"We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore pray for the protection of the United States forces." Whatever may be thought of the other contents of this note, the absolute truth of this latter statement is incontestable. When the note was written and delivered, the committee, so far as it appears, had neither a man nor a gun at their command, and after its delivery they became so panic-stricken at their position that they sent some of their number to interview the Minister and request him not to land the United States forces till the next morning. But he replied that the troops had been ordered, and whether the committee were ready or not the landing should take place. And so it happened that on the 16th day of January, 1893, between four and five o'clock in the afternoon, a detachment of marines from the United States steamer Boston, with two pieces of artillery, landed at Honolulu. The men, upwards of 160 in all, were supplied with double cartridge belts filled with ammunition and with haversacks and canteens, and were accompanied by a hospital corps with stretchers and medical supplies. This military demonstration upon the soil of Honolulu was of itself an act of war, unless made either with the consent of the Government of Hawaii or for the bona fide purpose of protecting the imperilled lives and property of citizens of the United States. But there is no pretense of any such consent on the part of the Government of the Queen, which at that time was undisputed and was both the de facto and the de jure government. In point of fact the existing government instead of requesting the presence of an armed force protested against it. There is as little basis for the pretense that such forces were landed for the security of American life and property. If so, they would have been stationed in the vicinity of such property and so as to protect it, instead of at a distance and so as to command the Hawaiian Government building and palace. Admiral Skerrett, the officer in command of our naval force on the Pacific station, has frankly stated that in his opinion the location of the troops was inadvisable if they were landed for the protection of American citizens whose residences and places of business, as well as the legation and consulate, were in a distant part of the city, but the location selected was a wise one if the forces were landed for the purpose of supporting the provisional government. If any peril to life and property calling for any such martial array had existed, Great Britain and other foreign powers interested would not have been behind the United States in activity to protect their citizens. But they made no sign in that direction. When these armed men were landed, the city of Honolulu was in its customary orderly and peaceful condition. There was no
symptom of riot or disturbance in any quarter. Men, women, and children were about the streets as usual, and nothing varied the ordinary routine or disturbed the ordinary tranquillity, except the landing of the Boston's marines and their march through the town to the quarters assigned them. Indeed, the fact that after having called for the landing of the United States forces on the plea of danger to life and property the Committee of Safety themselves requested the Minister to postpone action, exposed the untruthfulness of their representations of present peril to life and property. The peril they saw was an anticipation growing out of guilty intentions on their part and something which, though not then existing, they knew would certainly follow their attempt to overthrow the Government of the Queen without the aid of the United States forces.

Thus it appears that Hawaii was taken possession of by the United States forces without the consent or wish of the government of the islands, or of anybody else so far as shown, except the United States Minister.

Therefore the military occupation of Honolulu by the United States on the day mentioned was wholly without justification, either as an occupation by consent or as an occupation necessitated by dangers threatening American life and property. It must be accounted for in some other way and on some other ground, and its real motive and purpose are neither obscure nor far to seek.

The United States forces being now on the scene and favorably stationed, the committee proceeded to carry out their original scheme. They met the next morning, Tuesday, the 17th, perfected the plan of temporary government, and fixed upon its principal officers, ten of whom were drawn from the thirteen members of the Committee of Safety. Between one and two o'clock, by squads and by different routes to avoid notice, and having first taken the precaution of ascertaining whether there was any one there to oppose them, they proceeded to the Government building to proclaim the new government. No sign of opposition was manifest, and thereupon an American citizen began to read the proclamation from the steps of the Government building almost entirely without auditors. It is said that before the reading was finished quite a concourse of persons, variously estimated at from 50 to 100, some armed and some unarmed, gathered about the committee to give them aid and confidence. This statement is not important, since the one controlling factor in the whole affair was unquestionably the United States marines, who, drawn up under arms and with artillery in readiness only seventy-six yards distant, dominated the situation.

The provisional government thus proclaimed was by the terms of
the proclamation "to exist until terms of union with the United States had been negotiated and agreed upon". The United States Minister, pursuant to prior agreement, recognized this government within an hour after the reading of the proclamation, and before five o'clock, in answer to an inquiry on behalf of the Queen and her cabinet, announced that he had done so.

When our Minister recognized the provisional government the only basis upon which it rested was the fact that the Committee of Safety had in the manner above stated declared it to exist. It was neither a government de facto nor de jure. That it was not in such possession of the Government property and agencies as entitled it to recognition is conclusively proved by a note found in the files of the Legation at Honolulu, addressed by the declared head of the provisional government to Minister Stevens, dated January 17, 1893, in which he acknowledges with expressions of appreciation the Minister's recognition of the provisional government, and states that it is not yet in the possession of the station house (the place where a large number of the Queen's troops were quartered), though the same had been demanded of the Queen's officers in charge. Nevertheless, this wrongful recognition by our Minister placed the Government of the Queen in a position of most perilous perplexity. On the one hand she had possession of the palace, of the barracks, and of the police station, and had at her command at least five hundred fully armed men and several pieces of artillery. Indeed, the whole military force of her kingdom was on her side and at her disposal, while the Committee of Safety, by actual search, had discovered that there were but very few arms in Honolulu that were not in the service of the Government. In this state of things if the Queen could have dealt with the insurgents alone her course would have been plain and the result unmistakable. But the United States had allied itself with her enemies, had recognized them as the true Government of Hawaii, and had put her and her adherents in the position of opposition against lawful authority. She knew that she could not withstand the power of the United States, but she believed that she might safely trust to its justice. Accordingly, some hours after the recognition of the provisional government by the United States Minister, the palace, the barracks, and the police station, with all the military resources of the country, were delivered up by the Queen upon the representation made to her that her cause would thereafter be reviewed at Washington, and while protesting that she surrendered to the superior force of the United States, whose Minister had caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the provisional government, and that she
yielded her authority to prevent collision of armed forces and loss of life and only until such time as the United States, upon the facts being presented to it, should undo the action of its representative and reinstate her in the authority she claimed as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

This protest was delivered to the chief of the provisional government, who endorsed thereon his acknowledgment of its receipt. The terms of the protest were read without dissent by those assuming to constitute the provisional government, who were certainly charged with the knowledge that the Queen instead of finally abandoning her power had appealed to the justice of the United States for reinstatement in her authority; and yet the provisional government with this unanswered protest in its hand hastened to negotiate with the United States for the permanent banishment of the Queen from power and for a sale of her kingdom.

Our country was in danger of occupying the position of having actually set up a temporary government on foreign soil for the purpose of acquiring through that agency territory which we had wrongfully put in its possession. The control of both sides of a bargain acquired in such a manner is called by a familiar and unpleasant name when found in private transactions. We are not without a precedent showing how scrupulously we avoided such accusations in former days. After the people of Texas had declared their independence of Mexico they resolved that on the acknowledgment of their independence by the United States they would seek admission into the Union. Several months after the battle of San Jacinto, by which Texan independence was practically assured and established, President Jackson declined to recognize it, alleging as one of his reasons that in the circumstances it became us "to beware of a too early movement, as it might subject us, however unjustly, to the imputation of seeking to establish the claim of our neighbors to a territory with a view to its subsequent acquisition by ourselves". This is in marked contrast with the hasty recognition of a government openly and concededly set up for the purpose of tendering to us territorial annexation.

I believe that a candid and thorough examination of the facts will force the conviction that the provisional government owes its existence to an armed invasion by the United States. Fair-minded people with the evidence before them will hardly claim that the Hawaiian Government was overthrown by the people of the islands or that the provisional government had ever existed with their consent. I do not understand that any member of this government claims that the
people would uphold it by their suffrages if they were allowed to vote on the question.

While naturally sympathizing with every effort to establish a republican form of government, it has been the settled policy of the United States to concede to people of foreign countries the same freedom and independence in the management of their domestic affairs that we have always claimed for ourselves; and it has been our practice to recognize revolutionary governments as soon as it became apparent that they were supported by the people. For illustration of this rule I need only to refer to the revolution in Brazil in 1889, when our Minister was instructed to recognize the Republic “so soon as a majority of the people of Brazil should have signified their assent to its establishment and maintenance”; to the revolution in Chile in 1891, when our Minister was directed to recognize the new government “if it was accepted by the people”; and to the revolution in Venezuela in 1892, when our recognition was accorded on condition that the new government was “fully established, in possession of the power of the nation, and accepted by the people.”

As I apprehend the situation, we are brought face to face with the following conditions:

The lawful Government of Hawaii was overthrown without the drawing of a sword or the firing of a shot by a process every step of which, it may safely be asserted, is directly traceable to and dependent for its success upon the agency of the United States acting through its diplomatic and naval representatives.

But for the notorious predilections of the United States Minister for annexation, the Committee of Safety, which should be called the Committee of Annexation, would never have existed.

But for the landing of the United States forces upon false pretexts respecting the danger to life and property the committee would never have exposed themselves to the pains and penalties of treason by undertaking the subversion of the Queen’s Government.

But for the presence of the United States forces in the immediate vicinity and in position to afford all needed protection and support the committee would not have proclaimed the provisional government from the steps of the Government building.

And finally, but for the lawless occupation of Honolulu under false pretexts by the United States forces, and but for Minister Stevens’s recognition of the provisional government when the United States forces were its sole support and constituted its only military strength, the Queen and her Government would never have yielded to the provisional government, even for a time and for the
sole purpose of submitting her case to the enlightened justice of the United States.

Believing, therefore, that the United States could not, under the circumstances disclosed, annex the islands without justly incurring the imputation of acquiring them by unjustifiable methods, I shall not again submit the treaty of annexation to the Senate for its consideration, and in the instructions to Minister Willis, a copy of which accompanies this message, I have directed him to so inform the provisional government.

But in the present instance our duty does not, in my opinion, end with refusing to consummate this questionable transaction. It has been the boast of our Government that it seeks to do justice in all things without regard to the strength or weakness of those with whom it deals. I mistake the American people if they favor the odious doctrine that there is no such thing as international morality, that there is one law for a strong nation and another for a weak one, and that even by indirectness a strong power may with impunity despoil a weak one of its territory.

By an act of war, committed with the participation of a diplomatic representative of the United States and without authority of Congress, the Government of a feeble but friendly and confiding people has been overthrown. A substantial wrong has thus been done which a due regard for our national character as well as the rights of the injured people requires we should endeavor to repair. The provisional government has not assumed a republican or other constitutional form, but has remained a mere executive council or oligarchy, set up without the assent of the people. It has not sought to find a permanent basis of popular support and has given no evidence of an intention to do so. Indeed, the representatives of that government assert that the people of Hawaii are unfit for popular government and frankly avow that they can be best ruled by arbitrary or despotic power.

The law of nations is founded upon reason and justice, and the rules of conduct governing individual relations between citizens or subjects of a civilized state are equally applicable as between enlightened nations. The considerations that international law is without a court for its enforcement, and that obedience to its commands practically depends upon good faith, instead of upon the mandate of a superior tribunal, only give additional sanction to the law itself and brand any deliberate infraction of it not merely as a wrong but as a disgrace. A man of true honor protects the unwritten word which binds his conscience more scrupulously, if possible, than he does the bond a breach of which subjects him to
legal liabilities; and the United States in aiming to maintain itself as one of the most enlightened of nations would do its citizens gross injustice if it applied to its international relations any other than a high standard of honor and morality. On that ground the United States can not properly be put in the position of counte-
nancing a wrong after its commission any more than in that of consenting to it in advance. On that ground it can not allow itself to refuse to redress an injury inflicted through an abuse of power by officers clothed with its authority and wearing its uniform; and on the same ground, if a feeble but friendly state is in danger of being robbed of its independence and its sovereignty by a misuse of the name and power of the United States, the United States can not fail to vindicate its honor and its sense of justice by an earnest effort to make all possible reparation.

These principles apply to the present case with irresistible force when the special conditions of the Queen’s surrender of her sovereignity are recalled. She surrendered not to the provisional govern-
ment, but to the United States. She surrendered not absolutely and permanently, but temporarily and conditionally until such time as the facts could be considered by the United States. Further-
more, the provisional government acquiesced in her surrender in that manner and on those terms, not only by tacit consent, but through the positive acts of some members of that government who urged her peaceable submission, not merely to avoid bloodshed, but because she could place implicit reliance upon the justice of the United States, and that the whole subject would be finally con-
sidered at Washington.

