Between 1945 and 1947, American strategic planners became convinced by their interwar and wartime experiences that the future security of the United States could only be guaranteed by the complete control of Micronesia, the exercise of dominating influence throughout the rest of the Pacific Basin, and the wielding of significant influence in continental East Asian affairs. This imperial solution to American anxieties about national security in the postwar Pacific exhibited itself in a bureaucratic consensus about turning the Pacific Basin into an “American lake.”

Unlike the interwar period, when civilian and military officials clashed over the strategic efficacy of the Washington treaty system, in 1945 military and civilian officials generally agreed about the need to treat the Pacific as an exclusive American strategic preserve. There was little, if any, talk of postwar arms control or multilateral agreements as a strategy of national security, and even vocal critics of American military rule over civilian populations in the Pacific Islands, such as Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, were not opposed to American rule per se. Bureaucratic consensus within the government over strategic goals was still accompanied by interdepartmental disagreements over the tactics to achieve those goals, but it was an accepted
strategic “lesson” of the Pacific War that the solution to American security was to treat the Pacific Basin as one “integrated strategic physical complex” and to control it with a combination of highly alert mobile forces and fortified island bases.\(^2\)

In fact, the prewar Mahanian emphasis on mobile power as the key to postwar Pacific defense was reasserted and was now more widely subscribed to by officials outside of the Navy Department. In effect, prewar Mahanian doctrine was reaffirmed by the experience of Pearl Harbor and the island-hopping campaign, but with a different emphasis on the role that island bases would play in support of mobile forces. While Mahan had placed equal emphasis on a mobile fleet and a “string” of supporting island bases stretching across the Pacific, post–World War II policymakers and planners put more stress on the key importance of mobile forces. Still, however, they asserted that some key islands had to be maintained as support bases for mobile forces, and they went even further than Mahan by arguing that entire chains of undeveloped islands also had to be occupied or denied to other powers even if the United States did not intend to develop them as military bases. These civilian officials and military officers, in other words, were arguing for “Modified Mahanism.”\(^3\)

**Mahanian “Offensive-Defensive” Warfare and Mobile Force in the Postwar Pacific**

The Pacific Basin has constituted a strategically important area for the United States since before 1900. Any nation with palpable interests in East Asia would find the Pacific the key to projecting power toward mainland East Asia.\(^4\) Perceived strategic interests in East Asia and the western Pacific provided the incentive in 1898 for the United States to acquire individual islands, such as Guam and Wake, and the Philippines archipelago as logistical bases for American naval forces, and American naval officers expressed a desire to acquire entire chains of islands in Micronesia when opportunities arose in 1898 and 1919. Political and diplomatic considerations, such as the difficulty of obtaining congressional approval and Woodrow Wilson’s hopes to gain Japanese membership in the League of Nations by acquiescing to mandates in Micronesia, prevented naval officers
from convincing policymakers to annex the islands at these times. Still, the idea that comprehensive American control was necessary for strategic security remained a constant in U.S. naval thinking from the 1890s to the 1940s.\(^5\) Guaranteeing American security in the Pacific and East Asia, however, was not merely a case of occupying islands and “neutralizing” them from the possibility of a hostile takeover. Indeed, strategic thought from the 1898—1941 period and wartime experiences combined to dictate that American defense in the post-1945 Pacific would become synonymous with offensive base development in the western Pacific and mobile power projection toward mainland East Asia.

Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) originated the idea of offensive actions for defensive purposes within the U.S. Navy in the 1890s. Mahan, searching for an alternative strategy to America’s alleged policy of isolationism, argued that the Navy should be geared toward “offensive-defensive” actions.\(^6\) An “offensive-defensive” naval strategy was one involving a blue-water navy capable of patrolling global waters, supported by an overseas system of bases, and able to strike instantaneously at any enemy that threatened or seemed to threaten American strategic interests. In essence, Mahan seemed to be suggesting a strategy that bordered on continual peacetime preparations for preventive wars since potential rivals could become enemies at any time.\(^7\)

The issue of preventive war and preemptive strikes reappeared numerous times after Mahan’s death. The U.S. Army Air Corps (AAC) also adopted a strategy of “offensive-defensive” warfare in the late 1920s as a means to promote land-based air power as the new “first line” of American defense. Colonel William Mitchell, fresh from his court-martial for insubordination toward War and Navy Department authorities, changed his emphasis on air-power strategy from a hemispheric defense supporting an isolationist foreign policy to an offensive strategy that used air power to support an assertive American foreign policy in Latin America and the Pacific.\(^8\) Mitchell, like Mahan, also walked the fine line between retaliatory strikes against a hostile nation and preemptive strikes against possible enemies. At first not widely adopted by the AAC, the strategy of forward deployment and deterrence gradually came to be accepted by the Army Air Corps and
the Army Air Force (AAF) in the late 1930s and early 1940s, respectively. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that the 1930s and 1940s were an incubation period for strategic thinking that stressed constant peacetime readiness and instant retaliation against enemy nations. It is inconceivable that officers who were professionally trained in the parsimonious 1930s and who matured during the disasters of the early 1940s could have taken different lessons about preparedness from these events. The AAF postwar planners between 1943 and 1945 even defined defense and deterrence in terms of immediate offensive capability and preemptive strikes against potential enemies, in this case a resurgent postwar Japan.

