Provocation and Angst: FDR, Japan, Pearl Harbor, and the Entry into War in the Pacific

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Through the afternoon of December 7, 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt kept getting more disheartening news about the devastation wreaked by the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. These reports were hard for him to fathom, for he knew that Washington had sent repeated alerts to all the Pacific bases—indeed, FDR had personally ordered warnings sent on November 27 and 28, which included a note that in a confrontation the United States would prefer to have the enemy fire first.1 This provision catered to Congressional isolationists, who would support combat only if U.S. forces were under attack. Although the president, unlike Secretary of War Henry Stimson, was not surprised by the attack, the outcome must have caused him grave angst.2
Japan regarded the successful air strike at Pearl Harbor as justified retaliation for America’s existential attacks on Japan’s economy beginning in July 1941. Those actions—freezing Japanese assets and embargoing the sale of oil to Japan—had been imposed by the United States as punishment for Japan’s occupation of southern Indochina as a staging area for its campaign to seize oil. The American president, on the other hand, had compelling reasons for feeling that, as de facto leader of the free world, he had a grave responsibility to oppose both Hitler’s Germany and its Tripartite Pact (Axis) partner, Japan, in their joint quest for world domination.

Though the immediate crisis resulted from Japan’s aggression, Roosevelt’s overarching concern was Nazi Germany and always had been. Hitler at this point not only dominated most of Europe, but also, surprisingly, in view of his hatred of communism, had been linked to Stalin and the Soviet Union through a non-aggression pact signed in August 1939. This Eurasian time bomb had exploded on June 22, 1941, when Hitler, disregarding his pact with Stalin, mounted a massive invasion of the Soviet Union, as the president looked on in horror. His advisers warned him more and more urgently that America must not wait longer to join Great Britain in its life-and-death struggle, for the Soviets might soon succumb, and Germany would then be able to overwhelm Britain. However, the president’s support in the U.S. House of Representatives was paper-thin; on August 12 the House had passed by only one vote his indispensable proposal that the one-year term of service for draftees be extended.3

Meanwhile, the North Atlantic sea-lanes had to be kept open if Britain was to avoid starvation. After German torpedo attacks on the destroyers USS Greer in September and USS Kearny in October (in which the Kearny lost 11 of her crew), FDR ordered U.S. Navy ships convoying Lend-Lease shipments to Britain to shoot German U-boats on sight in American defensive waters west of Iceland. This was the context when Robert Wood—chairman of Sears, Roebuck & Company, and spokesman for the America First Committee, the leading isolationist organization in America—urged the president to ask Congress to vote “up or down” on the question of going to war. The president declined, perhaps sensing that Wood made the proposal knowing there were enough isolationist votes in Congress to prevail against FDR.
On October 31 a German submarine torpedoed and sank the destroyer USS *Reuben James*, with the loss of 115 crew members. Roosevelt then ordered the arming of U.S. merchantmen; however, he continued to decline to call for a congressional vote on the issue of war, although in delaying such a vote he was plagued by the nightmare that Germany might defeat the British and Soviets before the U.S. could join the fight, leaving America, alone in the world, to engage the Axis powers.4

Facing this impasse in the undeclared war with Germany in the Atlantic—Hitler was shrewdly refusing to declare war—the president turned to the Pacific and Japan. He reasoned that, if Japan initiated hostilities by attacking an American asset, the U.S. would be justified in retaliating, in which case he was sure Germany would side with its Tripartite Pact sworn ally, Japan, and enter the war against America.5 His problem then became how to inveigle Japan into attacking.

As early as the first quarter of 1941, feeling his way cautiously, FDR arranged to stage the sudden appearance of groups of cruisers at various sites in the West Pacific, thus keeping the Japanese off balance and harassing them by unexpected confrontations and scrutiny—a relatively minor form of provocation. He explained: “I just want to keep them popping up here and there and to keep the Japs guessing.” Admiral Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), agreeing with his revered chief, stated his own position clearly: “. . . there was some merit in ships popping up here and there, provided we still maintained them in a position where we could concentrate where necessary, and not isolate them from the rest of the fleet.”6

Roosevelt was gravely concerned by the prospect of Japanese forces occupying southern Indochina, which would lead immediately to the development of airfields and facilities to support an attack on the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies in Japan’s quest for oil. When Japanese troops occupied southern Indochina, FDR responded on July 26 by embargoing trade with Japan—including the sale of oil—and freezing Japanese assets in the U.S., thus inviting military retaliation, since Japan could not survive as an industrial nation without an assured supply of fuel. Roosevelt also suspended the negotiations with Japan, looking toward improved relations in the Pacific, that had engaged Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Japan’s Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura since April.
After prompting from British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the Atlantic Conference in early August, the president warned Japan against intimidating the Soviet Union, which was struggling to fend off German armies threatening its major cities. As part of his effort to assist the Soviets, FDR agreed to resume discussions with Japan. He and Hull met with Nomura again on August 17, after receiving assurances that Japan would not resort to the use of force against its neighbors.\(^7\)

