policy.—S.M.
TUNING-IN

Many years ago I read only one newspaper and was satisfied with myself and the world. It was a small-town paper and had very clear-cut human principles which fascinated me. The closed-in world of this newspaper was identical with my conception of the world. The paper gave me something to cling to; it gave me matter for thought as well as information; and its judgments were also mine. I knew the editor personally, and I read his weekly editorials regularly; I liked the clean, simple, and unshakeable convictions I found in them.

The news section, too, of this paper, seemed to me to be beyond doubt. If there was a report that a circus would be showing in the next town one could be sure that it would be there. Just as faithfully correct were the court-room reports. No one in the neighborhood had any doubt that a man branded by this paper as a swindler was a rogue.

Yet one day the ground fell away from under my feet. For Christmas an uncle of mine gave me a subscription to a newspaper with a nation wide circulation. The clear mirror of my gullibility broke, and with it the neatly rounded off world of my newspaper and of my imagination. The great world suddenly looked quite different.

I had been driven from Paradise, and ever since I have felt the heavy burden of the curse that had been placed upon me. I chased after versions, interpretations, and tendencies, in the hope of finding—perhaps on a more intellectual level—truth and peace of mind. Soon I was reading not only two papers, but ten, twelve, fifteen a day, and uncountable periodicals.

With every newspaper and periodical I added to my reading, I got further and further away from the truth and a well-balanced conception. The world was torn asunder, and an unholy confusion raged in me.

Finally things became altogether too topsy-turvy and senseless for me, and I decided to turn my back on all newspapers. Since then I don’t read any paper at all. Let everybody be happy in his own way.

For a while I was conscious of the relief afforded by the deep silence around me. No newspapers! And no reformers of world and men! But he who has once left Paradise can never regain it. This relief of deep silence was soon replaced by a consuming boredom and a torturing curiosity. Instead of silence there was emptiness, yawning emptiness, and I realized that it was impossible to live one’s life on a peaceful, isolated island.

In order not to return to newspapers as a source of news and information, I bought a radio. With this modern instrument I hoped to conjure up the voices of the world in my peaceful room. The fairy of distance was to bewitch the world into a magic lantern of my mind. I had great expectations of the spoken word, of the human voice, which surely must be different from printer’s ink.

How wrong I was! I jumped out of the frying-pan into the fire. While in the case of newspapers, in spite of all the confusion, I had after all been dealing only with the papers of a single country, now the spoken views of the whole world came rushing at me from all sides. But I made up my mind to put up with it this time, so that I might not entirely desert this exciting world. I decided scientifically to investigate this radio propaganda. Although I did not believe that lies could be entirely banished from the world, I wanted at least to discover the limits to the possibility of deception, perhaps to stumble upon the truth of lies.

I know my radio set, and I know the wave-lengths of the important transmitters in the world. I have long overcome the so-called technical difficulties of tuning-in. Of course I cannot do anything about the inevitable atmospheric disturbances and I accept them philosophically as an act of Providence. What else could I do? But I am annoyed by the artificial, deliberate interference from the “other side.” Every station has its enemy, just as every human being is envied and opposed.

The first thing I discovered was that every station has its personal note which, quite aside from the language, shows the mentality of the country to which the station belongs, together with all its worries, troubles, intentions, and joys. From an American station a different spirit fills the ether than, for example, from a German transmitter. And a Japanese station again is different from a Russian or Indian or Chinese one.

The range of radio propaganda is much wider than that of printer’s ink. Just as every newspaper has its face, so has every radio-station too. Indeed, it has more; it has its own color and its own tone. It requires a fine and delicate sense to hear it properly. If, in the case of newspapers, one need only read between the lines to find the hidden meaning, in the case of radio . . . . Here the difficulties
The ether has no lines to read between. Radio demands far greater concentration and devotion by its readers—beg pardon, listeners.

A good announcer must be a good actor or speaker who, as an artist, really lives the material he has to deliver. Through the vivacity and realism of his voice and delivery he gives the impression of authenticity but carries away his listeners. Indeed, he often only makes the material interesting to his listeners through his voice. However clear and unequivocal the written text may be, a good announcer is capable of giving this text, through his voice, a completely different meaning, without changing a single word.

Every day I am kept busy by about ten stations, mostly during the evening and at night. There are some stations I feel an affection for, and their announcers have become my good friends. Among the stations some are interesting, some boring, some are harmless and some vicious, borne are on their toes, and others always just miss the bus, some are accurate and some not so particular about the truth.

I recognize the different stations by the voices of their announcers, just as on the telephone one recognizes by the voice who is at the other end. I also know approximately the way the mind of each announcer works.

For example, there is the announcer of the London B.B.C. station: I have no idea what he really looks like, but I imagine him to be tall. He is a self-assured man, and very matter-of-fact. His voice is clear and distinct and betrays no trace of passion. He never stumbles. Coldly he tells sometimes the truth and, just as coldly, sometimes an untruth as if it were the truth. The voice is that of a gentleman, rather severe, like that of a superior British officer in the colonies.

An entirely different type is represented by the announcer of the American station KGEI. He is a hearty fellow, who almost certainly makes violent movements of the body while speaking. His voice sounds slightly admonitory, as, indeed, with many American speakers. It is the voice of a reporter used to sending out sensational news into the world, hurrying, lively, with a decidedly optimistic undertone. It knows neither punctuation nor pause for breath; it is not at all melodramatic but nevertheless rich in modulation. It sounds like the yells from the bleachers of a baseball game. It seems to report without any semblance of order. But the careful listener feels that this medley is well-prepared, that there is method behind it.

I also listen with pleasure to the Khabarovsk RV15 transmitter. The announcer seems to be a regular fellow, at least judging by his voice: it thunders through the ether, loud, powerful, and clear. I am sure that, when speaking, he often clenches his fist and is almost carried away by his own words: he even outdoes himself. He seems to carry all of Siberia within himself as a sounding-board. He is one of the announcers one can really understand without difficulty; for he speaks slowly and will not be hurried. I am sure he does not perspire while speaking; one is conscious of his reserves of strength. His voice is unaffected and deep: a Russian bass!

Besides this man the Khabarovsk station also has a girl who announces. As a rule I do not care for women announcers, since nearly all of them have something pretentious in their voices. But this girl is an exception: her voice is soft and undulating, very agreeable, with something refined and womanly about it. She really should not speak about a subject so full of horrors as politics, but rather about farming or care of children. It is an ideal voice for a kindergarten teacher. What a pity that television is not more widespread, for I should like to have a look at that girl, especially at her eyes—they must be sad but shining.

I have just remembered that I have not yet told you my name. Every station has a name made up of some mysterious letters. Why should I not have one? I christen myself with the calling-letters: ECCE.
The curtain rose on the current act of the world drama on June 22 at two o'clock in the morning (Central European Standard Time, which will be used throughout for events in Europe), when German troops crossed the Soviet border. At 3:30 p.m. Propaganda Minister Goebbels read over the radio the Fuehrer's proclamation which explained to the German nation the background and reasons for the new war.

After a summary of the events since the Great War the proclamation turned to the German-Soviet pact of August 1939 and stated:

"National Socialists! At that time you probably all felt that it was a bitter and difficult step for me to take. Never did the German people harbor hostile feelings for the people of Russia. Yet for over 20 years the Jewish Bolshevist rulers in Moscow have endeavoured to set aflame not only Germany but the whole of Europe. At no time did Germany attempt to curry her National Socialist ideas and conceptions into Russia, yet the Jewish Bolshevist rulers in Moscow unswervingly endeavoured to force their domination upon us and upon other European nations not only by ideological means but above all with military force.

The consequences of the activity of this regime were nothing but chaos, misery and starvation in all countries.

I, on the other hand, have been striving for 20 years with the minimum of intervention and without destroying our production to arrive at a new socialist order in Germany which would not only eliminate unemployment but would also permit workers to receive a greater share of the fruits of their labor.

The success of this policy of economic and social reconstruction of our nation, which aims finally at a true people's community by systematically eliminating differences of rank and class, is unique in the entire world.

It was, therefore, only with extreme difficulty that in August, 1939, I brought myself to send my Foreign Minister to Moscow in an endeavour there to oppose the British encirclement policy against Germany.

I did this not only from my sense of responsibility towards the German people, but above all in the hope of achieving, after all, a permanent relief of tension and of being able to reduce sacrifices which might otherwise have been demanded of us.

While Germany solemnly affirmed in Moscow that the territories and countries mentioned—with the exception of Lithuania—lay beyond all German political interests, a special agreement was concluded in case Britain were to succeed in inciting Poland actually to go to war against Germany.

In this case, too, the German claims were subject to limitations entirely out of proportion to the achievements of the German forces.

National Socialists! The consequences of this treaty, which I myself had desired and which had been concluded in the interests of the German nation, were very severe indeed, particularly for the Germans living in the countries concerned.

Far more than 500,000 German men and women—all of them small farmers, artisans, workmen—were forced to leave their former homeland practically overnight in order to escape from the new regime which from the very first threatened them with boundless misery. Nevertheless thousands of Germans disappeared. It was impossible ever to determine their fate, let alone their whereabouts.

Among them there were no less than 160 men of German citizenship. To all this, I remained silent because I was forced to. For after all, it was my one desire to achieve the final relief of tension and, if possible, a permanent settlement with this state."

At this point the proclamation stated that the Soviet Union, contrary to the treaty with Germany, suddenly claimed Lithuania. Germany complied with this demand and after
her victory in Poland addressed another offer of peace to the Western powers. This found no response because Britain still hoped to mobilize a European coalition including the Balkans and the USSR against Germany. For this purpose Sir Stafford Cripps was sent to Moscow. After briefly mentioning the Finno-Russian war, the proclamation came to the question of Russian troop concentrations:

"Those in power in the Kremlin immediately went further. Whereas in the spring of 1940 Germany, in accordance with the so-called pact of friendship, had withdrawn her forces a long way from the eastern frontier and had in fact cleared a large part of these territories entirely of German troops, concentration of Russian forces at that time was already beginning in a measure which could only be regarded as a deliberate threat to Germany.

According to a statement which Molotov himself made at that time, there were 22 Russian divisions alone in the Baltic States in the spring of 1940. Since the Russian Government always maintained that Russian troops were called in by the local population, the purpose of their presence in that area could therefore only be a demonstration against Germany.

While our soldiers from May 10, 1940 onwards had been breaking the power of resistance of France and Britain in the west, the Russian military development on our eastern frontier was being continued to an ever more menacing extent.

From August, 1940 onwards, I therefore considered it to be in the interest of the Reich no longer to permit our eastern provinces, which moreover had already been laid waste so often, to remain unprotected in the face of this tremendous concentration of Bolshevik divisions.

Thus the effect intended by British and Soviet Russian co-operation was accomplished, that is the binding of such powerful German forces in the east that a radical conclusion of the war in the west, particularly as regards aircraft, could no longer be vouched for by the German High Command.

This, however, was in line with the objects of not only British but also Soviet policy, for both Britain and Soviet Russia intend to let this war go on for as long as possible in order to weaken the whole of Europe and render it still more helpless."

"Contrary to our principles and customs, and at the urgent request of the Rumanian Government then in power, which itself was responsible for this development, I advised acquiescence to the Soviet Union demands for the sake of peace, intimating that Bessarabia should be ceded.

The Rumanian Government believed, however, that it could not answer its own people for this unless Germany and Italy would at least in compensation guarantee the integrity of what still remained of Rumania. I did so with a heavy heart. Principally because, if the German Reich gives its guarantee, that means that it will also abide by it. I still believed at this late hour that I had served the cause of peace in that region, if only by assuming a serious obligation myself.

In order, however, to solve these problems and achieve clarity concerning Russia's attitude towards Germany as well as under the pressure of the continually increasing mobilization on our eastern frontier, I invited Molotov to come to Berlin.

The Soviet Foreign Commissar then requested Germany's clarification of or agreement to the following four questions:

Molotov's first question was: Is Germany's guarantee for Rumania also directed against Soviet Russia in case of an attack by Soviet Russia on Rumania?

My answer: The German guarantee is a general one and is unconditionally binding upon us. Russia, however, had declared to us that she had no other interests in Rumania beyond Bessarabia. The occupation of Northern Bukovina had already been a violation of this assurance. I did not, therefore, think Russia could now suddenly have more far-reaching intentions against Rumania.

Molotov's second question: Russia again felt menaced by Finland. Russia was determined not to tolerate this. Was Germany ready not to give any aid to Finland, and above all, to withdraw the German relief troops marching through to Kirkenes?

My answer: Germany continued to have absolutely no political interests in Finland. A new war waged by Russia against the small Finnish people could not, however, be regarded any longer by the German Government as tolerable, all the more so as we could never believe Russia to feel threatened by Finland. But we had no desire that another theater of war should arise in the Baltic.

Molotov's third question: Was Germany prepared to agree that Russia should give a guarantee to Bulgaria and should send Soviet Russian troops to Bulgaria for this purpose,
whereas he, Molotov, wished to state that they did not intend on that account, for instance, to depose the King?

My answer: That Bulgaria was a sovereign state and I had no knowledge that Bulgaria had requested Soviet Russia for any kind of guarantee as Rumania had requested Germany. Moreover I would have to discuss the matter with my allies.

Molotov’s fourth question was to the following effect: Soviet Russia required free passage through the Dardanelles under all circumstances, and for her protection also demanded that she be allowed to occupy a number of important bases in the Dardanelles and Bosporus. Would Germany agree to that or not?

My answer: Germany was at all times prepared to agree to an alteration of the Statute of Montreux in favor of the Black Sea States. Germany was not prepared to assent to Russia’s occupying bases in the Straits.

National Socialists! In this situation I adopted the only attitude which I could as a responsible Leader of the Reich, but also as a representative of European culture and civilisation.”

The proclamation accused the Soviet Union of attempts to remove the Bulgarian Government by means of propaganda and to undermine the new Rumanian State from within, which led to the unsuccessful coup d’etat against General Antonescu. Further Soviet troop concentrations in dangerous proximity of the German frontier followed.

“The German forces and the German nation know that until a few weeks ago not a single German tank or mechanized division was stationed on our eastern frontier.

Had any proof been required for the coalition meanwhile formed between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, this proof was given by the Yugoslav conflict, notwithstanding all attempts at diversion and camouflage.

Whilst I made every effort in attempting to pacify the Balkans, and invited Yugoslavia to join the Tripartite Pact, in sympathetic cooperation with the Duce, Great Britain and Soviet Russia in joint conspiracy organized the coup d’état which in one night removed the government which had been willing to come to an agreement. For today we can inform the German nation that the Serbian putsch against Germany did not take place merely under British, but primarily under Soviet Russian auspices.

Since we remained silent on this matter, Soviet leaders went still another step further. They not only organized this putsch but a few days later concluded the well-known agreement with their new subservient vassals which was intended to strengthen the Serbs in their desire to resist pacification of the Balkans and to incite them against Germany. This was no platonic intention: Moscow demanded the mobilization of the Serbian army.

As even at that time I still believed it better not to speak to those in power in the Kremlin, they went still further ahead: The Government of the German Reich today possesses documentary evidence which proves that Soviet Russia in order to induce Serbia finally to go to war against Germany promised to supply her with arms, munitions, aircraft and other war material via Salonica. And all this happened at the very moment I myself advised the Japanese Foreign Minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, to ease the tension with Russia, hoping as I did thus to serve the cause of peace.

Only the rapid advance of our divisions to Skoplje as well as the capture of Salonica itself frustrated the aims of this Soviet Russian—Anglo-Saxon plot.

Officers of the Serbian air-force who fled to Soviet Russia were received there as allies. It was the victory of the Axis powers in the Balkans alone which thwarted this plan to involve Germany in battles in southeastern Europe lasting for months throughout the summer while in the meantime Soviet Russia was to complete the alignment of her forces along the border and improve their preparations for war in order to be able with Britain supported by American supplies, finally to throttle Germany and Italy.

Thus Moscow not only broke but also miserably betrayed the stipulations of our friendly agreement. All this was done whilst the rulers in the Kremlin, exactly as they had done in the case of Finland and Rumania, up to the last moment put up a show of friendship and peace and published innocent denials.

Although up till now I have been forced by circumstances to keep silent again and again, the moment has now arrived when to continue being a mere observer would not only be a sin of omission but a crime against the German people, and even against the whole of Europe. Today approximately 160 divisions are facing our frontier.

For weeks, constant frontier violations on the part of Soviet troops have taken place not only into our territory but from the Far North down to Rumania. Russian army men consider it a sport simply and nonchalantly to overlook these frontiers, presumably in order to prove to us that they already consider themselves masters of these regions. In the night of June 17 to June 18, Russian reconnaissance patrols could only be driven off by prolonged firing.
This has brought us to an hour when it has become necessary for us to take steps against this plot devised by Jewish—Anglo-Saxon war-mongers and to an equal extent by Jewish rulers of the Bolshevik centre in Moscow.

German people! At this very hour movements of our troops are taking place, the magnitude of which is the greatest the world has ever witnessed. United with their Finnish comrades, the German warriors who brought about the victory at Narvik, are manning the shores of the Arctic Ocean. German divisions commanded by the Conqueror of Norway together with the champions of Finnish Liberty, under the command of their Marshal, are protecting Finnish territory. From East Prussia down to the Carpathians extends the front of the German formations in the east.

Along the shores of the Pruth, along the lower reaches of the Danube, down to the shores of the Black Sea, German and Rumanian soldiers are united under the Rumanian Chief of State, General Antonescu.

The task of this front thus no longer consists in the protection of individual countries but aims at safe-guarding Europe and means the rescue of us all.

I have therefore decided today to entrust the fate and future of the German Reich and the German nation to the hands of our soldiers.

May God, our Lord, aid us in this greatest of all struggles.

(signed) Adolf Hitler, June 22, 1941.

In the first two years of the present war there have been many curious parallels with the Great War of 1914-18. This is particularly the case in the clash between Germany and Russia.

On August 1, 1914, the Kaiser's Government declared war on Russia on very similar grounds as Hitler's Government did now. In 1914 Germany explained her declaration of war by the general mobilization of Russia, in 1941 with the threatening massing of Soviet troops on the western border of the USSR. In both cases it was a question of speed against mass.

The Kremlin gave its answer to Germany in two installments: the first was a radio speech by V. Molotov, the Premier and Foreign Commissar of the USSR, at 11:16 a.m., June 22. (Hence Molotov spoke before Goebbels had broadcast the Fuehrer's proclama
tion.) The nationalistic tone towards the end of Molotov's speech came as no surprise to those who have noted in the USSR the increase in patriotic slogans during the last few years, and which, of course, does not mean that the final aim of Bolshevism—world revolution—has been abandoned. After briefly mentioning the military activities during the first few hours of the new war, Molotov said:

"The attack on our country has been made in spite of the fact that throughout the time this pact was valid the German Government could not furnish proof that the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has ever infringed a single one of the clauses of the pact. All responsibility for this robber attack on the Soviet Union falls on the German-Fascist leader.

After the attack the German Ambassador in Moscow, Friedrich Werner Count von der Schulenburg, at 5:30 a.m. gave me, as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, a Note in the name of his Government that the German Government had decided to proceed against the Soviet Union because of a concentration of units of the Red Army on the German frontier. In answer to this, I declared in the name of the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics that until the last minute the German Government had made no representation to the Soviet Government. Germany decided to attack the Soviet Union in spite of the peaceful attitude of the Soviet Union, and because of this very fact Fascist Germany becomes the aggressor.

I have also to announce that at not a single point have our forces or our air force allowed any frontier to be violated and because of that allegations of the Rumanian radio that the Soviet air force raided Rumanian airfields today is nothing but a lie and a provocation. In the same way, the whole of Hitler's declaration published today is nothing but a provocation.

Now, when this attack on the Soviet Union has taken place, the Soviet Government has given our forces the following order: Beat back the enemy's invasion and do not allow enemy forces to hold territory of our country! This war has been forced upon us not by the German people, not by the German workers or the intelligentsia whose problems we thoroughly understand, but by a clique of bloodthirsty Fascist leaders of Germany who have oppressed the French, Czechs, Poles, Serbs, Norwegians, Belgians, Danes, Dutch, Greeks and other nations.

The Government of the Soviet Union is firmly convinced that our gallant Army and Navy, supported by the Soviet Air Force,
will honorably fulfill their duties to the Soviet people and will deal a complete blow to the aggressor. This is not the first time that our country has had to deal with an arrogant invading foe. When Napoleon invaded Russia, our country answered with a nationalist war and Napoleon was beaten and met his doom. The same thing will happen to arrogant Hitler who has started this new attack on our country.

The Red Army and the whole country will once again wage a victorious war for the nation's honour and liberty. The Government of the Soviet Union is convinced that the whole population of our country, all workers, peasants and intelligentsia, men and women, will act with complete understanding of their duties and work. All our people must be united as never before. Everyone of us must demand from himself and from others discipline, organization and self-sacrifice worthy of a true Soviet patriot in order to fulfill all needs of the Red Army, Fleet and Air Force and to guarantee victory over the enemy. The Government relies upon all citizens, men and women, of the Soviet Union.” (Reuter, China Press, June 23.)

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The second and more weighty Soviet statement was made by Stalin himself on July 2 after the first great German victories had become known. First he explained the Russian reverses:

“The fact of the matter is that the troops of Germany as a country at war, were already fully mobilized, and the 170 divisions hurled by Germany against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and brought up to the Soviet frontiers were in a state of complete readiness, only awaiting the signal to move into action, whereas Soviet troops had still to effect mobilization and move up to the frontiers.

Of no little importance in this respect is the fact that Fascist Germany suddenly and treacherously violated the non-aggression pact she concluded in 1939 with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, disregarding the fact that she would be regarded as the aggressor by the whole world. Naturally, our peace-loving country, not wishing to take the initiative of breaking the pact, couldn't resort to perfidy.”

Stalin repeated a number of Molotov's points, he explained the Red Army's strategy of withdrawal, and urged the destruction of everything in territories which had to be abandoned to the Germans. He demanded a guerrilla war in the rear of the German armies, increased output of war materials, and a ruthless campaign within the USSR against spies, saboteurs, rumor-spreaders, and disorganizers. He ended his speech by appealing to rally—not around “Little Mother Russia” as some had expected—but around the Communist Party and the Soviet Government:

“The State Committee of Defense has entered in its functions and calls upon all our people to rally around the party of Lenin-Stalin and around the Soviet Government so as self-denyingly to support the Red Army and Navy, demolish the enemy and secure victory.

All our forces for support of our heroic Red Army and our glorious Red Navy.

All the forces of the people—for demolition of the enemy!

Forward, to our victory!” (U.P., New York Times, July 4.)

* * *

The Polish question has developed along lines strikingly similar to those in the Great War. In both cases the territories inhabited by Poles and formerly belonging to Imperial Russia or to the USSR had been occupied by the German forces. In both cases the Eastern Poles hated the Russians—in 1914 after a century and a quarter, in 1941 after not quite two years of Russian domination. In both cases it was necessary from the Russian point of view somehow to win Polish sympathy and to make the world forget the previous Tsarist and Bolshevik tyranny over the Poles.

At the beginning of the Great War the Grand Duke Nicholas promised the Poles in a proclamation that the war would lead to the granting of Polish self-government, and appealed to the Poles for their assistance in the war. This promise was confirmed by the Tsar and became part of the official government program. But the Poles always suspected the sincerity of the Russians. Their fears were confirmed when Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, was dismissed because of his far-reaching schemes for Polish autonomy. In the end they won their independence and frontiers only after a bloody war with the Russians (1920).

In 1941 Russia again made a promise to Poland in a pact signed in London at 4 p.m., July 30, by the Soviet Ambassador and the refugee Polish Government. The pact declared:

“1. The territorial changes in Poland as a result of Soviet-German treaties of 1939 are void;

2. Mutual aid and support of all kind is pledged in the present war against Hitlerite Germany;
3. Provision is made for the formation of a Polish legion in Russia, under a Polish commander;

4. Russia will grant amnesty to all Polish prisoners of war and others detained on sufficient grounds in the Soviet Union.” (Reuters, North China Daily News, July 31.)

Thus the Soviet Union promised to give up the territorial gains which she had made at Poland's expense in the autumn of 1929 and which she has meanwhile lost to the German armies. For this the Poles must pay by fighting for the Soviet Union. That this latter was the main point of the agreement was clearly stated by Mr. Eden when, on July 31, he answered a question in Parliament with the words, “We have had in mind throughout the negotiation the enormous value to the Allied cause of raising and equipping rapidly a Polish army in Russia.” (Reuters, London, July 31.) A military agreement between the USSR and the Poles in London providing for the formation of a Polish army in the USSR was duly signed on August 15.

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The parallel does not end here. On September 5, 1914, Russia, England, and France promised each other in the “Pact of London” that none of them would conclude a separate peace and that they would fight together to final victory. On July 15, 1941, the same thing happened again, this time, of course, without the signature of France. This “Agreement for Joint Action” reads:

“1. The two Governments have undertaken to render each other assistance and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite Germany; and 2. They have undertaken that during this war they will neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement.

The two contracting parties have agreed that this agreement enters into force as from the moment of signature and is not subject to ratification.

The agreement was concluded on the evening of July 12, and was signed, by authority of the British Government, by Sir Stafford Cripps, British Ambassador to Moscow, and, by authority of the Government of the USSR, by M. Molotoff, the Soviet Foreign Commissar.

The agreement was concluded in English and Russian.” (Reuter, Shanghai Times, July 14.)

The “Pact of London” of 1914 lasted almost exactly three and a half years, until Russia, defeated and tried of fighting the British war, broke her promise by signing the separate peace of Brest Litovsk with Germany on March 3, 1918. How long is the new pact going to last? The Soviet Union is fulfilling her part of the bargain as promised in the agreement’s first point. It is indeed rendering tremendous assistance to the British cause and paying dearly for it. But where, the Russians will ask, is the assistance promised by Great Britain? Apart from raids by the RAF on northern France and western Germany and a brief British raid in the Arctic, hardly anything has been done, while the USSR is losing many thousands of men and an average of almost ten thousand square kilometers every day.

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Here America was called in to strengthen the Russian morale by hope for aid. During their Atlantic meeting President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill sent a joint letter to Stalin. In it the Russians are told a number of very obvious facts and a meeting of representatives of the three Powers in Moscow is suggested. When reading the letter Stalin must have looked for the word “act,” and when he found it in one of the very last lines of the message he discovered that it was used most cautiously and that the “action” was to consist of “planning a program.” The letter said:

“We have taken the opportunity afforded by consideration of the report by Mr. Harry Hopkins on his return from Moscow to consult together as to how best our two countries can help your country in the splendid defense you are making against the Nazi attack.

We at the moment are co-operating to provide you with the very maximum of supplies that you most urgently need. Already many airplanes have left our shores and more will leave in the immediate future. We must now turn our minds to consideration of a more long-term policy since there is still a long, hard path to be traversed before there can be won a complete victory without which our efforts and sacrifices would be wasted.

The war goes on upon many fronts and before it is over there may be further fighting fronts that will be developed. Our resources, though immense, are limited and it must become a question as to where and when those resources can be used best to further to the greatest extent our common effort. This applies equally to manufactured war supplies and war materials.

The needs and demands of your and our armed services can only be determined in the light of full knowledge of many factors which must be taken into consideration in the decisions we make. In order that all of us may be in a position to arrive at speedy decisions as to apportionment of our joint resources, we suggest that we prepare for a meeting to be held in Moscow to which we
would send high representatives who could discuss these matters directly with you. If this conference appeals to you we want you to know that pending decisions of that conference we shall continue to send supplies and material as rapidly as possible.

We realize fully how vitally important to the defeat of Hitlerism is the brave, steadfast resistance of the Soviet Union and we feel, therefore, that we must not in any circumstances fail to act quickly and immediately in this matter of planning a program for future allocation of our joint resources.

Signed:—Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill.” (U.P., Shanghai Evening Post, August 16.)

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While all eyes were focused on the broad plains of eastern Europe, events of great importance—not only for the Pacific area but also for the world as a whole—were taking place in the Far East. On July 15 the Government of unoccupied France had published the Syrian armistice which it had been forced to sign. The English-French relations were badly strained and the French Government feared a repetition of the Syrian experience in other parts of her colonial empire. At the same time Japan was anxious to establish bases in the strategically important southern part of French Indo-China. In the second half of July it became known that France and Japan were negotiating an accord on Indo-China. On July 27 the Vichy Government issued a statement explaining the reasons for such action and reminding the French of the recent events in Syria:

“It is absolutely necessary that French public opinion should be given exact particulars on the significance, bearing, and practical consequences of the Franco-Japanese agreements concerning Indo-China.

It is known that, according to the terms of the agreement of May 9, 1941, the Japanese could temporarily use the harbor facilities of Haiphong and concentrate troops and material at certain points in Tonking. It must be noted that there is no question of the surrender of bases, for this would imply abandoning the sovereignty and rights over the territory of such bases, which is not the case.

In the port of Haiphong in particular, the Japanese could use for a fixed period certain wharves, pontoons, and transportation facilities; but French authority, both civil and military, is maintained.

There is a great difference between the cession and the utilization of bases. In the first case the principle of sovereignty is affected; in the second the effect is only partial and temporary.

There is no analogy between the aggression in Syria and the Indo-China affair. In Syria, without seeking a previous discussion with the French Government, the British invaded our territory, publicly declaring their intention of driving us out of the country, which, moreover, they did.

Japan, on the contrary, first of all explained her point of view and through friendly negotiations sought for the terms of an agreement. She also—and this is the most important point of all—solemnly affirmed her intention of recognizing, both for the present and for the future, the integrity of the Federation of Indo-China and French sovereignty over all parts of this Federation. In other words Japan, afraid of complications in the situation in the southern part of the Far East, asks of us facilities of a strategic and military nature destined to protect her economy, for Japan is in urgent need of rice from Indo-China in order to feed her own population.

It is likely that these facilities will be made use of with the least possible delay, mainly by movements of Japanese troops from Tonking to Annam and Cochinchina; by the use of roads and possibly even railways for some days and of landing-points on Indo-Chinese territory; finally by stationing of Japanese units at mutually agreed upon positions.

It is necessary that the public be given exact information about the military consequences of the recently concluded agreement: in this frank and accurate statement of facts will be found the best defense against a propaganda which seeks to undermine confidence and to sow confusion in the minds of the public.” (Havas Telemondiial. Transl from Journal de Shanghai. July 30.)

* * *

Two days later, on July 29, the Agreement itself was published. It read:

“The Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of France, taking into consideration the present international situation, recognize as a result that there exist reasons for Japan to consider that in case the security of French Indo-China should be threatened, general tranquility in East Asia and her own security would be exposed to danger.

The opportunity is taken to renew the promise made by Japan on the one hand, to respect the rights and interests of France in East Asia, especially the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and French sovereignty over the whole Union of French Indo-China; and the promise made by France on the other hand not to conclude with any third power or powers an agreement or understanding regarding Indo-China envisaging
economic or military co-operation directly or indirectly aimed against Japan, and the two Governments have agreed upon the following provisions:

1. The two Governments mutually promise military co-operation for the joint defence of French Indo-China.

2. Measures to be taken for such co-operation shall be the object of special arrangements.

3. The above stipulations shall be valid only so long as the situation which motivated their adoption exists.

In witness thereof, the undersigned, having been duly authorized by the respective Governments, have signed and affixed their seals to the present protocol to go into effect from today.

Done at Vichy in duplicate in the Japanese and French languages, this twenty-ninth day of July, the sixteenth year of Showa, corresponding to the twenty-ninth day of July, 1941.” (Domel, North China Daily News, July 30.)

On the morning of July 31, the Japanese occupation of strategic Cam Ranh Bay began.

* * *

The opponents of the Axis took measures as soon as they became aware of Japan’s latest move. As early as July 25, Under-secretary of State Sumner Welles issued a sharp statement to the Japanese Ambassador, and the following day the White House and the U.S. Treasury issued the following identical statement concerning the freezing of Japanese Assets in the United States:

“In view of the unlimited national emergency declared by the President, he has today (Friday) issued an Executive Order freezing Japanese assets in the United States in the same manner in which the assets of various European countries were frozen on June 14, 1941.

This measure, in effect, brings all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Japanese interests are involved under control of the Government and imposes criminal penalties for violation of the order.

This Executive Order, just as the order of June 14, 1941, was designed among other things to prevent use of financial facilities of the United States and trade between Japan and the United States in ways harmful to national defence and American interests, to prevent liquidation in the United States of assets obtained by duress or conquest, and to curb subversive activities in the United States.

At the specific request of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and for the purpose of helping the Chinese Government, the President has at the same time extended freezing control to Chinese assets in the United States.

Administration of the licensing system with respect to Chinese assets will be conducted with the view of strengthening the foreign trade and exchange position of the Chinese Government. Inclusion of China in the Executive Order in accordance with the wishes of the Chinese Government is a continuation of this Government’s policy of assisting China.” (U.P., North China Daily News, July 27.)

* * *

Great Britain acted likewise and the Netherlands East Indies followed by suspending exchange and trade with Japan. This move was announced in the statement of the Director of Economic Affairs to the People’s Council in Batavia on July 28.

1. Foreign exchange between the N.E.I. and Japan are suspended.

2. All exports from the N.E.I. to the Japanese Empire, Manchukuo, China and Indo-China are liable to special licences.

3. Banks are forbidden to pay or receive values on accounts of Japanese subjects without special permits from the Director of Economic Affairs.” (North China Daily News, July 29.)

By now the tension in the Western Pacific had greatly increased. Admonitions flew back and forth across the Pacific. Japan stopped sending her ships to America and is looking with deep suspicion upon the dispatch of American oil to Vladivostok.

* * *

Ever since the military collapse of France in the summer of 1940 a bitter struggle has been fought for the soul of France. Great Britain and the United States have never lost hope of winning her away from growing co-operation with Germany. As far as Marshal Petain and the present Government of unoccupied France are concerned, this hope has little chance of fulfilment. Marshal Petain made this quite clear in his most important speech to date, delivered on August 12, in which he said:

“Frenchmen, I have grave things to tell you. In an atmosphere of false rumors and intrigues veritable uneasiness is gripping the people of France. My name is invoked too often even against the Government to justify alleged beneficial undertakings which are in fact appeals to discipline.
It is easy to understand the reason for this uneasiness. When war continues on the frontiers of a nation which defeat has put hors de combat but whose empire remains vulnerable everyone asks himself with anguish, 'What is the future of my country?' Insidious propaganda adding to the confusion of the spirit, a sense of national interest ends by losing its rightness and its vigour.

Our relations with Germany are by an armistice convention whose character could only be provisional. Prolongation of this situation renders it more difficult to support since it governs relations between two great nations. As to the collaboration offered in October, 1940 by the Chancellor of the German Reich, under conditions, the great courtesy of which I appreciate, it is a work of slow development and could not yet bear all its fruits. We must know how to orientate ourselves towards the larger horizon which a reconciled continent can open up to our activities. That is the end to which we are guiding our efforts. But it is a huge task calling for our will and our patience.

With regard to Italy our relations are also regulated by an armistice convention. Here again our wish is to escape from these provisional relations and establish more stable bonds without which the European order cannot be built up again.

I would like to recall to the great American republic the reasons why she need not fear a decline of French ideals. Our parliamentary Democracy which is dead had few traits in common with the Democracy of the United States but the instinct of freedom still lives in us proud and strong. Our difficulties and mistakes arise above all from troubled minds, lack of men and scarcity of products.

Disturbance of our spirit does not only arise from the vicissitudes of our foreign policy but above all from our slowness in reconstructing the new order. The national revolution has not yet become a fact. This is because between the people and myself arose a double barrier raised by the upholders of the old regime and the servants of the trusts. Long delay will be necessary to conquer resistance of all these adversaries to the new order but we must from now on break their undertakings by decimating their leaders.

If France failed to understand that she is bound by the force of events to change the regime of yesterday she would see open at her feet the abyss into which the Spain of 1936 nearly disappeared, only saving herself by sacrifice of faith and youth.

In the light of experience I shall rectify the work and shall take up again against egotistic and blind capitalism the struggle that the Kings of France waged and won against feudalism.

I wish that our country shall be freed from a most despicable tutelage, that of money."

Next the Marshal summed up his immediate program of political action in the following points: Activities of all parties and political groups are suspended of national interest ends by September 30; sanctions will be taken against civil servants who are Free Masons and holders of high Masonic rank will be excluded from public functions; powers at the disposal of the police will be doubled; commissioners will be entrusted with discovering and destroying administrative organization and activities of secret societies; powers of regional prefects will be strengthened.

A labour charter will be promulgated shortly; a provisional statute for economic organization will be remodeled; organization for food supply will be altered; a council of political justice will be set up in order to speed up trials of those responsible for the disaster, its proposals to be submitted to the Marshal before October 15; all Ministers and high officials must take the oath to Marshal Petain, Then he continued:

"The problem of Government goes beyond the framework of a simple ministerial reshuffle. It requires above all the rigid upholding of certain principles. Authority no longer comes from below. It is properly that which I confide and delegate.

I delegate it in the first place to Admiral Darlan, towards whom opinion has not shown itself either always favourable or always fair, but who has never ceased to help me with his loyalty and courage. I have entrusted him with the Ministry of National Defence so that he can exert over the whole of our land, sea and air forces more direct control.

To the Government which surrounds him I shall leave the necessary initiative. I mean however to lay down for it in certain spheres a very clear line."  (Reuter, North China Daily News, Aug. 14.)
THE NATIONS OF RUSSIA
By KLAUS MEHNERT

Irrespective of where we may stand in the present war, we all hope that in post-war Europe peace will be more stable than in the past. But, in order to gain stability, any future organization of Europe will have to take two factors into consideration: on the one hand, the necessity for a large-scale economic co-operation which will have to reach beyond national frontiers; on the other, the powerful urge of the awakened peoples to live with their fellow nationals as free men in nations of their own. To find a solution that would do justice to both these objectives will be a task that no one will expect to be easily accomplished. Nationalism in particular is deeply ingrained in the nature of man.

Most of the outstanding political issues of today are fairly well-known throughout the world. But of the national minority problems, which were particularly responsible for the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 and again of the present war (Sarajevo, Danzig), most people have only a very hazy notion. Not many, for example, realize that almost half the population of the Soviet Union (47.2% according to the census of 1926) consists of people who are not or do not consider themselves Russians in the proper sense of the word, and that 88 different nationalities of at least 10,000 members each are living within the USSR, not counting many smaller groups which bring the total number to about 150. (Of these the Ukrainians and the Turks are by far the largest.) As a result many more nationalities are living and many more languages are spoken in Russia alone than in the whole of Europe. Russia is the world's nationality problem number one, even though few people outside know this on account of the silence which the Soviet Government imposes upon its national minorities.

VOYAGE TO BASHKIRIA

After studying during a number of years the theoretical angle of the Bolshevist nationalities policy I decided a few years ago to spend a month amongst one national minority of Russia. I tried to find one that would be neither too big nor too small, neither too backward nor too advanced, neither too far from Moscow nor too close—in other words one that could be considered as typical of the rest. I chose Bashkiria.

I even attempted to learn the language before I went on my expedition and found a young Bashkir journalist in Moscow who was willing to teach it to me. I did not tell him right away that I was a foreign correspondent. The inhabitants of the USSR have learned to avoid contacts with foreigners as much as possible, since these have often led to accusations of espionage, and I did not want to scare him away. After the first three lessons, however, I casually mentioned that I was not a Soviet citizen. I must say for him that he managed to sit through that hour, but after that I never saw him again.

The "Bashrespublika," as the Bolshevists call the Bashkirian Republic in their fancy for abbreviations, is inhabited by a branch of the Turk peoples of which there are some twenty to thirty millions in the USSR. They live in the mountains and foothills of the Urals. On comfortable and leisurely steamers I went down the Volga and up the Kama and Belaya rivers to the
heart of Bashkiria. To travel on Russian boats is always restful. They move slowly through the endless countryside. Although there was nothing exciting to be seen, my eyes enjoyed the forests red with autumn and the golden wheat fields on both banks. There were only a few villages and stops on the way. While the sailors loaded or unloaded a little cargo, we passengers ran ashore to buy a boiled chicken, a pound of butter (with fingerprints), or a basket of apples from the Bashkir women who were sitting in dignified silence behind their wares. Here and there I stayed for a day or two, visiting a collectivized village (kolhoz), chatting with the peasants, and sleeping in their huts.

In Ufa, the capital, the Bashkir Government invited me to participate in the maiden run of a train over the newly completed ninety mile railroad to Ishembayevo, where new oil fields were being developed. I went along. Part of the way I preferred to walk. In order to complete the construction program on time the train had to cross gulleys, not on bridges—which were not yet built—but on rails supported by piles of wooden ties. The roadbed was so hastily built that in places the rails looked like snakes. But we reached our destination—slowly and with much speech-making at every station. The train returned to Ufa with ten tank cars filled with the first oil from the new fields; and I returned with the experience of having seen Bashkirian peasants in the process of transformation into railroad and oil field laborers.

"DE-NOMADIZING" THE KAZAKS

Feeling that one month in one of the national republics had not been enough, in the following year I spent another few weeks with another branch of the Turkic nation in the Kazak Republic of Soviet Central Asia. While Bashkiria was until recently a country of peasants who are now being changed into collective farmers and industrial laborers, the Kazaks (not to be confused with the Cossacks) since time immemorial have been herdsmen and nomads and are now being forced into settled life and factory work through the process of "de-nomadization." In Kazakstan I had to adapt my mode of traveling to the enormous size of the country, which equals the combined territories of Germany, England, France, Spain, Italy, and Turkey. I flew the whole way, with stops in nomadic, industrial, and agricultural regions.

The Bolsheviks feel very proud and progressive when they claim in their publications that practically all the ten million nomads living in Russia at the time of the Revolution have been torn away from their former habits and are now settled. To the Marxists a nomad is an unfortunate being who must be saved, even against his will, from his economic backwardness. However, I have often wondered whether it is really progress to transform into forced settlers the free and wandering Kazak nomads whose mode of life is the result of thousands of years of adjustment to their natural environment.

The Bolsheviks were honest enough to admit at least part of the price which the Kazaks and the whole of the Soviet Union had to pay for this de-nomadization. According to the official Soviet figures the total livestock of Kazakstan, formerly the livestock country of the USSR, sank from 24 million head in 1930 to 2.4 million in 1933. (From Kazakstan k IX Syezdu Sovietov, Alma Ata, 1935, p. 87.) Obviously the Kazaks after losing 90% of their livestock had no other way out than either to starve to death or to follow the Soviet demand to become settlers and industrial workers. But while the Soviet Government admitted that its policy of de-nomadization in Kazakstan alone has cost 21 1/2 million head of livestock, the loss in human lives was never announced. Judging from conversations I had on the way, and from the many abandoned habitations I saw from the plane, my guess would be that 20 to 30% of the Kazaks paid with death for this tremendous upheaval in their lives.
The following pages are a result of my expeditions into Bashkiriia and Kazakstan, of observations in a number of other national minorities such as Karelia, the Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, and of a study of the theoretical foundations of the Bolshevist nationalities policy.

STALIN'S THEORY

Twenty-nine years ago, in the winter months of 1912, a man was writing his first large theoretical study. Known to the small group of his political friends as well as to the police under many different names, and to history as Stalin, he composed the standard work *Marxism and the National Question*, and thus became among the Bolsheviks a specialist in this field. Five years later, in November, 1917, Stalin was the first People's Commissar for Nationality Questions and hence a member of the Soviet Government. At a time when his name was still unknown abroad and only rarely heard in Russia, he played a considerable role in the relations between the Soviet Government and its national minorities.

The most concise formulation of his nationality theory was given by Stalin at the Sixteenth Communist Party Congress in the summer of 1930. Stalin declared the melting of national cultures into a single culture, with a single language, to be the final aim of the Bolsheviks. This aim, he explained, could only be reached after the victory of the world revolution. As long as the dictatorship of the proletariat was confined to one country, the Soviet Union, the individual nationalities were to be allowed to possess and to develop their national cultures.

The calculation which led to this decision was simple: in order to win the much needed support of the minorities in the struggle against the Tsarist regime, the Bolsheviks had had to give them something that would bind them to the cause of the Revolution. Nothing could accomplish this better than the granting of those rights which the various nationalities had always craved and rarely obtained under the Tsars: free speech, press, and education in their own languages. The granting of these rights by the Bolsheviks actually had much to do with the eventual victory of the Bolsheviks in the whole of Russia. The national minorities felt that the Bolshevist victory would be to their advantage.

Soon, however, the minorities found that things were not quite as simple as they had appeared. In his theory Stalin divided culture into form and content, and he created the famous formula that in the Soviet Union the cultures of all nationalities should be national in form, socialistic in content. That in itself did not sound bad; but what did it mean? It meant that the form of cultural life—language, alphabet, etc.—could be Bashkir, Kazak, or Ukrainian, but the content had to be—Moscow. In other words, the nationalities were permitted—for the time being in their own languages, with their own alphabets, in their own newspapers, movies, or radios—to praise the ideas of Bolshevism and nothing else.

NATIONAL FORM

Up to the middle thirties Stalin's formula was on the whole adhered to. The nationalities actually were granted the national form of their cultures. Schools, newspapers, printing houses grew like mushrooms, all of them becoming so many channels through which Bolshevist ideas were pumped into the minds of the people. The Bolsheviks even went further than the nationalities themselves intended them to go. They created new written languages where they had not before existed, in order to split up the non-Russian population into small and harmless groups.

In particular was this done in the case of the Turks, the largest non-Slavic nation within the USSR. The Bashkirs had never had a written language of their own, their spoken language being only a Tartar dialect.
To prevent too much co-operation between these racially closely related groups, the Bolsheviks insisted on giving the Bashkirs a written language and grammar of their own. Thus we have the curious phenomenon that with regard to the other Slavic peoples (Ukrainians and White Russians) the Bolsheviks always minimize the differences in language and historical tradition, claiming them to be Russians like themselves, while in the case of non-Slavic nationalities they emphasize to the utmost the already existing differences between them.

**SOCIALISTIC CONTENT**

There is no question in my mind that the granting of the national form has won the Bolsheviks many friends among their numerous national minorities. These were now allowed freely to enjoy what the former Government had either prohibited or limited. For many of them this was all they were interested in. Those, however, who tried to look at the root of things soon found that there had been much more lost through the "socialistic content" than had been won through the national form, and that the tremendous power of the socialistic content gradually made that national form meaningless.

The socialistic content expressed itself primarily in three ways.

**COLLECTIVIZATION AND DE-NOMADIZATION**

The first concerned the mode of life of the agrarian population: collectivization of the peasants and de-nomadization of the nomads. The collectivization, which turned individual peasants into laborers on large collective or state farms, was enforced in the whole of Russia in the years 1929-32 in almost exactly the same way. The influence of this entirely new economic development was so tremendous that, in comparison with it, the formerly existing differences between, say, Russian and Bashkirian peasants paled into insignificance.

In Bashkiria 4,000 collectives, or *kolkhozes*, took the place of 400,000 individual peasant farms. Daily life on a collective farm is radically different from that in an individual peasant home. Where formerly a hundred peasants had performed more or less similar tasks, there was now a wide differentiation. In a *kolkhoz* one needed bookkeepers, mechanics, managers, chauffeurs, and many other specialists whom neither the Russian nor the Bashkirian villages had known before. The collectivization also brought countless Russian, Bolshevist, or international words such as *kolkhoz*, *traktor*, *combine*, *Marxistic*, etc. into the language of peasants throughout the USSR. Sometimes, while listening to Bashkirian *kolkhozniks*, I was able to follow their conversation. Not, I hasten to add, because of my three lessons in Bashkir, but because their conversation was permeated with the same words I had so often heard in Russian *kolkhozes* or read in Russian newspapers.

**INDUSTRIALIZATION**

The second way in which the Bolshevist content overwhelmed the minorities was through industrialization by the Five Year Plans. In Bashkiria, for instance, the figures of Bashkir industrial laborers increased by 600% in the first Five Year Plan alone. If one observes Bashkir peasants or Kazak nomads suddenly transformed into industrial workers one can easily imagine the tremendous revolution which this means in their lives. The more simple-minded and backward a person is, the more will he be overcome by this change in his work and way of life.

Compared with conservative agriculture, modern industry is a very powerful melting-pot. The ex-nomads and ex-peasants must, in order to succeed, speak Russian well to converse with their Russian superiors — the foremen and engineers in their plant — and it will not be long before you hear Bashkir laborers speaking Russian even among themselves, at least when their conversation concerns their work.
BOLSHEVIZATION

The third great influence of the socialistic content is the Bolshevization of all cultural life. Take Bashkiria, for example: I have met practically all Bashkir writers of note, have read all their works as far as they have been translated into Russian, and have had lengthy talks with them about their writing. What I found was not a Bashkir literature, but a Bolshevist-Russian literature accidentally clothed in Bashkir language. The subjects treated were with rare exceptions the same as those in the rest of the Soviet Union: class struggle, glorification of the Revolution and of communist ideology, collectivization, industrialization. (Only in one literary field was there a national note to be found, in that of historical novels and plays. I shall return to this later). The same is also true of the schools. The only thing I found to be Bashkirian was the language: everything else—subjects, methods of study, type of textbooks, presentation of the subject matter—was dictated from Moscow.

The extraordinary power of Bolshevization becomes particularly evident when one observes that even Islam, once a powerful factor in the life of the Turk people and a strong bond uniting them, is receding in importance. I gained the impression that with few exceptions Islam has lost contact, at least for the time being, with the realities surrounding its erstwhile followers. Accustomed to dealing with illiterate peasants and nomads, it was swept off its feet by the rapid transformation of its people and now has little influence on the younger generation. It is, of course, quite possible that the young Turks of Russia will eventually realize the emptiness of life without some religious content; but they will, I believe, return to Islam only if it succeeds in readjusting itself.

DANGEROUS HISTORY

It is not enough to mention these obvious consequences of the application of Stalin's nationality theory on the peoples of Russia. There are also some more subtle results. The permission to use and develop the forms of their culture gave the consciously nationalistic elements among the minorities a welcome weapon in their struggle for the preservation of their national individuality. They had to proceed with utmost caution and one should not overestimate their success. Nevertheless they were to some extent able to use the national form for the propagation of a national content. This was particularly the case in their emphasis on national history. The Bashkirs, for example, rapidly changing from a nation of illiterates to one where the majority could read and write, were now able, for the first time, to read for themselves of the heroic deeds of their ancestors in the many books about Bashkir history which began to appear.

As far as the nationalists were concerned, it was all to the good that almost the entire history of the Bashkirs is one long fight with Russian imperialism. Thus in the guise of history they could awaken and strengthen the pride of their countrymen in their age-old heroic struggle against Russian domination. Listen, for instance, to the song of Salavat Yulayev, the greatest hero in Bashkir history, whose life—at the time of Catherine the Great—was an endless struggle against the Russians. I found the song in a biographical novel of the hero, published in 1933. In it Salavat Yulayev sings of his love for the Bashkirian land and for Yurusen, his native river.

THE SONG OF SALAVAT YULAYEV

O Yurusen, river of my home,
Your banks are covered with reeds,
Those of other rivers have only stones.
O lovely river, swift as an arrow.
Came the Russian with his shovel,
Many Russians with their guns.
They built factories,
Factories on your beautiful banks,
Spreading filth and feeding pigs.
Let them tear apart my nostrils,
Let them cut off my ears and tongue,  
Let them pierce my eyes with arrows  
Your breeze, O Yurusen, is balm to my torn nostrils,  
My mutilated ears will hear your rippling waves,  
O Yurusen, my tongue will not be there to praise you  
But my blind eyes will remember your beauty.  
Let them raise high my head upon a spear  
As they have done before to our fathers  
We will never surrender your beauty,  
O Yurusen, river of my home,  
As long as your waters are not red with our blood,  
As long as we do not drink the blood of our children with your water!

THE CASE OF SULTAN-GALIYEV

Typical of the attempts to use the national form for purposes of nationalism is the case of the Tartar leader Sultan-Galiyev. Prior to the Revolution he had openly been a Turkic nationalist, advocating the liberation of the Tartars and the eventual establishment of a Pan-Turkic state. When the Bolshevik Revolution broke out, he joined the Communist Party. He trusted the slogans of Lenin and Stalin, who, immediately after coming into power, had said in their proclamation headed “To all toiling Moslems of Russia and the East”:

“From now on your beliefs and customs, your national and cultural institutions shall be free and inviolable. Organize your national life freely and without hindrance ... You yourselves shall be the masters in your country and organize your life according to your spirit and likeness. This is your right, for your destiny is in your hands.”

Sultan-Galiyev had a brilliant career, held important posts, won the confidence of Stalin, and became one of the deciding men in the People’s Commissariat for Nationalities. Yet at the same time he had to see his Tartar nationalism come into ever-increasing conflict with the real intentions of the Bolsheviks. He was perfectly willing to accept the economic doctrines of Bolshevism, but he demanded the fulfillment of Moscow’s promises of national autonomy. He became what we might call a national-communist, who worked for the formation of a “Communist Party of the East” for the Turkic and Mongol peoples of Russia.

Moscow became increasingly suspicious, and Sultan-Galiyev was forced to adopt secret methods. By 1923 he was convinced that he had committed a terrible mistake. His nationalism and Moscow’s internationalism were irreconcilable enemies, and Bolshevism was a far deadlier enemy of nationalism than Tsarism had ever been. He established secret contacts with illegal organizations at home and with anti-Bolshevik refugees abroad. These connections were discovered.

Badly shocked by the discovery of Sultan-Galiyev’s intrigues, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party convoked a four-day meeting of Party leaders and representatives of national minorities to Moscow. This was in June, 1923. The facts of the plot were put before the assembly, and Stalin, the People’s Commissar for Nationalities—himself the son of two national minorities in the Caucasian mountains—was bitterly attacked. In his defense, Stalin declared that he had possessed knowledge of Sultan-Galiyev’s nationalist tendencies but that he had put up with them on account of the scarcity of capable leaders among the minorities willing to co-operate with Moscow. He admitted that he had been duped by Sultan-Galiyev and that he had now broken with him completely. Sultan-Galiyev was excluded from the Party and disappeared.

FORM AND CONTENT ARE ONE

The Bolsheviks had to deal with similar cases time and again. By the
middle thirties they began to suspect that the neat division of culture into form and content was too simple to succeed with such complicated creatures as human beings. Form and content, they discovered, are very closely related. Just as the body and soul of a man cannot be separated at will, so the content and form of a nation’s life are one. In theory and for purposes of discussion their separate existence is, of course, possible, but in real life they are only two sides of the same thing. It is not irrelevant which language we speak, what melodies we sing, which historical heroes we worship. Every language, music, or history has its own spirit which helps to mould the mind of its people.

During the last few years little more was said in Russia about Stalin’s famous division. Instead, the tendency turned noticeably against national form. Emphasis on the Russian language was greatly increased, and the use of national tongues discouraged with the assertion that they were backward and tended to retard the growth of socialism. “Why should we,” wrote for example the Soviet writer Gladkov, “renew the past and galvanize the dusty Ukrainian language? That would only hinder the development of socialist progress.” National alphabets were abolished and replaced by the compulsory introduction of Russian letters; words and phrases that had long been taboo, such as “Little Mother Russia” and “Russian Fatherland,” reappeared. Everything that could be interpreted as furthering the national spirit of minorities was sought out and “liquidated.”

**THE CASE OF VASSA’S PRETTY LEGS**

A curious example of the exaggerated but perhaps not unjustified Bolshevik suspicion against everything national was the case of the book *First Spring* by the Ukrainian author Gregory Epik. In one scene of the novel, the writer describes the thoughts of Comrade Golubenko, a Ukrainian Bolshevik Party Secretary, as he thinks of Vassa, a lovely Ukrainian girl, or rather of her pretty legs. These are his thoughts: “Vassa’s legs to him appeared neither thin nor thick. Their elastic rotundity softly fell near the sculptured knees, evenly continuing lower and enlarging again, well-proportioned, to beautiful calves, and ended thinly as if in a chiseled bone. Because of legs like these the Ukraine more than once suffered attacks from Tartars and Turks and because of such eyes and such a soft deep voice as that of Vassa the Ukraine was justly proud of her daughters.”