Concern for overseas bases occupied a great deal of strategic planners' attention between 1898 and 1941. American naval planners charged with base development in the prewar Pacific and Caribbean were very concerned with potential base sites falling to “enemy” powers in peacetime and being used against the United States upon the initiation of war. American naval officers desired to control entire chains of the Pacific Islands, in particular, in order to deny them to potential enemy naval powers.

Yet because of limited funds for base development and ship construction, as well as strategic-political limitations on acquiring base sites in the first place, naval officers chose to concentrate scarce resources on building large, mobile fleets of armored battleships and developing a few, select base sites in the Pacific. American naval officers largely detested the idea of the Japanese being allowed to control the Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls after 1914, and they feared that Japan’s control over these island chains would bode ill for the United States in the future. Nevertheless, these officers consistently strove to limit base development to Pearl Harbor, Guam, and Subic Bay in the Philippines, confident that a strong mobile fleet supported by a few well-fortified bases along this “Mid-Pacific Route” could successfully prosecute a war against Japan.

Not every senior American naval officer believed in the efficacy of the Mid-Pacific Route. After the Japanese gained diplomatic recognition of their control over Micronesia in 1919, some senior officers worried about the vulnerability of American bases on the Mid-Pacific Route. In fact, between 1917 and 1921, Admiral Robert Coontz, chief of naval operations (CNO), Admiral Hugh Rodman, commander-in-
chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), and Admiral Albert Gleaves, commander-in-chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, attempted to convince their civilian superiors to use British and French war debts to the United States as a quid pro quo to gain control over the South Pacific and an alternative naval route to the Philippines and East Asia. Though the officers seemed to have Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes's ear for a time, their ideas were contrary to President Warren Harding's and Hughes's policies for multilateral naval arms control and Pacific island demilitarization, and the idea was shelved.13

Still, the area took on added importance for the United States after the Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor reinforced interwar naval convictions that dominance in the Pacific was the only way to ensure long-term security from future attacks by other great powers. More important, however, Pearl Harbor and the Pacific War convinced many policymakers and advisers outside of the Navy that American security demanded control over Micronesia at least and the entire Pacific Basin if possible. The attack on Pearl Harbor had an especially traumatic effect on American planners, who had to consider the strategic reverses of the winter of 1941-1942 as possibilities in any future wars.14

High casualties sustained by the United States throughout the war, in particular, had a searing impact on civilian officials and military officers charged with the nation’s security. High casualties, in fact, helped form a strong postwar strategic mindset about annexing island groups and creating an “American lake” in the Pacific Basin.15 For example, the more than 107,000 American casualties (killed, wounded, and missing) sustained in the Marshall, Mariana, Caroline, Volcano, and Ryukyu Islands campaigns had a telling effect on American officials, who specifically and repeatedly discussed the islands in the context of the “blood and treasure” expended for them. In July 1945, for instance, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal used American casualty figures in these campaigns to justify unilateral American postwar rights in the Pacific and eagerly provided this information to Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia in order to reinforce in congressional circles the idea of annexing the islands after the war.16

Moreover, the high monetary cost of conquering the islands, creating military bases for prosecuting the war against Japan, and policing the postwar Pacific had an influence on those concerned directly
with Pacific policy. Guam, which became Pacific Fleet and 20th Bomber Command headquarters in 1945 and had become a focal point of U.S. strategic power by that time, cost the government $275 million as of 30 June 1945 for reconstruction, island government, military base construction, and the stationing of forces. Even island groups that were secondary support bases by 1945 could cost a considerable amount. The Navy alone had spent more than $4.6 million on Palmyra Reef by the summer of 1945, and more than $7.8 million had been spent on five islands in the Marshalls that had been taken from the Japanese before the end of the war. Granted, the Navy’s budget in fiscal year 1945 was more than $31 billion dollars, but these wartime amounts were not the norm for the U.S. government, and policymakers and planners repeatedly emphasized not having to reconquer bases in the region because of the significant expenditure of national treasure, as well as lives, involved in the process.\textsuperscript{17}

In addition, World War II had produced more technologically sophisticated weapons with shorter reaction times. To American military officers, the attack on Pearl Harbor epitomized the loss of the geostrategic advantage of distance from Eurasia. Thus, Pearl Harbor taught them that the best way to prevent a future attack on the continental United States was to have a defense-in-depth with far-flung bases, or what General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower, Army chief of staff from 1945 to 1948, called a “cushion of distance.” At the same time, the “lesson” of Pearl Harbor concluded that the best future defense was also a good offense and that defensive bases should be simultaneously prepared as support areas for offensive action against “aggressor” nations in East Asia. This peacetime preparation of military bases and mobile forces in the Pacific was also linked to a domestic program of industrial mobilization and government-sponsored scientific research for technologically advanced weaponry.\textsuperscript{18}