On October 8, in response to Secretary Hull’s request for his opinion on the matter, Admiral Stark argued that America should enter the war against Germany as soon as possible, even if doing so meant fighting a war with Japan at the same time. Stark added: “. . . the sooner we get in the better.” About a week later, mindful of Prime Minister Hideki Tojo’s reputation as a headstrong militarist, Stark warned Admiral Husband Kimmel, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, based at Pearl Harbor, of possible hostile Japanese action; unfortunately, though, he confused Kimmel by downplaying the warning.\(^8\)

Fearing reprisals after embargoing the sale of oil to Japan, and emboldened by reports of British success in using B17s to bomb Germany, the president, service secretaries, and service chiefs began planning a surprising new American strategy for the West Pacific. This strategy called for establishing a B17 bomber base in the Philippines capable of interdicting marine traffic on the South China Sea and bombing Japan’s home islands and island bases. British authorities happily agreed that B17s scheduled for early delivery to England should be delivered instead to Clark Field on Luzon because the arrangement entailed a commitment by America to join in opposing Japan’s invasion of European colonies in Southeast Asia.

Thus, Clark Field became the base for the Far East Air Force (FEAF), under General Lewis Brereton, as a component of General Douglas MacArthur’s U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE).\(^9\) MacArthur boasted that the “inability of an enemy to launch his air attack on these islands is our greatest security.” That circumstance, he said, “leaves me with a sense of complete security.”\(^10\) MacArthur’s boast was based on his—and Washington’s—disastrously mistaken belief that Japan lacked fighters capable of escorting bombers from Formosa (Taiwan) to Clark Field and back without refueling.

On November 5 CNO Stark and Army Chief of Staff General George
Marshall sent the president a memorandum urging him to avoid for another three months any action that might provoke a Japanese attack. This cushion would supposedly enable America to strengthen its defenses and ship more B-17s to the Philippines. However, even while the service chiefs were seeking more time to improve defenses, the president was thinking aggressively. Attorney General Francis Biddle noted that, in a Cabinet meeting on November 7, “the President was hopeful that an ‘incident’ in the Pacific—not the Atlantic—would force the issue of war—‘everyone would think of this as naval warfare, excluding the possibility of an (American) expeditionary force.’”

On November 15, Hull coolly told Nomura, “If Japan succeeds in coming to an agreement with the United States, . . . she would not find it necessary to hold onto the tripartite pact,” thereby adding a condition that would clearly be unacceptable to Japan. Also on this day a second Japanese ambassador, Saburo Kurusu, arrived in Washington to assist Nomura and to help expedite negotiations. That very morning General Marshall scheduled a top-secret press conference in his office at 10:30, to which the War Department invited seven senior correspondents representing *Time*, *Newsweek*, the *New York Times*, the *New York Herald Tribune*, United Press, International News Service, and Associated Press. The fullest available account of this extraordinary gathering is a memorandum dated November 15, 1941, prepared by *Time*’s Robert Sherrod for his editor, David Hulburd, Jr., and included among the *Marshall Papers*. Marshall himself later reviewed this memorandum, with the guarded observation that Sherrod seems to have gotten the gist of the proceedings.

According to Sherrod, General Marshall told the correspondents that the purpose of the press conference was to inform them about the surprising new U.S. strategy regarding Japan and the West Pacific, so that in their interpretations of events they would not risk interfering with this strategy. He then announced that the entire conference was off the record and that those who did not agree to keep secret what they learned at the conference should leave. No one left!

Sherrod summarizes the theme of the conference as follows: The United States wants “to put up a big front to the Japanese, without forcing them into face-saving war measures.” In lurid detail, Marshall pictures American B-17 bombers attacking Japan’s civilians and destroying its municipal infrastructures (the “big front”): “If war with
the Japanese does come,” he warns, “we’ll fight mercilessly. Flying fortresses will be dispatched immediately to set the paper cities of Japan on fire. There won’t be any hesitation about bombing civilians. . . .” Remarkably, Marshall’s “Grand Strategy does not include the use of much naval force.” He believes that “U.S. bombers can do the trick against Japanese Naval strength and against Japanese cities ‘without the use of our shipping.’” Marshall’s point is that America’s new Philippine policy means it would be far wiser for Japan to continue negotiations rather than to resort to aggression. He also treats a corollary danger: that the withdrawal of U.S. National Guard units might lead Japan to attack if Japan thinks those withdrawals mean a reduction in U.S. defenses. The withdrawals, he says, are really part of an enlargement of the Army, with draftees in the Army Reserve replacing National Guard units and increasing the size of the Air Corps and the Armored Force.

Marshall risked endangering an indispensable source of intelligence when he claimed to the seven newsmen that the United States had a secret source—unknown to the Japanese—that revealed how little Japan knew of American military developments in the Philippines. There was in fact such a secret source, but that source had revealed to American cryptographers that Japanese spies were already regularly monitoring U.S. developments at Clark Field in the Philippines. The secret source Marshall would have had in mind was “Magic.” U.S. cryptanalysts had broken “Purple,” Japan’s top-secret diplomatic code, late in 1940, and “Magic” was the name given to the process of decrypting “Purple” and other intercepted Japanese codes as well as to the decrypted messages themselves. Only the President and his War Cabinet—that is, Hull, Stimson, Knox, Marshall, and Stark, plus their top military aides, and certain communication specialists and technicians—knew about “Magic,” and they were all sworn not even to mention “Magic” except to those with a need to know. From Marshall’s hint an alert Japanese official familiar with “Purple” could have inferred that America had broken the code, in which case Japan would have changed its codes instantly, with disastrous results for the United States.

