SHOULDER STRAPS — AND THEN?

By KLAUS MEHNERT

Russia has always been considered a riddle. Even in bygone centuries, writers stressed the difficulties involved in traveling in Russia and in studying that country. A deep clef has always separated the ruling class from the rest of the population; for this reason, the picture of life in Russia presented to the rest of the world by the ruling class differed considerably from reality. But it would be mistaken to conclude that nothing could be learned about Russia, as many people claim, or that the little one could learn was all propaganda. It is simply a matter of adopting one’s methods of study to the peculiarities of that country and its regime.

We have already shown this to be possible in our article “Inside Russia,” published in February 1942, in which we surveyed the latest trends within the USSR by means of material available in Shanghai. That survey, partly based on minute indications usually overlooked, included the forecast of certain events, such as a change in the Soviet Government’s attitude toward the Orthodox Church, which have taken place since then. The present issue’s analysis deals with one particular aspect which has aroused much comment in the world.

Of all the cities outside the Soviet Union—with the possible exception of Ankara—Shanghai is best equipped for the study of developments in the USSR. It is the only place in East Asia, and one of the few places in the world, where one can simply step into a bookstore and purchase literature—newspapers, magazines, novels, plays, pamphlets, scientific treatises—fresh from the Moscow presses; where three Soviet dailies (two in Russian and one in English) as well as three Soviet magazines (two in Russian and one in Chinese) appear; where Bolshevist editorials are frequently made available verbatim to Shanghai readers and radio listeners within a few hours of their publication in Moscow; and where a Soviet radio station transmits daily from morning to night in Russian, Chinese, German, and English.

That which strikes one more than anything else in the study of recent Soviet material is the efforts on the part of the Soviet Government to raise the fighting morale of the Russian people. Nobody would expect anything else in time of war; what counts is the methods being employed for this purpose. What are the slogans by which the Bolshevist state is trying to achieve this goal? With no knowledge of the latest developments, one might be tempted to say: the slogans of Bolshevism, of course. Since the days of Karl Marx, and especially since it came into power in Russia, Bolshevism has, after all, been proclaiming day in and day out that it offers the answer to all the problems of life; that it has brought happiness to the Russian population; that conditions in the Soviet Union represent, if not Paradise, the penultimate step to Paradise; and that the peoples of the Soviet Union believe the masses of the rest of the world to be thirsting for a chance to adopt the blessings of Bolshevism.

If these claims corresponded to facts, one would expect the inhabitants of the Soviet Union to march into battle with Bolshevist slogans on their banners, as they did in the campaigns of 1917/21. But this is not the case. In the Soviet propaganda directed at strengthening the
fighting morale, the traditional Bolshevist slogans have no part. Indeed, they do not even appear. Which, then, are the slogans that have taken their place?

To obtain the answer to this question, we can start at any given point. We shall always arrive at the same result. Let us, for instance, turn to the Soviet policy of awarding decorations. Decorations have been awarded everywhere for centuries. After the abolition of the Tsarist regime and its decorations, the Soviets were quick to create their own decorations. During the Civil War, there was already the “Order of the Red Flag” and soon after that the “Lenin Order,” the “Order of the Red Labor Flag,” and the “Order of the Red Star.” The very names show that the Soviets took over only the outward form of orders, filling them entirely with a Bolshevist content. There is nothing incongruous in citizens of a Bolshevist state wearing an “Order of the Red Flag” or of the “Red Star” on their chests.

THREE NEW SAINTS

But on July 29, 1942, when, in the midst of heavy blows being suffered by the Soviet Southern Army at the hands of the Germans and their allies, Stalin created three new decorations by a decree of the Supreme Soviet, he departed essentially from the previous Bolshevist policy as regards decorations. The new decorations were: the Suworov Order, the Kutuzov Order, and the Alexander Nevsky Order. The three men after whom these orders are named have as much to do with the Soviet regime as Lenin with ancient Greece. Suworov and Kutuzov were extremely unrevolutionary generals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, pious Orthodox Christians and devout servants of their Tsars, who granted them the title of “Prince” in recognition of their loyal services. Both were typical representatives of Tsarism, and Suworov conducted some of his campaigns against Russian insurgents under the popular leader Pugachyov, whom the Bolsheviks regard as one of their precursors. Alexander Nevsky (1218-1263) was a grand duke, a member of the Russian ruling house of those days. He is venerated by the Orthodox Church as one of its greatest saints. These three men personify all that the Bolsheviks have been opposing and vilifying for years. For Stalin to create orders with their names is as paradoxical as if Hitler were to create a Karl Marx Order for the German Army.

What made Stalin conceive this curious idea? This is made quite clear by the voluminous literature which has appeared in the USSR since the creation of the three orders.

In Suworov, the Soviet propaganda celebrates the robust Russian who, in spite of his rough manners, rose to be one of the greatest generals of the Napoleonic era. His memory is to instill the Red Army with confidence in its own leaders who are often equally uncouth.

Kutuzov, who effected the Russian retreat before Napoleon in 1812, was glorified as an expert on the Russian mentality and a master of the strategic withdrawal when it was necessary to make the withdrawals of the Red Army in the summers of 1941 and 1942 plausible to the people. In countless books and articles it was explained how Kutuzov, with his knowledge of the Russian character and terrain, insisted on the withdrawal to Moscow against the will of
many other generals, and how he was ready to retreat even five hundred miles beyond Moscow if this should prove necessary for final victory.

Alexander Nevsky's great merit in the eyes of the Bolsheviks is his victory against the Knights of the German Order on Lake Peipus, which is supposed to prove the superiority of the Russian warrior over the German.

THE DAVYDOV CASE

The skill with which Soviet propaganda works is perhaps best shown by the case of Denis Davydov (1784-1839). Davydov was a loyal officer of his Tsar who would never have dreamed that one day men who had overthrown the Tsarist regime would make him the object of a hero's cult. How did the dead general acquire this honor? Davydov was the inventor of guerrilla warfare against the French in 1812 and was himself a successful guerrilla leader. He wrote the first book on the theory of partisan warfare (O Partisanskoï Voïne). From this book and other writings of DavydoH's, which are at present being republished in the Soviet Union in tens of thousands of copies, we quote the following sentences which throw a light into the workshop of Soviet propaganda. This is what Davydov taught the Russian peasants living in the rear of Napoleon's advancing army:

When the enemies enter your village, treat them hospitably, bowing deeply (for, as they do not know the Russian language, they will understand your bows better than words). Bring them everything you have in the way of food and especially drink. See that they go to bed drunk; and, when you notice that they have fallen asleep, seize all their arms, which usually lie in a heap in the corner of the hut or stand on the street. And then do what God has commanded us to do to the enemies of our country. As soon as you have killed them, bury the bodies in the stable, in the forest, or at any other place which is hard to reach.

Davydov taught that not only food and ammunition transports but even the transport of hospital supplies and medicines, of sick and wounded, should be the object of guerrilla warfare. Davydov does not hesitate to reject the rules of warfare valid in other countries:

Foreign authors interpret the laws of warfare not for us Russians but for those states of which they are citizens. Consequently, they do so according to the standards and characteristics of military power as they know them but not according to the standards of a state whose means of military power and whose geography have always lain beyond their comprehension and calculation.