The prewar tradition and wartime practice of planning for offensive warfare in a defensive context was already apparent by 1946. One of Forrestal’s wartime aides, Navy Captain William Beecher, asserted to the secretary in an analysis of the effect of atomic weapons on naval warfare that “[o]ne enduring principle of war has not been altered by the advent of the weapon: that offensive strength will remain the best defense.” Naval planners, in particular, assumed that
potential enemies had learned these Mahanian principles when they pointed out that the world’s oceans should no longer be considered defensive barriers but “open highways” for attacking forces, and that the U.S. Navy should be able to commence offensive operations before “any enemy” could deliver an attack on American territory.¹⁹

Probably the best example of continuity between prewar Mahanian thought and postwar Pacific defense was expressed in Admiral John Towers’s 1946 report on the strategic lessons of the island-hopping campaign. Towers, the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and commander-in-chief/military governor of the Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPAC-CINCPOA), the Navy’s senior naval aviator in 1946, and a strong advocate of carrier-based air power as the basis for postwar defense, wrote an after-action report that captured Mahan’s ideas about mobile defense in the Pacific and combined them with tactical lessons derived from combat experience in the Pacific War.²⁰

Towers was decidedly against continuing to base the naval defense of the region on large gun platforms and surface forces. He was convinced that surface forces had important support roles to play in the Navy, but the best use of scarce postwar resources was to concentrate on maintaining a mobile carrier fleet in the Pacific. He discussed how easily U.S. possessions such as Guam and Wake had fallen to Japanese air and naval forces in 1941, and he repeatedly insisted that the United States not become bogged down in defending the large number of island bases it now had under its control. Too many bases to defend, he asserted, would restrict the mobility of the postwar carrier fleet and allow for a possible resurgence of Japanese mobile strength in the Pacific by tying scarce resources to stationary locations rather than the maintenance of mobile forces. He emphasized that the United States in 1941–1942 and Japan in 1942–1945 both came to rely too heavily on static bases and that the primary strategic lesson of the war should be to maintain a mobile fleet that combined aviation, surface, and amphibious power in a way that was reminiscent of the central and western Pacific campaigns of 1942–1945.²¹

Towers’s outlook was eminently Mahanian but with the postwar changes to Mahanism readily apparent. Like Mahan, Towers mainly emphasized the mobile fleet, with the difference that Mahan had talked about a battleship fleet, not a carrier-centered one. This change in platform aside, Towers, similar to Mahan, stressed a very
aggressive, “free-wheeling” use of mobile power throughout the Pacific War and had protested to his superiors during the war whenever he believed that U.S. carriers were being misused or squandered in strictly defensive ways. Towers believed, unlike Mahan, that the United States could not simply acquire sovereignty over a few islands and use them as support bases. Instead, the United States should “strategically deny” as many locations to other nations as possible, even though it could ultimately only afford to develop a few of those locations as support bases for the mobile fleet.22

Towers was not alone in his ideas. Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman, deputy chief of naval operations for operations and CNO Chester Nimitz’s strategic “brain trust,” was the architect of the Navy’s component of the 1946 JCS “Pincher” war plans, the first set of comprehensive war plans aimed against the Soviet Union. Though primarily concerned with projecting power in European waters, Sherman foresaw the need for mobile carrier power to be concentrated and forward deployed near the Soviet Union’s Far Eastern maritime approaches for maximum surprise effect so that it could destroy the Soviet surface fleet in the Pacific, target Soviet Pacific Fleet submarine pens with atomic and conventional munitions, and keep sea lines of communication in the western Pacific open for reinforcements from the United States. In effect, Sherman and other planners wanted to use carrier-based air power in the Sea of Okhotsk, the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Bering Strait to guarantee the security of Japan, the Ryukyus, the Aleutians, and the Philippines and deny the Soviets the use of strategic facilities in the Kurile Islands, the Kamchatka and Korean Peninsulas, and northern China.23

After 1945, Army officers, cabinet officials, joint strategic planners, and key members of Congress also subscribed to similar ideas about postwar Pacific defense. Mobile forces and bases were no longer separate in any concerned minds, and mobile force usually took precedence over the interwar idea of the island fortress. The Pacific War had demonstrated to those individuals outside of the Navy who were also charged with maintaining the republic’s security that the strategic future in the Pacific lay first with planes and ships, and then island bases.

General Carl Spaatz, commanding general of the AAF, elaborated
on the AAF's version of this strategic security formula in March 1946. His plan placed a different emphasis on mobile force than the Navy's idea of sea-air power, but it too was heavily influenced by the Pacific War. Although neither Japan nor the Soviet Union was mentioned as a potential future enemy, the point was clear about orienting American air power toward East Asia in the wake of Pearl Harbor. Participating in an NBC broadcast, Spaatz took the opportunity to promote the idea of land-based air power as the main American deterrent force in the postwar Pacific. Asked, in fact, if deploying the peacetime American air force meant stationing it in areas like the Pacific, Spaatz replied emphatically in the affirmative. Implied that the United States was lucky in 1941, Spaatz also stressed that there would be no time to prepare for any future wars after the initial attack because of drastically reduced warning times from atomic bombs, rockets, and jet aircraft.\(^{24}\)