The purpose of Marshall’s conference, as announced to the assembled newsmen, was to call upon them to keep the information dealt with in the press conference secret in order to give Hull time to divulge...
the new U.S. strategy to the new ambassador, Kurusu. Marshall said he hoped that the new ambassador would use this information, kept secret by the assembled newsmen, to influence Prime Minister Tojo to continue Japanese-American discussions. In fact—notwithstanding Marshall’s ostensible purpose in convening the press conference: to keep America’s new Philippine policy secret for the time being—a series of Japanese diplomatic messages intercepted and decrypted by “Magic” had revealed that Japan was already aware of the danger to its home islands posed by the B-17s in the Philippines.17

As Marshall (and FDR, of course) very likely intended, the conference was not kept secret for long. At least one participant, probably Charles Hurd, leaked material to Hurd’s senior colleague at the New York Times, Arthur Krock. On November 19 Krock, a leading Washington pundit, published information from the conference. Krock reported that, if American commanders decided to defend the Philippines by attacking Japan, they had enough large bombers to bomb Japan, land in Siberia for rearming and refueling, and attack again on their return flight to Luzon. This published threat of violence involving noncombatants angered and terrified Japanese civilians and challenged Japanese leaders to respond in kind. Krock and anyone else involved in the leak could hardly have failed to recognize that such threats would be likely to provoke the kind of incident President Roosevelt had fancied at his November 7 cabinet meeting.

However, Krock’s understanding of the American Navy’s future role in the Pacific differs from Marshall’s as divulged at the “secret” press conference. Where Marshall explains how and why the Navy’s participation in the forthcoming campaign will be negligible, Krock sets the record straight in his corrective by stressing that the new strategy calls for the Navy to play a key role in a Pacific conflict. This fact suggests that—with at least tacit presidential approval—he has had access to a key naval source, which would most likely be the navy’s rising star, Undersecretary James Forrestal, later Navy Secretary, and finally Defense Secretary. Forrestal was known for providing leaks on occasion to Krock, his longtime close friend.18

Two days after the appearance of Krock’s piece, and just six days after Marshall’s press conference, the following article appeared in the New York Times:
TOKYO, Friday, Nov. 21 (U.P.)—

Newspapers today echoed a warning in the Diet [Japan’s representative body] that war in the Pacific would bring bombs crashing into the inflammable wooden homes of Japanese cities and towns and urging [sic] the people to promote their “fighting spirit.”

Major Gen. Kenryo Sato, director of the War Office Military Affairs Bureau, told a [Japanese] House of Representatives committee yesterday that it would be impossible to keep all enemy warplanes from Japan. Undoubtedly, he said, the enemy would bomb civilian areas in an effort to break the people’s morale.19

This warning in Japanese newspapers concerning the threat posed by America’s new strategy was based on discussions the previous day in the Diet, and those discussions seem to have made use of Krock’s article. Coming from members of the Diet, the warning regarding U.S. attacks was aimed at arousing alarm and anger in the populace, thus assuring strong support for the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor and Clark Field 16 days later.

In spite of irreconcilable differences between Japan and America, their diplomats continued to negotiate until November 26, and then pretended to do so until December 7. These efforts seemed to be succeeding on November 20 when Japan’s proposal suggested a practical compromise. However, on November 22 the United States learned through “Magic” that Japan was extending its deadline for completion of any agreement one final time, for four days, to November 29, but that thereafter “things are automatically going to happen.” Unknown to Washington, of course, Japan’s Pearl Harbor Strike Force sortied secretly on November 25, on schedule.20 The plan included provisions that enabled Japan to abort the strike any time before the final signal triggering the attack. That final signal, however, was eventually issued on December 2 (Japan date): “Climb Mount Niitaka, 1208 [%0000 December 8 (Japan time)].”21

On November 25, FDR was confronted by daunting headlines on page one of the New York Times: “Nazis Press Air Attacks; GERMANS CLOSE IN ON SOVIET CAPITAL.” Fearful that Moscow was about to succumb and that the row of dominoes would start to fall, the president realized that decisive action was imperative. At the afternoon meeting of his War Council he “brought up the event that we were
likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.”22

The next day, November 26, the president aborted a conciliatory *modus vivendi* and directed Hull to present the Ten-Point Note containing demands known to be insulting to Japan.23 He let it seem that the decision had been made by Hull, who notified Stimson that the situation was no longer an issue of diplomacy but was now a matter for which the Army and Navy must take responsibility. The president then directed that war warnings be sent to the Pacific bases containing his note that in a military confrontation the U.S. “desires” that the enemy strike first.24 After Hull presented the Ten-Point Note demanding that Japan withdraw its troops from China and Indochina and repudiate the Tripartite Pact, the ambassadors, abashed by America’s abrupt volte-face, communicated the Ten-Point Note to Tokyo very reluctantly. Tojo then ordered them to pretend to continue negotiating as though nothing had changed.25

As we have seen, President Roosevelt revealed to his cabinet on November 7 his hopes that some incident in the Pacific would enable America to enter the war. Over the intervening weeks that idea had continued to engross him. He knew from “Magic” that after November 29 “things are automatically going to happen.” On November 30 the president directed Stark to order Admiral Thomas Hart, Asiatic Fleet Commander in Chief, to “cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt this despatch.” The planes are to observe only and must not “appear to be attacking but must defend themselves if attacked.”26 This tentative move, seemingly intended to tempt Japan to strike the first blow, was immediately followed by a more calculated action.