I have not, however, overlooked an incident of this unfortunate affair which remains to be mentioned. The members of the provi-
isional government and their supporters, though not entitled to extreme sympathy, have been led to their present predicament of revolt against the Government of the Queen by the indefensible encouragement and assistance of our diplomatic representative. This fact may entitle them to claim that in our effort to rectify the wrong committed some regard should be had for their safety. This senti-
ment is strongly seconded by my anxiety to do nothing which would invite either harsh retaliation on the part of the Queen or violence and bloodshed in any quarter. In the belief that the Queen, as well as her enemies, would be willing to adopt such a course as would meet these conditions, and in view of the fact that both the Queen and the provisional government had at one time apparently acquiesced in a reference of the entire case to the United States Government, and considering the further fact that in any event the provisional
government by its own declared limitation was only "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon," I hoped that after the assurance to the members of that government that such union could not be consummated I might compass a peaceful adjustment of the difficulty.

Actuated by these desires and purposes, and not unmindful of the inherent perplexities of the situation nor of the limitations upon my power, I instructed Minister Willis to advise the Queen and her supporters of my desire to aid in the restoration of the status existing before the lawless landing of the United States forces at Honolulu on the 16th of January last, if such restoration could be effected upon terms providing for clemency as well as justice to all parties concerned. The conditions suggested, as the instructions show, contemplate a general amnesty to those concerned in setting up the provisional government and a recognition of all its bona fide acts and obligations. In short, they require that the past should be buried, and that the restored Government should reassert its authority as if its continuity had not been interrupted. These conditions have not proved acceptable to the Queen, and though she has been informed that they will be insisted upon, and that, unless acceded to, the efforts of the President to aid in the restoration of her Government will cease, I have not thus far learned that she is willing to yield them her acquiescence. The check which my plans have thus encountered has prevented their presentation to the members of the provisional government, while unfortunate public misrepresentations of the situation and exaggerated statements of the sentiments of our people have obviously injured the prospects of successful Executive mediation.

I therefore submit this communication with its accompanying exhibits, embracing Mr. Blount’s report, the evidence and statements taken by him at Honolulu, the instructions given to both Mr. Blount and Minister Willis, and correspondence connected with the affair in hand.

In commending this subject to the extended powers and wide discretion of the Congress, I desire to add the assurance that I shall be much gratified to cooperate in any legislative plan which may be devised for the solution of the problem before us which is consistent with American honor, integrity, and morality.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, December 18, 1893.
The President:

Washington, October 18, 1893.

The full and impartial reports submitted by the Hon. James H. Blount, your special commissioner to the Hawaiian Islands, established the following facts:

Queen Liliuokalani announced her intention on Saturday, January 14, 1893, to proclaim a new constitution, but the opposition of her ministers and others induced her to speedily change her purpose and make public announcement of that fact.

At a meeting in Honolulu, late on the afternoon of that day, a so-called committee of public safety, consisting of thirteen men, being all or nearly all who were present, was appointed "to consider the situation and devise ways and means for the maintenance of the public peace and the protection of life and property," and at a meeting of this committee on the 15th, or the forenoon of the 16th of January, it was resolved amongst other things that a provisional government be created "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon." At a mass meeting which assembled at 2 p. m. on the last-named day, the Queen and her supporters were condemned and denounced, and the committee was continued and all its acts approved.

Later the same afternoon the committee addressed a letter to John L. Stevens, the American minister at Honolulu, stating that the lives and property of the people were in peril and appealing to him and the United States forces at his command for assistance. This communication concluded "we are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore hope for the protection of the United States forces." On receipt of this letter Mr. Stevens requested Capt. Wiltse, commander of the U. S. S. Boston, to land a force "for the protection of the United States legation, United States consulate, and to secure the safety of American life and property." The well armed troops, accompanied by two Gatling guns, were promptly landed and marched through the quiet streets of Honolulu to a public hall, previously secured by Mr. Stevens for their accommodation. This hall was just across the street from the Government building, and in plain view of the Queen's palace. The reason for thus locating the military will presently appear. The governor of the Island immediately addressed to Mr. Stevens a communication protesting against the act as an unwarranted invasion of Hawaiian soil and reminding him that the proper authorities had never denied permission to the naval forces of the United States to land for drill or any other proper purpose.
About the same time the Queen's minister of foreign affairs sent a note to Mr. Stevens asking why the troops had been landed and informing him that the proper authorities were able and willing to afford full protection to the American legation and all American interests in Honolulu. Only evasive replies were sent to these communications.

While there were no manifestations of excitement or alarm in the city, and the people were ignorant of the contemplated movement, the committee entered the Government building, after first ascertaining that it was unguarded, and read a proclamation declaring that the existing Government was overthrown and a Provisional Government established in its place, "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon." No audience was present when the proclamation was read, but during the reading 40 or 50 men, some of them indifferently armed, entered the room. The executive and advisory councils mentioned in the proclamation at once addressed a communication to Mr. Stevens, informing him that the monarchy had been abrogated and a provisional government established. This communication concluded:

Such Provisional Government has been proclaimed, is now in possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and is in control of the city. We hereby request that you will, on behalf of the United States, recognize it as the existing de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands and afford to it the moral support of your Government, and, if necessary, the support of American troops to assist in preserving the public peace.

On receipt of this communication, Mr. Stevens immediately recognized the new Government, and, in a letter addressed to Sanford B. Dole, its President, informed him that he had done so. Mr. Dole replied:

Government Building,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

Sir: I acknowledge receipt of your valued communication of this day, recognizing the Hawaiian Provisional Government, and express deep appreciation of the same. We have conferred with the ministers of the late Government, and have made demand upon the marshal to surrender the station house. We are not actually yet in possession of the station house, but as night is approaching and our forces may be insufficient to maintain order, we request the immediate support of the United States forces, and would request that the commander of the United States forces take command of our military forces, so that they may act together for the protection of the city.

Respectfully, yours,

Sanford B. Dole,
Chairman Executive Council.

His Excellency John L. Stevens,
United States Minister Resident.

Note of Mr. Stevens at the end of the above communication.

The above request not complied with.

Stevens.

The station house was occupied by a well-armed force, under the command of a resolute capable, officer. The same afternoon the Queen, her ministers, representatives of the Provisional Government, and others held a conference at the palace. Refusing to recognize the new authority or surrender to it, she was informed that the Provisional Government had the support of the American minister, and, if necessary, would be maintained by the military force of the United States then present; that any demonstration on her part would precipitate a conflict with that force; that she could not, with hope of success, engage
in war with the United States, and that resistance would result in a useless sacrifice of life. Mr. Damon, one of the chief leaders of the movement, and afterwards vice-president of the Provisional Government, informed the Queen that she could surrender under protest and her case would be considered later at Washington. Believing that, under the circumstances, submission was a duty, and that her case would be fairly considered by the President of the United States, the Queen finally yielded and sent to the Provisional Government the paper, which reads:

I, Liliuokalani, by the grace of God and under the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a Provisional Government of and for this Kingdom.

That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose minister plenipotentiary, his excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the Provisional Government.

Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces and perhaps the loss of life, I do, under this protest, and impelled by said force, yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo the action of its representative and reinstate me and the authority which I claim as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

When this paper was prepared at the conclusion of the conference, and signed by the Queen and her ministers, a number of persons, including one or more representatives of the Provisional Government, who were still present and understood its contents, by their silence, at least, acquiesced in its statements, and, when it was carried to President Dole, he indorsed upon it, "Received from the hands of the late cabinet this 17th day of January, 1893," without challenging the truth of any of its assertions. Indeed, it was not claimed on the 17th day of January, or for some time thereafter, by any of the designated officers of the Provisional Government or any annexationist that the Queen surrendered otherwise than as stated in her protest.

In his dispatch to Mr. Foster of January 18, describing the so-called revolution, Mr. Stevens says:

The committee of public safety forthwith took possession of the Government building, archives, and treasury, and installed the Provisional Government at the head of the respective departments. This being an accomplished fact, I promptly recognized the Provisional Government as the de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands.

In Secretary Foster's communication of February 15 to the President, laying before him the treaty of annexation, with the view to obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate thereto, he says:

At the time the Provisional Government took possession of the Government building no troops or officers of the United States were present or took any part whatever in the proceedings. No public recognition was accorded to the Provisional Government by the United States minister until after the Queen's abdication, and when they were in effective possession of the Government building, the archives, the treasury, the barracks, the police station, and all the potential machinery of the Government.

Similar language is found in an official letter addressed to Secretary Foster on February 3 by the special commissioners sent to Washington by the Provisional Government to negotiate a treaty of annexation.

These statements are utterly at variance with the evidence, documentary and oral, contained in Mr. Blount's reports. They are contradicted by declarations and letters of President Dole and other annexationists and by Mr. Stevens's own verbal admissions to Mr. Blount.
The Provisional Government was recognized when it had little other
than a paper existence, and when the legitimate government was in
full possession and control of the palace, the barracks, and the police
station. Mr. Stevens's well-known hostility and the threatening pre
sence of the force landed from the Boston was all that could then have
excited serious apprehension in the minds of the Queen, her officers,
and loyal supporters.

It is fair to say that Secretary Foster's statements were based upon
information which he had received from Mr. Stevens and the special
commissioners, but I am unable to see that they were deceived. The
troops were landed, not to protect American life and property, but to
aid in overthrowing the existing government. Their very presence
implied coercive measures against it.

In a statement given to Mr. Blount, by Admiral Skerrett, the ranking
naval officer at Honolulu, he says:

If the troops were landed simply to protect American citizens and interests, they
were badly stationed in Arion Hall, but if the intention was to aid the Provisional
Government they were wisely stationed.

This hall was so situated that the troops in it easily commanded
the Government building, and the proclamation was read under the
protection of American guns. At an early stage of the movement, if
not at the beginning, Mr. Stevens promised the annexationists that
as soon as they obtained possession of the Government building and
there read a proclamation of the character above referred to, he would
at once recognize them as a de facto government, and support them by
landing a force from our war ship then in the harbor, and he kept that
promise. This assurance was the inspiration of the movement, and
without it the annexationists would not have exposed themselves to
the consequences of failure. They relied upon no military force of their
own, for they had none worthy of the name. The Provisional Govern
ment was established by the action of the American minister and the
presence of the troops landed from the Boston, and its continued exist
ence is due to the belief of the Hawaiians that if they made an effort
to overthrow it, they would encounter the armed forces of the United
States.

The earnest appeals to the American minister for military protection
by the officers of that Government, after it had been recognized, show
the utter absurdity of the claim that it was established by a successful
revolution of the people of the Islands. Those appeals were a confession
by the men who made them of their weakness and timidity. Courageous
men, conscious of their strength and the justice of their cause, do not
thus act. It is not now claimed that a majority of the people, having
the right to vote under the constitution of 1887, ever favored the exist
ing authority or annexation to this or any other country. They earnestly
desire that the government of their choice shall be restored and its
independence respected.

Mr. Blount states that while at Honolulu he did not meet a single
annexationist who expressed willingness to submit the question to a
vote of the people, nor did he talk with one on that subject who did not
insist that if the Islands were annexed suffrage should be so restricted
as to give complete control to foreigners or whites. Representative
annexationists have repeatedly made similar statements to the under
signed.

The Government of Hawaii surrendered its authority under a threat
of war, until such time only as the Government of the United States,
upon the facts being presented to it, should reinstate the constitutional
sovereign, and the Provisional Government was created "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon." A careful consideration of the facts will, I think, convince you that the treaty which was withdrawn from the Senate for further consideration should not be resubmitted for its action thereon. Should not the great wrong done to a feeble but independent State by an abuse of the authority of the United States be undone by restoring the legitimate government? Anything short of that will not, I respectfully submit, satisfy the demands of justice.

Can the United States consistently insist that other nations shall respect the independence of Hawaii while not respecting it themselves? Our Government was the first to recognize the independence of the Islands and it should be the last to acquire sovereignty over them by force and fraud.

Respectfully submitted,

W. Q. Gresham.

[Confidential,]

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis.

No. 4.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 18, 1893.

SIR: Supplementing the general instructions which you have received with regard to your official duties, it is necessary to communicate to you, in confidence, special instructions for your guidance in so far as concerns the relation of the Government of the United States towards the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

The President deemed it his duty to withdraw from the Senate the treaty of annexation which has been signed by the Secretary of State and the agents of the Provisional Government, and to dispatch a trusted representative to Hawaii to impartially investigate the causes of the so-called revolution and ascertain and report the true situation in those Islands. This information was needed the better to enable the President to discharge a delicate and important public duty.

The instructions given to Mr. Blount, of which you are furnished with a copy, point out a line of conduct to be observed by him in his official and personal relations on the Islands, by which you will be guided so far as they are applicable and not inconsistent with what is herein contained.

It remains to acquaint you with the President's conclusions upon the facts embodied in Mr. Blount's reports and to direct your course in accordance therewith.