Spaatz's idea for defense was different from the Navy's in tactics but not strategic rationale or desired outcome. The Navy envisioned stationing a large fleet in the Pacific, while AAF plans entailed meeting any attack at all points beyond the continental limits of the United States with air power based within reach of "any possible enemy." Spaatz, in effect, wanted to keep the mass of U.S. air power stationed in the continental United States as a strong, mobile air striking force (the rationale for the Strategic Air Command, formed in March 1946), and he wanted to rotate units back and forth to forward-deployed areas like the Pacific for training and mutual support in time of emergency. Still, it was forward-deployed mobile force that Spaatz was emphasizing over stationary bases.\(^{25}\)

Other officers concerned with the postwar defense of the region subscribed to the idea of a defense-in-depth of the entire Pacific Basin, but one that equated offensive readiness for war with defensive deterrence. In June 1946, for example, Lieutenant General Ennis Whitehead, commanding general of the Pacific Air Command, United States Army (PACUSA), wrote Spaatz with his ideas about defending the postwar Pacific. Whitehead told Spaatz that all of the thinking on this subject that he had been privy to assumed that the United States would not retain air bases in Japan. He believed, however, that Japan and the Philippines were "vital" because they were the only
land areas outside of the Asian mainland that could support major
deployments of AAF heavy bomber units. Whitehead, in fact, thought
the Philippines was especially important if the United States “moved
out” of Japan, because American air bases in the new republic could
“control all of southeast Asia and the Netherlands East Indies with
their great storehouses of oil and tin.”

Whitehead was convinced, however, that Japan could be per-
suaded to ask the United States for air protection, not because the
Japanese “like” the United States, but because they “fear the Russians
more.” Whitehead also thought the United States could use the Japa-
nese “safely” as the ground and service forces to support American
air forces in Japan. Whitehead’s idea for the postwar defense of the
Pacific Basin culminated in the United States providing the overall
command and staff, as well as air power, for defending Japan, while
the Japanese provided the ground and service forces, and Japan itself
constituted the major strategic base complex of the region. In turn,
Okinawa, the Philippines, the Marianas, and Hawai‘i would be a
“lightly held” rear area of this defense-in-depth. Together, this com-
plex would provide the United States with control over the northern
Pacific and relieve the Aleutians as a “vulnerable salient” vis-à-vis the
Soviet Union.

Later in the year, Spaatz’s office elaborated in quite a detailed
fashion on its earlier ideas for the postwar air-power defense of the
Pacific Basin. Dr. Bruce Hopper, a civilian analyst for the AAF and
personal friend of Spaatz’s, elucidated his ideas of offensive-defensive
warfare to Spaatz in October 1946. Hopper was answering criticism
by John Foster Dulles, U.S. delegate to the United Nations for trust-
eeship negotiations, who had asserted that the United States should
renounce bases that were distant from North America since U.S. posi-
tions would constitute an offensive threat to other nations and sow
international mistrust, which would negate the value of the bases.
Not really answering Dulles’s objections to U.S. claims, Hopper nev-
ertheless made clear the effect that World War II had on U.S. strate-
gic thinking.

Claiming that the meaning of words such as “offensive,” “defen-
sive,” “distance,” and “time” had all been altered by the impact of “air
war” on nations, Hopper said the United States needed a “national
security policy” that not only dealt with issues of offense and defense
but also combined diplomatic and military policy. Arguing that the U.S. "diplomatic frontier" in the 1930s was on the Yangtze but that its "military frontier" was at Pearl Harbor, Hopper claimed that the result of this discrepancy was the Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor, a dangerous pattern to be avoided in the future. "Either the political arm must recede, or the military arm brought forward, in similar situations in the future. To permit continuance of the discrepancy is to invite a super-Pearl Harbor." Hopper believed that the mere existence of "American political democracy" was an "offensive threat" to "totalitarian nations and that the... line between the offensive threat to others and the defensive value to the United States can be drawn only by closer approximation between the political and the military concepts of national security...."28

These concepts were elaborated on in August 1946, when General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, commander-in-chief of U.S. Army Forces, Pacific (CINCAFPAC), and General Whitehead agreed with Admiral Towers that the Pacific should be considered as an integrated defense zone, especially in terms of air defense. All three officers were determined to prevent any "limited concept of local area defense" from becoming the postwar strategic order of the day in the region. Whitehead, in particular, was emphatic that "air power in the Pacific should not be divided" since the Pacific is "one air area." He concluded that the AAF should be constantly ready to assume an active defense of the region by practicing "air-power war" and that the majority of the AAF’s air units should be stationed in Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, with Hawai'i and the Marianas constituting the training and supply "rear areas" of this defense zone. He also envisioned a basinwide defense based to such a degree on the inherent mobility of airpower that "Hawaii may be defended from air attack by stationing aircraft in the Ryukyus."29

"Strategic Physical Complexes" and "Strategic Denial"

Given prewar ideas, wartime experiences, and postwar plans, it is not surprising that the United States wanted to monopolize strategic influence in the Pacific after World War II. Planning documents illustrate that the ghosts of the interwar period and the winter of 1941–1942 died hard in the minds of American strategic planners.30 While
some islands were left in Japanese hands during the island-hopping campaign of 1943–1945, nothing was to be left to chance after the war, and primary sources reveal just how significant interwar and wartime events were in shaping a postwar American strategic consensus that entailed controlling as much Pacific Island real estate as possible.