THE GOOD AND THE WICKED

Along with DavydoM's, many other historical names have suddenly been lifted out of the past again during the last two years and have been set up as ideals for the Russian people. General A. A. Bru­silov is extolled in numerous newspaper articles as the hero of the Russian offensive during the Great War, and even a novel The Brusilov Offensive has appeared. The best-known modern historian in the Soviet Union, E. V. Tarlé, has written a biography of Admiral P. S. Nakhimov, who fell in 1855 in the defense of Sevastopol. The writings of General M. I. Dragomirov, who distinguished himself in the Turkish War of 1877/78, are recommended for study to Soviet officers. A copious literature has been published about Prince Dmitry Donskoi, the victor over the Mongols in 1380. The memory of Peter the Great also plays an important part.

Even men who did not belong to the military profession are made into heroes if they happen to fit into the general trend. Professor Tarlé gave a lecture in Moscow on October 6, 1943, on the Russian foreign policy of the nineteenth century, in which he glorified Gorchakov, that rather mediocre but anti-German Foreign Minister of Alexander III.

An entirely new branch of literature has sprung up which exclusively serves the glorification of various figures and episodes of Russian history. The Red Star, the organ of the Red Army, regularly publishes military monographs on the Russian past. A number of authors have specialized on such monographs. They are headed by S. N. Sergeyev-Tsensky, whose Sevastopolskaya Strada, a historical novel on the Crimean War of 1854/56 covering 774 large pages with small print, represents the most pretentious product of this literary genus to have appeared so far.
Another special field of recent Bolshevist literature is the misrepresentation of the history of Russo-German relations. During the last twelve months we have read a lot of articles in the Soviet press which all amount to the same thing: the Germans have always been deadly enemies of the Russians and have done them nothing but harm.

Those who try to prove their thesis of the evil influence of the Germans have their work cut out for them. It is difficult to describe Russian history without recognizing the constructive Germanic influence ever since the days of the earliest foundation of a state on Russian soil by the Scandinavian Varangians. Consequently, everything in Russian history that does not please the authors of these articles is ascribed to the Germans; and where the originators of some evil are undeniably Russians—for example, the tyrant Arakcheiev—these are said to have been “under German influence.” But in those cases where a beneficial German influence cannot be denied it is explained that those were Germans “who loved Russia and felt Russian” as, for instance, the poet Fonvisin (von Wiesen).

The fact that Catherine the Great was a pure German is treated most discreetly, as is Suvorov’s descent from the Swedish family Suvorov.

In a recent essay by V. Ivanov we are told that it was only the Germans of Russia who were responsible in the nineteenth century for Russia becoming a reactionary gendarme for the rest of Europe. The traditional friendship with the Hohenzollerns, he claims, was a betrayal of the Slavic cause on the part of the Romanovs. Will he be telling us next that the Bolshevist Revolution was necessary only because the Romanovs were pro-German, and that otherwise there was little to object to in the Tsars?

OATH TO THE FLAG

Decorations were not the only attributes of the Tsarist Army to be reintroduced in the Red Army. It started with the restoration of Guards regiments, which we already mentioned in our article “Inside Russia.” This development has meanwhile progressed considerably. A revealing picture is presented by the book Our Guards by A. Krivitsky, which appeared in 1943 in an edition of 30,000 copies and has frequently been reprinted in newspapers. The sole aim of this book is to represent the Guards formations of the Red Army as the direct continuation of the Guards of Tsarist Russia, indeed, as their culmination. The author does his best to draw a straight line from the army of knights in the battle on the Kulikovo Field (1380), which he calls the “Russian Guards,” up to today. Of course, there is no hint to be found anywhere to the effect that before and during the Revolution the Bolshevists bitterly hated the Russian Guards regiments as the “bodyguards of the Tsar,” which in name and fact they actually were; or that to belong to a Guards regiment was at that time in their eyes a deadly crime.

The form in which flags are presented to Guards units is interesting from a psychological point of view. The ceremony, which in its details goes back to Peter the Great, is obviously intended, in a highly un-Marxist manner, to endow this act with a sort of mystic consecration. Let us quote a description of the ritual:

The ceremony of presenting the flag is carried out according to strict rites. The whole unit parades. The flag is carried out to the strains of the divisional march. Before the order presenting the flag is read out, the command is issued: “Under the flag, on your knees!” The flag is handed over to the commander of the unit, who is assisted by its most outstanding heroes. After a congratulatory speech by the representative of the People’s Commissariat of Defense, the commander of the unit accepts the flag, kisses the crimson material three times on his knees and then, raising himself up again, reads out the oath of reply. After the commander, the whole unit rises from its knees. Then the commander passes the flag to the standard-bearer. At the same time the order is given: “Attention! Present arms to the flag!”

Having read the description of the flag ceremony this far, one might feel inclined to assume that the Bolshevists have succeeded surprisingly well in welding the past and the present in presenting a Red flag according to a Tsarist ceremony. But the next sentence shatters all our illusions. It runs:
The band plays the *International*.

What has this song of the World Revolution, written by the French Communist E. Potier (1816-1887), to do with a national Russian ceremony going back to the days of Peter the Great? Even Stalin was conscious of this inconsistency: on December 20, 1943, he presented the population of the USSR with a new national anthem.

**FORCED RHYMES**

It is not the first instance of changed times having produced a change in songs. The *International* was a suitable song for the Bolshevist revolutionaries when they were fighting first for power and then for the maintenance of this power. For it is a summons to revolution, revolution in one's own country as well as all over the world. For ten years, however, especially since the new constitution of 1936, Moscow has been emphasizing the completeness of the victory of revolution in the Soviet Union, and it was rather embarrassing for the national anthem still to be calling upon the masses to revolt against their oppressors. Hence the summons to revolution could only be directed at the outer world. On the other hand, the Soviet Government has been trying for some time to prove to this outer world that there was no such thing as a world revolution threatening from the USSR. The *International* was thus no longer suitable either for domestic or foreign purposes.

What is interesting is not the fact that there is a new anthem but what this anthem looks like. It consists of three verses of four lines each; each verse is followed by the same refrain of four lines. A whole book could be written about the social significance of these sixteen different lines and about the light they throw on the psychological situation of the Soviet Union. Here we must limit ourselves to pointing to the fact that the new anthem fits perfectly into the propaganda of the last two years in its appeal to Russian patriotism. It, too, seeks by every means to link up Russia with Bolshevism, even at the cost of a forced rhyme especially ugly to Russian ears—that of *Rus* (the ancient Kiev state of the tenth century) and *Sovetsky Soyuz* (i.e., Soviet Union).

The nationalistic character of the new anthem has also been emphasized by Soviet commentaries. The *Moscow Izvestiya*, for example, wrote on December 21:

> The great Rus has welded the Union of the Republics for all eternity, and its powerful national traditions are embodied in the Russian labor class. It is to the immortal credit of the great Russian people to have created our state. The Russian labor class has created the great Bolshevist Party.

**SHOULDER STRAPS**

On January 10, 1943, shoulder straps were reintroduced into the Red Army by a decree of the Supreme Soviet. The Bolsheviks did not even bother to invent their own form of shoulder straps—they simply took over those of the Tsarist Army, the same shoulder straps which in the Revolution they had torn off the shoulders of their officers before killing them, because they saw in them the symbols of class differences and of the old regime they hated so much.