The Provisional Government was not established by the Hawaiian people, or with their consent or acquiescence, nor has it since existed with their consent. The Queen refused to surrender her powers to the Provisional Government until convinced that the minister of the United States had recognized it as the de facto authority, and would support and defend it with the military force of the United States, and that resistance would precipitate a bloody conflict with that force. She was advised and assured by her ministers and by leaders of the movement for the overthrow of her government, that if she surrendered under protest her case would afterwards be fairly considered by the President of the United States. The Queen finally wisely yielded to the armed forces of the United States then quartered in Honolulu, relying upon the good faith and honor of the President, when informed
of what had occurred, to undo the action of the minister and reinstate her and the authority which she claimed as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

After a patient examination of Mr. Blount's reports the President is satisfied that the movement against the Queen, if not instigated, was encouraged and supported by the representative of this Government at Honolulu; that he promised in advance to aid her enemies in an effort to overthrow the Hawaiian Government and set up by force a new government in its place; and that he kept this promise by causing a detachment of troops to be landed from the Boston on the 16th of January, and by recognizing the Provisional Government the next day when it was too feeble to defend itself and the constitutional government was able to successfully maintain its authority against any threatening force other than that of the United States already landed.

The President has therefore determined that he will not send back to the Senate for its action thereon the treaty which he withdrew from that body for further consideration on the 9th day of March last.

On your arrival at Honolulu you will take advantage of an early opportunity to inform the Queen of this determination, making known to her the President's sincere regret that the reprehensible conduct of the American minister and the unauthorized presence on land of a military force of the United States obliged her to surrender her sovereignty, for the time being, and rely on the justice of this Government to undo the flagrant wrong.

You will, however, at the same time inform the Queen that, when reinstated, the President expects that she will pursue a magnanimous course by granting full amnesty to all who participated in the movement against her, including persons who are, or have been, officially or otherwise, connected with the Provisional Government, depriving them of no right or privilege which they enjoyed before the so-called revolution. All obligations created by the Provisional Government in due course of administration should be assumed.

Having secured the Queen's agreement to pursue this wise and humane policy, which it is believed you will speedily obtain, you will then advise the executive of the Provisional Government and his ministers of the President's determination of the question which their action and that of the Queen devolved upon him, and that they are expected to promptly relinquish to her her constitutional authority.

Should the Queen decline to pursue the liberal course suggested, or should the Provisional Government refuse to abide by the President's decision, you will report the facts and await further directions.

In carrying out these general instructions you will be guided largely by your own good judgment in dealing with the delicate situation.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis.

[Telegram sent through dispatch agent at San Francisco.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, November 24, 1893.

The brevity and uncertainty of your telegrams are embarrassing. You will insist upon amnesty and recognition of obligations of the Provisional Government as essential conditions of restoration. All interests will be promoted by prompt action.

W. Q. GRESHAM.
Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 3, 1893.

Your dispatch, which was answered by steamer on the 25th of November, seems to call for additional instructions.

Should the Queen refuse assent to the written conditions, you will at once inform her that the President will cease interposition in her behalf, and that while he deems it his duty to endeavor to restore to the sovereign the constitutional government of the islands, his further efforts in that direction will depend upon the Queen's unqualified agreement that all obligations created by the Provisional Government in a proper course of administration shall be assumed and upon such pledges by her as will prevent the adoption of any measures of proscription or punishment for what has been done in the past by those setting up or supporting the Provisional Government. The President feels that by our original interference and what followed we have incurred responsibilities to the whole Hawaiian community, and it would not be just to put one party at the mercy of the other.

Should the Queen ask whether if she accedes to conditions active steps will be taken by the United States to effect her restoration or to maintain her authority thereafter, you will say that the President can not use force without the authority of Congress.

Should the Queen accept conditions and the Provisional Government refuse to surrender, you will be governed by previous instructions. If the Provisional Government asks whether the United States will hold the Queen to fulfillment of stipulated conditions, you will say, the President, acting under dictates of honor and duty as he has done in endeavoring to effect restoration, will do all in his constitutional power to cause observance of the conditions he has imposed.

GRESHAM.
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LIST OF PAPERS—Correspondence.

1. Mr. Gresham to Mr. Blount, March 11, 1893.
2. Same to Mr. Stevens, March 11, 1893.
3. Same to Mr. Severance, March 11, 1893.
4. Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham, No. 1, April 6, 1893.
5. Same to same, No. 2, April 8, 1893.
6. Same to same, No. 3, April 26, 1893.
7. Same to same, No. 4, May 4, 1893.
8. Same to same, No. 5, May 6, 1893.
9. Same to same, No. 6, May 9, 1893.
10. Same to same, No. 7, May 24, 1893.
11. Same to same, No. 8, June 1, 1893.
12. Same to same, No. 9, June 6, 1893.
13. Same to same, No. 10, June 17, 1893.
14. Same to same, No. 11, June 28, 1893.
15. Same to same, No. 12, July 7, 1893.
16. Same to same, No. 13, July 17, 1893.
17. Same to same, July 17, 1893.
18. Same to same, No. 14, July 19, 1893.
19. Same to same, No. 15, July 26, 1893.
20. Same to same, July 31, 1893.

PART I.—CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Blount.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 11, 1893.

Hon. JAMES H. BLOUNT, etc.: 

SIR: The situation created in the Hawaiian Islands by the recent deposition of Queen Liliuokalani and the erection of a Provisional Government demands the fullest consideration of the President, and in order to obtain trustworthy information on this subject, as well as for the discharge of other duties herein specified, he has decided to dispatch you to the Hawaiian Islands as his special commissioner, in which capacity you will herewith receive a commission and also a letter, whereby the President accredits you to the president of the executive and advisory councils of the Hawaiian Islands.

The comprehensive, delicate, and confidential character of your mission can now only be briefly outlined, the details of its execution being necessarily left, in great measure, to your good judgment and wise discretion.

You will investigate and fully report to the President all the facts you can learn respecting the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, the causes of the revolution by which the Queen's Government was overthrown, the sentiment of the people toward existing authority, and, in
general, all that can fully enlighten the President touching the subjects of your mission.

To enable you to fulfill this charge, your authority in all matters touching the relations of this Government to the existing or other government of the islands, and the protection of our citizens therein, is paramount, and in you alone, acting in cooperation with the commander of the naval forces, is vested full discretion and power to determine when such forces should be landed or withdrawn.

You are, however, authorized to avail yourself of such aid and information as you may desire from the present minister of the United States at Honolulu, Mr. John L. Stevens, who will continue until further notice to perform the usual functions attaching to his office, not inconsistent with the powers entrusted to you. An instruction will be sent to Mr. Stevens directing him to facilitate your presentation to the head of the Government upon your arrival, and to render you all needed assistance.

The withdrawal from the Senate of the recently signed treaty of annexation, for reexamination by the President, leaves its subject-matter in abeyance, and you are not charged with any duty in respect thereto. It may be well, however, for you to dispel any possible misapprehension which its withdrawal may have excited touching the entire friendliness of the President and the Government of the United States toward the people of the Hawaiian Islands or the earnest solicitude here felt for their welfare, tranquility, and progress.

Historical precedents and the general course of the United States authorize the employment of its armed force in foreign territory for the security of the lives and property of American citizens and for the repression of lawless and tumultuous acts threatening them; and the powers conferred to that end upon the representatives of the United States are both necessary and proper, subject always to the exercise of a sound discretion in their application.

In the judgment of the President your authority, as well as that of the commander of the naval forces in Hawaiian waters should be, and is, limited in the use of physical force to such measures as are necessary to protect the persons and property of our citizens; and while abstaining from any manner of interference with the domestic concerns of the Islands, you should indicate your willingness to intervene with your friendly offices in the interest of a peaceful settlement of troubles within the limits of sound discretion.

Should it be necessary to land an armed force upon Hawaiian territory on occasions of popular disturbance, when the local authority may be unable to give adequate protection to the life and property of citizens of the United States, the assent of such authority should first be obtained, if it can be done without prejudice to the interests involved. Your power in this regard should not, however, be claimed to the exclusion of similar measures by the representatives of other powers for the protection of the lives and property of their citizens or subjects residing in the Islands.

While the United States claim no right to interfere in the political or domestic affairs or in the internal conflicts of the Hawaiian Islands otherwise than as herein stated, or for the purpose of maintaining any treaty or other rights which they possess, this Government will adhere to its consistent and established policy in relation to them, and it will not acquiesce in domestic interference by other powers.

The foregoing general exposition of the President’s views will indicate the safe courses within which your action should be shaped and
mark the limits of your discretion in calling upon the naval commander for cooperation.

The United States revenue cutter Rush is under orders to await you at San Francisco and convey you to Honolulu.

A stenographic clerk will be detailed to accompany you and remain subject to your orders.

It is expected that you will use all convenient despatch for the fulfillment of your mission, as it is the President's desire to have the results before him at the earliest possible day. Besides the connected report you are expected to furnish you will from time to time, as occasion may offer, correspond with the Secretary of State, communicating information or soliciting special instruction on such points as you may deem necessary. In case of urgency you may telegraph, either in plain text or in the cipher of the Navy Department, through the kind offices of the admiral commanding, which may be sent to Mr. W. A. Cooper, United States dispatch agent at San Francisco, to be transmitted thence.

Reposing the amplest confidence in your ability and zeal for the realization of the trust thus confided to you,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

[Inclosure.]

President Cleveland to President Dole.

Grover Cleveland, President of the United States of America, to his excellency Sanford B. Dole, President of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND: I have made choice of James H. Blount, one of our distinguished citizens, as my special commissioner to visit the Hawaiian Islands and make report to me concerning the present status of affairs in that country. He is well informed of our sincere desire to cultivate and maintain to the fullest extent the friendship which has so long subsisted between the two countries, and in all matters affecting relations with the Government of the Hawaiian Islands his authority is paramount. My knowledge of his high character and ability gives me entire confidence that he will use every endeavor to advance the interest and prosperity of both Governments and so render himself acceptable to your excellency.

I therefore request your excellency to receive him favorably and to give full credence to what he shall say on the part of the United States and to the assurances which I have charged him to convey to you of the best wishes of this Government for the prosperity of the Hawaiian Islands.

May God have your excellency in His wise keeping.

Written at Washington this 11th day of March, in the year 1893.

Your good friend,

By the President:

W. Q. GRESHAM,
Secretary of State

No. 2.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Stevens.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 11, 1893.

SIR: With a view to obtaining the fullest possible information in regard to the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands the President has determined to send to Honolulu, as his Special Commissioner,
the honorable James H. Blount, lately chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Blount bears credential letters in that capacity, addressed to
the President of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional
Government, and you are requested to facilitate his presentation.

In all matters pertaining to the existing or other Government of the
Islands the authority of Mr. Blount is paramount. As regards the
conduct of the usual business of the legation, you are requested to con-
tinue until further notice in the performance of your official functions,
so far as they may not be inconsistent with the special powers confided
to Mr. Blount. You are also requested to aid him in the fulfillment of
his important mission by furnishing any desired assistance and informa-
tion, and the archives of the legation should be freely accessible to him.

Mr. Blount is fully instructed touching his relations to the command-
ing officer of the United States naval force in Hawaiian waters.

I am, &c.,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

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No. 3.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Severance.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 11, 1893.

Sir: With a view to obtaining the fullest possible information in
regard to the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, the President
sends to Honolulu, as his Special Commissioner, the honorable James
H. Blount, lately chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

You are requested to aid Mr. Blount in the fulfillment of his im-
portant mission by furnishing any desired assistance and information;
and the archives of the consulate-general should be freely accessible
to him.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

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No. 4.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, April 6, 1893.

Sir: I have the honor to inform you that about noon on the 29th
ultimo the Rush anchored at Honolulu. I was immediately met by the
American minister, Mr. Stevens. He informed me that the annexation
committee, which came on board with him, had rented one of the most
eligible residences in the city for my use; had provided servants, among
others an American steward, and a carriage and horses, etc., for my
use. I could pay whatever I wanted to for it, from nothing up. He
urged me very strongly to accept the proposed arrangement.

I replied to him that I could accept no favors at the hands of any
parties in the islands, and that I should immediately go to a hotel.

The annexation committee then came up and insisted that I should
take the accommodations which they had seen fit to provide on the
terms already indicated by the American minister. I again declined,
stating that I should resort to a hotel and make my arrangements there.
At this time there was an immense collection of natives on shore, men, women, and children, evidently in a state of joyous expectation.

One of the annexation committee said to me: "When you reach the shore the natives will desire you to take their carriages and allow them to escort you to your hotel." This was said with anxiety. I replied: "I shall go to my hotel in my own carriage."

Soon after this a Mr. Robertson appeared on the scene as the Queen's ex-chamberlain, to request that I would accept her carriage to convey me to my hotel. I returned thanks to her, but stated that I would use my own conveyance.

