WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

JAN 17 1944

Hon. John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

I have Captain Hall's letter of November 15 to which was attached excerpts from General Emmons' confidential letter of November 10 commenting on my letter to you of October 16.

Captain Hall indicates that you are in general accord with what General Emmons had to say. This disturbs me because I evidently did not make clear either to General Emmons or to you exactly what I was proposing in the way of cooperation between the Army and the War Relocation Authority.

At no time did I indicate that the Army should take over the full public relations responsibility. You may assure General Emmons that I will be glad to try to obtain the support of Governor Warren and the Governors of any other western states on a sound program for relocation of Japanese Americans, as we have done in other areas, and that I have no intention of "ramming down their throats" a plan to return Japanese to the western states. On the contrary I suggested that plans should be well thought through jointly by the War Department and the War Relocation Authority, both of whom I feel have a responsibility, in order to avoid the very thing that General Emmons suggests should not be done. I disagree that the relocation problem is purely a civilian matter. I do agree that it is largely our responsibility but in the coastal areas that responsibility, in my judgment, should be shared by the military. I believe that our program cannot be executed unless this responsibility is properly shared.

General Emmons indicates that I suggested several officers be detailed to WRA to work with us in a solution of this problem. I am sorry he misunderstood my suggestion, which was that two or three officers be assigned to this task in the War Department to work with
representatives of WRA in developing a particular plan of operations, but not that they be detailed to WRA. My purpose in this suggestion was to develop a joint plan agreed upon by representatives of the War Department and the War Relocation Authority providing for the execution of certain responsibilities by the War Department, with major responsibilities, of course, being assumed by WRA. I further pointed out that time should be devoted by key officers to assure that staff members of the armed forces were thoroughly informed about the plan and why certain procedures had been developed, in order to avoid interference with the public relations job the WRA will be required to do by anyone in the armed forces because of personal opinions or inadvertent statements.

I appreciate having had an opportunity to read the excerpts from General Emmons' confidential letter and to clarify the record regarding my recommendations.

Sincerely,

D.S. Myer
Director
EXCERPTS FROM CONFIDENTIAL LETTER FROM GENERAL EMMONS TO MR. MCLOY
DATED 10 NOVEMBER 1943:

I have read Mr. Myer's letter to you with a great deal of interest. As stated to me that the Army's prestige is such that we could do things that he could not do and suggested that we were in a good position to handle public relations matters bearing on this subject. I recommend that the War Department confine its interest in this matter to military security. That we do not enter into any joint policies or agreements reference the return of the Japanese to the West Coast but that we do retain veto power. 'It is true that the Army evacuated the Japanese from the Coast but they did it because there was no other agency that could do it. In the meantime, the WRA has been organized and, as I understand it, it is their job to relocate evacuated Japanese and our job to determine what Japanese may be brought back into critical areas.

On the first of November the West Coast ceased to be classified as a theater of operations. That, coupled with the President's statement which you quoted, leaves me in a very weak legal position and that is the reason why I am going through all individual exclusion cases, except Japanese, with a view to permitting the return to the Coast of a large proportion of non-Japanese evacuees. I am also going through the mixed Japanese marriage cases, I can't give you a policy covering these cases as I think each one of them, and there are not very many, has to be handled on its merits, giving due consideration to human reasons. Incidentally, instructions have been issued which will enable the wife of Tameo Takayoshi to return to Seattle.

This Tule Lake situation has aroused a tremendous amount of anti-Japanese feeling on the West Coast. Newspaper reporters are concocting the wildest kind of stories and the papers are giving wide publicity to them because it is a popular issue. Of course, the politicians are riding along at full speed. I think it would be very good policy, therefore, to let this feeling subside before any considerable number of Japanese are returned to the Coast. I would like to suggest to Mr. Myer that it would be good policy for him to endeavor to obtain the support of Governor Warren and other Western States governors on a sound plan for relocating Japanese in these areas, both during and after the war. I am quite sure that if we ran down their threats any plan to return Japanese to the Western States, such political opposition would be aroused as to completely nullify even a perfectly sound plan.

Mr. Myer also suggested that he would like several officers detailed to the WRA to work with them in the solution of this problem. I would like to repeat my recommendation that the War Department take the attitude that this relocation problem is purely a civil matter and a responsibility of the WRA and that our only interest in the matter is that of military security.

On the matter of military security, I think the danger of plant sabotage has been over-emphasized at the expense of espionage. The
danger of sabotage has been greatly reduced by reason of barbed wire fences, plant guards, etc., and by the fact that most Japanese will be under constant surveillance by other races. Espionage, however, is still serious because knowledge of fleet and ship movements would be of real interest to the Japanese. Because of our proximity to the Mexican border, it would be easy to get this information to Japan.
The Honorable J. J. McCloy  
Assistant Secretary of War  
War Department  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

Your letter of November 5 arrived this morning: we are re-organizing the Western Defense Command and placing it on a much sounder basis.

I have read Mr. Myer's letter to you with a great deal of interest. My reaction to Mr. Myer is that he is very anxious to have the War Department assume partnership with him in what may prove to be a very unpopular move; that is, the return of any quantity of Japanese to the Coast during or after the war. He stated to me that the Army's prestige is such that we could do things that he could not do and suggested that we were in a good position to handle public relations matters bearing on this subject. I recommend that the War Department confine its interest in this matter to military security. That we do not enter into any joint policies or agreements reference the return of the Japanese to the West Coast but that we do retain veto power. It is true that the Army evacuated the Japanese from the Coast but they did it because there was no other agency that could do it. In the meantime, the WRA has been organized and, as I understand it, it is their job to relocate evacuated Japanese and our job to determine what Japanese may be brought back into critical areas.

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(Trusting this letter may be of some value to you in your discussions with Mr. Myer and with kindest personal regards, I am)

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army