On December 1, “Magic” offered FDR the reassurance he needed for creating a serious incident in the Pacific. In a November 29 dispatch to Tokyo, Ambassador Hiroshi Oshima had quoted German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop as follows:

> Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no
possibility of Germany’s entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on that point.27

Fortified by that reassurance, FDR at midnight December 1 directed Stark to order Hart to post three small vessels as a “defensive information patrol” in the west China Sea at intervals off the Indochina coast, directly in the path of Japanese transports bearing amphibious troops to Malaya. Each of these cockleshells was to be armed with at least one machine gun and to proceed under the command of a U.S. naval officer, with a Filipino crew.28 On December 2 Hart sent this advisory to Stark: “When it is considered called for will increase air patrols and send out more subs,” indicating that the Asiatic Fleet already had ample resources for surveillance and strongly suggesting that the defensive information patrol was exclusively a presidential assignment intended as bait for a Japanese assault.29 The fact that both General MacArthur and General Brereton, commanders in the Philippines, in our correspondence with them informed us that they were unaware of the defensive information patrol is further evidence that the patrol was not stationed for genuine reconnaissance.30

The only small vessel Hart had been able to commandeer for the project, the Isabel, reached her station 22 miles from the Indochina coast on December 5, was buzzed, and then shadowed all day, by Japanese planes, whose pilots made no move to attack. “In other words,” observes Hart’s biographer, “the Japanese had chosen not to sink her; there would be no incident.” At that point Hart recalled the Isabel to Manila.31 No reports regarding troop ships had been made. A second small vessel, the Lanikai, had been commissioned too late to reach her station before the attack on Pearl Harbor.32 Thus the President’s gambit never had a chance of fulfilling whatever promise it may have had.

Meanwhile, a Chicago Tribune reporter, Chesly Manly, somehow secured a copy of the top-secret U.S. Joint Army and Navy Board Plan—“Rainbow Five”—which entailed war in Europe against Germany and Italy. On December 4, 1941, the headlines over Manly’s article screamed “FDR’S WAR PLANS!” From the point of view of the America First Committee and other citizens suspicious that a president who had promised never to send American troops to fight in a foreign war had made unconstitutional commitments to the British,
the appearance of Manly’s piece seemed to provide irrefutable evidence that FDR had lied to the people.\textsuperscript{33}

Three days later, however, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor totally eclipsed all other concerns. Concluding that the inquiry he had initiated to determine the source(s) of the leak would be a distraction from the war effort, Roosevelt cancelled the inquiry. On 11 December, with Germany’s Declaration of War on the United States, even erstwhile isolationists joined in the nationwide chorus that only one thing mattered then: “Victory!”

The capstone event among the president’s entrapment schemes occurred around midnight December 6, 1941, the night preceding the attack. The president was in the White House, relaxing with Harry Hopkins. Around 9:30 p.m. a Navy courier, Lieutenant Lester Schulz, delivered intercepted “Magic” decrypts of the first 13 parts of a Japanese message terminating diplomatic negotiations. A “pilot note” was also delivered, indicating that a final part would arrive the following morning, December 7, with instructions for delivery of the whole message. The message, encrypted in “Purple,” had been sent to Ambassador Nomura for typing-up and later delivery to Secretary of State Hull in accordance with instructions accompanying the final part.

After the President had read the thirteen parts, he commented, “This means war.”\textsuperscript{34} In doing so, he was, we believe, referring to statements in the message asserting that the latest U.S. proposal “menaces the Empire’s existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige.”\textsuperscript{35} Despite recently published opinions to the contrary, it seems to us that the president understood at once that such charges as these would be made in a formal message addressed from one nation to another if—\textit{and only if}—the offended nation was gearing up to attack the offender in defense of its honor and, indeed, its very existence.\textsuperscript{36}

This insight (we believe) would have triggered a stunning realization on FDR’s part that things \textit{were} beginning to happen automatically. Could it be that a Japanese strike force somewhere in the Pacific, utilizing intelligence provided by Japan’s resident Pearl Harbor spy over a period of months, was ready to attack one or more American bases in the Pacific, particularly Pearl Harbor?\textsuperscript{37} Supremely confident that Pearl Harbor, as well as Clark Field in the Philippines, had been fully alerted and was on the lookout, the president now seemed
prepared to stand by as the scenario unfolded and Japan proceeded to fire the first shot.

FDR discussed the intercepted message with Harry Hopkins and then immediately phoned Admiral Stark, asking him to call back as soon as possible. Returning home from the theatre, Stark called the president near midnight on December 6. Since the message implied that Japan would attack the United States, perhaps within hours, the president, we suggest, would have been eager to get Stark's advice on whether to send a last-minute warning to Pearl Harbor. After our June 11, 1961, interview with Admiral Stark in his Washington DC home, we ultimately came to the conclusion that he must have recommended that such a warning be sent on Saturday night. Since no such message was in fact sent, it would seem that FDR decided at the last minute to order Stark to withhold any warning.