On Thursday, March 30, at 4 o'clock in the evening, in company with the American minister, I called on the President of the Provisional Government. I communicated to him the friendly disposition of our Government towards his and towards the Hawaiian people. I assured him of its purpose to avoid any interference with the domestic concerns of the islands unless it became necessary to protect the persons and property of American citizens. I then offered my letters of credence, which were accepted by President Dole, accompanied with expressions of great friendship for my Government and confidence in myself.

The Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser of March 31, 1883, reports the proceedings of the Hawaiian Patriotic League, from which the following is taken: "Mr. Joseph Nawahi, one of the speakers, said that all Hawaiians were in favor of monarchy, and then he asked his hearers if they wanted their queen to be restored. They all answered 'yes,' as a matter of course. He then went on to say that the Commissioner was sent here to feel their pulses, and for all Hawaiians to ask him for a return of the old order of things. He told the people to show by their actions that they did not want annexation, and as a greater power than the Government had arrived among them, a memorial would be read without fear of arrest."

The resolutions adopted by the meeting are as follows:

Whereas His Excellency Grover Cleveland, President of the United States of America, has honored the Hawaiian Nation by sending to us the Hon. James H. Blount as a special commissioner, to find out the true wishes of the Hawaiian people as to the proposed annexation of their country to their great friend the United States; Therefore, we, the people of the Hawaiian Islands, in mass meeting assembled, take this mode of submitting our appeal and expression of our unanimous wishes to the people of our great and good friend the Republic of the United States of America, with whom we have always entertained the most cordial relation, whom we have learned to look upon as our patrons and most reliable protectors, and in whose honor, integrity, and sense of justice and equity we have ever confidently relied for investigation into the grievous wrongs that have been committed against us as a people, against the person of our sovereign and the independence of our land;

And while we are anxious to promote the closest and most intimate political and commercial relations with the United States, we do not believe that the time has yet come for us to be deprived of our nationality and of our sovereign by annexation to any foreign power;

And, therefore, we do hereby earnestly and sincerely pray that the great wrong committed against us may be righted by the restoration of the independent autocracy and constitutional government of our kingdom under our beloved Queen Liliuokalani, in whom we have the utmost confidence as a conscientious and popular ruler.

Previous to this, accompanied by Mr. Stevens, the American minister, I had called upon the President of the Provisional Government and briefly stated the friendly disposition of our Government towards the Hawaiian people. Care had been taken on this occasion to avoid any reference to the use of the American troops. It had seemed to me up to the action of the aforesaid meeting that it would be wise to take a few days to ascertain the situation of affairs before causing the troops to be removed from the vessels and the ensign hauled down.
A Major Seward called on the morning of March 31, desiring to know when it would be convenient for me to receive a committee from the mass meeting of the preceding evening, which desired to present the resolutions adopted. It was quite clear that in the mind of that assemblage, there were apprehensions that I was here vested with power to reinstate Queen Liliuokalani.

The reception of a committee so avowedly hostile to the existing Government raised a question as to whether this would consist with a recognition of existing authority and the policy of noninterference. The messenger was informed that the subject would be taken into consideration and that he might call at 2 o'clock of the same day for my reply.

Very soon after his departure I called on President Dole, and called his attention to the meeting and resolutions. I said that, under existing circumstances, I deemed it proper at once to say to him that I should cause the ensign of the United States to be hauled down, and the troops ordered on board their respective vessels. I informed him further that they would be used only to protect the persons and property of American citizens, and that our Government would not acquiesce in the interference by any other Government in the establishment or maintenance of any form of Government on the islands. He desired to know when the troops would be removed and the ensign hauled down. I replied, to day or to-morrow. He expressed a preference that it should be done on the morning of the following day, April 1. To this I agreed. I asked if he was satisfied he could preserve order when our troops were withdrawn. To this he replied that he had no doubt of it. He added that when the troops were first furnished they could not have gotten along without their aid. He was given to understand that this question was not intended as a guide to me in the removal of the troops, but simply to ascertain whether disorders were likely to occur.

Soon afterwards the following order was issued to Admiral Skerrett:

HONOLULU, March 31, 1893.

Sir: You are directed to haul down the United States ensign from the Government Building, and to embark the troops now on shore to the ships to which they belong.

This will be executed at 11 o'clock on the 1st day of April.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

Rear Admiral J. S. SKERRETT,
Commanding Pacific Squadron.

On the afternoon of this day (March 31) I informed the messenger of the mass meeting that I would receive them at 4 o'clock on the following day. This was done in order that when the committee called, the ensign would have been hauled down and the troops ordered aboard of their vessels, and I could state freely to the committee that it was not my purpose to interfere in their domestic concerns; that the United States troops would not be used to maintain or restore any form of government, but simply to protect the persons and property of American citizens. This reply I hoped would allay any action on the part of the people based on erroneous impressions as to my future conduct.

On the night before the flag was taken down, the American minister came to me with a Mr. Smith, correspondent of the San Francisco Chronicle, whom he introduced as a gentleman of intelligence and high character desiring to make an important communication to me. This gentleman claimed to know that it was the purpose of the Japanese commissioner, who had learned that the American flag was to be hauled
down and the troops sent on board their respective vessels, to enter Honolulu with troops for the purpose of restoring authority to the Queen.

This story was credited by the American minister, who urged that I should not take down the flag until diplomatic intercourse between the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan should determine the correctness of this information.

Very little observation had satisfied me that all sorts of rumors arise in this community almost every hour, and are credited without reference to the probabilities.

Conscious of the power and policy of our own Government in these islands, and that of these the Japanese Government was well informed, I maintained my purpose to insist upon the order to Admiral Skerrett.

At 4 o'clock on Saturday, April 1, a committee, consisting of nineteen members, very intelligent, respectable half-castes, called at the headquarters of the commission. The spokesman, Mr. John E. Bush, stated that at the mass meeting of the natives resolutions had been adopted which they desired to present to me to be transmitted to the President of the United States. He declared the high esteem and affection his people had for the people of the United States, and spoke of the friendly disposition our Government had always manifested towards them. He said that up to my arrival the people had borne patiently the existing condition of things, trusting in the disposition of the American Government to do absolute justice by them. I replied that he did not misinterpret the kindly feeling of the Government and people of the United States for all classes of citizens in these islands. I said I would accept their resolutions in no other sense than as I would any other fact to be communicated in the way of information to the President of the United States; that I could not discuss with them the objects of my mission, nor the purposes of my Government. To this, response was made by Mr. Bush, that this was all they could reasonably expect.

I append herewith a copy of a letter, marked Inclosure 1, from Admiral Skerrett, containing a statement of the circumstances attending the hauling down of the ensign and the removal of the troops.

I also append a copy of a letter from Capt. Hooper, of the Rush (Inclosure No. 2), a very intelligent gentleman, whom I had asked to be present on the occasion and report the circumstances.

Mr. Parker, the last secretary of state under the late Queen, a half-caste of wealth and intelligence, called on Monday morning, April 3. In his conversation he stated that he and other leaders of the Kanaka population, loyal to the Queen, had been very active in impressing upon their followers that the lowering of the flag and the withdrawal of the troops must be accepted by them without any manifestations of their opinions or feelings.

On Sunday, April 2, I called on the American minister. While there he related that he had had a conversation with the Japanese minister, and satisfied him that our Government would not consent to Japanese interference in these islands. I was glad to find that he himself was not suffering from any apprehensions over the flag incident.

The American minister and consul-general seem to be very intense partisans for annexation. I do not yet see how they will embarrass me in the purposes of my mission. While they seemed to give out the impression that the troops will be brought back here in the event of trouble, my presence discredits the authority of their statements. I have uniformly stated that the troops would only be used for the pur-
pose of protecting the property and persons of American citizens; that I could not tell in advance what specific contingency would justify me in doing so. At this time I think I may pursue all my inquiries in the midst of peaceful surroundings.

Since my arrival visitors are constantly calling upon me and Mrs. Blount. It appears to be a manifestation of regard on the part of all classes of political opinion and of all races towards the Government of the United States. Most of my time has been occupied in this way. I do not know that it could have been employed more usefully. I think I shall cautiously but surely find my way to the political feeling of all classes. I shall commence soon to make inquiry in regard to the various questions naturally arising in connection with the relations of the United States to the Hawaiian Islands from persons whose opinions I shall have decided are of any valuable significance.

I feel assured that I can successfully ascertain much valuable information in this way.

I have, &c.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

Admiral Skerrett to Mr. Blount.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 1.]

No. 110.] U. S. S. MOHICAN, FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, April 1, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inform Special Commissioner Blount that in obedience to his directions, the United States ensign over the Government building was lowered at 11 a.m. of this date, and the force withdrawn from the building and the place designated as Camp Boston, at the same hour. I learn that quite a number of people congregated about the Government building at the time. The force of marines stationed there were relieved by a force of the Provisional Government. There was no demonstration made by the populace present. No cheering nor any other signs of either joy or grief.

I went on shore this afternoon and saw quite an access in numbers of those who were wearing the Annexation club badge. There has been no evidence shown of unruly or riotous characters. Absolutely there appears to be peace and quiet.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,

[Inclosure 2 in No. 1.]

Capt. Hooper to Mr. Blount.

U. S. REVENUE STEAMER RUSH, Honolulu, April 2, 1893.

MY DEAR SIR: I witnessed the hoisting down of the American flag and the raising of the Hawaiian flag over the Government building at this place yesterday, and was surprised not only at the absence of any indication of the violent and partisan feeling which I had been led to expect, but by the apparent apathy and indifference of the native portion of the assembled crowd, and also their politeness and evident good feeling towards Americans. As I passed freely among them, accompanied by my son, we were kept busy returning their friendly salutes. The greatest good order prevailed throughout. There were no demonstrations of any kind as the American flag came down, and not a single cheer greeted the Hawaiian flag as it was raised aloft. The native men stood around in groups or singly, smoking, and chatting and nodding familiarly to passing friends or leaning idly against the trees and fences, while the women and children, which formed a large proportion of the assemblage, were talking and laughing good-naturedly. As the hour for hoisting down the American flag approached, many people, men, women, and children, could be seen approaching the Government square in a most leisurely manner, and show-
ing more interest in the gala day appearance of the crowd than in the restoration of their national flag. The air of good natured indifference and idle curiosity with which the native men regarded the proceedings, and the presence of the women and children in their white or bright colored dresses, was more suggestive of a country "fair" or horse race than the sequel to a "revolution."

Even the presence of the "armed forces" of the Provisional Government, numbering perhaps 200, parading the corridors of the Government house, failed to elicit any sign of a feeling of anger or resentment.

In half an hour after the exchange of flags had been made the crowd had dispersed and only the "force" of the Provisional Government, which I was told was necessary to prevent mob violence, remained to indicate that a "revolution" had recently taken place. While among the crowd I looked carefully for indications of "arms" upon the persons of the natives, but saw none, although with the thin clothing worn by them, the presence of a revolver or such an arm could easily have been detected.

If any danger of mob violence on the part of the natives existed, all outward signs of it were carefully concealed. Only evidences of the greatest good feeling were apparent.

Hoping that this short statement of the facts as they appeared to me may prove of interest to you,

I am, etc.,

C. L. Hooper,
Captain U. S. Revenue Marine.

No. 5.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 2.] HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, April 8, 1893.

SIR: I send you by the steamship China the following documents:

Report of the president of the Bureau of Immigration to the Legislature of 1892;

Constitution of the Hawaiian Islands for 1887;

The Honolulu Almanac and Directory for 1886, containing the Constitution of 1884, and

The Hawaiian Annual for 1892.*

These contain much valuable information, which may be useful in properly understanding the political movements and the disposition of different classes of persons in these islands. I forbear any comment now. It seems to me important to gather all the information I can, in every direction, before permitting myself to reach conclusions or indulge in comments. I am conversing with many persons of all shades of political opinion. Some of these conversations I have in writing. They will cover much space, and, unless especially desired by you, I will not, as a rule, forward them by mail.

I send a conversation between Admiral Skerrett and myself, taken down by my stenographer and approved as correct by Admiral Skerrett. (Inclosure No. 1.)

I inclose a copy of a letter from Mr. Thurston to Mr. Antone Rosa, the original of which I have seen. Also an explanation of Hawaiian words used in Mr. Thurston's letter. (Inclosure No. 2.)

I inclose also a copy of a letter written by Mr. Thurston to Mr. J. T. Colburn, who was in the last ministry of the Queen. (Inclosure No. 3.)

I think the annexation party is endeavoring to impress the Royalists with the belief that, although the American ensign has been hauled down and the American troops ordered to their vessels, under color of protecting the persons and property of American citizens the troops

* Omitted from present publication.
will be returned, if need be, to suppress an outbreak against the existing Government.

As a class, American citizens here have been the most active in dethroning the Queen, and are active in maintaining the existing Government. If they are thus to participate in the affairs of these islands, and when force is used to suppress such movements on their part the forces of the United States are to be called in to protect their persons and property, it does seem that our Government encourages them to lawlessness, and its good faith is impugned.