To S. Shtchupak, a Bolshevik literary critic, this sounded like counter-revolution. In his work *The Struggle for Methodology* (p.142-143) he wrote: “The nationalistic enthusiasm for the ‘Wonderful Ukrainian Woman,’ this theory of national biology, is in reality a racial theory, a clear case of nationalism.” Eventually the author Epik was exiled to the Far North and then shot.

We may smile at the zealous Bolshevik critic, yet, in a way, he was right: form and content cannot be separated. The affectionate enthusiasm for Ukrainian legs which a Ukrainian author puts in Ukrainian words into the minds of a Ukrainian Bolshevik is, all other means being closed, one possibility of making Ukrainian readers think along Ukrainian lines.

The present war emergency is strengthening the emphasis on everything Russian; it is heightening suspicion towards the national minorities and increasing their oppression. The original promise to leave the forms of their culture to the various nationalities, until they can be replaced by a rising international culture after the victory of the world revolution, seems to have been forgotten. Perhaps the Bolsheviks have found that there can be no international culture, that there must be a national culture or none at
all. At any rate the new tendency to enforce Russian culture rather than an international culture on the minorities is unmistakable. If the present development is to continue, Stalin's slogan will soon have to read: the culture of the national minorities is to be Russian in form and Bolshevist in content.

THE ISSUE

The replacement of national culture by a uniform world culture, as it is frankly advocated by the Bolsheviks, seems to many a desirable and logical evolution. These are frequently the same people who, when speaking of world culture, naively assume that this means the adoption of their own civilization and way of life by the rest of the world. Their internationalism is often at bottom nothing but a supernationalism, based on the belief that they, of course, are on the right track and that the salvation of the world rests with everybody's becoming like themselves.

There is also another way of looking at nations. It is less simple but also less superficial, and seems more convincing to the student of history and political realities: to regard nations as the organic outgrowth of thousands of years of history and their variety as a source of great enrichment for the world. This attitude comes naturally to persons like myself who have enjoyed living in many different parts of the world, because they have found, growing on the common soil of human nature, a miraculous wealth of nations, cultures, ideas, forms of art, literatures, religions. Hawaii is perhaps the finest example of the values created by the preservation of the national culture of many different peoples living together.

Those who share this attitude know that for countless ages a narrow, misunderstood, and misinterpreted nationalism has been breeding hatred, suspicion, and wars. They see no way out in either the imperialistic enforcement of one way of life on the rest of the world or in the fratricidal antagonism between various nationalisms. They look toward a solution in which each nation accepts and respects the peculiarities of the other (without denomadizing the nomads or proletizing the peasants), and where all by common agreement and under the intelligent guidance of leading nations work for the same purpose—a better future.
THE UKRAINE—WHAT IS IT?

By DR. MICHAEL MILKO AND R. KORDA-FEDORIW

This magazine does not advocate any one particular solution for the pressing problems of the world. Corresponding to the world-wide nature of the present crisis, future solutions cannot take into consideration only the wishes of this or that group, but will have to be planned on an enormous scale and will depend to a large degree on the eventual outcome of the war. What this magazine wants to do, however, is to bring out the fundamental issues of our time. Understanding them today will contribute to their intelligent solution after the war. The problem of nationalities is one of these issues. Believing it to be important that they should have a chance to speak for themselves, we submit articles written by competent members of two large national groups, the Ukrainians and the Turks of Russia. They represent a total of some 60 to 80 million people who do not possess states of their own.

The editor does not identify himself with the views presented in these two articles; but in his opinion they correspond to the beliefs and desires of a large percentage of the co-nationals of both authors. They are worth serious consideration as examples, taken in this case from the Soviet Union, for the disturbing problem of national minorities all over the world.

The authors of this article are Ukrainians active in organizations directed toward the independence of their native land. They have written many articles and books on Ukrainian affairs. Both were educated first in Czechoslovakia and then in Germany, where Dr. Milko obtained his Ph.D. at the University of Giessen.

The world has become accustomed to looking at the history of the Russian empire through the eyes of Russian historians. Without wishing to enter into a discussion about the pros and cons of Ukrainian and Russian historiography, the editor, himself a pupil of the Russian school of history, believes that the Ukrainian interpretation of the history of Eastern Europe is an interesting study. It is for this reason that we have left unchanged some terms unfamiliar to most readers, such as “Moscovians” for the better known “Great-Russians.” Some of our authors’ statements are contestable, the figures claimed for the Ukrainians, for instance, varying between 30 and 50 millions. Nor is there common agreement as to the size of their ethnographic territory. Our maps are the work of a Ukrainian authority.

The Russians naturally maintain that there is no separate Ukrainian nation. Indeed, it would be hard to prove objectively either the Ukrainian or the Russian contention. The editor, having lived in both parts, has found that it is rather a matter of subjective feelings among the peoples concerned. Those of many Ukrainians are expressed by Dr. Milko and Mr. Korda.—K.M.

The French philosopher Voltaire wrote in his history of King Charles XII of Sweden: “L’Ukraine a toujours aspiré à être libre.” He was right. The question of a free Ukraine exists independently of any plans which the great powers might have for the future of Europe; for there are some 45
million Ukrainians, inhabiting in a compact block a territory of 380,000 square miles—approximately the size of France, Italy, Switzerland, and Denmark combined.

THE UKRAINE AND MOSCOVY

Many people are familiar with such terms as “Ukrainian wheat,” “Ukrainian black soil,” and “Ukrainian iron ore.” But in using them they do not imbue the word “Ukraine” with a concrete national and political content as they do in the case of other states, for instance Poland. Accepting the interpretation of the Russians, the world has accustomed itself to look upon the Ukraine as “southern Russia” just as it regards Bavaria as “southern Germany.” Yet the Ukrainians have been and still are as much of a nation as the Poles or the English or the French.

The word Ukraine comes from Krai which has the meaning of land, country, also border. It was used in the past side by side with another name, Rus. In the ancient Ukrainian Ipatyev chronicle of 1187 A.D. it is written, in connection with the death of a Ukrainian prince, “about him the Ukraine groaned much.” Thus the term Ukraine included not only the land but also the people who groaned over the death of their beloved prince. The word Ukrainian also appears frequently in other early documents. It is constantly met with in ancient Ukrainian songs. In the sixteenth century the Ukrainian students at the Sorbonne were listed in Latin as Natione Ruthena de Ucraina. On a map dated 1580 in the Paris National Library the Ukrainian territory is named Ukraine, nor have maps of the seventeenth century any other name for this territory.

At the same time the Moscow state to the northeast of the Ukraine is always called Moscovia on these maps. Thus in those days there was a Ukraine and a Ukrainian people just as there was a Moscovy and a Moscovian people. The term Russia is very recent. It was introduced by Peter the Great by an official decree in 1721 after his conquest of the Ukraine. This term, derived from the old word Rus, was to indicate that from now on Moscovy and the Ukraine were to be one.

THE UKRAINIA NS— A SEPARATE NATION

The attitude of the Ukrainian towards the Moscovian is characterized by ancient Ukrainian proverbs, such as:

If a Moscovian is your friend, you must keep a stone at hand.
A Moscovian cannot breathe without lying.
“Dad, the devil is trying to get in.”
“Never mind, as long as it isn’t a Moscovian.”

The Ukrainian people arose from a number of Slavic tribes in the territory where the Ukrainians live to this day, in the broad plains of the Dniepr river. In the ninth century these tribes appeared for the first time in European history by forming the state of Rus with Kiev as their capital. The Moscovians on the other hand did not emerge as a nation till much later. They are a mixture of Slavs with peoples of non-European stock. Those Slavs came partly from the northern Slavic tribes and partly from the Ukraine, whence many had moved into the northern forests to escape the constant attacks of Asiatic nomads in the open spaces of the south. In the north they intermarried with tribes belonging to the Finno-Ugrian family of nations. While Rus, in its struggle against the nomadic tribes of Asia and its western neighbors, the Poles, became increasingly weaker, the tribes in the north were organized in the twelfth century into the principality first of Suzdal, later of Moscow.

Although originally of the same Slavic stock and ruled for many centuries by members of the same dynasties—first the Ruriks, later the Romanovs—the Ukrainians and the Moscovians eventually became entirely
ANCIENT UKRAINIAN CULTURE

The rise or decline of Ukrainian culture is closely linked with the political ups and downs of the Ukrainian people. But even in times of political weakness the distinctive culture of the people remained an important weapon in the struggle for their liberation.

The Golden Age of Ukrainian culture lasted from the tenth to the thirteenth century during the existence of Rus. From this period there still remain beautiful structures, such as the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev, which, although erected in Byzantine style, show many Ukrainian characteristics.

Ukrainian art developed at that time under Greek and Roman influence and held its own in the cultural life of Europe. Its outstanding literary product is an epic poem relating the warfare of the Ukrainian Prince Igor against the Asiatic tribe of the Polovtsy. This epic, "The Saga of Igor's Campaign" (1187), bears comparison with the Song of the Nibelungs or the Song of Roland. In 988 the Kiev prince Volodimir recognized Christianity as the state religion. Christianity left its permanent mark on Ukrainian culture.

All this came to an end with the Mongol invasion in the beginning of the thirteenth century. Under the blows of the Mongols from the east and her neighbors in the west and north (Poland, Lithuania, Moscovia) the Ukraine ceased to exist as an independent state in the middle of the fourteenth century. Her rich fields were turned into an eternal battlefield for Tartars and Turks, for Poles, Lithuanians, and Moscovians.

But even though the Ukrainian state disappeared, Ukrainian culture continued to develop, and for a considerable time retained its leading position in Eastern Europe. In the Lithuanian state, for example, of whose population...
only one-tenth were Lithuanians, Ukrainian was the official language. Not until Lithuania and Poland became one state in 1386 did the oppression of Ukrainian culture begin, putting an end to its further development for some time.

THE RISE OF THE COSSACKS

New life was given to the Ukraine with the rise of the Ukrainian Cossack state. Cossacks were those Ukrainians who had in centuries of warfare with Asiatic nomads developed the peculiar characteristics of a peasant-warrior class. To them were attracted the most active men of the population. In fortified camps they led a proud, Spartan life under their own laws and chiefs (hetmans), in constant fights with Tartars and Turks, and often with Poles and Moscovians. Their rise as a political factor imbued the entire Ukraine with new political confidence and cultural life.

The upper classes learnt Latin, Greek, and other European languages. Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky could correspond with ease in Latin with Cromwell and Wallenstein, and spoke the Turkish and Tartar languages; and Hetman Ivan Mazepa, on whom poems were written by the Englishman Byron, the Russian Pushkin, and the Pole Slowacki, was one of the most cultured men of his time.

When the great days of the Cossack-Ukraine passed and the Ukraine fell under the domination of Moscow, the Moscovians directed their energies more and more against the cultural independence of the Ukraine, abolishing Ukrainian schools and eventually forbidding the publication of Ukrainian books and even the use of the Ukrainian language. This was done because Moscow felt the gap between her own half-Asiatic and the consciously European culture of the Ukraine. Outstanding Ukrainian poets and scientists were persecuted, imprisoned, and exiled.

Ukrainian folk music is known all over the world, and the list of outstanding singers and conductors is a long one. The Ukraine has produced her own scientists, sculptors, and painters, and in particular her own forms of applied art in wood and metal work, embroidery, and ceramics.

It is in cultural life that the difference between the Ukraine and Moscovy is particularly evident. The culture of Moscovy obviously belongs to the border-line between Europe and Asia. While members of the Russian intelligentsia have always quarreled over whether their culture is European or Asiatic, many of them denouncing the Europeanization which Peter the Great forced on his people, the Ukrainians never had any doubts on this score. From the beginning of their history they have considered themselves a part of European civilization.

At the time when the Ukraine came under the rule of Moscovy, her church was practically independent. Moscow immediately proceeded to change this. To give their action a legal semblance, the Moscow authorities exerted pressure on the Patriarch at Byzantium till he renounced his formal rights as head of the Ukrainian Church and turned them over to the Patriarch of Moscow. Thus the Ukraine lost her religious independence and with it her ancient custom of electing the clergy.

WHY NO UKRAINIAN STATE?

In 1838 the German traveler Kohl wrote concerning his impressions of the Ukraine: "There can be no doubt that in the eventual disintegration of the huge Russian empire, the Ukraine will be the first to cut herself loose and become independent. The night in which this will happen is already approaching."

This prophecy of Kohl's came true when in 1918 the Ukraine proclaimed her independence. But after bloody battles lasting four years the Ukraine was again cut up by her neighbors.
How did it happen that a nation of 45 millions was not able, in the course of so many centuries, to organize its own state and, on finally winning its independence, could not preserve it for more than a short time?

The Ukrainians have expended an enormous amount of energy in their struggles with the nomad peoples of Asia, who constantly invaded the Ukrainian territories through the age-old gate between the Ural mountains and the Caspian Sea. Whenever the Ukraine was weakened by this ceaseless warfare, she found herself attacked by the fresh forces of her neighbors. Her most implacable enemy was Russia.

The reasons for the determined efforts of her neighbors to control the Ukraine are to be found in her natural wealth and her geographical location. For centuries the Ukraine has been known as the granary of Europe, her wheat famous throughout the world. Her mineral resources are known for their wealth. The deposits of coal in the Donets basin and of iron ore in the Krivoy Rog and Kertch districts are practically unlimited, to name only a few of the treasures of her soil.

The geographical location of the Ukraine is important as she is the nearest gateway between Europe and Asia. For centuries the Black Sea, the northern shore of which is Ukrainian, has played an important international role and attracted many conquerors.

EUROPEAN ALLIES

In spite of all these obstacles, the Ukraine has fought untiringly for her freedom and twice—in the seventeenth and twentieth centuries—succeeded in putting herself on the political map of Europe as an independent state.

The first climax in the nationalistic struggle of the Ukrainian Cossacks came in 1648 when Hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky, utilizing his people's national, religious, and social unrest for a revolution, established a Ukrainian state. But realizing that the Ukraine would not be able to preserve her independence as long as she was threatened by Moscovians, Poles, and Tartars, he tried to destroy his dangerous neighbors one by one. He appealed Moscovy and turned against Poland. A coalition army of Ukrainians, Swedes, Brandenburgians, and Lithuanians marched victoriously against Poland, which faced a catastrophe. At this critical moment the Hetman died, and the Ukraine was left without a leader. Bloody warfare continued. Eventually Poland and Moscovy came to an agreement and divided up the utterly exhausted Ukraine into spheres of influence.

Hetman Ivan Mazepa tried to free his people from their dependence on Poland and Moscow through an alliance with Charles XII of Sweden whose victorious army had penetrated into Poland. But in 1709, in the battle of Poltava, the Ukrainian and Swedish armies were defeated by Peter the Great, and the Ukraine had to suffer terrible punishment. Many Ukrainians were carried away and forced to labor at the building of St. Petersburg. To this day the Ukrainians say that St. Petersburg is built on Ukrainian bones.

The Ukrainians continued their struggle, hoping for aid from western Europe. But none came. In 1764 the Hetman Government was replaced by a Moscovian governor general. Occasional revolutions were suppressed, and in 1775 the cradle of Ukrainian Cossackdom, the Sitch, was destroyed. Yet memories of the free Cossack state have always remained in the hearts of the Ukrainians.

High hopes were placed by the Ukrainians in Napoleon's war against Russia. Napoleon had promised them independence. Hiding their real motive, the Ukrainians organized within a short time fifteen Cossack regiments on the pretext of aiding the Russians. But the enthusiasm with which the Ukrainians joined these regiments caused suspicion in Moscow. The secret connections between the Ukrainians and
The percentage of Ukrainians within the total population.
From the same source as the map "The Ukrainians in Europe"
Napoleon were discovered, the regiments transferred and partly dissolved, and many Ukrainians executed. Again in 1847 a secret Ukrainian organization, "The Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius," was discovered and its leaders exiled. Other secret organizations were formed. "The Ukraine for the Ukrainians" was their unanimous battle cry.

THE COMING OF THE BOLSHEVIKS

After centuries of servitude the Great War finally gave the Ukraine her chance. After the Bolshevik revolution and a good deal of fighting and political confusion, the complete independence of the Ukrainian Republic was proclaimed on January 22, 1918. In answer the Bolsheviks, in spite of their declared principle of self-determination, occupied Kiev.

With the help of German and Austrian troops the Bolsheviks were driven from the Ukraine. A change took place in the Ukrainian Government. On April 29, 1918, General Skoropadsky, the representative of the conservative elements, was elected the first Hetman of the Ukraine in 154 years. His regime survived the fall of the German Empire by only a few days. The republic was restored under the so-called Directory with Simon Petlyura as the leading figure. The Ukrainian nationalists under the command of Petlyura and Colonel Konovalets defeated the troops of Skoropadsky, who renounced his powers and left the country. The collapse of Germany had left the Ukraine to face her enemies alone—the Poles in the west, the Red Army in the north, the White Army under General Denikin in the southeast, and the Rumanians in the southwest. In this "quadrangle of death," as the Ukrainians called it, their troops fought desperately up to 1921, while the Entente states calmly looked on. In the end Ukrainian resistance broke down and their land was divided up. The Soviet Union received the lion's share with more than 35 million Ukrainians, Poland seven and a half, Rumania one and a quarter, and Czechoslovakia over half a million.

The Bolsheviks accorded the Ukrainians a purely nominal independence under the title of the "Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic." On paper the Government of this member state of the Soviet Union has the right to determine its frontiers, to entertain diplomatic relations with foreign Governments, to declare war and peace, to have its own army and legislation. In reality, however, power is strictly centralized in Moscow. The Ukrainians were deeply dissatisfied. Frequent and bloody rebellions took place and many preferred death to slavery.

The lack of Ukrainian co-operation in the Bolshevik cause can be seen from the fact that in 1927, 37.6% of the members of the Ukrainian Communist Party were Russians and not Ukrainians. In 1928, among the 627 high officials in the administration of the Ukrainian Republic only 158 were Ukrainians, while there were 258 Russians, 178 Jews, and 35 others.

THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES

Gradually the Bolsheviks realized that in order to stabilize their regime in the Ukraine they would have to make some concessions. They slightly loosened the restrictions they had placed on Ukrainian nationalism. The Ukrainians made immediate use of their increased influence in government, education, the press, etc., to further their nationalistic aims, cloaking their real purposes with the profuse use of Bolshevik phraseology. Voices raised in opposition against Moscow became louder and louder. Even men like the Ukrainian Commissar for Education, Shumsky, openly proclaimed the inevitability of Ukrainian independence. Much excitement was caused by the slogan of the poet Khvylyovy, "Away from Moscow—Orientation towards Europe." The wave of nationalism entered even into the ranks of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the Communist Youth Organization.
Scenes from a film based on the Ukrainian opera Zaporozhets za Dunayem describing the life of cossack refugees who fled to Turkey in 1709 after their defeat by Peter the Great at Poltava.

This picture of Ukrainian refugees of the past was made by Ukrainian refugees of today in America.

A Cossack, sturdy warrior-farmer of the Ukraine.
Ukrainian peasants on their way to work

The Gopak, a Ukrainian national dance
In these circumstances Moscow returned to its policy of oppression, which in turn forced the Ukrainian nationalists underground. In 1930 an illegal organization, "The Federation of the Liberation of the Ukraine," was discovered. The following year the GPU unearthed the "National Center" in which even members of the Ukrainian Communist Party were found; and in 1933 the "Organization of Ukrainian Revolutionists," directed from abroad by Colonel Konovalets.

The discovery of underground organizations led to mass terror, executions, and party purges. All the opposition members within the Communist Party were "liquidated." The Commissar of Education and member of the Council of Commissars of the USSR, Skrypnik, committed suicide on the eve of his arrest.

In the early thirties enforced collectivization resulted in a terror and subsequent famine which caused indignation throughout the world and was answered by many Ukrainians with sabotage and passive resistance. In 1937 the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Kossyrov, acknowledged in a speech that during the preceding year 50% of all tractors had been damaged by the Ukrainian peasantry and that of the repaired tractors some 30-40% were found to be useless (Bolshevik Ukrainy, I, 1937).

LITERATURE AS A WEAPON

Ukrainian literature in particular was purged. Moscow suddenly discovered dangerous tendencies in the writings of the Ukrainians. The poet Slissarenko attacked both the Red Army and the leading Soviet writer Gorky, for which he was exiled to the Far North. The humorist Vychnya ridiculed Stalinism and was "liquidated." Khvylyovy frankly stated that the Soviet Ukraine was nothing but a colony of Moscow. Through one of the heroes in his novel Woodcocks he expressed the thought: "If the Ukrainians do not want to be swallowed up by Moscow, they must become nationalists." In 1934 a great trial was staged against writers who were accused of nationalism and of belonging to a terrorist revolutionary organization. A number of leading authors were shot, others disappeared without trace. Their writings were of course banned.

The Ukrainians know that, in the last analysis, the weakening of Moscow, no matter where it takes place, aids their own struggle for freedom. Hence they have been deliberately working for the awakening of national consciousness among the nations under the Russian yoke, particularly among the peoples of Asia. They did this by means of underground organizations as well as through the medium of literature.

The Soviet Ukrainian writer Gjytisky, for example, has written a novel, The Black Lake, in which he describes the enslavement by Moscow of the natives of the Altai Mountains (on the Russo-Chinese border). In this novel the author shows the Altabans how to fight for their liberty. His Altaban nationalists in their fight against the Soviet regime know no difference between Bolsheviks and Russians, for in their eyes Bolshevism is only another instrument of Russian imperialism. Some Altabans are teaching their children the Ukrainian language as the common language for all peoples under the Russians.

In a similar vein we have a novel by another Soviet Ukrainian writer, Olesytsch, Fires on the Lakes, in which he describes the movement for freedom among the Karelians (near the Finnish border). Both Gjytisky and Olesytsch were executed.

THE UKRAINE AND EUROPE

During all this time the Ukrainians have also been fighting for their liberty within the state boundaries of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and particularly Poland, where the ruling class committed the old mistake of dreaming
about the “Great Polish Empire” while oppressing its national minorities instead of raising the cultural and economic level of its own people.

The ruthless liquidation of any national movement in the Soviet Ukraine by the Bolshevist Government placed the leadership in the ideological fight for an independent Ukraine into the hands of Ukrainians abroad. The Ukrainian refugees are divided into several groups, among them the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (first under Colonel Konovalets, and since his assassination in 1939 under Colonel Melnik), the Hetman Movement (conservative and under the former Hetman of the Ukraine, Skoropadsky), and the Followers of the Ukrainian Republic as it had existed 1919-1921. Differing on various points, all these groups agree that the Ukraine must have the closest economic and cultural relations with Europe. To them the meaning of Ukrainian independence is to lead their rich and beautiful country with its millions of industrious and peaceful people back into the fold of Europe and thus to make Europe greater and stronger.

The cause of the Ukraine has many representatives all over the world, particularly in the Americas where over a million U.S. and Canadian citizens are of Ukrainian origin. There are 80,000 of them in the Argentine, 60,000 in Brazil, and 30,000 in other American countries. In the Americas alone they publish 55 periodicals in their own and other languages. Ukrainian refugees in the Far East are active on account of a large section of the Soviet Far East, particularly along the Amur and in the Maritime Province, being inhabited by Ukrainian settlers who are struggling for the independence of what they call the “Ukrainian Wedge.”

The importance of an independent Ukraine for Europe was clearly expounded in the Dédication des Droits de l’Ukraine, addressed by Hetman Orlyk in 1712 to the European powers. He wrote: “Those who care for the interests of all Europe and of each single European state will easily understand the danger for the freedom of Europe that comes from such an aggressive power as Moscovy . . . . Hence the security and stability of peace depends to a certain degree on the restoration of the Ukraine.” Today these words still hold their meaning and are true not only for Europe but also for Asia.
THE TURKS OF RUSSIA

By MEDINA SELIHMET

The word "Turks" is commonly used only for the inhabitants of Turkey. However it also possesses a much wider sense in which it includes those peoples in western, central, and northeastern Asia who speak closely related dialects of the Turkic languages, belong to the Mohammedan faith, and are strongly influenced by Arabic-European civilization. In the following article the noun "Turk" will be used in this wider sense together with the adjective "Turkic." For the inhabitants of Turkey the term "Turks of Turkey" will be employed together with the adjective "Turkish."

Apart from the Turks of Turkey, the tribes of Chinese Turkestan, the Yakuts of northeastern Siberia, and some scattered groups in the Balkan peninsula and Iran, all Turks today live within the boundaries of the USSR. They include the following main groups: the Tartars of the Volga and the Bashkirs of the Urals, both combined under the newly created term Idel-Ural (Idel is the Turkic word for Volga); the Tartars of the Crimea; the Azerbaijani and Transcaucasia; and the Kazaks, Kirghiz, Turkmen, and Uzbeks of Central Asia. They inhabit a practically closed block of roughly a million and a half square miles, that is an area as large as continental Europe without Russia and the Balkan peninsula. The inclusion of Yakutia would add another 1,200,000 square miles.

The figures for the Turks living within the USSR are very much in dispute: it is in the interest of the Russians and Soviets to minimize the numbers of Turks in their country, while the Turks in their turn want to prove as many as possible. Since the difficulties for a reliable census of nationalities are so great, we must confine ourselves to the statement that the figures vary between 15 and 40 millions.

Medina Selihmet is by birth a daughter of a Tartar Muslim family in Ufa in the Urals and was brought up in the spirit of the growing Turkic nationalism to which her family, in common with most educated Turks, belonged. She went to school in Ufa and St. Petersburg until the waves of the revolution carried her to the Far East, where she married a Tartar. She has always been active among the numerous Turks in the Far East, working with her countrywomen, lecturing, and writing for the Makedon magazine of the Idel-Ural people. She has been living in Shanghai since 1933, and is the vice-president of the "Society of Collaboration of the Peoples of the Caucasus, Idel-Ural, and the Ukraine."—K.M.

TURKS AND RUSSIANS

Some 40 million Turks live within the borders of the Soviet Union. It was against their will that they were incorporated into the Russian empire during the last few centuries, and they have never ceased to long for their freedom. The present war between Germany and the USSR has given new impetus to their hope for liberation and for the establishment of independent states in the areas inhabited by them.

To most people, even those who are regular readers of newspapers and magazines, it will come as a surprise when we speak of a Turcic problem in the USSR. Russia, the link between Europe and the Turkic peoples, has purposely prevented the world from having any knowledge about this question, and has done her utmost to make
it seem unimportant and unworthy of consideration. In order to eliminate forever the danger of an organized Turkic population, the Russians employed the ancient policy of “divide and rule.” They cultivated every antagonism among the Turks and tried to convince them that a Turkic question did not exist. They had good reason for this policy, for the Turkic issue is of vital interest for Russia.

The Turks themselves must bear part of the blame for the world’s ignorance of them and their problems. In irreconcilable hostility toward the Russians, the Turks fenced themselves off from the rest of the world, became egocentric and provincial, they “stewed in their own juice” and lived under the influence of outworn conceptions which had lost their meaning long ago. This was the case, at any rate, up to the second half of the nineteenth century. At that time a decisive change took place. The Turkic leaders were stirred by a new interest in the world beyond the Russian borders, whence a breath of fresh air was blowing into their own stuffiness. Their eyes were opened, their national consciousness awoke, and an active struggle for independence took the place of passive resistance.

WHERE DO THE TURKS COME FROM?

Legend has it that the Turks originated in the Orkhon country south of Lake Baikal. Their home for thousands of years can be approximately defined by the following line: from the hills of the Khingan in the Far East to the basin of Lake Baikal, along the snow-capped giants of the Altai through Tarbagatay and the Ural mountains down the Idel (Volga) river, to the Caspian Sea and eastward along the Tien Shan and Karakorum mountains back to the Khingan. This was the home of great tribes of the past, the Alans, Avars, Huns, Scythians, Petchenegs, Komans, and Seldjuks, as well as of many Turkic tribes existing to this day, among them the Yakuts of eastern Siberia, the Uzbeks and Kirghiz of Central Asia, the Tartars and Bashkirs of Russia, and, of course, the Turks of Turkey.

The earliest reference to a Turkic tribe is probably the mention of the Hiung-Nu people in the Chinese Annals (about 2000 B.C.), and the first mention of the name “Turk” is to be found in Byzantine, Persian, and Chinese sources. Zemorevos, sent by the Emperor Justinian to the Altai in 568 A.D., refers to them as Turks, and in Arab sources of this period the same name can be found. In the oldest written alphabet, invented by the Turks, and in a language understandable to all Turks, ancient writings praise the deeds of Bilge Khan whom they call the Khan of the Turks, and they include a prayer to God that he may allow the Turks to live forever.

Compared with that of other great human races, the history of the Turks has been given little attention, and no agreement as to their racial affiliations has as yet been reached. As a Turk, the author prefers to accept the result of recent Turkic investigations which maintain that the Turkic people are a race of their own, although in regions bordering upon the Mongols and Ugro-Fins they are mixed with these peoples. This latter fact can be noticed particularly in the case of the Kirghiz, the Kazaks, and part of the Bashkirs.

SONS OF THE STEPPE

It is commonly accepted that environment played an important role in the history of any nation. In no other case, perhaps, did environment play so paramount a role as in the historical development of the Turks. At the foot of the giant mountain ranges begin the endless steppes, stretching thousands of miles in every direction. Then comes the region of the dead sands, the “hunger steppes,” where hardly anything grows, and then more steppes, cut from time to time by the blossoming valleys of the rivers. These valleys and their fertile soil reward the labor of men a hundredfold. They caused
people to settle, to work, and to create civilizations. The steppes, on the other hand, were the ideal ground for cattle-breeding. Man moved with his herds into the steppe, and the steppe, like an ocean, carried him on its waves. The steppe created nomads. There were times when violent storms from the

TURKIC TRADITIONS

Excavations carried out by archeologists in regions inhabited by Turkic tribes have proved that the Turks have at different times developed a high civilization of their own. Cultural treasures fit to stand side by side with those of other ancient civilizations have been brought to light from the enveloping cloak of the wandering sands. The myth that the Turks received their civilization from outside, particularly from the Arabs together with Islam, is gradually being broken down. It appears that the Arab conquerors themselves were greatly astonished at the high degree of culture reached by the Turks.

Islam, of course, exercised a profound influence on the life of the Turks and
united them spiritually. However, Turkic genius may claim a lion's share in the progress of science and enlightenment which took place after the Islam victory, and in the development of Islam culture. The philosopher Ibni Sina, the Aristotle of Islam, and that other leading Moslem philosopher, Farabi, were Turks. Many intellectual and spiritual leaders were given to the Islam world by the Turks from earliest times up to this day. But, since they wrote in the language of the Koran, that is in Arabic, they were wrongly considered to be Arabs. When the Turks accepted Islam they also accepted the Arabic alphabet, although they already possessed their own system of writing. The ancient Orkhon monument shows that the latter consisted of thirty-eight characters. From the seventh century A.D. the Turks had been using the Uigur alphabet, which, in spite of the coming of Islam, remained in use up to the fifteenth century.

The most brilliant period in Turkic art was the Middle Ages, from which magnificent masterpieces have come down to us. They have been especially well preserved in Turkistan from the days of the great Tamerlane and his successors. Mosques, religious schools, astronomical observatories, mausoleums, monuments of all kinds, tombstones—all these beautiful examples of medieval architecture are the work of Turkic genius. Great achievements were also accomplished in the fields of science and literature. In the neighborhood of Samarkand a famous observatory has been discovered where the outstanding astronomer Ulug-Bek, the son of Tamerlane, for many years carried out his observations. His star tables, as we now know, were more exact than those worked out by European astronomers a century after his death. He was the first to prove the sphericity of the earth and its movement around the sun, while Europe was still under the influence of Ptolemy. It is from memories like these that the Turks draw the strength and determination for their struggle for freedom.

THE TARTARS

The basin of the river Volga (or Idel) became in its central and lower reaches the habitation of Turkic people several centuries before Christ. Khanates (Khan-states) were formed there under various names. Among the first to arrive were the Turkic Bulgars, whose name is probably related to that of the river Volga. One branch of this tribe later migrated to the Balkan peninsula, mixing with peoples of Slavic origin and settling in the territory now known as Bulgaria. The other, moving north along the Idel and ousting the Finns living there, established the powerful Bolgar Khanate. Later, in the lower reaches of the Idel, there existed the rich Khazar Khanate. In the thirteenth century the Mongol invasion led to the formation of the Golden Horde as the westernmost part of the mighty empire of Genghis Khan and his successors. The members of the Golden Horde became known in Russia and Europe as Tartars. They were predominantly of Turkic rather than Mongol stock; for the farther west the armies of Genghis Khan moved the smaller became the percentage of Mongols in their ranks.

When the Golden Horde disintegrated, three Tartar Khanates emerged in its place, two on the Idel—the Kazan and the Astrakhan Khanates—and one in the Crimea and the steppes to the north of it. The Khanate of Kazan was the most important of the three, with rich agricultural soil and fat pastures for cattle, linked by the far-flung system of the Idel with Moscovy to the west and Central Asia to the south. Kazan itself became a commercial and cultural center.

THE RISE OF MOSCOVY

But rising Moscovy, after fighting in the course of a century twenty-five campaigns against the Khanate, in 1552 conquered Kazan under Ivan the Terrible. A few years later the Astrakhan Khanate also ceased to exist. Only the Crimea held out for another two centuries. The entire
course of the Idel was in Russian hands. Moscovy immediately began to colonize, to Russianize, and to Christianize the newly won lands. Russian peasants were settled on Tartar lands, mosques were closed and destroyed, and Russian churches and monasteries erected.

The Tartars' answer was in the form of frequent rebellions and uprisings. Every internal disturbance in Russia was used by the Tartars for their attempts to win back their freedom. When Moscovy passed through her "Troubled Times," between her first and second dynasties, the Tartars allied themselves with the Poles; during the rising of Stenka Razin the Tartars took his side; and joining the rebellious Pugatchov in the civil war against Moscovy they made yet another attempt at independence.

Under such conditions of continuous struggle there could be no question of a normal cultural and economic development. Not until the end of the eighteenth century did the contest become less fierce. Moscow tried to compromise. Schools were built, and in 1799 permission for the printing of religious books was given. The economic life of the country improved. Factories were erected, and commercial relations taken up with Central Asia and China. The subsequent quick rise of Kazan alarmed the Russian Government, and the further building of new factories, the founding of credit associations, and many other things were prohibited. Everything was done to increase the importance of Moscow as a commercial and industrial center at the expense of Kazan. Draconian measures were introduced against the cultural and spiritual development of the Tartars.

CONQUEST OF TURKESTAN

The conquest of the Idel Tartars opened the road to the east for the Russians. Early in the eighteenth century they won control over the steppes of northern Turkestan, inhabited by the Turkic Kirghiz. Next they turned against the Caucasus, where the Christian Grusians (or Georgians) had asked the Russians for aid against their Mohammedan neighbors Turkey and Persia. The Russians came, and soon transformed Georgia into an outpost of their imperialism. The Turkic tribes of the Caucasus, under their great leader Shamyl, for many decades offered heroic resistance, but in the end the Caucasus and the regions to the south of it inhabited by the Azerbaidjan Turks became part of Russia. The stage was set for the final scene of the Turkic tragedy, the conquest of Turkestan, which began in 1864 and ended in 1883 with the complete subjugation of western Turkestan as far as the great mountain wall of Central Asia.

NATIONAL REBIRTH

The conquest of Turkestan, center of their culture and historical tradition, was a terrible blow for the Turks. It disclosed the weakest point of the Turkic nation: their stagnation and backwardness. The Turkic leaders began to realize that their fanatical hostility towards everything non-Moslem had made the assimilation of western culture and civilization impossible. New roads were sought for and a new ideal was born: orientation towards Europe. It now became necessary to carry on a struggle among their own people in order to prepare the ground for these new ideas.

One of the outstanding men who decisively turned the trend of Turkic cultural life towards Europe was Shigabetdin Merdjani (1815-1889). With tremendous energy he fought against religious fanaticism and the seclusion of women. He was the first to teach European sciences in his school and to insist on the study of the Turkic language and Turkic history in addition to the hitherto exclusive interest in things Islamic. The linguist Kayum Nassyri was another leader of Turkic nationalism. Fully aware of the enormous importance of the written word,
he struggled for permission to publish a newspaper, which was constantly refused. Finally he was allowed to print a calendar, which he turned into an effective political publication.

In the field of education and schools the outstanding leader was the Crimean Ismail Bey Gasprali (1853-1914). After finishing military school in Moscow, Gasprali spent much time abroad, particularly in Turkey, where at that time the spirit of modernization was strong. Returning to the Crimea, Gasprali worked as a teacher and compiled the first textbook in Arabic letters based on a phonetic system. He did his utmost to develop the school system as the most important instrument for bringing new ideas into the minds of his countrymen. His newspaper Tarjman, which he was finally allowed to publish in 1883, greatly aided him in his endeavors. In it he fought against the dusty and out-of-date school methods of the past and for his political and social ideas. His battle cry was: "One ideal, one endeavor, and one language for all Turks."

THE FEMININE QUESTION

The Bolsheviks have for many years loudly proclaimed—and many people abroad have taken this at its face value—that the Turkic woman owes her liberation from seclusion entirely to the Bolsheviks. In reality, however, the fight against the enslavement of women began in the second half of the nineteenth century in connection with the general awakening of the Turks. It made its first appearance in Idel-Ural and the Crimea, and among its most energetic leaders were Merdjan and Gasprali. In this struggle, modern literature played a powerful part, novels, magazines, and newspapers all participating in it. The representatives of Islam had also shown increasing understanding for its necessity. The emancipated Turkic women turned eagerly towards education and by the time the Bolshevist revolution broke out their cultural level had already been raised considerably. Among them were women with the highest education, such as physicians and university professors, and there were many with a good average education. There were journalists, authors, social workers, teachers, librarians, and many other professions in which women were building their place in society.

The emancipation of women in the advanced parts of the Turkic nation exercised its influence also on the more remote regions. Everywhere the development was clearly in the direction of a complete liberation. It was at this stage that the Bolshevist revolution broke out, and the Bolsheviks have since taken credit for and used for their own purposes a development which was already well under way before they came into power.

THE TURKS AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONS

After the Russian revolution of 1905, feverish activity set in in the field of magazines and newspapers. From the very first meeting of the Russian Parliament (Duma) the representatives of the Turkic peoples always acted in unison. This caused the Tsarist Government to reduce the number of Turkic delegates from forty to seven, while Turkestan was entirely deprived of its right to vote. The reactionary policy following the brief liberal era of 1905-1907 resulted in new pressure being exerted on the Turkic tribes; but it could not stop the process of a rebirth which had already set in.

The outbreak of the Great War was welcomed by the Turks as a possible chance for the solution of their national problems. A "Committee for the Protection of Rights of the Enslaved Turkic-Tartarian Moslems of Russia" was formed abroad under the leadership of Yussuf Akchtura. Akchtura, after receiving part of his education in Turkey, had become one of the founders of Turkism, the ideology which advocates the unity of all Turks. His committee included Turks from the Idel, the Caucasus, Turkestan, and the
Crimea. Its members tried to arouse interest in the fate of the Russian Turks through lectures in various European cities and through the publication of a memorandum describing the methods used by the Russians against the Turks and Moslems. In 1916 the Turks under Aketchura participated side by side with Ukrainians and other nationalities in the "Congress of Nations" held at Lausanne, Switzerland. They asked the world to assist them in their struggle for liberation from Russian control. Meanwhile a bloody rebellion against Russian rule broke out among the Kirghiz, Kazaks, and Uzbeks.

After the liberal revolution in the spring of 1917 the Russian Turks were among the first to organize and to act as a unit. An "All-Russian Moslem Revolutionary Office" was formed which convoked a Moslem congress in Moscow. Among the 970 delegates were members of all the Turkic tribes of Russia and even Eastern Turkestan. It was planned to convocate similar congresses in the various parts of the Turkic world, but this program was upset by the general political chaos which developed in Russia.

**THE BOLSHEVIST VICTORY**

The Bolshevist revolution of October/November 1917 found the Turks of Russia in the midst of serious attempts to form states of their own. As their organization had not yet been completed, the Turkic peoples were not ready to defend themselves successfully against the flood of Bolshevism. They were overwhelmed, although in some regions—particularly in Turkestan—only after long and bitter fighting. On encountering such strong resistance the Bolshevists decided to compromise and organized so-called "national republics." However, in order to prevent any unity among the Turks, they artificially divided them into a great number of "nationalities." The scissors of the Bolshevist Government craftily cut the territory inhabited by Turks into many small republics closely tied to Moscow. In the last analysis the Soviet Union was nothing more than the familiar "Great Indivisible Russia" painted red.

The next task of the Bolsheviks was to colonize the Turkic lands. In this they obviously followed the policy of the Tsars. In the so-called Tartar Republic on the middle reaches of the Idel, for instance, 64.3% of the best land which formerly belonged to the Government and to monasteries was handed to Russian settlers. Likewise the best of the land opened up by the construction of the Turksib railway (linking Turkestan and Siberia) was given to Russians, while the native population was forced into regions unfit for habitation. Starvation and death for a great number of Turks was the result.

**CHANGING ALPHABETS**

Next the Bolsheviks attempted the cultural disintegration of the Turks. To destroy the unity of their education and literature, a congress of Turkologists, meeting in 1926 in Baku, abolished the Arab alphabet, replacing it with the Latin alphabet and producing for each of ten Turkish "nationalities" a Latin alphabet of its own. This was done in spite of the fact that all Turkic languages are very closely related. A second congress meeting two years later in Kazan tried to unify the Latin alphabet. The Bolsheviks considered this to be counter-revolutionary, and prohibited it.

After another ten years the attitude of Moscow had become openly Russian-imperialistic. It was decided once again to change the alphabet of the Turkic people. In the summer of 1938 by order from Moscow the Latin alphabet was replaced by the Russian, again to be used differently in different republics. Thus even the outward forms of national culture were made to disappear one by one. The Turkic literature of the pre-revolutionary period was banned. In its place the book stores and libraries were filled with Russian books in Turkic translations. Even the Turkic language was
ATTACKED AS PREVENTING THE CULTURAL UNITY BETWEEN RUSSIANS AND TURKS.

THE FIGHT AGAINST ISLAM

The struggle with the Mohammedan religion passed through various stages. First the Bolsheviks tried to introduce pro-Bolshevik movements into Islam. Failing in this, they began to attack the mullahs (Moslem priests). Enormous taxes were levied on mullahs and mosques; many mosques were closed or transformed into clubs and amusement halls. When in 1926 a world congress of Mohammedans was called together in Mecca under the chairmanship of Ibn Saud, the Bolsheviks, in order to win the sympathy of the Moslem world, allowed a delegation of Russian Mohammedans under Mufti Fakhretdin to participate and slightly relaxed their pressure. But the campaign against Islam was soon resumed. Thousands of mosques were closed and thousands of mullahs exiled or executed.

THE TURKS FIGHT BACK

Stubbornly and ceaselessly the Turks continued their resistance. There was a never-ending chain of political trials. The most extensive of these was held against Sultan-Galiyev and led to the exile of many thousands. Similar trials took place against Ibrahim in the Crimea, the Mussavatists in Azerbaidjan, and the nationalists of Turkestan. They all prove the nationalist ardor of the Turks, whose desire for independence cannot be destroyed by any terroristic measures on the part of the Bolsheviks or Russians. Nor will it be destroyed by the forcible settlement of Turkic nomads, nor by the enforced shift of the agriculture of Central Asia from grain to cotton production, which made the population, who cannot eat their cotton, dependent on the Soviet Government and the transportation of food supplies from Siberia.

The fight for Turkic liberty is also carried on outside the Soviet Union. Turks from all territories within the USSR have their national committees and their own press abroad. The leader of the Idel-Ural Turks and one of the most prominent men in the entire Turkic movement is Ayaz Ishaki. He has been a leading writer among the Turks since the early years of this century. Until the Bolsheviks came into power, his books were read by all young Turks of Idel-Ural. He was an implacable enemy of Tsarist tyranny and spent a large part of his life in Tsarist prisons. During his visit to the Far East in 1933 he organized a Turkic center in Mukden to unite the Idel-Ural Turks, of whom some fifteen thousand live in the Orient. The periodical "Milli Bayrak," founded by him, is still published in Mukden.

In their fight for liberty, the Turks' common history, language, culture, and religion, as well as their common enemy, are factors uniting them. They have become conscious of this unity, in the USSR as well as abroad. They look with sympathy and admiration toward free Turkey, and are observing with suspicion the movements of Great Britain in Iran. And they are convinced that they now face the fall of the Bolshevist empire better prepared than they were at the time of the downfall of the Tsars.
THREE AGAINST MOSCOW

So many superficial comparisons have recently been drawn between the Russian campaign of Napoleon and that of today that an analysis of this subject would seem desirable. To make this analysis still clearer we have included another campaign—that of Charles XII of Sweden. Up to 1941 his campaign and Napoleon's were the two most celebrated marches on Moscow. Both failed. From this some would like to draw the conclusion that the present one must fail too. Only time will tell. But already the similarities and differences in the three campaigns, separated by roughly a century from each other, are sufficiently clear for a comparison.—K.M.

CHARLES XII, 1708-1709

With the rise of Peter the Great and his drive for an outlet to the Baltic Sea, Russia and Sweden—the mistress of the Baltic—had become the two chief rivals of northeastern Europe. At Narva in 1700 Charles XII, the brilliant young king of Sweden, defeated Peter's large but primitive army. Believing that he had dealt Russia a deathblow, Charles thereafter for many years directed his efforts against Poland, thus giving Peter time to reorganize his army on the basis of the lessons learnt at Narva and to occupy a large section of the Baltic countries.

Finally, with conquered Poland as an ally, Charles decided to turn again on Peter. With one Swedish army under Lewenhaupt at Riga covering his left flank, he crossed the Vistula early in 1708 with his main force of 46,000 men. Using all available parallel roads, the Swedes in a quick and exemplary winter march reached Grodno and Radoszkowicze near Minsk. Here they stayed two and a half months to organize the supplies for their further advance.

Charles faced a serious problem: which road was he to take to reach his goal, Moscow? His generals advised the northern route through the Baltic states in order to operate from a region closer to Sweden, to join Lewenhaupt, and to use Pskov as a base for the drive against Moscow. But Peter, anticipating this plan, had ordered the devastation of the Baltic lands and the evacuation of the inhabitants of Dorpat, Narva, and other cities to northeastern Russia. Charles, impatient and self-confident, decided to march straight towards the east and ordered Lewenhaupt to join him with ammunition and supplies.

The road from Minsk to Moscow leads through the famous gap between the Baltic river Dvina and the Black Sea river Dniepr, a gap which at its narrowest point is 45 miles wide. There is only one major natural obstacle on the way, the Beresina river. In vain did the Russians try to prevent Charles' crossing it a few miles south of Borissoy, and when they made a stand at Golovtchin, northeast of Mohilev, they were defeated on July 3, 1708. While the Russian forces retired to Smolensk, the traditional post guarding the Dvina-Dniepr gap, Charles remained for a month in Mohilev, but then, tired of waiting for Lewenhaupt, he pushed on towards Smolensk. He got as far as Tatarsk, and it was here that he made the most momentous decision of the war: abruptly abandoning his previous direction, he turned at a sharp angle towards the south, leaving orders for Lewenhaupt to follow.
It was by now the middle of September, 1708.

What made Charles give up his head-on drive against Moscow? For the last 233 years historians have tried to answer this question, and many theories have been advanced. Evidently Charles had convinced himself on the one hand that the Russians had strong positions at the traditional gateway to Moscow and that they were ruthlessly laying waste the country, thus depriving the Swedes of any supplies. On the other hand a detour through the south seemed to offer many advantages. For there the rich and still intact fields of the Ukraine beckoned, a country inhabited by a population restive under Russian domination and apparently ready to rise under their leader, Hetman Mazepa. There was news of a rebellion against Peter among the Cossacks of the Don; there was the possibility of aid from Turkish or Tartar armies; and there was finally the lack of strong Russian defenses on the southern approaches to Moscow. There appeared to be only
one disadvantage: the tremendous distances to be covered.

Charles' decision is one of the turning-points in European history. The advantages which he had expected from his march to the south did not materialize, but the disadvantage—the enormous size of the country—remained. Charles was soon to feel the consequences. First Lewenhaupt, still trying to catch up with the main force, was defeated at Lyessnaya. He lost his supplies and artillery and reached Charles with only half his army left. Next it became clear that, in the absence of careful preparations, the march to the Ukraine had become an adventure rather than a military enterprise. The Ukrainians were by no means pleased with Charles' unexpected decision, which carried the war into the heart of their country. Although Mazepa himself remained true to his promise to aid Charles, he was joined by only 2,000 Cossacks, the others either holding themselves aloof or, electing a counter-Hetman, even turning against him. Though they hated the Russians, the orthodox Ukrainians feared that a victorious Swedish advance into their country would ultimately lead to its control by the detested Roman Catholic Poles. For Sweden was far away, while neighboring Poland was an ally of Charles.

Worst of all, the winter of 1708/9 was unusually bitter. When Mazepa's main base, Baturin, was destroyed by the Russians, the Swedes found themselves without decent winter quarters. Their communications with Poland and Sweden had long been cut. No general uprising against Moscow occurred in South Russia. No aid arrived from the Tartars or the Turks. The small-scale warfare of the winter months allowed no decision to be reached but only served to decimate the Swedish forces. And all the time Peter avoided a battle. He was biding his time. He waited until cold, hunger, guerrilla warfare, and disease had sufficiently weakened the isolated army of Charles.

It was not till the summer that Peter felt his time had come. In the battle of Poltava on June 7, 1709, some 40,000 Russians with 70 guns fought 18,000 Swedes with 30 guns. The Russian army and Peter's generalship had both vastly improved in the years since Narva. The greatest handicap for the Swedes was not their small numbers but the fact that their king had been wounded a few days earlier so that he was prevented from leading his men in person. His generals, used to relying on the genius of their king, made blunders now that they had to act on their own. The Swedes were utterly defeated. Charles, suffering from wound-fever, was barely saved from capture. Mazepa fled. The army surrendered.

For Sweden, the battle of Poltava was a blow from which she never recovered, and she has remained a secondary power ever since. For Russia it meant the foundation of her undisputed hegemony in northeastern Europe.

NAPOLEON, 1812

During the years 1807 to 1812, while Napoleon was extending his control over Europe and vainly trying to defeat England through his Continental Blockade, Russia under Tsar Alexander I was playing for time. Though formally an ally, Napoleon could never be sure of Russia's position. The final break came in 1812. To force Russia into a dependable co-operation and perhaps to open through her the road to India—the brightest jewel in the British crown—Napoleon decided to march against Moscow. With this decision he accepted war on two fronts, for the fighting in Spain was still tying down a French army of 290,000 men and claiming considerable losses. There was also unrest in France and other parts of Europe.
Yet Napoleon was confident. He had some 600,000 men at his disposal in the east, of which 470,000, “la Grande Armée,” were ready to march into Russia. His left flank was protected by strong forces, including a Prussian corps under Yorck, and his right flank by some 30,000 Austrians under Schwarzenberg. On his march toward Moscow he faced two Russian armies, one of 120,000 men under Barclay de Tolly in the neighborhood of Vilna, the other, 37,000 strong, under Bagration, south of the Pripet river. In addition to these there were Wittgenstein’s northern army to guard the approaches to St. Petersburg, and Tchitchagov’s in the south.

Napoleon began his campaign by crossing the Nyemen on June 24. His plan was to drive a wedge between the two main armies of the Russians and to defeat each of them in turn. But the Russians constantly withdrew without engaging in any major battle and finally effected a junction of their armies at Smolensk. On three occasions—at Vilna, Vitebsk, and Smolensk—Napoleon hoped to force the Russians into battle, but each time they retired. After their retreat from Smolensk,
Kutuzov, the hero of an earlier war with Turkey and by this time sixty-seven years old, took over the Russian command. To reach Smolensk on August 18, Napoleon had taken two months. He felt he had no time to lose.

In Smolensk Napoleon decided to carry out what Charles XII had avoided: a head-on attack on Moscow. He had, to be sure, a much larger army than Charles, but otherwise he faced the same difficulties, and his army of men and horses was melting rapidly away. The roads were poor, the distances tremendous, the devastation of the countryside on the part of the retreating Russians ruthless and thorough. From Smolensk eastward Napoleon was no longer on Polish or Lithuanian but purely Russian soil. Yet no attempt was made to win over the Russian peasants by liberation from their age-old servitude. The French knew that they were facing a nation united in patriotic effort.

Before Moscow Kutuzov decided to make a stand. In the battle of Borodino on September 7 Napoleon finally got his long-awaited chance. (The Germans crossed the same battlefield on October 14.) Each army was about 125,000 men strong. The French were exhausted by the long marches through devastated lands. Napoleon was not his old self. The Russians resisted stubbornly and both sides suffered terrible losses, but in the end the Russians gave way and abandoned Moscow. On September 15 Napoleon entered the almost empty city, and on the following day huge fires broke out which laid waste the greater part of it, destroying quarters and supplies. In vain Napoleon hoped that the Tsar would sue for peace. A further campaign without a base against the elusive enemy was impossible. Winter was closing in. Moscow was at the tip of a long and narrow wedge—its sides hundreds of miles long. The French were engulfed by a hostile nation, armed and patriotic. Only one ruined road linked Napoleon with Europe. Powerful Russian armies were threatening his rear 450 and 700 miles away, at Drissa and Brest-Litovsk.

On October 19 Napoleon began his retreat. What was left of his army was demoralized and had lost all marching discipline. Pressure from Kutuzov forced him to take the same road back over which he had advanced. In the terrible Russian cold a life and death race set in for the Beresina river. From three sides armies were rushing toward the ford: Napoleon from the east, harassed by Kutuzov's forces marching slightly to the south of him, Wittgenstein from the north, Tchitchagov from the south. Against huge odds and a combined Russian army of 129,000, Napoleon effected a crossing of the Beresina during the last days of November. But only a small number of Frenchmen reached the other bank, and a few days later Napoleon left the miserable remnants of his army and hurried back to Paris. From Moscow his path led straight to Leipzig, Elba, Waterloo, and St. Helena.

HITLER, 1941

Two important parallels between the present and previous campaigns in Russia have rightly been stressed, those of time and space. In all three instances serious fighting began in the second half of June (Charles XII forced his way across the Beresina on June 16, Napoleon crossed the border June 24, Hitler on June 22) and today, as then, the theater of war lies in the same endless plains, marshes, and forests of Eastern Europe.

However, these two parallels are opposed by a long list of divergences. Attention has been called to the fact that Napoleon, starting out almost simultaneously with Hitler, entered Moscow on September 15, when the German armies were still some 150 miles from that city. It is true,
Napoleon advanced with greater speed than the German troops, especially as all movements were made on foot. If it were a question of winning the race to Moscow, Napoleon would deserve the cup. But the problem was to defeat Russia. And here Napoleon's speed, far from being an advantage to him, was actually the cause of his downfall. Napoleon marched as rapidly as he did because his chief aim, to force the Russians to full battle, was not accomplished. From the border almost all the way to Moscow, over a distance of 500 miles as the crow flies, Napoleon chased the Russians in vain. Although Napoleon's army marched an average of almost 6.3 miles per day (520 miles from the Nyemen to Moscow in 83 days), the Russians managed an average of 9 miles per day for Barclay de Tolly's forces and even 16.2 miles per day for Bagration's. When they finally made a stand at Borodino Napoleon's army was tired and decimated by the long march through devastated country.