The key differences with strategic thinking after 1945 were, first, the belief that entire chains of islands now had to be acquired by the United States for the nation to be truly secure in a hostile international environment and, second, the subscription by numerous officials in and out of the military that the Pacific had to become an American lake. “Strategic physical complexes” rather than individual bases had to be “denied” to “any other power” in the region. Even though the United States lacked the resources to develop every Pacific island and atoll into a bristling fortress after 1945 and even though bases continued to take a secondary role in relation to mobile forces, many strategic planners and thinkers in the United States hoped to acquire complete control over entire island chains in order to preclude any possible repetition of the interwar period.

Policymakers and planners used consistent themes to argue that the Pacific was one entity that should come under U.S. control after the war. One such theme was the alleged inability of the European powers to defend their colonies in the postwar environment. For example, retired Admiral Harry Yarnell, head of the CNO’s wartime Special Planning Section for Postwar Demobilization, made it quite clear that the United States should be strategically interested in any area of the Pacific in which the European colonial powers were deemed weak and unable to repel assaults from foreign powers. In an attempt to blame American defeats in 1941–1942 on European military weakness in the region rather than American unpreparedness or Japanese proficiency, Yarnell claimed that the Japanese were able to attack the Philippines because of Anglo-French inability to defend Indochina and Malaya.⁴¹

Yarnell assumed that stronger European forces in southeast Asia would have prevented the disasters of December 1941 and that American forces would not have been as necessary or vulnerable in the region if the Europeans had merely done their job. Of course,
the assumption ignores the fact that the United States decided against strengthening its bases in the Philippines and Guam in order to preserve the Pacific Fleet and other vital strategic assets in Hawai‘i, the Atlantic, and the Caribbean, just as the Europeans were doing vis-à-vis their positions in Europe and the Middle East. Clearly, the British, French, and Dutch were not very well equipped to deal with the Japanese in 1941 and 1942, nor were those nations prone to strategic or tactical cooperation with each other or with the United States. Nevertheless, American officials in the interwar period were just as unwilling and unable to foster closer European-American cooperation and were set on a unilateral course when it came to defending U.S. interests in the Pacific Basin. In fact, while one argument places major blame on the European powers, the same author cites numerous documents in which U.S. officials refused to agree to closer cooperation because of the U.S. emphasis on keeping strategic forces in the Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the eastern Pacific, as well as because of prewar domestic opposition to peacetime cooperation with any of the European belligerents.  

There were other consistent themes that policymakers and planners used as evidence to argue that the United States was entitled to the control of strategic islands. Cabinet members thought the islands should come under U.S. control not only because of the role these areas had played in the Japanese attacks but also because the United States had supposedly been cheated out of their possession by the Japanese in 1919. For instance, when Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Forrestal wrote President Harry Truman on 13 April 1945 and urged him to take sovereign control of the former Japanese Mandated Islands, they justified seizing the islands by claiming that Micronesia had been “taken by the Japanese by fraud,” an allusion to Japan’s consolidation of its 1914 seizure of the German islands through secret treaties with Britain and France in 1917. The secretaries also charged the Japanese with “illegal” military development of the islands in the 1920s and early 1930s, fortification allegedly undertaken in violation of Japan’s League of Nations mandate. While it has been determined that Japan did not undertake military development before 1934, by which time it had withdrawn from the League, popular beliefs at the time subscribed to the notion that
Japan had illegally and unethically fortified strategic bases in Micronesia and used them against Allied positions in 1941. To be sure, this suspicion of Japanese fortification was reinforced by difficulties in obtaining interwar intelligence on the area, difficulties that provided additional “evidence” to strategic planners about Japanese duplicity.34

Military and congressional recommendations on these matters were similar. For example, the House Naval Affairs Subcommittee on Pacific Bases, which toured every major island group in the Pacific in August 1945 to determine postwar base requirements, ignored the idea that Japan may have begun to fortify Micronesia after withdrawing from the League, blamed Japan for the Pacific War, and claimed the Japanese had legally forfeited any claim to the Mandated Islands because of this alleged interwar fortification.35 The subcommittee also found fault with the military weaknesses of the European powers in the Pacific in 1941–1942. Asserting that island mandates were meaningless if not properly defended against aggression, the legislators ignored the reality of American military weaknesses in 1941 and seemed to conclude that the European colonial powers were unfit to defend their possessions in a postwar environment. Of course, this conclusion conveniently allowed the subcommittee to recommend postwar American control over Micronesia and any other island group the United States felt to be necessary for American security in the Pacific.36