My present impression is that the existing Government owes its being and its maintenance to this perverted influence. Of course, time and further inquiry may furnish a different and better opinion.

It is not easy for me to impress persons here with the complete idea of our noninterference policy, coupled with exceptions. The protection of the persons and property of American citizens here has come to mean aid to or enforcement of the laws whenever force is used against existing authority. This may be used to create a new Government and maintain it.

To meet the situation here may require a clear, defined, and thoroughly advertised announcement of when and how our troops are to be used. I know much must always be left to the sound direction of the representative of the United States here. Any suggestion or instruction to me, additional to what has been already given, would be very helpful.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
United States Commissioner.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 2.]

Interview between Admiral Skerrett and Mr. Blount.

APRIL 8, 1893.

Col. Blount. When did you come to the islands?
Admiral Skerrett. February the 10th of the present year.
Col. Blount. Were you in Washington prior to that?
Admiral Skerrett. Yes; I was in Washington on the 31st day of December, or the 30th day of December.
Col. Blount. Did you have any conversation with the Secretary of the Navy about coming down here?
Admiral Skerrett. Yes.
Col. Blount. Please be kind enough to state it.
Admiral Skerrett. I called at the Navy Department on the 30th of December to see Mr. Tracy, the Secretary of the Navy, to ask him if he had any final instructions for me, as I was going to leave the next day for San Francisco to assume command of the Pacific squadron. He replied: "Commodore, I have no instructions to give you. You will go there and perform your duty, as I know you will, and everything will be satisfactory." I remarked: "Mr. Tracy, I want to ask you about these Hawaiian affairs. When I was out there twenty years ago I had frequent conversations with the then United States minister, Mr. Pierce, on the subject of the islands. I was told then that the United States Government did not wish to annex the islands of Hawaii."

He replied: "Commodore, the wishes of the Government have changed. They will be very glad to annex Hawaii." He said as a matter of course none but the ordinary legal means can be used to persuade these people to come into the United States.

I said: "All right, sir. I only wanted to know how things were going on as a cue to my action," and I bade him good-bye.

Col. Blount. Admiral, please give me your opinion as to the disposition amongst the opponents of the existing Government to resort to force.
Admiral Skerrett. The only means I have of knowledge is what I glean from newspapers. I am never in conversation with any of the party; never been brought in contact with them or anybody I knew to be opposed to the annexation movement.

Col. Blount. Do you see any symptoms of any disposition to resort to force of any kind?

Admiral Skerrett, I have never since my arrival—and I have been on shore many times—seen any indications of such a disposition.

Col. Blount. Up to this time?

Admiral Skerrett. Up to this time.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 2.]

Mr. Thurston to Mr. Rosa.

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 15, 1893.

FRIEND ROSA: Yours of March 1st is duly at hand. I am very sorry that the band boys have taken the course which they have. It is certain that they cannot get work enough in Honolulu to support themselves from the receipts of an independent band, as there are not people enough there who could afford to pay for a band of that size to give the boys a living.

With regard to my taking charge of them in Chicago, I thank you for the interest you have taken in the matter, and their confidence in me; but for several reasons I would be unable to do it. In the first place, the expenses of so large a number of men are very heavy, and it is only by a systematic arrangement that the business part of the trip could be made a success. This would require the laying out of a regular series of entertainments, with detail arrangements with theaters, fairs, etc. This time I cannot possibly give to them, as my own business at Chicago will necessarily take a great deal of time. In the second place, I should not think of such a thing as undertaking to engineer such a combination as the Hawaiian band without a thoroughly competent musical leader such as Berger. I think they would make a great mistake if they go on there under the leadership of the Manila man that you speak of, or any of their own men. It requires something besides the ability to blow in the end of a trumpet to conduct a band. You yourself know how rapidly the band has always deteriorated when Berger has been away. Of course there are other men in the world just as good as Berger, but the boys are a peculiar lot, and I know of no one who has been able to handle them or get music out of them as he has. I should, therefore, very seriously doubt the advisability of their going at all unless they can get a better leader.

I hope that something can be done by which their differences with Berger and the Government can be fixed up so that they can go to Chicago, as I think their presence there would be of great benefit to Hawaii. You can tell any of those gentlemen in Honolulu, who you say are interesting themselves to keep the band out of my control, that they need not worry themselves any longer about it. If the band comes to Chicago I will do everything in my power to assist them and forward their interests, and shall be glad to employ them during part of the time to play at the Volcano building. Further than this I have no desire nor intention to have anything to do with, or any control over them, although I presume this will be difficult for some of our peanut-souled friends, who can not imagine anyone doing anything except for private gain, to understand.

I am glad you have succeeded in settling up the Aylett suit with the Bishop estate. I will write to W. O. Smith to represent me in the matter, as the probability is that I will be unable to come back until after the opening of the fair, and after that my movements are uncertain.

You say that you hope that we will do what is fair for all of you here. You ought to know by this time that we desire nothing else. I think, Rosa, that you have not an opportunity now to take a stand that will not only be beneficial to yourself, but in the highest degree beneficial to your people. I desire to say a few words to you on the subject, knowing that from your superior education and associations you can appreciate the logic of events and what the future is likely to bring forth, as very few of those who look to you for guidance and as a leader can. What is done within the next month or two is going to affect the future of Hawaii for a great many years. A vast number of natives will look to you and Colburn and a few others for their opinions and information, and whether you take a narrow view of matters or a broad one is going to be a radical factor in the settlement of the question at issue. There are several things which are settled and determined, and if we all recognize them and act upon that basis the results will necessarily be very different from what they otherwise will be. One of these certainties is that the monarchy is past. The Queen
and her immediate partisans may not appreciate this, and will probably continue to labor under the delusion that there is a possibility of her restoration. T. H. Davies is over here now musing about the restoration of Kaulani, but there is no more possibility of it than there is of the restoration of Don Pedro to Brazil.

It is a simple waste of energy on the part of anybody to spend their time in attempting to restore what has fallen through its own weakness. Neumann recognizes this condition fully here, and is now confusing his fight to get as much money as he can out of it for the Queen. The question for you and me and the others of us who expect to continue to live in Hawaii to consider is, what is coming next? If the native leaders hang back in a sulky way and oppose annexation tooth and nail, it may very likely have some influence upon the immediate adoption of an annexation treaty. It will only cause delay, however, and can not interfere with ultimate annexation. It will also generate much ill-feeling and perpetuate differences of opinion on race lines, which of all things is the one which we ought to do the most to discourage. As I said, the most that opposition to annexation will succeed in affecting is delay. That is to say, the Provisional Government will remain in power. The United States recognizes it as the Government and will continue to do so until some other understanding is arrived at by mutual agreement.

If through native opposition, annexation does not take place, a protectorate will be the result; as I said before, this will not be a protectorate of the Hawaiian Government under the protection of the United States. In either case, that of simple delay or of the protectorate, a continuation of the present autocratic system of Government will result, which is a thing which neither you nor those you represent, nor the Provisional Government desire. It means a government of force with the attendant probable conspiracies against it, and general unsettlement of business and degeneration of values which will prevent business enterprise from development and be injurious to us all, while no end of personal and party differences and hard feeling will be generated. If the Provisional Government and its leaders were bent on the rule or ruin policy, with no other object in view but to secure control of the Government, which Peterson and his boodle friends are always harping upon, we would want nothing better than the protectorate proposition which would leave us in control of the Government with Uncle Sam's troops to keep order. We want nothing of the kind.

We have resisted all propositions from the Government here looking to a government on that basis, although we could secure a treaty of that description without difficulty, as the entire opposition in the United States to annexation advocates freely the execution of a treaty on the line above indicated.

As I have stated above, however, we have no desire to perpetuate any government of this description, nor to secure any laws, terms, or conditions which would operate to establish any differences between the citizens of Hawaii on a color or race line. We do not propose to ask for nor accept any legislation which shall apply to either natives or white men that does not apply equally to the other. If, instead of a protectorate, with its attendant evils, we secure absolute annexation, one thing is certain, the natives and white men equally will have no less liberties as American citizens than they did as Hawaiians; while, as far as their financial condition is concerned, there is no comparison of the two systems.

With annexation Hawaii will inaugurate such a condition of commercial development as will put the development of 1876 and succeeding years entirely in the shade; no one can say the community will reap the benefit of it.

It may be said that the treaty which we have proposed does not cover a number of points which ought to be covered, to wit, a removal of duties, prohibition of carpet-baggers, securing American citizenship to Hawaiian citizens, and similar points. In reply, I would say that once we become American territory, there is not the slightest reason to believe that we will be treated in any manner differently from other portions of the United States. All the subjects spoken of are matters of detail legislation, which have to be covered by legislation passing both houses of Congress, and are not covered by the treaty for that reason, as that would have caused delay which we are seeking to avoid. As to the officers being given to Malihini there is no reason to believe that there would be such difficulty, as it has become an unwritten law in connection with the territories that the officers shall be filled from local residents, and with very few exceptions that rule is now and has been for a number of years carried out. If you and others will take hold and frankly work with us, explaining to the natives the situation, and doing what you can to correct the impressions being given out by the demagogues, I believe that within a year from now we will have a prosperous, contented community, with no more thought of revolution or conspiracy than there is in Washington; but that if the agitation against annexation and the accompanying stirring up of the Kanakas against the Haole goes on, it will result in a situation disastrous to business interests, if not dangerous to the peace.

I hope you will show this to Colburn, Bob Wilcox, and any others whom you may choose, and that you will take it in the spirit in which it is intended, that is, the
forwarding of the common interests of our country and people. I have got no ax to grind, do not want and will not accept any office, and am actuated by no impulse but to secure the advancement of Hawaii and her people to a freer political and more prosperous commercial condition than she has ever occupied before. I write to you because, although we have been of opposite political parties, I believe you can see through a grindstone when there is a hole in it, and that if you believe that the best interests of the natives lie in the direction of annexation, you will use your influence in that direction, even though it may not be the popular side among them to begin with.

Me ke aloha nui ia oe a me ke one hanau o ka no. L. A. Thurston.

Definition of Hawaiian words used in Hon. L. A. Thurston’s letter to A. Rosa, of March 16, 1893:
“Pau” means “finished,” or “over with.”
“Malihinis” means strangers.
“Kanakas” means “men,” but generally applied to native Hawaiians.
“Haoles” means “white foreigners.”
“Me ke aloha nui ia oe a me ke one hanau o ka no.”
“With much love to you and the land of our (two) birth, I am.”

L. A. Thurston.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 2.]

Mr. Thurston to Mr. Colburn.

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 16, 1893.

FRIEND COLBURN: I have just written to Antoine Rosa on the subject of annexation, and asked him to show you the letter. Please consider that portion of the letter written as much to you as it is to him.

Whatever our political differences may have been in the past, I give you credit, as I believe you do me, for acting as you thought best in the interest of Hawaii and the Hawaiians. I see by the papers that your name is more or less connected with that of Ashford, Peterson, and other political agitators of that stripe. Without any personal animosity against either of those gentlemen, I do feel that their past history, which is known to you as well as to us, is indicative of the disinterestedness in the advice which they now give and which they now take. A tremendous responsibility rests upon you and others who have been identified with the opposition in the recent movement, but who, from their knowledge of the situation, must know the ultimate advantages of annexation to the United States. Your influence thrown against it will, of course, tend to perpetuate the race feeling now existing; if thrown in favor of it, while it may not be immediately popular, will, under the circumstances, have a very strong effect. With annexation there will, of course, come a temporary reconstruction period, during which the necessary legislation is being formulated for the reconstruction of the government, and when the government will not be carried on under representative lines; but, if we are within the United States system, this can be but temporary. In the long run we will receive all the benefits and privileges of American citizens, and it behooves us to look to the future, and not be governed entirely by the immediate present.

With aloha mu, I remain, etc.,

L. A. Thurston.

This is a correct copy of the letter written to me by L. A. Thurston, and received by me Thursday, April 7, 1893.

JOHN F. COLBURN.

No. 6.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 3.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, April 26, 1893.

SIR: On the 7th instant the Alameda reached this place. Among its passengers were Dr. William Shaw Bowen and Mr. Harold M. Sewall. The San Francisco papers announced that they had refused
to say that they were not joint commissioners with myself to Honolulu. The former represented himself to me as a correspondent of the New York World, and said he would be glad to give me any information he could gather here. Thinking it a mere matter of courtesy, I thanked him. On Sunday, the 16th instant, I was out walking and met him on the street, riding in a buggy. He left his buggy in the hands of his friend, Mr. Sewall, and joined me in a walk of some length. Before it was concluded he said to me that he and Paul Neumann were arranging a meeting between President Dole and the Queen, the object being to pay her a sum of money in consideration of her formal abdication of the throne and lending her influence to the Provisional Government with a view to annexation to the United States. He repeated this statement frequently, at intervals, to which I made no response.