Herein is to be found the chief difference. In both the earlier campaigns the Russians succeeded in saving their own strength and in evading battle until they were ready to fight an enemy far from his base, exhausted, and lost in the enormous space. This they were able to do because the Swedish and French armies marched like slim arrows into the vastness of Russia. Charles' small force was never more than one column. And Napoleon's army of half a million, while starting from a broad base, quickly narrowed down to the one column that marched on the main road to Moscow. The German army today, on the other hand, is moving in a broad front, like a flood tide, from the Arctic to the Black Sea. In this frontal attack the Russian armies must fight, whether they like it or not. They could not adopt the dilatory and withdrawing tactics of the previous campaigns because that would have meant losing their main industrial areas, developed in western Russia since Napoleon. Thus instead of saving their strength for the finish they are suffering heavier losses than their opponents.

This difference becomes particularly clear if we look at the role of Smolensk in the three campaigns. Charles, after almost reaching it and without sufficient forces for a head-on attack, tried the detour through the Ukraine. After marching hundreds of miles practically without fighting—much farther than it would have been to Moscow—he suffered a tragic defeat. Napoleon passed Smolensk quickly, and on his almost unopposed march to and from Moscow he lost his entire army. The German armies, after breaking through to Smolensk on July 16, that is a whole month before Napoleon, did not follow his example, but waited almost three months until their wings had straightened out the front from Leningrad to the Crimea. When Napoleon marched eastwards from Smolensk he courted disaster with his dangerously open flanks threatened from both the north and south. When the German troops advanced on October 2, six weeks later than Napoleon, their flanks were safely anchored on the shores of the Baltic and Black Seas. And on October 19, when Napoleon began his disastrous retreat, the German army, without perceptible loss of striking power, was shelling Moscow.

Both Charles and Napoleon paid for the speed of their advance with the breakdown of their communication systems in the rear. Both had hoped to live off the land, Charles in the Ukraine, Napoleon upon reaching Moscow. Both were unprepared for the Russian "scorched earth policy." In the end it was not so much the cold of the Russian winter as the lack of communications which caused the collapse of their armies.

Neither the Swedes nor the French prepared their campaigns with the meticulous and detailed care and foresight of the Germans. Compared with the present war, where every eventuality has been taken into consideration, their campaigns seem like grand improvisations. Napoleon had taken with
him neither winter clothing for his army nor special winter horseshoes. The lack of the latter caused serious losses to his artillery and train as a large number of horses broke their legs in slipping on the icy roads. For a carefully equipped army the Russian winter has one advantage: it bridges all rivers and bogs with ice.

There is no need to elaborate on all the technical differences between the first two wars and today. It is enough to mention the mechanized equipment which has tremendously increased the speed and striking power of the armies and hence reduced the size of Russia for all practical purposes; the advantage held in mechanical warfare by a nation trained for generations in the sphere of industry over a people that in its masses has only recently turned toward the technical fields; the use of huge air fleets which carry the war far into the territory behind the Soviet armies, destroying their means of supply and communication (the Russians of 1812 could fight from unscathed country while they destroyed everything in the path of Napoleon); the existence of railroads and motor trucks for carrying supplies, and so on. There is one difference, however, which is of even greater importance: that is the difference in the spirit of the three armies marching against Moscow.

The wars of 1708 and 1812 might almost be called the personal affairs of Charles XII and Napoleon. Neither the Swedish nor the French soldiers had any personal interest in the war, just as Europe in those days had no grudge against Russia nor any fear of her. Charles’ men followed him in the spirit of adventure and because they loved the brilliant personality and leadership of their king. Few men in the armies of Napoleon, which had largely been raised by force, saw either sense in their participation or necessity for the campaign itself. But today Europe and the soldiers of the German and Allied armies know what they are fighting for and what a Bolshevist victory would mean.
"GROSSRAUM" AND "REALM"
New Terms for International Law
By DR. CARL SCHMITT

The following article dealing with new developments in international law is not easy reading. Dr. Schmitt, since he is a German professor, writes in a rather difficult style; moreover, where common language is not yet adapted to modern developments, he has coined a number of new terms. After all, there are some ideas which cannot be expressed in words of one syllable. Great revolutions, such as the one through which mankind is now passing, create new conditions and bring into the limelight old ones hitherto not clearly recognized. Since most of the recent revolutionary forces have come from either Russia or Germany, these languages have contributed more than any others towards the new political vocabulary of the world. "Lebensraum" is one such addition. The idea of "Lebensraum" is as old as history: Rome fought Carthage, American settlers the Indians—for "Lebensraum." But what was a political reality from time immemorial has not become a political term until now.

In the following pages Dr. Schmitt offers two new political terms: "Grossraum" and "realm." We believe that he deals here with problems of interest to those who, in the midst of this war, are giving serious thought to the organization of future peace. Of course the author must expect opposition from the adherents of the traditional school of international law; nevertheless we think that even they will find stimulation in his reasoning.

"Grossraum" literally means "great space." Dr. Schmitt uses the term to indicate large political areas under the leading influence of one particular nation. His term for these nations is "realm" (Reich). For example, the Americas are in his terminology a "Grossraum," and the United States is the "realm" within this "Grossraum."

Dr. Schmitt has during the last twenty-five years been a professor at the Universities of Strassburg, Greifswald, Bonn, Cologne, and Berlin. He has published a great many important books and articles on acute problems of international and German law, in which fields he is considered one of the leading and most original minds in Germany.—K.M.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

In the modern history of international law the American Monroe Doctrine is the first and so far most successful example of the Grossraum principle in international law. It is therefore a singularly important precedent. From it we must proceed when discussing the international legal aspect of the Grossraum.

There can be no question of taking the Monroe Doctrine as it is and simply transferring it to other countries and times. Our task is rather to make clear to what extent it is an internationally useful legal concept. We do not intend to increase the voluminous literature on the Monroe Doctrine by a further treatise but rather to show the essence of the Doctrine in all its simple greatness. We shall therefore discuss neither the question whether the Monroe Doctrine is a "legal principle" or only a "political maxim" of the United States Government, nor whether it has a "quasi-legal" or "semi-legal" character. We will limit ourselves to three simple and incontestable facts:

...
1. Probably all important textbooks and encyclopedias of international law deal with the Monroe Doctrine, irrespective of whether they affirm or deny its "legal" aspect. It appears in every important system of international law.

2. In practical negotiations of international agreements the United States have, since the first peace conference at the Hague (1899), prevailed with great success, especially against British opposition, in always having the proviso of the Monroe Doctrine expressly or tacitly recognized.

3. The statutes of the League of Nations in Geneva in Article 21 recognize the precedence of the proviso of the Monroe Doctrine over its own rules.

CHANGING INTERPRETATION

A difficulty is to be found in the inconstancy of the Doctrine’s meaning. Originally a principle directed against intervention of European powers in the American hemisphere, it later became the justification for the intervention of the United States in other American states and most recently in European and Asiatic affairs. In this way the Monroe Doctrine has been invoked for a policy of strict isolation and neutrality for the USA as well as for a policy of intervention reaching across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In 1923 Secretary of State Hughes gave a very significant reply to the question regarding the real content of the Monroe Doctrine, when he declared that its purport could be defined, interpreted, and sanctioned solely by the Government of the United States of America.

It is decisive for us that the original Monroe Doctrine of 1823 is the first declaration in the history of modern international law referring to a political sphere of interest and setting up for this sphere the principal of non-intervention by outside powers. It refers specifically to the “Western Hemisphere” of the world.

The true and original Monroe Doctrine was directed against the monarchic-dynastic principle of legitimacy. This latter gave the sanctity of law to the then existing status quo in the distribution of power and frontiers. It made absolute and legitimate monarchy the standard of international legal order. On this basis it justified at that time the intervention of European powers in Spain and Italy and should logically also have led to intervention against the revolutionary rise of independent states in Latin America. The nations of the Americas, however, since they no longer felt themselves to be subjects of European powers and refused to remain the field of foreign colonization, did not permit any intervention on the part of Europe. In a political Grossraum that had become conscious of itself Europe was not to interfere by insisting on old titles of ownership and on the status quo.

Here we have the essence of the original Monroe Doctrine, a true Grossraum principle. Three factors have come together: a politically awakened population, a political idea, and a political area governed by this idea and excluding foreign intervention. To repeat, it is not the Monroe Doctrine as such but rather its essence, the idea of creating an international law of the Grossraum, which can be transferred to other geographical spheres, other historical situations, and other political groupings. Its applicability to Central and Eastern Europe is not affected by the fact that since 1823 conditions in Europe as well as America have changed considerably, and that, with regard to the character of the basic political ideas, the fronts have actually been reversed. The western Democracies are now in the position of the former European monarchies of the Holy Alliance. The monarchic-dynastic principle has now become a liberal-democratic and capitalistic principle of legitimacy.

THE “LIFE LINES” DOCTRINE

Next we turn to a doctrine which is frequently mentioned in the same
breath with the Monroe Doctrine, the doctrine of the “Safety of the British Life Lines.” It is the antitype of the original Monroe Doctrine. The latter had in view a coherent geographical entity: the Americas. The British Empire, on the other hand, is not a continent, but a political combination of possessions scattered over every continent—Europe, America, Asia, Africa, and Australia. The original Monroe Doctrine was intended to exclude the intervention of European powers in the Americas in order to defend a new political idea against the powers upholding the legitimacy of the status quo. The principle of the “Safety of the British Life Lines,” however, from the viewpoint of international law, is nothing but an attempt to use the idea of the legitimacy of the status quo for the preservation of existing possessions.

In order to have a case, an empire scattered over the face of the earth must prove its continuation as such to be in the interest of humanity. For the lawyer of such an empire, particularly the specialist in international law, it is therefore more natural to think in terms of communication lines rather than geographical areas. Characteristic of this peculiarity in the British way of thinking is the pronouncement of an eminent British expert, Sir William Hayter, who openly said that the British Government could permit revolutions in Greece and Bulgaria; but that in Egypt there must be peace and order, so that the great lines of communication of the Empire, especially the route to India, might not be disturbed.

The vital interest of sea lanes, air lines, pipe lines, etc., from the viewpoint of the scattered British Empire cannot be denied. But while the problems of the American Monroe Doctrine have been treated in innumerable publications, there are hardly any works of international jurisprudence devoted to the great problem of the “Safety of the British Life Lines.” Only here and there can one find statements, often in the form of legal reservations, expressing this Doctrine. Take, for instance, the decisive passage in the note addressed to the American Ambassador in London on May 19, 1928, by the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, which contains the British reservations to the Kellogg Pact. Here it is clearly stated that there are areas in the world, the welfare and integrity of which are of special and vital interest to the peace and security of Great Britain. Any intervention in these areas could not be tolerated by the British Government, which could only sign the Kellogg Pact if this were clearly understood.

An interesting conflict arose when the Monroe Doctrine of America and the Life Line Doctrine of Great Britain clashed in the case of the Panama Canal. Here the opposing interests of the two worlds became apparent. The struggle ended with a complete victory for the United States and the Monroe Doctrine, which, as a concrete Grossraum principle, proved superior to England’s universal claim.

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

England never abandoned her struggle. For instance she has always insisted on the freedom of the seas. “Freedom” in every case of political importance meant to her the understandable, specifically British imperial interest in the world’s great lines of communication. Hence “freedom of the seas,” according to a formulation by Wheaton-Dana, famous through its citation in the Miramichi case (British prize court decision of November 23, 1914), means: “the sea is res omnium, the common field of war as well as of commerce.” As long as England rules the seas, the freedom of the seas is limited by and coincides with the interests of British naval warfare, which claims the right of the belligerent power to control the trade of neutrals. “Freedom of the Dardanelles” means unrestrained use of these straits for British warships in order to be able to attack Russia in the Black Sea, and
so on. Behind these terms implying freedom for all mankind one can always perceive the peculiar connection that drives the interests of a geographically non-coherent empire toward legal formulations of a universal and generalizing nature. This cannot simply be explained as cant, or deceit, or by similar expressions. It is an example of the inevitable co-ordination of certain ways of thinking in international law with a certain kind of political existence.

THE REALM, A NEW LEGAL CONCEPT

On the basis of our discussion of the Monroe and Life Line Doctrines we now introduce the conception of a “realm” as a specific term of international law. Realms in this sense are those leading powers whose political ideas radiate into a definite, large, geographical sphere, which on principle exclude the intervention of outside powers in this sphere, and which raise themselves above the state borders as well as above the population frontier of a single people. A sphere is not identical with the realm, nor is a realm simply an enlarged state; nor is every state or every people within the sphere a part of the realm. No one, for example, in acknowledging the Monroe Doctrine, would declare Brazil or the Argentine to be a part of the United States of America.

The introduction of this term of international law is a necessity. The future of international law depends on properly recognizing the actual determining forces in the relations between nations and on making them the starting-point for discussion and formulation. Such forces are no longer “states,” as in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but “realms.” The important point is to set up in place of what used to be the main conception of international law—namely the state—a higher, more realistic, and more modern conception, which would be useful in international law.

THE STATE, OBSOLETE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Present international law, developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and carried over into the twentieth century, is nothing but a law of states. In spite of certain modifications it recognizes only states as subjects of international law. In its eyes, realms do not exist. Nevertheless, through the ages leading powers were a political and historical reality; there was, for example, a “Concert of the European Powers” and, in the system of Versailles, we had the “Allied Powers.” Legal terminology clung to the general term “state” and to the legal equality of all independent and sovereign states. In its theories international jurisprudence ignored the differences in rank between the various states.

The frank recognition of these differences was also avoided by the League of Nations, although in Geneva the false character of the slogan of equality in international law was particularly obvious in view of the patent hegemony of England and France. Traditional international law is based on the presumption that all members of the international legal community are “states” with certain concrete and definite characteristics.

BALANCE OF POWER AS GUARANTEE

International law as it has been until now saw its real guarantee, not in an intrinsic idea of justice nor in an international consciousness of what is right (they both proved to be non-existent during the Great War and in Versailles), but—again in full harmony with the interests of the British Empire—in a balance of power among the states. The fundamental idea is that the power of the many large and small states is maintained in perpetual balance, and that whichever state becomes too powerful and hence dangerous to international law will be automatically confronted by a coalition of the weaker states.
This fluctuating, constantly moving, and therefore extremely unsteady balance can at times really offer a guarantee, that is to say when there is a sufficient number of strong neutral powers. The neutrals become in this way not only the impartial witnesses in a war between other powers, but also the true guarantors and preservers of international law. In such a system of international law there is exactly as much real law as there is real neutrality. It is no accident that the League of Nations has its seat in Geneva, and it is for as good a reason that the Permanent International Court is at the Hague. But neither Switzerland nor the Netherlands are strong neutrals who could in an emergency defend international law alone and unaided. If there are, as in the last year of the Great War, no more strong neutrals, there is in practice no more international law.

**A WEAK CENTRAL EUROPE**

**THE PREREQUISITE**

Traditional international law is based furthermore on the unspoken but—during the past centuries—essentially correct presumption that this balance of power shifted around a weak Central Europe. It could really only function if a number of medium-sized and small states could be played against each other here. Clausewitz, the soldier and thinker, has hit the nail on the head when he said that the numerous German and Italian states of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were used as the small and medium weights to be thrown, now on this, now on that side of the scales to maintain a balance between the great powers. A strong political power in Central Europe was bound to destroy this kind of international law. The jurists of such a law could therefore maintain and in many cases genuinely believe that the Great War of 1914-18, directed against a strong Germany, was a war of international law itself, and that the apparent destruction of the political power of Germany in 1918 was "a victory of international law over brute force." It is necessary, not only for political-historical but also for jurisprudential discussion and research to remember these circumstances in order properly to comprehend the present turning-point. For today, in the face of a new, strong Germany, this host of international conceptions directed against a powerful Germany is being mobilized again in full force by the western Democracies and all the countries influenced by them.

**GROSSRAUM AND REALM**

Not all nations are able to pass the test of creating a good modern state machinery, and very few are equal to a modern war on the strength of their own industrial and technical power of production. In order to qualify today for a first-rank position in international law a nation must have a huge measure not only of "natural" or innate attributes, but also of conscious discipline. It must have a heightened ability of organization, and the faculty to create alone and unaided the complicated machinery of a modern community and to hold it firmly together. Traditional international law has entirely overlooked this fact. The task of modern international jurisprudence is to formulate the conception of a concrete order of Grossraums which does justice to the large spaces of our present world as well as to our new conception of state and people. This can only be the conception of the realm.

Four different kinds of possible legal relations would result here: first, between the different Grossraums as such, since these are, of course, not meant to be hermetically sealed blocs, but rather to enjoy economic and other exchanges—in this sense, a "world-trade"; secondly, between the leading realms; thirdly, between the people within each Grossraum; and finally—on condition of non-intervention of outside powers—between the peoples belonging to different Grossraums.
The limitations of the former conception of international law are manifested by the fact that it focused its attention entirely on the territory of a state. The more far-reaching problems of political reality such as Grossraums, claims of intervention, prevention of intervention of outside powers, zones on the high seas (zones of administration, danger zones, blockades, stoppages of marine traffic, convoys), problems of the colonies (which are, after all, state territories in a quite different sense and with a quite different constitution from the motherland), protectorates, dependencies—all this fell a victim to the practice of indiscriminate "either/or" and to the simple classification of all territories as "state territory" or "not state territory," in which latter case it had no legal standing. Borders are identified with border lines. The possibility of real (not only inter-state) borders and border zones is excluded from the thinking of jurists who see only states, and who fail to recognize that there are in reality many hybrid structures, neither purely intra-state nor purely extra-state. Even neutral buffer states, whose significance is that of an intermediate zone and which owe their existence to agreements between realms, are treated as sovereign states and on the same level with these realms.

**FIXED BORDERS AND ZONES OF EXPANSION**

The old system of international law, recognized in Europe under the leadership of England and France, was based on the differentiation between an orderly European sphere of states and a non-European sphere, free for European expansion. The non-European sphere was without a master. It was semi- or uncivilized territory, waiting for colonization, subject to seizure by European powers, which indeed became realms through the possession of such overseas colonies. All realms of this international system had huge territories for expansion at their disposal: Portugal, Spain, England, France, and Holland in their overseas colonies; the Habsburg monarchy in the Balkan possessions of the Ottoman empire (which did not belong to the society of international law); and the Russian realm in Ottoman possessions as well as in Siberia and Eastern and Central Asia. Prussia was the only power which was merely a state, and which, if it expanded in territory, could only do so at the expense of its neighbors belonging to the European society of international law. Hence it was a simple matter to give Prussia the reputation of being a disturber of the peace and a brutal aggressor, although its territory was small and very modest in comparison to that of the realms.

**NEW CONCEPTIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD**

While the European states were still expanding into colonies, the emancipation of those colonies was beginning. In the same measure in which the oversea colonies detached themselves from European leadership, the state system of Europe, which was mainly built up on oversea expansion, began to change. The War of Independence of the United States and the Monroe Doctrine not only freed a huge part of the world from the apron-strings of Europe; they also created the first modern Grossraum banning outside intervention. In 1905 the second non-European realm appeared, Japan.

The development of the world in recent times seems to point strongly to the formation of further such spheres. It is the duty of the international jurist to recognize and to point out that the world has entered a new phase of international relations. He must, as we have attempted here, analyse this phase and bring order into its conceptions. He must see to it that theory does not lag too far behind reality. The enumeration of future realms and Grossraums and their borders, however, is not his task. This he can leave to the statesman and the prophet.
By HELMUTH WOHLTHAT

The domestic and foreign economic policies of Germany have for the last eight years been subject to much bitter criticism from abroad. Nevertheless few deny that the economic structure which Germany has built up at home and more lately also in other parts of Europe has stood the severe test of two years of war. More and more do we find on the part of other nations the willingness to study and understand rather than simply ridicule and condemn Germany's new economic ideas and methods. Day by day it becomes clearer that, at the end of this war, the world will not be able to continue where it left off in the last days of August 1919 and that new ways will have to be found.

Wishing to present our readers with the views of one of Germany's leading economists, we have asked Mr. Wohltath, who happens to be in the Far East at present, for a contribution dealing with some of the outstanding economic problems of post-war Europe. The reader will, we believe, appreciate his calm and broad-minded discussion of subjects which more often than not are presented in an emotional manner.

At the age of nineteen Helmutk Wohltath entered the German Army and received his lieutenant's commission with special honors from Emperor Wilhelm II in 1914. After going through the whole war, he left the army and took up a business career. He soon developed a particular interest in international trade, and between 1920 and 1932 he spent much of his time traveling all over Europe and North Africa, as well as three years in the USA where he studied at Columbia University and the University of New York City and obtained his degree of M.A. In 1933 and the following year the German Government made use of his extensive knowledge and entrusted him with trade negotiations in Holland, Denmark, the Baltic States, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, England, Manchukuo, Spain, and Japan. The trade agreements concluded by him during this period became the foundation for the present economic structure of Europe. In 1937, 1938, and 1939 he also took part as Germany's representative in the International Whaling Conferences in London. All these negotiations were carried out in his capacity of Ministerial Counsellor and Commissary for the German Four Year Plan.

Hence it would be hard to find a better authority to speak on the intricate structure of Europe's economic affairs and their probable future trend. Mr. Wohltath is at present in Tokyo as head of a German economic mission which is endeavoring to pave the way for the future economic collaboration between Europe and the Far East.—K.M.

In the midst of this war, efforts are being made to prepare the economic future of Europe, as it is to be shaped in peace-time in co-operation with all of Europe and for the benefit of all nations. The economic relations of the European states have naturally always been so close that by far the greater part of their commerce and exchange was carried on within Europe. It is intended in future not just to restore these relations, but to promote and guide the economic co-operation of all European states in such a way as to increase their trade to the greatest possible extent and to raise the standard of living all over Europe. It will not doubt be impossible,
when the present war is ended, to establish suddenly a general sphere of free trade in a Europe split up for centuries by tariff barriers. This would cause too great a revolution in European agriculture and industry; the problem will rather be to abolish excessively high customs barriers and to reduce some of the duties and other impediments to trade.

CURRENCIES

The national states will probably continue to exist for a long time as economic units, and with them the various national currencies and budgets. Hence the creation of a uniform European currency is not very likely; the Reichsmark, however, as a medium of exchange will rise in importance and will occupy the first place among European currencies. As soon as the condition of the various national economies and their debts to each other can be surveyed after the war, an attempt must be made to stabilize the rates of exchange in such a way as to effect a natural balance between the prices of the countries concerned and the purchasing power of their currencies.

GOLD STANDARD?

It is not to be expected that the currencies will be based on a gold standard, which would lead to an automatic balance of payments in a gold currency system. The gold stocks of the world have been concentrated during the last few years in the United States, and it remains to be seen to what extent claims of European countries against the United States will be paid in gold after the war. At any rate, a great number of states in the near future will have no large gold reserves at their disposal, but will be forced to support their currencies by balancing payments through the various methods of exchange control, and to bring about the balancing of the domestic fiscal budget. To this must be added that all states will have to solve the problem of price levels in their countries, which in industrial countries will have repercussions on the wage standard and hence on the social structure.

LABOR AS CURRENCY RESERVE

If it has been said that currencies will in future be based not on gold but on labor, this does not imply a policy concerned only with maintaining a stable wage system. Rather, human labor is regarded as the most important source for the production of values and as the basis of an ordered national economy. The stability of the currencies could be maintained in such a financial system by the careful supervision of the balances of payment. As the balance of payment of every national economy in relation to other states must in the long run be equalized, the supervision of the balance of payments is a means for creating a basis for a stable domestic economic development. The supervision of the balance of payments will in future have to be extended, not only over trade and the long-term movements of capital, but above all over the short-term movements of capital. For the sudden demands and movements of the latter were, during the last few decades, the starting-point for the disturbances in the sphere of currencies and caused, in connection with the unsettled interstate indebtedness, the breakdown of the credit markets of the world.

NO REASON FOR UNEMPLOYMENT

The European states will endeavor to solve the social problem by the fullest possible employment of all able-bodied workers. This goal can probably be attained only through systematic directing of public works by the states in their own countries as well as in European projects common to all, for instance in the fields of communications and power development.

It is quite conceivable that, after the restoration of peace, full employment of all workers will be maintained in a planned economy, not only in Germany but in all of Europe, even if rearmament programs and war-produc-
tion no longer play the same role as they do now.

THE ROLE OF PRIVATE CAPITAL

During the last few years the necessity arose in many countries for a state control of their economic systems. This control had to be subjected to tedious and costly experiments. In the disturbances caused by these experiments it was seldom possible to conclude long-term agreements for interstate commerce. We hope that in future this will again be possible in order that private capital and enterprise, relying on peace and a safe political future, will again find a field for fruitful activity beyond the borders of its own country. Considerable alleviations are also conceivable in the methods used at present to control and direct foreign trade and interstate commerce when the basis of a lasting peace has been secured and the nations have been convinced that such a peace will endure.

NO STATE CAPITALISM

If the destruction of capital invested in Europe can be kept within limits until a condition of peace has been established, and if the domestic and foreign debts of the states do not take on excessive proportions as a result of the war, there is no doubt that Europe would be capable of great economic development. In view of the large population figures and the high standard of living of many European nations, the social and economic problems should be solved in a manner which upholds the principles of private property and initiative; for only in this way is it possible to overcome the greatest danger to modern mass-populations: the creation of an economy managed exclusively by the state under Marxist-Socialist or Communist auspices.

The present opponents of Germany should not forget that during the last twenty-five years many European countries have become acquainted with the dangers of a revolutionary social upheaval, for the most part when the unemployed masses came under Communist leadership. Germany, more than any other country, cannot forget the years up to 1932, when the number of unemployed steadily rose and Communism seized the masses.

MISUNDERSTANDINGS

There have been many symptoms during the last few years in Europe which were not properly understood on the Anglo-American side. The economic development of Europe, for example, has reached the highest degree of industrialization in Germany, north-western Europe, and those territories adjoining Germany in which either the German population predominates or in which German influence has for centuries been especially strong. Austria, Sudetenland, Upper Silesia, and Alsace-Lorraine, for example, have not, as is often maintained, been returned to German sovereignty because they are territories with a highly developed industry, but because their population is of German origin.

THE NATURAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY

Germany, although primarily a great industrial power, has herself always insisted on the maintenance and development of her agriculture. In her domestic economy there has always been a struggle for the balance of interests between agriculture and industry. But Germany owns the richest coal deposits in Europe and so has developed the greatest heavy industry. Moreover, a large section of European industry beyond the German borders has for decades been dependent on German coal supplies, and for technical reasons has always sought close cooperation with German industry. The existence of coal, for that matter, together with other raw materials is also characteristic of the development and location of heavy industries in Great Britain and America. Far from obstructing the development of industry in other European countries, German capital has at various times—mainly before 1914 and also, as soon as this was possible, after 1918—been the leading participator in the foundation of industries in many European countries.
The commanding position of Germany as an industrial power is not of recent date. It has existed in Europe for more than fifty years. European industry is distributed over many countries, and Germany has, especially in the last few years, furthered the industrial development mainly of the agricultural states of the southeast by supplying machinery. It is characteristic of Europe that the center of gravity of modern industry developed in Germany. The reasons for this are to be found in natural resources, and the aptitude of the German population to develop those forces in capital, labor, and science which are indispensable to a highly developed modern industry.

It would be not only unnatural but senseless to develop heavy or chemical industries in those parts of Europe with a suitable soil for their agricultural production. For industrial raw materials would have to be brought in from distant countries, and the working-class, by nature agricultural, would have to be educated to industrial labor. It is necessary to have a certain industrialization in the European agricultural states; the question is to find the degree of industrialization best suited to a common European plan. The industrialization is to effect an increase in purchasing power and the standard of living. Germany knows that her foreign trade has always been greatest with industrial countries of a high purchasing power.

THE ATTITUDE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE USA

The problem of the industrial and agricultural development of Europe will perhaps be better understood from the Anglo-Saxon side if the British remember their own conditions. In the British Isles the industrial development has almost completely ousted agriculture, while, on the other hand, agricultural production has been developed under very favorable climatic conditions on the good soil of the Dominions, which again are supplied with consumer goods and means of production by British industry. For decades the Dominions have been struggling for a chance to develop industry. Such industries should, however, only be developed in those parts overseas where raw materials and market conditions justify the investment of capital.

It is not only in Europe that the amount expressed in international purchasing value, produced per head, is higher in industrial production than in agriculture. We can find this phenomenon all over the world, in America perhaps to an even greater degree than in Europe. In American domestic economy the struggle between agricultural and industrial interests is almost greater than in Germany and Europe. In Germany, however, the entire economic structure is far more characterized by its highly developed modern industry than in America.

THE GERMAN POSITION

For the last sixty years the German Governments have been endeavoring to maintain agriculture on a solid basis. The National-Socialist Government is outstanding for the attention it has devoted to agriculture and for having done more for agriculture through organization of markets and price policy than any other German Government. It seems to me, therefore, mistaken for Anglo-American circles to maintain that Germany intends to ensure for herself, in the new order of Europe, more or less an industrial monopoly by de-industrializing the agricultural territories of Europe and leaving them entirely to their agricultural production. In Europe, German industry holds the leading position in almost all branches, just like the United States industry in the Americas. British industrialists have often said that in the course of the last twenty years they had fallen behind the achievements of German and American industry.

EUROPE'S PROBLEM

The European continent (excluding Russia), with a population of more than three hundred million and with its fixed conditions of space and raw materials, has, however, an entirely different prob—
lem to solve from that of British industry, with the whole Empire-market at its disposal, or that of U.S. industry, with a population of one hundred and thirty million in a country almost as large as Europe. For the participants, the "new order of Europe" is not a slogan for the maintenance of a huge war-machine. It is rather a program for the solution of social and economic problems existing in Europe, which can only be solved co-operatively and not separately by twenty different European states.

PROSPEROUS CUSTOMERS DESIRED

In its economic relations with the countries of Europe, Germany has often attained as large a share as 40-50% of the foreign trade of the countries in question. This can be compared with the similar share enjoyed by Great Britain in the trade of the British Empire; and also with the share of the USA in the foreign trade of Canada and of Central and South America. In Europe the idea is gaining ground that the isolation of the various national states by customs barriers, protective tariffs, and similar methods which prevent the traffic of goods and evoke an artificial development in the protected territories, is not the correct means of raising the standard of living. Germany's interest in maintaining and increasing the purchasing power of her customers in Europe coincides with that of the various European Governments endeavoring to raise the standard of living of their peoples.

NON-GERMAN INDUSTRIES IN EUROPE

Native industries have developed, within the limits set by nature, in northwestern Europe, Sweden, northern Italy, and northern Spain. Such industries, based upon the natural resources of these countries and upon the capacity of their populations for industrial labor, will in future not only continue to exist but will develop further within a reorganized Europe. The idea of establishing an industrial monopoly on the part of Germany, founded upon the exploitation or impoverishment of the agricultural population of Europe, would be just the opposite of that which German economic policy has been practicing during the last eight years. There is, for instance, the problem of over-population in the agricultural countries of Europe. This cannot be solved by emigration, but only by agricultural reforms and partial industrialization suited to local conditions. German economic policy has taken this into account and furthered the co-operation with the local industries concerned.

PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN AGRICULTURE

In order to obtain consumer goods and means of production, the European agricultural states must sell their agricultural over-production to procure the necessary foreign exchange. They can sell the greater part of their production only in Europe, that is in territories with an industrial population. They cannot sell their products to a sufficient extent and at profitable prices in England, for there they have to compete with the products of the British Empire, which expects to sell at least half of its exports to the highly industrialized British Isles.

Owing to existing circumstances and the high standard of living reached in the course of their centuries-old history, the agricultural nations of Europe cannot produce agricultural goods at the prices at which they are produced in the British Empire and elsewhere overseas under the most favorable conditions of soil and climate. For this reason Germany has paid the European agricultural nations prices for their products which ensure a living for the population. In future, too, Germany will have to pay not only its own farmers but also those of other European countries higher prices than it would for example have to pay Australia or Canada for wheat in good crop-years.

THE AMERICAN PARALLEL

Germany is not alone in this policy. The United States has also passed
legislation for the protection of its own farmers and their products. This legislation, covering wheat, cotton, and tobacco, is intended, first, to protect its own production against foreign competition, and secondly, to ensure prices sufficient for the requirements of the farm population. The European nations live under what is possibly an even stronger pressure of social and economic problems than the population of the United States or the British Commonwealth of Nations. For the solution of the problems which will arise in Europe after this war, the guidance of economy by the Governments will be unavoidable.

AGAINST SOCIALIZATION

On the basis of the experience gathered by Germany during the last few years, the program for the future of Europe will definitely not consider any ideas of socialization as they have been proclaimed in Marxist Socialism. As for the Bolshevist and Communist ideology, a decisive battle is now being fought against it.

When the war is over, the Anglo-American Governments will be faced by social and economic problems similar to those of Europe. However, in view of the methods of economic control employed in America in the last few years, American capitalists will have to consider how far they themselves are threatened by Marxist ideas of socialization. The national domestic debt, the claims against Great Britain, the change-over to peace production, the adjustment of foreign trade, and social problems will force the Federal Government to attempt, to an even greater degree than at present, to steer the economic development.

FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN EUROPE AND OVERSEAS

The Anglo-American world argues that the proposed system of European economy threatens to rule the entire world. This danger is supposed to be found in the fact that the concentrated purchasing power of an economic Grossraum Europe would carry an overwhelming weight in trade negotiations when compared with the economic power of non-European nations.

The economic complexity of the world, however, has led to an ever-increasing degree to a compensation of interests not only within large economic spheres but between the spheres themselves. In its negotiations with overseas areas, Europe, it is true, can stake the consumption power of her mass-population; but the overseas areas, on the other hand, can offer the industrial nations their industrial raw materials and foodstuffs.

I do not see why one natural combination of buying and selling interests should be stronger than another. World harvests, new inventions, changes in the method of production, problems of exchange will continue to keep markets in movement and to offer the best chances to the enterprising and inventive merchant. In the future just as in the past a compensation of interests will have to be achieved in trade policy and economic negotiations, without one part or the other being able to dictate terms.

EUROPE WILL REMAIN A CUSTOMER

The tests of strength between raw material and industrial interests, between consumer and producer, as they take place in war, usually prove to be very costly for the participants. At any rate, for the future development of the South American countries and the Dominions the sale of a large part of their production to Europe is of more importance than their sales to the USA. Even the American efforts to buy up in the Americas raw materials essential for defense, to give credits to the South American States, and to work out plans of the Inter-American Development Commission, cannot do very much to change this state of affairs. Moreover, the plans of the last-named Commission show much similarity with the attempts at a new European order, which have in view the development of such complementary productions in the states of Europe.
The possibility for South America and the Dominions of sales within the sphere of the growing industrial power of Japan would not compensate for the total or partial disappearance of their former European markets; for the further development of industrial production in the Far East is to be expected on a basis of raw materials obtained from within that area.

As far as leading statesmen have taken economic questions into consideration in their proclamations, they have always placed emphasis upon the access to the sources of raw material and food, and not upon the threat which is supposed to arise from a massed purchasing power as visualized in the reorganization of Europe. Although Europe can help herself in times of war as regards foodstuffs and industrial raw material, this condition is not to be maintained in peace-time. Overseas territories are deeply interested in a Europe with a strong purchasing power developed on a sound basis.

**THE ROLE OF AFRICA**

The colonial history of the European nations is responsible for a number of grave problems mainly connected with the economic future of the African continent. For two thousand years North Africa has had the closest economic relations with Europe. European nations, too, were instrumental in the more recent colonial development of Central and South Africa. The cultivation of the various parts of Africa has been carried out mainly in order to fill the requirements of Europe. This tendency will continue to an even greater degree in the future. The reorganization of Europe aims at enabling the various colonial administrations, through exchange of experiences and systematic, long-term co-operation, to work peaceably for an increased production of African agricultural and industrial raw products.

Such ideas seem quite obvious to European minds, and it is hard to see why they should mean a threat to the Anglo-American world. An economic development of Africa and the raising of the purchasing power of the native population will benefit all nations participating in world trade.

**THE SOLIDARITY OF EUROPE**

The new order of Europe is not a program invented in this war with the hidden aim of ruling the world. It is rather the result of a movement within the European nations going back to the effort of the various governments after the economic world-crisis of 1929/30 to lead their nations out of the misery of unemployment and a sinking standard of living. The borders of the smaller European states, however, enclose territories which are unable to carry out large-scale recovery measures out of their own economic and financial strength.

Penetrating the borders of the individual states there is a European consciousness, developed in a centuries-old common history. This European consciousness has grown since the Great War through the struggle with Bolshevism within the various countries, and since 1939 the peoples have been again awakened to it through the British blockade of Europe. A Bolshevist Russia does not belong to the sphere of European civilization. Great Britain today, feeling herself more a part of the British Commonwealth of Nations in all continents than a member of the European nations, leans more toward the United States, the new center of gravity of the Anglo-Saxon world.

**FROM WAR TO PEACE ECONOMY**

The present war has divided up the world into several large areas, which have, moreover, been sharply outlined by the latest Anglo-American measures with regard to financial transactions. American Dollars, Reichsmark, and Japanese Yen with their dependent currencies characterize these economic Großeräume in which the peoples have at present to rely on their own resources. Economic warfare delimits them clearly against each other and against the few remaining intermediate zones which are still being fought for. Out of this war, we hope, will evolve a constructive solution for future peace.
DUDE RANCH IN THE ROCKIES

By KLAUS MEHNERT

In the imagination of the European and the Oriental, the American exists almost exclusively as a being continuously in the throes of work and worry to produce dollars. To a certain extent this is justified, for, ever since the arrival of the first Puritans in America, the emphasis in American life has been on work and money-making. More recently, however, one can perceive a growing understanding for the importance of relaxation of mind and body. As in many other spheres, America has created its own forms of recreation, some of which differ widely from those familiar to us in Europe or Asia.

Never before has it been so important for the rest of the world to understand the complicated nature of the American, made up of many contradictions. This understanding is aided by a knowledge of the American at play and of the various forms of his entertainment, such as football and bridge, soda fountains and movies, crossword puzzles and university summer sessions, "let's go for a ride." Coney Island, vacations in National Parks, auto camps, and dude ranches. The author believes that the peculiarity of American recreation and vacation is based on four main factors: the enormous size of the country, the automobile, a certain amount of Wild West romanticism in the hearts of most Americans, and the desire to "do things" even when relaxing.

WHAT IS A DUDE?

"Over there," said the driver of the bus, whose only occupant I was, "where the edge of the forest makes a sharp corner, you can see the smoke of your dude ranch." He pointed with his gloved hand toward the mighty mountain range which suddenly appeared before us as we emerged from the rocky canyon. We were now driving along a plateau over 6,000 feet high and surrounded by giant snow-capped mountains. The cool air was good to feel after the long day in the hot wheat plains. Ten minutes later we reached the terminus of the bus line, which was at the same time the end of the main road. A Ford belonging to the ranch was waiting for me, and after another twenty minutes on a bumpy and steeply rising road we stopped in front of the dude ranch.

For years I had been hearing of this new American institution which had rapidly spread all over the country, and I was curious to see what life on a dude ranch was really like. A "dude ranch" is a place where city-dwelling Americans have, for some days or weeks, a chance to behave like cowboys and get some real exercise. "Dude" is an American slang word and means, according to Webster, "a dandy, a fop, an Easterner or city-bred person," and "fop" in turn, as I learned from the same source, stands for "a silly person, a coxcomb." It takes a country with a good sense of humor to make a place with as derogatory a name as "dude ranch" a successful tourist attraction.

What little I had heard about dude ranches led me — like probably most other Europeans — to expect something false, affected, and ridiculous. So, when on my last vacation trip in the West I heard of the existence of a dude ranch in the neighboring mountains, I decided to take a look at the place.
"WE ARE VERY INFORMAL"

And now I had arrived. In the twilight I saw before me a large, one-storied house built of unhewn logs on the edge of a magnificent fir-forest. Around a huge fir standing alone right in front of the house there were long chairs and a pingpong table. The Ford sounded its horn. A white-coated servant (a college student, as I later discovered, who was working here during his summer vacation) came trotting from behind the house and took charge of my baggage. The young mistress of the house came briskly out onto the porch. In her smart riding clothes, tall, slim, sure of herself, moving with freedom and confidence, she came very close to the American ideal of feminine beauty as it has been created by Hollywood and cigarette advertisements, only healthier and less affected.

"Dr. Mehnert? We have been expecting you. Welcome to the ranch. My husband had to drive into town. I am Mrs. Garrett, but everyone calls me Linda. Do you mind if I call you Klaus? We are very informal here on the ranch."

I stammered my approval, and she showed me my room. It was simple, its walls of rough logs with cracks through which the evening breeze came in, but provided with every comfort and furnished with good taste.

Then Linda led me into the lounge. Meanwhile night had fallen. In a large open fireplace a bright fire was cracking, its light thrown upon my fellow dudes, upon the walls hung with antlers and pictures of horses and mountain scenery, and upon several bearskins on the floor.

"We have a new guest," Linda announced, and mentioned my name. "Klaus," she turned to me, "I want you to meet the others: that's Emily, Joe, Marjorie, Jean..." and so on till she had introduced me to all thirty of them. All were wearing cowboy outfits, even the women—riding pants, the high-heeled boots typical of the American cowboy and rather uncomfortable for walking, gayly colored blouses, and neckerchiefs knotted in front. On the grand piano lay a pile of wide-brimmed hats. The guests were lounging around in a comfortable, lazy mood. They had just had supper, and most of them had not long returned from a strenuous day's riding in the mountains. Some were playing cards, one group stood at the piano singing old cowboy songs, but most of them had made themselves comfortable in the easy chairs by the fire.

MY FELLOW DUDES

By bed-time I had more or less of an idea of the sort of people my "colleagues" were. Like everywhere else in the USA, when it is a question of vacations and traveling, the feminine element predominated. The ratio was about 5:2. Most of the men were married and were on the ranch with their wives and some with their children, while the women were mostly working bachelor-girls spending two or three weeks of their annual vacation up here. They were all from big cities lying within a radius of about five hundred miles of the ranch. One of the women was a journalist, another a doctor, two were nurses, and the rest mostly teachers and secretaries. It was all a harmless, jolly crowd in that pleasant evening mood people enjoy who feel that the day has been well-spent in physical exertion. It was a mood I had known, for example, as a student on evenings in Bavarian ski huts. The conversation was concerned exclusively with the events of the day, the horses, and the plans for the next day. On a list hung up on the wall everyone entered his wishes for the following day. When someone tuned the radio in to the news and the voice of the announcer brought the war in Europe for a few moments into the room, protests were raised: "Turn it off, we are here on a vacation. No politics!" A movement of the dial, and the announcer was silenced. Dance music filled the room, and the conversation of the guests was turned once again to the pros and cons of the various horses.
HAPPY RIDING

These were the people with whom I spent the next few days. We began the day, according to American custom, with a tremendous breakfast. The mountain air and physical activity made us hungry. Milk, eggs in every possible form, ham, pancakes, porridge, fruit, fruit-juice—all this and more was devoured by the ravenous dudes. After breakfast we strolled over the fields to the corral, chatted with the real cowboys, caught our horses, and saddled them. All the different desires of the dudes were taken into account: some wanted to go for a whole day's ride—they were given a cowboy who rode along as a guide, and an extra horse to carry food; others were passionate fishermen and had to have a cowboy to show them a good fishing-stream and to carry the fishing tackle; a couple of men went shooting, and others again wanted to be back for lunch.

On one occasion we went for a two-days' ride to a lake high up in the mountains. There were eleven of us—the cowboy guide, seven women, and three men, with fourteen horses, as three were needed to carry sleeping-bags, provisions, and cooking equipment. It was a strenuous ride, all day in the saddle, on narrow mountain paths leading over rocks and canyons, and now and then a level stretch where we could canter. The night at the lake was crystal-clear and frosty, and lying on the stony ground was hard and uncomfortable. Had these young people been forced to spend a night under these conditions, they would have been highly indignant at such a dastardly attack upon their human rights. But since it was a part of their vacation, they enjoyed it as a great lark, with much laughter and unflagging good humor. The girls showed far more spirit than one would have expected from them had one met them in their home-town in all their finery and make-up. Some of them had never been on a horse before, but in spite of aches and pains the first day they took part in everything, not only without complaints but with genuine enthusiasm.

"ROUGHING IT"

This longing for the hard and primitive life, this pleasure in "roughing it" lies deep in nearly all Americans, a heritage from their ancestors who only a few decades ago were advancing in their covered wagons into territory that had never before been cultivated. This does not only apply to young people. It is to be found in all ages and both sexes. However, two generations of a high standard of living have accustomed city-bred Americans to certain demands of civilization, such as plentiful food, hot water, modern plumbing, etc., to such a degree that they would find it hard to do entirely without them. The dude ranches offer that very mixture of "roughing it" and civilization which the American desires for his vacation. Moreover, it satisfies his romantic longing to be a cowboy or a ranger and to find himself as it were transplanted back into the great period of America, into the time when the Wild West was conquered by the pioneers and their herds of cattle, the time of battles with the Indians and with bandits—in short, into an atmosphere which for generations has fascinated even German youngsters more than any other phase of history.

For many nations, wars are the greatest memories of their past. This I believe is not the case with Americans. The War of Independence is too far away, the Civil War too sad to remember, and of the Great War they think with mixed feelings. The part of their history that fills Americans with the greatest pride is the Conquest of the West. They thrill at the thought of covered wagons on the Oregon trail, of Kit Carson's scouting and General Custer's last stand. How much more thrilling to view from the saddle the magnificence and grandeur of this very West and to remember the exciting events that happened in this canyon or on the shores of that lake.

Anyone who has lived in the USA has felt the stores of vigor and strength in her youthful, buoyant
people. For this, the finest characteristic of the American, the pioneer period offered an extraordinary opportunity. It gave purpose, meaning, and satisfaction to his life. Since then times have changed. The frontiers have been reached. The Conquest of the West as chief problem of the nation has been replaced by the much less exciting tasks of conquering unemployment, of restoring fertility to once abundant and now drought-ridden lands, of preparing for war against a nation which lives thousands of miles away across an ocean.

ADULTS AT PLAY

The American now finds an outlet for his vitality in the rough and hardy forms of his play and recreation; and nowhere is he offered a more ideal playground than on a dude ranch. He is aided in his enjoyment by another of his characteristics: his lack of inhibitions as we would have them. Most Europeans would consider it ridiculous and in bad taste and it would make them uncomfortable to dress up and pretend to be something they are not. (For many years one of the standard characters of German cartoons was the Berlin snob in the mountains dressed up like a drawing room Tyrolean.) In this matter the American is more unsophisticated. When, as little boys in Germany, we stuck feathers on our heads to become Indians or were transformed into medieval knights by wearing paper helmets, we really were Indians or knights and did not feel at all ridiculous. The same thing happens to the grown-up American when he plays at cowboys. He does not feel ridiculous in a costume that his father still wore in all seriousness, nor does he feel uncomfortable when the farmers he meets on his rides greet him with “Hello, dude!”

DUDE RANCHING WILL GROW

The only possible limit to the development of dude ranches are the prices; however, these show a tendency to decrease. When the first dude ranches came into fashion, only the rich could afford to stay there. There are still such ranches to be found today, with polo fields and golf courses and landing fields for private planes. Later on dude ranches for the middle classes came into existence, at first only a few, but soon more and more. I paid $45 a week for my room at the ranch, while others, living in tents scattered in the forest and belonging to the ranch (roughing it!), within a few steps of comfortable log-cabin washrooms with hot showers, paid $35. That is not much in America, where even a modest back room in a city hotel, without breakfast, costs $1.50 a night. The best thing about the dude ranch is that it is not a “gyp-joint.” Everything is included in the $35 or $45: three enormous meals a day, service, horses at every hour of the day or night, guides, the use of the ranch car for drives into town, etc. I actually did not spend a cent over the price agreed upon.

Most dude ranches are located in the classic country of the Wild West, the Rocky Mountains, and I predict a successful future for them. In the travel folder of one single state, Arizona, I found a hundred and six of them listed, with prices ranging from $20 to $100 a week. Many ranchers have realized that by taking in dudes they can have two crops a year: calves in the spring and dudes in the summer. Lately the Wyoming State University has even introduced courses on dude ranching. At the same time the number of dudes is rapidly increasing; they now amount to tens of thousands every season. This number will continue to grow, for there is a lot of truth in the old crack that “the average American grows up in the country, works like mad to be able to move into the city where he works like mad to make enough money to be able to move back to the country.”
In the Steppes of Central Asia
Where the ancestors of Turks and Hungarians came from,
and where Mongols still pasture their herds
In the Puszta, the Steppes of Hungary
The ancient Magyars settled in the wide plains of the middle Danube because they found here the same natural surroundings they were used to in their Asiatic home.
A nomad's shelter in the Puszta today as it was a thousand years ago in Asia. Because of their unchanged natural surroundings, the mode of life of the Magyars remained basically the same.
VLADIVOSTOK

No Pacific naval base has been in the news recently than the port of Vladivostok. With the Baltic and Black Seas closed, the railway to Murmansk cut, and the Arctic Coast frozen for a large part of the year, Vladivostok is the only railway-linked port left to the huge Soviet empire for maritime communications with the outside world. Compared to the tremendous size of the USSR, Vladivostok is no larger than a keyhole in a boarded-up house. What is the significance of this keyhole likely to be in the immediate future? The answer depends on the facilities offered by the port and is not easy to give in view of the usual Soviet secrecy. The following pages are compiled from information by various persons with intimate and recent knowledge of Vladivostok.

P.S. As we go to press the U.S. Maritime Commission announces the abandonment of the Vladivostok route for supplies to the USSR after Oct. 28. The technical reasons for this may be found in our article.—K.M.

"RULE THE EAST!"

For a true impression of Vladivostok one should arrive there by boat. Vladivostok is located on a peninsula, about twenty miles in length, in the wide Bay of Peter the Great. Coming from the east, the steamer enters the "Eastern Bosporus" between the peninsula and the so-called Russian Island. Passing between huge rocks and wooded hills the steamer turns north and then east into the deep and sheltered bay of the "Golden Horn," where Vladivostok, built in terraces on hills, offers a beautiful panorama.

Among the great naval bases of the world, Vladivostok has one of the briefest histories. The Bay of Peter the Great and the surrounding land, though claimed by the Manchu dynasty of China, was practically no man's land until it was acquired by Russia in 1858 during her eastward drive under N. N. Muraviov, the colorful Governor General of Eastern Siberia. In the following year the clipper Griden carried out a survey and brought back the first description of the bay, and in 1860 the town was founded under the significant name of Vladivostok. (Vladi means "rule!" and Vostok means "the east.") The Russians liked to think that Vladivostok would compensate them for their failure to win their age-old goal, Constantinople and the Straits. This hope they expressed symbolically by transferring geographical names — such as the Bosporus and the Golden Horn — from Constantinople to Vladivostok. Siberian troops were landed. Within two years the town was declared a military post, and in 1885 it became a naval port and the base of a squadron consisting of twelve ships.

THE TSARS BUILD A RAILWAY

To link this faraway outpost of the Russian empire to European Russia, Tsar Alexander III on February 21, 1891 decreed the building of the Trans-Siberian Railway from the Ural Mountains to the Pacific Ocean, a distance of about 4,500 miles. To emphasize the significance of this great technical and political undertaking, Crown Prince Nicholas, later to be the last of the Russian Tsars, on May 19, 1891 personally laid the foundation stone of the new railroad in the city of Vladivostok, where he had arrived from the Baltic Sea aboard the cruiser Pamyat Azova. With his own hands he filled a wheelbarrow with earth to take back to Europe and unload at the other end of the line. Behind him followed in long rows the wheelbarrows of the workers, and the huge undertaking quickly moved into the endless
spaces of Siberia. At the same moment work began on the building of the railroad from the Urals towards the east. To shorten the distance, China gave her permission to run the line through northern Manchuria. The first through-train that was not ferried across Lake Baikal arrived in Vladivostok from Europe after the completion of the difficult section around Lake Baikal in 1905; a second line, running all the way on Russian territory north of the Amur reached the city during the Great War. With these railway connections Vladivostok rapidly grew in importance. The Great War in particular led to considerable enlargement of the port facilities for the passage of large freights arriving from abroad.

PRE-REVOLUTIONARY VLADIVOSTOK

Up to the revolution Vladivostok was a blossoming and growing city. The large business houses of Tchurin and of Kunst & Albers carried on a lively trade with the Russian Far East and with other countries. Especially famous were the canneries with their excellent sea food. A steamship company, the "Voluntary Fleet Company," ran ships linking Vladivostok with China, Japan, and northeastern Siberia, and had a regular line to the Black Sea port of Odessa, while the shipping company of Count Keyserling served the Pacific coast of Russia. Ships of many foreign nations also called with goods for Siberia and northern Manchuria. In the rising city the road to success lay open to every energetic person, whether Russian or foreigner. Goods were surprisingly cheap in this free port and available in abundance.

All this was changed by the revolution. In the Far East the civil war lasted several years longer than in European Russia, and Vladivostok, the disembarkation port of American, Japanese, English, and other intervention troops, saw much fighting and misery before Bolshevik rule was finally established. For a long time the economic life of Russia was disrupted. With the growing development of Siberia and the Soviet Far East during the first, and even more during the second Five Year Plan, the port slowly came back to life. Yet even today Vladivostok is only a shadow of its former self.

VLADIVOSTOK 1941

Since the outbreak of the present war and the establishment of blockade and counter-blockade in the Atlantic, Vladivostok had become, at least up to June 1941, an important port of transit for travelers between Europe and the Americas. We have asked an observer from a neutral country, which has no interests in the Far East or the North Pacific, to describe his impressions of Vladivostok as he saw it shortly before the German-Soviet war broke out. Here is his description:

"A sad contrast to the beautiful landscape with its many bays and islands is formed by the poverty-stricken appearance of the city and its inhabitants. There is a complete absence of any attempt to beautify the town—no gardens, no parks, and only very few trees. I saw no new houses in the city, though some wooden barracks were being erected on the outskirts."

"The streets, even in the harbor, look as if they had not been paved since the days of the Tsars. Full of holes and with loose cobblestones, they are hard to traverse, particularly at night, as very few streetlamps are lit and these only in the main street. The streetcars, too, are an inheritance from Tsarist days, and negotiate the turns with great caution and creakings. There were only two taxis in the whole city. When a train arrived they worked a shuttle-service until all passengers had been transported to their destinations. The only hotel, the "Versailles," with its faded and shabby rooms also dates from Tsarist times. Its chief attraction is its great dining-hall, where many officials and "big shots" eat every day. The appearance of the room and the food was much poorer than in Moscow. However, even in the hottest weather men are not allowed to enter the dining-room without their coats, evidently in
order to prove that a proletarian state also has manners. Outside of the hotel it was difficult to obtain food. Turnips were the only vegetable available, and there was no fruit. For amusement I found two ill-kept cinemas and a rather good traveling circus.

SOVIET YOUTH IN THE WATER

"Vladivostok has, however, one thing to reconcile the visitor and which remains one of my few pleasant memories of the city: the tremendously popular water-sports. All along the shore of the Amur Bay there are bathing-houses with landing-stages; sailboats cruise over the waves or are moored to buoys. On the city beach there are plenty of facilities for swimmers, with dressing-rooms, and diving boards of every height. The population of Vladivostok seem to be great water-sport enthusiasts. Wherever one looks one can see people swimming, rowing, and sailing.

"Once they are in the water all people look alike. One forgets the neglected and dirty city and enjoys the frolicking of Soviet youth. One is reminded of other young people, swimming and sailing elsewhere on the coasts of the Pacific, in Japan and California, in Hawaii, Manila, or Batavia, and it gives one pleasure to find even in Vladivostok something of the common joys of sun and ocean on the Pacific."

PACIFIC NAVAL BASE

The strained relations between the USSR and Japan led to the growing military importance of Vladivostok. Today it is a great naval, air, and commercial port with a civil population of some 180,000, guarded by powerful, strongly manned fortifications and guns with a firing radius of fifteen miles. To the nearest ports of Japan it is only 480 to 535 miles, a very short distance for modern ships, not to mention modern planes. And Seishin
and Rashin, the two north Korean ports which Japan is developing with much energy, are only 110 and 150 miles away.