Under oath Stark repeatedly maintained that he had no recollection of what he was doing on the night of December 6, 1941. Steve Twomey, in his (generally superior) recent Pearl Harbor narrative, strangely enough accepts Stark’s testimony at its face value. Stark’s failure of memory, he believes, was genuine, because “Harold Stark was too honest, too decent” for it to be otherwise. In another excellent recent study, however, Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan, in their exasperation at Admiral Stark’s stonewalling, complain that, “read today, Stark’s testimony seems on its face to be at best vacuous, at worst evasive.”

With Twomey, we believe that Stark was, by nature, honest and decent. With Summers and Swan, however, we find Stark’s testimony vacuous and/or evasive. By claiming total amnesia regarding the evening of December 6, the CNO accepted personal blame for failing to send a last-minute warning of an imminent Japanese attack, and thus shielded his revered president from an investigation that could have ruined FDR’s presidency.

One can only imagine how excruciatingly humiliating it must have been for Stark to testify over and over that he could not recall the substance of his conversation with FDR on the eve of the Pearl Harbor debacle, a conversation that, under the circumstances, must have been indelibly etched in his consciousness. Admiral Stark’s admiration for the president as the necessary savior of the free world from Nazism, however, was unstinting: In a note dated December 12, 1941,
Stark urged Roosevelt to be mindful of his health and well-being: “You are not only the most important man to the United States today,” he says, “but to the world. If anything should happen to you, it would be a catastrophe.”

Though we cannot quote the admiral verbatim, we believe this was the situation Stark was referring to when, to the best of our recollection, he said something like this to us during our interview with him that day in 1961: “Somebody had to stand up and shoulder the blame. It was up to me to do that. I’ll carry that burden, always. I’ll keep that secret, always.”

There is further evidence that a December 6 midnight warning was in the works. James Stahlman, a confidant of Navy Secretary Frank Knox, intending to help authenticate what really had happened, made this declaration: “[Knox] told me that the following had sat for a considerable portion of the night of December 6, anticipating a Japanese strike somewhere: FDR, Hopkins, Stimson, Marshall, Knox, with John McCrea [Stark’s aide] and Frank Beatty [Knox’s aide].” George Victor suggests that at this meeting “a decision to warn Kimmel was made, Knox [and Beatty] left, and the decision was then reconsidered.”

It may well be that President Roosevelt cancelled a decision to send a last-minute warning during his telephone consultation with Stark, and that Knox and Beatty were not notified of the cancellation. This development would explain their persistent questions to Kimmel and his staff during their investigatory visit to Pearl Harbor on December 9–14: “Did you get Saturday night the dispatch the navy department sent out?” Kimmel and his staff denied receiving such a message. Apparently lacking knowledge of any cancellation, Knox insisted, “Well, we sent you one.”

No doubt Knox divulged this vexing experience to the president upon returning from Hawai‘i. FDR must have clued him in at that time, for the matter was dropped, and Knox did not mention it in his secret report to the president or in their jointly written public report. However, in his secret report Knox does mention the erroneous statement by General Walter Short, commander of the Army’s Hawaiian Department, that a Washington warning “on Saturday night at midnight, before the attack, failed to reach him until four or five hours after the attack had been made.” That message, arriving hours
too late, must have been Marshall’s December 7 warning, which was delayed in transmission.

On that wretched afternoon of December 7, 1941, the president was further stunned to learn that the Army’s Hawaiian Department, charged with defending the berthed Pacific Fleet and its base, had lost most of its interceptor fighter planes before they could become airborne. General Short had bunched them together on the ground for better protection against sabotage. Thus arrayed, the interceptors made ideal targets. Not only Army Air Force planes but also some Navy fighters, which came under Army command when the base was on alert, were destroyed or seriously damaged. Short had taken these measures for better protection against the purported threat of sabotage by the thousands of people of Japanese descent living on O‘ahu. Although Short’s preoccupation with sabotage seemed to verge on obsession, he was not unique in his concern. As Charles Anderson notes, “. . . Short’s awareness of the danger of sabotage in Hawaii . . . was shared by virtually every Army and Navy officer of his generation.”

As early as June 1941 Short had foresightedly conferred with the governor of Hawai‘i and the mayor of Honolulu and was granted authority to “close or restrict the use of and travel upon any highway within the city and county of Honolulu, whenever . . . [Short] deems such action necessary in the interests of national defense.” Why Short never exercised his authority to close the roads remains a mystery. (It is conceivable that he concluded that such closures would simply send a spy to an aerie in one of the surrounding hills.) Kimmel too was ever anxious about the complete freedom of access to harbor berthing arrangements. It seems inexplicable that Short apparently never raised with Kimmel the advantages of closing harbor roads or suggested that, since he, Short, had been empowered to regulate or halt traffic, Kimmel might be granted similar authority—a clear instance of their failure to cooperate proactively.

Although no sabotage had been attempted, Short’s concern had been heightened by three messages that generals in the War Department had sent him on November 27 and 28, warning of sabotage. Short, in reporting to Chief of Staff General George Marshall, as he had been ordered to do, provided no explanation regarding the defen-
sive measures he had adopted. His exact words were: “Report department alerted to prevent sabotage period Liaison with Navy. . . .”