When the Soviets began to build up their own army after the Revolution, they took pains to show unmistakably by all outward attributes that their army was different from all other armies of the world and especially from that of the Tsars. For that reason they abolished not only the shoulder straps but also all the titles of rank of the old army. Instead of "soldier," they said "warrior"; instead of "officer," they said "commander"; instead of "lieutenant" or "colonel"—"company commander" and "regimental commander," and so on.

In the meantime, all this has been revoked again. Decrees of the Supreme Soviet of July 29 and August 11, 1943, established rankings for army and navy which correspond in every respect to those of Tsarist days and by which the words "officer" and "officers' corps" came into their own again. In a leading article of July 29, 1943, the most prominent newspaper of the Soviet Union, the *Pravda*, even went so far as to declare: "The designation 'officer' is one of the most
honorablc in our country.” While Soviet propaganda used to claim it to be the Red Army’s special advantage over all other armies that it was like one big family and knew no difference between officers and men, it now proudly proclaims that the restoration of the officers corps has led to an increase in the fighting strength of the Red Army.

To make the Red Army an exact outward counterpart of the Tsarist Army, only two more things are needed: the introduction of the word “soldier” instead of warrior and of a national flag instead of the Red Flag.

This reactionary development is not limited to the Army. Moscow, which used to ridicule the colorful uniforms of foreign diplomats and always boasted that it was represented by diplomats in ordinary clothes, has decreed that in future its diplomats (and even its judiciary officials) will appear in uniform. And when one reads the list of rankings for law-court officials issued by the Supreme Soviet on September 25, 1943, and consisting of eleven ranks, from “State Counselor of Justice” down to “Third Class Jurist,” one feels transplanted to the heyday of Tsarist bureaucracy, which has been immortalized by Gogol and other Russian satirists.

THE NEW PATRIARCH

In the late summer of 1943 an event took place in Moscow which no one would have believed possible three years ago. Stalin received Metropolitan Sergius of the Orthodox Church and gave him permission to call a Bishops’ Council for the election of a Patriarch. (In the Orthodox Church a metropolitan has approximately the position of an archbishop in the Catholic Church, and the Patriarch corresponds more or less to the Pope. The last Patriarch had died in 1925.)

The Bishops’ Council met in Moscow on September 8. Sergius was elected Patriarch and given the historic title of “Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia.”

The news of Stalin’s reconciliation with the Orthodox Church proved a sensation throughout the world, and this is not hard to understand in view of Bolshevism’s well-known hostility toward the Church. One of the official doctrines of the USSR is: “Religion is opium for the people.” For twenty-five years the Church had to suffer the worst oppression. Sergius himself spent several years in Bolshevist prisons. The number of Orthodox priests murdered by the Soviets or sent into Siberian exile is appalling. And in its issue of December 1938 the Moscow periodical Bezbojnik (The Godless) stated that the priests and servants of all denominations, whose number had amounted to 300,000 in Tsarist Russia, had “practically died out” by 1938.

SECOND FRONT AND ANATHEMA

The first deed of the new Patriarch consisted, not in having the many clergymen released who were still languishing in concentration camps, not in opening closed churches, not in obtaining permission for religious instruction to be given to the country’s youth, but in issuing a propagandistic flood of paper. On that very September 8, Sergius already signed three documents. First was a letter of salutation to the Soviet Government, which contained the following sentence:

May the divine Head of the Church bless the efforts of the Government with His merciful blessing.

Next came an appeal calling upon the “Christian brother-warriors now fighting in the armies of all our allied nations” and all the Christians of the world to “unite in a friendly, brotherly spirit, firmly and powerfully in the name of Christ for the final victory over our common enemy . . . for the freedom of the Christian Church.” The cloven foot of political propaganda became apparent when it continued: “The Orthodox Church hopes that . . . the long-awaited second front will finally be established.”

The third document signed by the Bishops present was a decree containing the following sentences:

There are persons among the clergy and laymen who, having forgotten the fear of God, have ven-
tured to build their personal welfare on the common misfortune. They receive the enemies like welcome guests, enter their service, and sometimes fall so low as to commit outright treason, betraying to the enemy their brothers, as, for instance, the guerrillas and others who are sacrificing their lives for our country... Just as Judas lost his soul and underwent extreme physical suffering while still on earth, these traitors, too, are preparing their eternal perdition and will not escape Cain's lot on earth...

We, who are gathered here today in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost... resolve:

Everyone guilty of treason to the common cause of the Church and deserting to the side of Fascism as an enemy of the Cross of God shall be cut off from the Church, an anathema being pronounced on him; and if that person is a bishop or clergyman, he shall be shorn of his dignity. Amen.

This decree shows that the clergy of the occupied areas have willingly cooperated with the German authorities, and that Stalin's churchmen are prepared to assist the GPU in punishing them.

"SLAVS OF THE WORLD...

It is not only in the domestic sphere that Stalin has shifted from an exclusive emphasis on class consciousness to a recognition of the importance of racial feelings. In his attitude toward the rest of the world a similar change is to be noted. For many years the foreign-political propaganda of Moscow was built up on the battle cry with which Marx ended his Communist Manifesto of 1848: "Proletarians of the world unite!" The Bolsheviks recognized only classes as actual factors in politics. Everything else, especially races, they regarded as negligible quantities which had either been invented by class enemies for wicked ends or at least magnified beyond all reason. Consequently, until recently Bolshevism also condemned Pan-Slavism as wrong and reactionary. Shortly before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, the official Soviet news agency Tass still called Pan-Slavism a "reactionary phenomenon of Tsarism." But the war was only a few weeks old when a complete change in course was effected. On August 10, 1941, the first Slavic Congress met in Moscow. The second followed on April 4, 1942, and the third on May 9, 1943. Since June 1942 a Russian monthly has been published in Moscow called

Slavyane (Slavs) which bears on its cover, surrounded by old Slavic ornaments, the motto, "Death to the German conquerors!" It serves chiefly to describe alleged German atrocities and to glorify the fight of the Red Army against the Germans as well as all wars of the past conducted by Slavs against Germans.

The speeches held at these congresses and the entire propaganda surrounding them challenge the "300 million Slavs" to recognize their racial ties and the necessity of their throwing their weight on the side of the Soviet Union in the present war. Incidentally, the figure of 300 millions is vastly exaggerated. To give two Slavic authorities: the Czech statistical work Slavansky Svet (Slavic World), which appeared in Prague in 1910, estimated the total number of Slavs living in Europe and Russia at 138,500,000; while the Ukrainian scientist T. Florinsky, in a similar work that appeared in Kiev in 1907, estimated this number to be 148,521,000. Even if we take into account the increase in population since the beginning of the century and include the Slavs overseas, the total number of Slavs would on the basis of these estimates hardly exceed 190 millions today.

Those who are acquainted with the Pan-Slavism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century will recognize most of the old slogans in the propaganda of the neo-Pan-Slavists of Moscow. In the last analysis, it is the return of imperialism, as can be seen, for instance, from a lengthy article in the Shanghai Soviet paper Novaya Jizn (June 9, 1943) on the Slavic question, in which Vsevolod N. Ivanov writes:

Draw a straight line approximately from the spot near Hamburg where the Elbe, i.e., our Slavic Laba, flows into the North Sea, southward to the point where Venice is, up to our River Plava, now called the Piave. All the territory east of this line—is the territory of Slavic tribes.