The idea that the Pacific now represented an integrated strategic complex was enunciated more strongly by Secretary Forrestal in December 1945. A strong advocate of U.S. annexation of Micronesia, the Bonins, the Volcanoes, and Marcus Island, Forrestal stated that the official Navy position on the strategic value of the islands was their use as a “farreaching, mutually supporting base network” from which large-scale offensives could be launched and which would permit a “full exploitation” of mobile forces in the Pacific. More specifically, Forrestal told Congress that American security in the postwar Pacific depended upon the United States forming a “defensive wedge” in the region based on positions in the Aleutians, the Ryukyus, and Micronesia and defended by mobile “sea-air power.”37

Similar AAF concepts of strategic physical complexes became even clearer in November 1946. At that time, Colonel Harold Bowman, AAF deputy director of information, forwarded the “Statement of
Army Air Forces Position Regarding Pacific Island Bases" to Spaatz, who in turn asked Lieutenant General Ira Eaker, AAF deputy commander and chief of air staff, for comments on acquiring the necessary bases to service heavy bomber units within international political and domestic budgetary restrictions. By this time, Spaatz made it clear that the Soviet Union was the new enemy in the Pacific Basin, but the "lessons" from Japanese expansionism and the Pacific War were repeatedly used to illustrate a course for the future.\(^\text{38}\)

The paper began by stressing the strategic raw materials, such as oil, rubber, lumber, and bauxite, available in the "Pacific Littoral" and emphasized that no one nation resisted Japan's filling the "military vacuum" that existed in the region during the interwar period. Convinced that Japan's expansionist policy was the sole reason for the Pacific War, the paper perceived that the Soviet Union had replaced Japan as the expansionist nation filling a Eurasian power vacuum. To the authors of the paper, "a military vacuum of Post-World War I dimensions in the Pacific . . . would be inviting a repetition of events similar to those which occurred in the Far East between 1920 and 1941."\(^\text{39}\)

Accordingly, it was necessary for the AAF to construct a "Strategic Triangle" of air bases between the Philippines, the Ryukyus, and the Marianas with the mission of safeguarding "air lines of communication" between these areas, as well as between East Asia and North America. Okinawa would sport airfields from which the AAF could conduct strategic surveillance of the northwest Pacific, the air defense of the Ryukyus, and strategic air offensives toward northeast Asia. Because of Soviet domination of Manchuria and north China, Okinawa constituted the key point of the strategic triangle with the Philippines and the Marianas, either of which could support Okinawa. The Philippines, as the westernmost point of the triangle, in addition to supporting Okinawa, would also be used for strategic air offensives and to conduct strategic surveillance of sea routes between "sources of essential materials," most likely meaning the Straits of Malacca. Finally, the Marianas, especially Guam and Saipan, would complete the triangle by supporting strategic surveillance to the north, supporting operations from Iwo Jima and Okinawa, and supporting the air lines of communication between the Philippines and Hawai'i.\(^\text{40}\)
The strategic triangle, however, was not to stand on its own. It was, in fact, to have support to its rear and its front. The triangle, in essence, was a “frontline,” and Iwo Jima was to be a kind of “listening post” that could survey the strategic approaches to the Marianas and assist in conducting offensives to the north. Moreover, Hawai‘i was to be the major rear area base, meant to support the strategic triangle logistically through northern and southern “air lines of communication base routes” based at Johnston-Kwajalein and Wake-Midway, respectively. Most important, Hawai‘i, in conjunction with bases in the Aleutian Islands, was to prevent any future Pearl Harbor by conducting strategic surveillance to the north.41

Other officials and planning bodies argued along similar lines about the defensive and offensive potential of the islands by indicating how the Japanese had used their Pacific mandates in 1941 as offensive staging areas against Allied positions. In addition, there was a defensive attitude among the planners when it came to interwar events, a defensiveness probably brought about by the 1945-1946 congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor raid. For example, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), a long-range strategic planning body subordinate to the JCS,42 asserted that during the interwar period the War and Navy Departments had recognized the dangers to American security if Japan acquired control of the western Pacific. The JSSC claimed, however, that the military services had been unsuccessful in preventing their legitimation to Japan in 1919 because of the wartime special treaties. The JSSC also intimated that President Woodrow Wilson’s unwillingness to allow Pacific policy to interfere with his plans for reconstructing Europe through the League of Nations prevented a firm American response to Japan’s expansion.43

Whether or not the leadership of the military services was really aware of these “strategic realities” during and immediately after the First World War remains to be seen. The 1946 JSSC document asserted, however, that American consent to Japan in 1919 acquiesced in “grave danger” to the Western Hemisphere, the Pacific Islands, and the Philippines. To a great extent, the effect of the Pearl Harbor strike was reflected in the committee’s use of phrases such as “very vulnerable” and “militarily unsound” in describing the prewar
strategic positions of Guam and the Philippines. Moreover, the Japanese control of Micronesia was seen, in hindsight at least, as a direct risk to Hawai‘i, and the JSSC asserted that “effective political denial” of the islands to Japan would have been of “supreme importance” to prewar American preparations, as well as to the conduct of the Pacific War. The JSSC even implied that if Micronesia had been under U.S. control in 1941, the Japanese carrier strike on Pearl Harbor would not have succeeded and that the United States could have relieved the Philippines in 1942.