In port the battleships of the Pacific Fleet were generally double berthed, so that only outboard vessels and single berthed vessels were subject to attack by innovative, specially adapted shallow-running torpedoes the Japanese dropped so successfully from slow-flying planes. Other battleships and major vessels were subject to armor-piercing dive-bombing. Thus most of the fleet’s battleships in Pearl Harbor were seriously damaged or sunk, with ghastly loss of life. Admiral Chester Nimitz, Kimmel’s successor, later observed, however, that had the fleet sortied—as Admiral Kimmel said he would have ordered if properly warned—losses would have been even worse, prey to Japanese submarines.

As late as December 6 Admiral Kimmel was assuring a newsman that the Japanese would not attack Pearl Harbor: “I don’t think they’d be such damned fools.” Lacking sufficient patrol planes for reliable reconnaissance, the confident Kimmel had discontinued the fleet’s long-distance patrol flights on November 22 in order to reserve the use of his patrol planes for immediate training and later combat. Knowing that the Army had search radar high above O‘ahu’s north coast capable of detecting approaching aircraft, Kimmel relied on Short to provide a warning in what they both regarded as the highly unlikely event of a Japanese attack. Unfortunately, the “bogies” (unidentified radar echoes) picked up by off-duty radar operators practicing on their own shortly after seven a.m. on December 7 were dismissed as likely friendly aircraft by the single inexperienced officer on duty at the time in the Combat Information Center, and thus were not tracked. As a result, Kimmel and Short received no warning, and the Japanese raiders approached Pearl Harbor unrecognized.

As reports of U.S. deaths and losses in Hawai‘i continued to mount late in the afternoon of the seventh, the president, we suggest, at some moment experienced a hideous epiphany: that the disaster unfolding on O‘ahu was in large part the unintended consequence of his own decision to withhold a final warning. For a last-minute alert might, at the very least, have shaken up Short and Kimmel, prodded them to order general quarters, and inspired Short to ready his fighter planes for action.
Edward R. Murrow, the nation’s premier radio news commentator, and his wife had been invited to the White House for dinner that evening. Murrow, just returning from London, was to give a private briefing for the president after dinner. Once the news of Pearl Harbor broke, that briefing was cancelled, but Murrow was invited to meet with FDR later that night, and he agreed to do so. Roosevelt’s second confidant of the evening, William Donovan, recently appointed the president’s “Coordinator of Information,” was at a football game in New York when his aide, James Roosevelt, the president’s son, called Donovan to a telephone shortly after two p.m. and asked him to meet with FDR at the White House. Donovan flew at once to Washington and later joined Murrow for the meeting with the president.

Roosevelt called a War Council meeting for three p.m. At one time or another, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Knox, Secretary of State Hull, Army Chief of Staff General Marshall, CNO Admiral Stark, and FDR’s most trusted adviser, Harry Hopkins, were present. In detailed notes Hopkins made before retiring for the night, he discusses the meeting:

The conference met in not too tense an atmosphere because I think that all of us believed that in the last analysis the enemy was Hitler and that he could never be defeated without force of arms; that sooner or later we were bound to be in the war and that Japan had given us an opportunity. Everybody, however, agreed on the seriousness of the war and that it would be a long, hard struggle. During the conference the news kept coming in, indicating more and more damage to the fleet. The President handled the calls personally on the telephone with whoever was giving the despatches . . . . There was some discussion about the President’s message to Congress, for by this time the President had decided to go to Congress Monday. The President expressed himself very strongly that he was going to submit a precise message and had in mind submitting a longer message later. Hull urged very strongly that the President review the whole history of the Japanese relations in a strong document that might take half an hour to read. The President objected. I thought . . . that he proposed now to keep the case centered on the attack at Hawaii.

During the course of the War Council meeting on the afternoon of December 7, President Roosevelt received a telephone call from
John G. ("Gil") Winant, U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who were dining together when news of the attack reached them. They wanted to express solidarity with the president and delight that the attack would dispel the antagonism between those endorsing and those opposing Roosevelt’s support of Great Britain. At the conclusion of the War Council meeting at 4:30 p.m., FDR, acting on Hopkins’s advice, scheduled meetings with his cabinet and key congressional leaders for that night. Around 5:00 p.m. he called Grace Tully, his secretary, into the Oval Study and began dictation of his short—and “precise”—message to Congress.  

From 5:30 to 6:40 p.m. Roosevelt rested and was attended by his personal physician, Admiral Ross McIntire, an otolaryngologist, who treated the president’s inflamed and swollen nasal passages and sinuses. The process customarily used by specialists in treating this condition involved swabbing the affected tissues with a constricting one-percent cocaine solution, followed by flushing with a saline solution to cleanse and soothe the tissues, making it easier for the patient to breathe. It is likely that Admiral McIntire followed these accepted procedures on December 7.  

After supper, FDR and his cabinet convened at 8:40 p.m. and were joined by congressional leaders at 9:45. The president informed the group that late reports indicated that fatalities and losses were worse than had at first been believed. A friend and customary supporter, Texas Senator Tom Connally, was outraged by what Roosevelt reported. Leaping up, Connally exclaimed, “How did it happen that our warships were caught like tame ducks in Pearl Harbor? How did they catch us with our pants down? Where were our patrols?” All the president could answer was “I don’t know, Tom. I just don’t know.”  