Although on the same latitude as Marseilles, Vladivostok has an average annual temperature of only 40° F. The northern storms, frequent between November and March, bring ice and cold currents of air and water from the huge cold storage of northeastern Siberia. Hence the port usually freezes over by the end of December and stays frozen for an average of eighty-six days a year. The thickness of the ice at the Golden Horn rarely exceeds thirty-two inches, although in exceptionally cold winters it reaches sixty-four inches. Navigation is possible all the year round with the help of icebreakers, of which the Lazar Kaganovich is the most powerful. A pipe line carries oil right to the water front. Vladivostok can be considered one of the best ports in the Far East, with enough space for a huge navy and an unlimited number of freighters.

Reports on the present conditions of the formerly important docks and shipyards in the Golden Horn are contradictory. The appearance at Shanghai in June 1941 of five Soviet ships including the Maxim Gorky and Piskchevaya Industriya for the purpose of repairs might indicate that the docks of Vladivostok are not what they used to be, or that they are fully occupied with work for the navy. However, in the Bay of Ulissa (not far from Vladivostok) there still seem to be facilities, dating from pre-Revolution days, for the building of destroyers and submarines from parts sent out from European Russia.

The naval base, which was formerly situated in the innermost part of the bay towards the northeast, seems to have been transferred to the long, fjord-like Novik Bay of Russian Island. The entire region is surrounded by heavily fortified districts which include the Bay of Possiet to the south, the Bay of St. Olga to the northeast, the port of Soviet Harbor (formerly called Imperial Harbor), the Bay of De Castries — both opposite the island of Sakhalin — and the entire coast to the mouth of the Amur.

HARBOR FACILITIES

The most vital question today is how much war material can get through the port of Vladivostok to aid the embattled Red Armies in European Russia. According to available information Vladivostok has, apart from the wharf at the Golden Horn, eight piers in Egersheld (built especially for the Chinese Eastern Railway), four at Portovaya Spit, and two reserve piers on the Amur Bay. The port is believed to have eight cranes, the larger of which are floating cranes, with a lifting power of from ten to a hundred and fifty tons. It has, however, been reported at times that some of them were not in use because of their poor condition and the lack of experienced operators. The same can be said about other modern equipment, including highly up-to-date loading conveyors. It is strange to see such modern machinery in the midst of dirt and careless primitiveness. Compared with modern ports of other nations, loading and unloading proceeds very slowly, as has time and again been noticed by members of foreign crews calling at Vladivostok in recent years.

Up to the present war commercial activities in the port have not been great. Apart from Soviet freighters on their way to or from eastern Siberian and Arctic ports, the steamers of a Japanese line serving the run between Vladivostok and Tsuruga (Japan) were the only ships calling regularly. Probably in anticipation of this, the USA last winter opened a consulate general in Vladivostok.

THE TRANS-SIBERIAN BOTTLENECK

The problem of supplying the Soviet Union through Vladivostok depends less
on the facilities of the port than on the ability of the railway to transport across Siberia the goods unloaded in Vladivostok. During the Great War the experience was that considerably more was landed in Vladivostok than could be handled by the Trans-Siberian Railway. Towards the end of the war, enormous stores of untransported war material were piled up on the wharves of Vladivostok, in spite of the fact that railway cars, sent in parts from America, were assembled in Vladivostok plants.

During the first two years of the Great War, roughly 75% of Russia's imports arrived through Vladivostok, the rest through the port of Archangel in the White Sea (an inlet of the Arctic). With the construction of the railroad St. Petersburg—Murmansk (on the Arctic coast) an increasing amount of war material began to come through Murmansk, and towards the end of the war the share of Murmansk and Archangel on the one hand and that of Vladivostok on the other tended to balance. Goods arriving through Vladivostok were transported to Russia almost exclusively by way of the Chinese Eastern Railway through northern Manchuria. Only a small fraction of the freight destined for local consumption was shipped over the Amur railway. The theoretical maximum of the Trans-Siberian Railway, probably never reached, was the movement of twenty-five freight trains in each direction every twenty-four hours, but the average attained was only ten. Somewhere along the line there was sure to be a congestion creating a bottleneck. The lack of locomotives and of skilled personnel, combined with the constant demand for greater speed, led to breakdowns and in the end slowed down rather than speeded up the traffic. Freight trains which had normally covered Siberia in twenty days took thirty or sixty or even ninety days.

AND TODAY?

Today the situation is different from that of the Great War in several respects. Now Vladivostok will have to handle practically the entire Soviet imports, first because the White Sea will be frozen during the winter; secondly because there is no railway linking the Persian Gulf with the Russian railway system; and thirdly because practically all the war material for the Soviet Union would have to come from America. Hence the demands on Vladivostok will be even greater than they were in the Great War. On the other hand, the Chinese Eastern Railway is no longer available owing to the Japanese position in Manchukuo, so that all goods will have to make the detour around the Amur. The Amur railway has no doubt been greatly improved during the last few years and has now a double track most of the way where in 1914 it had only one. But it is still very inefficient. It is poorly built and has countless curves, as the road follows every little valley and turn of a river. The roadbed is unsatisfactory and the trains rock badly, even when moving at a slow speed. The bridges are built in pairs and for military reasons some two or three hundred yards apart. The efficiency of the newly constructed BAM (Baikal-Amur Railway), which runs parallel to the Amur Railway farther north, is not yet known. Nevertheless, taking into account the well-known difficulties in the entire Soviet transportation system, it is not likely that the total amount of goods transported from Vladivostok to European Russia will be larger than it was during the last war. It is true, some goods for Russia could go by way of Dairen and Manchukuo, but they too would run into the bottleneck of the Trans-Siberian.

In a short German-Soviet war, Vladivostok would be useless to the Russian armies on account of its distance and its limited communications with European Russia. In a lengthy war it doubtless has possibilities. Hence one might say that the role of Vladivostok, as that of most other political and economic factors in the present situation, depends on the course and duration of the German-Soviet war and the attitude of Japan.
AFGHANISTAN—THE END OF A BUFFER STATE?

The British occupation of Iraq, Syria, and Iran during the last few months was in every case preceded by the claim that dangerous German intrigues were being carried on in those territories. Quite recently such reproaches were also directed against Afghanistan. Does this mean that Afghanistan's part as a buffer state has been played out?

Throughout the last few decades modern Afghanistan has been the typical example of a buffer state. It owed its existence to its strategic position which straddles the only road (Shiba Pass—Kabul—Khyber Pass) between the systems of the Amu Daria and the Indus rivers—between Russia and British India. It was given its role of a buffer during the nineteenth century when Russian imperialism led the soldiers of the Tsar deep into Central Asia, and that old bugbear of England's—an attack on India from the north—came very much to life. There was on several occasions at that time a serious possibility of an armed clash between the two great powers. However, the Russian advance gradually came to a standstill and was replaced by an activation of Russian foreign policy in other directions, towards Europe and the Far East. Nevertheless England made sure of the vulnerable North-West Frontier of India by the creation of the buffer state of Afghanistan. The advantage of Afghanistan as a buffer against Russia outweighed its nuisance as a base and refuge for anti-British tribesmen such as the Fakir of Ipi.

Afghanistan, the Great Divide of rivers and peoples, seems to have been especially chosen by nature for this purpose. The mighty ranges of the Hindu Kush and Koh-i-Baba are almost entirely impassable. In the course of thousands of years, wave upon wave of migrating peoples swept from all sides against this barrier without ever completely surmounting it. This is the origin of Afghanistan's manifold population.

Four river systems carry the waters of the Koh-i-Baba away to all points of the compass: to the north flows the Amu Daria into Lake Aral, to the northwest the Murgh-ab into the deserts of Kara Kum, to the southwest the Hilmend into the marshlands of Seistan, and to the east the Kabul river to the Indian Ocean.

The road-network of Afghanistan gives a clear picture of its geographical and political position. The main road runs in a wide circle through the Shiba Pass and round the central massif of the Afghan mountains. From this ring radial roads branch off into the neighboring countries—northwards into Russia, westwards into Iran, and on the extended southeastern border into British India.

Nothing indicates more clearly the buffer nature of Afghanistan than its railway connections with the outside world. Four railroads, two Russian and two British, lead right up to the very border barriers of Afghanistan. But England and Russia have watched with jealous and suspicious eyes to see that the railroads of the opposing side did not move into Afghan territory by so much as a foot.

The rivalry between Great Britain and Russia, to which Afghanistan owes its existence as a buffer state, although it continues to exist fundamentally has been temporarily suspended today by the alliance of these two powers. For the duration of this suspension the
position of Afghanistan has, therefore, undergone a radical change. A buffer state created by two powers as means of defense against each other has suddenly turned into a country through which both allies would be able to co-operate economically and militarily. An occupation of southern Russia in Europe by German troops would render the road through the Khyber and Shiba Passes the most important means of communication between the British Empire and the USSR.

Afghanistan is following this trend with great anxiety. During the last few years the country has been busy with modernizing and inwardly strengthening the state by building up its systems of education and administration. The occupation by British and Soviet troops would bring this development to an abrupt end.
A NEW BORDER IN ASIA
By P. L.

Some months ago the world was startled by the news of a war between Thailand and French Indo-China. Thailand wanted to regain territories which it had lost to the French in 1907. Japanese mediation led to an agreement between the two opposing parties by which approximately 25,000 square miles were to be returned to Thailand from French Indo-China. On August 21, in the city hall of Saigon, a commission of Japanese, Thai, and French Indo-China representatives met, under the chairmanship of the chief Japanese delegate, to determine exactly the new border.

The author, who prefers to remain anonymous, is a Viennese journalist. Although he is only twenty-eight, he has seen a large part of the world and has published five books on such remote countries as Iran, Afghanistan, and Tibet. During the past few months he has been traveling and writing in Indo-China. He was the only white man to be present during the significant events described below.—K.M.

A tropical shower spattered the street, and palm trees swayed in the storm. The natives sought shelter beneath the trees from the falling torrents; the Thailand officers, however, standing around in informal groups in front of the palace of Battambong, refused to be driven away by the rain. In Thailand, rain is considered a good omen if it falls during important events, and during the last few decades there has been no event in the history of Thailand more deserving of auspicious rain than this day.

In a few minutes trucks, tanks, and motorcycles of the Thai Army were to roll through the main street of Battambong. At the palace, where hitherto the French tricolore had waved, the three-colored flag of Thailand was to be raised: Battambong and other provinces which had been under French rule for thirty-four years were thus to return to Thailand.

The troops were a little late in arriving; they had to cover seventy-five miles over poor roads from the former border at Aranya. A few hours earlier, at dawn, I had traveled the same route by car. Just after Aranya we had passed the old border; a few deserted houses and a barrier pushed to one side reminded one that this had once been the frontier. The country, as it became visible in the first light of day, seemed rather poor. Rice fields were only rarely to be seen; there was little but dense jungle or high prairie-grass. At the entrance to the poverty-stricken villages the farmers had built touchingly primitive triumphal arches of bamboo, from which waved Thai flags. Naked children, whose newly-washed little rice-bellies shone in the sun, wildly waved their small flags, or pensively scratched themselves with them when they had become somewhat tired by their enthusiasm.

I had left Bangkok the day before. The railway station was overcrowded with a happy throng; soldiers and officials were leaving for the new territories. Some of the soldiers were decked with flower-garlands: a curious contrast—the hard, sun-tanned soldiers' faces and the extravagant tropical blossoms. I spent the night at Aranya. As there is no hotel there, the Mayor was our host. Hardly an hour before the dinner to which he had invited us
New Border in Asia

Thailand troops occupy Battambong

The flag of Thailand waves from the former French Resident's palace

Luang Kovid Abhaiwongse officially declares Battambong a part of Thailand
He is tired out from cheering and waving his flag

Thai officials after the ceremony

Part of the crowd, watching from an old cannon in front of the palace
began, his brother had died of injuries received in a motoring accident on the overcrowded road. Nevertheless the Mayor, in spite of our protests, would not be dissuaded from spending the evening with us: Battambong was returning to Thailand, and everyone had to contribute towards making this event as festive as possible, be it only by entertaining foreign journalists while one's own brother was dying.

The first place of any size we came to after Aranya was Sisophon. During the winter battles between Thailand and French troops, there had been bitter fighting here. Of this, however, one could find scarcely a trace, and the numerous bridges across which our road led were undamaged.

Driving into Battambong was not without difficulties. The Thailand cars drive on the left of the road, as is customary in Thailand, while the native drivers use the right-hand side. There was mild confusion, but with some shouting and wild gesticulation a compromise was usually arrived at.

The French had left the town with their troops the day before. They were spared the sight of the natives greeting their new masters with apparently sincere enthusiasm. The natives lined the main street in packed ranks as they waited for the arrival of the Thai troops. Suddenly a movement went through the crowd, the little flags were waved frantically, and the shouting of the people approached like a wave. The first motorcycle troops had arrived. Cars and tanks followed. Officers accepted reports, while the movie-detachment of the Thai Air Force recorded this moment in sound and picture.

Then H. E. Luang Kovid Abhaiwongse proceeded towards the palace. He had been designated by the Premier to carry out the taking over of the new provinces, and for a particular reason. He had grown up in Battambong. His father had been the lord of these territories and had lived in the palace in front of which his son was now standing. In 1907, when the French incorporated Battambong into Indo-China, Kovid's father had had to take down the Thai flag. They say that at the time tears ran down his cheeks.

And today, thirty-four years later, his son was to raise this flag again. He appeared on the balcony, from which he had a good view of the waiting crowds. Troops marched into the park and took up parade positions. Officers and dignitaries, whose uniforms, in spite of the rain, had remained snow-white, grouped themselves around Kovid Abhaiwongse.

The soldiers raised their rifles, and three salvoes echoed across the square. At this point the natives gave vent to their feelings in roars of enthusiasm. Slowly, with deliberate movements, as if he were tasting the full joy of it, Kovid raised the flag and then read a proclamation of the Government. Battambong and other provinces, which hitherto had been a part of French Indo-China, had now become Thailand territory.

An unimportant event in faraway jungles? Perhaps. But possibly a very important one in the history of humanity. After Adua and Port Arthur this is the third battle that Westerners have lost against the people of Asia and Africa. That this battle was lost not so much on actual battlefields as in the conference rooms of diplomats renders the result all the more significant.

While I was chatting with proud and happy Thailanders under the new flag, it suddenly struck me that I was the only European, the only white man among ten thousand Asiatics. This is perhaps the most important realization of this day. A new border has been drawn. An Asiatic state and a European colonial power have used the good offices of the leading nation in the Far East to restore the peace of southeastern Asia.
PEOPLE FROM FIVE SIDES
By T. F. HSU

To all foreigners who visit Shanghai and even to many who live there permanently all the Chinese inhabitants of the city are simply "Shanghai Chinese." But odd as it may seem, the natives of Shanghai actually form an almost negligible fraction of the community and the outsiders are the backbone of the city's Chinese population.

Mr. Hsu, though born in Shanghai and knowing it inside out, considers himself a native of Ningpo, his ancestral home.—K.M.

SHANGHAI AND NEW YORK

The Chinese community in Shanghai is composed of people, to use an old expression, from "five sides"—the four corners of the country and from the city itself. A Shanghai Chinese today is quite unlike a native of the Shanghai of a hundred years ago, when it was still a mudflat on the Whangpoo; and modern Shanghai dialect differs radically from the real Shanghai dialect once spoken by the residents of the fishing center which has grown in the course of a century into the sixth largest city in the world. Today, a typical Shanghai Chinese represents the characteristics of all the provinces in the Yangtze delta, if not all the provinces along the central and southern China coast. And modern Shanghai dialect is a mixture of practically all dialects of China proper.

Superficially one might be tempted to compare the Shanghai Chinese community to New York with its population composed of such varied nationalities and races. However, in spite of the influence of so many foreign tongues upon it, the New York dialect is very little different from that of Chicago, whereas the Shanghai dialect can hardly be understood in Hankow. Nor are the national and racial differences in the population of New York as pronounced as the provincial distinctions among the Shanghai Chinese, who, though showing some mixed characteristics and speaking a mixed dialect, never forget that they are not natives of the city. They still believe that "a tree may be a hundred feet tall, but the fallen leaves return to the root"; hence, though they may prosper in Shanghai, they do not lose sight of their native place or ancestral home.

NATIVE GUILDS

This loyalty to their native places gave rise to the establishment of various native guilds, each representing people from a certain province, city, or district, and working for their interests. The activities of a native guild are many-sided. Under its auspices, for instance, mass weddings are held in which the sons and daughters of its members are married in a single impressive ceremony witnessed by a leading figure from the same district. It also cares for the poor and sees to it that destitute persons from its district are repatriated.

The guild works for the welfare of its home district too. It may petition the government for the removal of a magistrate whose administration has irked the home district. It may also issue somewhat arbitrary orders forcing undesirables from the mother district to leave Shanghai. A few years ago, for instance, the Ningpo Native Guild in Shanghai used its influence to force several Ningpo troupes
specializing in popular music off the stage and air because it considered their performances an unnecessary exposure of the shadier side of its home town.

**GUILDS AND COFFINS**

One of the most important activities of these native guilds, however, is to serve the dead. Some of the larger guilds in Shanghai maintain an elaborate and efficient system for the sole purpose of serving bereaved families, rich or poor. These funeral departments are usually subdivided into two sections, one handling the sale of coffins and the other being in charge of the coffin depositories. Both operate on a non-profit basis, and their activities can well be considered the first example of a co-operative in China.

The coffins are graded into several qualities for members of various economic strata. However, in order to preserve the “face” of the poorer classes, these qualities are not identified as first, second, third, etc. Instead they are identified by a sequence of characters taken from a passage in a Chinese classic, thus hiding the grade of quality and the economic position of the buyer. In a way the coffin sales department of a guild reminds one of Hollywood producers, as even the poorest quality they have is labeled as “great” or “magnificent.”

The wealthier Chinese likes to buy his coffin during his lifetime. If he has a son, it is the heir’s duty to present his father with a good coffin. He can go to his guild and order a coffin many years in advance, so that each year a new coat of Ningpo varnish may be applied to his “future abode.”

For the poor the coffins sold by the guilds are much cheaper than those obtainable in the ordinary coffin shops. Most of the native guilds issue coupons to their poorer members entitling them to coffins at a nominal payment of a few dollars. Only rarely are the guilds called upon to donate a coffin entirely free of charge, as no decent Chinese would “sleep” in a free coffin. The nominal payment technically enables him to avoid the misfortune of being buried in a donated coffin.

**HOTELS FOR THE DEAD AND THE LIVING**

On the outskirts of Shanghai one can find imposing structures maintained by the various guilds. These are the coffin depositories, where coffins may be kept for a long period pending burial. Chinese like to be buried in their native place, which is not necessarily their birthplace. They want to be laid to rest near the tombs of their ancestors. Hence the necessity for institutions where the coffins may be kept for some time until the preparations for shipping the body home have been completed. Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war and the resultant interruption of many lines of communications, these depositories have gained added importance.

The Ningpo Native Guild, one of the largest in Shanghai, maintains two such depositories, each covering several acres of ground, on the southern and northern outskirts of Shanghai.

The depositories are hotels for the dead. Each has various grades of accommodation ranging from what might be called “suites” to “flops.” In a “suite” the “guest” has the privilege of a room to himself. Then there are rooms shared by two, four, or six, and finally the “flops” where coffins are just piled one on top of the other and crowded together to the capacity of the large hall.

Although conducted like a hotel, the depository offers no such attractions as “bridal suites,” because a clear line is drawn between the sexes. Not even the coffins of a married couple are allowed to share a room. The female ghost, it is argued, would resent the company of other male ghosts, even when escorted by her husband.

During the Tsing Ming (Tomb-Sweeping) Festival in spring, the Chung Yuan
THE XXTH CENTURY

(All-Spirits) Festival in summer, and the Winter Solstice these guilds charter special steamers or trains for the transportation of the coffins to their native places where they are to be laid to rest.

In addition to these activities the native guilds also maintain hotels for the living in the form of dormitories.

“FACE” AND THE BARBER’S COUSIN

While the existence of these native guilds encourages the provincial differentiation among the Shanghai Chinese community, occupational differences also contribute their part toward the maintenance of such differentiation.

These occupational differences may be attributed to the deep-rooted Chinese feeling of “face.” New arrivals in Shanghai always go to their relatives, however distant they may be, and the latter, to gain “face” by obtaining jobs for them, tend to introduce the newcomers to their own profession. Thus a barber’s cousin on arriving in Shanghai will often land a job in a beauty parlor; and a wharf coolie’s nephew has a better chance to follow in his uncle’s footsteps than any other calling.

Statistics compiled by the Shanghai Municipal Council reveal, for instance, that practically all of Shanghai’s thousands of rickshaw pullers come from a part of China generally known as “Kompo,” or “north of the (Yangtze) river.” A rickshaw puller’s distant cousin has a greater opportunity of becoming a “human horse” than a wharf coolie because it is only in the former field that he can avail himself of connections. He has the best chance to learn his trade by running behind his cousin’s rickshaw, thereby becoming familiar with the roads, traffic regulations, and the delicate art of bargaining for a fare.

Practically all the Chinese police constables in the International Settlement of Shanghai are natives of Shantung or Hupeh, provinces renowned for their sturdy sons.

WHARF COOLIES, BANKERS, AND PAWNSHOP ASSISTANTS

Among the army of wharf coolies, who day after day carry heavy loads to and from the multitude of steamers calling at Shanghai, the great majority comes from Shantung. Almost all the fish hawkers are from Ningpo, while the vegetable hawkers are mainly natives of Shanghai, having better connections with the local farmers.

There are also pronounced provincial distinctions in the higher professions. Natives of Ningpo and Shaoxing, prosperous districts in eastern Chekiang, dominate the native banks and exchange banks. Almost all pawnshop assistants are from Anhui province. The four largest Chinese department stores in the city are dominated by Cantonese, and their influence extends to the smaller ones as well.

Even the domestic servants in foreign households show a clear provincial distinction. Most of the servants in European families are from Ningpo, while those in Japanese families are either from Tsungming Island at the mouth of the Yangtze or from northern Kiangsu. In foreign restaurants one more often than not finds Ningpo waiters.

Provincial distinction can also be found among the personnel on public vehicles. On a tramcar, for instance, the driver is most likely a native of northern Kiangsu, while the conductor comes from districts adjoining Shanghai. The same applies to the busses, where the tough-looking drivers are mostly natives of northern provinces and the conductors are southerners.

It will be generations before most Chinese can forget their native places and become entirely loyal to the city where they now live and earn their living. As long as they follow the example of the falling leaves and return to “the root” they will not easily forego the ancient custom of being buried near their ancestral tomb. Shanghai, this teeming city of millions, will long continue to be called “home” by only a few hundred thousand Chinese.
REVIEWS

BOOKS

Foreign Devils in the Flowery Kingdom, by Carl Crow, illustrated by Esther Brock Bird. (New York, Harper & Bros., 1940, 340 pp. $3.00).


The Dutch East Indies, by Amy Vandenberg. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1941, second edition, revised, 446 pp., $4.00).

The first two of the books reviewed deal with the subject of our article "People from Five Sides"—Shanghai. We have asked two "Foreign Devils" who have spent most of their lives in this extraordinary city, to review the books. * * *

The foreigners of Shanghai fondly remember Carl Crow as a typical efficient American advertising expert, who is well qualified by his twenty years of life in Shanghai and his many travels in the interior of China to tell us something about the life of the white man in China. His first book on China, 400 Million Customers, was a best-seller, and I feel sure that Foreign Devils in the Flowery Kingdom will also be read with pleasure by all who have had any contact with China.

There are two things, however, that should be borne in mind when reading this book, else those not well acquainted with conditions in China might gain the unfounded impression that the life of the white population there is the very easiest. First of all the period described by Mr. Crow belongs to the past, and secondly his description of the life of the foreigners is true, at least during the last twenty years, only of Anglo-Saxon circles, and hardly of those nationalities who after the Great War had to build up their existence from the very beginning again.

With great charm and much humor the author describes the development of the foreign communities and their settlements. It is indeed almost a miracle that a city like Shanghai, where the interests of the Chinese and the other nationalities do not at all always go in the same direction, could enjoy its unprecedented development. The common motive that always brought everyone together again was "business." In small as in large affairs "squeeze" plays an important part, and the author very amusingly shows us in some well-known examples as well as in examples of his own experience how the Chinese, usually an employee of the white man, is a master in taking care of his own interests. The Chinese are never obvious in their "squeeze," but apply it with their inborn flexibility and delicacy which prevents their overstepping the borderline where the more temperament foreign employer would lose his temper.

Mr. Crow's book often reminds one of the well-known Diary of a Shanghai Baby, which describes adventures with the Chinese servants of a household from the point of view of a foreign baby, while the Foreign Devils retains the lights and shadows, the strength and weakness in the lives of foreigners in China in the fluent and humorous style of Carl Crow. Perhaps many of those who have spent their whole life in China think with regret of the disappearance of the happy, easy times of the past, for which Carl Crow has set up a sympathetic and jolly monument.—C.

* * *

According to Ernest O. Hauser Shanghai is dead. It died—after having received the first serious warning blow in 1932—in August 1937, and the Taipans (Chinese name for the heads of large business houses), who, according to Hauser, planned, created, and managed Shanghai's affairs since 1842, knew that Shanghai had died for good and always. To quote Hauser:

"Bombs—The Taipans stood on the rooftops of their white office buildings and watched the dots grow bigger. Death had come to the Settlement, and the Taipans were there, with their binoculars to watch their city die." (p. 310).

"They knew that this was the end—in any case. If China would ever win this war, if the Generalissimo's armies should push the Japanese into the muddy river, they would push the Taipans along with the Japanese.... If the Japanese should win, there was no hope either. The Japanese had left no doubt about their determination to end the White Man's glamorous career. Shanghai, as the White Man's most successful enterprise in the largest and richest continent of the
world, had ceased to exist. Shanghai, and all of China could never again become a comfortable place for white men to work. The Taipans knew: it was all over.” (pp. 314 and 315).

Hauser's book contains a short history of Shanghai from the time of its first occupation by British forces in 1842 until 1937, dealing for the greater part with Shanghai’s development from 1919 through the last twenty years. It contains most of the facts more or less known to people living in Shanghai, and is spiced with some amusing gossip and ironical remarks about the city's leading set.

Out of these facts, however, the author weaves a story of sinister plotting and scheming by a small and influential group, the Taipans, activated by the so-called peculiar “Shanghai mind” bent on money-making and unscrupulously robbing “China’s poor millions.”

To quote Hauser:

“Shanghai was sitting by the river mouth... draining the Yangtze valley with its boundless wealth.... The Shanghai scheme ingeniously conceived in the days of Palmerston, had begun to work. It was a racket, if you will, the greatest and most profitable racket ever devised by men. Its basic idea was that of draining half of a continent without more effort than the upkeep of a single city required.”

This sounds interesting, sensationaily new, and makes good reading for round-the-world tourists or propaganda leaflets. But it is nevertheless fiction and not history. There has never been any such thing as a scheme or a preconceived plot.

Shanghai's development from a small foreign trading settlement to a large industrial city has run parallel to that of other large European and Chinese cities; the contrast between capital and labor, town and country, industrial and financial magnate and the peasant/cooler has been similar in many other Chinese and Japanese ports. This contrast has, as a matter of fact, grown far more violent between Chinese on both sides than between foreigners and Chinese. Business methods have changed in the course of the last few decades, and what Hauser describes as the silk- and opium-rackets of the late nineties have disappeared and with them the predominant position of the Chinese compradores. Not only has sino-foreign cooperation been introduced in many fields of Shanghai’s economic life; it is also true that the Chinese element, acting independently of foreigners, has thoroughly invaded and permeated the economic system of this city.

It is therefore the underestimation of the ever-growing Chinese influence upon the development of Shanghai which seems to be the most objectionable feature of this book. The lack of this understanding leads the author (and perhaps some of its readers) to an entirely false judgment of Shanghai’s history and future. Those chapters, for instance, which deal with the silver boom in 1934, or Chiang Kai-shek’s decision against Russian influence in 1927/28 give a purely one-sided picture of the events. The silver boom and the exodus of China’s silver from the country appear, according to the author, as a gigantic swindle maneuver by foreign banks and their compradores, a sort of larceny on a grand scale, an interpretation which does not bear a close analysis of all the aspects of that hectic period of Shanghai’s history.

Just as misleading, in our opinion, is the picture of sharp contrasts—a painting in black and white—of Shanghai’s social life: on the one hand a handful of foreigners with their racing, golf, large motorcars, tea-parties, gossip (and of course the Russian girls are not forgotten!), and on the other, “China’s countless millions laboring for the white devil and barely earning their daily living.” It is true that the wealth of the Chinese upper classes is not as conspicuous in its outward appearance, but whoever has lived here for even a short time must be well aware of the enormous riches amassed in Chinese hands, not only in the upper classes but also in the middle classes—tradesmen, bankers, industrialists, etc. One cannot deny that Shanghai faces social problems of the first magnitude, but it shares them with other great cities inside and outside of China, and they are becoming more and more specifically Chinese problems, just as Chinese as the land problem all over the country or the everlasting controversy between rich and poor in other Chinese provinces far in the interior.

In the political field Shanghai’s position as an international settlement is undoubtedly unique. It is no secret that its administration has not been satisfactorily adapted to the many new problems and needs confronting this city during the last twenty years. There are in particular two grave errors that have been committed which have without doubt most adversely affected Shanghai’s fate up to the present day: first, the exclusion from the administration, on the one hand of the smaller foreign nations enjoying extraterritoriality, and on the other of those nations, such as Germany, who no longer have these rights; and secondly the delay and half-heartedness in carrying through a larger representation of Chinese on the Municipal Council. Both problems are of a very delicate political nature, but they could be solved satisfactorily, at least temporarily, until the
main problem can be tackled, that is, how to amalgamate Shanghai with China proper in the future. This latter question—essentially a purely Chinese political problem—was much nearer solution between 1933 and 1937, but this solution had, for obvious reasons, to be postponed until China's own Government and political life were stabilized. The main point to be taken into consideration for a future solution of this problem is that Shanghai is and has been for very many years a Chinese city, with enormous Chinese investments in land, buildings, industry, and enterprises.

During the last forty or fifty years, the leading foreign business men of Shanghai have, it appears to us, been less the masters over conditions than the tools of the inexorable course of economic developments. They have, it is true, enjoyed the peculiar political self-government willingly or unwillingly granted them by the Governments of China and foreign powers; but they have been acting, it seems, not on the basis of fixed plans or hard and fast rules but following their private inclinations based on their business interests and a considerable amount of common sense. All in all, they have not been wholly lacking in a certain feeling of responsibility for the problems of this ever-growing city. The shortcomings and mistakes have been the result of the political situation, but they were due more to a lack of continuity in the handling of Municipal affairs rather than to the continuous opposition of a close-knit clique, as Mr. Hauser would have it.

On the whole the foreign community has already adapted itself to changed conditions during the recent past, and will continue to do so as long as there is any international trade and cosmopolitan co-operation at all. Instead of accepting the author's dramatic and final verdict on the fate of Shanghai, we believe that it comes nearer the truth to regard Shanghai's latest crisis, which began in 1937, as just another phase in a gradual metamorphosis, the conscientious analysis of which would indeed be a very interesting study.

The book is undoubtedly cleverly written, interspersed with sarcastic remarks and amusing sidelights on such well-known families as the Hardoon's, the Sassoon's, etc. The interpretation of the facts and trend of events, however, is erroneous—a "Shanghai Saga," perhaps, but certainly not a true picture of Shanghai.—K.

Amry Vandenbosch's book should arouse considerable interest. The reader who wishes to study the problems of this equatorial island world will not be disappointed.

In the part entitled "The National Awakening" the author discusses the steadily growing nationalistic movement. Originally stimulated and influenced by the similar development of ideas in neighboring British India, and further roused by the importation of western ideas in the social and economic spheres, the Indonesians were torn from their static calm into the dynamic stream of modern life. Forces were awakened which for the time being lay beyond any possibility of realization. This was the soil from which sprung the parties eventually to be represented in the Volksraad. Efforts for an independent East India were launched among Indonesian circles. The growth of the national movement caused the Europeans during the last few decades to form political blocs with the aim of preserving the interests of the European population and the inviolability of the empire against what they branded as the "red" danger. Between the two camps there is the large group of Indo-Europeans, who in the Netherland East Indies are racially recognized as Europeans and by reason of their numbers considered to be a bulwark of Dutch strength and loyalty. According to the author's opinion, however, they are slowly beginning to lean toward the Indonesians. Although he touches upon these questions which are so important for the future shaping of the country, Dr. Vandenbosch refrains from expressing any prognosis with regard to the possible future of this problem.

The political attitude of the Netherland East Indies toward the great powers, especially toward those of the Pacific area, is dealt with under "World Politics." The author justifies the Anglophile attitude of the country by its strategic situation.

A chapter on the Dutch East Indies and Japan has been added to the new edition of the book. Here again the author only supplies a factual report on the relations between both countries from the sixteenth century up to the latest developments. One can find news reports, and reports from heterogeneous camps; not, however, a critique by the author.


The Dutch East Indies is written by a scientist with a fluid style, and contains lively descriptions. To the initiated as well as to the novice it offers a clear picture of the inner and outer structure of the Netherland East Indies of the past and present.—R.
MAGAZINES

During the past few decades magazines have attained an ever-increasing importance in the field of public opinion, which they both shape and reflect. In the following pages we present reviews of articles from two groups of periodicals. The first are English language magazines published in the Far East or dealing with its problems, the second are magazines in the Japanese language. Instead of giving tables of contents or reprinting excerpts we are reviewing individual articles. The articles reviewed are, of course, only a fraction of those published. They are selected with a view to their importance or significance—K.M.

ENGLISH LANGUAGE MAGAZINES

Japan and the USA

Much space in last month's magazines was devoted to speculation on the outcome of Japanese-American negotiations. Although as yet nothing definite could be said, it was possibly the very secrecy surrounding these negotiations which provided an added stimulus to expounding theories or doing some wishful thinking.

In an article in the Far Eastern Review entitled An Appraisal of Pacific War Factors Ippei Fukuda stresses the importance of the fact that President Roosevelt himself is conducting the negotiations on the American side. Mr. Fukuda feels that Japan need not harbor any undue anxiety with regard to the ABCD encirclement. Japan's mighty guardian, her navy, is still in full fighting trim and under able leadership. Foreign critics are warned not to confuse the navy's policy of marking time with weakness. The paramount problem of acquiring adequate oil supplies for Japan may, he hopes, be solved by peaceful means. However there seems to be room for misgivings as to what measures America will eventually adopt. Should she take steps harmful to the vital interests of another country, the author contends, she would place herself in line with the so-called aggressor nations whom she so roundly condemns. Like the authors of most other articles on this subject, Mr. Fukuda believes that the USA will not be satisfied with a mere temporary solution this time, but means to deal with Japan, as he puts it, "in a big way."

In the same magazine an article by William Hosokawa, The Fates at Work in Washington and Tokyo, deals with the freezing measure: "The mutual freezing acted like a bucket of ice water dashed on a pair of fighting dogs, for the war-fever in many super-heated circles on both sides of the Pacific suddenly cooled off. Hitherto most outspoken exponents of settling American-Japanese differences by force, once and for all, viewed the problem more soberly as paralysis of commerce fore-shadowed the awful cost of a shooting war." Probing into the emotional state of the two nations the author points out that the American Gallup poll reveals seventy percent of the population to be in favor of war with Japan should the necessity arise. In Japan, on the other hand, judging by official utterances and press comments, the population, while far from wishing for any new conflicts, are yet prepared for the worst.

The British interpretation of these psychological factors in Japanese-American relations can be found in the October issue of Oriental Affairs in an article entitled America and Japan.

The same issue contains A Letter from Japan in which Phyllis Argall, managing editor of Japan News-Week, quotes a Domei statement which seems to give a clear and brief definition of the Japanese attitude: "Whatever interpretation may be put on the Konoye message at home or abroad, the policy of disposal of the China incident and the policy of Constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere are the two great and immutable national policies of Japan."

The second part of this statement is dealt with by Shigetomo Sayegusa in Contemporary Japan under Betraying the Monroe Doctrine. In the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere he sees the application of the Monroe Doctrine to the East. He stresses Japan's right to pursue a policy aiming at the fulfillment of this ideal. The USA is charged with having conveniently forgotten the true meaning of the Monroe Doctrine as it was originally conceived, and of changing its interpretation to suit their desires, leaving out entirely the retroactive part of the Doctrine. Hence, while no outside
power may meddle in American affairs, the Americans usurp the right of sitting in judgment on others. The author believes that the extension of the Monroe Doctrine over both the Americas is a violation of the principle of non-colonization embodied in the Monroe Doctrine, as colonization is exactly what is happening to Central and South America. Japan's ideals, on the other hand, as regards the Far Eastern sphere, aim not at dominating the countries in question but rather at cooperating with them. In conclusion the writer wonders whether the violation of the Monroe Doctrine's spirit will eventually break President Roosevelt, just as it broke Woodrow Wilson. He even goes so far as to propose "the formation of an alliance for enforcing the Monroe Doctrine on the United States."

**Peace Movement in China**

This movement, founded in support of Japan's program for a new order in East Asia, is being commented on by its foremost exponents in a series of articles in the *People's Tribune*:

*Who be Pessimistic?* President Wang Ching-wei asks this question and admonishes the Chinese people not to lose patience. Peace has to be worked for and will be restored gradually. He then suggests some general rules of conduct.

In *The Basis of Sino-Japanese Co-operation* Mayor Chen Kung-po enlarges on some cardinal points which must be observed if a prosperous future is to be assured. China's independence is one of the fundamentals. Honor, justice, trust, and respect must come into their own if co-existence, co-prosperity, and co-operation are to be achieved. The author also attempts a psychological explanation for China's contradictory attitude toward foreign capital. He believes that industrialization will put China on her feet again.


Lin Pai-sheng, Minister of Publicity in the Nanking Government, writes a long article, *Towards the New Order in East Asia*, in which he defines the positions of China and Japan in the following way: "China should work, first, for the existence and independence of herself and her people, secondly for the existence and independence of East Asia, and thirdly, should know that the existence and independence of China and that of East Asia are interrelated. Japan, as an advanced state, is under the obligation to give leadership and guidance to the East Asiatic people in their struggle for emancipation and national independence. This constitutes the political foundation for the East Asia Axis."

Commenting on Sino-Japanese co-operation in *Oriental Affairs*, W. C. Pennell in an article entitled *Communists Lose Ground in North China* says that in the north Japan has changed a punitive into a conciliatory and constructive policy, with the effect that local Chinese authorities have joined forces with the Japanese in the struggle against the communists.

**Communism**

Never lost sight of in China but often superseded by the day's events, the problem of communism is far from being solved in the Far East. The struggle in China's northwest is still going on. Mr. Pennell's article throws some light on the present state of affairs. Quoting a competent observer he gives as the main reason for the communist losses their recent return to terroristic methods, and the awakening of the people, who from news seeped through in spite of the strictest control learn that people in the Japanese occupied areas are better treated. The fight will be long and bitter, for the Reds, although short of supplies, make up for this lack by superb fighting qualities.

A brief note in the *People's Tribune* regarding the food problem blames in part the communists for the existing scarcity in foodstuffs and maintains that it is due to their scorched earth policy that so much land lies waste.

**Inner Mongolia**

Meng Chiang, comprising the major part of the territory that used to be known as Inner Mongolia, is the name of a new state on the map of northeastern Asia that has escaped the attention of many a reader. There is a wealth of information about it to be found in a reprint from the US Foreign Commerce Weekly in the *Far Eastern Review*. This Mongolian federation, consisting of about one-fifth of all Mongols, is struggling for a place in the sun under the leadership of Prince Te Wang, who claims to be a descendant of Genghis Khan. Meng Chiang seems to have been the proving ground for many a Japanese economic measure and is of unquestioned strategic importance as a buffer state between North China and sovietized Outer Mongolia. As Meng Chiang has to depend on imports to a very great extent, her people are at the moment faced with many new perplexities.

More information on the same subject is contributed in an article on *Prince Te Wang* by Takayoshi Matsumuro in *Contemporary Japan*. In the story of his life we learn the story of the Mongol autonomous movement, which was started by Prince Te Wang. He is depicted as a well-informed, unpretentious, and at the same time dignified man of Forty. His self-imposed task seems gigantic: it involves
the organizing, uniting, and uplifting of a people completely enervated by three hundred years of idle peace, the majority of whom are entirely without education. It also means steering the ship of state through the sea of economic, political, and financial crises of our days with hardly any talent among his people to assist him and without natural resources to make him independent.

Japan’s Southern Problems

In Japan in the South Seas, reprinted from the Melbourne Herald in the Far Eastern Review Japan’s possessions in that part of the world are surveyed. Tribute is paid to her successful administration of the Nanyo Islands (Mariana, Marshall, and Caroline groups). The Japanese share in the rubber interest of Borneo, Sumatra, and Dutch New Guinea is sized up, the Japanese effort in Dutch New Guinea being of particular interest. There the Japanese have made an excellent start at exploring resources and opening up the country for cultivation. Details on Japanese fishing fleets in the South Seas are given according to Japanese sources.

Another of Japan’s southern problems is touched upon by Ario Kasama, who writes on Safeguarding French Indo-China in Contemporary Japan. Old cultural relations are recalled. Of interest today is France’s offer during the first World War to cede Indo-China to Japan in return for military help. The writer hails the occupation of French Indo-China by Japanese troops and sees in it a step toward the realization of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Great Britain and America are accused of always having obstructed Japan’s moves and of denying her the rights they have established for themselves. Even before the war, because of Japanese goods making headway in world markets, the full force of capitalism was turned against Japan. Mr. Kasama is convinced that if the co-prosperity sphere can be translated into reality, everybody will benefit.

Japan’s Domestic Affairs

In recent years life in Japan has undergone many changes. There is a cheering report on the reopening of The Port of Tokyo in the Far Eastern Review. It took an earthquake to open the eyes of the people of Tokyo to the inadequacy of their harbor facilities. The work of enlargement and reconstruction was resolutely undertaken and is now completed.

Autumn in Japan is a lively study, appearing in Oriental Affairs, of people and conditions in Japan as seen through British eyes.

Sumie Seo Mishima in her Good-Bye to Foreign Friends, appearing in Asia, is concerned about the exodus of foreigners, mainly British and American, from Japan. She decries the loss of teachers and friends, and tells about the role played by foreign mission schools in Japan. After giving them full credit for their excellent record she thinks that now the time has come when the foreign school can no longer follow the quick changes in the undercurrents of Japanese life. Therefore, girls who have gone through such a school, though equipped with a beautiful ornamental education, are not prepared for taking up the duties of a Japanese woman which involve hardships and drudgery. Although her foreign friends had to leave, Miss Mishima hopes that the Christian spirit will not die in Japan.

An entirely different note is struck by Charles Nelson Spinks who contributes How the Japanese Are Becoming Less Japanese in the same issue of Asia. He sees a change for the worse in the character of the Japanese people, which he traces back to the rapid modernization of the last few decades. The leaders in these years, he says, wanted only to build up industry and a strong army, never realizing what a tremendous influence these two forces would exercise on the life of the family and the shaping of the individual. Mr. Spinks thinks that Japanese women, who have always expressed the qualities of Japanese culture to a greater degree than the men, have withstood these changing influences better.—G.

JAPANESE MAGAZINES

For the better understanding of this review we call the attention of our readers to the article “Magazines of Japan” in our last issue.

Against Encirclement

The latest issues of the leading Japanese periodicals are mainly occupied with warnings of encirclement intentions by America and England, which have been intensified by the German-Soviet war and the sending of additional Japanese troops to Indo-China. They are also concerned with the problems of the Asiatic continent and the Pacific area arising in this connection, and the possibilities of overcoming the present dangerous situation.

This situation is described in the following words in a leading article of Kaizo dealing with the Roosevelt-Churchill talks: “The con-
He believes that a yearly production of 37,000 planes (21,000 for America and 16,000 for England) can be reached in America by 1942. Following a lengthy survey of the various models now being built and their performances, Mr. Ida is of the opinion that at present the American air force is not yet very powerful. A further proof for this, he says, is Col. Lindbergh’s opposition to war, which is based above all on Lindbergh’s exact knowledge of the weaknesses of the American air force. The main interest of Japan is concentrated on the twenty-one bases of the American air force in the Pacific and on the airplane carriers of the navy. The American navy at present has six airplane carriers, while twelve more are under construction or planned, so that within a measurable space of time the American fleet will possess 18 carriers with 2,500 to 3,000 planes.

Japan and the USA

Economic questions and above all problems of raw material have become especially urgent in connection with the deterioration of Japanese-American relations. In a general discussion by various big businessmen and economic scientists published in *Bungei Syunzyu* it is said that Japan should attack America at its weakest point. Just as Japan needs oil, America needs rubber. Japan should also not underestimate the importance of American-Russian co-operation. The possibility of bases for the American airforce in Siberia entails the possibility of American air raids on Japan; however, this danger would not mean much to Japan, so accustomed to earthquakes. Japan should now make every effort to get all her supplies from the Greater East Asiatic sphere. In payment of raw materials she could offer her large stocks of cotton textiles, for he who wants to take must also give.

After the War

In a lengthy essay in *Nippon Hyoron* entitled *Japan and the World Disturbances* the well-known writer T. Taira sees the root of the English power of resistance in the widely scattered possessions of the British Empire. In his opinion the present conflict is founded upon the fact that England—a European power, yet existing not in Europe only—had wanted to summon the forces of the whole world in order to dominate Europe. He deals with the changes caused by the present war, the weakening of England and her gradual separation from her world possessions. He maintains that the English motherland alone is no longer a world power, and that America is preparing to take over the inheritance. It is difficult to make any predictions, but a German victory in Europe and the formation of a greater European economic area with German industry as a center could be taken as certain. This area would also encompass Africa and would have trade with Asia and South America. Russia, after the destruction of her military power, would probably have to agree to co-
operating in Europe; her possibilities for development in Siberia are very limited. From the past developments of the war Taiara draws the conclusion that Japan must reinforce her traditional position as a military and naval power in order to be able to meet the threat from the north and at the same time ensure her markets in the south. "As time progresses the China conflict emerges more and more as part of the world conflict, the solution in the north and the advance in the south proving their close connection."

Politics and Morals

The prominent writer and former professor of the Imperial University of Tokyo, M. Royama, publishes in Chuo Koron an article entitled The Moral Foundations of World Politics. He writes of the decline of former international morals and demands a new code of political morals as a basis for international relations. He demonstrates the impossibility of really close relations without such a moral basis by the example of the German-Russian pact, which was determined solely by strategic, political, and economic necessity. As an example of an actual policy of morals he presents the Tri-Partite Pact. He calls it a friendly alliance between three nations, all three animated by the desire to create a new world order in accord with the Japanese "Hakko Ichiu" principle of world order and world peace ("eight corners of the world joined under one roof") and the Imperial Edict at the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact. This spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact should be made the basis of a new code of morals in world politics. Mr. Royama sees the task of the new world order in creating a union of nations on a moral and cultural basis going beyond agreements and armed force.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PACIFIC

Since the early days of Russian history the pendulum of Russian imperialism has swung back and forth between the east and the west. Serious obstacles in westward expansion and reverses along her western borders usually led to increased pressure towards the east and vice versa. Will the defeats of the Russian armies in the present war with Germany and the loss of her western territories bring the Russians with renewed pressure to the borders of the Chinese and Japanese empires? This question is of particular interest to Japan and is examined by Ichiro Inokuti in an article entitled The Soviet Union and the Pacific in Taiheiyō.

Mr. Inokuti, a graduate and later an instructor in the Department of Political Science of the Tokyo Imperial University, has been since 1938 a member of the Institute of the Pacific in Tokyo. The organ of the institute, Taiheiyō (The Pacific) in its last issue published both Mr. Inokuti's article and an essay, Pacific History, by the editor of The XXth Century. Because of its special interest we present the translation of the last part of Mr. Inokuti's article in full.

"In spite of her vast territory stretching across two continents from Siberia to Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union has actually only a short coastline to defend: the shores along the Gulf of Finland and the Black Sea, and a thousand-mile stretch between Vladivostok and the estuary of the Amur river. An oceanic mode of living in the real sense of the word can be found only in her territories along the Gulf of Finland. This indicates the continental nature of the Soviet Union, and explains why her sea-power has hitherto been weak. In fact, the history of the Russian navy is not much more than a succession of tragedies such as the Crimean War against Britain and France, the battle against the Japanese navy in the Straits of Tsushima, and her struggle with the German navy during the World War. On each occasion Russia lost her command of the sea.

Time and again, beginning with Peter the Great, Russia has made attempts to strengthen her navy or build a new fleet. In the recent past the Soviet Union made an entirely new plan for the establishment of a fleet, the actual construction of which began upon completion of her first Five Year Plan, when she made her initial appearance in the theater of international politics. In 1938 Mikai L. Kalinin, Chairman of the Soviet Presidium, stated that the Soviet Union's technical achievements in warship building must reach world standard and even surpass the British.

The type of warship on which the USSR concentrated her efforts was the submarine. Her aim was to build a really first-class submarine fleet. At a Convention of the Communist Party held in November 1936, Feodor Orlov, Naval Commissar, claimed that Soviet submarines were the best in the world and revealed that the Soviet navy had 150 submarines of various types.

In January 1941, the total number of Soviet submarines was estimated at 225. According to the Izvestia of February 23, 1941, the Soviet Navy had 350 submarines. Whatever the correct figure, all indications point to the fact that a large submarine fleet is stationed in Arctic and Far Eastern waters. According to the New York Times of September 19, the Soviet submarine fleet in the Far East consisted in January 1941 of 60 old-type "Shark" and 42 craft built within the last three years. Since then additional submarines have been assembled from hulls and engines shipped through Siberia.

The disposition of Soviet men-of-war indicates that the hostilities in 1939 between Soviet Russia and Finland led the former to search for an outlet to the Atlantic. As a result of that war, Russia seized Petsamo, strategic port in northern Finland, where the Soviet naval power was concentrated to exert pressure on Norway in an effort to get
even closer to the Atlantic Ocean. Such action on the part of the Soviet fleet reveals nothing but Russia's long-cherished desire to obtain a foothold on the Atlantic coast. She also shows her desire for the open sea in the Far East in the form of the establishment and strengthening of naval bases on the coast of the Maritime Province, and the mass production of small-type war vessels and aircraft on the Pacific coast.

At present the USSR is working on six projects to increase her naval power in the Far East. They are:

1. The construction of a naval base in Possiet Bay in order to give additional support to Vladivostok.

2. The improvement of Sovietskaya Gavan (opposite Sakhalin) where a floating dock capable of repairing a 5,000 ton ship will be set up. A railway between Khabarovsk and Komsomol'sk on the lower Amur has been under construction and is perhaps already completed.

3. The improvement of the harbor of De Castries Bay (opposite North Sakhalin) and the construction of a canal between this port and Mariinsk on the Amur for better connection with Komsomol'sk.

4. The improvement of port facilities at Nikolayevsk (on the north bank of the Amur river at a point 25 miles from its estuary). Arrangements have been made to dredge the Nikolayevsk harbor, which was the base of Russia’s Far Eastern fleet between 1855 and 1872.

5. The development of Petropavlovsk, strategic port on the eastern shore of Kamchatka, where the initial stage in installing extensive facilities for ship repairs has been completed. The port will be used as a base on the Arctic navigation route. In view of the fact that it is an ice-free port facing the North Pacific and that it is close to the Commander Islands in the Bering Sea, designated in 1930 as a prohibited area, the Soviet authorities rank the port high in geo-political value. Moreover, a railway line said to be under construction on the western coast of Kamchatka will skirt the Sea of Okhotsk. The Soviet Union evidently plans to make the Sea of Okhotsk a mare nostrum.

6. The improvement of port facilities at Nagayev on the Tayusksaya Bay (on the northern shore of the Sea of Okhotsk). The harbor facilities there have been improved to protect ships from strong wind and dense fog. It is said that as many as four 3,000 ton ships can be docked at the pier.

Needless to say, airfields have been or will be established in the neighborhood of the above-mentioned bases. Judging from the types of warships the Soviet navy now possesses, it is obvious that these bases will be used as submarine bases. There is therefore every likelihood that the activities of Soviet naval power will be extended to the entire Pacific, whereas operations of the Russian Far Eastern fleet during the Russo-Japanese War were limited to the Japan Sea.

In 1939 Papanin, who was in charge of the exploitation of the Soviet Arctic, professed that the Arctic route, through its connections with the Baltic and the Sea of Okhotsk, would make it possible to transfer warships from one part of her territory to another in the shortest possible time, should the country be attacked in the east or the west. However, the gigantic struggle between Soviet Russia and Germany has resulted in the destruction or damaging of a large number of Soviet warships in the Gulf of Finland. The only remaining gateway to the Atlantic, the Stalin Canal between Leningrad and the White Sea, having apparently been blocked, the Soviet navy has lost the advantages thus far gained and is imprisoned in the Kronstadt inlet as in 1917.

Meanwhile the situation mentioned above gave birth to a phenomenon which calls for our attention. As pointed out by Papanin, the Moscow Government knows the strategic value of the Arctic route as a back-door lane connecting the Baltic Sea and the Far East. Although Soviet Russia's attention to the Pacific area has probably been deflected by the confusion caused in her nerve-center due to the German advance in European Russia, we must carefully keep in mind the following problems:

(a) Relations between the British sea forces and the Soviet naval bases of Polyarnoye (25 miles north of Murmansk) and Molotovsk (near Archangel on the White Sea).

(b) The connection with the American air force through the Arctic air line.

(c) Relations between the American and Soviet naval forces with the Aleutian Islands as a point of contact.

With European Russia, particularly Moscow and Leningrad, as her geo-political center, Soviet Russia had been exerting pressure in two directions: towards the southeast (the Caspian Sea area, Iran, and India) and towards Siberia. But, under the German advance, this two-way pressure is bound to undergo changes in its function. These changes must be followed closely, as they will influence the future of the North Pacific.”—S.M.
The Family

Scenes from a recent Chinese film, reviewed in this issue, which tells the story of four generations of a Chinese family.

The rebellious younger generation. The second grandson visits Ching, his beloved (standing in the door), who after having clipped her hair and refused the Governor's son is hiding in the home of her schoolmate.

The Kao family on New Year's Eve.

Taoist priest staging a ghost hunting ceremony is thrown out by the radical third grandson. "There is no ghost in my room," he says, and the priest agrees diplomatically.
ON THE SCREEN

Beginning with this issue we shall present reviews of films which we believe to be of special interest to the readers of this magazine either because of their subject matter or because of their manner of handling important issues of our time.—K.M.

The Family

Produced by the Hsin Hwa Motion Picture Company, Director S. K. Chang.

In 1937 Pa Chin published a novel, The Family, which soon became a Chinese bestseller and is now in its twenty-second edition. The author had earned his fame long before through a number of popular works, but The Family became his greatest success. Since then he has written two sequels, first Spring, which tells of the revolt of the younger generation in the Kao family against the older generation with its deep-rooted Chinese traditions and conventions based on a narrow interpretation of Confucianism; and the second, Autumn, describing the downfall of the older generation. A third sequel is in preparation.

It has been said that the novel is the author's autobiography. He is supposed to be one of the grandsons depicted in the novel, struggling against the old generations and obsolete traditions. One of the author's uncles, in fact, wrote to the author complaining about the veiled attacks against him in the novel. Pa Chin, in a preface to the tenth edition of the book, emphatically denied that allegation. He admitted, however, that his earlier life in Chengtu gave him his inspiration.