This increased attention to entire chains of islands was not restricted to military and congressional officials after 1945. The consensus to blanket the Pacific with American power was subscribed to by civilian officials outside of the military departments, and it resulted from an increased perception that strategic denial was an important element of strategic security in the region. For example, Warren Austin, U.S. ambassador to the UN Security Council in 1947, used Japanese military dispositions in 1941 as a case for a U.S. “strategic trusteeship” over Micronesia. A form of the League of Nations mandate system carried over to the UN Charter, trusteeships were supposedly a means by which great powers would develop former colonies into independent nations. In reality, the multilateralism implied in “international trusteeship” gave way to the unilateralism of “strategic trusteeship” when it came to the U.S. trusteeship in Micronesia. A concept developed specifically by Under Secretary of the Interior Abe Fortas in early 1945 to find a middle ground between the military’s call for annexation and State Department opposition to European-style colonialism, strategic trusteeship entailed a situation in which the United States would have sole authority for the occupation, defense, and administration of Micronesia, as well as the other islands taken from Japan north of the equator. The idea of strategic trusteeship epitomized the U.S. position that its security was to be absolutely guaranteed in the postwar Pacific.

Labeling Japan’s possession of the islands as a “tremendous advantage” to its prewar preparations, Austin and his staff argued that Japan had “mutually self-supporting” and fortified naval and air bases throughout the western Pacific and that these bases had been “strategic barriers” between American, British, and Dutch positions in the
Pacific. According to Austin, these barriers had been used in a variety of ways to defeat Allied forces in the Pacific in 1941 and 1942. He pointed out, for instance, that most of the Japanese submarines used in the Pearl Harbor operation were based at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. In addition, he asserted that the Marshalls had been used as bases for naval and air forces attacking Wake Island, that Guam had been captured by forces originating in the Marianas, and that Palau (now Belau) was used as a staging point for attacks on the Dutch East Indies and New Guinea. Austin specifically mentioned Truk as the main Japanese naval base in the western Pacific and the staging point for operations against New Britain, the Solomon Islands, New Ireland, and the Bismarck Archipelago, and he argued that Japan's use of these islands as a mutually self-supporting complex of strategic assets prevented early American reinforcement and relief of Allied positions in the Philippines, Southeast Asia, and China.

What are scholars to make of the assertions that U.S. possession of Micronesia would have prevented so many Allied military defeats in the winter of 1941-1942? Given the sensitivity of the Pearl Harbor investigations, it can easily be argued that the military services were merely using historical hindsight to point fingers at the Washington treaty system for their own failures since the argument that American control over Micronesia would have made a strategic difference in December 1941 is disingenuous.

It is true that the American commanders in Hawai‘i in 1941 believed Japanese attacks would come from Japan’s bases in the Mandated Islands. It is therefore understandable that American military officers in the interwar period would have been opposed to Japan’s control over Micronesia. By 1945, however, American officials knew that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had come from the northwest and that patrol planes from Hawai‘i had only slight chances of detecting the Japanese task force even if they had been properly deployed. More important, Micronesia under U.S. control would have been too far to the south to be useful as a system of patrol bases for planes trying to detect naval movements in the northern Pacific. Strong American control of Micronesia would have prevented the Japanese from staging attacks on Wake, Midway, and the Philippines.
from the Mandate bases, might have prevented a Japanese attack from the home islands or Taiwan toward the western and central Pacific, and might have precluded Japan from deploying submarines to the Hawaiian area. But the islands as American bases in 1941 would have done little to prevent a Japanese carrier attack on Hawai‘i originating from northern Japan.

Moreover, the United States had failed to develop even Guam as a reconnaissance outpost because of congressional parsimony, and the military services were so badly coordinated in terms of patrolling, intelligence, and communications that it is difficult to envision a more alert peacetime force ready for an attack on Hawai‘i.\(^{53}\) I am convinced by these primary sources, however, that military officials sincerely believed that there was some connection between interwar Japanese control over Micronesia and the raid on Pearl Harbor, even if their ideas were not clearly thought out. As Forrestal put the matter as late as February 1947, the islands in the interwar period “figuratively, if not literally, . . . became steppingstones to Pearl Harbor.”\(^{54}\)

Austin’s use of evidence, like that of military officials, is also questionable from another point of view. It was geared toward convincing skeptical allies and the Soviet Union about the need for an exclusive American strategic trusteeship in the Pacific. Moreover, his rendition of the events of 1941–1942 reflects the sincere fears of American planners about any postwar strategic situation in the Pacific that might have led to a repetition of interwar events. His speech and supporting data, however, are interesting from a number of other perspectives.

Historians now know, for instance, that some of the assertions about American reinforcements for Allied positions in East Asia were inaccurate. For example, Franklin Roosevelt and his closest strategic advisers never placed China high on the priority list for relief by the United States.\(^{55}\) In addition, while American reinforcement and relief of the Philippines would have been much easier with control of Micronesia, it should not be assumed, as it was by Austin and others at the time, that operations in the central and western Pacific would have been successful in this context. The U.S. Pacific Fleet in 1941 was outnumbered in aircraft carriers and deficient in the quality of its planes and pilots. In addition, the Japanese Navy had been prepar-
ing for just such a decisive battle in the region for more than twenty years. Still, Austin's staff did sufficient research to enable him to "show" that Japanese control and development of Micronesia provided it with the strategic capability to strike every Allied possession in the Pacific Basin. Thus, he could argue to the western European colonial powers and the USSR that the inflexible U.S. position on a strategic trusteeship in the western Pacific was in the best interests of British, French, Dutch, and international, as well as American, security.