Replacing such revolutionary saints as Spartacus and Karl Marx, Bolshevist literature has lately been creating a new pantheon of Pan-Slavistic saints like Hus, Kolar, Skobelev, and all those men who had ever been militant exponents of Slavism. Women are also included as,
for example, Saint Olga (tenth century), although it is very doubtful in her case whether she was of Slavic blood. (B. Pares, the London professor of Russian history, takes it for granted that Olga, i.e., Helga, came from a Scandinavian family.) Naturally the new Bolshevist policy toward the Orthodox Church has as one of its aims the support of the Pan-Slavist propaganda by a Pan-Orthodox propaganda.

RETURN FROM AN ICE FLOE
While the rediscovery of Pan-Slavism and the Orthodox Church did not take place until after June 21, 1941, the beginning of the trend toward a new kind of patriotism can be sought in the early summer of 1934, almost ten years ago.

On June 19, 1934, the Soviet Union celebrated a great festival. The crew of the Soviet vessel Chelyuskin, which had been rescued by planes from an ice floe in the Arctic Ocean, was to be honored in Moscow. In a country in which countless people are constantly being arrested and disappear without trace, Bolshevist propaganda had managed to make the fate of those people on an ice floe the main object of public interest. The train carrying the 104 persons saved and the seven aviators who had saved them was showered with gifts and flowers on its entire journey from the Pacific coast to Moscow. In addition to being decorated with the Order of Lenin, the seven airmen had been given a sort of new title of nobility, that of “Hero of the USSR.”

Everything had been done to make June 19 a great popular festival. Factories and offices closed at noon. The streets were alive with flags, banners, and huge portraits of the aviators and crew members. The policemen regulating the traffic had been issued clean white uniforms and gloves.

ON THE RED SQUARE
At 5.30 p.m., when I finally succeeded in reaching the press tribune beside the Lenin Mausoleum, the Red Square was already covered with tens of thousands of Red Army men, athletes, and other young people in organized groups. The walls of the large central buildings were hung with vast portraits of Lenin and Stalin, flanked by those of the seven aviators and the most prominent men of the crew of the Chelyuskin. At one end of the square a huge map had been fastened to the wall of the Historical Museum showing the course of the Chelyuskin around Siberia. And at the former place of execution there stood a mighty papier-mâché iceberg with an almost life-size model of the ship. Shortly after six o’clock the heroes arrived in about fifty cars decked out with peonies as for a flower carnival, received by the deafening applause of the multitude and the thunderous “Urraaah” of the troops echoing from one end of the square to the other. The Chelyuskinites made their way to a special tribune erected in front of the mausoleum. Hardly had the cheers died away when they started again with even greater force: from the Nikolsky Gate of the Kremlin, Stalin, surrounded by other prominent Soviet leaders, walked across the square to the mausoleum, while the band played the International.

Kuibyshev addressed a welcoming speech to the men who had been rescued. After that, some of these men and the aviators made rousing speeches through the microphone. Then again the International and then the parade. First the units stationed on the square filed past in rows of thirty-two men. Then came air-force troops and cavalry on picked horses, motorized units, cannons, light and heavy tanks. And while the iron fortresses were still rumbling across the square, a host of heavy four-motored bombers roared up from the north, followed by a giant plane, the Maxim Gorky, which had recently been completed. And finally—by this time it was half-past eight—the flood gates of the streets leading to the square were opened, and the population of Moscow streamed in a wide front across the entire square, carrying red banners, flags, portraits of leaders and Chelyuskinites with music, songs, and countless “Urraaahs.” The procession, divided up according to districts, lasted until after midnight.
The Red Square had already seen many parades. Every year May 1 is celebrated as the day of World Revolution and November 7 as that of Lenin's seizure of power, in other words also as a step toward revolutionizing the world. That which took place before my eyes on June 19, 1934, was something different.

RODINA REHABILITATED

Eleven days previously a new word, which had been taboo for many years, had made its appearance in the USSR. As a result of the force with which it had been thrust into the masses and the echo it had found in the hearts of the population, this word became within a few days one of the most widely used expressions in the country. On the day of the Chelyuskin celebration, it leaped at us from every mouth, from every poem and song, from every newspaper—rodina (native land).

The new wave of propaganda had begun with an ominous note: on June 8 the Central Executive Committee of the USSR had passed a law against "betrayal of the rodina," which provided for the severest penalties for espionage, betrayal of military secrets, and similar offenses. By means of this law, the word rodina, which had long been ridiculed by the Bolsheviks as being sentimental and bourgeois, had suddenly found official recognition. Until then, the furthest they had ever gone was to use the word otechestvo (fatherland), but even this never alone, only in conjunction with other words, e.g., "otchestvo of the workers" or "socialist otechestvo." Now suddenly they said, and without any qualifying word: rodina, and in Russian this word is much stronger than otechestvo. For its root is rodit (to give birth). So rodina is the land which has given us birth, to which we are bound by the ties of blood.

There can be no doubt that the re-introduction of this word was no coincidence or slip of the tongue but an intentional preparing of the ground for an appeal to sentiments in the Russian people which up to then had been neglected, indeed, even mocked. A proof of this was the commentaries on the new law. In its issue of June 9, the Pravda associated the new law with the heroism of the Chelyuskin crew in an editorial entitled "For the Rodina." It raised the question as to what had enabled these men to carry out such deeds of heroism, and answered it as follows: "Their boundless love and devotion to their rodina." In the following sentences, the central organ of the Bolshevik Party called upon all Soviet citizens to fight "for the rodina, for her honor and glory, her power and prosperity," and went on to say: "The defense of the rodina—that is the supreme law of life," a sentence which a few days earlier would have been unthinkable in a Bolshevik paper.

"WE RUSSIANS"

This new rodina propaganda reached its climax on June 19. In all the speeches which resounded throughout the Soviet Union from the Red Square that evening, again and again we heard the new word with especial emphasis. "Love for the rodina sent the Chelyuskin on its perilous voyage . . . Love for our native land made us save her crew . . . For love of our native land we are prepared at any time to sacrifice our lives. . . . The old Russia, whom anyone could beat who so desired, no longer exists. The time has come for us to beat the others." Every sentence was intended to hammer into the brains of the listeners that this had been a Russian arctic expedition which had been rescued by Russian aviators in Russian planes with Russian motors. And it was no coincidence that the first trial flight of the largest land plane in the world, the eight-motored Maxim Gorky, formed the climax of the celebration. "We Russians have built that," was the feeling one was supposed to have.

And, as if officially to emphasize the new course now taken by the Soviet Union, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR decreed, on the day following the Chelyuskin celebration, that the Army was to be placed directly under War Commissar Voroshilov, thereby liquidating the collective command of the
Red Army known until then as the Revolutionary War Council. The next day a new badge was created for young people, to obtain which they had to pass not only athletic but military tests.

What I have said about the rediscovery of the rodina by the Bolsheviks is quoted verbatim from an article which I wrote in Moscow ten years ago, on June 22, 1934, for some German newspapers. In view of the developments of the last two years, it is interesting to note that this appeal to patriotism was actually in preparation for years. Our theory that the beginning of this development is to be sought in the early summer of 1934 is also confirmed by the fact that, almost at the same time, another event took place which was paid even less attention by the rest of the world but which was to become of the utmost importance for the path leading to Soviet patriotism. We mean the decree of May 16, 1934, signed by Stalin and Molotov, which reintroduced the traditional teaching of history into the schools of the USSR. After long years of repudiation of Russian history, this decree laid the foundation for its present renaissance, which during the last few years has assumed almost the proportions of a cult of Russian history.