The scene is laid in the Chengtu of twenty or thirty years ago, and the story that of four generations of the Kao family. There is grandfather Kao who, as the patriarch, rules his large family with an iron hand. There are his sons, two of them good-for-nothings, growing up in the shadow of the old man without rights or responsibilities, behaving like schoolboys, gambling, and fooling around. There are the three grandsons, two of whom represent the new China while one, the oldest, is trying to bring about a compromise in his life between old and new. And there are the first great-grandchildren. The grandfather as well as his sons and grandsons have their wives or concubines or lovers. Most of them live in the same great house, and the drama of their lives is the story both of the novel and the film.

While the novel attacks old China on a broad front, the film concentrates its main fire on one old Chinese custom, the matchmaking by the elders for their young ones. This tradition, the film tries to show, is nothing but bad, for it leads in almost all cases to unhappiness and disaster. The eldest grandson loves a girl whom he is not allowed to marry and who dies of consumption. The slave-girl whom his brother loves drowns herself when she is forced to become the concubine of a fat and elderly rascal—and so on.

There are also some side-attacks against other old traditions, such as a Taoist priest's hocus-pocus, and the custom that no child may be born in a house containing an unburied corpse. This leads to the death in childbirth of the first grandson's wife due to the neglect she suffers when she is rushed off to some other house.

Against everything old there rise the young heroine and hero of the novel and film: the girl Ching, loved by the second grandson, who shows her attitude by cutting off her hair and refusing to marry the Governor's son; and the youngest grandson, who decides to leave backward Chengtu for modern Shanghai.

Except for two minor digressions the film is a fairly faithful reproduction of the novel. In producing the picture, the Hsin Hwa Motion Picture Company, one of the largest in Shanghai, China's Hollywood, broke a record established some fifteen years ago, when a now defunct picture company gathered all available stars and produced a star-studded picture known as The New Family. Curiously enough, that picture was an attack on the "small family" system, while the current production, also an all-star picture, may be called a scathing attack on the old "big family."

Billed as an "extra-super-production," The Family has in its cast practically all of the currently favorite movie stars, such as Miss Yuen Mei-yuan, who handles the role of Cousin Mei; Miss Chen Yung-shang as Cousin Ching; Liu Chung, "China's Clark Gable,"
as the second grandson; and Miss Koo Lan- 

chung in an impressive performance as wife of the first grandson.

In order to muster all available talents, the company went so far as to shoot part of the picture in Hongkong where they enlisted the services of two of the veteran movie stars of China—Miss Butterfly Wu, known as "China's Movie Queen," and Wong Yuan-lung, once the most popular leading man. As a result, the sets in Shanghai and Hongkong, though purporting to depict the same house, are not identical.

The company also mustered a number of well-known directors to work on the picture, each directing a section of the film under the supervision of the head of the company, S.K. Chang.

The acting and the stage sets of the film are excellent. To be sure, for western taste some of the scenes are too drawn-out—the whole film lasts three full hours. But the clever change from comedy to tragedy and to lyrical love-scenes holds the interest of the spectator throughout.

As is the case with every film with a "message," this one also has some exaggerations, and too much of a black-and-white manner of presenting things. There are some exceedingly powerful scenes of stark realism, particularly the distorted features of the first grandson's wife, when, assisted by the old-fashioned midwife and a young girl, she gives birth to a child and dies in the process.

The Family is a typical drama of emancipation and reminds one of a certain type of European literature of the nineteenth century. Its message is that everything will be fine once the old traditions, laws, and ways of life are overthrown. The world today and China in particular have proved that the real trouble only began with emancipation. Emancipation does not tend to lead individuals and nations straight away to the happiness which they expected, but rather into an inner and outer chaos, at least until new traditions, laws, and ways of life have been found to provide the frame-work within which man can find the necessary happy mean between the two extremes of slavery and anarchy.

* * *

The Fifth Ocean

Produced by the Kiev Studio, Director I. Annensky. In the leading parts: A. Abrikosov (Leonty Shirokov), E. Gorkusha (Sanya), I. Novoseltsev (Kirillov), A. Garder (Natasha).

The Soviet film The Fifth Ocean, shown recently in Shanghai, was advertised as "a new artistic film about the life of Far Eastern aviators." But to those who expected to see a film of the Soviet air force on the shores of the Pacific, along the lines of the recent American picture Flight Command about the life and training of the American air force on the West Coast, this film is a disappointment. That the plot is supposed to take place in the Soviet Far East is not apparent from the film: it might just as well have been any other place in the large Soviet Union, or even in any other country. For apart from Soviet uniforms and Russian dresses there is nothing particularly Sovietic about the film.

The plot is very simple. Leonty, a strong, healthy, but independent and self-willed hunter, decides to become an aviator in order to travel in what he calls the "Fifth Ocean," that is, the air. He joins a flying-school and falls in love with Natasha, the fiancée of his instructor. At the same time another candidate for the school, the girl Sanya, has been refused admission because of her youth. Having fallen in love with both Leonty and flying, however, she sticks around the airport as a servant in the restaurant. Leonty has all the qualifications to become an excellent aviator; his independent and undisciplined personality, however, worries his superiors. For example, when Natasha returns from leave he lands his plane on the square outside the railway station in order to be the first to greet her, a breach of discipline for which he is punished. The whole film seems to be designed to impress upon young Russians the importance of discipline, and dissiplina is the word most used throughout the film.

In the end, of course, Leonty reforms. During a test flight he has a crack-up because the airport mechanic had bungled his job. Yet Leonty's newly-won self-discipline leads him to take the blame upon himself in order not to implicate the mechanic. It almost looks like the end of his flying career; but the mechanic steps forth and confesses his guilt. Leonty becomes a great aviator and returns several years later with the decoration of "Hero of the Soviet Union" to visit his old flying-school. Natasha and the instructor are married, and Sanya has in the meantime become a pretty pilot. The spectator is left with the impression that a second marriage is in the offing.

There are many humorous lines in the dialogue. Leonty's carefree song is cleverly used as a leitmotiv that accompanies his self-willed actions and gradually develops—parallel to Leonty's own evolution—into a powerful marching tune. But as regards the photography and acting the film is considerably below the high standard frequently found in Soviet films.—K.M.
DOCUMENTS OF THE AUTUMN

All through this autumn two developments have held the center of world attention: the German-Soviet war and the attitude of the USA. For the war in Russia the tremendous Soviet losses in men and war material and the gradual occupation of important Soviet industrial centers by German troops were the outstanding features. From week to week Russia's demands for material aid from outside have increased.

Great Britain's position with regard to the Russian problem was dealt with by Prime Minister Churchill in two speeches. On September 9 he had this to say on Russia's need for aid and Britain's chances of satisfying it:

"The magnificent resistance of the Russian armies and the skillful manner in which their vast front is being withdrawn makes it certain that Hitler's hopes of a short war with Russia will be dispelled. Already, in three months, he has lost more German blood than was shed in any single year of the last war. Already, he faces the certainty of having to maintain his armies on the whole front, from the Arctic to the Black Sea, at the end of long and precarious lines of communication, through all the severity of the Russian winter, and with vigorous counter-stroeks, which may be expected from the Russian army.

From the moment when Russia was attacked, we have cast about for every means of giving the most speedy and effective help to our new ally. Discussions of military projects which have been examined would be harmful. Nor will it be possible to enter upon arguments on such questions. In field of supply more can be said. I agree with Mr. Roosevelt upon the message which was sent to Stalin. The need is urgent and the scale is heavy. A considerable part of the munitions and iron steel production of Russia has fallen into the enemy's hands. On the other hand, the Soviet disposes of from 10,000,000 to 15,000,000 soldiers, for nearly all of whom they have equipment and arms."

After briefly dealing with the proposed Moscow conference, Churchill proceeded:

"Meanwhile many very important emergency decisions are being taken, and large supplies are on the way. We must be prepared for serious sacrifices in the munitions field to meet Russia's needs. The greatest exertion will be required from all concerned in production, not only to help Russia, but to fill the gaps which must now be opened in our long-sought and at last arriving, supply. Everything given to Russia is subtracted from what we are making ourselves, or in part at least from what would have been sent us by the United States. The flow of our own production in Britain and the Empire is still rising. It will reach full flood during the third year of war-time munitions production.

If the United States are to fulfill the task they set themselves, very large installations will have to be established or converted and there will have to be further curtailment of civilian consumption over there, as they fully recognize. We may ourselves expect a definite reduction in military supplies from America on which we had counted, but within certain limits, we are prepared to accept those facts.

Other limiting factors like time, distance and geography, impose themselves upon us. There are limitations of transport and harbour facilities. Above all, there is the limitation of shipping. Only three routes are open—the Arctic by Archangel, which may be hampered by winter ice, the Far Eastern route via Vladivostok, which is scowled upon by the Japanese and operates over 7,000 miles of railway lines, and the route across Persia, which leads over a 500 miles stretch from the Persian Gulf into the great inland sea, the Caspian, upon which the Russians maintain a strong naval force, and which gives access to the very heart of Russia, namely the Volga basin." (Reuter, North China Daily News, September 11).

* * *

On September 30, Churchill in a thirty-seven minute speech returned to the same issue. During the three weeks that had passed the Soviet need for aid as well as the difficulties of supplying such aid had increased considerably. Hence the "limiting factors" in British assistance were stressed still more in this second speech.
“British and United States missions are now in conference with the chiefs of the Soviet at Moscow. The interval which has passed since President Roosevelt and I sent our message from the Atlantic to Premier Stalin, has been used in ceaseless activity on both sides of the Atlantic.

The whole ground has been surveyed in the light of new events, and many important supplies have already been dispatched. Our representatives and their American colleagues have gone to Moscow with a clear and full knowledge of what they are able to give to Russia, month by month, from now onwards. The Soviet Government have the right to know what monthly quota of weapons and supplies we can send, and they can count upon. It is only when they know what we can guarantee to send, subject of course to the hazards of war, that they themselves can use their vast resources and reserves to the best possible advantage.

It is only thus that they can best fill the gap between the very heavy losses which they have sustained, and the diminution of munition making power which they have suffered, on the one hand, and the arrival of really effective quantities of British and American supplies on the other.

I may say at once, however, that in order to keep Russia's armies indefinitely in the field as a first-class warmaking power, sacrifices of the most serious kind, and most extreme efforts, will have to be made by the British people and enormous new installations or conversions from existing plants will have to be set up in the United States, with all the labor, expense and disturbance of normal life which these entail.

We have just had a symbolic tank week for Russia, and it has I feel—in fact I know,— given an added sense of the immediate importance of their work to the toiling men and women in our factories. The output of "Tank Week" is only a very small part of the supplies which Britain and the United States must send month after month upon a growing scale, and for an indefinite period.

It is not only tanks—tanks for which we have waited so long—that we have to send, but precious aircraft, and aluminum, rubber, and oil, and other materials vital to modern war, large quantities of which have already gone. All these we must send, and keep sending to Russia. It is not only the making and giving of these commodities, but their transportation, rather than our willingness or ability to give, that will prove in the end the limiting factor.”

Here Churchill mentioned the Moscow conference, then in session, and continued:

“There are many other interests which have to be remembered at the same time. In some respects the problems we have to face are similar to those which rent our hearts last year, when we had, for instance to refuse to send from this country, for the help of France, the last remaining squadrons of fighter aircraft upon which our future resistance depended.

Or again they remind one of the occasion when, rightly judging Hitler's unpreparedness for invasions in the summer of 1940 we took the plunge of sending so many of our tanks and trained troops all around the Cape to the Valley of the Nile, in order to destroy the Italian armies in Libya and Abyssinia. If it is now thought that we solved those problems correctly, we could hope that here might be grounds for confidence that in these new problems His Majesty's Government, and their professional advisers, will not err, either in direction, improvidence or through want of courage.

Anyone, who, without full knowledge, should attempt to force the hands of those responsible, would act without proper warrant, and also—I say it with great respect—would not achieve any useful purpose, because in the discharge of duties which the House has confided to us, we are determined to take our decisions and to be judged accordingly.”

To explain the inactivity of the British army, Churchill pointed to its small size:

“We never had, and never should have, an army comparable in numbers to the armies of the Continent. At the outbreak of war our army was insignificant as a factor in the conflict. With very great care and toil and time we have now created a medium-sized, but very good, army.

Cadres had been formed, batteries and divisions and corps taken shape and life. Men worked together in military units for two years. Very severe training was carried out all through last winter. The army was hardened, nimble, alert.

Commanders and staff had had opportunities, and were having opportunities, of handling large-scale movements and maneuvers. The British army might be small compared with the Russian or German armies. It had not had the repeated successful experiences of the German army, which was a formidable source of strength, but nevertheless a finely tempered weapon had been forged.”

The small size of the army, in turn, Churchill explained by the lack of man-power. In fact, he even had to defend himself against proposals to decrease the size of the army in favor of industry which is very short of labor.
"There is no question of increasing the numbers of the army, but it is indispensable that normal wastage—considerable even when troops are not in contact with the enemy—should be made good, the ranks kept filled, and battalions and tank regiments kept at their proper strength. Above all we cannot have existing formations pulled to pieces and gobbled by taking out of every platoon and section trained men, who are an essential part of these living entities whereon, one of these fine or foggy mornings, the whole existence of the British nation may depend." (Reuter, Shanghai Evening Post, October 1.)

On October 3 Chancellor Hitler unexpectedly made a speech to introduce the Winter Relief Drive of this year. It dealt largely with the war in Russia.

The Fuhrer began his speech by stating that he had no intention of replying to those foreign statesmen who had wondered why he had been silent so long. Rather had he come to open the Winter Relief Campaign, as he had done in previous years. The Fuhrer stressed that he had found it particularly difficult to come to Berlin at a time when a new important development on the eastern front was beginning to take shape.

"Since 48 hours an operation of gigantic extent has been under way. It will contribute to the final annihilation of the enemy in the east."

In the name of millions of German soldiers fighting on the battlefields the Fuhrer then asked all people at home to shoulder once again the additional sacrifice of Winter Relief. The struggle raging since June 22 would lead to a decision of truly world-wide importance. Only future generations would clearly fathom the full significance and depth of that event and would say that it was the beginning of a new age.

Here the Fuhrer reviewed the developments of the past years, his domestic reforms, his vain attempts at winning British friendship, the change of relations with Russia in August 1939, the insincerity of the Soviet Government, and its attack on Finland.

"You all know what it meant for us to have to look silently on while the little Finnish nation was being strangled. No one can realize a square foot of ground there that had not been opened up to culture and civilization by German pioneers. Nevertheless I remained silent. It was not until I felt, as the weeks passed, more and more positive that Russia believed her hour was come to attack us, when I had evidence that one airfield after another had sprung up on our frontier, and division after division from throughout the entire Soviet empire was being concentrated there, that it became my duty to take precautions; for history knows no excuse for a mistake. Standing at the head of the German Reich, I feel responsible for the German people, for their present and, so far as possible, for their future. I was therefore compelled gradually to take precautionary measures on our part.

These were of a purely defensive nature. As early as August and September of last year, however, I had realized that an offensive against England was then no longer feasible. Such a campaign would have tied up the whole of our air force, while in our rear a state was preparing to make use of just such a chance to invade us."

Hitler referred to Molotov's visit in Berlin and his four demands which he, Hitler, had refused.

"From that moment on I carefully watched every Russian move. Already in May there could no longer be any doubt of Russia's intentions to attack us at the first opportunity.

At that time I was forced to remain silent. It was doubly difficult for me, not so much because of those on the home front, for, after all, they would realize that there are times when one may not speak if one does not wish to endanger the entire nation. Far harder was it for me to have to keep silence towards my soldiers, who were now standing in massed divisions on the eastern border of the Reich without knowing what was really happening. And it was just for their sake that I could not speak freely. Had I uttered a single word, it would not have changed Mr. Stalin's decision in the least; but the possibility of surprise—my last weapon—would then have been lost. For that reason I continued to remain silent, even after I had definitely decided to take the first step. It was, I can say this today, the gravest decision of my whole life, for such a step opens a door concealing nothing but secrets."

On the morning of June 22 this battle, the greatest in history, began. Since then some three and a half months have elapsed, and there is one statement I can make at once. Up to now everything has gone according to plan. Not for a single moment during all this time has the initiative been wrested from the hands of the German High Command. On the contrary every operation up to today has gone just as exactly according to plan as in the campaigns in Poland, then Norway, and finally in the west and in the Balkans.
There is one point I must emphasize here. We have made no mistake in our plans, nor in the unique bravery of the German soldier, nor in the quality of our arms. No mistake was made in planning the smooth working of our organization; we were under no delusion regarding the huge spaces stretching behind the Red Armies, nor have we been disappointed by the home front.

We have, it is true, erred on one point. We had no idea how gigantic had been Russia's preparations against Germany and Europe, how immensely great had been our danger, and how narrowly we had escaped annihilation, not only of Germany but all Europe. I can say this today, I did not say it before, because today I am in a position to say that our opponent is already defeated and will never rise again. Here a power had been massing to threaten Europe, of whose dimensions most people had no idea and many people still have no idea to this very day. It would have become a second invasion of Genghis Khan. We have to thank the German soldier and his unsurpassed bravery, and the bravery of all those who marched with us, for averting this peril. For the first time something like a European awakening has stirred the continent."

After paying tribute to Germany's allies, he continued:

"The immensity of this struggle is illustrated by the following figures. The number of Russian prisoners has now reached about 2½ millions. The number of guns captured or destroyed, but in our hands, already amounts to about 22,000. The number of tanks destroyed or captured, hence in our hands, now amounts to 18,000. The number of airplanes destroyed, demolished, and shot down is over 14,500. And the territory occupied is twice as large as Germany was when I assumed leadership in 1933, or four times the size of England..."

Our soldiers have been marching over the roads of this 'paradise.' The whole 'paradise' is one huge armament factory, at the cost of the standard of living of these people. An armament factory against Europe. Against this cruel, bestial foe with these huge armaments, our soldiers have won such victories.

I know that words cannot suffice to praise them. Their courage and bravery, their spirit in overcoming grueling hardships, are beyond description. The greatest feats, however, have been accomplished by the German infantryman, the German musketeer. Some of our divisions have covered distances of 2,500 to 3,000 kilometers on foot. If one can talk of 'blitzkrieg,' or 'lightning war,' their achievement can well be called 'lightning-like.'

There are only a few historic 'blitz-retreats' which have surpassed their actions in rapidity. However, in those cases the distances were not as great because the forces, from the very beginning, kept to the coast. Far be it from me to abuse the adversary; I only wish to see that the German soldier receives the credit he has deserved. His achievements are supreme.

Activities behind the front are equally impressive. More than 25,000 kilometers of Russian railways are again in operation. More than 15,000 kilometers of track have been changed to the German gauge. And behind this front a new administration is already being organized, which will see to it that those enormous territories will be put to use for the benefit of the German homeland and our allies, should this war be prolonged. Their usefulness will be tremendous, and no one should doubt our ability to organize them.

I know that there is no adversary left whom we could not subdue with the masses of available munitions. If, now and then, you should read in the papers about the vast plans of other states, and of all the things they intend and are beginning to do, and if you hear of sums mentioned in billions, remember what I now say.

First, we too have put to work a whole continent to aid us in this struggle. Secondly, we do not speak of capital, but of our capacity of labor, and we are putting one hundred percent of this capacity of labor to this use. And thirdly, just because we do not talk about it, it does not mean that we are idle.

When this war is ended, it will have been won by the German soldiers, whose masses really represent the masses of our people. And it will have been won by the German home front with its millions of workers.

Up till now people had known only two extremes of social order. On the one hand there are the capitalist states which by hook or by crook deny their people the most vital natural rights. They are only concerned for the financial interests of a small privileged minority. To these interests they would sacrifice millions of human beings. On the other hand we see the communist extreme with a state that has inflicted untold misery upon millions. In the pursuit of insane doctrines it casts aside any consideration for the happiness and welfare of its people.

This in my mind imposes but one obligation on us: to strive more than ever for the realization of our National-Socialist ideals. When this war is over I shall return from it a much more fanatical National-Socialist than I was before. I shall return from this struggle with my old party program whose materialization..."
is and seems to be more essential now than on the day of its conception."

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Great Britain and the United States have made great efforts to bring into their camp nations which are either still neutral or fighting on the side of Germany. On September 28, the Finnish Government was handed a British note. Britain, the note declared, would have to regard Finland as a member of the Axis as long as she was fighting with Germany an aggressive war against Russia, England's ally. If the Finns continued their advance on Soviet territory, Great Britain would be forced to consider Finland as an enemy not only during the war but also during the post-war peace conference. In her answer Finland on October 7, declared that the Soviet Union on November 30, 1939, had started an unprovoked attack against Finland. As a result of this the Council of the League of Nations, including Great Britain, on December 16, had declared the Soviet Union an aggressor and excluded her from the League. But Finland had had to fight alone and was forced to conclude a compulsory peace. On June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union resumed hostilities against Finland.

"After Finland had established that she was again the object of armed aggression, she resorted, but not until the beginning of July, to active defense measures. The battle of Finland was and is defensive....

Important regions of Finnish territory are still in the hands of the aggressor and must be occupied in order to prevent a further offensive by the Russians.

Furthermore, some regions beyond the former Finnish border are not Russian but rather belong to Finland since Soviet statistics themselves show that Finns represented from 93 to 99 per cent. of the population. Soviet Russia herself in 1920 granted these regions the right of self-determination.

Finland is waging her defensive war without any political undertakings, but is grateful not to have to fight alone this time.

Finland cannot understand how Britain, with whom she desires to maintain peaceful relations, takes upon herself the right and even considers herself compelled to treat Finland as an enemy state, and that solely because Finland is no longer alone in her fight against Soviet Russia." (U.P., Shanghai Evening Post, October 8, and Havas Telemendial, North China Daily News, October 9.)

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The diplomatic fight for Turkey's stand has been equally bitter. The newspapers were full of rumors about her relations with Germany. On October 9, the official "Turkish News Agency" published the following statement:

"During recent weeks, press and wireless reports emanating from foreign sources have on repeated occasions and in different ways, attempted to create the impression that Germany was formulating demands, exercising pressure and massing troops in Bulgaria and was on the point of attacking Turkey.

While at no time having attached the slightest importance to these tendentious rumors, the Turkish and German Governments have nevertheless agreed to state that these reports—devoid of all foundation—cannot in any way disturb the relations of confident friendship which the two countries confirmed by their agreement of June 18." (Reuter, Shanghai Evening Post, October 9.)

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For the position of the United States the "Atlantic meeting" between Roosevelt and Churchill was the most important event.

The people of America would like to know the actual decisions arrived at by the two Anglo-Saxon leaders and we would like to publish them, but only future historians will be in a position to do this. We have to confine ourselves to the official statement on their conversations broadcast by the British Deputy Prime Minister, Lord Privy Seal C. R. Attlee, on August 14:

"The President of the United States and the Prime Minister Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, have met at sea. They have been accompanied by officials of their two governments, including high-ranking officers of their military, naval and air services.

The whole problem of supply of munitions of war, as provided by the Lease-Lend Act for the armed forces of the United States and for those countries actively engaged in resisting aggression, has been further examined.

Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister of Supply of the British Government, has joined in these conferences. He is going to proceed to Washington to discuss further details with appropriate officials of the United States. These conferences will also cover the supply problem of the Soviet Union.

The Prime Minister and the President have had several conferences. They have considered the dangers to world civilization arising from the policy of military domination by conquest upon which the Hitlerite Government of Germany and other governments as-
sociated with it have embarked, and have made clear the steps which their countries are respectively taking for their safety in facing these dangers.

They have agreed upon the following joint declaration:

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries, on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

1. Their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other.

2. They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

3. They respect the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

4. They will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

5. They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration of all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advance­ment and social security.

6. After the final destruction of Nazi tyranny they hope to see established a peace which will afford all nations a means of dwelling in safety within their own bounda­ries and which will afford an assurance that all men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

7. Such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.

8. They believe that all nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten or may threaten aggression outside of their frontiers they believe, pending establish­ment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armament." (Reuter, North China Daily News, August 15.)

Innumerable clippings with interpretations of the Eight Points could easily be collected. One fact, however, has been rather over­looked: the Eight Points show that any hope to win German support, to bring about the downfall of Hitler-Germany from within, has apparently been abandoned. Wilson's Four­teen Points had a very strong appeal to the Germans of 1918 and contributed their share to the disintegration of the German morale. The Eight Points, however, cannot count on finding any sympathy within Germany. The reaction of the average German who read the Eight Points was:

They do not seek any aggrandizement (Point 1)? Of course not, because they have already more than they can handle. Self­determination (Point 2)? Everyone still remembers how in 1919 this slogan was used only against Germany, as in the case of Austria, Upper Silesia, and the Sudeten-Ger­mans, but never against the Allies, as, for instance, in Egypt, Arabia, India, or Indo­China. Who would trust the sincerity of this slogan a second time? Restoration of the old government (Point 3)? Why? The Weimar Republic disappeared because the great majority of Germans had turned their back on it. Access to raw materials (Point 4)? In the first place the very wording of this point limits its effectiveness by speaking of "existing obligations," meaning no doubt the preferential tariffs of the British Empire and other existing tariff walls. Secondly, if one nation owns raw materials and the other does not, how can there be "equal terms"? The post-war period has seen a never-ending succession of refusals on the part of the "haves" to share their riches with the "have­nots." A nation without raw materials must pay for them in pounds or dollars. It can obtain these only through exports. But how can it export in sufficient quantities if the "haves" close their gates by high tariffs?

"They desire"? "They hope"? (Points 5 and 6.) These are generalizations, and what guarantee is there that the American people will feel bound by such desires and hopes any more than they did in 1919? Besides, in the years 1919 to 1933, before the advent of Hitler, there had been in a world shaped by the Allies neither "collaboration of all na­tions in the economic field" nor "freedom from fear and want."

Freedom of the seas (Point 7)? Under the Pax Anglo-Saxonica there will be as much freedom of the seas for the Germans as there had been under the Pax Romana for the
vanquished Gauls or Greeks. As long as the Anglo-Saxon powers have their fleets and their bases all over the world, and the ability to impose blockades at will, freedom of the seas will only exist for them or for those who play their game.

And the last Point, disarmament of "nations which threaten or may threaten aggression"? This of course is meant to refer to Germany, Italy, and Japan. Germany has once before had the bitter experience of being a disarmed nation among armed neighbors and will never go through it again if she can help it. This time even the empty promise of disarmament by the victor nations given in Versailles has been left out. And even more serious: no word is said about the Soviet Union. All Europe would like to know how Roosevelt and Churchill envisage the role of Stalin after the war.

A Swedish newspaper has compared the Atlantic conference to an iceberg of which only one eighth is visible, this being the official declaration with the Eight Points, while the bulk is hidden below the surface. We might add that even of this visible eighth the Germans see only the eighth part, that is the last Point, their disarmament. It is the one concrete and unobscured Point of the entire program and is in itself enough for the German people to reject the whole plan. What its effect on the other nations will be remains to be seen. We do not believe that future historians will compare the Eight to the Fourteen Points in historical importance.

* * *

The next step in the road of President Roosevelt towards a "shooting war" was his "shoot first order" to the US navy which he explained in a message to the nation of September 12:

"No matter what it takes or costs, we will keep open the line of commerce in these defense waters. No act of violence or intimidation will keep us from maintaining intact the two bulwarks of defense: first, our line of supply of materials to the enemies of Hitler; the second, freedom of our shipping on the high seas....

Upon our naval and air patrol — now operating in large numbers over the vast expanse of the Atlantic ocean — falls the duty of maintaining the American policy of freedom of the seas — now.

That means very simply and clearly that our patrolling vessels will protect all merchant ships — not only American ships but ships of any flag — engaged in commerce in our defensive waters. They will protect them from submarines and they will protect them from surface raiders....

American war ships and planes will no longer wait until Axis submarines lurking under the water or Axis surface raiders, strike their deadly blow — first....

The danger here now is not only from a military enemy but from an enemy of all law, liberty, morality and religion. There has now come the time you and I must see the cold, inexorable necessity of saying to these inhuman, unrestrained seekers of world conquest and permanent world domination by the sword — you seek to throw our children and our children's children into your form of terrorism and slavery. You have now attacked our own safety. You shall go no further.'

We have sought no shooting war with Herr Hitler. We do not seek it now, but neither do we want peace so much we are willing to pay for it by permitting him to attack our naval and merchant ships while on legitimate business.... We cannot bring about the downfall of Nazism by the use of long-range invective.

But when you see a rattlesnake poised to strike you do not wait until struck before you crush him.

Nazi submarines and raiders are rattlesnakes in the Atlantic. They menace the free pathways of the high seas. Challenge our sovereignty and hammer at our most precious rights when they attack ships of the American flag — symbols of our independence, our freedom, our very life....

It is no act of war on our part when we decide to protect the seas vital to American defense. Aggression is not ours. Ours is solely defense. But let this warning be clear. From now on if German and Italian vessels of war enter waters, protection of which is necessary to American defense, they do so at their own peril." (U.P., Shanghai Evening Post, September 12.)
THE BOLSHEVIKS' CHANCES IN SIBERIA
By KLAUS MEHNERT

At the moment of this writing the Soviet armies are still holding the line Lake Onega-Moscow-Lower Don. Yet the possibility of their losing their European strongholds and with them the vast and scarcely fortified spaces to the Ural is sufficient to warrant the question: what next?

There is no doubt in our mind that the Bolsheviks would want to continue the war even after the loss of European Russia, for they know that Bolshevism is doomed once they accept defeat. The question is: can they continue the war?

The following pages are not an answer to this question but only material for an answer. In view of the extraordinary secrecy of the Soviets, the difficulties in making this study were considerable. Shanghai is perhaps the best place to undertake such an investigation. News through many channels gathers in this city, and we believe that the information contained in this article and in the various maps is as complete and up-to-date as it is possible to obtain at present.

The area under investigation is the whole of Asiatic Russia, including the Ural but excluding the Central Asiatic Republics of the Turkemens, Karakalpaks, Usbecks, Tadjiks, and Kirghiz. Kazakhstan has been included because its northeastern portion is part of Siberia, although its southern and western parts are not.

A NIGHT AT THE MAGNET MOUNTAIN

Never in the course of some 20,000 miles of travel in the Soviet Union had I felt so strongly the essence of modern Siberia as I did during that first night at the Magnet Mountain. This is how it happened.

On a journey through the southern Ural I had succeeded after much effort in obtaining a Russian Ford from the city soviet of Beloretsk, a mining town in the heart of the Ural. I needed the car to continue my trip to the eastern slopes of the Ural.

It was beginning to get dark as the car climbed over the last pass of the Ural. In front of us there lay only bare, gently rising hills. The muddy road, soft and slippery from the rains of the last few days, followed the course of a river which we crossed at a ford, there being no bridges anywhere near.

Now and again we met natives in fantastic fur caps, on horseback or riding in small carts. At the sight of our car the animals became panic-stricken and reared wildly. The villages were a spectacle of infinite poverty—tiny, ramshackle huts blown askew by the wind, slant-eyed peasants in ragged clothes, lean cows.

Soon the hills lay behind us too. Before us the treeless steppe stretched away in the barren brown of autumn. Only in the distance, directly toward the east, one long, high mountain broke the horizon: Gora Magnitnaya — the Magnet Mountain. This was our goal.

The first stars were twinkling, and when I looked closely at the mountain I could see little lights flickering there too, and, growing ever more distinct, a blood-red glow over the plain. Once more into a hollow, then up over the last rise, and a strange picture lay before my eyes.
In the broad valley of the Ural river in which a few years ago there was nothing but a barren, lonely steppe, there lay between our rise and the mountain of ore, brightly illuminated for the work of the night shift, the sea of lights of a large city—Magnitogorsk. Tens of thousands of lamps like a shining white belt surrounded the gigantic works lying in the center of the city. The Kombinat, enveloped in flames and smoke, resembled a volcano in eruption.

At the left the huge blast furnaces, among the largest in the world, glowed dusky-red; to the right of them the yellow flames of the coke works leapt up into the night; next to them shone the Martin furnaces; further on the vast buildings of the rolling mill were spread out. Everything was veiled in a murky smoke that hung over the city like a heavy cloud, tinted the color of blood from below as by a huge conflagration.

BARRACKS AND RED CORNERS

The overwhelming majority of the 100,000 workers and employees (there may be more, no one seems to know exactly) live in barracks. There was no hotel and after some difficulty I too was allotted a camp bed. I stumbled through the unlighted alleys, my high boots sinking up to the ankle in the sticky mud. I had to look out—here was a huge garbage heap, there deep trenches were cut in the ground over which one had to balance on a piece of iron rail (wood would have been stolen and burnt long ago in this treeless district), and large drainpipes lay beside them. Suddenly there was a fence, a little kitchen garden guarded by an old man in a fur coat with a rifle on his shoulder. Sometimes there was a revolting stench, which meant that there was a dimly lit public latrine in the vicinity.

I entered some of the barracks at random. They consisted of large dormitories with twenty or more bunks along the walls and a table with a few chairs in the middle, the whole lit by one or two bulbs. Snores came from some of the beds—those were probably men of the day shift. Now they were sleeping, exhausted and covered by their sheepskin coats. Others were at work on the night shift (the work is done in three shifts), some were reading. One man squatted on his bed playing an old Russian folk song on the accordion. Next door there was a room hung with political posters and portraits of the Bolshevik leaders, the “Red Corner.” Little groups of men were sitting there taking part in some course or other. Some of them were listening to a lecture on Fascism, others to one on metallurgical questions, others again were learning to read and write.

I sat down on a bed here and there and asked the men about their lives. Almost all of them—about four-fifths of the entire number of workers—had come from their villages only a few months before, at most three or four years, having been “mobilized” by professional recruiters. At that time they had never seen a machine, now they were to run one of the most modern plants in the world. Many were simply exiled to Magnitogorsk. By a huge system of courses, schools, and lectures the management was trying to turn them into useful workers. Those who were alert, industrious, healthy, and ready to take part in the Bolshevik activities could become foremen within two years and get on very quickly. The lack of qualified labor in this country of new construction could become foremen within two years and get on very quickly. The lack of qualified labor in this country of new construction led to uncommonly swift careers. The number of new arrivals was tremendous and grew from week to week. The country louts of the day before yesterday were yesterday unqualified workmen; today they have been promoted to construction workers; and, while they are still erecting the building, the best among them are already being trained in courses for running the finished plant as “qualified” workers tomorrow.

A HARD LIFE

Living conditions were bad; the lack of nourishing food, of warm, durable clothes and shoes—that year the first snow had fallen in September—were the source of constant complaint. It
was especially difficult for men with families. There were still barracks in which ten to fifteen families were living in the same room with their children and all their belongings. Many preferred to build themselves mud huts beyond the city and to live there like the cave dwellers of prehistoric times. Later on I had a look at a number of these pitiful Semlyanki. The majority of the families, however, already had single rooms in the barracks and regarded this as a vast improvement. At my question whether they would not rather go back to their collectivized villages they laughed: "No, we are better off here." The people demand so little that a bit more space, food, and clothing would satisfy them.

I went on. In one brightly lit barracks the door opened with a loud crash, a man came hurtling out and remained lying on the ground. In the light from the doorway I saw that his face and hands were bleeding. Two men came out and carried him away. The sign on the door indicated that I was at one of the metal workers' clubs. I entered, and was confronted by a wild uproar and swinging fists. I asked one of the fellows, who wore the badge of a prize-winning Udarnik (shock-worker) on his lapel, what was up. "Drunken dogs," he said, "all men who have just arrived."

We wandered together through the club rooms. In one hall movies were being shown, in another Russian dances danced to the accordion. In one corner a group was playing chess. "Come along," said the boy, "in a club near here it is Udarnik evening, first a talk and discussion, then a play." I agreed, and we stumbled along the dark streets.

UDARNIK MEETING

In the hall we came to there were about 150 Udarniks of one factory department. An engineer and a foreman had reported on how the work could be further improved. The discussion was on and many of the workers were ready to speak. Everything they said was sharp criticism, above all criticism of the absolutely insufficient qualification of the majority of workers and of the poor organization of the work. Non-delivery of missing parts; rapid wear of the material through wrong treatment; lack of interest and unpunctuality on the part of the workers; frequent changes in personnel and management; the excessive number of accidents; much waste of time—one engineer was of the opinion that on the average only two and a half to three of the seven hours of the working day were really utilized; these were some of the items on the long list of complaints.

THE "SPETSY"

AND THEIR WIVES

I left the hall and moved on. In front of me I heard two Americans; where the alley ran into the street they said good-bye to each other. One of them went on, and we got into a conversation. He was a spets, a technical specialist. He asked me to come to his place for a glass of tea, and I gladly accepted. He did not live in the barracks but in the so-called "Socialist City," which consists of large, three-storied blocks. Originally the intention had been to build there an entirely new collective type of city, but by now the goal had become more modest. Houses were being built simply with a lot of single rooms, one room for each family, a type of apartment house long in existence in capitalist countries.

In a long line we waited for the bus for Sots-Gorodok (the "Socialist City"). In Magnitogorsk with its large number of inhabitants there was only a single bus line with less than a dozen vehicles. Every bus arrived overcrowded and cut off at most two or three men from the head of our queue. The third bus we waited for stopped altogether: there was no more gasoline. The woman conductor told us that the other busses would have to suspend service for the same reason. No gasoline could be expected in Magnitogorsk before the next forenoon. So we had to walk, forty minutes. Others had further to go.

My American friend was a quiet man. He told me about his experiences during
the three years he had been with the plant. Many things in his work were pretty awful, and he had often been tempted to lose his temper over the ignorance and lack of organization of the Russian workmen. The Russians would probably learn one day, but it would take a long time. He had not abandoned hope altogether. His “better half” did not share his opinions. She did not mince matters: bad living conditions, filth and neglect in the houses, rain coming through the ceiling, and a thousand other things. Nor could she offer me any tea. There had not been any kerosene for the Primus stove for weeks, and the wood-burning stove in the only kitchen of the dwelling-block with its eighty families was so full of pots and pans that a number of women were still standing in line with saucepans in their hands, waiting for their turn.

RETURN AT DAWN

It was nearing dawn when I started home. The glare from the works showed me my way. There was a cutting north wind, and the puddles underfoot were frozen. The night was filled with noise. Constant thundering, howling, and hissing resounded from the works, interrupted by the loud detonations of blastings on the mountainside.

Walking in front of me was a group of men going to work, some of them in bast shoes. A barefooted woman ran across the street with a child. In some of the barracks there was still light. From one of them a drunken song poured forth, from another a marching tune of the Red army.

The light was still burning in my room too. Most of the men were already asleep, while one was still sitting up. With some string and newspapers he had made a sort of tent around his table so that the light would not disturb the others. “What, are you still up?” I asked. “I have to work out a speech for the literary circle of the construction workers’ club,” he answered. I glanced over his shoulder.

There were several volumes of Schiller on the table.

I lay down in my bunk, wrapped myself in my blanket, and slept, bitten by a few bedbugs and a lot of fleas.

THE LESSONS OF MAGNITOGORSK

This, then, was Magnitogorsk, a place that had become almost proverbial in the Soviet Union and that was used by the Bolsheviks when they wanted to express something tremendous. In literary magazines, for example, Russian authors were called upon to create “a Magnitogorsk of literature,” and people were heard to say, “I feel like Magnitogorsk.” And this Magnitogorsk with its strange mixture of shocking human misery and gigantic industrial construction is characteristic of the development of Siberia during the last few years. Coal, ore, and human happiness are all thrown into the insatiable blast furnaces, and the whip of the Five Year Plans drives the people on to ever renewed efforts. At the beginning of the revolution the word “soul” was struck from the Soviet vocabulary. While in old Russia the inhabitants of a village or a town were entered as so-and-so many “souls” (dushy), they are now counted, following the materialistic way of thinking, as so many “eaters” (yedaki). In view of the prevailing food shortage, this sounds often enough like irony. No matter by what term the people are counted, however, they are all just parts of a machine and a means for the purpose of turning the Soviet Union and especially Siberia into an arsenal for the World Revolution.

Magnitogorsk is characteristic of Siberian economic development also in another way. If one looks at this development more closely, one sees that it is far more complicated and problematical than it appeared at the first glance. One’s first impression of the Magnet Mountain is of its riches. But when one begins to investigate the details of Magnitogorsk’s iron production, one finds a number of considerable difficulties. Magnitogorsk and the whole of the Ural are as poor
in coal as they are rich in ores. To work the ores of the Ural, coal must be brought from the Kuzbass (Kuznetsk Basin) 1,240 miles away, or from Karaganda, only a few hundred miles nearer. This fact forms the base for the idea of the UKK (Ural Kuznetsk Combine), according to which the ores of the Ural are to be carried east to the Kuzbass and the coal of the Kuzbass and Karaganda west to the Ural. Thus an industrial district is being created whose two poles lie over 1,000 miles apart, connected only by a single railway. Since this railway is at the same time Siberia’s only through railroad, it has a vast number of other freights to carry.

**HASTE MAKES WASTE**

Karaganda was supposed to relieve the situation. The new Karaganda railway, on which I have traveled, had been built in such haste—in parts the rails had simply been laid on the steppe without a roadbed—that the train could only move slowly and the line had often to be repaired. Every repair creates a new bottle-neck, and the hungry blast furnaces of Magnitogorsk have to wait for coal. Every time the stream of coal from Karaganda or the Kuzbass slackens for some reason or other, coal must be brought from the Donets Basin 1,000 miles away (now in German hands).

*Haste makes waste* can be nowhere applied more often than with regard to the economic development of Siberia in the last few years, or, to use an old Russian proverb:

"*Pospeshil, pospeshil, i lyudei nasmeshil.*"

(He hurried and hurried and made himself ridiculous.)

**FORTY MILLION PEOPLE**

In the last analysis it is, even in this technical age, still men who carry on a war. In attempting to answer the question of the number and kind of people available for a continuation of the war from Siberia we immediately come up against the greatest of all difficulties in studying questions regarding the Soviet Union: the scarcity and unreliability of Soviet statistical material. We cannot explain here in every instance how we have obtained or calculated the figures used without doubling the length of this article. In many cases they are the result of efforts not unlike those of a detective. We have striven to base our calculations on Soviet statistics. For, however unreliable the individual statements published by the Soviets usually are, a relatively accurate picture may still be obtained through careful and lengthy observation of the Soviet press and literature and through comparison of knowledge thus gained with information from other sources.

One factor which renders the study of the population development of Siberia especially difficult is the constant change in the administrative division of the USSR. Her domestic borders have been altered so often during the last centuries that they are different on almost every map. In the assumption that the existing administrative division of Siberia will be maintained...
during the next few months, in which the Siberian problem promises to become acute, we shall take this as a basis for our investigations. On Map II the reader will find a sketch of the present division. For the sake of clearness we have only indicated the larger administrative units, the population figures of which can be found in Appendix I.

For the population movement of Siberia during the last century and a half we have the following table. In considering it one must bear in mind that the term “Siberia” has not always had the same meaning.

Population of Siberia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Russians and Other Non-Natives</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>In Concentration Camps</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>576,000</td>
<td>863,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>939,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>2,288,000</td>
<td>648,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,936,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>4,800,000</td>
<td>871,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,761,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>8,383,000</td>
<td>973,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,356,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>c. 28,521,035</td>
<td>c. 7,000,000</td>
<td>c. 5,000,000</td>
<td>c. 38,521,035</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The figures for 1939 include the Ural and Kazakhstan.)

MILLIONS ON THE MOVE

Since the outbreak of the war, many inhabitants, transplanted either voluntarily or by force from European Russia, must be added to this figure. The Soviet press has mentioned the moving of whole industries to the other side of the Ural, and reports of travelers confirm that the eastern part of European Russia and large parts of Siberia are overrun by an enormous number of people moving eastward by rail, horse, or on foot, in the midst of indescribable suffering and sacrifice. As Siberia, especially in the winter months, is totally unprepared for such a sudden influx of people, many will have to pay for this migration with their lives.

From the Siberian city of Tomsk, for example, it has been reported that on August 20 of this year the authorities ordered all those whose presence in Tomsk was not absolutely necessary to leave the city by September 1 and to betake themselves further east.

This order affected 40,000 people who were thus driven out of Tomsk within a few days’ time and without any available means of transportation. They were not allowed to take their furniture, and, before they had even left their homes, their successors, evacuated from European Russia, moved in. As far as can be seen, the majority of the people streaming from European Russia into Siberia consists of members of the Soviet bureaucracy as well as women and children, since all able-bodied men are being kept back in European Russia for the time being.

During my years in the Soviet Union I have found again and again that the Russians manage to keep alive even under the most difficult conditions—in Arctic concentration camps, in frost or sandstorms, in half-finished barracks or hastily dug holes in the ground. Hence one may assume that also in the present eastern migration, in spite of its unorganized and desperate character, large numbers will survive the hardships, and that the population of Siberia will increase by next spring to a total, to give an approximate figure, of 40 millions.

EARLY SETTLERS

The structure of the Siberian population can be traced to the history of the colonization of this immense area. It began with the invasion of the conquering, fur-hunting Cossacks at the end of the sixteenth century and was at first very slow. Not until the former serfs of European Russia had been permitted to emigrate to Siberia in 1881, and especially after the Siberian railway had been opened in 1892, did the figures of the annual migrants start to climb rapidly. Within the first five years after the opening of the railway, 600,000 colonists passed through the border town of Tchelyabinsk in the Ural. Siberia became the main goal of Russian domestic migration. To the right and left of the railway, which passes through the only strip of agriculturally useful land on its way to the east, new settlements spread in an ever finer net.
SIBERIA
NET OF COMMUNICATIONS
Distribution of the Slavic population in Siberia.
It follows the agricultural belt and river valleys

The black areas are inhabited by Slavs

MAP IV

FORESTS AND AGRICULTURAL DISTRICTS IN USSR.

MAP V
It was only in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East that the results were at first disappointing, for here the building of the railway, which was to form the backbone for the colonization of these areas, proved to be of greater attraction for the Chinese and Koreans than for the Russians. Only after the defeat in the war against Japan in 1904-05 had shown the Russian Government how dangerous it was to have a wholly underpopulated frontier, was the colonization of Eastern Siberia taken up systematically. Nevertheless the main stream of emigrants continued to be directed towards Western Siberia, climatically and agriculturally more suited to the Russians. In the years 1896-1909, in spite of all efforts on the part of the Government, only 8% of the total of 3,600,000 migrants reached the territories east of Lake Baikal.

During the years of the Great War the movement of migrants towards Asia more or less ceased. After the end of the civil war, however, and partly as a result of the famines in European Russia, it was resumed in the twenties. Meanwhile the influx of Chinese and Koreans to the Russian Far East had also increased considerably, and their proportion in the total population of this area rose from 17% (1917) to 25% (1923). In the thirties the migration was given a tremendous impulse by the industrialization of Siberia and by the banishment of millions of victims of the "de-kulakization" and the various political purges.

One characteristic of the population problem that Siberia has in common with several other colonial areas, as for example Canada, is the very uneven distribution of its population, which is crowded together in relatively small areas while by far the greater part is hardly inhabited at all. Map III shows the situation in the thirties, which has undergone no essential changes.

**CAN BOLSHEVISM RELY UPON THEM?**

A second characteristic of the Siberian population is its racial diversity. By far the greater part of Russian Asia (left white on Map IV) is inhabited by some dozens of non-Slavic nationalities, together amounting to about 7 millions. The Russian population of Siberia (shown black on Map IV) is again divided into Great-Russians, Ukrainians, and White Russians, among whom the Ukrainians in particular consider themselves a separate group.

One can assume that the percentage of opponents to the Soviet regime is higher in the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union than in the European. The old Siberians (Sibiryaks) have a stronger anti-Bolshevist tradition than the inhabitants of European Russia, as is shown in detail in the next article. Among the people spending their time in the concentration camps of Siberia one can hardly expect much sympathy for Bolshevism. The majority of the camps of the Soviet Union (about forty-five in all) is in Siberia, and the number of prisoners contained in them is estimated at 5 millions. A map of Siberia showing the location of the concentration camps coincides more or less with the Siberian areas of new construction, since the prisoners are all used as cheap labor for the development of Siberia. Whether it be Karaganda or the Kuzbass, the Balkhash or the new East Siberian Railway (BAM), the opening up of arctic regions or the Pacific coast, everywhere these unfortunate people are to be found, forming an essential part of the economic system of Siberia.

The employment of the non-Slavic peoples, even assuming their willingness, is very doubtful owing to their technical and cultural backwardness and their living in inaccessible and relatively unexplored regions.

**FOOD IN SIBERIA**

At first sight the providing of a population of only 40 millions with food in the vast area of Siberia would seem to be no problem. Actually, however, only a small part of Siberia is suited for agricultural activity. Our Map V shows Siberia from the viewpoint of agricultural utility. According
to latest Soviet figures less than 20% of the total agricultural land of the Soviet Union is in Siberia. This land is to be found mainly in western and southwestern Siberia and is inferior in quality and yield to the soils of European Russia. In the last few years agronomic science has succeeded in expanding the regions for cultivation by breeding species of grain which are cold-resisting and otherwise adapted to Siberian conditions. New crops have been introduced or developed, as for instance sugar beets.

During the last few years the Bolsheviks have often emphasized their success in developing agricultural possibilities on soil formerly considered to be unsuitable. Through the application of modern methods they have indeed succeeded in introducing agriculture, especially vegetable gardening, far up in the north, which fully utilizes the short but intensive arctic summer. I was fed homegrown tomatoes north of the polar circle. Of course the Siberian north will not produce large quantities of food within the near future, but the new production facilitates the feeding of the sparse and inaccessible population of the Far North.

Soviet statistics of agricultural production being one of the most contested and unreliable products of the Soviet Union, we shall refrain from giving new figures. (In 1913 Siberia produced 245 million poods [one pood = 16.3 kilograms] of grain, 118 of oats, 63 of potatoes and 5 of butter.) There seems to be no question that potentially Siberia is in a position to feed the Siberian population, but actually this will only be possible with great difficulties. The destruction of horses during the years of collectivization has yet to be made up. In the territory of the present Soviet Union there were in 1916 35.8 million horses, in 1938 only 17.5 million. Assuming that the ratio of destruction was equal all over the USSR, Siberia, which had 6 million horses before the revolution, would now have only about 3 million. Tractors must take their place, and supplying these with gasoline will become increasingly difficult as the war goes on. Local famines due to the sudden influx of people or to the insufficient performance of the transportation system may be unavoidable. But the continuation of the war from Siberia will hardly be frustrated by the question of food, particularly in view of the recklessness with which the Bolshevist Government sacrifices the lives of people not essential to military purposes.

We have no reliable figures on the cattle stocks of Siberia. Reindeer play an important part in the feeding of the population of the Far North and are estimated at 1.5 million head. The fishing catch of the Pacific Coast represents 25-30% of the entire catch of the Soviet Union. Canneries of various food products have recently been established, mainly in the Far East, Western Siberia, and Kazakhstan.

THE TRUTH OF AN OLD JOKE

According to an old anti-Bolshevik joke a foreign capitalist once came to the Soviet Union to see whether he could do some business there. He was shown through the factories, and in the end he had to listen to a flaming speech about the wealth of the country. "Under the ground," exclaimed his guide, "we have enormous deposits of all kinds of resources, and, standing firmly on the ground, millions of ardent Bolsheviks."

The capitalist shook his head sadly and replied: "I tell you what: as soon as it is the other way round, you let me know. Then we might be able to do some business."

The guide's statement cannot be disputed. The Soviet Union, especially her Asiatic part, possesses vast mineral resources and has, taking the long view, tremendous possibilities for economic development. Every book on Siberia and especially every Soviet publication emphasizes this side of the problem. But the object of this article, dealing with the chances of the Bolsheviks to continue the war from Siberia, is to determine what is available or "on the ground" today and
during the next few months, not what in future times will be brought up from “under the ground.”

The two legs upon which stands the Siberian industrial development are the ore deposits of the Ural and the coal deposits of the Kuznetsk basin. Under the name of UKK they form the heavy industrial base of Siberia and, in the eyes of the Bolsheviks, of the entire Soviet Union.

At the beginning of November 1941 the organ of the Red army Krassnaya Zvezda declared that Siberia was ready from the industrial point of view to continue the war against Germany. “Miracles can and will be achieved in Siberia,” the article said, and added that the most important armament factories were situated in the Ural, that the no longer available production of the German-occupied areas could be replaced in Siberia, and that the machinery of numerous factories had already been transported from European Russia to the east and had again been put into operation.

Such statements must be taken with a large grain of salt. Whoever has witnessed under what tremendous difficulties and with what waste the industrial development of the Soviet Union took place even in normal times will be skeptical of the boasts of the Soviet press. Let us rather consider in detail what is known about the present industrial position of Siberia.

**BASIC INDUSTRIES**

(1) **Iron:** the most important plants are in Magnitogorsk, Nijni Taghil (producing since June 1940), Verkhisetsk (near Sverdlovsk), Tcheremkhovo (near Irkutsk), Stalinsk (Kuzbass), and Komsomolsk (Lower Amur).

The following figures give an approximate idea of the development of the pig iron industry of Russia, and reveal that its center of gravity is still in European Russia, although the Ural-Siberian share of the total production has risen from 21.4% to 32.3%. The table also shows that the production of Siberia is negligible if the Ural is not included.

### Pig Iron Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1918</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Siberia Proper</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ural</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These are Soviet figures and to be treated with caution. Very likely the percentage of Siberia and the Ural is exaggerated, and, even if it is correct, the quality of the industrial output in Siberia is generally below that of European Russia. As we have shown with the example of Magnitogorsk, the laborers of the new Siberian plants are a motley band, most of them without any technical experience, knowledge, or tradition—things which cannot be acquired overnight.

(2) **Coal:** beside the two most important coal districts, Kuzbass and Karaganda, coal is mined for local consumption in the territory of the Bureya (a tributary of the Amur), in Sutchan (near Vladivostok), on Sakhalin, and in smaller quantities also in other places.

The following table shows that the eastward shift of coal production is greater than that of the iron production. Most of the coal comes from Siberia proper.

### Coal Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ural and</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siberia Proper</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>67.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Russia</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>126.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) **Oil:** during the last few years oil has been one of the chief sources of worry to the Soviet Union. This is especially true of Siberia. The most important oil fields which the USSR possesses would be of no use to the Bolsheviks in the case of a retreat beyond the Ural—neither the fields of Baku, producing 75% of all Soviet oil, nor those of Grozny (northern Caucasus, 10% of total production), nor those of Emba (northern shore of the Caspian Sea) and the remaining small oil fields scattered over European Russia. Hence the Soviet Government has for years
expended much effort toward the expansion of the so-called “Second Baku,” in the area between the middle Volga and the Ural. But the development of the “Second Baku” was a disappointment. After promising beginnings, especially in the oil fields of Ishembayevo south of Ufa in the Ural, proved to have a very large salt and sulphur content. Here, as in Magnitogorsk, the excessive haste in the carrying out of surveys led to the refineries, built on the basis of the first results, being no longer suitable.

The pipe line which pumps the oil from Emba to the refineries of Orsk would, in the event of European Russia being lost, be too exposed to be of much value. Oil production in Ust-Yennisseisk and Voyampolka (Kamchatka) is in the most elementary stages, and that of the Soviet oil fields of Sakhalin (1938: 360,000 tons) cannot be counted on with complete certainty in view of the tension in the Far East. Thus Siberia at present produces about 2 million tons, which is only a fraction of the oil it needs for the normal requirements of its agriculture and industry, not to mention carrying on the war.

(4) **Other Metals**: here the picture is much more favorable, as the Ural and Siberia possess large resources of the different metals. Copper is mined at Lake Balkhash (Kazakhstan) and in Revda (near Sverdlovsk); zinc in Tchelyabinsk and Berlovsk (Kuzbass); nickel in Orsk (30% of the Soviet production); lead in Ridder (Altai); tin in Tchita; and gold in various parts of Siberia, above all in the Aldan area (Yakutia) which provides 25% of the total Soviet production.

**ARMAMENT INDUSTRIES**

Apart from factories in the Ural started in Tsarist days and further developed by the Bolsheviks, nothing is known about a native armament industry in Siberia. In various places however, e.g. in Orenburg (the Tchkalov of today) and in Komsomolsk on the lower Amur, there are assembly plants for airplanes and other armaments.