The member of the Cabinet who had known President Roosevelt best—and had worked longest and most closely with him—was Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins. A sensitive observer, she spoke tellingly of the president’s demeanor on the night of December 7: “[T]here have been times when I associated that [facial] expression with a kind of evasiveness . . . . I had a deep emotional feeling that something was wrong, that this situation was not all it appeared to be.” Secretary Perkins’s observation may be profitably compared with that of the president’s wife, Eleanor, who encountered him in his study immediately after he learned of the Pearl Harbor attack. Mrs. Roosevelt
noticed that her husband had the same expression of “deadly calm” then that she had observed years before when he first learned that the diagnosis of his physical disability was poliomyelitis—a steeling of himself against travails ahead.65

After adjourning the meeting with the cabinet and legislative leaders near midnight, FDR invited Donovan and Murrow to join him and Harry Hopkins in the Oval Study. According to Murrow, Roosevelt was “calm and steady,’ though gray-faced.” Over beer and sandwiches the president outlined “in detail the losses at Pearl Harbor: the death count; ships sunk at the dockside; planes knocked out—‘On the ground, by God, on the ground!’”66

During the 35-minute midnight conference, FDR, according to Donovan, “had still not recovered from the shock of the attack. ‘They caught our ships like lame ducks! Lame ducks, Bill! . . . We told them at Pearl Harbor, and everywhere else, to have the lookouts manned. But they still took us by surprise . . . .’” Donovan felt that Roosevelt found the attack not unwelcome—save for the base being caught off guard.67 Luckily for the president, national attention early on remained focussed on the failures of Kimmel and Short—not on those of Roosevelt, Stark, and Marshall—and on the reconstitution of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, the installation of unity of command, the appointment of able leaders to replace Kimmel and Short, and the organizing of strike forces led by the carriers USS Lexington, USS Enterprise, and USS Saratoga, which, fortunately, had been away during the Pearl Harbor attack.

Earlier in the afternoon FDR had received an encouraging message from T. North Whitehead, a British Foreign Office authority. The message focussed on a very important point: “The dictator powers have presented us with a united America.” “Was it true?” the president asked. “Would America now support a declaration of war against the Axis powers . . . ?” It was a question that had haunted him for months. Donovan and Murrow did indeed believe that Congress would now support a declaration of war.68

After the midnight meeting, Harry Hopkins, still weak, having been released from the hospital only four days before, wanted to chat with Murrow briefly before retiring. Hopkins’s assessment of the Japanese attack, which he shared with Murrow, is of special interest, since Hop-
kins was the president’s closest friend and most influential counsellor. As they chatted frankly together at the end of a painful day, Hopkins assured Murrow that “the Japanese attack was a godsend because it meant the country would enter the war united.”

Afterwards, Murrow returned to his hotel room and, deeply affected by what the president had told him, divulged to his wife that the meeting had provided him with the “biggest story of his life,” but “he didn’t know if it was his duty to tell it or forget it!” His uncertainty in this regard indicates that the president had not said he was speaking off the record, but was relying on the good judgment of his visitors. Murrow then decided not to divulge what the President had revealed. A few years later, however, when questioned closely by John Gunther, Murrow replied that the “story was going to send his son through college . . . , ‘and if you think I’m going to give it to you, you’re out of your mind!’”—thus implying an (unrealized) intention to publish the story.

Later that night or early next morning, FDR learned that a Japanese raid on Clark Field in the Philippines had destroyed, on the ground, 12 of the 19 B17 bombers stationed there. Somehow, Lieutenant Colonel Eugene Eubank, the bomber commander, had not received the warnings, supposedly sent to all FEA F units, that Japanese bombers were approaching Clark Field. At 12:35 p.m. (Philippine time) December 8, preoccupied with preparing for an attack on Formosa scheduled to take off at 2 p.m., Eubank was briefing his pilots in the headquarters building when Japanese planes high overhead dropped bombs that soon began exploding just outside—this despite General MacArthur’s telephoned assurance to Washington only hours earlier that after Pearl Harbor “our tails are up in the air.” Apparently a false alarm involving Japanese bombers attacking Camp John Hay in Baguio—which unbeknownst to U.S. observers had returned directly to Formosa instead of attacking elsewhere after their raid on John Hay—had led the B17s to stay in the air from 8 a.m. till 11 a.m., only to be destroyed or disabled on the ground when they all had to land to refuel for their (aborted) attack on Formosa. General MacArthur, who presided over the debacle at Clark Field hours after learning of the Pearl Harbor attack, escaped censure, unlike Kimmel and Short, and eventually went on to become a revered American hero.
During the December 7 midnight meeting, the president, we suggest, told Murrow, Donovan, and Hopkins of the angst that he was experiencing and explained that it was caused by the grievous error he himself had committed at midnight December 6 in cancelling a last-minute warning. He would have felt that he had been in large part responsible for allowing the Japanese to attack an undefended base, leading to thousands of American deaths. That would indeed have been Murrow’s “biggest story of my life.” Whatever it was, he never divulged it. Hopkins later told Admiral Stark that FDR meant to set the record straight, but he died before doing so.72 Very likely, the President hoped that Ed Murrow and Wild Bill Donovan, his two savvy and respected confidants, would be able to find a way of justifying his decision to withhold a late warning, were such a defense to become necessary.