The last few decades have shown the importance of symbols and myths in the life of the nations. Perhaps no other age has so consciously made use of them for political purposes as ours. The raised hand of the Hitler salute and the clenched fist of the Communist salute are only two of the countless symbols brought forth by the years since the Great War. Since all that lives is subject to evolution, no one should be surprised at the change of symbols in the Bolshevist state. However, some changes are of an organic evolutionary type and others nothing but conscious deception.

As an example of an organic change in symbols, I recall the history of the collar in the Soviet Union. In the years after the Revolution, the white collar was abhorred by the Bolsheviks as a symbol of the bourgeoisie, the class enemy. Even the former middle classes no longer dared to wear a collar, as they feared for their lives if they did so. But, as the Revolution receded into the past and new paths began to open up, so the problem of the collar changed. Anyone wearing a white collar in Moscow in the early thirties was regarded not as the wicked bourgeois of prerevolutionary times but as a successful Soviet functionary or Soviet engineer. In those days the Tar brothers, the well-known humorists, published an article in a Moscow paper in which they sarcastically—and correctly—predicted a time when it would be good form to wear, not only a white but—imagine!—a clean white collar.

At about the same time, there was a report in the Soviet press to the effect that Comrade Ordjonikidze, the People's Commissar for Heavy Industry, had not received an important engineer who had come to Moscow by the night train on urgent business because he had called on him unshaven. This meant that the proletarian stubble, by which one had formerly tried to distinguish oneself from the well-shaven bourgeois, had also fallen into disgrace overnight.

Changes of this kind are quite natural since they correspond to human nature. They do not represent the abandoning of principles but only an evolution arising from circumstances. But when Stalin presents the Red Army with the officers' ranks and shoulder straps of Russian Tsarism—that same Tsarism that he, the non-Russian from the Caucasus, has opposed all his life in principle and in deed; when he, the militant atheist and international revolutionary, drags out the Orthodox Patriarch from his oblivion and Tsarist generals from their collars and parades arm in arm with them before the world: then these are not the actions of an organic evolution but the costumes of a masquerade.

But why all this?

We now come to the question: what was the reason for this development?
Every modern war which involves the participation of the entire nation leads inevitably to an intensification of national feelings. No one would comment on the growing patriotic propaganda in Russia had not the leaders of the Soviet Union for decades been proclaiming a doctrine which is diametrically opposed to all patriotism. How they decried all those as reactionary and bourgeois before and during the Great War who fought for Little Mother Russia and gave their lives for her! How they lauded the solidarity of the world’s proletariat, and how they made nationalism out to be utterly obsolete and noxious! After having adopted this attitude for so many years, they should not be surprised if their complete turnabout today has astonished the world, and if one wonders as to the reasons.

During the last ten years, Soviet patriotism experienced its most obvious impulses in the early summers of 1934 and 1941. The reasons for it having happened in these two particular periods are easily recognized and closely related. In both instances, Soviet patriotism was stimulated by Stalin owing to events on the western border of the USSR: the first time by the victory of National-Socialism in Germany, and the second by the out-break of the German-Soviet war.

LOOKING WEST

My stay in the Soviet Union in 1933 and 1934 showed me that the Bolshevik leaders were immensely impressed by the fact that Hitler, after acceding to power in 1933, defied all prophecies of his early collapse and established himself firmly in the government without any resistance to speak of on the part of the German proletariat. They desperately sought for the cause of this complete failure of all their calculations. When it became clearer from month to month that an increasing proportion of the German people, including the working classes, were supporting Hitler, the Red leaders began to see the reason for the utter defeat of Communism in Germany in the fact that its international ideology had despised and mocked the national feelings of the German people, while National-Socialism had directed its strongest appeal at the patriotism of the Germans.

The Kremlin was still far from assessing the effectiveness of patriotism as highly as it does today. Yet it was clever enough to lay the foundations for a rehabilitation of patriotism. This led to the developments of May and June 1934 which we have already described. Furthermore, the Communist International was instructed at its Seventh World Congress in the summer of 1935 to take the national feelings of the various peoples more into account in their propaganda. The reintroduction of various old officers’ ranks and of the title “Marshal” followed in November 1935. And in the literature of those days we find again for the first time somewhat more national tendencies.

BANKRUPT IDEOLOGY

However, those first steps were hesitating ones. The overwhelming outward impetus was still lacking. This was provided on June 22, 1941. The terrible defeats of the first few months of war, and the loss of millions of soldiers who surrendered after brief resistance, showed Stalin that the Russian soldier was not prepared to die for Bolshevik slogans. After only a few days it had already become clear that no help was to be expected from the “class brothers” abroad, i.e., from the proletariat in Germany and other countries. In the German Army, all classes were fighting in complete unity shoulder to shoulder against the Red Army. And when help finally began to arrive, it did not come from the “workers of the world” but from the capitalist governments of America and England, whose leaders are as far removed from the Bolshevik ideology as can be imagined.

Under the impact of this knowledge, Stalin has been trying to rouse and fully to awaken the national feelings which had been appealed to so hesitatingly and unsystematically between 1934 and 1941. We described the first few steps taken by
Stalin in this respect in our article "Inside Russia."

For consumption abroad, national imponderables were also mobilized. For almost twenty-five years, Soviet propaganda had been riling against capitalism in the USA and Great Britain, reiterating to the Russian people the terrible situation of the workers of those countries, their exploitation by capitalism, their hosts of unemployed, their lack of culture, etc. Of course, it could not be expected now that the Russians should suddenly feel great confidence in the same America and England under the same capitalist regime and the same plutocratic leaders, just because they had become allies. The disappointment over the nonforthcoming help of the world's proletariat could not be made up for simply by pointing to the alliance with capitalist countries which had been decried as being rotten and ripe for their downfall. Stalin had to find something that appealed to ideas slumbering deep within the people. As we have seen, he found it in Pan-Slavism.

In other words: in the severe crisis which the war with Germany meant for the Soviet state, the Bolshevist ideology suffered so terrible and complete a bankruptcy that it had temporarily to be supplanted by two entirely new—or, more correctly, the two oldest known—ideologies: patriotism and religion.

**MARBLES FOR THE CHILDREN**

We need hardly add that this change of slogans represents only a change of slogans and not a change in the essence of Bolshevism. It goes without saying that Stalin is still the same Bolshevik, atheist, materialist, and world revolutionary that he has always been, and we shall not waste time over proving this. It is sufficient to point to the fact that Stalin himself has never claimed a change in the essence of Bolshevism. Even when he dissolved the Comintern and replaced the International by a Soviet anthem, he did not utter a single word that could be interpreted as a renunciation of his conviction that the final goal is world revolution. Stalin's attitude toward patriotism, religion, Pan-Slavism, etc., may be compared to Lenin's attitude toward capitalism in March 1921. At that time, Lenin had decreed the New Economic Policy (NEP), which represented a temporary retreat from the socialization carried out in the first few years after the Revolution. He did this, not because he had relinquished his enmity toward capitalism, but only because he saw that the time was not yet ripe for its complete abolishment and that further progress along the path of socialization must lead to a terrible disaster.