While in the sphere of heavy industries Siberia is not only potentially but actually quite highly developed, in the sphere of other industries it lags far behind. Of the large tractor factories, built on the basis of the first results, being no longer suitable. The pipe line which pumps the oil from Emba to the refineries of Orsk would, in the event of European Russia being lost, be too exposed to be of much value. Oil production in Ust-Yennisseisk and Voyampolka (Kamchatka) is in the most elementary stages, and that of the Soviet oil fields of Sakhalin (1938: 360,000 tons) cannot be counted on with complete certainty in view of the tension in the Far East. Thus Siberia at present produces about 2 million tons, which is only a fraction of the oil it needs for the normal requirements of its agriculture and industry, not to mention carrying on the war.

(4) **Other Metals**: here the picture is much more favorable, as the Ural and Siberia possess large resources of the different metals. Copper is mined at Lake Balkhash (Kazakhstan) and in Revda (near Sverdlovsk); zinc in Tchelyabinsk and Berlovsk (Kuzbass); nickel in Orsk (30% of the Soviet production); lead in Ridder (Altai); tin in Tchita; and gold in various parts of Siberia, above all in the Aldan area (Yakutia) which provides 25% of the total Soviet production.

**FEW CONSUMPTION GOODS**

In the production of articles for consumption the picture presented by Siberia is dark. While this branch of industry has been very much neglected everywhere in the Soviet Union since the revolution, all emphasis having been placed on heavy industry, this has been particularly the case in Siberia. It is true that reports from the Soviet Union mention a number of new constructions in light industry, but it is apparent from accounts of people living in Siberia and the Soviet Far East that practically all consumption goods purchased by them originate from European Russia. There are, for instance, beginnings of a Siberian textile industry, with factories in Krass-
noyarsk, Novosibirsk, and Barnaul. However, the entire cotton industry of Siberia produces less than one twentieth of the total Soviet textile production. Moreover in its raw material it is dependent on supplies from the cotton areas of Soviet Central Asia via the Turkestan-Siberia (Turksib) Railway, which it probably could also not rely upon in the event of a Soviet retreat.

In spite of its great wealth in lumber, Siberia only provides about 15% of the paper produced in the USSR. In several other domains (shoes, sugar) some efforts have been made during the last few years to create native Siberian industries. These are, however, still in their very beginnings, and nothing is known about the size of their production.

**OVERWORKED RAILWAYS**

The transport system is the decisive bottle-neck in Siberian economy. For the study of this question we refer our readers to Map I, which shows at a glance the communication conditions of this vast space. We have purposely indicated railways, rivers, air lines, and motor roads in different colors, as the relative importance for Siberia of these four means of communication is radically different. All economic and military decisions revolve around the red lines, the railways, which carry 90% of the entire Soviet freight traffic.

In contrast to European Russia, which is covered by a dense network of railroads, Siberia really only possesses a single railway, the Trans-Siberian, in relation to which all others are merely feeder lines (Map VI). During the last few years several such feeder lines have been built. They have contributed to the opening up of new territories, but also to the overloading of the main line. The entire economic and military life of Siberia, the vast requirements of the UKK, the transport of troops, foodstuff, and armaments, of everything necessary for the prosecution of war—all depend on the four and a half thousand mile trunk line of the Trans-Siberian. A glance at the map will show that even the new lines under construction will not change this fact.

Map VI. Railroads of Russia.

Compare the density of the net in European Russia with the single trunk line in Siberia.
(In the last issue of this magazine we dealt with the question of the Trans-Siberian Railway in connection with Vladivostok, and we refer our readers to that article and particularly to Maps I and VI in the present issue.)

The main characteristic of the Soviet system of communications is the terrible overworking of the railroads. While the railroad network has only been expanded 50% since 1913, freight traffic has risen 500%. On every mile of railroad five times as much freight was transported last year in the Soviet Union as was in the USA, and one may say with some certainty that the full capacity of the Siberian railroads has been reached, if not already exceeded to their detriment. One can hardly imagine how a communication system that was already so overworked in normal times should be able to stand up to the requirements of a war in this huge country.

The lessons of the only war fought in Siberia so far, the war between the Whites and Reds in the years after the revolution, clearly showed the superiority of the Red armies operating from the dense network of communications in European Russia against the Whites with the poor communications of Siberia. The White armies, who had at first succeeded in occupying Siberia, found themselves bound to the Siberian railway and hence robbed of all freedom of movement. In its essence the whole war was a war for the railway.

In one respect, however, the position of the Red armies in the Siberia of today would not be quite as unfavorable as that of the Whites twenty years ago. During the last few years a number of large works have been built to supply Siberia with rolling stock: locomotive works in Orsk, Stalinsk (Kuzbass), and Ulan-Ude (Buryat-Mongolia), and the large railway car works in Taghil.

FROZEN RIVERS

On a map Siberia has an ideal network of rivers. For centuries this was her most important means of communication. Not only the Cossacks, the first conquerors of Siberia at the end of the sixteenth century, but later on fur dealers, settlers, tea cargoes, troops, and exiles were transported on its mighty rivers.

In small boats it was possible to traverse the whole of Siberia from the Ural to the Pacific coastal range with only two portages. These were between the system of the Ob, the Yenissei, and the Lena, and in each case only a few miles long. (Meanwhile the Ob and the Yenissei have been connected by the small Ket-Kass Canal, and the Yenissei and the Lena by a new railroad.)

However, what was good enough for the primitive requirements up to the middle of the nineteenth century is entirely insufficient for today. The Bolsheviks have, it is true, opened up long distances of the magnificent Siberian rivers for shipping, as can be seen on our map; but they are covered during a large part of the year by a thick layer of ice. Moreover, with the exception of the Amur they all flow into the Arctic Ocean, which is open only a few months in summer and even then can only be navigated with great difficulty. They do not, therefore represent a reliable means of communication either for Siberian domestic traffic or for connections overseas.

But even in summer the rivers of Siberia cannot for the time being be anything like fully utilized because of the shortage in shipping space. In all of Siberia there is at present only one large plant, at Tyumen, that builds river boats, and those only for the system of the Ob.

PLANES AND AUTOMOBILES

On no phase of Siberian development have more articles been written in the world's press than on the opening up of Siberia through air traffic. Indeed, much has been achieved here, and the development of the Far North would not have been possible without the creation of air bases in large numbers. Our map shows the air net as it exists at present. However, it is hardly of great strategic importance
in the war against Germany, as fighting is not to be expected in those territories for which the airplane is of special importance as a means of communication, i.e. in the Arctic and in the deserts. To this must be added the already mentioned lack of oil in Siberia, and probably also that of airplane factories. Most of the above facts apply also to the system of motor roads.

The extension of traffic toward north-eastern Siberia, which points toward Alaska, is interesting. Numerous air bases have been established, especially on Kamchatka, as well as on the islands of the Commodore group (Map VII), the Bay of Anadyr, and in Wellen, the Russian settlement nearest Alaska on the Bering Strait. The rapid expansion of American air bases in Alaska and in the Aleutians, and the ever repeated cry of the Alaskan representative in Washington (the last on November 13, 1941) for more airplanes indicate that the USA and especially Alaska, which was Russian territory until seventy-five years ago, are well aware of a possible danger from Siberia, even though they may at present be aligned with Stalin.

**MILITARY FORCES**

The number and type of troops stationed in Siberia has always been a closely guarded secret. After the outbreak of the German-Soviet war the number of troops was probably tripled through mobilization. It appears that the enormous losses of the Red armies in their battle against Germany have led to veteran Siberian troops being transferred to the European front and that therefore the Siberian and Far Eastern armies have declined in quality although increased in quantity during the last few months.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Leaving aside the possible attitude of Japan toward the Soviet Union during the next few months, a German victory in European Russia could have two consequences for Siberia. The first would be the collapse of the Bolshevist regime and the creation of a White Siberia. For this, Siberia has, as is shown in the next article, a certain tradition.

Our article, however, deals with the second possibility, namely that even after the loss of European Russia the Bolshevist regime would be able to survive for a while in Siberia. In that case, we believe, a study of the position of Siberia shows that militarily Germany would not be menaced from there. Neither in numbers, nor in means of communication, nor in armaments could a Red army forced out of European
Russia and practically isolated from the rest of the world play an important military role within the near future. And even if aid should appear from somewhere outside, the inherent difficulties of fighting a war from Siberia would remain the same. We have also seen that the possession of the Ural would be indispensable for the Bolshevists of Siberia.

What then would the Bolshevists do? Would they try to recapture European Russia? Very likely. But the propaganda of a Bolshevism pushed behind the Ural would hardly have much attraction for the people living in European Russia. During the last twenty-three years it has always been the case in Europe that those nations that became acquainted with Bolshevism through their own experience (Hungary, Italy, Germany, Spain), became, after having overcome it, its strongest opponents. This may also be the case in Russia. Moreover one may assume that, through the war and its terrible losses and through the migration of the bureaucratic and party apparatus from European Russia to Siberia, the Bolshevik elements will be the hardest hit and that their already very low proportion in the population will sink even further.

What then? Would the Bolshevik leaders fold up in Siberia and quit? Anybody who knows them will doubt this very much. They are fully aware that to confine themselves to Siberia would mean their end. Bolshevism can only exist as long as there is the prospect of a World Revolution. Hence we expect that the loss of their military power would lead to new political aggressiveness. In spite of all the recent nationalist phrases and the seeming retreat from radicalism which Stalin has performed for domestic and foreign political reasons we still believe that basically nothing is changed in his and the Bolshevist ideas. For Stalin, himself not a Russian but the son of Caucasian mountain tribes, Bolshevist Russia was a steppingstone toward the World Revolution. In Russia herself he was not interested, and he would just as well have fought from any other state for his aim. Should, therefore, Bolshevism disappear from European Russia but be able to maintain itself for the time being in Siberia, the next step, seen from the viewpoint of consistent Bolshevism, would be to rekindle the burnt-out Bolshevist conflagration of Europe in Asia or America with the aid of the embers kept alive with Siberian coal.

From the moment of their coming into power the Bolsheviks have skillfully continued, in a manner calculated on the long view, to prepare their influence upon the millions of southern Asia and the Far East. India and China were their special goals; in China they were able to gain a strong foothold by taking advantage of her desperate situation. And are not perhaps the growing labor troubles in the USA an indication of their influence in America? We do not think that Bolshevism has abandoned its old double game, of co-operating with capitalist powers, if need be, from without, and of boring simultaneously from within.

The world is at present passing through abnormal times. Enmity against National-Socialist Germany and her allies has brought nations into the same camp that normally would never have dreamt of co-operating with each other. Capitalist Great Britain is fighting on the side of the Red armies, and capitalist America practically considers herself an ally of the USSR. But one day this war will be over, the passion and hatred grown from it and blurring the vision will gradually calm down. Then, we believe, the nations will agree that the rebuilding of a new world on the ruins left by this war will render undesirable the existence of a Bolshevist source of unrest in Siberia.
The preceding article deals with the chances of a Red Siberia to continue the present war. The question arises: is there no possibility of a White Siberia? To give an answer to this question from a historical perspective we have requested a contribution from a Russian who has been and still is most intimately connected with Siberia and who prefers to hide his identity under a pseudonym.

A large literature, particularly in Russian, exists on Siberia and her role in the civil war that followed the Bolshevist revolution, but we are not aware of any article that has ever presented in concise form the history of the Siberian autonomist movement in its relation to Russia and Bolshevism.

Our article ends with the victory of the Reds in Siberia in 1922; but the struggle for a White Siberia has gone on ever since.—K.M.

CORTÉZ AND YERMÁK

Two great political events of the sixteenth century, taking place on different continents, brought magnificent results to the states in whose interests they were undertaken. These events were the conquest of Central America by Cortez and that of Siberia by Yermak. Thanks to the efforts of these conquistadores, both typical adventurers eager to get as far away as possible from the laws of their respective countries, Spain and Moscovite Russia became empires as colossal in their dimensions as in their political influence. The similar character of the activities of these two historical figures created very similar political results: Spain became an empire in whose boundaries the sun never set, and Russia consolidated herself in the vast spaces of Asia. The significance of both events in history is even greater if we take into account the fact that the direct consequence of Cortez’ and Yermak’s conquests was the spreading of Christian civilization into new continents.

IMPERIALISM VS. REGIONALISM

As for Siberia the question was: who was to determine the policy—the center that is St. Petersburg and Moscow, or the periphery that is Siberia?

In the former case we have an imperialistic policy which regards Siberia simply as a colony existing for the needs of the metropolis, in the latter the development of an economic and political program of the local Siberian population which, with its own promoters and ideologists, became known as the Siberian autonomist movement, or Siberian regionalism—Sibirskoye Oblastnitchestvo.

That the Imperial Government looked upon Siberia as on a colony was evident in many respects. Siberia was administrated by three Governor Generals (Western Siberia, Eastern Siberia, and Amurland, which latter included the entire Russian Far East). These were practically viceroyas with almost unlimited power. They were hardly restrained in their decisions from above, nor from below, as the share given to the population in local affairs was very limited. Siberia up to the revolution did not know local self-administration, and juries were introduced only shortly before the Great War. Hence the only limitation for the Governor’s administration were the general laws of the empire and to some extent the attitude of the Sibe-
rians which could not be entirely overlooked.

In the economic field the Central Government always was jealous that the development of Siberia might hurt the economic interests of the landowner and merchant class of European Russia. Many obstacles were put in the path of Siberian grain reaching European Russia in order not to lower the local grain prices. To protect the industry of European Russia the growth of Siberian industries was retarded. This attitude of the government was particularly responsible for the growth of the autonomy movement in Siberia.

As the very name of the movement shows, the political thought of the Sibiryak (Siberian Russian) took a territorial point of view. The interests of the Siberian population were considered by the Siberian autonomists to be in certain respects opposed to the interests of European Russia as she saw them. This opposition had given the Russian Imperial Government cause to look with suspicion upon the Siberian autonomist movement and to believe that its hidden aim was separation from the Empire. In actual fact, the founders of the movement, Yadrintsev and Potanin, were in no way separatists, but only the ideological defenders of the cultural and economic interests of the Siberian people and their way of life.

As a rule, opposition of local interest to the interests of the empire is wrong, as it tends to weaken the organization of the state. But in some cases such opposition may have good results, not only for the local interests but for the whole state. This is especially true when such opposition creates conditions which may help a part of the state to develop its natural resources to the fullest extent, and by this development to increase in importance in the affairs of the whole empire and its responsibility in its future. Such is the case with the Siberian autonomous movement.

MENDELEYEV AND THE BOLSHEVIKS

The real problem in every historical period of the Russian state was how to harmonize the interests of Siberia with those of all Russia. This is confirmed by the deductions of the famous scientist Mendeleev, a Siberian by birth, who in his historical book Understanding of Russia declared that the natural, geographical, and sociological factors existing in Russia pointed to the necessity of removing the vital center of the Russian Empire to the region of Omsk in Western Siberia. It is evident that the Bolsheviks adopted Mendeleev's idea in their industrial planning, not for the benefit of either the Siberian or Russian population but solely to consolidate the base of the World Revolution. Only because of the efforts exerted by the Bolsheviks in this direction were they able to survive so far in spite of the heavy blows they sustained from the German war machine.

The original plan of the economic and industrial development of Siberia does not by any means belong to the Soviets. The foundation stone for this plan was laid in the reign of Emperor Nicholas II (1894-1917) and great strides in this direction were made after the revolution during the short life of the Siberian Government. The plans of this Government concerning the development of Siberia were very broad and calculated on the actual possibilities and resources of Siberia and its real needs. Not being subjected to the program of a World Revolution, they had all the essentials for future success. Had these plans been allowed to be carried out without hindrance during the past twenty years, the Siberia of today would be one of the most important economic and industrial territories in the world.

ARGUMENTS FOR AUTONOMY

The main arguments brought forward by the Siberian autonomists are as follows: firstly, Siberia with regard to its own population is economically entirely self-supporting: not only does it not import raw materials but it even exports them; secondly, the ethnical
composition of its population is well adapted to its natural and climatic conditions in which the exploitation of natural wealth must be carried on; thirdly, the Siberian population has a higher standard of living than the population of European Russia; and finally, the quantity of goods produced is large in relation to the number of working hands and is showing a tendency to increase in the most important sections of economic life.

A RURAL POPULATION

Life in Siberia has always been entirely different from that in Russia. Even Communism was unable to do away with this difference. The existence of enormous resources has put a peculiar mark upon the character of the Siberian. Every man in Siberia regards himself as rich. If we compare the economic strength of the peasant’s farm in European Russia with that of Siberia we see that before the revolution in European Russia the average quantity of land belonging to one farm was 3.4 and in Siberia 5.2 dessyatins.

The predominant part of the Siberian population was and still is rural. If, besides that fact, we take into consideration the great dimensions of Siberia and the scarcity of means of communications, we can readily understand that the townsfolk of Siberia could not have much influence over the rural population, in contrast to the conditions existing in European Russia. In recent years the Bolsheviks have done their utmost to change this, but, before the Great War, European Russia, with a population nine times larger than that of Siberia, had thirty-one times as many industrial enterprises and a hundred times as many workers. The proletariat as a class did not exist in Siberia.

NO SERFS, NO PROLETARIAT

The country population in Siberia consists of peasants, Cossacks, and native tribes. The peasant class in Siberia is not homogeneous, as many seem to think. It consists of old settlers who have lived in Siberia for several generations, and of new settlers or immigrants. The new settlers arrived after the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway from Russia and settled on land allocated to them by the Government. The Cossacks before the Revolution were organized into seven separate troops, each troop occupying its own territory and ruled in its internal affairs by authorities elected among its members. Finally there are native tribes living in regions which they have occupied since time immemorial. The inter-relations of all these groups assumed peculiar forms very different from those existing in European Russia.

A characteristic feature of the Siberian situation was the absence of the agrarian question as it existed in Russia, the reason being that Siberia had never known the great private landowners. To be sure, Siberia had its own agrarian problems, connected with the migration of peasants from European Russia. This became evident when the waves of migrants from Russia encroached upon the lands of the old settlers or natives. Discontent on the part of the Siberians with the policy of the Central Government led in some cases in Western Siberia to open resistance.

Psychologically the absence of serfdom in the past life of the peasants and the small size of the proletariat gave the Siberian a free mind and great self-respect, since he was accustomed to rely upon his own strength. The fact that there was no bitter economic struggle among the classes made life in Siberia very different from that in European Russia and influenced the ideology of the Siberian autonomists.

VELVET OVER MUD

In answer to the question whether the Siberian autonomist movement was in opposition to the Tsarist Government, it can be said that it did not oppose the Tsarist Government as such but opposed its policy towards Siberia. This opposition was very
different from that of the revolutionary anti-Tsarist parties. These were striving to destroy the historic structure of the state; the Siberian movement on the other hand was directed toward the development of the cultural and economic strength of its region while wishing at the same time to remain within the framework of the existing political organization of the state. While in European Russia the restless peasant dreamed of one day having his own land, and the revolutionary laborer, influenced by political propaganda, thought of seizing the factories, the Siberian peasant was considering the better and more productive use of the land he already possessed, and the Siberian miner was accustomed to deal with thousands of rubles easily earned and easily spent in the belief that in another gold-digging season he would again make a fortune.

When I think of the difference between the Sibiryak and the people from European Russia, one scene, witnessed more than once, always comes first to my mind: a Siberian gold-digger returning from a season's work in the wilderness knew no greater joy than to show not only his money but that this money did not mean anything to him. With his pockets full he would first direct his steps toward the town's main store. There his arrival was already known and he was met on the street with deep bows and the respectful request to enter the store. “Damn dirty, the road to your store,” he would say haughtily, “get busy and bring a piece of velvet that I may cross the street.” Eagerly the clerks would bring a bolt of cloth and spread a velvet carpet across the mud. Stamping the costly material deep into the dirt with his heavy boots the man would triumphantly march into the store, greeted by the bows of the storekeeper and rewarded by the approving laughter of the crowd. This was the high spot of the year for him. He was a regular fellow and had dough—what chances had Marx to impress him with his theory of surplus value?

ST. PETERSBURG
FAILS TO UNDERSTAND

The Sibiryak suffered more from arbitrary administration than economic difficulties. Even the famous case of the shooting of the workers in the Lena gold fields some years before the Great War resulted not from economic reasons but mainly from an act of administrative violence which produced angry protests on the part of the miners. The Siberian peasant already represented the type of farmer toward whose creation in European Russia was directed the great agrarian reform of Stolypin (1907), which aimed at strengthening the economy of the country and thus stabilizing the regime. If Siberian economic life had received encouragement from the administration, the Tsarist Government would have been strongly supported by the Sibiryaks. The migration to Siberia would have been caused not by the lack of farming land in Russia but by the attractions of Siberia itself. But unfortunately Siberia did not receive from the Tsarist Government the eagerly and vainly hoped for establishment of local self-government known in Russia as zemstvo. Only by the reforms of Speransky during the reign of Emperor Nicholas I in the second quarter of the nineteenth century had the acts of arbitrary administration in Siberia become somewhat limited. Before that reform Government officials were directly responsible for the dispersal of the population which preferred to move to localities situated as far as possible from the eagle eye of the authorities.

Another noted administrator was Count Muraviov-Amursky, perhaps the only one of all the statesmen working in Siberia to realize its possibilities and the ways in which they could be developed. Actually Muraviov-Amursky can in a way be regarded as the first autonomist of Siberia, and during his governor-generalship of Eastern Siberia he did a great deal of good for the country. However, the general policy of the Government was contradictory to that of the Count, and his work
could serve only as a demonstration of the possibilities which could have been opened up for the Russian Government had it ceased to look upon Siberia as a colony for convicts.

CRIMINALS, ORDINARY AND POLITICAL

It would not be fair to assert that the Government had nothing to fear from social movements in Siberia. The basis for such fear was the fact that Siberia was used as a place of exile for criminal and political convicts. St. Petersburg always believed that if you scratch a Sibiryak you will find either a criminal or a political convict. Of course the Tsarist Government itself had been responsible for the filling of Siberia with such elements, as it had tried simultaneously to solve two problems—that of colonizing a distant, sparsely populated country and that of getting rid of undesirable elements at home.

It is to be noted, however, that much of the cultural influence in Siberia must be attributed to anti-Government elements, forced to stay in Siberia against their will. Important bringers of culture, for instance, were the leaders of the revolt of December 1825 in St. Petersburg, the so-called Decembrists, who were deported to Siberia in 1826. Numerous exiled political convicts imparted a great deal of intellectual impetus to Siberia. No doubt these men tried to impose their views upon the people around them; yet it is astonishing how rapidly they adapted themselves to Siberia, how quickly Siberia transformed their psychology, and how they took the interests of Siberia to heart. Many of them preferred to remain in Siberia after the termination of their sentence. They acquired property, and their children became real Sibiryaks with all their characteristic features.

FROM SOCIAL TO POLITICAL ACTIVITY

The activity of the Russian revolutionary parties was, of course, also to be found in Siberia, but it was remarkable that none of them dared openly to oppose the purely Siberian feelings of the autonomists. They were afraid of losing contact with the masses, though no doubt the ideology of the autonomists was regarded by them with utmost scorn as "petty-bourgeois."

At the beginning of August 1917 a conference of Siberian democratic organizations was called in Tomsk and the question of autonomy for Siberia was put before it. It is characteristic that many representatives of the revolutionary democracy present at this conference found it necessary to support autonomy in order not to lose the confidence of the masses in Siberia. The growth of Bolshevism in European Russia during the summer of 1917 forced the Siberian organizations to be on the alert. They realized immediately that the possible seizure of power by the Bolsheviks would render any prospects of Siberian autonomy very doubtful. It was decided to take measures for the creation of purely Siberian military units consisting of soldiers of Siberian origin who were at the German front. The successful uprising of the Bolsheviks in Petrograd in October 1917 brought the question of the organization of the Siberian Government to a climax. A congress of a number of Siberian organizations decided to call an extraordinary Siberian Regional Assembly. All preparatory work was entrusted to the Siberian Regional Council under the presidency of Potanin.

THE FIRST SIBERIAN GOVERNMENT

Conditions and ideas created under the influence of the Bolshevist revolution spread like waves from the centre of Russia. In Siberia, too, soviets were founded. At the same time there were evident differences between the development in Siberia and European Russia. The most significant was the demand for the creation of a Siberian Government that would be independent of the Bolsheviks. This demand was the main cause of the rupture between the Siberian autonomist movement and the Bolsheviks.
The first meeting of the Siberian Duma in Tomsk was fixed for January 19, 1918. At first a fight for supremacy between the two major groups, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Siberian autonomists, seemed inevitable. However, after the Communists had on January 18, 1918, dispersed the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in Petrograd, the Socialist-Revolutionaries realized that as democrats they must unconditionally support Siberian autonomy. In the night of January 26 the Bolsheviks seized several members of the Regional Council and the Duma in Tomsk. Thereupon the other members of the Duma secretly arranged a meeting in which a Provisional Siberian Government was elected with the aims of resistance to the Bolsheviks and autonomy for Siberia. Whatever were the defects of the process of election and of the persons elected, this fact in itself had enormous consequences, for it marked the beginning of civil war in Siberia.

The secret meeting of the Siberian Duma proclaimed that the Duma was now taking the course of a supreme legislative power existing in a free and autonomous republic. A statement was issued regarding, first, full separation of Siberia from Bolshevism, and second, Siberian autonomy, which was to be considered the chief aim of the whole movement and the means for the restoration of national Russia. In this way from the time of the Bolshevist coup d'état the Sibiryaks had shown the resolution to go as far as circumstances might require. From the outset Siberia became an independent factor in the fight against Bolshevism, with its own ideas, conceptions, and expectations. At that time there was no question of foreign political influence from outside. Optimism was supreme throughout the country, and the majority of the people had complete confidence in a final victory over Bolshevism.

The program of the movement was as follows: (1) one united all-embracing camp of Sibiryaks; (2) one Siberian Government; (3) the convocation of the Siberian Constituent Assembly. Thus the active resistance of the Siberian people was successfully led into a single channel, which, though created in a revolutionary manner, corresponded to the desires of autonomy long cherished by the Siberian population. The masses took part in the fight, which developed fully by the summer of 1918.

**SIBERIA RID OF BOLSHEVISM**

The anti-Bolshevik uprising began on May 24, 1918. After several days of hard fighting, a large territory with many towns and a population of eight million fell into the hands of the Siberian Government, which declared the provisional independence of Siberia.

By the middle of August the Government already had its own army of 200,000 men. Successfully they carried operations to the east. Here they met the Cossack forces of Ataman Semenov, who joined the Siberian army. Thus Siberia was completely rid of Bolsheviks, and all the forces were transferred once again to the west.

A series of problems now confronted the Siberian Government, some of which it was able to handle. Among those solved were the creation of an army and its equipment, the restoration of law and order, and the gaining of sympathy among the population. Unsolved remained the problem of sound relations with the refugee forces entering Siberia from European Russia who should have been regarded as auxiliaries only, not as equal partners, since they were strangers in Siberia and even hostile to it, looking at the country with the eyes of the former Russian center.

**FAILURE**

A number of persons foreign to the ideas of the Sibiryaks was allowed to penetrate into the highest circles of the Government. Such a Government could not maintain the confidence of the people for very long, since the weakness of its inner structure was bound to become known. To make matters worse, a conflict between the Siberian Government and the Siberian Regional Duma broke out.
Under the pressure of the Allies the Siberian Government finally resigned in favor of the All-Russian Directory, a political combination which brought about a short-lived victory for the party of the Socialist-Revolutionaries but which did not have the support of the Sibiryaks. This victory turned after eighteen days into a defeat, when the All-Russian dictatorship of Admiral Koltchak was proclaimed. Exactly one year later the Bolsheviks were to invade Siberia.

While the Siberian Government had been in office it believed that the future of Siberia depended upon its position in the Far East. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained, therefore, that if economically Siberia were interested in relations with the western powers, then politically its relations with Japan were of the utmost importance. With the change-over from the Siberian to the All-Russian Government this idea gave way to another, the so-called “western orientation.”

ADMIRAL KOLTCHAK

The masses simply ceased to support the White Movement when it lost its quality as a Siberian movement. Admiral Koltchak himself was less responsible for this situation than any other person. He was a man deserving full confidence, but sometimes even a strong personality is unable to do anything against a common frame of mind.

As early as May 1919 the Siberian groups which had started the anti-Communist movement a year before realized that Siberia was heading for a major catastrophe, to avoid which strong measures had immediately to be applied. There were two ways to accomplish this — either to come to an agreement with Admiral Koltchak or to try to overthrow his Government. At this point the ways of the Siberian autonomists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries parted. The autonomists chose to throw in their lot with Koltchak, which led them nowhere; the Socialist-Revolutionaries organized a rising against him which brought about the complete ruin of all of White Siberia. Besides the difference in their tactics, the very aims of these two most important groups were completely at variance. The Socialist-Revolutionaries went the way of compromise with the Bolsheviks, while the autonomists became more implacable than ever against Bolshevism.

END AND OUTLOOK

The loss of Omsk and Irkutsk confronted the autonomists with the problem of future action, as the liberation of Siberia remained their chief aim. This idea found its realization in the creation of the Council of Representatives of the Siberian organizations that was later to lead the struggle against the Bolsheviks in Siberia. In 1922 a Siberian detachment was organized by this Council in Vladivostok and despatched to northern Siberia. It hoped to penetrate into the interior of Siberia and to stir up a new general uprising against the Bolsheviks there. After several victorious encounters it met with disaster and had to retreat. In October 1922 the Council of Representatives had to undertake the evacuation of the White forces from Vladivostok.

Since then the Siberian autonomist movement has had to relinquish its purely regional character, as it realized the hopelessness of fighting Communism, which had all Russia’s resources behind it, with the meager resources of the Siberian population. Instead it has sought to associate itself with a world-wide movement aimed against the ideology of Communism. In the success of such a movement it sees the only hope for the liberation of Siberia and the salvation of Russia. If Communism should survive even in a part of European Russia, an independent Siberian state would automatically become a strong bulwark against Communism.

If in the past the destiny of the Siberian autonomist movement was a purely Russian domestic affair, it has now become a question of international importance of the first magnitude.
HOW BIG IS A HEMISPHERE?

By F. VAN BRIESSSEN

The revision of the American neutrality law on November 13, which will allow armed American merchant ships to travel to ports in the European war zone, has again focused world attention on events in the Atlantic. In the discussions concerning the attitude the United States should take there, no term has been more widely used than “Western Hemisphere.” It is remarkable that a term of such importance has never been clearly defined.

Dr. van Briessen, formerly on the staff of the United Press in Berlin and now Far Eastern correspondent for a Cologne paper, has written a study about the Western Hemisphere, or rather about its Atlantic portion. For years he has made a hobby of collecting maps of the Western Hemisphere, some of which are reproduced here.—K.M.

WHAT IS A BOUNDARY?

Boundaries are the visible definition of claims to ownership and power which can be defended. Whether it is the peasant who marks off his fields from his neighbor’s with stones, or the state that drives in boundary posts with the national insignia to indicate the extent of its power, it always stands for the maintenance of a claim and the course of the line up to which this claim has been established. A boundary always runs where the pressure from without and within as well as the mutual requirements of security are balanced.

Politically speaking a boundary is always related to man and society. It only appeared when man acknowledged personal property and the community of a group. But ever since that indeterminable moment in prehistoric times it has also always been the subject of endless dispute among men, a symbol almost of human strength and weakness. The true or alleged urge for security, this dynamic shifter of boundaries, is often a driving force behind such disputes, for boundaries, in order to give a feeling and reality of security, must push outward. This is particularly true in cases in which actual political frontiers and ethnological boundaries do not coincide.

Undoubtedly a “sensible agreement” has often defined the course of a border, and such borders have proved to be a great deal more stable than those whose formation has been decided by irrational factors such as hate, greed, revenge, or a feeling of superiority. But human society and its forms of life, particularly in the older continents, have grown so complex in the course of thousands of years that in many cases a rational solution was impossible. Instead it was often the stronger who fixed the borders in the manner which seemed most reasonable to him.

IMAGINARY BOUNDARIES

Great as the difficulties are in defining the borders between territories or states, the obstacles become almost insurmountable when it is a case of defining spheres of interest. These are often bordered by imaginary lines which, moreover, enclose territories whose ownership is not clear or, on account of pseudo-sovereign conditions, is subject to the danger of being constantly shifted. These zones of interest or spheres of influence and their boundaries are a direct function of the power of those states who are in dispute about them. While, however, in the case of national frontiers these states are in direct contact with each
other, spheres of interest are more often zones of protection or preferential activity reaching beyond the actual state borders. In the case of imperial possessions they are usually territories adjoining colonies, protectorates, or dominions. In other words the sovereign states have contact with each other only in their fields of gravitation. For the definition of zones of interest, lines of demarcation are usually agreed upon, unless a powerful state prefers simply to declare a zone of interest and to leave it more to the extent of its power than to international agreements whether this zone shall be recognized or not.

GEOGRAPHICAL AND POLITICAL BOUNDARIES

The territorial course of political borders makes them at the same time geographical phenomena, but only in so far as their course runs over land and sea, rivers and mountains, that is to say, geographical contours. This fact has often led to false conclusions, so that it seems necessary to define here the difference between geographical and political boundaries.

Geographical boundaries are usually unequivocal, as they are the clearly definable encounter of natural conditions or the universally recognized results of scientific agreement. No one doubts the obviousness of the boundary between land and sea, or the partition of the earth into east and west by the prime meridian. High, unscaleable mountains and broad, rapid rivers can be geographical borders, and tropics and subtropics are divided from each other by the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn. While geographical borders, at least according to earthly standards, are of a permanent nature, political borders are variable. Hence beside geographical there are also historical atlases. Those countries whose geographical and political borders coincide completely or over long distances, as is the case with islands (England, Japan) or states spanning a continent like the USA, are favored with a tremendous political advantage. They could, in the course of their history, save enough time and power to be able to go forth from their naturally protected borders into the world of imperialistic undertakings.

DIVIDING THE WORLD

The idea of dividing up the earth beyond the fixed state borders by imaginary lines of demarcation, that is, to define the various fields of gravitation, is not new and has probably always been a child of expansion-minded ages. Ancient Rome had such a boundary line at the Pillars of Hercules; and in the Age of Discovery Pope Alexander VI in 1493 divided the world by a meridional line, redefined in 1494 in the Treaty of Tordesillas, into Spanish and Portuguese spheres, thereby separating part of present-day Brazil from what is now known as the Western Hemisphere (see Map IV). Because the world was discovered from Europe, the earth’s boundaries were decided in those days by the Old World. In the meantime, however, the balance of power has shifted so greatly that new demands have been made on the part of the New World for a redistribution of the world. The problem of the Atlantic frontiers of the Western Hemisphere has become so acute in present times that its solution, in case of war between the continents, would entail the decision over right and wrong.

IN WHICH HEMISPHERE IS ENGLAND?

In 1884 the Washington Meridian Conference recommended the exclusive use of the Greenwich meridian as prime meridian. Since then modern geography has made the Greenwich meridian the demarcation line between the hemispheres, and everything to the west of this meridian as far as the 180th degree is Western Hemisphere. According to this, geographically almost all of England, large parts of western France, all of Spain and Portugal, and considerable parts of West Africa belong to the Western Hemisphere.

Cartographically, however, such a division is impracticable, as it has
been agreed upon to draw the world, not according to its division into hemispheres, but according to its large land masses. It is more practical to represent all of Europe or all of America on a map than to take into consideration the arbitrarily determined prime meridian. The fact, however, that for cartographic reasons the Western Hemisphere is made to begin in maps at longitude 20 or 30 and the Eastern (Eurasian) Hemisphere is made to end there, naturally does not mean that these meridians are the political or geographical boundaries of the hemispheres. Hence the practical considerations of cartography have no influence on the political distribution of the world. Otherwise we would have the fantastic situation of cartographers being the ones to decide whether or not the American occupation of Iceland is justifiable by international law.

**MONROE'S HEMISPHERE**

When President Monroe formulated his well-known message, there was no doubt that with the expression “this hemisphere” he meant only the American continent including its islands with its clearly defined geographical border formed by land and sea, and that Greenland as well as Iceland, both possessions of a European power, were excluded from this, that is, the Western Hemisphere. This is generally confirmed by politicians and historians, except when they make assertions for purposes of propaganda. Thus Francis Pickens Miller, although favoring the expansion of the hemisphere, writes in an article in *Foreign Affairs* (July 1941, page 727): “For three centuries Americans have been accustomed to think of their world in continental terms. The land mass of the Western Hemisphere was the New World... The Monroe Doctrine was concerned with continents, not oceans... We favored freedom of the seas, but we were not interested in ruling the waves.”

**CONTINENTAL AMERICANISM**

While Miller attempts in the second part of his short essay to prove that the conditions and possibilities of the world have changed so fundamentally that Monroe’s (and John Adams’s) continental conception of the Western Hemisphere have been destroyed and made invalid, as high-ranking a historian as Professor Charles A. Beard is of a different opinion. In his book *A Foreign Policy for America* (New York, 1940) Beard writes (page 12):
“The primary foreign policy for the United States may be called for con­venience Continental Americanism. The two words imply a concentration of interest on the continental domain and on building here a civilization in many respects peculiar to American life and the potentials of the American heritage. In concrete terms the words mean non-intervention in the controversies and wars of Europe and Asia and resistance to the intrusion of European or Asiatic powers, systems, and imperial ambitions into the western hemisphere. This policy is positive. It is clear-cut. And it was maintained with consistency while the Republic was being founded, democracy extended, and an American civilization developed.”

In his final summing-up (page 151) Beard, who absolutely refuses to be called an isolationist, says: “Slowly, but with increasing force, it was realized that the ‘foreign outlet’ doctrines of imperialism and internationalism were illusions; . . . that the frontiers for the expansion of American enterprise were within this continent, not in the fabled Indies or on the Rhine, the Danube, or the Vistula.”

And further (page 152): “With reference to such conflicts and sufferings, continentalism merely meant a recognition of the limited nature of American powers to relieve, restore, and maintain life beyond its own sphere of interest and control—a recognition of the hard fact that the United States either alone or in any coalition, did not possess the power to force peace on Europe or Asia, to assure the establishment of democratic and pacific governments there, or to provide the social and economic underwriting necessary to the perdurance of such governments. . . . Continentalism, strictly construed, meant a return to the correct and restrained diplomacy of earlier time.”

WHAT IS THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE?

No American President since James Monroe has made the idea of the Western Hemisphere as much of a political slogan as has President Roosevelt. The beginning of Roosevelt’s turn towards foreign policy can be determined by his “Quarantine” speech in Chicago in 1937, whose tendency, directed against the non-democratic powers, mainly Germany, was intensified soon after in his honorary degree speech at Kingston. Since then the expression “Western Hemisphere” has become so frequent in speeches, articles, and official documents, without it ever having been properly defined by authoritative American circles, that it seems necessary to discuss this term critically. In this article we shall deal only with the Atlantic expansion of the Western Hemisphere.

The term has been defined neither in the resolution of Congress against the transfer of territories within the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another, which was included as a basic principle in the Havana Convention (July 29, 1940); nor in the National Guard and Reserve Officers Mobilization Act of August 27, 1940, which prohibits the use of American troops outside of the Western Hemisphere. But the term continues to appear in laws, speeches, and documents and to retain the same vagueness and elasticity.

In our introductory discussion we have established that the term “Western Hemisphere,” as it is used by politicians and statesmen, is not a geographical or cartographical but solely a political concept. In a critical investigation of the American conception of the boundaries of the Western Hemisphere purely geographical arguments can therefore be disregarded. President Roosevelt too seems to have realized this when, after the Eight Point Declaration, he replied in the Washington press conference to a question regarding the extent of the Western Hemisphere that it depended on which geographer he had last talked to. In other words, from the geographical point of view this term is arbitrary. AN ELASTIC LINE

As a matter of fact these boundaries have been constantly expanded in de-
mands upon Europe, and American writers are now throwing the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, and Dakar into the discussion. The most recent steps in this expansion were the agreement between the Danish Minister in Washington, de Kauffmann (who had been recalled by his Government) with the Federal Government, by which Greenland was practically ceded to America; the American occupation of Iceland, already occupied by the British; the establishment of an American air base on the African continent in Nigeria; and the increasing vehemence of official American formulations, which added to the elastic term of the Western Hemisphere the new expression "American defense frontiers." Secretary of State Hull on September 12 stated that it depended upon the attitude of Germany how far the "defensive waters" of America should extend.

The claims of American writers and speakers are contradictory, since they avoid making a clear difference between geographical and political boundaries. The New York Times of July 20, 1941, fixes the Atlantic border between the hemispheres on the 20th western meridian (see Map I), with the assertion that this is the general agreement between cartographers. A map of the Associated Press appearing on October 19, 1941 in the Shanghai Times (see Map II) shows the same line of demarcation, with, however, two indentations so that the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands remain in the European hemisphere. Both solutions divide Iceland in half, in order to give a geographical justification for the American occupation of Iceland. Vilhjalmur Stefansson in a politically inspired geographical study in Foreign Affairs (No. 3, 1941) entitled "What is the Western Hemisphere?" proposes fixing the boundary in the "middle of the Atlantic channel" at an equal distance from both land masses (see Map III).

In this last on the whole excellent presentation the attempt is made to designate Iceland as an old part of the Western Hemisphere, even before this hemisphere itself is defined. Hence Iceland is claimed as the first European settlement in the Western Hemisphere. To reinforce this theory he quotes a report of the American State Department of 1868 ("A Report of the Resources of Iceland and Greenland" by Benjamin Peirce, Superintendent of the US Coast Survey), which says: "It belongs to the Western Hemisphere." Thus a geological and geographical relationship is quoted to prove a political theory. In actual fact the old Germanic settlement of Iceland was, until its occupation by the British, in personal union with Denmark by having the same king.

ZONE VS. ZONE

With all these American attempts at a representation on a geographical basis one must not forget that, while there is a war in Europe, the United States are still officially at peace.
According to international law, European powers are, on the basis of a state of war, entitled to declare combat zones as a warning for neutral shipping. On the other hand the United States could declare a state of war on the basis of the Neutrality Act, and, in connection with this state of war, a prohibited zone for American shipping. Both were done on November 5, 1939. The fact that the combat zone declared by Germany, which also included Iceland and has often been shown in American maps, and the American neutrality zone, which has carefully left Iceland free, overlap has been the cause of constant friction and may, as the Greer and Kearny incidents have shown, lead to a decided aggravation of European-American relations. (For both zones see Map IV.)

The revision of the Neutrality Act by Congress on November 13 made even this vague and ill-defined limitation for American shipping obsolete. The boundaries of the Western Hemisphere as seen by America have become even more elastic and hence more liable to entail a serious clash.

According to the conservative conception as it is represented by Prof. Beard, the political boundaries of the hemispheres coincide with the land boundaries of the continents. If the doctrine of the freedom of the seas, as it is traditionally expounded by the United States in contrast to the British demands for supremacy of the sea ("Britannia rules the waves"), is to have any real meaning, it must utterly exclude limitations of this freedom of the seas by demarcation of zones of sovereignty and predominance. This applies all the more to a state which cannot yet claim the rights of a belligerent. Its hemisphere ends theoretically and practically with the three-mile limit, and even the American Safety Zone of about 300 miles, which was established at the Panama Conference (see Map IV), has only a theoretical value, as—having been introduced during the war—it has found no general international recognition. The German reply to the Declaration of Panama states unequivocally that a safety zone of this nature can only have a meaning if agreed upon and treated equally by all. (See Documentary Appendix.)

TO THE LOGICAL END

The American demand for extending American "defense frontiers" almost infinitely is, in the real sense of the word, ex-orbitant, that is, reaching beyond its own orbit. This becomes obvious when the demand is carried ad absurdum. At a time when warships were well-known as a mobile means of defense, the range of a cannon, then three miles, was fixed by common consent as the limit of sovereignty. There were only a few powers who did not join in this agreement and demanded a nine or ten-mile limit. Lately, however, attention has been called to the fact that modern guns can shoot much farther, and that airplanes may in a way be considered as long-range artillery. Similar arguments such as the changes that have taken place in warfare through the greater effectiveness of modern weapons, through high-speed warships, submarines, and bombing planes with a large radius connected with airplane carriers, sponsored the Declaration of Panama and the claim for an extension of the boundaries of the Western Hemisphere. But where is such an extension supposed to end in view of the constant development of the effectiveness of modern industry? If every state were to claim this point of view for its defense there would very soon be an unholy confusion in the world of safety zones, defense frontiers, and outposts. In that case Europe could demand bases in Massachusetts, Japan in Australia, the USA in Kamchatka, and Russia in California.

ROOSEVELT AND NELSON

The main reason given for the expansion of the Atlantic boundaries is President Roosevelt's assertion of the menace, economic as well as military, to the American continent or Western Hemisphere (whatever that may be) by Germany. We need only refer to Roosevelt's speech of October
28, 1941, in which he mentioned an alleged German plan to divide up South and Central America and to occupy the Panama Canal.

In the influential periodical Foreign Affairs (July 1941), F.P. Miller, for instance, gives the following reasons for his imperialistic anti-Monroe Doctrine theory of hemisphere expansion:

"The ocean has ceased to be a barrier and has become a highway for enemy attack. Our coastline is no longer the line of American defense. To paraphrase Nelson, our sea and air frontiers have become the shore-lines and air-lines of our enemies. Our freedom as a nation will depend, in the future, less upon our ability to execute land operations than upon our control of the sea and air approaches across the oceans.

"This means that as long as Europe continues to be a source of actual or potential aggression against us, the air and water of the North Atlantic must be controlled by us or by our friends. A glance at the map will show the location of control points in this area. If control over the entire area is to be effective, the controlling forces must be in possession of Greenland, Iceland, the British Isles, Gibraltar, the Azores, Cape Verde Islands, and either Dakar or some nearby point on the West Coast of Africa. From the standpoint of the defense of the United States, these strong-points are our advance bases."

ARE THE AMERICAS MENACED?

Hence an aggressive demand of tremendous extent is built up on a problematical danger. Opposed to such demands that seek to extend the Western Hemisphere into the infinite are the views of military experts, as, for example, those of the well-known collaborator of the New York Times, Hanson W. Baldwin. In an article, "The Realities of Hemisphere Defense," appearing in a recent issue of Reader's Digest, he writes:

"If we must seize half the world in order to defend America, the quicker we know it the better. Let us look at the matter more closely. There is, first of all, the problem of the narrowed world. In terms of time the world is smaller. But what is often overlooked is that this helps the defense as well. Defense forces, as well as attackers, can be rallied far more rapidly than was ever before possible. In the balance of offense and defense, it is just as far as ever from Dakar to Brazil. Moreover, our ships and planes can now be based, not on New York or Norfolk, but on our new strongholds at Trinidad and in British Guiana. And they are roughly as close to the shoulder of Brazil as is Dakar! This is an altogether different picture from the one that has become popular in the hysteria of the moment. There is altogether too much disposition in this country to lose sight of the influence of geography upon war, to regard 1,600 miles of ocean as a mere bagatelle in the seven-league strides of Adolf Hitler. We are asked to envisage an Axis base on the shoulder of Africa and swarms of planes and
ships cutting us off from our sources of strategic raw materials in South America and imprisoning our shipping in the Caribbean. This is absurd. Our shipping would be harried by submarines, surface raiders and planes, but our lines of communication could not be cut. Neither the British nor the Germans have been able to prevent shipping from using the English Channel. 25 miles wide, not 1,600.

"There remains the threat of invasion of South America from African bases. Britain has not yet been invaded, yet she lies within 25 miles of the Continent. The American people may decide to enter the war at the side of Britain. If they do a case can be made out for our temporary occupation of West African bases. But clearly such bases are not vital to Hemisphere Defense: they would probably be more of a liability than an asset."

**AMERICA'S DEFENSE**

There is not much to be added to this in our presentation of the Atlantic boundaries of the Western Hemisphere. These boundaries are to be found neither in Iceland nor Dakar, neither in Ulster nor the Cape Verde Islands. And even if one calls the boundaries of the Western Hemisphere, which are undefined, the American defense frontiers, this does not alter the fact that America can be defended from its own continent.

A recognition of this fact might be seen in the acquisition of bases on British islands within the Western Hemisphere which took place on September 5, 1940 in connection with the destroyer deal and which may be but the first step in this direction. A return to a realization of its own position would show the New World that it is lucky enough, even without extensive safety zones and defense frontiers, without advance posts and bases in other continents, to be more secure than any other great state on earth.
LET TONARIGUMI DO IT

By LILY ABEGG

Those foreigners who have known Japan in former days have almost certainly never heard the word "Tonarigumi," and will wonder what kind of a new invention this may be. On all sides one hears it mentioned. One is told that Tonarigumi is "the lowest political cell in the new structure of Japan," or one hears that Tonarigumi obtains the ration cards for sugar, is responsible for air raid precautions, organizes send-off escorts for soldiers going to the front, or distributes cooking recipes. It seems to be a real maid-of-all-work.

A SONG AND A DANCE

If the foreigner finds himself at a geisha party he will see, among the many old and new songs and dances, a performance of the Tonarigumi dance to the melody of the Tonarigumi song. The Japanese have a craze for everything new and topical and are therefore always ready to participate in or celebrate a new fashion. The past year produced new song hits inspired by air raid precautions, the China incident, the new reform movement, and many other things. No wonder that the new neighborhood leagues are also immediately taken up in songs and dances. The Tonarigumi song, translated into English, goes something like this:

Knock, knock, knock on the door
For we're the neighbors' guild,
When the door is opened
'Tis the face of friends we see.
Please, my neighbor pass around
The notification board,
So we may tell to others
What we have been told.

Knock, knock, knock on the door
For we're the neighbors' guild,
Help for this and help for that
"Miso Shooyu."
Telling how to boil the rice,
While gossiping o'er the fence,
Teaching to other neighbors,
Also being taught.

Knock, knock, knock on the door
For we're the neighbors' guild,
Help in earthquake, lightning, thunder,
Fire and catching thieves,
Giving every mutual aid
And being the watch-dog,
Giving our aid to others,
Also being helped.

Knock, knock, knock on the door
For we're the neighbors' guild,
No matter what the number
We're a single family,
Hearts the same just like the moon
Which shines down on the roofs,
Having our troubles solved
And solving others' too.

The dance to this song represents, in the beautiful, graceful figures of Japanese dancing, the humorous side of neighborhood help, whereby neighborhood gossip is, of course, not forgotten. The song and dance are performed by two geishas who, after much ado and whispering, make a pretty picture as they merrily go off arm in arm.

WHAT IS TONARIGUMI?

But what is Tonarigumi? In short it is the association of usually ten neighboring families for mutual assistance and for the carrying out of various public duties. Heading this neighborhood league is the Tonarigumi-cho, the leader or chief, who is assisted by an acting-leader. Several such leagues are combined in city blocks, these again in districts, the districts in boroughs, and at the head of the boroughs there is a city leader. All leading posts are honorary. In the case
of the Tonarigumis—the ten-family leagues themselves—as well as in the case of blocks and districts, the leaders are almost always private citizens, while the highest positions are usually administered by officials in addition to their regular posts. In this way the Mayor of Tokyo is at the same time the city leader of the neighborhood leagues. In Tokyo, with its five million inhabitants, there are 108,000 Tonarigumis.

One cannot understand the spirit of the Tonarigumis or the scope of their duties without knowing something about their origin. These leagues appeared simultaneously in different places after the outbreak of the China conflict, when living conditions began to get more difficult. The stimulus for them went out from the semi-official “Bureau for Spiritual Mobilization” formed in 1938. The idea was, however, taken up so readily and quickly that one can almost speak of a spontaneous national movement. This would hardly have been possible if it had been a question of something entirely new. The Tonarigumis link up with a tradition interrupted many years ago; for in former centuries there were very similar organizations in Japan. It speaks for the feeling for tradition and the active historical sense of the Japanese people that in the present critical period it remembered a proven organization of olden times that had apparently been long forgotten.

AN OLD IDEA

The system of neighborhood leagues was introduced in Japan as early as the seventh century in connection with the Taikwa reforms. It originated in China, where at that time every five families (or rather family clans), combined in neighborhood associations, formed the cells of the state. These associations were called Go-ho in Japan, which means “provision of safety among five (families).” The Go-ho were responsible for questions of economy and for the maintenance of peace and safety. Later these associations temporarily lost their importance in Japan—as in China—because the families and clans regained the ascendancy. In both countries the state had introduced these very associations as a counterweight against the growing power of the family clans. Through the neighborhood associations the state attempted to cultivate a community spirit not based exclusively on family bonds.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century the Tokugawa Shoguns, who succeeded in uniting and pacifying the whole country, again introduced this system, at that time maintained by only a few of the princes, with some modifications in all of Japan. These Goningumi (five men associations) also had economic and political duties. The leader of the Goningumi was a sort of connecting link between the people and the government and had multifarious duties, from settling quarrels to selling land and collecting taxes. He had also to see to it that individual clans did not become powerful enough again to oppose the rule of the Shoguns.

During the Meiji period these Goningumi, together with most other traditional organizations, were abolished in the course of the great changes of that time. Three quarters of a century later they have now come to life again. It is significant that this time they were not solely created or decreed from “above”—perhaps to keep the families under control, or with some other political intention—but grew spontaneously out of the population. The “Bureau for Spiritual Mobilization” had after all no legal power to enforce the creation of Tonarigumis; it could only offer suggestions and encouragement.

CHINA HAS THEM TOO

It is interesting in this connection that in China too, in 1935 and 1936, these almost forgotten associations were revived under the name of Pao-chia (responsible headman, or guarantor) organizations. It was Chiang Kai-shek who introduced them, after the dispersion of the Communists, in the war-torn provinces of Central China with the aim of ensuring peace, security, and reconstruction. At the time they were sponsored mainly for political reasons.
The headman of each association had to guarantee that there were no Communist elements among its members. Wang Ching-wei has also recently reintroduced this long proven Far Eastern organization. In a model district established by the Nanking Government near Soochow—about halfway between Nanking and Shanghai—which contains about 200,000 people, the Pao-chia are to be the basic cells for peace, security, and reconstruction.

The Tonarigumis first made their appearance in Tokyo and then in a few other large cities. In the country, where there had always been a sort of neighborhood help and village community spirit, there was less reason for their creation. Hence today the Tonarigumi organizations are more developed in the large cities than in smaller towns and in the country. However, the spreading of Tonarigumis over the whole of Japan is only a question of time.

At first hardly taken seriously, especially in intellectual circles, the Tonarigumis soon attracted the interest of the Government to an increasing extent. On behalf of individual families they undertook the despatch of economic and other questions, so that in the end the public services found it more convenient to make use of these leagues.

**RATION CARDS, AIR RAIDS, AND EVACUATION**

Today the distribution of rationed foodstuffs and other goods is carried out everywhere by the Tonarigumis or similar rural organizations. Rationing has not been uniformly regulated in Japan and differs in the various provinces and large cities. There are, for example, districts possessing enough charcoal (still the most important fuel in Japan), and others where there is a scarcity of this commodity, so that the consumption must be regulated. Today in Tokyo and other large cities the Tonarigumis take care of the distribution of sugar, matches, charcoal and coal, rice, flour, edible oil, towels, and rice wine. The rationing of fish, meat, and soya bean sauce (which takes the place of our fats) is about to come into force. In several places the Tonarigumis, when required, also handle the distribution of cotton, bandages, and other articles as soon as a shortage is felt.

Furthermore the Tonarigumis form the backbone of the air raid precautions system. The Tonarigumi-cho is at the same time an air raid warden, and his neighborhood league is obliged to provide auxiliary forces for firefighting, salvage work, etc.

The evacuation of large cities and other dangerous areas, to be provided in an emergency for children under fourteen and all persons over sixty, is being prepared by the Tonarigumis. Many meetings have already taken place in the Tonarigumis and among their leaders to discuss the best methods of evacuation.