Still, thankful that Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor had enabled America to enter the war as a united nation, the president could confidently ask Congress to declare that a state of war had existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire “since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December seventh.”73 Congress did so on December 8. But only someone ignoring 1) American sanctions imposed to cripple Japan’s economy, 2) FDR’s “incidents” arranged to bait Japan into striking the first blow, 3) General Marshall’s leaked threats to firebomb Japan’s cities, and 4) what Japan perceived as an insult to its honor and a menace to its very existence, would venture to describe Japan’s attack as unprovoked.

Hitler, unaware that Japan was planning to attack Pearl Harbor and still hoping to avoid war with America, reneged on Ribbentrop’s promise and did not join forces with Japan on December 8, no doubt to the surprise of Japan—and Roosevelt! However, in his much anticipated December 9 Fireside Chat, an unruffled FDR cannily baited Hitler to declare war by charging that “Germany and Italy, regardless of any formal declaration of war, consider themselves at war with the United States at this moment just as much as they consider themselves at war with Britain or Russia.”74 This time FDR’s legendary sense of timing did not fail him. Enraged by the Fireside Chat, Hitler did finally declare war on America on December 11.75 Thus Murrow and Donovan were never called upon to justify FDR’s stratagems.
Notes


2 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper, 1948) 391. Stimson and Bundy write: “When Stimson recovered from his astonishment at the Japanese choice of the greatest American base as a point of attack, he was filled with confident hope of a major victory; it seemed to him probable that the alerted forces at Hawaii could cause very heavy damage to the attacking Japanese. It was not until evening that he learned how great a tactical success the Japanese had achieved in their strategic folly. The military party in Japan had undertaken a war which could have only one final result, but they had certainly made a good beginning.”


5 In his admirable study, Steve Twomey, *Countdown to Pearl Harbor: The Twelve Days to the Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016) 133–34), strongly disagrees. He asserts, “... a scheme to get into a war in the Pacific could hardly have been more at cross-purposes with Roosevelt’s paramount goal: to help the British survive.” With respect, we believe that the evidence we cite below is a sufficient rebuttal.


7 Nomura eventually began to despair, informing Tokyo on October 22 that he didn’t “want to be the bones of a dead horse” and begging for “your permission to return to Japan.” On November 16, after Saburo Kurusu’s arrival to assist him, Tokyo wrote Nomura to convey its “gratitude for the efforts you have put forth” and to plead with him to “fight harder than you ever did before” because “the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days.” Paul S. Burtness and Warren U. Ober, eds., *The Puzzle of Pearl Harbor* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1962) 39, 48.


10 Bartsch, *December 8, 1941* 193.

Layton, “*And I Was There*” 190.


*Pearl Harbor Attack* 11, 5433.


Roll, *Hopkins Touch* 158.
Burtness and Ober, *Puzzle of Pearl Harbor* 80.


*Twomey, Countdown to Pearl Harbor: The Twelve Days to the Attack* 246.


*Pearl Harbor Attack* 5, 2182–88; 11, 5153–75, 5543–60.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, dated 12 December 1941. Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park NY: President’s Secretary’s Files; Departmental Files; Navy Department, July–December 12941 [Box 59]. We thank Bob Clark, Supervisory Archivist, for providing a copy of the letter.


Layton, “And I Was There” 331–32.

*Pearl Harbor Attack* 5, 2338.

Rear Admiral Patrick Bellinger, Commander of Hawaiian naval patrol aircraft, testified before the Roberts Commission as follows: “All the fighter planes there were under the [Army] fighter commands . . . . The Navy fighter planes came under the command of the Army as the Army bombardment planes came under mine,” *Pearl Harbor Attack* 22, 571.

*Pearl Harbor Attack* 22, 26.


*Pearl Harbor Attack* 32, 189–90.

*Pearl Harbor Attack* 22, 434.


*Pearl Harbor Attack* 14, 1330.


Layton, “And I Was There” 308.


An interesting sidelight of the December 7 cabinet meeting involved a message received in the State Department at 7:13 p.m. from the U.S. Consul General in Shanghai and mentioned by the President in his cabinet meeting at 9:30 p.m. The message describes how the river gunboat U.S.S. Wake, commanded by Lieutenant Commander C.D. Smith, was captured by the Japanese: “Captain C D Smith Commanding U.S.S. Wake received telephone call at four fifteen this morning [December 8; 3:15 p.m. Washington time December 7] period A Japanese naval officer stated quote A state of war exists between my country and yours and I am taking control of Wake unquote period All communications with Wake cut off and no further information is available regarding her period . . . ” Pearl Harbor Attack 11, 5491–92.

Interview with Frances Perkins, Columbia University Oral History Project (1951) 8, 83–85.

Gillon, FDR Leads the Nation into War xvi.

Sperber, Murrow 206–07.

Brown, Last Hero, 6.

Brown, Last Hero 6–7; Sperber, Murrow 207.

Roll, Hopkins Touch 163–64, 434 (Footnote 35).

Sperber, Murrow 207–08.

Bartsch, December 8, 1941 261, 287, 303–04, 313, 383.


Burtness and Ober, Puzzle of Pearl Harbor 85.


Roll, Hopkins Touch 164–66.