Stalin has also had to acknowledge since 1941 that the population of the Soviet Union is not yet ripe to follow him in his international ideas, and that he has to make certain concessions to this "immaturity" of his subjects if he wants to get them to die for the Soviet regime. For an inveterate Marxist like Stalin, it must seem funny that there are people whose willingness to sacrifice their lives is increased by a Kutuzov Order or a shoulder strap. But, since there are such people, he is prepared to give them their decorations and shoulder straps, just as a child is made happy with a gift of colored marbles.

Finally, Stalin kills two birds with one stone by his nationalist camouflage. He appeals on the one hand to the strong Russian national sentiments, and on the other he reduces the anxiety of the Anglo-Saxons and certain neutrals over the Bolshevist threat to the world.

**WAS IT WORTH IT?**

Now we come to the obvious final question: has this masquerade been worth while?

At first sight one feels inclined to answer this question in the affirmative. There can be no doubt that the Russian fighting morale has been strengthened by the new national slogans. It can hardly be a coincidence that the military achievements of the Red Army have increased considerably since the summer and autumn of 1941 and that, in comparison to the first few months, only a fraction of
the former number of prisoners has fallen into the hands of the Germans in the last two years. While the Bolshevist ideology failed in its first serious test, the appeal to patriotism—properly supported by Bolshevist methods of terror—has been successful.

But on closer inspection we find that matters are more complicated. In addition to enhancing the fighting morale, the change of slogans has had other consequences which are less apparent and with which we shall now deal.

DANGER FOR THE RUSSIANS

The increasing identification of Bolshevism with Russia brought about by Stalin is having its effect on the Russians as well as on Bolshevism. For the Russians there is a grave danger inherent in this. It is a very different matter whether the Russian people patiently endure Stalin's rule as victims of Bolshevism, as they have already endured so many things in their history; or whether they let themselves be carried away by false propaganda in the spiritual upheaval of a war to accept Bolshevism as the historical continuation of old Russia and the modern embodiment of the true Russian soul. The latter danger is the greater as various traits are actually to be found in Russian history whose affinity to Bolshevism cannot be denied. After all, it is no mere chance that Bolshevism has so far only been successful in Russia, Bolshevism's ideas of world conquest, of the equality of all men, of its mission of redemption, of the use of violence as a means of educating the people, are reminiscent of outstanding trends in Russian history. We need only recall the conquest of one sixth of the globe, the propertyless equality within the Russian village community, the Messianic complex of the Russian people, and the knout of Ivan the Terrible or Peter the Great. Were this not so, Stalin would not have found it possible so successfully to establish the theory that Bolshevism represents the crowning glory of all Russian history.

But can the Russians forget that Bolshevism was brought to them from abroad and chiefly by non-Russians, mainly Jews? That Joseph Djugashvili-Stalin, to whom all Russians and Slavs are now supposed to pay homage as the protector of their cause, has not a drop of Slavic blood! Or that one of the most vociferous criers of "Russia!" is the Jewish author Ilya Ehrenburg?

In spite of all assurances of admiration and comradeship-in-arms rendered by England and America for the last two and a half years because the Russians have been bearing the main burden of the war, Bolshevism still remains the deadly enemy, not only of Hitler Germany, but also of England, America, and the rest of the world. Those Russians who have been induced to identify themselves with Bolshevism, and to aid it with the great gifts with which nature has endowed them, are contributing to the inevitable fact that all of Russia will have to suffer one day for the sins of Bolshevism.

SENSATIONAL ADMISSION

What are the consequences arising for Bolshevism from this progressive identification of Bolshevism and Russia?

In No. 9 of Voina i Rabochy Klass (War and the Labor Class)—which although only founded last summer has already become the most interesting political magazine of the Soviet Union—we find a remarkable editorial urging the allies of the Soviet Union to fight more energetically and to end the war as soon as possible. The fact that Moscow desires a more active support on the part of its allies is not in itself surprising. What is surprising is that the necessity of the earliest possible conclusion of the war should be motivated in these words:

War intensifies the internal conflicts existing in modern society and causes new and all the more acute political processes the longer it lasts... In the same measure in which the war drags on, the relationship inevitably changes between the military and political factors which determine the course and end of the war. The longer the war lasts, the more does the military factor, which is under complete control of the government, decline in comparative importance; and the more do the political factors grow in importance as do the complicated and contradictory social processes, which are far less under the control and regulating influence of the belligerent governments.
In spite of the involved style of these sentences, their meaning is only too clear. They contain the sensational admission that it is necessary to return to peace as soon as possible because otherwise the "new and acute processes" in the social and political sphere threaten to become a grave menace. But has not the Soviet Union been proclaiming to the world for years that by means of the panacea of Bolshevism it had successfully solved all domestic conflicts? What has happened to have forced them to make such an admission? What internal conflicts created by the war does this editorial mean?

If we draw the conclusions from what we have shown so far in our article, the answer to this question is clear. The simple truth is that, when Stalin was forced by the exigencies of war to resurrect old slogans directly opposed to Bolshevism, he also revived old problems, although, of course, on a new plane.

**SIX EXAMPLES**

Before the Bolshevist Revolution, there were numerous conflicts in Russia which were partly responsible for the collapse of Russia in the Great War. Among these conflicts there were: (1) that between administration and army, which finally led to the army turning its bayonets away from the enemy and against its own government; (2) that between officers and men, which broke up the inner cohesion of the Tsarist army; (3) that between the Great Russians and the minorities of Russia, which led to the defection of all the western territories and to serious revolts in Central Asia; (4) that between Russia and other Slavic states, which became most apparent in the conflict with Poland; (5) that between the intelligentsia and the Orthodox Church, which contributed toward the crisis in morale; and (6) that between the older and the younger generations, which had been fermenting during the entire nineteenth century and which reached its climax in the Bolshevist Revolution.

For all these conflicts, the Bolshevist ideology offered definite solutions: to remove (1) that between administration and army by thoroughly permeating both with the same—i.e., Communist—Party; (2) that between officers and men by almost completely abolishing the difference between the two; (3) that between the Great Russians and the minorities by the doctrine of the equality of all Soviet citizens and by minimizing the Russian factor; (4) that between Russia and the other Slavic states by dissociating itself from the imperialistic past of Russia; (5) that between the intelligentsia and the Church by almost completely wiping out the Church; and (6) that between the generations by turning entirely toward youth.

Many non-Communists will reject the solutions propagated by Bolshevism as wrong and insincere. Nevertheless, they were solutions of a sort. By the consistent application of these solutions since 1917, the six conflicts lost much of their significance in comparison to pre-Bolshevist times. But, above all, these solutions formed a compact and consistent ideology with the rest of the Bolshevist principles.

Today this compactness and consistency have been destroyed. That is the price Stalin has had to pay.