In other respects, however, the range of duties for the Tonarigumis is not uniformly regulated. According to the initiative of the members it can extend to all kind of things, such as mutual aid in cases of illness, labor shortage (where men have been conscripted), or, on the contrary, unemployment. There are Tonarigumis that make wholesale purchases to save money, that send off packages to the front, that rent empty building sites to plant vegetables. Practically all of them hitherto provided escorts at funerals, weddings, and for departing and returning soldiers. Recently, however, this custom has been greatly curtailed in the general trend towards simplicity and economy.

**A BUSY MAN**

The Tonarigumi-cho is a very busy man, for all his work is done in an honorary capacity in addition to his regular job. He is responsible for the just distribution of articles of daily need and for making public the official regulations in question. In order to save paper he pastes one copy on a wooden board—so that the paper will not tear—and sends this board from family to family. The Tonarigumi-cho is usually the owner of a shop, a bookseller, hardware dealer or something similar. In any case he must be a man who works...
mainly at his home and is not occupied the whole day at an office or in a large business house. The meetings of a neighborhood league take place in the houses of all ten families in turn. Only the heads of each household—usually the head of the family—take part in the meeting, but of course they can also send their wives, brothers or sons as their representatives if they are too busy to come themselves. In a suburb of Tokyo there is even a German Tonarigumi-cho, probably the only foreigner to have been given this honor.

**WOMEN'S SHARE**

As the men are often out or at their place of work and as furthermore mostly household questions are dealt with, women occupy a very prominent place in the Tonarigumis. For the Japanese woman, whose life had hitherto been limited to the family and household, the neighborhood leagues are on the whole a welcome change and innovation. They can now have discussions in meetings, have an opportunity to meet new people, and may even have their say in such important public affairs as distribution of food, evacuation, etc. With this the Japanese woman has suddenly begun to come out into the open. This is a healthy and natural development, for in the long run Japan can hardly get along without some cooperation of women. This has already become apparent during the last few years, when many women have had to take the places of their husbands conscripted for war service.

Meeting the neighbors is a new experience not only for the women but for all Japanese city dwellers. Under similar circumstances as in the belligerent countries of Europe people are now being brought together who formerly hardly knew each other by sight. Japanese circles are right in pointing out that the Tonarigumis, even if they had not been dissolved, could not have flourished during the last fifty years, as they did not fit into that liberal period. Without a community spirit neighborhood leagues are impossible.

**CELS FOR A NEW STRUCTURE**

In the pyramid-like structure of the neighborhood organizations the center of gravity lies in the ten-family leagues, that is in the real Tonarigumis. They are so to speak the soul of the whole; this is where the daily life of the people pulses, and the willing cooperation of the neighbors is the only warrant for the neighborhoods' satisfactory and beneficial working in the future. Although as yet the Tonarigumi-cho has nothing to do with political affairs, it seems to be in the nature of present developments for the neighborhood leagues to be gradually incorporated in the political structure of Japan. From a legal point of view the nature of the Tonarigumis is still unclear; they can be considered neither as purely private organizations nor as public bodies.

For the present the Tonarigumi organizations meet the Government organizations halfway, so to speak, and the contact points in the large cities are the boroughs and in smaller towns the municipal administration. The food ration cards, for example, are given out in Tokyo at the borough halls to the leaders of the neighborhood leagues of these boroughs. These leaders, and no other municipal or government organs, hand on the cards to the districts, blocks, and Tonarigumis. Due to the personal union existing between the highest leaders of the neighborhood leagues and the higher officials of the municipal or local administration, there is a close contact between the wishes and suggestions coming from below and the desires of the Government.

Of all the innovations that have come into existence in Japan the Tonarigumis are without question among the most successful. They will decidedly play a part, in one way or another, in the future of the country, for they represent an organization that has already proved its reality and that will, I am sure, be characteristic of the new political structure of Japan.
SOCIETY DIES HARD
By K. H. ABSHAGEN

Modern wars have the tendency to beget revolutions. The birth of the Third French Republic in 1870 and its collapse seventy years later; the tottering and fall of the Romanov dynasty in 1905 and 1917; the end of the Habsburg monarchy in 1918; the German revolution of 1918 and 1919; the “March on Rome” in 1922—all these important political changes were intimately linked with wars. When the people have been asked to give their lives for the “Patric,” “Vaterland,” or “Rodina,” those who survive the wars cannot go on as they did before. Amidst trenches and bombs their outlook and sense of values have changed, and many things they had accepted before have become intolerable.

Great Britain, a victor of the last war and a nation of deeply rooted traditions, has changed its mode of life very little as a result of the Great War. Too little, it now seems. Essentially everything remained the same. But in the present war things are different. This time it is not a war fought on the distant battlefields of France: it is a war in which, for the first time, every English man and woman is a participant. In a recent article in “Harper’s Magazine,” Mr. Harold J. Laski, well-known English author, said: “There is a greater chance today of what may be termed a revolution by consent in Britain than at any time in history.” And indeed, apart from military developments, the inner transformation of Great Britain is one of the major problems of this war. Mr. Abshagen writes about it with the keen eye of a trained observer, with sympathy for the British people, and humorous sarcasm for their ruling class.

Mr. Abshagen has made a special study of British society. His book “King, Lords, and Gentlemen” was published by Heinemann’s in London a few weeks before the outbreak of the present war. An army officer in the Great War, Mr. Abshagen went into journalism in 1918. “From that moment,” he says, “I never looked back.” During the last fifteen years he has lived and worked in many European capitals. At present he is covering the Orient. K.M.

MR. BRYANT MAKES A DISCOVERY

A startling discovery was recently made by Arthur Bryant, that distinguished British author, historian, and biographer (of Samuel Pepys fame). In his weekly column in the Illustrated London News, a few months ago, he surprised his well-to-do British readers by the blunt statement that the greatest change in the civilized world during the last two hundred years had not been the coming of railways, electricity, gas-cookers, or even the daily press, but the emergence of class consciousness. Truth to tell, Mr. Bryant’s elucidating article makes it clear that he himself has for some time been aware of this phenomenon; but quite obviously he is under the impression that he conveys something absolutely new and surprising to the particular class of reader the Illustrated London News caters for.

THE GOOD OLD DAYS OF QUEEN ANNE

Speaking of the times of Queen Anne and George II, Mr. Bryant says that class barriers were at that time probably even more rigid and clearly defined than they are today. They were, on the other hand, no more of a problem to either rich or poor than is, say, the weather. Class division
and distinction, Mr. Bryant thinks, were to the people of England in those not very remote times a natural phenomenon like a shower or a smell. The class system with its gross inequalities and human limitations was as universally accepted as the South Downs or the Bristol Channel. He thinks that in recent years a great change has taken place, so that the awareness and resentment of class have become “part of the air the moderns have breathed.” Mr. Bryant thinks that, as a result, the members of the “upper” classes or those who believe they belong there, though socially proud of the fact, politically have become ashamed of it; while what the Victorians used to call the “lower orders” are inclined to be troubled by the feeling—Mr. Bryant does not say whether it is justified or not—of not getting a square deal.

All this—according to Mr. Bryant—produces “a kind of permanent acid stomach-ache in the body politic.” And, perhaps not too surprisingly, Mr. Bryant ends up with a sally against Hitler, whom he accuses of deliberately attempting to administer to the British people the poisonous drug of class consciousness. Mr. Bryant thinks that class consciousness, like other poisons, if given in moderate doses, may be useful for the abolition of abuses and oppressions. If taken indiscriminately, however, it would threaten to evoke “two of the most destructive passions in the world—envy in the poor and fear in the rich.”

THE “UPPER” CLASSES

Class consciousness and even class hatred may, in 1941, appear to most people outside of Great Britain to be a rather hackneyed subject, particularly for discussion, not by a soap-box orator but by a writer of Mr. Arthur Bryant’s standing and reputation. If, however, we take into consideration the political and social scene in England, we might even conclude that Mr. Bryant has understated rather than exaggerated the startling nature of the belated emergence of class consciousness in that country. Startling, at least, from the viewpoint of the average reader of the Illustrated London News, that is, of those “who belong or think they belong to a ‘higher’ class.”

Up to the outbreak of the present war, class consciousness in England was almost as rare among the poor as among the rich and noble. The social upheavals which followed the Great War and reached their climax at the time of the General Strike in 1926 had receded into the past and were almost forgotten.

Labor ministers, on the occasion of their appointment, had kissed the hand of the King and had submitted to Court ceremonial; Labor politicians had accepted peerages and Trade Unionists had become knights. The privileged position of Society—with a capital S—seemed to be as secure as ever. The “National Government,” supported by an enormous Tory majority in the House of Commons, was made up in the main of the “right” people. At any rate, it was managed by the “right” people, who, in the well-known manner, met at week ends in the country, at race meetings, and at the “right” sort of clubs, etc. The “lower orders” did not seem seriously to object to this state of affairs, as evidenced among other things by the presence of only one rather tame Communist in the House of Commons. Hence, in the summer of 1939, things did not seem so very different from what they must have been under Queen Anne or George II.

WHAT THIS WAR MEANS

For any careful, unbiased observer, however, who had the opportunity of living in England during the last few years preceding the present war, it was not difficult to realize that this state of affairs could not go on indefinitely. One felt that, if Britain were involved in a major war for the second time within a generation, this might mean the end of the rule of that curious mixture of feudal aristocracy and plutocracy that has passed for so long as British Democracy. Whatever the outcome of the war might be, the
people of Britain would, once the struggle were over, no longer endure the rule of those who had led them into this second conflict—and had led them into it with shockingly inadequate armor.

The other reason why this rule of a socially privileged minority was bound to come to an end, once a new war started, was obvious to anyone with even superficial insight into the workings of the complicated, delicately balanced machinery of the British Government: the actual method of government was based on the existence of an abnormally high standard of living for the ruling few, and the war was bound to consume the wealth on which this standard of living depended.

Sir John Simon's speech, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, introducing the first War Budget on September 27, 1939, was in fact the death knell of that system which hitherto had ruled England. With income tax plus surtax taking as much as 83% of the large incomes, with death duties claiming one half and more of really big estates, the aristocracy and landed gentry must before long be driven from their country manors. Even if this rule of the aristocracy and landed gentry had for some considerable time been watered down by the influx of the new rich, it still depended for its acceptance by the masses on its facade of feudalism. These masses, which were willing to be governed by "real gentlemen," would never, in the long run, submit to the undisguised predominance of mere material wealth.

INNOCENTS AT HOME

The only people who did not grasp this inescapable logic were those whom it most concerned. They went to war to prevent the spread of National Socialism, a threat to their own predominance, but they failed to realize that the very fact of war would hasten their own disintegration as a ruling class. In the years before the war, they and their representatives in Government and in diplomatic positions abroad had signally misjudged the strength and direction of the new political movements which, with varying methods and varying success, were striving for a solution of the very class problems which had as yet scarcely cropped up in Britain.

In the same way they now misjudged the patience of their own people. This became evident quite early after the outbreak of this war. An unprecedented wave of public discontent swept the country when the "brass hats" of the War Office tried to enforce the old rule that privates must not visit restaurants frequented by officers for their meals or amusement. After long discussions in the press and in Parliament the rule was dropped; but the damage had been done.

THE FATE OF THE CHILDREN

What contributed more than anything else to the stirring up of class consciousness was the mass exodus of children of the privileged classes to the United States and Canada, while the children of the rest of the population had to remain in Britain. These could either stay with their parents in the bombed industrial areas or be evacuated to the country.

The reaction of the masses was so violent that, for a while, it gave quite a shock to many of those who until then had felt it to be the most natural thing in the world to send their own offspring to safety, even if, unfortunately, the same privilege could not be extended to other children. After all, they had never felt any qualms about carrying on their own way of living even in war time. In an only slightly modified form, adapted to the inevitable change caused by German bombers, they continued their rounds of social events and amusements, at a time when in the East End of London tens of thousands of fellow Britons for weeks on end had neither a roof over their heads nor a decently cooked meal.

CHARITIES

Of course it would be wrong to think that society people in Britain are doing
nothing at all but continue to have a good time. Many thousands of the men are serving in the armed forces or in the many special services which modern warfare has created. Women, too, are doing their bit as nurses, with the WRENS and WAAFS, etc. And then there are the many charities. But it is just in these charities, the way they are run—which is exactly the same way that has prevailed since the times of Queen Anne and which has now become such an appalling anachronism—that the futility of society's effort to hold its own becomes most manifest.

SOCIETY CARRIES ON

Meanwhile, to all outward appearances society carries on. If one looks at one of the fashionable illustrated weeklies, be it the Illustrated London News, the Sphere or the Tatler, one sees all the usual pictures of debutantes, of young brides and mothers—of course only of the "right" people. We see the same pictures of race meetings, hunt balls, and garden parties, with the one difference that these social events are nowadays mostly held not in Great Britain, but in the safety of Eire—one advantage in Mr. De Valera's policy of strict neutrality—or in India, or, most important of all, in the United States. It is really astounding, the number of socialites who have found ways and means—and the necessary permit to take out exchange—to serve their country in America, be it as propagandists, be it by transferring their anachronistic charity business to the western shore of the Atlantic.

It carries on, too, in the field of Government. With all the reshuffles in the Cabinet since the war began, Mr. Churchill's "equipe" has changed very little. The few newcomers, with the exception of two or three Labor politicians who were taken into the Government for the main purpose of silencing potential opposition, are all of the "right" people. Even patent misfits have not been got rid of, because they belong to one's good friends.

Important departments of state are practically exempt from Parliamentary control by the system of appointing ministers from outside Parliament, who do not even bother to undergo the formality of being returned uncontested to the House of Commons but prefer to accept a peerage. At scarcely any time during the last twenty years have there been more ministers of the Crown sitting in the Upper House than at present. The most determined die-hard could have little to complain of if outward appearances mean anything.

SOCIETY DIES HARD

And yet the system under which social position combined with wealth has been ruling England is dying. The people of England are tired of it, and it is only due to the patriotism and perfect discipline shown by the British people during the first two years of the war, in spite of all their disappointments and discontent, that Mr. Churchill can continue to govern Great Britain with the old crowd of politicians who were responsible not only for the pre-war period but for all the blunders committed since the war began.

But one has only to look closely at the British press, particularly at the provincial papers, to learn from any number of articles, reports, and thousands of "Letters to the Editor" how deep is the concern with which the best citizens of Great Britain are following the record of their rulers. Moreover one can also perceive a growing determination that, when the war is over, great changes must be effected.

In the meantime, as we have said, society carries on. Judging from Mr. Bryant's article, it is only just beginning to discover that class distinctions can create serious problems—problems, indeed, of life and death for the individual as well as for whole classes and systems of government. English society, without knowing it, is already doomed. But no doubt it will fight on with its die-hard stubbornness to the very end.
THE MOSLEMS OF CHINA

By J. H. EFFENBERG

The last thirty years have shown that the forces of emotion play a far greater part in politics and international relations than the enlightened nineteenth century was willing to concede. Among the emotional forces religion is one of the strongest, and Islam, with its 250 million followers, is one of the four great religions of the world. Once the most aggressive faith of its time, Islam conquered within a few decades the lands from the Pyrenees to Central Asia and carried the Crescent as far as the Pacific. After a period of comparative obscurity it has now again become a political factor. Its role in western Asia and its attitude towards the present war are a subject of widespread interest.

During the last year the spotlight of events touching upon the Moslem problem has moved steadily eastward, from Egypt to Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, and India. The German advance toward the Caucasus and Central Asia will undoubtedly have its repercussions among the violently anti-Russian and anti-Bolshevist Moslems of Soviet Central Asia, and these in turn are closely linked to their religious brothers in China.

In our last issue we published an article on the Turks of Russia written by a Tartar. We now follow it up with the story of the Moslems of China, by an author who has probably had as much personal experience among them as any man living. Ever since his boyhood days, when he read the daily reports of the Russo-Japanese war in the newspapers, Mr. Effenberg's interest has been the study of Asia. After the Great War, in which he requested and was granted a detail in the Turkish Army, he came to China for the Seventh Day Adventists Mission. He has been here ever since, traveling through all but four of the provinces. Most of his time, however, he has spent in China's Far West—six years as mission director in Szechwan and eastern Tibet and four years as superintendent for the northwest with his headquarters in Lanchow. The greater part of his travels was made in a specially designed automobile, and he was the first to reach the Koko Nor by car.—K.M.

THE MOSLEM QUESTION—A WORLD PROBLEM

The Asiatic continent is seething with unrest. Great changes have occurred here in the past few decades, yet the new face of Asia is still in the making. Parallel to the awakening of Japan in the Far East, another gigantic change in Asiatic life is slowly but steadily taking place—the awakening of the Moslem world. The vastness of this phenomenon can be seen when one realizes that every eighth person on the globe is a follower of the Prophet. Although the Moslem problem may hence be regarded as a problem of world-wide interest, it is primarily of interest to Asia, since the vast majority—more than 150 millions—of the followers of Mahomet are Asiatics. They form a wide belt across the old world from the Mediterranean in the west to the Yellow Sea in the east.

Moslem populations in this belt:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>14,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq and Arabia</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine and Syria</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>14,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern India and Afghaniastan</td>
<td>75,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Central Asia</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Central Asia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chinese Turkestan, Kansu, Koko Nor, Ninghsia, Shensi)</td>
<td>11,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of China</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>153,500,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Besides those mentioned above, there are 30 to 40 million Moslems in the Netherlands East Indies, and 60 to 70 million in Africa and the rest of the world, bringing their number to a total of some 250 million.

"ONCE A MOSLEM . . ."

The secret of Mahomet’s success is the deep consciousness common to all Moslems of an all-embracing brotherhood. This consciousness is based on their holy script. In the Koran, Surah 3, 97-98 we read: “O ye faithful give glory to Allah, and never die otherwise than a Moslem . . . remember that by the great and venerable deed of Allah ye all have been made into one great brotherhood.” Hence the saying, “Once a Moslem, always a Moslem.” Irrespective of family, clan or color, the Moslem is born into a new race, a tie that can never be broken except on pain of death.

This may be the answer, at least in part, as to why the Christian Church has failed in its endeavors in the Moslem world. I know of one mission society that has been working hard among the Moslems of the Near East for forty years without having gained a single Moslem convert. Another society has worked for more than two hundred years without much more success. Of course they have gained converts, but they are all from among other peoples, from other sources. Not one is from among the followers of the prophet of fire and the sword. “Once a Moslem, always a Moslem” seems to stand as immovably today as a thousand years ago.

ARE THEY CHINESE?

In general the Moslems of China are foreign to this country. They are strangers in a strange land. They have come from far off, and they were compelled by force of circumstance to settle down among a people of different race, different speech, different mentality, customs, and religion. Chinese literature and history refers to them as the Hui Chao (回教). Hui stands for Moslem, and Chao means “emigrants abroad”; hence “Moslem emigrants abroad.” In 1911 the new Government of the Republic of China recognized this fact when it ascertained that the Republic comprised five races, all living within the borders of the Middle Kingdom. These five races were named as follows: Han, Man, Mung, Hui, Chang (漢、滿、蒙、回、藏), that is Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Moslems, and Tibetans. A five-colored flag representing these five races was adopted, white representing the Moslems as a race distinct from the Chinese.

Sometimes the name Ta Shi Hui (大食回) is used. Ta Shi stands for Moslems than any other country except India and the Netherland East Indies.

In some places, especially the Central Asiatic districts of China, the Moslem population outnumbers the Chinese in the proportion of seven to one. Then there are vast Moslem communities to be found in many of the great cities of China. Peking in the north is credited with a Moslem population of 200,000; Canton in the south with 100,000; Chengtu in the west with 80,000, and so on. Again there are whole districts with a very small number of Moslems, and some places without any at all. Actually, however, we can find them in greater or smaller numbers throughout all of China. Wherever I went on my travels from the plains of Mongolia to Indo-China and Yunnan, from the China Sea to the boundaries in Central Asia, I have found the sons of Sem. I even found them on the roof of the world, settled in the grasslands of eastern and northern Tibet.

MOSLEMS IN CHINA

In the absence of any reliable censustaking, figures about Moslems in China vary greatly. According to the most reliable authorities, their number is estimated at between 20 and 25 millions. Hence they outnumber their co-religionists in Arabia, the cradle of Islam, by four to one, and China ranks third among the Moslem countries of the world, giving shelter to more
Arabia, hence "Arabian Moslems." But not all Moslems in China are of Arabian descent. Scientists divide them according to their origin into the following groups: the Arabian or Ta Shi, the Turkish or Salar, and the Mongol or Hui Hu (ウィ ひ) Moslems.

In their religious activities the Moslems of China can hardly be called aggressive. Intermarriage with the Chinese is by no means uncommon, but mainly on one side only. The Moslems often take Chinese girls as wives for their sons, but are seldom willing to marry one of their own daughters to a Chinese. The children of such unions, since especially the sons are carefully brought up in the Moslem faith, increase the number of Moslems; but there are very few so-called "direct proselytes." Nevertheless, whatever the number of these may be, there is one branch which does not belong to any of the three above-mentioned groups and which we may truly call "Chinese Moslems." Thus we have to distinguish clearly between "Moslems in China" and "Chinese Moslems."

**HOW THE MOSLEMS CAME TO CHINA**

China, always closely guarded against foreigners and foreign influence, was considered up to the time of the Opium War the dark, mysterious, closed land of the Orient. Yet the Moslems not only entered but settled all over the Middle Kingdom in great numbers. It is recorded that even before the year 1000 A.D. the mosques of the Moslem communities scattered throughout China numbered more than five thousand.

The Moslems of China came from the Near East — from Arabia, Turkey, and the Central Asiatic Moslem states. They came by two routes, by sea and by land. They came by boat from Arabia via the Indian Ocean, and by land from Turkey and Central Asia via the Ta Lu (タ ル), the "Great Road." This is one of the world's oldest, longest, and most interesting roads. It is the ancient route of trade and migration linking the Occident with the Orient, Peking with Rome. It is the great channel through which the Crescent has penetrated freely into the Middle Kingdom. Hence we can up to the present time find Moslems residing almost everywhere along the Great Road, from Istanbul in the west to Peking in the east. Till ten years ago, that is, before an auto highway was built in Central Asia parallel to the Great Road, all traffic was handled exclusively by the Moslems.

The story of the Moslems in China is as old as Moslem history itself. It is recorded that, while Mahomet was still alive, one of his cousins, Wa Abi Kabsha, came to China. Some historians insist he was a maternal uncle of Mahomet's. Cousin or uncle — the fact remains that he took the sea route and landed, the first Moslem though not the first Arab, in Canton with a band of merchants, all followers of the new faith. His name is immortalized in the history of Islam, and with him begins the fascinating story of the Moslems in China.

After his arrival in the great port of Canton he set out immediately for a long journey overland. His aim was Chang An (長安) in Shensi, the Sian of today, which was then the capital of China. He was to pay a visit to the Emperor of the Middle Kingdom and lay a firm foundation for the future of his brethren. He did his work thoroughly indeed. On his arrival in Chang An he introduced himself to the Emperor as an Ambassador from Ta Shi Kuo (大食國), Arabia. He was received in audience by the Emperor Tai Chung (太宗). The result of his visit was that he could return with the permit in his hand to settle in Canton with his band of followers. There he organized the first Moslem community in China, and erected the first mosque to spread the teachings of the Prophet. Two of the four mosques as well as one of the two ancient pagodas in Canton are accredited to this energetic apostle and founder of Islam in China. He died fifteen years later and was buried outside the "Great North Gate" in Canton.
The "Moon Tower" of a Chinese Mohammedan mosque, topped by a crescent and decorated with Arabic script.

Ching Cheng Ssu, the great mosque at Linski.

Interior of Ching Cheng Ssu. The steps in the right-hand background lead to the pulpit, while the large carved inscription in the foreground reads "Allah."
A Mohammedan restaurant, as indicated by the characters Hui Hui at the very top, the water-kettles signifying purity, and the pictures of sheep and a cow to show that no pork is served.

MOSLEMS IN CHINA

A turbanned Moslem

A mullah, and his attendants. They still prefer Arabic to Chinese.
After this glorious beginning, another "ambassador" accompanied by great numbers of merchants was sent out from Arabia to China. They followed the route of their forerunners and arrived in China during the reign of Emperor Tang Yuan Kai (~ 唐元), about 625 A.D., settling at several different seaports along the China coast as far north as Hangchow.

**ALLIES FROM BAGDAD**

One of the greatest epochs of expansion of Islam in China took place at the end of the eighth century. Unrest and rebellion had broken out against the Government, and a state of terror existed throughout the country. In order to quell the uprising the Tang Emperor Su Tsung (唐宗皇) appealed to his friend Abur Giafer, Caliph of the fourth Caliphate in Bagdad. The Arabs at the time were at the height of their power and glory, and Caliph Abur, in response to the appeal, sent an army of his best cavalry to China. They took the route along the Great Road of Central Asia. Their number varies, according to the historian, between four and ten thousand men. These sturdy warriors crushed the rebels, but never returned to their mother country. They found the Middle Kingdom a so infinitely more pleasant place to live in than the sandy desert plains of Arabia that they expressed their desire to make it their new home. The Emperor, in recognition of their services, granted their petition. They were permitted to settle in small groups in all the larger cities of China, and to marry Chinese girls. This might explain why history records thousands of Moslem communities as early as the tenth century, and this is supposed to be the nucleus of the present Moslem population of China.

Even now the mixing of Arab and Chinese blood can be clearly recognized in many of the descendants of those Arab soldiers. Arabic traits have prevailed over the Chinese. In spite of centuries of living among the Chinese, and although intermarriage between the sons of Sem and the daughters of Han has left its mark upon their individual as well as their communal life, the fact remains that they have retained many peculiarities of feature, manners, and customs which clearly distinguish them from the Chinese.

**THE MOSLEMS OF SOUTHWEST CHINA**

The majority of Moslems in China are to be found in the provinces of the southwest and northwest. Yunnan is credited with a Moslem population of 3 to 4 millions, and the northwest with more than 11 millions. The Moslems of the southwest have a history altogether their own. Their ancestors may have been immigrants, but only to a small degree. They have been made up to a great extent of proselytes from among the aborigines of Yunnan—the Nosu, or Lolo, and Miao tribes. Their history is also of more recent date. At the close of the thirteenth century, in the days of the Mongol dynasty, Kublai Khan sent one of his ministers, Omar, as governor to Yunnan. Omar was an immigrant and a devoted follower of Mahomet. He called many Moslems to Yunnan and settled them all over the country as proselytizing missionaries with the aim of converting all the wild aborigines to the Prophet. His plan met with considerable success. When he died, after more than half a century of hard and faithful work, a large part of the population of Yunnan were followers of the Prophet.

**THE GREAT NORTHWEST**

Chinese Central Asia, often called the "Great Northwest," holds an important place in Chinese history. It has been the scene of much fierce fighting and bloodshed, and the home of many strange peoples. In fact, the Great Northwest is more cosmopolitan than Chinese. Here live many different peoples of contrary nature. Side by side and even intermingled we may find Tibetans and Chinese, Mongols and Moslems, Russians, aborigines, and others. Here the traveler may listen
to many strange and different tongues and dialects: various Chinese dialects, Turkic, Arabic, Mongolian, Tibetan, Persian, Russian, etc.

It was from the Great Northwest that the Huns went out in the fourth century, starting what is known in European history as the migration of nations. Here at the beginning of the thirteenth century Temu-Ching was made Genghis Khan—"chief of chieftains." Today the Great Northwest is still the home of millions of Moslems, in fact of more than half of all those living in China.

Whence and at what period did these Moslems of the Great Northwest come? Very little is known concerning their appearance and establishment there. But, in contrast to the Moslems of the southwest, it seems evident that those of the northwest are descended from immigrants. They possess a very strong racial, one might even say national feeling. The following little incident illustrates this.

In the city square in Lanchow, capital of Kansu, I once met a band of Hui Hu Moslems selling furs. With Chinese politeness I inquired as to their health, their home, whence they came, and where they were going. They promptly and emphatically replied: "We are not Chinese, we are foreigners like you." Of course they had never seen a foreign country, they had been born and raised in the Great Northwest, but that was the way they felt. Millions of Moslems in China today, especially in the northwest, likewise probably consider themselves just as much foreigners as did those Hui Hu friends of mine.

**MOSLEMS AND TIBETANS**

It seems that the Moslems of the northwest all came from Asia Minor and Central Asia, and all followed the same route over the Great Road. We mentioned how in the eighth century the Arab cavalry had successfully fought their way along the Great Road.
through Central Asia. It is very likely that, after they had quelled the Tibetan uprising and were permitted to make the Middle Kingdom their new home, many of them preferred to settle right there where they had fought. Moreover, it would have been only natural for the Emperor to have kept a good contingent of these sturdy soldiers in the northwest to deal with any further attempt at revolt on the part of the Tibetans. It is a historic fact that the Moslems of the northwest are to this day the sworn enemies of the Tibetans.

During the past thousand years the Great Northwest has been not only the scene of fierce fighting between Moslems and Chinese, but has time and again been the battlefield for Moslems and Tibetans. Whenever these two wild forces have met in combat, the earth of the northwest has been literally drenched with blood. Nowhere in all China have I found so many ruined villages and cities as in the Great Northwest, bearing silent witness to the destructive forces of hatred and revenge. It seems that these descendants of the sons of the Arabian desert have never forgotten the command of their great Caliph, and have always remained faithful to the purpose for which they were sent out, namely to subdue the Tibetans.

**THE MONGOL AND TURKIC MOSLEMS**

The Mongol Moslems are descended from a once powerful Central Asiatic tribe called the Uigur. They migrated to central Chinese Turkestan, intermarried with and were absorbed by the Mongols, who in turn were joined by Arabian emigrants with whom they intermarried. This threefold mixture of race and blood is today known as the Hui Hu, and the Chinese as the *Chan T'ou* Moslems. (*Chan*, to bind, and *t'ou*, head, gives us *Chan T'ou Hui*, or "Moslems who bind their heads," that is, turbaned Moslems.) They have their own customs and their own language, a distinct Mongol dialect. They are very proud of their ancestors, the Uigurs, of whom it is said that they took part in the invasion of Europe in the ranks of Attila's fierce Huns. Today they are no less wild and independent than their cousins the Arabs.

The Turkic Hui Hui or Salar Moslems are the latecomers among the Moslems of the Great Northwest. They are to be found at present in Kansu, about a hundred miles to the southwest of Lanchow, around Tita and Hsuen Hua. When visiting their district I was greatly puzzled at not being able to understand anything of their conversation. They have, like the other groups, their own strange language. Their former home seems to have been either Persia or Samarkand. One story relates that when Genghis Khan, having vanquished the Bagdad Caliphate, returned to the northwest, he brought back with him thousands of Persian soldiers. These warriors settled in the Great Northwest and may be the forefathers of the present Salar Moslems. Another story is common among the Salars which relates that their ancestors' home was Samarkand, and runs as follows.

**WHITE CAMEL AND RED WHISKERS**

On account of their taste for freebooting and plundering and generally making the highways unsafe, the Salars were expelled from Samarkand by their ruler, a relative of Mahomet. They were forbidden to return on pain of death. Three things their ruler gave them on their departure—a white camel, a bottle of water, and a bag of a particular kind of soil. They were told that the white camel would lead them to their future home, and that the water and soil of that place would correspond to the specimens given to them. One day, after a long and hazardous journey, they were amazed and greatly stirred to see the perfect shape of their white camel on a rock on the mountainside. They tested the water and examined the soil: both proved to be of the same quality as their specimens. When they looked for their white camel they could not find
it—it had mysteriously disappeared. So they were convinced that at last they had found their new home, and they settled down and are living there to this day.

Unlike the descendants of the Arabs and Uigurs they never changed their place of dwelling, and the wild blood of their ancestors seems still to be pulsing in the veins of many of the Salar Moslems. They are notorious throughout the Great Northwest for their robber instincts and their free-booting. On my travels through western China and the Great Northwest I met up with the lords of the highways and byways not less than sixteen times. On thirteen of these occasions I had the honor to meet the sons of Sem, called by the Chinese Hung Fu Tzi (Hung Fu Tzi), "red whiskers," as many Moslems wear a red beard. Whenever I met them I offered them my calling card and made friends with them. But they never gave me one of their cards in return. I would not be surprised if they did not have any, for they can have little use for them in their strange business. But even though they failed to inform me about their residence, I have always had more than a suspicion that my wild looking friends were followers of that mysterious white camel. Every time that I came up with them it was always somewhere in Kansu, the land of their adoption.

The language of the Turkic or Salar Moslems is related to modern Turkish. Anyone who can speak that tongue will be able to understand their language. Once I had an accident with my car. Governor Ma Pu Fang (Ma Pu Fang) offered me his car for a trip to the Kumbum monastery. One of his secretaries took the opportunity to go with us. In our conversation he told me that he was born in Adrianople and that he was really a Turk from Turkey. He had come to the Great Northwest only a few weeks ago, yet he could converse fluently with the Salar Moslems.

**ARABIC THEIR LANGUAGE**

The predominant language of the Moslems in the northwest is Arabic. I have been in their schools in Sining, the capital of Chinhai, and other places, and have visited the Moslem University in Hochow, Kansu. Everywhere almost all their main teaching work is done in Arabic. It is no wonder, therefore, that Moslems living more than a thousand years among the Chinese have retained so many of their own characteristics. Sining with its great Moslem population is credited with more than one thousand mullahs or akongs, teachers of the Mohammedan faith. They all use Arabic exclusively.

Sining is an important trading center. Commerce and business are mainly handled by the Moslems, but there are very few merchants who have a sufficient command of the Chinese language to write their own business accounts and to do without a Chinese clerk. Accounts must be kept in Chinese, so that for this purpose even the smallest shops need Chinese clerks. In contrast to this, the Koran can be found and is read in Arabic in nearly every home. I have had the honor of being the guest of several of the Moslem provincial governors in the Great Northwest. I once made one of them a present of a new medical work in Chinese. It was graciously received, but the attending official inquired if it could not be obtained in Arabic, saying: "The governor is a famous and brilliant scholar of Arabic, but he has little use for Chinese."

Indeed, generally speaking the Moslems of the Great Northwest have not much use for the Chinese language, at least in its written form. It is for them a secondary language only. Their eyes are turned westward rather than eastward, and their hearts are bound to the Near East and Mecca rather than China and Peking, Nanking, or Chungking. Mullahs from Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt pay frequent visits to the Moslems of the Great Northwest.
And a pilgrimage to Holy Mecca is the goal and ambition of every Moslem in the northwest, just as Lhasa is for every Tibetan. "Hui uh er chiao" (回 无 之 教)—"Islam is the undivided religion"—is a favorite slogan among them, and can be taken as an expression of their westward inclination.

MOSLEMS AND CHINESE

The history of the Moslems in China is an interesting story, but not always a very pleasant one. Too much of it has been written in blood. Through the centuries there has been rebellion after rebellion, mostly by Moslems against Chinese, some also by Chinese against Moslems. Some of these have been of wide extent and considerable duration. In 877 a serious rebellion broke out under the leadership of Wang Chao (王 嘉). In a storm of bitter hatred tens of thousands of Moslems and Chinese were massacred. In 1385 a large-scale persecution was officially decreed against the Moslems in China, and many had to flee for their lives. Since 1525 the Chinese Government has granted the Moslems the same rights and privileges as the Chinese, but there have still been rebellions and bloodshed from time to time—among others, four great rebellions on the part of the Moslems of the southwest: in 1817, in 1826, in 1834, and the fourth, lasting eighteen years, from 1855 to 1873. There was also the great Tungan Rebellion in the northwest lasting twelve years, from 1862 to 1874, and still others. The pages of the history of the Moslems in China are indeed filled with unrest, uprisings, and bloodshed. Such has been their past.

What will be their future? Some claim that the Moslems of China have in the course of time become Chinese, not only in habits and manner but also in national feeling and character. If this were true, China would have no Moslem problem. Although this might be the case among certain individuals or in some smaller communities in the east, it is certainly not true in the Great Northwest, where the majority of Moslems live. Today the balance of power in Central Asia rests mainly with the Moslems. The Chungenking Government, realizing this fact, has placed several of the provinces of the Great Northwest under Moslem government. But there are other provinces, such as Kansu, with a large Moslem population still under direct Chinese rule. It is those that have constantly been the sources of unrest. At the present time the struggle for supremacy may be considered suspended rather than ended, and the Government is still faced by tremendous difficulties in its attempts to adjust the differences between the Moslem and the Chinese populations of these areas.

THE CALL FROM THE OMAR MOSQUE

But these are minor questions at present. The real issue of the Moslem problem today is far wider in its scope. We have to bear in mind the Moslem belief in a universal judgment by Allah, and that all Moslems will take part in what is called the "Holy War," which is to free them from their oppressors. Furthermore they believe that the call to this judgment will come from the Omar Mosque in Jerusalem.

In the Koran, Surah 1,40 we read: "The crier shall cry from a nearby place, that is the place from which all Mussulmans will hear it. Husain says: this nearby place is Jerusalem."

It is indeed significant that Jerusalem ranks above Mecca and Medina in the minds of many Moslems of today. It is to them the Holy City, the city where—according to the oldest Mohamnedan doctrines—all the Moslems of the world shall be called to rally to the "Holy War" on Allah's judgment day.

The days in which we are living forecast approaching events of the greatest import. Tremendous changes are about to take place in the world,
and it is more than possible that the Moslem world—the Near East and Central Asia—may become a storm-centre. A great Pan-Islamic movement is afoot. Its apostles have also come to the Middle Kingdom to stir up the followers of the Prophet. They want the whole Moslem world to rise united and to cast off its present yoke.

A HOLY WAR?

Recent developments in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, India, Iran, and Afghanistan certainly show no signs of appeasement in the Moslem world. In Central Asia in recent years, the Moslems and the Bolsheviks, facing one another as two opposite camps, were forced by circumstances to maintain the status quo, a kind of armed peace. The Moslems in Chinese Turkestan have been constantly pushed further and further back. Is the hour of revenge about to strike? The problems of the Near East, Turkey, and the Bosporus, considered by many to be unsolved and perhaps even insoluble, have risen once again to haunt the statesmen of the old and new worlds alike. Day by day Turkey is being more closely encircled. At present she is still holding herself aloof. Will she be able to do so indefinitely? The eyes of the whole Moslem world, including those in China, are focused on the events in the Near East. While I am writing these lines, the radio announces that the Moslems in North China are holding big demonstrations to express their sympathy for their downtrodden brethren in Iran and the Near East and to call for action and a united front against the invaders, in short a Holy War for the freedom and self-determination of the Moslem world. Similar voices are heard from Turkey, India, Egypt, and other places.

In my discussions with the Moslems of today I have found that even those of Central Asia are wide-awake to present-day world problems. I have learned to respect them as keen observers possessed with a clear, sound judgment, and as friends. I have been treated royally by highly educated officials, and quite decently by the wild men of the highways.

A little village in central Kansu was notorious as a robber stronghold. Upon taking it, the bandits had first tortured sixty-two of the comparatively well-to-do inhabitants by hanging them over a fire, and afterwards slaughtered them all. Once while I was slowly driving through this village I unexpectedly met with gunfire from one of the houses. I could not race on as I had done on several similar occasions, for ahead of me was a deep riverbed with no bridge and guarded by three bandits. So I stopped. Leaving the car, I ran toward the house where the shots came from and pushed open the door. Immediately three guns were pressed against my chest. Not wishing to give offense, I stood still and asked them not to shoot. But, alas, the gunlocks clicked, ready to let off their deadly charge. At this moment a fourth bandit suddenly sprang forward, realizing the imminent danger to my life, and, violently pushing aside the three guns, he cried: "This is the pastor, don't harm him!" I had never seen the man before and I never saw him again. He had saved my life, and I could leave the place unharmed.

The Moslems of today can indeed show fairness and courtesy, but when inflamed with holy zeal and religious fanaticism they can easily turn into raving maniacs. Their nature is the same as that of their ancestors a thousand years ago, wild, independent sons of the hills, plains, and deserts of Central Asia. The untamed blood of their forefathers is still pulsing through their veins. And if the cry from the Omar Mosque to rally to the Holy War should be passed on to the millions of Moslems from the Mediterranean to the Yellow Sea and from Turkestan to the Indian Ocean, the world might have to face a Moslem uprising of gigantic dimensions. Two hundred and fifty million followers of the prophet of fire and the sword on the path of war might well be able to effect changes that would deeply influence the entire political developments of the Old World.
Curry and rice for the children of laborers. The law in Ceylon provides that the plantation owner must give one free meal a day to the children of his workers.

"Living Manure." For months before the rice is planted, water buffaloes are allowed to wallow all day in the flooded fields.

Over 90% of the world's rice crop is produced and consumed in Asia. The daily life of the rural populations of nations as far apart as Japanese and Malays, Koreans and Filipinos, Chinese and Indians, Thailanders and Singhalese revolves around the growing and consuming of rice.

For 2,000 years this has been the method in Ceylon of threshing rice. By stamping on the ears the oxen separate the grains from the straw.
Like ballet dancers the golden sheaves of rice stand in the sun.

This Chinese farmer is laboriously pumping water to irrigate his precious rice-fields with the same primitive treadmill used by his ancestors for thousands of years.
Rice being carried from native craft into the storehouses of the big city

The pattern of this mill which turns rice grains into rice flour has not been changed in China for 3,000 years. Walking around it in endless revolutions the man turns the heavy millstone

His daily bowl of rice
It is known that rice was the main staple of India and China as early as 3000 B.C. It was first mentioned in writing in a Sanskrit text dating from the year 1000 B.C. and is called *errated*, from which the Greek *oryza* and the Arabic *arras* were derived. Europe first became acquainted with rice through the Indian campaign of Alexander the Great.

The shoots are ceremoniously handed by the priests to elaborately dressed geisha girls.
Rice in Japan

So essential is rice in the lives of the people that it holds a position of veneration and its cultivation is surrounded by religious ceremonies.

The geisha girls do a solemn dance before passing on the shoots of rice to the farmers.

The shoots being planted by farmers in festive costume.
JOURNEY TO A LEGEND
By P. L.

Southeastern Asia is today one of the world's danger spots. It has constantly been in the news during the summer and autumn of 1941. The agreement with the French Government has brought Japan to the southern part of French Indo-China and to the eastern borders of Thailand, while Great Britain, supported by America, is feverishly developing her position, concentrating troops from the whole empire in Malaya and establishing a chain of British airfields along the Burma-Thailand border.

In the strategic aspect of southeastern Asia the isthmus of Kra plays a unique role. We have asked P. L., our collaborator in Bangkok—known to our readers from the article "A New Border in Asia" in the October issue of this magazine—to report upon what he saw on the isthmus.—K.M.

A GHOST REAPPEARS

Next to white elephants (which are at best gray, never white) and the Siamese twins, the isthmus of Kra is one of the things that have made Siam, or Thailand, known throughout the world. At Kra the Malay peninsula narrows down to a strip of land that could be pierced by a canal of about 70 miles which would rob Singapore of its dominating position and shorten the shipping routes to the Far East by several days.

For decades the canal project of Kra has been appearing like a ghost in the international press to increase the tension in the already tense enough atmosphere of the Far East. During the last few months the atmosphere in southeastern Asia was electric and everyone was talking of war—unless he preferred to say nothing. Promptly the legend of Kra returned. 20,000 workmen, rumor had it, were working feverishly at the building of the canal under the supervision of Japanese engineers.

So one day I took the express from Bangkok and traveled south. The traffic on the railway showed the effects of the war atmosphere. Trains coming from Malaya to Bangkok were crowded with Japanese who could no longer do business in Singapore after the freezing of Japanese credits.

THROUGH THE JUNGLE

I reached the famous isthmus of Kra, at Chumpon, whence a thirty-mile motor road leads to Taplee, which lies right on the border of Burma and is separated from that country only by a river about a hundred yards wide. This river, which soon widens into an inlet, forms the border as far as Point Victoria in the south. No matter which route the planned canal of Kra may one day follow, it must end in this inlet.

The motor trip to Taplee revealed the difficulties with which the construction of a canal would meet. The district is fairly hilly, overgrown with dense bamboo forests, and the rivers flowing into the sea from both sides of the watershed descend so steeply that they can hardly be considered an aid to the project.

A tropical bamboo forest is uncanny. Seen from an airplane or a high mountain it looks pleasant and harmless, a gentle, deep-green fringe taking the harshness out of the landscape. Seen from close by it is an impenetrable thicket of smooth, hostile bamboo stems and thorny creeping plants in which thirsty leeches eagerly wait for a chance to cling to the calves of passers-by. When one tries to penetrate a few steps into this thicket, one can understand why the British hold courses
in "jungle warfare" for their troops from Australia, New Zealand, England, and India.

**DOWN THE KRA**

In Taplee, which consists of only a few houses, there was a motorboat waiting to take us further south. Besides myself there were innumerable bearded Sikhs stowed away into the narrow boat. To add to my discomfort their staple food seemed to be garlic.

At first the Kra river, swollen by the heavy rainfall of the last few days, was swift and rushing. Soon, however, it became broader; a brackish smell rose from the water, and the drops that from time to time sprayed into the boat tasted slightly salt. It was already water from the Indian Ocean—in a few hours we had crossed the narrow isthmus between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, although by car and small motorboat and not on a big steamer, as the project of Kra envisages it.

The journey downstream was monotonous but fascinating. Dense, apparently quite uninhabited jungle slipped past us. Only now and again did we meet other boats. Some had set up broad palm-leaves as sails, and from a distance they looked like strange, leafy logs drifting in the water, on which a few humans had found refuge.

In Kraburi we made a short stop. It lies six miles down the river from Taplee and is already connected with this place by a road. Later the road is to be extended to Ranong in order to open up the rich tin district in the south.

**"FEVERISH ACTIVITY"**

Kraburi seemed to be peacefully asleep. Buri in the Thai language means place or town. Hence Kraburi is the "Town of Kra." A few posts sticking out of the dirty gray water of the Kra river, connected by some rotten planks, represented a landing stage. Two rows of about ten houses each reached down to the edge of the water and formed the main street. I thought of the feverish activity reported by some newspapers. The only person working feverishly around here was an old Chinese woman concocting a midday meal for me. She chopped onions and tomatoes, washed cabbage and similar leaves in the grayish-brown river water, took out of a huge bowl some noodles which had apparently already been cooked and had meanwhile stuck together again in a spongy mess, mixed all this in an extremely greasy mess, mixed all this in an extremely greasy mess, mixed all this in an extremely greasy mess, and finally broke an egg over the whole thing. The dish she put before me a few minutes later was so delicious that I made an effort to forget the way in which it had been prepared. I tried to imagine instead that I was at the Ritz. The chef of the Ritz could be proud to have produced such a dish. And after all we do not know how he does it.

The rainy season was in full swing. At short intervals lukewarm water splattered down on us. I gave up any attempt to seek shelter under the straw mats from the torrents of water. Instead I stowed away my coat and shirt in a dry place and sat, stripped to the waist and soaking wet, up in the bows. The rain was pleasantly warm, and when it stopped and the view became clear again the scenery captivated me. Out of the water, which was by now very rough, rose steep hill-like islands, and the mainland on both sides of the inlet was also mountainous—wild, green mountains behind drifting wisps of fog. By now it was evening, one of those swift evenings of the tropics where night has already begun to rule while the sun is still above the horizon. The sun was shining through a narrow opening in the dark storm-clouds, but the sea and the mountains around us had already taken on the appearance of night. The sun seemed quite out of place and—as if he were conscious of it—finally disappeared. The details of the surrounding mountains now vanished, and I could no longer distinguish whether they were covered with palms, bamboo, or firs. Their outlines, however, and the mist floating through the valleys gave me for a short time the illusion of a rainy evening in the European Alps.
Soon lights appeared in the darkness and we reached Ranong, the tiny port at the mouth of the inlet.

**VICTORIA POINT**

I did not drive into town, but spent the night instead in one of the ramshackle huts which lay right at the edge of the water. From my bed I could see the lights of Victoria Point shimmering through the night. Victoria Point is on the southernmost tip of the Burma mainland—only a few islands reach further south—and it is one of the important strategic points of the British Empire. The future Kra Canal would have to end in the inlet which joins the sea at Victoria Point. As long as Victoria Point is British, the canal of Kra could never gain importance as an anti-British measure, for from Victoria Point England would absolutely command the western end of the canal. A few batteries built into the steeply rising hills—and no ship could reach the canal against the will of the rulers of Victoria Point.

A little beyond the headland a few islands can be seen in the haze. They too are British. They are insignificant little islands on which fishermen ply their trade; like a rampart they follow the coast to the south. There are Sullivan Island, St. Matthew Island, Chance Island, Middle Island, Perforated Island, and many others; little, insignificant islands, but only insignificant so long as there is no Kra Canal. Should the canal one day come into existence, these islands would have the same value that Perim has today for the Suez Canal. As long as the Union Jack waves over these islands and there is a power behind this flag, England would control the Kra Canal.

The significance of the canal lies in the fact that it would avoid the naval fortress of Singapore and the large radius of the airplanes and ships stationed there. However, as long as England is secure in Singapore she will also be able to retain the northern islands. Should she, on the other hand, withdraw from Singapore together with her American aid, there would be little incentive for the new master of these territories to build the costly canal. We therefore have a complete logical circle: if England is powerful in Malaya and Burma the canal would be of great value to a hostile power; but England would dominate it strategically from Victoria Point and render it worthless. Should the Union Jack, however, disappear from these territories, then the canal would be feasible, but rather futile.

![Map of the Isthmus of Kra and the Malay Peninsula](image)

**IT IS AN OLD STORY**

However, there are considerations other than strategic which speak for the construction of the canal. The plan to create a sea connection through the isthmus of Kra is probably several hundred years old. The shipping route from Europe to the Far East would be shortened by three to five days and the roundabout way via Singapore would be avoided. The distance from Ceylon to Saigon would be shortened.
from 2,500 to 1,900 miles. The discovery of flint implements and other antiquities proves that even in earliest times a lively traffic took place here. The powerful Indian influence, which left a lasting impression on the buildings of Angkor Wat, probably found its way over Kra. During the Middle Ages hurried travelers landed on the west coast of Kra and rode across the isthmus on elephants to continue their voyage by sailing boat to Ayuthia, the capital of those days.

Hence there were palpable and positive advantages which repeatedly revived the canal project. As early as 1843 the district was investigated by Burma. The result was hardly encouraging. The engineers found that seventy miles of difficult territory would have to be traversed, and they estimated the cost of building a canal at one and a half million pounds sterling.

Twenty years later new investigations and surveys were made by Captains Fraser and Forlong on behalf of the Indian Government. Both came to the conclusion that the construction of a canal would be unprofitable.

Another twenty years later the French Government, desirous of creating a shorter and cheaper route to Indo-China, had surveys carried out and came likewise to a negative conclusion.

WOULD IT PAY?

Technically much has changed since those days, and today the canal could certainly be built. It would, however, still represent an enormous technical achievement. We all remember at what costs and sacrifices the Panama Canal was built. It had to conquer a distance of 49 miles and a height of 275 feet. For the Kra Canal the corresponding figures would be 70 miles and 250 feet. Merchants would have to calculate whether the undoubtedly very high costs of construction could be covered within a reasonable time by the saving of three or four days of shipping time. Furthermore it is still an open question whether the trade center of Singapore could be so quickly deprived of its importance, or whether, even after the completion of the canal, a large part of Far Eastern shipping would not call at Singapore for economic reasons.

From the point of view of Thailand, a waterway through the isthmus would be very welcome. Almost a fifth of the country's wealth—especially tin and rubber—is to be found in the southwestern part of the narrow isthmus. Hitherto the commercial traffic from this region has gone mainly to Penang and Singapore. The work of opening up through roads and railways is proceeding very slowly and cannot replace a short shipping route to Bangkok.

Beside the Kra project mentioned here, there are two further possibilities of creating waterways south of Kra, navigable only for small ships.

England is not quite without anxiety about the isthmus with its possibilities. When she signed a treaty with Siam in 1909, one of the conditions was that Siam was not to undertake any steps in the matter of Kra without first consulting England. The over-generous King Rama VI had at one time wanted to present the isthmus to a French company. His advisers were able at the last moment to cancel this magnanimous gift.

Today Kra is a myth, a legend and a fact, all in one. Its future—as that of so many other things in the Far East—will be decided in the course of greater disputes.
The river that separates Thailand from Burma is narrow and rushing in its upper reaches.

Kraburi, the sleepy little village that takes its name from the isthmus.

Ranong, a possible terminus for the planned canal. Across the inlet are the hills of Victoria Point, the southernmost tip of Burma.
JAVA,
ISLE OF VOLCANOES

The sawah rice-fields of Java

Mount Brohmo in eruption

Looking toward Mount Smeroe
THE FIRES OF SMEROE

By BRIGITTE REINDERS

A few weeks ago Smeroe, the most dangerous of Java's volcanoes, started erupting again. News dispatches carrying the story around the world also mentioned the ancient Javanese superstition connected with this volcano to the present day, according to which disobedience to the will of the god will lead to the breaking of the island in two.

Brigitte Reinders, who has made a special study of Javanese folklore, tells some of the legends of the volcano interwoven with a charming description of the Smeroe festival as it is still performed today.—K.M.

On the eve of the annual sacrificial feast of Smeroe, Madi and Atoen were celebrating their wedding. The moon stood over the ridge of the Tengger mountains. It shone upon the soft clouds of smoke rising towards the starry sky from the peaks of Smeroe and Brohmo. Its light spilled over their wild, rugged sides, reflected from the flooded rice-terraces, and crept over the gray stone figures of the temple. It penetrated the coconut forest surrounding the village, painted the bamboo huts a ghostly white, and came upon Madi and Atoen. There they sat among all the villagers, gathered for the wedding slamatan.

Together they had prayed and eaten and laughed. Together they now watched the shadow-play and listened to the accompanying words of the Dalang, the teller of stories. The melody of the gamelan followed the actions. As the story grew in excitement the chords of the orchestra became louder and louder and resolved themselves in a single tone when the voice of the Dalang died away. The Wayang puppets of the shadow-play disappeared into a large box, but the listeners sitting in a circle, and even Madi and Atoen, the bridal couple, begged the Dalang for more stories.

He came from a family of storytellers. For generations the father had passed on to the son the treasure of his tales and legends, and now this Dalang was roaming the island of Java and telling the people the stories of their country. He was rather tired today, for he had had a long journey. But he was poor, and Atoen's father was rich, and the Dalang needed money to make his own dreams come true. The teller of stories longed for concrete things—sawah rice-fields and many carabaos, the strong water buffaloes who would plough his plot of land.

But today he was still the storyteller. Today glowworms were flying through the night and getting caught in the blossoming hibiscus hedge surrounding the courtyard of the kampong. Today the wind was carrying waves of fragrance over the crowd of listeners. Atoen slowly raised her delicate head, stole a glance at Madi, and pulled her wedding sarong closer about her hips. Then her wide dark eyes looked up at the Dalang. He raised his hand, softly the gamelan music began, and he started his story:

“Long before the gods brought rice to our island, when the country of Java floated upon the sea as flat as a banana leaf, there ruled over the land the Princess Citra. She was so beautiful that in her presence the birds were silent, the flowers closed their petals, and the densest bamboo groves opened to clear the way for her. Yet as great as her beauty was her grief. She loved Prince Djamodjo, who lived on the other side of the island, and the Prince loved her. But the only link between the lovers was the course of the sun, which in the morning rose from the water where Citra stood,
and in the evening sank again where Djamodjo longingly watched it disappear. They could not marry, for remember, at that time Java was like a leaf floating on the water. Had the Prince with his large suite left his end of this leaf to visit Citra, the Princess with her whole court would have been drowned at the other end. Thus was Java in those days. And that was Citra's great grief.