Finally he asked me if I did not think it would simplify the situation very much here and facilitate annexation. Suspecting that my answer was designed to be used to induce the Queen to yield to solicitations to abdicate: I replied "I have nothing to say on this subject." Dr. Bowen said: "I did not ask you officially, but simply in a private way." I responded: "I am here as a Commissioner of the United States and must decline to converse with you on this subject."

The next morning early I had an interview with President Dole. I told him that I had seen in the San Francisco newspapers intimations that Dr. Bowen and Mr. Sewall were here as representatives of the President of the United States; that the former told me that he had arranged to bring him and the Queen together on that morning; that I desired to say to him that neither Dr. Bowen nor Mr. Sewall, nor any other person was authorized to act for the Government in that or any other matter relating to the present condition of affairs in the islands save myself; that I did not know absolutely that these two gentlemen had claimed to have such authority. He replied that he had been informed that they were here representing the Government. He did not give his authority.

He said that there had been some approaches from the Queen's side with propositions of settlement; that he had responded: "I will consider any reasonable proposition."

I told him I would not permit the Government of the United States to be represented as having any wish in the matter of any negotiations between the Queen and the Provisional Government. He asked if I would be willing to authorize the statement that I believed it would simplify the situation. I replied that I was not willing to do this, that I was not here to interfere with the opinions of any class of persons.

Since this interview with President Dole I have heard that Dr. Bowen, when asked by newspaper people if he represented the President of the United States, declined to answer, saying that all would be revealed hereafter.

He is representing himself in various quarters as an intimate friend of the President. I can but think that these statements are made to create the impression that he is here authorized to bring about negotiations for a settlement between the Queen and the Provisional Government.

On the day before yesterday Dr. Bowen came over to my table to say that a meeting between the Queen and President Dole had occurred, and terms were agreed upon. I said I did not care for him to talk with me on that subject.

On the 21st instant Mr. Claus Spreckels called to see me. He said
that he suspected there was an effort at negotiation between the Queen and the Provisional Government, and that he had urged the Queen to withdraw her power of attorney from Paul Neumann. I inclose hereewith a copy of that power of attorney (Inclosure No. 1) which Mr. Spreckels says was derived through the agency of Mr. Samuel Parker, the last secretary of foreign affairs. He told me that Paul Neumann would leave for Washington by the next steamer, under pretense that he was going to the United States and from there to Japan. How much or how little Mr. Spreckels knows about this matter I am unable to say, as I do not know how to estimate him, never having met him before. He promised to see me again before the mail leaves for the United States on next Wednesday and give me such information as he could acquire in the meantime.

I believe that Dr. Bowen, Mr. Sewall, and Mr. Neumann have pretended that the two former knew the opinions of Mr. Cleveland and assured the Queen that annexation would take place, and that she had better come to terms at once.

Mr. Neumann leaves here on the next steamer, probably with a power to act for the Queen, with authority derived from her out of these circumstances.

The question occurs to my mind whether, if the United States desired the adjustment as probably agreed on, it had better not be accomplished through its representative here, either myself or the successor of Mr. Stevens as minister here, that assurance might be had that the action of the Government was free from any suspicion of indirection in the transaction.

I know the American minister, Mr. Stevens, has said that he had learned that Mr. Blount believed that such a settlement as indicated would simplify the situation. I called on him yesterday and told him that I did not think it was proper for him to speak of my views on the subject; that declarations of that sort coming from him would give rise to the suspicion that the Government of the United States was behind Dr. Bowen and Mr. Sewall in whatever they might see fit to represent in regard to the views of the President. During this interview I called his attention to the following conversation between Mr. Spreckels and myself on the 21st instant:

Mr. Blount. Please state whether or not you have had any message from the American minister, and whether any conversation with him.
A. I have.
Q. Be kind enough to state it.
A. He sent down on Tuesday about 3 o'clock, whether I would be kind enough to come up to his house to see him. I took a carriage and saw him at 4 o'clock that Tuesday afternoon. He told me that Mr. Parker had no influence with the Queen, but that Paul Neumann could control her, and, if I would, I could control Paul Neumann; that Paul Neumann tell the Queen that she be in favor of annexation, and tell the Kanakas, who follow her, to go all for annexation. He said that he expected to be here only thirty or forty days, and he would like for annexation to be before he left. Some words to that effect.

He said he thought Mr. Spreckels misunderstood him as to his declaration that he wanted to finish up annexation before he left. I then told him that I felt assured that it would be displeasing to the Secretary of State and the President if they were informed that he was seeking to mold opinion here on the matter of annexation of these islands; that I was here instructed in part to inquire into that very subject; that it was certainly very unseemly, while I was making the inquiry, for him to be urging annexation; that he must know by the fact of my presence alone that he was not authorized to represent the views of the present administration in relation to any matter growing out of the
proposition to annex these islands to the United States. At first he said that his position had been made known through the publication of his dispatches, and that he never could go back on them.

To this I replied that the proposition of going back on his dispatches was one thing, and that his undertaking to form public opinion here on the subject of annexation at this time for an Administration not of his own political party, and when I was present to represent it especially in such matters, scarcely seemed fair in the light of the courtesy which had been manifested towards him. I said to him that I hoped in future that he would not undertake to advance or retard the cause of annexation or to represent the Government in any way in that connection, and that whenever it was necessary for him to speak on the matter that he would refer persons to me. This he agreed to. All this colloquy was characterized by kindness on my part, and, so far as I could observe, by courtesy on the part of Mr. Stevens. He complained somewhat that I did not confide in him and did not seek his opinion about men and things here. I replied that I was engaged on certain lines of inquiry and might in the future find occasion to seek his opinion.

On Tuesday, the 18th instant, President Dole sent Mr. Frank Hastings, his private secretary, to say that Mr. Stevens had requested, on application from Admiral Skerrett, permission for the United States troops to land for the purpose of drilling, and said that he thought proper, before consenting to it, he should make this fact known to me. I replied that I did not desire the troops to land. I then sent for Admiral Skerrett and told him that there were circumstances of a political character which made the landing of the troops for any purpose at this time inadvisable. This was entirely satisfactory to him.

On the 21st the aforesaid Mr. Hastings called and asked how he should answer Mr. Stevens' note for permission to land the troops. I replied by simply saying that the Commissioner had informed him that he disapproved of it.

The landing of the troops, pending negotiations between the Queen and President Dole, might be used to impress the former with fear that troops were landed to lend force to the Provisional Government in bringing her to an adjustment. I did not think proper to communicate this reason to Mr. Stevens or any other person, save Admiral Skerrett, and to him confidentially.

A great many hearings have been given to persons classed as Reformers or as Royalists. The former justify the dethronement of the Queen, because of her revolutionary attempt to subvert the constitution of 1887, and by proclamation to create a new constitution in lieu thereof, containing provisions restoring to the Crown the right of appointing nobles and of appointing ministers responsible only to it. In speaking of the controversy they refer to one party as whites and the other as natives. They represent the political contests for the last ten or twelve years as running parallel with racial lines. A confidence is sometimes expressed that the revolution of 1887 taught the whites that whenever they desired they could do whatever they willed in determining the form of government for these islands, and had likewise taught the natives that they would be unable to resist the will of the whites.

It is urged that the aid of the Government of the United States was not needed to make the revolution successful. Closer scrutiny reveals the fact that they regarded the revolution as successful when they should be able to proclaim a constitution from some public building, believing that the presence of the United States troops signified their use for the preservation of public order, which latter, in the minds of
the people of Honolulu, means the prevention of hostile combat between opposing parties. Whatever may be the truth, I am unable to discover in all the testimony any apprehension that the troops would be inimical to the revolutionary movement. In all of the examinations of persons thus far this fear has never manifested itself for an instant. The natives, on the other hand, insist that the Queen never contemplated proclaiming a new constitution without the assent of the ministry. They argue that the establishment of a new constitution by the proclamation of the Queen was as justifiable as that of 1887, in which a mass meeting of whites in the city of Honolulu extorted the proclamation of a new constitution from King Kalakaua, which had never been ratified by any vote of the people. They represent that the proclamation of a new constitution by the Queen was founded on the universal wish of the native population, which is in overwhelming majority over other races participating in the affairs of this Government.

They allege that on the day the Queen sought to proclaim a new constitution a committee representing the Hui Kalaiaina were waiting on her by direction of that organization. They represent that various petitions had been presented to the Queen and to the legislature for a series of years, asking for a new constitution similar to that existing prior to the revolution of 1887. Testimony on these two lines of thought has been taken. In addition to this, very much evidence has been given in the form of voluntary statements as to the causes of the revolution and the circumstances attending it, especially as to how far the whites compelled the Queen to acquiesce in their movement on the one side, and on the other as to the entire success of the movement of the whites depending on the action of the United States troops and the American Minister in support of this movement.

It is not my purpose at this time to enter into an elaborate consideration of the evidence which has been adduced, because many other statements are yet to be made, which will be considered.

I invite your attention to the following copy of a memorial from the Hui Kalaiaina, because of its striking disclosure of the native Hawaiian mind in its aspirations as to the form of government, and, in connection with that, a colloquy between myself and a committee of that organization taken down by a stenographer and approved by them:

Statement of facts made by the Hui Kalaiaina (Hawaiian Political Association) in behalf of the people to J. H. Blount, the United States Commissioner, showing why the people urged the Queen to promulgate a new constitution for the Hawaiian people.

To the Honorable J. H. Blount, the United States Commissioner, greeting:

We, the Hawaiian Political Association, in behalf of the people of the Hawaiian islands—an association organized in the city of Honolulu, with branches organized all over these islands, which association has been in existence since the overthrow of the constitution of Kamemeha IV by the descendants of the sons of missionaries who are seeking to usurp the Kingdom of our Queen for themselves—

And for this reason the people did ask King Kalakaua to revise the constitution of 1887 now in force, and during his reign many petitions were made to him and to the Legislature with thousands of signatures attached, but the desire of the people was never fulfilled.

Therefore, the people petitioned to him for redress according to these statements now submitted to you:

First. This constitution deprived the Crown of Hawaiian Islands of its ancient prerogatives.

Second. This constitution based the principles of government on the forms and spirit of republican governments.

Third. This constitution opens the way to a republican government.

Fourth. This constitution has taken the sovereign power and vested it outside of the King sitting on the throne of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

Fifth. This constitution has limited the franchise of the native Hawaiians.
For these five reasons was King Kalakaua petitioned by his people to revise the constitution, but it never was carried out until the time of his death.

During the reign of Queen Liliuokalani the same thing happened. Numerous petitions were laid before her by and from the people, and from this association to the Legislature and to the Queen. These petitions contain over eight thousand names, and this Hawaiian Political Association did repeatedly petition the Queen to revise and amend or to make a new constitution, to which she finally consented to lay this request from her people before the cabinet, but the wishes of the people were not carried out.

On the 14th of January, 1893, at the time of the prorogation of the Legislature, in the afternoon, this political association came and petitioned Her Majesty Liliuokalani to issue a new constitution for the people, to which she consented, with the intention of listening to the desires of her people, but her cabinet refused.

A short while afterwards the descendants of the missionaries came forward in their second attempt to usurp the Kingdom of our Queen Liliuokalani, and said attempt would not have succeeded had it not been for the support given it by the American Minister Stevens—therefore our Queen yielded the Kingdom into their hands through the superior force presented by the men of the American warships, who had been landed on the Hawaiian soil.

Queen Liliuokalani yielded her Kingdom into their hands, not with good will, but because she could not defend it, and because the Queen did not desire to see the blood of her Hawaiian people shed on this land of peace.

Therefore, we submit to you our humble petition and statements, as you are in possession of vast powers in your mission to do justice to the Hawaiian people, our independence, the throne, and the Hawaiian flag; we beg you to restore our beloved Queen Liliuokalani to the throne with the independence of the Hawaiian people, as you have restored the Hawaiian flag.

Submitting these statements and petitions to you we pray that the Almighty God would assist you in your responsible duties, that the prayers of our people may be granted, that continued friendship may exist between us and the American nation.

We, the undersigned subscribers of the Hawaiian Political Association,

W. L. Holokahi, 
Chairman.

John Kepuhi, 
J. Alapai, 
J. Akahoonei, 
J. R. Kekia, 
J. Kean, 
D. W. Kanoelehua, 
T. C. Pohikupa, 
Committee.