**DEAD AND LIVING GENERALS**

(1) By having created an officers' corps and endowing it with a growing *esprit de corps* through the provision of shoulder straps, decorations, and increasing authority, Stalin has invoked the danger that this officers' corps may one day follow its own laws and slip out of his hands. Stalin is well aware of this danger. What other explanation is there for the fact that among fifty laudatory books and articles about Suvorov, Kutuzov, and other dead Tsarist generals, there is hardly a single one about a living Red general? Bolshevist propaganda, which otherwise loves to crow about Soviet successes, is exceedingly taciturn about the Red generals. Except for their names, their decorations, and perhaps their places of birth, the Soviet public knows hardly anything about them.
The Bolsheviks have carefully studied the history of the French Revolution and have always felt anxious about what they call Bonapartism, i.e., the rising of a counterrevolutionary leader from a revolutionary army. It was this anxiety which contributed some years ago to the execution of Marshal Tukhachevsky and his friends and which now causes Stalin to praise the generals of the Tsars more than his own. The danger of Bonapartism has become particularly acute since last summer: In order to strengthen Russian morale, Soviet propaganda has been celebrating the withdrawal of the German front since August 1943 as a chain of mighty victories. This made it inevitable that the popularity of the Red Army and its generals should rise tremendously at the cost of the Party.

**STALIN STARTS A CAMPAIGN**

Stalin tried to anticipate a possible conflict between Party and Army by having himself—the head of the Party—made a Marshal on March 7, 1943, exchanging his simple tunic for a smart Army uniform, complete with shoulder straps, gold collar, and decorations. But apparently this was not enough. Now he has opened a powerful propaganda campaign for enhancing the authority of the Party, which indicates his anxiety over his own officers' corps. The entire second part of the speech he made on the occasion of the twenty-sixth anniversary of the Bolshevist Revolution (November 6, 1943) was a paean to the Party and contained the catchword which Soviet propaganda has since been drumming into the minds of the Russian population in daily variations: "The inspirer and organizer of the war against Germany is the Bolshevist Party!"

For two years after the outbreak of war with Germany, the Bolshevist Party was hardly ever mentioned in Soviet propaganda, in order to maintain the fiction at home and abroad of a national Russian war. But since the beginning of November 1943 a new flood of literature has been poured out over the Soviet population, which represents the Party, and especially Stalin himself, as the originator of all victories and the Red Army as nothing but an instrument. Here are two examples: the Party organ *Bolshevik* (No. 19/20, 1943) published a long article to prove that the victories of the Red Army were due to Stalin's brilliant command, trying to show at the same time that Stalin was the inventor of modern war science; and on November 29 the *Pravda* published an editorial on the Red Army in which almost every sentence began with the words, "Led by the Party . . ." and in which the words "Party," "Bolsheviks," "Stalin," and "Lenin" appeared altogether ninety times.

**UNIFORMS BEFORE AND AFTER**

(2) In 1929, when I was in the Soviet Union for the first time, it seemed to me that I saw no officers at all, only soldiers. Everybody in the Army was wearing the same simple uniform. Only by looking very closely could one discover the little insignia distinguishing a divisional commander from a private. The Army lived outwardly in complete equality, except that during duty hours the superior had powers of command over his inferiors. Hence no conflict worth mentioning could arise between officers and men.

But in the middle thirties one could already recognize an officer even from behind and some way off by the smart appearance of his uniform. And today the outward differences between officers and men are so striking that a certain estrangement is bound to occur. The longer the war lasts, the more will the officers be set apart from the masses of the Army. They have their special food, their special hospitals and sanatoria, even their own batmen—a system which had formerly been denounced by the Bolshevists as the worst form of exploitation. The cadet training of future officers which was opened on December 1, 1943, primarily for the sons of outstanding officers, will contribute all the more to a further segregation of the officers' corps.

**RUSSIANS AND NON-RUSSIANS**

(3) The German High Command has withdrawn from a large part of the ter-
tory gained in the summer offensives of 1941 and 1942. But the deep penetration into the Soviet Union has led both sides to the realization that the Soviet Government can rely far less upon the non-Russian minorities of the USSR than upon the actual Russians. The Ukrainians, the Cossacks of the Don and the Kuban, and the inhabitants of the northern slopes of the Caucasus, took an entirely different attitude toward the German armies from that of the Great Russian population. The guerrilla warfare in the rear of the German armies was far more intensive in the Great Russian areas than in the others. And the eagerness with which the inhabitants of minority regions joined the German troops in evacuating these districts, preferring to abandon their old homes rather than to fall into the hands of the Soviets again, speaks for itself.

It is not easy to distinguish between cause and effect here. The more the Soviet Government has to rely on the Great Russians, the more does it emphasize the idea of Russia in its propaganda. And the more it emphasizes Russianism, the slighter become its chances of employing the non-Russian sections of its population in the same way as the Russian ones for supporting its regime.

Moscow’s former propagandistic trend of placing all inhabitants of the Soviet Union—at least theoretically—on the same level (although the Russians and the Jews actually held the leading positions) had far greater chances of gaining the sympathies of its one hundred and fifty non-Russian peoples for the Soviet state than the new emphasis on Russianism. I have seen over and over again how native members of the minorities, with little knowledge of history, let themselves be carried away by the catchword of “Soviet patriotism.” For centuries these minorities had been fighting a heroic struggle against their subjection by the Russians. Consequently, the Bolsheviks sought to win them over by making themselves out to be internationalists who knew no differences of nationality. In order to gain the sympathies of millions of Tartars, for instance, a movie was made showing the Tartars’ struggle for freedom against Tsarist oppression. This film, which I saw some years ago in Moscow, showed the capture of the Tartar fortress of Kazan by Ivan the Terrible and painted the Tsar in the gloomy colors of an oppressor. And now suddenly the Russian part of the population is being exalted far above all others; it is being appealed to as the main pillar of the state, and the conquest of Kazan is being extolled as a great deed of the Tsar’s.

If, for instance, the German Government should suddenly begin to glorify the Prussians at the cost of the Bavarians, Saxons, etc., this would provoke great annoyance among the non-Prussian inhabitants of Germany, although these latter are closely related to the Prussians in language, race, and culture. One can imagine the reaction of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, who are in many respects entirely different from the Russians, when, after an interval of twenty-five years, things which they have been fighting for centuries are suddenly brought into the limelight again.

THEY SING OF BLUE EYES

Of course, the men of the Kremlin have recognized this danger, and they are doing their best to manufacture antidotes. From time to time they have some nice things to say about the minorities and speak about the “brotherhood of nations” within the Soviet Union. On October 11, 1943, a “Bogdan Khmelnytsky Order” was created, named after a historical leader of the Ukrainian people. And then they see to it that members of the minorities themselves sing hymns of praise to the Russians for the benefit of their own racial brothers. It is easy enough to find scriveners who are prepared to write whatever suits Stalin in his policy. Before us there lies a volume of poems by Armenian, Georgian, and Azerbaidjanian authors published in 1942 through which the glorification of Russianism runs like a scarlet thread. The Armenian poet Gegam Saryan, for ex-
ample, has composed a poem, “To the Russian People,” containing the following lines:

I believe in the great Russian people,
Famed throughout the centuries,
In its blue eyes blossoms victory
And the destruction of our enemies.
I know, the Russian warriors
Have the hearts of their hero-forefathers.
I believe in the great Russian people
And in the sacred vow of the brave.
I see the dome of Heaven, as blue
As the eyes of the Russian warriors.

The whole anthology is filled with the praises of the Russians, of Russian history, of Moscow, the Kremlin, and Stalin. The person of Stalin is the only thing that fits into this association. As a non-Russian, in spite of having been absorbed into Russian imperialism, he probably arouses a feeling of pride in some of his racial brothers in the Caucasus because he, one of themselves, now reigns in the Kremlin of the Russian Tsars.