In her despair she called upon the gods for help. They lived on high mountains in another country, but they knew of the yearning of these two lovers. And as Citra was so beautiful and so good, the god Brahma himself decided to help her. With the aid of Vishnu, the all-powerful one split off a part of the stony masses of the Himalayas and the mountain Mahameru. Brahma turned himself into a turtle, and with the load of mountains on his back he swam through the sea to the land of Citra and Djamodjo. Vishnu turned into a huge snake and wound himself around our island, holding it fast while the turtle set down its load in pieces all over Java. There was thunder and lightning. The earth groaned under its new burden. The waves of the sea grew higher, and Citra thought that the wrath of the gods was being poured forth over her and her land. But as it grew light there was a long chain of mountains stretching over the island. The water was quiet and the sky was clear. All that was left of the fearsome storm was the audible rumble and the thin wreath of smoke that came from the bowels of the mountains. It was thus that the gods came to Java, and from that day our island has lain firmly upon the water. Thus Citra and Djamodjo were made happy, and with them the people of Java.

The gamelan went on playing softly when the voice of the Dalang had died away. His eyes sought out Atoen. At the place where the girl had been sitting a few closed hibiscus blossoms lay on the ground, and Madi's place was empty. The listeners were sitting without a word. The rumbling of Smeroe could be heard from the Tengger mountains. First it sounded like the last mutterings of a dying thunderstorm. But when the wind started to turn, the people were overwhelmed by the full thunder of its elemental force. The oil lamps flickered. The crowd moved closer together, while mothers put protecting arms around their children. The birds were startled in their nests and began chirping. Then it became quiet again. The music of the gamelan rose and the voice of the Dalang sounded across the courtyard:

"You people from the Tengger mountains, you have heard the call of Smeroe. Before you, your parents heard it, your grandparents and the people who lived long, long before them. Like you, they all tilled the land and planted the rice that Brahma sent to earth in the beak of a bird. At that time there lived, not far from your village here, the man Kai Kesomo with his wife Njai. They were poor people, and possessed only a small piece of sawah. Kai had to drag the plow with his own hands, he had no carabao that bathed in the evening after work in the kali flowing past his hut. Yet both were content—they had a hut, and a mat to sleep on. They worked together and prayed to Brahma for sun, rain, and wind for their rice. And together they cherished deep in their hearts the desire for a son.

But the course of the years had bent Kai's back and turned to silver the black hair of Njai. When Kai was dragging the heavy plow alone through the water-soaked earth, he often sighed for the strong arms of a son. And when Njai sat at the Wayang shadow-play, the only woman without a child, her eyes were sad. But they did not quarrel with their fate. Every morning, before the sun had fully risen, they both went out to their work, and in the evenings they sat in front of their hut and watched the fiery ball disappear behind the wall of the Tengger mountains.

On one such evening it happened that a tired old man came wandering through
the sawahs and begged Kai and Njai to give him shelter. Kindly the old couple took him in. Njai gave him some of her rice, while Kai opened the most tender coconut for his thirst and brought him the largest papaya growing on the tree before the hut. And when the stars came out they bedded him on their own mat and themselves lay down on the bare ground to sleep.

In the night they were awakened by an unusual light. It was not the sun which straightened out Kai's back and painted a rosy glow on Njai's cheeks. It was the shining figure of a god that seemed to extend the walls of the little hut.

"I am Brahma," he said, "come down to you from Smeroe. I have found you to be good, kind, and humble, in spite of the great sorrow in your hearts. Therefore your wish shall be granted. I, Brahma, will give you a son. He will bring you joy, happiness and wealth. But when he is grown up you will hear from me again and I will let you know how his future destiny shall be shaped according to my will." The light vanished, the mat was empty, and there was no one in the hut.

The rosy glow, however, had not disappeared from Njai's cheeks. And when the full moon stood in the sky for the ninth time, she gave Kai a son. They called him Pretoe. He was a beautiful child; his eyes shone with a light which made humans and animals willingly subordinate themselves to him. He grew like a coconut palm, upright, slender and strong.

And when the child had grown into the boy Pretoe he stood beside his father in the water of the sawahs and plowed the earth. In all he did an invisible hand seemed to be guiding him. Everything he touched thrived, nothing failed. The sawahs stood full with golden rice, the trees were heavy with fruit, and corn and sugar cane grew high. Kai became a rich man. Every evening a large herd of carabaos now bathed in the river, and his fields reached as far as the eye could see.

The boy Pretoe became a young man. His shoulders were wide and his hips narrow. His skin was like bronze. When he laughed his teeth shone like the white blossoms of the melati bush. The light that was in his face from the hour of his birth never left him. And ever since the girl Loromanis knew Pretoe, her face also bore the reflection of this divine light. They loved each since that evening when, coming from the bathing place, they had followed the flight of the white cranes, and their shoulders had touched, as if compelled by a secret force. Now the girl's hair was adorned with yellow alamanda blossoms; soon her little head would be bowed under the marriage ornament.

The two young people were happy, and so was Kai Kesomo. But Njai lay at night on her mat and could not sleep. She was thinking of Brahma's
words, that Pretoe's destiny should be
decided by the god alone. Although
she had faith in Brahma and revered
him, there was fear in her heart.

Then dark clouds began to gather
over the summit of Smeroe. The heart
of the mountain boiled and raged, and
the earth trembled. In fear the people
fell upon their knees. And on this
very evening long ago, when the
Waringin tree was struck by lightning,
a messenger of Brahma appeared in
the kampong of Kai Kesomo. Again
that same light filled the room, again
the voice of the god resounded:

"Parents of Pretoe, Brahma gave
you a son to make you happy and rich,
and this you have become. You, Kai,
have the largest herd of carabaos and
the most fertile sawahs. You, Njai,
possess the most beautiful sarongs and
the heaviest gold ornaments. Brahma
demands that you give back your son.
This very night he must climb Smeroe.
At dawn Brahma himself will receive
him in his arms at the bottom of the
crater. But woe betide you if you do
not obey his wish. A curse will strike
the island, and in his wrath mighty
Smeroe will tear the land in two."

The light vanished. Brahma's mes­
senger was gone. The family awoke
as from a terrible dream. Pale as
death, Kai and Njai looked into each
other's faces. The young lovers clung
together desperately. But Brahma's
will must be done, and Pretoe started
on his way. With him went his old
parents, and with him went the young
Loromanis.

The mountain had ceased to rage.
The earth lay quiet. The moon stood
over the mountain ridge, as clear and
shining as it is tonight. But it was
not a wedding night in which its soft
light kept watch. The parents and the
lovers were dumb with grief. Only
when they reached the rim of the
crater and heard the hissing challenge
of Smeroe did they fall on their knees
and pray.

"O Brahma," cried the parents,
"take our son, but take us too. What
good is all our wealth without Pretoe,
whose laughter is our sunshine?"

"Almighty One," said the girl softly,
and the rumbling in the depths sub­sided, "Almighty One, take me too.
Pretoe and I belong together, on the
blossoming earth just as in your dark
kingdom. We have come."

But suddenly Brahma's voice rang
out: "My children, you have stood the
test. Go and be happy. Continue to
obey my commands and my blessing
will be upon you. But if you should
oppose my wishes the land will be
struck by the curse of which my
messenger warned you."

Pretoe and Loromanis became man
and wife. Every year they made the
same pilgrimage to the edge of
Smeroe's crater and offered their
sacrifices of rice and fruits. Their
children and children's children did
likewise, as we still do today. And
Brahma's blessing lay over our island."

The stars were paling in the sky
when the Dalang came to the end of
his story. Day was dawning. The
deep tone of the bedoek, the village
drum, mingled with the music of the
gamelan. It called and called. Now
the orchestra was silent, and the
listeners were torn out of their
absorption. The bedoek boomed on
through the night. It did not cease
calling until the villagers had finally
collected around the old Waringin tree.
All the men and women of the village
were there, only the Dalang and Atoen
and Madi were missing. A procession
was formed which wound its way up to
the rim of the crater. Now as then,
brown hands cast the best that their
fields had yielded into the boiling
depths to placate Smeroe.

The moon hung in the sky like a
finely carved sickle of quartz. The
sun flooded the countryside. It shone
upon the green of the rice-fields and
gleamed on the strong backs of the
carabaos. It caressed Atoen in Madi's
arms, and found even the Dalang, the
teller of stories. He went his lonely
way, from village to village, in his
eyes the longing for fertile sawahs and
plowing oxen, in his heart the treasure
of his stories.
"PACIFIC HISTORY"
By KLAUS MEHNERT

In the world's political vocabulary, "The Pacific" has become one of the most frequently used terms. From year to year the connection between Atlantic and Pacific affairs has grown closer. With the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis reaching from Bordeaux to the Marshall Islands, and with the Anglo-American bloc circling the globe, events in one hemisphere most intimately affect those in the other. To supplement the huge amount of literature on the modern political problems of the Pacific, we here present some ideas on the history of that area.

In 1936 the author was invited to join the faculty of the University of Hawaii. Before that he had been connected with the Universities of Berlin and California. The history of the White powers, particularly of Russia, in the Pacific has been his chief interest, and he has taught courses in "History of Russia in Asia and on the Pacific" and "History of the Western Nations in the Pacific." An article by him entitled "Marco Polo and the Pacific" and closely related to the present essay has just been published by the magazine "Il Marco Polo" in Shanghai.

The following is a chapter from a book on the history of the Pacific which the author has been working on for the past three years at the University of Hawaii.

THE NEGLECTED PACIFIC

The biggest thing on the surface of the earth—the Pacific Ocean—has been neglected by historians. Up to the Age of Discovery, man was unaware of the Pacific's existence. Then he became increasingly conscious of this ocean, and in the last hundred years he studied the Pacific area with mounting interest and from an increasing number of angles. But, while much research and writing have been devoted to the histories of individual regions of this area (such as Japan, China, California, and Hawaii) and some to individual aspects of Pan-Pacific history (such as discoveries, trade, and naval strategy), there has been no comprehensive history of the Pacific as a whole. The time has come to write such a history; world interest in this area and the amount of preparatory research justify it.

The author's desire to make this study resulted from six years of life, study, and teaching in and on the Pacific, particularly in the Hawaiian Islands. For this enormous ocean cannot fail to impress anyone who has lived in its midst; who has stood in a long line at the Honolulu Post Office on boat or Clipper day waiting to send a letter over thousands of miles of water to the nearest mainland; who from a plane or mountain top has seen the verdant archipelago enclosed by the white breakers of waves traveling over seventy million square miles; or who has contemplated on a globe against the background of blue the specks of dust that mark the Hawaiian group. Nowhere in the world do people think and talk as much in Pacific terms as in Hawaii, where the "Institute of Pacific Relations" was founded, where people assert they live at the "crossroads of the Pacific," and where the telephone directory includes a long list of Pacific enterprises—down to the "Pacific Fertilizer," "Pacific Plumbing," and "Pacific Junk" companies.
“PACIFIC HISTORY”?

Originally, as a European and a German, I was skeptical of so sweeping a term as “Pacific History.” The maps and atlases amid which I grew up had Europe in the center and hardly ever showed the Pacific as a unit. Indeed, what was there to show except a lot of water, currents and winds, and some islands? For all practical purposes Japan seemed to be the end of the world in the east and California in the west.

Furthermore, can eastern Asia and western America have a history in common—lands with the oldest and youngest civilizations, Confucius and Hollywood, Peking and New York, two races, two cultures, two ways of life, as different and incongruous as these? Do they not have more in common with Europe than among themselves? Can a common denominator be found for the snowy wastes of Alaska, the warm charm of Polynesia, the deserts of Australia?

Yes, Pacific History exists, it is worthy of careful analysis, and knowledge of it is necessary for the understanding of the future. Some writers have predicted that the political center of gravity will shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The future we do not know; but even if the next phase of human history should be called Pacific, it will not be “pacific,” and many decisive events are certain to happen in the vast expanse of this sea, events grounded in facts and ideas of the past.

DEFINITION

“Pacific History” is a new and unfamiliar child in the old established family of histories and requires a definition both as to area and period covered. A globe shows, better than a Mercator map, that the Pacific is almost a closed lake. In the north, Asia and America all but touch each other; in the southwest a dense mass of islands links Asia to Australia and New Zealand. This leaves only two larger gaps, separating the Antarctic—on one side from New Zealand, and on the other from Tierra del Fuego. Thus the area of Pacific History should embrace the Pacific coasts of:

a. Asia—from the Bering Strait to the Malay Peninsula;
b. The Americas between the straits of Bering and Magellan;
c. The Antarctic continent, all with their approaches and hinterlands. Everything between these coasts should also be included: Japan, the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands.

It is less easy to establish the limits of Pacific History in regard to time, but it seems reasonable to suggest that Pacific History began when man became aware of the Pacific and/or the continents that surround it. One cannot speak of Pacific History before the existence of the Pacific was known. The term therefore would not include the self-satisfied life led on the edges of the Pacific by the ancient Japanese or Chinese, Aztecs or Incas. They were unaware that the ocean which washed their shores—far from being the end of the world—was a body of water surrounded by land. For this period, when not even an idea, let alone knowledge, of the Pacific Ocean had yet emerged, we have only a Japanese or Aztec history, perhaps a Far Eastern and American, but certainly not a Pacific History.

EARLY MIGRATIONS

The Asio-American migrations which preceded the coming of the white man are unrecorded and thus prehistoric. Scientists are still debating on how they took place, whether by way of the Bering Strait, the Aleutian Islands, Polynesia, or the Antarctic, for the inhabitants of Asia and America encountered by the intruding white man had no memory of these movements.

Suppose early man in America—the “American Indian”—arrived over the circumpacific route across the Bering Strait. His contemporary in Asia, not
knowing of a huge continent across the sea, could have no idea that it was inhabited by his own kin. And the American Indian was probably just as unaware that his ancestral home lay somewhere on the other side of the Pacific. Even if he had believed that his forefathers had come over the Bering Sea, he would not necessarily have realized that the land they had left was on the other side of a vast ocean. For he would not have thought of them as having traveled by a circuitous route. In a way, they had not: the shortest route from North China to America—even to so distant a part as Peru—runs directly through the narrowest point of the Bering Strait.

Or let us assume that early Americans had traveled, as some prefer to believe, the trans-Pacific route by way of the islands of the South Seas. Such a migration would likewise not be Pacific History. True, the Polynesians performed magnificent and courageous voyages. But, if they reached America, the fact remained unknown, not only to the outside world, but apparently to the Polynesians themselves. In recent years their feats of navigation are being reconstructed by archeologists, anthropologists, and linguists after lengthy research, with an ingenuity which must use imagination, rather than knowledge, to fill the huge gaps between the known facts—facts as few and far between as the islands of the eastern Pacific.

One of the reasons why the early Americans seem not to have remembered their migrations can perhaps be found in the fact that none of the possible avenues was likely to have invited frequent use. The only easy and close access from Asia to America, across the Bering Strait, lay within the Arctic Circle, in an inhospitable latitude. Of the others, both the Aleutian chain and the Antarctic suffered not only from the same inconvenience of high latitude, but from the additional difficulty of wider distances of open water to be crossed. The only climatically favorable approach, through the islands of the South Pacific, necessitated the navigation of the ocean at its widest part where the southeastern end of Asia and the westernmost part of South America are almost exactly 180° apart.

Nor are there any memories of subsequent movements between the two continents, though such intercourse almost certainly took place. Thus the Pacific Ocean separated the Asiatic from the American branches of humanity to a point of complete unawareness of each other and of itself.

**THE WHITE MAN**

It was a newcomer, the white man, who first saw the Pacific as something to be crossed. In 1520-21, only seven years after Balboa had gazed upon it at Darien, Magellan was sailing across it for the first known time. Thereafter the Pacific became for almost 400 years a white man's sea, the indigenous races not participating actively in the destiny of the area as a whole.

This suggests that, up to the recent rise of modern Japan which began with the ending of her self-imposed seclusion, Pacific History is the story of the white man's exploration, struggle, conquest, rivalry, colonization, and exploitation in the Pacific area.

However, merely adding up the histories of the peoples in the Pacific area since the coming of the Europeans does not constitute Pacific History. The term should rather include only developments or problems concerning the Pacific as a whole. Therefore a Pacific History must deal with events, not because they happened in the Pacific, but because they influenced the development in this area. In many cases the drawing of the dividing line must be arbitrary, and the reader may not always accept the author's opinion. But all should agree, for instance, that since 1513 the events along the short and narrow Isthmus of Panama are of greatest Pacific significance, while those along the thousand miles of coast both to the north and south of the isthmus
rarely played more than a local role; and that the conquest of Mexico by Cortez left an incomparably stronger imprint on the destiny of the Pacific than the establishing of the Manchus in Peking. More than that: events in far away Europe, such as the defeat of the Armada or the incorporation of Portugal into Spain or the wars between Spain and the Netherlands, affected the Pacific more than many simultaneous events on the very shores of this ocean. Hence its history can be understood only in close connection with the development of Europe.

WHERE TO BEGIN?

At which particular moment of European intrusion into this area should Pacific History begin? The voyages of Columbus and Vasco da Gama are convenient landmarks, but Marco Polo can claim to be the first known white man to travel over the waves of this ocean and to bequeath his experiences to posterity. Marco's account of his travels has influenced the future of the Pacific more than any other book.

It also seems symbolic that Marco Polo, the individual, should stand at the dawn of Pacific History. The history of the white man in the Pacific is—if one excepts Polar explorations—more than any other the story of individuals. The Balboas and Pizarros, the Magellans and Xaviers, the Khaborovs and Berings, the Cooks and Vancouvers, the explorers, conquistadores, merchants, missionaries, and adventurers who penetrated the largest ocean, the widest open spaces of America and Siberia, the most populous empires of Asia, did this with incredibly small bands of followers. The lives and deaths of these few men, their successes and failures, have shaped the destiny of the Pacific.

LINKS

Pacific History since Marco Polo's time can be regarded as an entity; it is more than just the sum of otherwise unrelated histories of the shore countries. There are links which hold it together and make it a unit. Some of these may be enumerated.

First of all there was Marco Polo himself, largely responsible for the desire of subsequent Europeans to reach the fabulous lands of the East and to acquire the extraordinary treasures which he described. It is surprising how little his influence on history has as yet been studied. Much has been brought to light about him and his voyages, every inch of his routes has been re-traveled and checked, but that is about all.

Then there was that fragrant magnet which drew adventurers, merchants, and nations to the Pacific—spices. There exists no single adequate book on the history of spices and their role in world affairs. Even that distinguished arbiter over things important and unimportant, the Encyclopedia Britannica, has no entry between SPHINX and SPIDER. Yet it was in quest of spices that new worlds were discovered, that Vasco da Gama, Columbus, and Magellan sailed.

That dangerous phantom, the nonexistent Terra Australis Incognita, conceived and born in the minds of philosophers, lured countless navigators, from Mendaña to Cook, into the South Seas. By their courageous and unceasing efforts the one-time "continent," which was believed to cover the better part of the southern hemisphere, gradually resolved itself into Australia, New Zealand, hundreds of small islands, the ice-covered Antarctic, and, most of all, water. Privation, death, and disappointment cover this path, yet at its end emerged the map and the political shape of the modern South Seas.

What the search for Terra Australis meant for the discovery of the South Pacific, the desire to obtain furs meant for the North Pacific. Quest for furs drove the Russians from Novgorod to the Pacific and beyond, along the coasts of Alaska and northwest America; quest for furs led Canadians and Americans overland and around the Horn to the Oregon country. Fur-kingsdoms arose and clashed, increasing numbers of ships carried their produce
across the North Pacific to the markets of China, connecting southeastern China with northwestern America by way of Hawaii.

As soon as the continental character of the Americas had been recognized, nations, finding their entry into the Pacific blocked around Africa by the Portuguese, and around South America by the Spaniards, went in search of new approaches. The struggle to discover northern sea passages around America and Asia had begun. But while these, as was soon found, led hopelessly into arctic ice and polar night, northern overland passages to the Pacific were achieved by men in quest of fur. In 1639 the first Russian Cossacks, after crossing Siberia, reached the Okhotsk Sea, and in 1793 on the northwest coast of America these proud words were written on a rock: "Alexander Mackenzie, from Canada, by land."

In addition to the Terra Australis fantasy a number of other myths or misunderstandings called men into the Pacific, such as the fabulous islands Rica de Oro and Rica de Plata, the Strait of Anian—in search of which such prizes as California and Hawaii were found—and the Company Land.

And one of the strongest of the bonds holding Pacific History together is the area's close dependence on the affairs of Europe. The rise or fall of Spain and Portugal, of the Netherlands and Great Britain, of Russia and France, had obvious repercussions in the Pacific.

Then, with the coming of the nineteenth century, the Pacific area became an arena of intense rivalry among modern European imperialisms. This rivalry was expressed in many forms—in whaling and sealing, in trade and colonization, in missionary and military activities, in establishment of protectorates and convict colonies, in discoveries of gold and oil. Steamship lines, cables, airways, and radio—all helped to shorten the distances and introduced the word "Pacific" into the everyday vocabulary of the world.
For a change we are starting our review with articles that have no immediate political implications. One topic which will probably continue to be of controversial interest, although no longer of immediate concern, is the kowtow. An article by W. Sheldon Ridge in the Chinese Social and Political Science Review deals with this subject. The author, inspired by the centenary of the Opium War of 1839-42, enlarges on the question of the kowtow in connection with the problem of national equality. He comes to the conclusion that the significance of the kowtow has been overrated. He cites instances of foreign missions to Peking at various times in the course of the last thousand years. Many of them failed, and all too often attributed their failure to their refusal to kowtow, while the actual reasons were quite different. The refusal to kowtow was always motivated by the idea that the kowtow was an act symbolizing submission and therefore unthinkable for the representative of a sovereign ruler. The author maintains, however, that to the Chinese the prostration before the emperor was merely an act of court etiquette which Chinese envoys to Moscow unhesitatingly performed before the Russian ruler. This latter fact alone provides all the commentary required.

There is a further illustration to Mr. Ridge's article in an incident related in the China Journal ("Her Sacred Majesty Dowager Empress Tseu Hsi Relents..."). It contains a memoir by one of the Empress's advisers, one Ou K'o-tau, written at a time when heated arguments were taking place over the question of "to kneel or not to kneel" in the case of foreign ministers to Peking. Ou K'o-tau gives vent to his hearty dislike for the uncultured and presumptuous foreigners and complains: "They have made several scores of treaties with China, containing at least 70,000 written characters. In all, was there a single word pertaining to the veneration due to their parents or the culture of virtues, or the observation of the nine rules of good conduct? No. Was there a single word relative to the respect of ceremonies, duties, honesty or a just sentiment of shame? Again, no. They can speak of nothing but material advantages." In the end, however, he advised the Empress to waive the kowtow. This bears out Mr. Ridge's contention that the matter has never been unduly pressed in the case of diplomatic representa-

tives of sovereign states.

Chinese Life

The revolution that swept away the Manchu Dynasty introduced an era of modernization in China. Although much that colored—and hampered—Chinese life fell victim to this process of modernization, thirty short years could not completely wipe out all old customs that in the passage of centuries had become honored traditions. Norman Flynn, in the China Journal, reminds us of this fact in "China Clings To Her Traditional Customs," which is mainly concerned with the three great festivals of the Chinese year. The first is the Chinese New Year celebration, when the kitchen god goes up to heaven to report on the conduct of the household. During his absence all accounts must be settled and many parties are given. The second great feast and settlement day is the Dragon Boat Festival in spring, which dates back 2,700 years. It is in memory of Chu Yuen who drowned himself. His friends, to lure away the fishes from feeding on his body, threw little three-cornered packages of rice into the water. The same three-cornered packages still make their yearly appearance to this day. The last big festival and settlement day is the Moon Festival, which takes place in mid-autumn at a time when all crops have been harvested. Oscar Lord in an article in the China Digest very appropriately likens the Moon Festival to the American Thanksgiving Day.

Art

Ｔien Іhsia has an excellent article, "The Mounted Scroll In China And Japan," by R. H. van Gulik. No painting should be hung longer than a week, and the seasons and other considerations influence the choice of subjects as well as the place to hang the scrolls. In China the back wall of the main hall is the favorite place for hanging large scrolls. There is, however, no fixed rule in China as to where a scroll should hang, while in Japan the scroll may only be hung in one place, a niche in the main room called tokо-no-mа. The mounting of the paintings is of the greatest importance and an art in itself.

Modern art in the Far East is bound to benefit by the return of the well-known painter Foujita to his native land. Asiana reported on his arrival in Japan. Foujita, long a favorite of Paris, has made a name for himself in Europe and America. It will be interesting to watch his development under the influence of the Oriental atmosphere.
Agriculture

"The glory of the farmer is that in the division of labors it is his part to create. All trade rests at last on his primitive activity." These words of Emerson precede the article "Chinese Harvest" in the China Digest. In the eyes of the people of China the farmer ranks second only to the scholar. In recent years the work of the farmer has been greatly facilitated and his crops increased by the introduction of scientific methods. "Four Years Of Wartime China's Agricultural Progress," by John King in the China Quarterly, gives us an idea of the progress that has been made in spite of the war. The establishment of the new Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in Chungking and the great amount of work being done by the National Agricultural Research Bureau indicate the deep interest taken by the Government in the development of Chinese agriculture.

In the above report the province of Szechwan comes in for praise, which is all the more remarkable in face of the serious problem of soil erosion confronting this province. S. T. Hwang sums up the situation in an article "Soil Erosion And Its Control In The Red Basin of Szechwan in the China Journal. The naturally existing danger of soil erosion in this hilly country is increased by the farmers removing every scrap of undergrowth and leaf litter for fuel. On the other hand, an unbelievable amount of patient labor is put in to preserve the soil. All ditches are intersected with little dams in order to retain sediment, while in many parts the population twice a year patiently carries soil uphill in baskets to spread over the depleted fields. The obvious remedy of leaving the hills to recover their soil under a cloak of trees and grass is impossible for such densely populated areas.

Japan is faced by quite a different agricultural problem, where a hundred percent mechanization of farming is being attempted, without showing the desired results so far. In an article "Mechanization Of Agriculture In Japan" in the Far Eastern Review this failure is blamed on the uneven distribution of modern farm machinery, most of which is privately owned and far in excess of the capacity required by the small farmer. The article advocates the co-operative system and a central control of the farm mechanization program.

Of all the crops grown in the Far East, the soya bean is perhaps the most important. Clara Brewer analyzes its qualities in an article, "Four Star Food," appearing in the Diet and Health Digest and reprinted in the China Digest. Miss Brewer accords the soya bean four stars for its excellent chemical composition, its cheapness, its flavor, and its adaptability. She goes on to say that in the Orient the soya bean takes the place of eggs, meat, milk, cheese, butter, and wheat, giving us an inkling of its tremendous importance in the life of the Asiatic nations. There is no telling what the future may hold in store for the lowly bean, since the western world has only just discovered it—rather late in the day, though, considering that the soya bean has been known in the Orient for 5,000 years.

Communications

The Burma-Yunnan trade route, since time immemorial one of the world's biggest traffic arteries, fell into oblivion about a century ago, when the rise of Hongkong diverted all traffic from its old channels. The China incident has brought it back into prominence as the only supply route left to the Chungking Government. The traffic over this route has assumed such proportions that a new railroad is being built with Anglo-American assistance. Asiana reports on the progress of construction and believes in the peace-time future of the railroad. This belief is shared by C.Y.W.Meng writing in the Far Eastern Review. In "Railroad Communications In West China" he gives a detailed account of the rapid railway construction work going on in West China. Chungking and Rangoon will soon be connected by rail, and a network of branch lines will cover Szechwan, Yunnan, and Kweichow. The chief motive behind these efforts is, of course, the desire to establish direct contact with a free port (in this case Rangoon), but at the same time new districts, rich in natural resources, are being opened up.

According to Asiana North China is also trying to improve her communications, although with nothing like the feverish activity of the southwest. Some progress has been made in facilitating traffic with Inner Mongolia.

Engineering

Both the Far Eastern Review and Asiana contain accounts of the recently completed Suifeng Dam at the Manchuko-Korean border. This probably represents the greatest achievement of Japanese engineering to date. Although not as large as Boulder Dam, the Suifeng Dam breaks all records for holding capacity.

Philippine Islands

Several magazines contain articles dealing with the Philippine Islands. In "The Third Conquest Of The Philippines," in Pacific Affairs, S. P. Vak, jr. expresses his fear of Japan whose influence he sees in nearly every aspect of Philippine life. He feels that with the occupation of the Spratley Islands by Japan the encirclement of the Philippines is complete. Asiana, with "Philippine Defence Measures Hurried," asserts, however, that connections with Hongkong, Borneo, and Hawaii are unimpaired. Mr. Vak complains...
that the Philippine defense forces are too small to offer any serious resistance to an invader. According to Asiana, on the other hand, General McArthur, Commander-in-Chief of Philippine defense, believes in a small professional army, although not all military experts in the Philippine camp share the General's confidence. The economic unpreparedness for military defense is the only point on which both writers agree. Mr. Vak is probably right in his feeling that "the Philippine are being groomed to fit into the southward scheme of the Empire of the Rising Sun." Sueoki Asaka in an article "Guarding Of The West Pacific Vital" in Voice of New China briefly surveys Philippine history under American rule. The USA promised independence to the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, but failed to keep this promise. Their present willingness to relinquish the Philippines is motivated by selfish considerations only. The Islands do not pay and, furthermore, the influx of Philippine natives and cheap sugar in the USA is most unwelcome. The USA customs barriers to be put up after the Philippines regain their independence may well prove disastrous to their economic existence. Hence Mr. Asaki contends that the Japanese aim of a Greater East Asiatic Co-Prosperity Sphere will be the Philippines' salvation.

Tomokan Miyoshi, in "Development Of Philippine Civilization" published in Eastern Asia, strikes an entirely different note. He examines the various influences that have at one time or another dominated Philippine life. If one considers that the Philippines were submerged in five successive civilizations—Chinese, Mohammedan, Hindu, Spanish, and American—one is surprised to find that there is any native Philippine culture left at all. In out of the way places Mr. Miyoshi was able to find it still alive in songs, dances, tales, and old scripts. He has lovingly collected his material which he presents to the readers of his article.

State Control in Japan

"Control Of Foreign Trade" is the title of an article in the Far Eastern Review which throws a light on the far-reaching measures taken by the Japanese Government. The freezing act has brought the question of foreign trade into the limelight. Business with countries outside the yen bloc has, of course, come to a standstill, but exports to China and Manchukuo will be expanded while imports from these countries will be used for Japan's domestic needs only. Through the cessation of foreign imports there will be an accumulation of funds available for carrying out wartime programs of the Government.

Measures already taken to control shipping are described in an article, "State Manage-
thereupon changed their constitution; the Americans, being after all Anglo-Saxons, merely changed the meaning of their constitution."

The Chinese Communists
The article "Position And Policy Of The Reds In China" by W. V. Pennell in Oriental Affairs is based on a report in the Chinese daily Shun Pao, according to which the position of the Reds in China is becoming increasingly difficult. The course of events in Russia has hardly been heartening. Dissension is rife among the Communist leaders, the Japanese forces have gained ground in the Red areas, and, worst of all, there is growing opposition on the part of the population, so much so that anti-Communist propaganda is hardly required in these districts. Their former excellent relations with the Kuomintang have deteriorated since the spring of 1940, when they drove Kuomintang officials out of the areas occupied by the Communists. Rumors to the effect that a rapprochement between these two parties has taken place have so far not been confirmed.—G.

JAPANESE MAGAZINES

The Washington Talks
The relations between Japan and America, particularly the recent negotiations and the Konoye Message to the US Government, were widely discussed in Japanese magazines of the past month. It is generally stressed that nothing is known as yet about the contents of the message, and that the Washington authorities are guarding a studied silence as to its reception in the USA. However, there is no sign of pessimism visible regarding the outcome of the present Japanese-American negotiations.

Many articles are devoted to the analysis of American public and official opinion regarding Japan and to America's present and future role in world politics. In Kaizo G. Kusuyama writes about this vital question: "Roosevelt's Pacific policy is influenced by the thought that he cannot thrive if Hitler is not beaten, even if the President's fear of the Fuehrer is not as great as it is made out to be. These are the problems that loom behind the Konoye Message .... Japanese-American relations have arrived at a precipice where one unconsidered step may lead to catastrophe .... Yet no de facto war has broken out as in the case of Germany and the USA; instead economic warfare has flared up; so it is not too late to bring about an adjustment, and such efforts as manifested in the Konoye Message are not hopeless. The hasty conclusion that there is nothing left for Japanese-American relations but the path of war is tantamount to the criticism that both countries lack a foreign policy .... Responsible American quarters as represented by Roosevelt and Hull favor a settlement with Japan; the young naval officers are, as everywhere, for war; Morgenthau thinks he can break Japan without resorting to war .... Lindbergh is a pacifist as far as Germany is concerned because he knows America cannot beat the Luftwaffe, but his attitude towards Japan is motivated by different considerations."

Other writers think in different terms. For example, N. Saito, in Kaizo, feels that the Pacific has been ruled by a new constellation for some time, because an American-German war would be fought on a larger scale, and American warships not only on the Atlantic but also, and on a much larger scale, on the Pacific. The existence of the Tripartite Pact adds to the inflammability of this danger zone in case of ignition through an American-German outbreak of war. The enormous expansion of the US Navy contributes its share, as it is not known whether the American building program is directed against Germany or, as hitherto, "against the Pacific."

The author continues: "Consequently the situation in this area has completely changed; the means to cope with it is, in the first place, our navy, to which, according to the lessons of modern warfare, we must ascribe a higher fighting value than to the air arm."

T. Hira, a prolific writer, maintains in Kaizo that too great successes of the German Army in Russia are not helpful to the American position owing to the cracking up of the Soviet armies as a definite advantage to Japan's bargaining position. Throughout, the fact that Japan is negotiating with the USA at the present moment is not regarded as a side-stepping action on the part of a Power that has signed the Tripartite Pact, but as in line with Japan's duty, according to the Pact, to keep the USA out of the war.

The Japanese are known to be great lawyers, and in this connection an article in Kaizo from the pen of a well-known jurist, Prof. Z. Yokota, deserves attention. Prof. Yokota finds that "the existence of a de facto state of belligerency must be taken for granted between Germany and the USA although neither country has formally announced its intention to wage de jure war against the other. Furthermore there is no 'all out' war between those countries on all fronts, but merely a local war on a limited maritime front in the Atlantic. Therefore the application of the Tripartite Pact does not seem to be called for, as this Pact clearly presupposes a formally declared war between Germany and the USA although an 'all out' scale on the part of the USA against Germany." The writer then proceeds
to say that, should the *casus foederis* arise, Japan's basic policy must consist, to a cumulative degree, of the settlement of the China conflict; in other words, possible Japanese help for the German ally in the military, economic, and political fields, as called for by the Pact, must be of such a nature as to be fruitful in the final disposal of the China incident. Utterances such as these are apparently representative of the views of a great many critics.

On the other hand, in *Gendai* S. Miyada, a member of the House of Peers, finds that the USA will definitely remain the underdog till 1943 and will not be ready to tackle a war on two oceans before 1946. The crews of American warships are still undertrained, so that Miyada thinks that Japan should not take no for an answer this time. He believes that now is the time to settle outstanding issues in a drastic way, if there is no alternative. "The menacing attitude of the USA towards its victim of encirclement, Japan, must stop. It is time for Japan to come superior if confronted by strong determination on the part of Japan. It is high time for America to cease thinking only of itself and paying no regard to the Far East. Needless to say, we desire an adjustment of relations with America .... Nothing has changed regarding the military alliance which we have concluded with Germany and Italy, and the Tripartite Pact stands, so much ever more in the position.... Our foreign policy must stand on a firm base, working for the bringing about of world peace."

**Co-Prosperity Sphere**

Although the watchword *danko minami e* (southward with determination) is still alive everywhere, the *kyoiken* (Co-Prosperity Sphere) is not much in evidence in the magazines under review. The well-known columnist T. Murofushi, in the leading article of the *Nippon Hyoron*, raises a militant voice on behalf of Japan's demands in this sphere. Castigating the incompatibility of the Churchill-Roosevelt declaration concerning the share of all nations in the world's raw materials with the virtual economic blockade of Japan, he continues: "If Japan abstains from military expansion in a southerly direction—which is not under consideration at present—what raw materials do England and the USA propose to set apart for Japan? If those countries desire peace in the Pacific they have at least to deliver some sort of statement on this question. We are not in need of their magnanimity, as we are entitled to our share in our own right. There is but one way to satisfy us, namely the establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia. We do not care whether England and the USA lend us a helping hand in this; we only demand that they do not obstruct it. We want neither the Pax Britannica, nor the Pax Nipponica, but peace and again peace."

A similar but even more forceful note is struck by K. Hamada in *Toyo Kaino*: "The military and economic pressure brought to bear upon Japan by the Anglo-Saxons has driven us with our backs to the wall where we stand at bay, so that finally the Konoye Message was issued and the joint examination of the 'Cancer of the Pacific' was begun by Japan and America. Churchill has proclaimed the protection of Japan's 'legitimate rights,' but what he means by this remains as deep a mystery as what passes under the name of 'Cancer of the Pacific'. ... It would be Foreign policy *par excellence* to reach the goal of the Holy War without war, and it is to be hoped that Japan will do everything to avoid war with America; but should England and America misunderstand the meaning of our Co-Prosperity Sphere we will not even recoil from death by starvation, but show fight."

It goes without saying that in the midst of these more general aspects of the Pacific situation the individual parts of the prospective *kyoiken* (Co-Prosperity Sphere) are not lost sight of, and all magazines, big and small, feature travel accounts and descriptions of Thailand, Indo-China, and so forth. The Netherland East Indies are said to be bristling with military activity, and there seem to be *totchkas* (a Russian word for pillboxes used also in Japanese) in every banana field. A Malay prophet named Boyo-Moyo, as related by S. Tobishima in *Gendai*, predicted, no less than six centuries ago, that Insulinde would one day be ruled by a yellow race, the point of the story being that this prediction would come true in this year. This political hunch of the days of yore could be filed under "the lighter side" if it were not for the attention paid to this weird prophecy by the Indonesians. It has worried the Dutch authorities so much that they have burned all the Boyo-Moyo books.

**German-Soviet War**

Naturally the German-Soviet war is the object of much speculation in the recent issues of the magazine press. Practically all writers seem to agree on two points: 1) that the German thrust had been either temporarily slowed down or that the possibility of a complete German victory within a few weeks was from the outset a mistaken belief; 2) that the Soviet Government, while possibly able to put up some kind of resistance in the form of guerilla warfare from beyond the Urals, is doomed in the long run. Nevertheless the authors, almost to a man, freely admit the astonishing fight put up by the Red armies on many of the fronts; likewise the forceful dash and speed of the German troops is generally referred to. American and British help is mostly discounted as being of more of less theoretical value, while some of the critics say that in the aggregate it may serve to stabilize the tottering Bolshevist phalanx or to put backbone into hypothetical "partisan" fighters of the future. It is emphasized in the magazines that the possibility of a further German advance on the Central Front must here cast a shadow on the Allied conference of "political medicos" in Moscow.—*P.*
ON THE SCREEN

The Girl in the News
A Gaumont British Production released by 20th Century-Fox. Directed by Carol Reed. In the leading parts: Margaret Lockwood (Nurse Graham), Barry K. Barnes (Faringdon), Margaretta Scott (Mrs. Bentley), Emlyn Williams (Tracy), Roger Livesey (Detective Mather).

In a British picture made during the war and set, as the announcement in the newspapers said, against a background of air raids and London at war, one would expect a story, if not of the war itself, at least closely related to it. The greater is one's relief to find an excellent mystery film in which the background of the war is so unobtrusive that it is hardly noticed by the audience. Moreover no attempt at propaganda is made.

Nurse Graham has been innocently involved in the death of a patient who took too many sleeping tablets. Although acquitted, she is unable to find a new position and finally changes her name. This is known to Tracy, the butler in the wealthy Bentley home, and Mrs. Bentley who is in love with him. Deciding to murder Mr. Bentley, they engage the nurse. When Mr. Bentley dies of an overdose of sleeping tablets, the nurse, implicated by circumstantial evidence, faces the gallows, since the jury, remembering her first trial, is likely to see in her a homicidal maniac who has made a habit of killing her patients with sleeping tablets. It is only due to the efforts of the talented young lawyer Faringdon, who is in love with the nurse, that she is saved.

The film has all the advantages of a thriller in keeping the audience constantly in suspense. Yet it avoids the pitfalls of many mystery films which cram too much action, excitement, and horror together until the audience is completely confused and unable to follow the plot.

The acting is excellent, particularly that of the two leading actresses. The only reference to air raids is when the nurse, hidden in the lawyer's room, escapes discovery because the detective cannot switch on the light as the blackout curtains are not drawn.

* * *

In the Navy and Buck Privates
Universal Pictures. In the leading parts: Lou Costello and Bud Abbott, and the three Andrews Sisters.

Anyone wishing to compare the characters of different nations should look at movie comedies with a military or naval background produced in various countries during the last few years. Take, for instance, those of America, Germany, and the USSR. You will find that they are totally different and that the American film with its peculiar combination of patriotism, swing, and gay nonsense stands in a group by itself.

For us who live on the shore of the Pacific and read every day about the importance of the US Navy for the political future of this area, a film that can, like In the Navy, boast of the co-operation of the naval authorities in San Diego and San Pedro is of special interest. What this film shows, however, is not the American navy but a slapstick comedy which accidentally takes places among navy uniforms and battleships.

The plot is as usual very simple. Russ Raymond (Dick Powell), much-adored radio crooner, disappears from sight by secretly joining the navy. His female admirers are desolate. A pretty girl reporter (Claire Dodd) succeeds in tracking him down. When she pursues him, first to the training camp and finally on a battleship to Honolulu, many hilarious situations result until the happy ending brings the girl reporter into the arms of the singer. Buck Privates has hardly any plot at all and is just a series of amusing incidents of so-called army life.

The very motives for entering the navy or army are characteristic. In other countries they would join for patriotic or other heroic reasons; but Russ Raymond does it because he has become tired of being a crooning glamour boy and wants a vacation away from adoring females, while the "Buck Privates" are caught in the army when they run away from a cop and by mistake get into an enlistment center. Both films are done in the same spirit surprising to any save the Anglo-Saxon spectator. There is, for example, a huge naval review. Thousands of sailors and officers are lined up on a vast field and listen to the admiral's patriotic speech. After finishing his speech the admiral hardly has time to step back when the three Andrews Sisters appear on the platform in fanciful naval uniforms, dancing and singing for the men. Then there is a celebration on board the battleship with the unforgettable picture of a tap dancer performing between the barrels of huge naval guns. And in Buck Privates there are scenes which resemble a musical comedy much more than life in the army.

It is, we believe, characteristic of the attitude and humor of America that, at a time when a large part of the world is in flames, America's main weapon, the navy, lends its good-natured co-operation to a film of this carefree type.

Lou Costello steals the show in both films with his exceedingly funny acting and lines.
In view of the daily growing importance of the Atlantic issue in the relations between Europe and America, and as a documentary illustration to our article "How Big Is A Hemisphere?" we are publishing three documents of both historical and present-day significance.

The Declaration of Panama was approved on October 3, 1939, and reads:

"The Governments of the American Republics meeting at Panama, have solemnly ratified their neutral status in the conflict which is disrupting the peace of Europe, but the present war may lead to unexpected results which may affect the fundamental interests of America and there can be no justification for the interests of the belligerents to prevail over the rights of neutrals causing disturbances and suffering to nations which by their neutrality in the conflict and their distance from the scene of events, should not be burdened with its fatal and painful consequences.

During the World War of 1914-1918 the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru advanced, or supported, individual proposals providing in principle a declaration by the American Republics that the belligerent nations must refrain from committing hostile acts within a reasonable distance from their shores.

The nature of the present conflagration, in spite of its already lamentable proportions, would not justify any obstruction to international communications which, engendered by important interests, call for adequate protection. This fact requires the demarcation of a zone of security including all the normal maritime routes of communication and trade between the countries of America.

To this end it is essential as a measure of necessity to adopt immediately provisions based on the above-mentioned precedents for the safeguarding of such interests, in order to avoid a repetition of the damages and sufferings sustained by the American nations and by their citizens in the war of 1914-1918.

There is no doubt that the Governments of the American Republics must foresee those dangers and as a measure of self-protection insist that the waters to a reasonable distance from their coasts shall remain free from the commission of hostile acts or from the undertaking of belligerent activities by nations engaged in a war in which the said governments are not involved.

For these reasons the Governments of the American Republics RESOLVE AND HEREBY DECLARE:

1. As a measure of continental self-protection, the American Republics, so long as they maintain their neutrality, are as of inherent right entitled to have those waters adjacent to the American continent, which they regard as of primary concern and direct utility in their relations, free from the commission of any hostile act by any non-American belligerent nation, whether such hostile act be attempted or made from land, sea or air.

Such waters shall be defined as follows."

Follows a detailed definition, the essence of which can be seen on our Map IV (p. 189).

"2. The Governments of the American Republics agree that they will endeavor, through joint representation to such belligerents as may now or in the future be engaged in hostilities, to secure the compliance by them with the provision of this Declaration, without prejudice to the exercise of the individual rights of each State inherent in their sovereignty.

3. The Governments of the American Republics further declare that whenever they consider it necessary they will consult together to determine upon the measures which they may individually or collectively undertake in order to secure the observance of the provisions of this Declaration.

4. The American Republics, during the existence of war in which they themselves are not involved, may undertake, whenever they may determine that the need therefore exists, to patrol, either individually or collectively, as may be agreed upon by common consent, and in so far as the means and resources of each may permit, the water adjacent to their coasts within the area above defined." (Zeitschrift fuer ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Voelkerrecht, Vol. X. No. 1/2, October 1940, pp. 443-445.)

The President of the Republic of Panama on October 4, 1939 informed the German Government of the content of the Declaration and on February 14, 1940 the Panamanian Foreign Minister received an answer from the German
Government. After some preliminary remarks it stated:

“(1) The German Government welcomes the desire of the American Republics expressed in the Declaration of Panama to maintain strict neutrality during the present conflict and quite understands that they wish to prevent as far as possible the present war affecting their countries and peoples.

(2) The German Government believes itself to be in agreement with the American Governments that the solution envisaged in the Declaration of Panama would mean a modification of present international law and perceives in the telegram of October 4 of last year the desire that this question be settled in agreement with the belligerents. The German Government does not maintain that the hitherto recognized rules of international law should be considered an order fixed and unalterable for all time.

It is rather of the opinion that these laws are capable and in need of adjustment to the progress of development and newly arising conditions. In this spirit it has willingly undertaken to examine the proposal of the neutral American Governments. It must, however, call attention to the fact that of course only the prevailing laws could hitherto be valid for German warships even in waters of the envisaged safety zone.

German warships have in their actions adhered with the utmost strictness to these laws.

Therefore, in so far as the protest of the American Governments is supposed to be directed against the actions of German warships, this protest cannot be recognized as founded by the German Government. It has already expressed to the Government of Uruguay its differing legal conception of the special case mentioned in the telegram of the Acting President of the Republic of Panama of December 24.

Furthermore the German Government cannot admit the right of the Governments of the American Republics to decide one-sidedly upon measures differing from hitherto valid law as they are, according to the telegram of December 24 of last year, to be considered by the American Governments against ships of the belligerent states that have committed warlike acts in the waters of the planned safety zone.

(3) Upon examination of the questions bearing on the plan of the establishment of a safety zone one important point becomes immediately obvious which makes the position of Germany and that of the other belligerent powers appear unequal in this connection. For while Germany has never had any territorial aims on the American continent, Great Britain and France have acquired in the course of the last few centuries important possessions and bases on this continent and on islands off it whose practical significance for the questions arising in this connection needs no further explanation.

By this exception in the Monroe Doctrine in favor of Great Britain and France the effect of the safety zone desired by the neutral American Governments is immediately fundamentally and seriously limited. The inequality thus caused in the position of Germany and her opponents could perhaps be removed to a certain extent by Great Britain and France with the guarantee of the American states assuming the binding obligation of not utilizing the afore-mentioned possessions and islands as starting-points or bases for warlike action.

Even in that event the fact would remain that a belligerent state, namely Canada, not only directly adjoins the zone in question but that parts of Canadian territory are even surrounded by this zone.

(4) In spite of the above-mentioned circumstances the German Government would on its part be perfectly prepared to enter into a further exchange of views with the Governments of the American Republics regarding the enforcement of the Declaration of Panama. From the reply of the British and French Governments, recently made known through the press and radio, the German Government, however, must draw the conclusion that both these Governments are not prepared seriously to consider the idea of a safety zone.

The fact alone that demands have been put forward according to which German warships shall not be allowed to enter the zone in question while the warships of her enemies are apparently to retain the unlimited right to enter this zone shows so great a lack of respect for the most elementary conceptions of international law and exacts so flagrant a breach of neutrality from the Governments of the American states that the German Government can only see in it the desire of the British and French Governments to destroy from the very first the basic idea of the safety zone.

(5) In spite of the willingness of the German Government to discuss the proposals and suggestions of the American states in this field, the German Government can only anticipate a success from further discussions of the plan of a safety zone if the known English and French standpoint is basically revised.” (Translated from the German as quoted in Zeitschrift fuer auslaendisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht, Vol. X, No. 1/2, October 1940, pp. 452-454.)
The present German attitude towards the Americas and the problems of the Atlantic expressed in the following statement issued by the German Government on November 1, 1941:

“(1) The President of the United States of America in his speech on October 28 claimed that

a. The United States Government is in possession of a secret map made in Germany by the German Government. It is said to be the map of Central and South America, as the Fuehrer wants to organize it by dividing the 14 countries there into five subservient states and thus bring the South American continent under his rule. One of these five states is allegedly to include the Republic of Panama and the Panama Canal.

b. The United States Government is in possession of a second document drafted by the Reich Government. This document is said to contain a plan according to which Germany will, after the war has been won, eliminate all existing religions in the world. The Catholic, Protestant, Mohammedan, Hindustan, Buddhist and other religions are to be abolished in the same manner as church property is to be confiscated. The cross and other religious symbols are to be prohibited and the clergy is to be silenced under threat of the concentration camp.

Churches are to be replaced by an international National Socialist church in which speakers sent by the National Socialist Reich Government are to officiate. To replace the Bible, texts from the Fuehrer’s book “Mein Kampf” are to be imposed and enforced as Holy Script. The Cross of Christ is to be replaced by the Swastika and the naked sword while the Fuehrer is to fill the place of God.

Apropos of this the Reich Government states:

a. There is neither a map produced in Germany or by the Reich Government in existence about the distribution of Central and South America nor is there a document produced by the Reich Government in existence about the dissolution of various religions in the world. In both instances, it must be a case of forgery of a gross and clumsy kind.

b. The allegations of conquest of South America by Germany and abolition of religions and churches in the world to be substituted by the National Socialist church are so senseless and absurd that the Reich Government need not go into this.

The Reich Government has notified all neutral governments, including Central and South American Governments, of the aforesaid through diplomatic channels.

(2) The President of the United States of America in his speech on October 28 declared that one American destroyer was attacked by German naval forces on September 4 and another on October 17. The United States Government had been ready to avoid shooting but shooting has been started and before history it is established who fired the first shot. America has been attacked.

In truth, the reports of German submarine commanders and published official statements of American naval authorities established the following facts:

In the incident on September 4, the American destroyer “Greer” was involved while in the incident on October 17 the American destroyer “Kearny” was involved.

The destroyer “Greer” in close military co-operation with British naval forces pursued a German submarine for hours. During this pursuit, the German submarine, which was submerged, was attacked with depth charges. Only after this attack did the submarine make use of its weapons. The destroyer continued pursuit with depth charges for several hours without success.

The destroyed “Kearny” traveled as an escort of a convoy when it received SOS calls from a second convoy at another place in the Atlantic, which was engaged in a fight with German naval units. The “Kearny” thereupon altered its course and went to the scene of fighting, where it attacked a German submarine with depth charges. The United States Secretary of the Navy, Colonel Frank Knox, himself confirmed that the “Kearny” released depth charges and that “only some time later” were three torpedoes fired at the destroyer which found their mark.

The Reich Government, therefore, establishes that

a. President Roosevelt’s presentation in his speech that American destroyers were attacked by German submarines and that, hence, Germany attacked the United States, is not compatible with facts and is disproved by the official statements of the American naval authorities themselves.

b. On the contrary, the two American destroyers attacked the German submarines and that, hence, America attacked Germany—which has also been confirmed by the American naval authorities.” (Transocean, November 2, 1941.)
## Appendix I

### POPULATION OF SIBERIA IN 1939

*(tabulated from Pravda, March 28, 1939, according to the Census of 1939.)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>City Population</th>
<th>Rural Population</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sverdlovsk Region</td>
<td>1,508,507</td>
<td>1,003,668</td>
<td>2,512,175</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bashkir Republic</td>
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<td>2,613,617</td>
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<td>1,677,013</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3,600,988</td>
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<td>Kazakstan:</td>
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<td>Altai Region</td>
<td>404,441</td>
<td>2,115,643</td>
<td>2,520,084</td>
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<tr>
<td>Krassnoyarsk Region</td>
<td>551,419</td>
<td>1,388,583</td>
<td>1,940,002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irkutsk Region</td>
<td>501,070</td>
<td>725,020</td>
<td>1,226,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yakut Republic</td>
<td>78,667</td>
<td>321,877</td>
<td>400,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tchita Region</td>
<td>510,900</td>
<td>648,578</td>
<td>1,159,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buryato-Mongolian Republic</td>
<td>163,425</td>
<td>378,745</td>
<td>542,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siberia Proper:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,421,190</td>
<td>9,817,058</td>
<td>14,238,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East: (approximately)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>2,250,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>10,478,328</td>
<td>23,042,707</td>
<td>33,521,035</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Appendix II

## TOWNS OF SIBERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOWN</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>INHABITANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akmolinsk</td>
<td>Kazakstan</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandrovsk</td>
<td>Sakhalin</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alma-Ata</td>
<td>Kazakstan</td>
<td>230,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnaul</td>
<td>Upper Ob</td>
<td>148,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blagovestchensk</td>
<td>Amur</td>
<td>58,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birobidjan</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dudinka</td>
<td>Lower Yenissei</td>
<td>30,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igarka</td>
<td>Lower Yenissei</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irkutsk</td>
<td>Upper Angara</td>
<td>243,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaganda</td>
<td>Kazakstan</td>
<td>165,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khabarovsk</td>
<td>Amur</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komsomolsk</td>
<td>Lower Amur</td>
<td>70,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krassnoyarsk</td>
<td>Yenissei</td>
<td>190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kustanay</td>
<td>Kazakstan</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnitogorsk</td>
<td>Ural</td>
<td>145,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nijny Taghil</td>
<td>Ural</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikolaevsk</td>
<td>Lower Amur</td>
<td>15,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Novosibirsk</td>
<td>Ob</td>
<td>405,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oyrot-Tura</td>
<td>Altai</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omsk</td>
<td>Irtysh</td>
<td>280,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pavlodar</td>
<td>Irtysh</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petropavlovsk</td>
<td>Kamchatka</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petropavlovsk</td>
<td>Kazakstan</td>
<td>91,700</td>
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<td>Semipalatinsk</td>
<td>Kazakstan</td>
<td>109,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spassk</td>
<td>Maritime Province</td>
<td>20,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stalinisk</td>
<td>Kuzbass</td>
<td>169,500</td>
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<td>Sverdlovsk</td>
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<td>Tchelyabinsk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tchita</td>
<td>Transbaskalia</td>
<td>102,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tchkalov</td>
<td>Ural (formerly Orenburg)</td>
<td>172,900</td>
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<td>Tomsk</td>
<td>Northeast of Novosibirsk</td>
<td>141,200</td>
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<td>Ufa</td>
<td>Bashkoria</td>
<td>245,863</td>
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<td>Ulan-Ude</td>
<td>Buryato-Mongolia</td>
<td>129,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vladivostok</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>206,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yakutsk</td>
<td>Lena</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*There are more towns in Siberia, but recent population figures were available only for the above.*