In accepting the copy of the resolutions Mr. Blount responded as follows:

GENTLEMEN: Very much of the duties of my mission I cannot communicate to you. I will say, however, that your papers which have been presented I will accept and forward to the President in the nature of information indicating the opinions of your people in these Islands in reference to the inclination on your part to support the existing condition of things—that is to say, whether you are in favor of the Provisional Government and annexation, or whether your preference is for royalty. I am gathering information on these lines for the purpose of submitting it to the President. That is the extent of what I can say to you by way of response. I would like to ask, however, a few questions. Which is the chairman of your committee?

INTERPRETER: W. L. Holokahi, of Honolulu.

(These questions were given and answered through the interpreter.)

Q. On the day of the prorogation of the Legislature a number of natives are reported to have gone in to see the Queen—about thirty in number—and that their object was to ask for a new constitution. Was that a committee from this organization?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many voters—people who vote for representatives—are there in this order?

A. Some thousands; as we have it in our books about 3,000 of native Hawaiians.

Q. What did the Queen say in response to your request?

A. That she was quite ready to give a new constitution, but her cabinet is opposed to it. Her cabinet refused it so that she could not do otherwise. She told the people that they had to go home quietly and wait for the next session of the Legislature. Then would that be if the Government had not been overthrown?

A. The time, according to our laws, was two years, and that would run us up to 1894.

Q. Then the information was that nothing could be done under two years on account of the disapproval of the cabinet?

A. Yes; the Queen could do nothing.
Q. She said she could do nothing?
A. Yes; because the constitution said she could do nothing without being approved by her Cabinet.

Q. What did the committee do when they went out? Did they give this information to the native people?
A. Yes, sir. This committee shortly after they came out—they told the people they could do nothing now; that they would have to wait until the next session. Also, the Queen came out and told the people she could not give them any constitution now because the law forbids.

A great many petitions were exhibited—sometimes they were to the Queen and sometimes to the Legislature—asking for a new constitution.

A book was also shown containing the names of members of the organization throughout the island, and giving the numbers as follows:

Oahu, 2,320; Maui, 384; Hawaii, 266; Kanai, 222, and Molokai, 263.

Q. (To interpreter.) Why don't other natives join the organization?
A. They sometimes go to meetings. When anything happens they go together.

Q. These are active members of the organization?
A. Yes.

Q. In matters of this sort the natives followed the lead of this organization?
A. Yes, sir.

Prior to the constitution of 1887 the nobles were appointed by the Crown and the representatives were elected by the people, with but little obstruction in the qualification of the elector. The number of nobles was 20 and the number of representatives was 28, and these, constituting one body, enacted the laws. The cabinet was only responsible to the King. The majority of voters was overwhelmingly native. It is easy to understand how completely the native people could, if they desired, control the Government as against the white race. Under the constitution of 1887 the number of nobles and representatives is equal. The qualification of an elector of a noble required him to own property of the value of $3,000, unincumbered, or an income of $600. Practically this vested the power of electing nobles in the white population, or, as it is sometimes termed, the reform party. A cabinet could not be removed by the Crown except on a vote of want of confidence by the Legislature. The ability to elect a small number, even one of the representatives, enabled the white race to control legislation and to vote out any ministry not in accord with them. This placed the political power in the hands of the white race. I use the words “white” and “native” as distinguishing the persons in the political contests here, because they are generally used by the people here in communicating their views to me.

I had supposed up to the appearance of this memorial that the real demand of the native was for a just proportion of power in the election of nobles by the reduction of the money qualification of an elector. This I had derived from interviews with some of the intelligent half-castes. This memorial indicates an opposition to the new constitution because it takes away from the Crown the right to appoint nobles and the right to appoint and remove cabinets at will. There is no aspiration in it for the advancement of the right of the masses to participate in the control of public affairs, but an eager, trustful devotion to the Crown as an absolute monarchy. I had wondered whether or not this race of people, which up to 1843 had no rights of property, and over whom the king and chiefs had absolute power of life and death, had fully cast off the old system and conceived the modern ideas in the United States of the control of the government by equal participation by every citizen in the selection of its rulers. Up to the appearance of this memorial I had received but little satisfaction on this line of thought.

In this connection I invite your attention to Inclosure No. 2, being a copy of resolutions presented on the 16th instant by a committee of the “Hui Aloha Aina”—the Hawaiian Patriotic League.
Taken in connection with the foregoing memorial of the Hui Kalaiaina, it is strongly suggestive of blind devotion to arbitrary power vested in the crown worn by a person of native blood. I have forwarded these two documents because they present a phase of thought which had not been so well defined in anything I had seen in publications relating to these islands. They seem to go very far in the matter of the capacity of these people for self-government.

I have received communications from every source when offered, not to support any theory, but simply to see what might be derived from them in the way of information. I have studiously avoided any suggestion that the President contemplated the consideration of the restoration of the Queen, the support of the existing Government, or the question of annexation on any terms. I have intended to invite the freest expression of thought without any indication that it was to be considered with a view of guiding the action of the Government in the determination of any proposition. In all this I find my action most heartily approved by both whites and natives.

In several local papers, beginning with the 13th instant, editorials have appeared advising in terms somewhat indefinite, and yet pointing to the extreme action which should be taken towards the Queen and her adherents, and deploiring the want of such action on the part of the Provisional Government. On the night of the 14th instant a prominent half-caste called upon me. He had always assured me hitherto of the quiet intention of the native population. On this latter occasion he said: "We are in trouble. It is said the Queen is to be put out of the way by assassination, and her prominent followers to be prosecuted for treason or deported."

These apprehensions naturally grew out of the editorials alluded to. I said to him I had no idea there was any foundation for his fears in the purposes of the Government. Before he left me he seemed to be relieved.

On the morning of the 15th I called on President Dole, and invited his attention to the newspaper articles above referred to and to the visit of the half-caste, with his expressions of fear and my response. I said to him that perhaps I had gone farther than propriety would suggest in my opinion to the half-caste on the evening before, but that I was impelled solely by that humane feeling which would regret to see disorder and bloodshed inflicted on any portion of the community. I also intimated that if he deemed it desirable, owing to the kindly feeling the native population had manifested towards me, I might, without pretending to represent the Government, allay their anxieties and contribute to the public peace by assuring them that the extreme measures advocated by the press I did not believe were approved by the Government. To this he responded that it would be very gratifying to him and to those in political accord with him for me to act as I had suggested. He furthermore declared that it was the purpose of the Government to confine its action only to the preservation of order, and to take no extreme steps against any parties here unless it should be to meet a forcible attack on the Government.

When the ensign was hauled down and the troops ordered to the vessels there was some comment on the omission to recite in the order or by some public declaration the exact import of this action.

In the above conversation I referred to the subject and said that at the time I believed that any speech or written declaration might be liable to many and false constructions, and that the action of hauling down the ensign and the removal of the troops would in a few hours
tell with more simplicity and accuracy and with better results than any utterances of mine could do.

To this he replied that at first there was some criticism, but that all minds had come to the conclusion that I had taken the wiser course.

He took occasion to say to me that all men everywhere could only think that I was governed by the highest motives in all my actions here.

At 10 o'clock on the morning of the 22d instant Mr. Spreckels called to see me. He assured me that Mr. Neumann was going to San Francisco and then to Japan. I said to him: "But he is going to Washington." He said: "Yes; but in order to take some dispatches from Mr. Stevens to the Washington Government."

On the 21st, in the conversation with Mr. Stevens, to which reference has already been made, he told me for the first time of a letter he had written to you concerning certain matters which had passed between him and the Japanese commissioner at this place. The extent of it was that by representations that the United States was opposed to the presence of a Japanese war vessel here that it was determined that the Japanese Minister should ask his Government to cause the aforesaid vessel to be withdrawn.

In view of my instructions, I felt bound to give assurances to the Japanese commissioner that the present Administration does not view with displeasure or suspicion the presence of one of her war vessels here.

Mr. Paul Neumann is generally regarded here as a bright, plausible, unscrupulous person. Permit me to suggest that if the Administration should entertain any proposition from Mr. Neumann in connection with a contract between the Queen and the Provisional Government in the matter of her abdication, the consummation of it is surrounded by so many circumstances indicating that the Government of the United States has been made to appear to the Queen as favoring such action on her part that it would be far better to decline to entertain anything from Mr. Neumann, but for the Government to accomplish its purpose in a more direct manner. If such an adjustment is desirable, instructions to the American representative here to endeavor to bring about such an arrangement would be a much more honorable course on the part of the United States.

The representatives of the Provisional Government are conscious that the movement inaugurated on the 14th of January last for the dethronement of the Queen and annexation to the United States is a much more desperate one than they then realized.

The white race, or what may be termed the Reform party, constitute the intelligence and own most of the property in these islands and are desperately eager to be a part of the United States on any terms rather than take the chances of being subjected to the control of the natives. With them we can dictate any terms. The feeling of the natives is that while they do not want annexation, if the United States does it will be accomplished, and they will acquiesce. The situation is so completely under our control that I should regret to see Mr. Neumann's agency in the matter of abdication of the Queen, with his connection with Dr. Bowen and others and the attendant circumstances, recognized by the Government. You will readily understand that this is not intended as impertinence, but only as a suggestion.

Since writing the foregoing portion of my letter relating to attempts to represent the views of the President of the United States by unauthorized persons in connection with the subject of an agreement between ex-Queen Liliuokalani and the Provisional Government, I have deemed it proper to have an interview with the former in order to understand,
as far as I might, from her whether any negotiations had been authorized by her, and if so, how far they had gone. Before doing so, I called on President Dole and informed him of my purpose to see her in connection with this subject, stating to him that I was not willing that persons should make fraudulent representations to her as to that matter. I told him that I had abstained from seeing her lest my visit might be construed in a way to produce disorders, but now I felt all danger of this had passed. He concurred in my views as to the propriety of my calling, if I saw fit to do so.

I said to the ex-Queen that I had been informed that certain persons had sought to impress her with the idea that the President desired some such adjustment as indicated to be made; that I wished to say that no person was authorized by the President nor by myself to place the Government of the United States in such an attitude; that, while I would interpose no objection to such negotiation, I wanted her to know that whatever she did in the matter was free from any moral influence from the Government of the United States. I further said to her that I desired to be able to inform my Government whether she had been engaged in such negotiations or contemplated them, or whether anybody was authorized to act for her in any such matter; that I wished the information simply to put the Government at Washington in possession of the true state of facts.

She replied that parties who had represented her in other matters had talked to her on the subject; that she had declined to indicate any disposition to act in the matter; that she had said to some of them that she would wait until President Dole came to see her in person, and had heard what he had to say; that she did not intend to enter into any negotiations until the Government at Washington had taken action on the information derived through my report. She said she had sent Mr. Neumann to Washington to prevent the ratification of the treaty and to have a commission sent out here, and he reported that she had been successful in both. I then asked her what she desired me to say to the Government at Washington as to her purpose in the matter of this negotiation. She expressed a wish that I should say from her that no one was authorized to act in her behalf in this matter and that she should take no action until the Government at Washington had passed upon the information derived through the Commissioner.

Lest she might make improper inferences from my visit or something I had said I told her that one of the objects of my visit was to get all the facts connected with her dethronement and the disposition of the people of the Islands in relation to the present Government; that she could readily see that that was a matter to be hereafter considered by the Government in such manner as it saw fit. Without any apparent connection with what had been said, she remarked that much depended on Mr. Spreckels as to the future; that he and Mr. Bishop had been in the habit of furnishing money to the Government, and that if Mr. Spreckels did not advance to the Government she thought it would go to pieces. To this I made no response. It is evident that she is being impressed with the idea that the present Government could not get money enough to run itself long.

I am not sufficiently informed to express any views on this proposition at this time.

I think the operations of Dr. Bowen and Mr. Sewall have been conducted through Mr. Neumann. I shall, perhaps, know more before closing this communication.

I send you a map, marked Inclosure No. 3. You will find it useful
in considering the location of the various military forces connected with the revolution, to which I may refer in this and especially in subsequent communications.

I send you a written statement from F. Wundenburg (Inclosure No. 4), who says that his information is derived from being personally present in all the conferences of the committee of safety and that his utterances are based on his personal knowledge. He appears to be an intelligent man. He says that he acted with the committee in good faith until the American flag was hoisted, and then he ceased communication with them. He is at this time deputy clerk of the supreme court. I think in my next communication I may be able to give you information strongly corroborating all that Mr. Wundenburg has said.

I may say that the peaceful surroundings of the revolution are confirmed by all persons with whom I have communicated, and that Judge Cooper, who was and is an intense annexationist, let drop, in answer to a question of mine, that when the Government building was entered by the committee of safety and the proclamation dethroning the Queen and establishing the new Government was read by him there was not a soldier of the Provisional Government or of the Queen on the ground.

I send you, in original, a communication from Mr. William H. Cornwell, a member of the Queen's cabinet at the time of her dethronement (Inclosure No. 5).