Beside the sugarplums of propaganda, the whip of threats has not been forgotten. Those who do not acknowledge the “brotherhood of nations” are traitors, as are those North Caucasians and Ukrainians who, instead of joining the Bolshevik partisan units, welcomed their liberation from the Bolshevik yoke by the European armies; and what happens to traitors is told in countless articles and pamphlets.

A LIFE FOR THE TSAR

(4) The present strong emphasis on everything Russian has also caused conflicts with the other Slavs living outside of the USSR. One cannot sing the praises of the military past of the Russian people and at the same time ignore the fact that the Russians conducted more wars against their Slavic brothers, the Poles, than against any other people.

As a part of their Great Russian propaganda, the Bolsheviks have unearthed Glinka’s opera A Life for the Tsar from the grave of oblivion into which it had been thrown after the Revolution. By extolling the example of Ivan Susanin, the Russian hero of the opera who sacrificed his life for the Tsar in the war against the Poles, they may be able to fill present-day Russians with militant patriotism. But at the same time they have torn open an old wound caused by the fact that, next to the Mongols, no one has exploited periods of Russian weakness so maliciously as the Poles.

And again, in founding a new cult of Minin and Pojarsky as the prototypes of

CARTOON OF THE MONTH

By SAPAJOU
old Russian heroism, the Bolsheviks cannot possibly hide the fact that the patriotic merit of these two men was to have fought against Polish oppression (1612). Suvorov, too, cannot be extolled as a military genius without it being admitted that he won some of his laurels in fighting against Polish insurgents from 1768 to 1794. The more reasonable elements even among the Serbs must be gaining the conviction that the Moscow policy of the last few months is not an expression of Slavic solidarity but pure imperialism. Thus the Bolsheviks’ insincere propaganda is enmeshing them in more and more new conflicts with the other Slavs.

(5) In the same way, Stalin has created a welter of new problems by the revision of his attitude toward the Orthodox Church. Above all, he has destroyed the unity of the materialistic outlook which, however much one may criticize it, one must admit to have been consistent. What are young Russians, who have been intensively trained for years in atheistic materialism to think when they see Stalin not roaring with laughter as he accepts the prayers of church dignitaries?

**PARTY AND KOMSOMOL**

(6) Speaking of the younger generation takes us to an interesting development to which, as far as we know, no attention has been drawn yet because it has been overshadowed by more dramatic events.

In 1940 the Bolshevik Party of the Soviet Union had some two million members, most of them men. No figures have been given on the number of Party members called up for the Red Army (as soldiers, propagandists, commissars, etc.). But it can be assumed that, in view of the desperate efforts to mobilize all possible forces for the Army, their number is considerable, so that probably no more than about three to four hundred thousand Party members are left who are not in the Army. These have to carry out duties which used to be taken care of by a much larger number of men, and this at a time in which the responsibility of the Party members as the backbone of the Bolshevik state is greater than ever.

Beside the Party, there is a second organization in the Soviet Union which has similar functions: the Komsomol (Communist Youth Union). At the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, it had some eleven million members. Naturally, there are also many Komsomol members in the Army; nevertheless, the number of those who are not yet in the Army is very much greater than that of the Party members. The theoretical conclusion to be drawn from this fact, viz., that the influence of the Komsomol within the Soviet Union is greater today than ever before, is confirmed by many indications in the Soviet press and radio.

From these it can be seen that the Party organs, because of this thinning out of their ranks, can no longer cope with the tasks set them by Moscow, and that they are being replaced by the Komsomol. When one follows the Soviet press, one gains the impression that the Party is limited far more to the central administration than it used to be, while the executive work, especially of a local nature, is in the hands of the Komsomol. In the reports on the industrial and agricultural work in the various parts of the country, members of the Komsomol are mentioned noticeably more than those of the Party. In view of the perceptible shortage of hands in industry and agriculture, recourse is being had to younger and younger people. As a result, the average age of the labor forces of the USSR has become very much lower, which gives added importance to the Komsomol.

**FATHERS AND SONS**

The backbone of the Bolshevik Party are workmen who grew up in the revolutionary fight against Tsarism and capitalism. The members of the Komsomol, on the other hand, know the time before the Revolution from hearsay only, and millions have had middle- or high-school education. According to the ancient law of fathers and sons, it is inevitable that, in the ranks of the younger
Soviet generation—especially in those of the Comsomol, which contains its most active forces—new ideas should have arisen which differ from those of Stalin and the Party.

In view of the strict censorship in the USSR, it is impossible to tell from here just what these differences are. But no amount of censorship can conceal the fact that there are differences. For, parallel to the above-mentioned propaganda campaign directed at strengthening the authority of the Party as opposed to the Army, there is another one. This second propaganda campaign, which started on October 29, 1943, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Comsomol, has been reiterating every day and in every possible variation that the Comsomol is an instrument of the Party and must remain so. In its leading article of October 29, 1943, the Pravda provided the leitmotiv: “The Comsomol is a child of the Party.” And the whole chorus of propaganda immediately joined in. To give only three examples:

The Party inspires the Comsomol to its deeds. (Kalinin, President of the USSR.)

The source of the Comsomol’s strength has always been the fact that it is led by the Party of Lenin and Stalin. (Mikhailov, Secretary-General of the Comsomol.)

All attempts on the part of enemies of the Soviet people to force the Comsomol off the path of Lenin and Stalin ended inevitably in a complete fiasco. The Comsomol has remained loyal to its mother, the Communist Party. (Bolshevik, No. 18, 1943.)

Does this not sound more like an entreaty than a statement of fact?

* * *

In 1917 the Russian Empire had shoulder straps, church dignitaries praying for victory, books about Kutuzov, and the opera A Life for the Tsar. Yet it was not capable of solving the problems existing then, and it collapsed. The Bolsheviks who took over the power in the state tried to solve those problems in a diametrically opposed manner. The officers’ corps, prayers, Russianism, and Tsarist operas were abolished. But halfway along their road they turned back again. In 1943 there are again shoulder straps, church dignitaries praying for victory, books about Kutuzov, and the opera A Life for the Tsar.

What reason is there to assume that the Bolsheviks will have more success with these methods than the Tsar? True enough, they have for the time being strengthened the fighting morale of the Russian people. Simultaneously, however, they have created problems and conflicts similar to those on which the Tsarist Empire foundered. We do not by any means wish to encourage an overestimation of the domestic problems of the USSR, or go so far as to claim that the collapse of the Bolshevik regime is discernible on the horizon. What we have tried to show was this: for his introduction of national slogans which has created so much attention and even admiration abroad, Stalin has had to pay a high price. He can be compared to Goethe’s Sorcerer’s Apprentice—he cannot get rid of the spirits he has invoked.

This is the position in which Stalin finds himself: just as he destroyed capitalism after the period of the New Economic Policy, when it had served to rebuild the Soviet Union from the ruins of revolution and civil war, so he is bound to crack down on Russian nationalism as soon as it has served its purpose in fighting the war. But this he can only do if he wins the war before the consequences of nationalism have undermined the foundations of Bolshevism. And herein lies the reason for Stalin’s insisting on a much greater war effort on the part of his allies and on the quickest possible conclusion of the war.