Finally, Austin's assertion that Micronesia and the entire Pacific Basin should be considered as a single "integrated strategic physical complex vital to the security of the United States" was significant because it was a perception that was consistently repeated by American strategic planners throughout the government in the 1940s. While the United States could not afford to develop each and every island in the Pacific into a bristling fortress and did not want to because of the drain on maintaining mobile forces in the region, geostrategically important chains would still have to be denied to all other powers so that their strategic facilities could never be used against U.S. forces or territories.

Conclusion

After 1945, there was a new formula for American national security in the postwar Pacific Basin. This formula entailed mobile air and sea-based American military force constituting the first line of defense for U.S. interests in the Pacific and East Asia. While Army and Navy officers may have disagreed with each other over the efficacy of land-based versus carrier-based air power, there was little disagreement that mobile striking force was the key to the postwar period.

A new strategic consensus had also been formed over the role that island bases would play in this postwar defense. The idea of obtaining control over a few islands for support bases and leaving neighboring islands to be occupied by other powers or even left untended was no longer considered an option by military officers from either service or by civilian officials outside of the military. The strategic denial to other powers of entire island chains, or strategic physi-
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cal complexes, was now considered important as a secondary means of defense against potential future enemies. This aspect of the new policy marked a major change in interwar U.S. strategic thinking for that region of the world since naval officers were no longer the only group advocating the occupation of entire chains of islands and their defense with mobile forces. In effect, perceptions about interwar and wartime, as well as future, events made it strategically imperative and politically possible for a wider audience to subscribe to ideas about offensive-defensive warfare, strategic physical complexes, and strategic denial. These experiences, perceptions, and ideas, in turn, made it easier for civilian policymakers and military officers to plan on turning the entire Pacific Basin into an American lake.

NOTES

An earlier version of a portion of this essay appeared in my article, “The Beast in Paradise: The United States in Micronesia, 1943–1947,” Pacific Historical Review 62 (May 1993): 173–195. I wish to acknowledge the permission of Pacific Historical Review to incorporate the work here. I would also like to thank William Christopher Hamel, staff historian at the Oklahoma Historical Society, and Dirk Ballendorf, professor of Micronesian studies at the University of Guam, for assistance with the concept of “strategic denial.”


For similar interdepartmental rivalry over means to the same strategic goals in the Middle East in the 1940s, see Aaron David Miller, *Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy, 1939–1949* (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1980) 75, 78.

I am indebted to Perry Smith for this concept. In his work on wartime Army Air Force planning for the postwar world, Smith described planning officers as believers in "modified Mahan." These officers adopted Mahan's precepts about the use of strategic military power, such as the concentration of force, the use of island support bases, and the primacy of the offensive. The officers, however, applied these principles to strategic land-based air power, not naval power, thus producing "modified Mahan." See Perry Smith, *The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943–1945* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1970) 35–38. I have taken Smith's concept further, but I owe him an intellectual debt for providing my starting point.


See Dower, "American Lake," *passim*.

See Sherry, *Preparing for the Next War,* *passim*.


For a superb analysis of how these various ideas about postwar preparedness blended together in wartime planning, see Sherry, *Preparing for the Next War,* *passim*, and Smith, *Air Force Plans for Peace* 48–49, 80. For the statement on offense as defense, see William A. Shurcliff, *Bombs at Bikini: The Official Report


21 “Extract from Secret Information Bulletin No. 17.”


23 For a full description of Sherman’s plans, see Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy 30–37.


25 Spaatz to Harkness, 12 Mar. 1946.

26 See Whitehead to Spaatz, 14 June 1946, folder Pacific (3), Chief of Staff File, Spaatz Papers.

27 Whitehead to Spaatz, 14 June 1946.


See House Committee on Naval Affairs, Study of Pacific Bases 1014.

See cover letter by Bowman, 15 Nov. 1946, and memo from Spaatz to Eaker, 21 Nov. 1946; see also “Statement of Army Air Forces Position Regarding Pacific Island Bases”; all found in folder Pacific (3), Chief of Staff File, Spaatz Papers.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

See Thomas Buell, Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980) 207, 252, 311, for the creation of the JSSC.

See JSSC to JCS, "Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific," study attached to "Draft Trusteeship Agreement—Pacific Islands," State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee 59/7, 19 Oct. 1946, file 12-9-42 sec. 28, ccs 360, RG 218, NA.

44 Jssc, "Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific."
45 Jssc, "Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific."
46 See “Pacific Bases,” file 48-1-24, RG 80, NA.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
52 Colletta, “Rear Admiral Patrick N. L. Bellinger.”
57 See Austin to Security Council, 26 Feb. 1947, file 2-1-7, RG 80, NA.