I also send you, in original, a communication from Mr. John F. Colburn, a member of the Ex Queen's cabinet and a half-caste (Inclosure No. 6).

These are forwarded in advance of the testimony or voluntary statements in response to interrogatories by himself, because they present the views of these gentlemen as to the circumstances attending the revolution and which do not appear in any of the papers relating to the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands printed by the United States so far as I have been furnished with them.

It is my purpose to examine them in person so as to have an opportunity of thoroughly siting them.

I inclose you a copy of a communication from the committee of public safety—which conceived and executed the dethronement of the Queen—addressed to the American Minister (Inclosure No. 7). On page 12 of Executive Document No. 76, Fifty-second Congress, second session, this paper is simply referred to in the following language: "A copy of the call of the committee of public safety for aid is inclosed." It appears significant enough to have justified its being printed in full. To be imploring protection from the Government of the United States on the 16th and establishing the provisional government and dethroning the Queen without firing a gun on the next day—without any reference to the presence of United States troops—is quite a draft on my credulity.

This paper may have been overlooked, and hence my calling your attention to it.

I send you a pamphlet, entitled "Papers of the Hawaiian Historical Society No. 3" (Inclosure No. 8), on the subject of the evolution of the Hawaiian land tenures. To this I will add further information in relation to the tenure of lands in these islands. It appears from all information attainable that the great mass of the natives have at all times had but little interest in real property. This will throw some light on the little development attained by them, and how the real property

*Footnote omitted on account of length.
has, by virtue of the operation of these laws, resulted in the ownership
by large landed proprietors, mostly of foreign birth.

I see in the newspapers that the War Department is issuing in a
documentary form information of various sorts in relation to the
islands. In one of them it is stated that the natives generally speak
the English language. This is quite contradictory to my information
from intelligent persons here and my own observation. In Honolulu,
where the situation is most favorable to development, the groups of
children playing along the streets use their native tongue. The
natives of mature age whom you meet are generally unable to converse
with you in English or to understand what is said to them. They
learn in the schools the English text-books as an American child would
learn the Latin or Greek languages. This done, their capacity to think
or speak English seems very slight.

I am very much impressed with a belief that a large majority of the
people of these islands are opposed to annexation and that the proofs
being taken will verify this opinion.

I have not indicated any purposes of the United States on the sub-
ject of annexation in seeking to ascertain the sentiment of the people
towards existing authority. A response to this necessarily involves
the question of how the people feel towards annexation. The Provi-
sional Government being avowedly a part of a scheme towards annexa-
tion, and the opposition taking the form of opposing it, I have from
necessity been compelled to put my inquiries more or less in a form
answering to this division of sentiment. I have never claimed to mold
the disposition of the administration on that question nor indicated my
own.

The condition of the public mind is very peaceful. I think it
important to maintain this situation that a representative of the United
States should be here before my departure who will maintain the atti-
dude of noninterference in local affairs which I have observed. The
contrary course on the part of an American representative would imme-
diately produce much bitterness and discontent in one or the other
of the parties now dividing the people. I can see no advantage in
my remaining here longer than the month of May. I trust that you
will consent to my return at such time during the month of June as I
may choose. I prefer to write my report on my return to Washington
rather than while here. Interruptions on the part of people who are
constantly seeking my attention make this preferable.

It is difficult to get passage from here to the United States on account
of the great amount of travel, and arrangements must be made some
weeks in advance.

Please be kind enough to telegraph me in response to the subject of
my return.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 3.]

Power of attorney for Mr. Neumann.

To all persons and to the Government of the United States of America and to all
other Governments whatsoever: To all bodies corporate as well as bodies politic,
and more especially to the President and to the Secretary of the Department of State
of the United States of America, I, Liliuokalani, of the city of Honolulu, in the
Island of Oahu, one of the Hawaiian Islands, send greeting:
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

Whereas on the seventeenth day of January, A. D. 1803, at the city of Honolulu aforesaid, I did yield to the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands my authority as Sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands under protest;

And whereas by so doing I claim to be entitled by international law and in the high forum of conscience and equity to receive consideration and provision both for myself and family and for Kaulani, who was my legally appointed successor as such Sovereign;

And whereas it is my intention and desire by these presents to authorize, secure, accomplish, and finally complete and to ratify by such arrangements as may conduce to the greatest welfare and benefit of all the people of the Hawaiian Islands and also of myself and family and the said Kaulani;

And whereas I repose the fullest confidence in the ability, integrity, and fidelity of Paul Neumann, esq., of the city of Honolulu aforesaid, counsellor at law, and have entrusted him with full power and authority to act for me in the premises;

Now, therefore, know ye, that in consideration of the premises, I, Lilioukalani, aforesaid, have made, constituted, and appointed, and by these presents do hereby make, constitute, and appoint the aforesaid Paul Neumann, esq., my true, lawful, and sufficient attorney, for me and in my name, place, and stead, to negotiate, arrange, and agree with the United States of America and the President and the Secretary of the Department of State thereof, and with any other (if any) representative or official thereof having authority in the premises for such official, or the consideration, benefit, and advantage as in the opinion of my said attorney shall, may, or can be obtained from the United States of America as well for myself and family as for the said Kaulani, in consideration of existing conditions and circumstances. And if no official consideration for myself or said Kaulani shall in the opinion of my said attorney be attainable from the United States of America, then and thereupon, and in such case to arrange and agree upon such pecuniary considerations, benefits, and advantages as can or may be secured for myself and family, and for said Kaulani, from the United States of America, and whether the same shall be in the form of payment at some time of a sum of money to myself for or distinct sums of money to myself and said Kaulani, or in payment of stated sums of money annually, or oftener, for a fixed period or periods of time, and upon ascertaining that such pecuniary considerations, benefits, advantages, or payments of money from and on the part of the said United States can be secured to agree upon, receive, and accept the same, and in my name and behalf to make, execute, and deliver such agreements, releases, and acquittances of all my claims, demands, and pretensions whatsoever upon the throne of the Hawaiian Islands and upon the Government of the United States of America, as well as of the Hawaiian Islands and upon all persons having had anything to do with or having been or being in any way concerned in the said Provisional Government as shall be requisite to accomplish and secure such pecuniary considerations, benefits, advantages, and payments, or which shall be required therefor by the President or the Secretary of the Department of State aforesaid, or by any other (if any) representative or official of the United States authorized to act or agree in the premises, and all that my said attorney shall do or cause to be done in the premises I do hereby for myself and all my successors, heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns ratify and confirm, and further do hereby covenant with my said attorney, and successors, heirs, executors, administrators, and with the President of the United States of America and with any other person and persons representing the said United States of America in the premises, and with each of them, and with their respective successors both jointly and severally that all and whatsoever my said attorney shall in my behalf agree to do or cause to be done or agreed upon by virtue of these presents I will and my successors, heirs, executors, and administrators shall ratify and confirm, and that I will at any time thereafter execute, sign, seal, acknowledge, and deliver such other and further releases, acquittances, assurances and instruments in writing, as shall be in the opinion of my said attorney or in the opinion of the President of the United States of America or of any officer or representative thereof having the matter in charge be requisite and proper in order to carry out the full intent and meaning of these presents.

In witness whereof I have hereunto and also to two other instruments of the same date and time have set my hands and seals at the city of Honolulu aforesaid this day of

in the year A. D. 1893.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 3.]

Hawaiian Patriotic League to Mr. Blount.

We, the women of the Hawaiian Islands, for our families and the happiness of our homes, desire peace and political quiet, and we pray that man’s greed for power and spoils shall not be allowed to disturb the otherwise happy life of these islands, and
that the revolutionary agitations and disturbances inaugurated here since 1887, by a few foreigners, may be forever suppressed.

To that effect we believe that, in the light of recent events, the peace, welfare, and honor of both America and Hawaii will be better served, for the present, if the Government of the great American Republic does not countenance the illegal conduct and interference of its representatives here and the rash wish of a minority of foreigners for annexation.

Therefore, we respectfully but earnestly pray that Hawaii may be granted the preservation of its independent autonomy and the restoration of its legitimate native monarchy under our Queen Liliuokalani, in whom we have full confidence.

And we hope that the distinguished citizen, who so wisely presides over the United States, may kindly receive this our petition, for which we shall evermore pray for God's blessing on him and his Government.

MRS. JAMES CAMPBELL, President.
MRS. J. A. CUMMINS, Vice-President.
MRS. AL. FERNANDEZ, Treasurer.
MRS. C. K. STILLMAN, Secretary.
MRS. JOSEPH NAUAIH, MISS JUNIUS KAEE, MISS HATTIE HIRAM,
MRS. M. KAHAI, MISS HATTIE HIRAM,
MRS. LULIA AHOLE, MRS. L. KEKUWOLUI MAHFLONA,
MRS. W. H. ALDRICH, MRS. M. A. LEMON,

Executive Committee.

They were evidently persons of intelligence, and refined in their deportment. After reading the papers handed to me I responded that I would forward them to my Government as a matter of information, but that I could not enter into any discussion of the situation; that I would accept and transmit their papers, as I did all other facts, for purposes of information. To this they responded that they did not expect me to communicate anything to them as to my views or the disposition of the Government of the United States.

[Inclosure 4 in No. 3.]

A report from Mr. Wundenburg to Mr. Blount.

The committee of safety met at the office of W. O. Smith in Fort street, Honolulu, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon of Monday, the 16th day of January, 1893, for the purpose of discussing the necessary steps to be taken in forming a new government.

Shortly after the committee met it was decided that they were not ready for the landing of the American troops, and a committee of three, with Thurston as the chairman, was immediately dispatched to the American legation to prevail upon Mr. Stevens to delay the landing of the Boston's men. The committee returned shortly and reported that Mr. Stevens had said to them: "Gentlemen, the troops of the Boston land this afternoon at 5 o'clock, whether you are ready or not."

The foregoing report of Mr. Stevens's reply to the committee is as near literal as can be remembered, and gives a correct idea of the meaning conveyed. The committee of safety adjourned to meet the same evening, at 7:30 o'clock, at the house of Henry Waterhouse, in Nuuanu Valley. The American troops landed at 5 o'clock, as Mr. Stevens had told the committee they would, and marched up Fort street to Merchant, and along Merchant street, halting in King street, between the palace and Government building.

At the time the men landed the town was perfectly quiet, business hours were about over, and the people—men, women, and children—were in the streets, and nothing unusual was to be seen except the landing of a formidable armed force with Gatling guns, evidently fully prepared to remain on shore for an indefinite length of time, as the men were supplied with double cartridge belts filled with ammunition, also haversacks and canteens, and were attended by a hospital corps with stretchers and medical supplies. The curiosity of the people on the streets was aroused, and the youngsters more particularly, followed the troops to see what it was all about. Nobody seemed to know, so when the troops found quarters the populace dispersed, the most of them going to the band concert at the hotel, which was very fully attended, as it was a beautiful moonlight evening, all who were not in the secret still wondering at the military demonstration.

The committee met at Mr. Waterhouse's residence, according to adjournment,
at 7:30 o'clock p.m. of the same day, January 16. The formation of some sort of government was under discussion, and it was decided that a commander in chief of the forces supporting the proposed new government should be appointed. The position was offered to Mr. John H. Soper, who demurred, as he did not see any backing whatever to support the movement. Mr. Soper was answered by members of the committee that the American minister would support the movement with the troops of the Boston. Mr. Soper still doubted, so a couple of the committee escorted him over to the legation, which, by the way, was in the adjoining premises, and the three came back after a time, reporting that Mr. Stevens had given them the full assurance that any proclamation of the Government put forward at the Government building, or any other building in Honolulu for that matter, would receive his immediate recognition and the support of the Boston's men. This assurance seemed to satisfy Mr. Soper, and he accepted the position.

On Tuesday afternoon, January 17, the committee of thirteen, or committee of safety, proceeded from the office of W. O. Smith up Merchant street to the Government building and read the proclamation of a new government at 2:40 o'clock, there being practically no audience whatever. As the reading proceeded a dozen or so loungers gathered, and near the close of the ceremony about thirty supporters, variously armed, came running into the side and back entrances of the yard and gathered about the committee.

A few minutes later, the United States troops, in the temporary quarters in the rear of the Music Hall (less than 100 yards from where the committee stood) appeared to be under arms and were evidently prepared for any emergency.

During all the deliberations of the committee, and in fact throughout the whole proceedings connected with plans for the move up to the final issue, the basis of action was the general understanding that Minister Stevens would keep his promise to support the movement with the men from the Boston, and the statement is now advisedly made (with a full knowledge of the lack of arms, ammunition, and men, also the utter absence of organization at all adequate to the undertaking), that without the previous assurance of support from the American minister and the actual presence of the United States troops no movement would have been attempted, and if attempted, would have been a dismal failure resulting in the capture or death of the participants in a very short time.

(Among those present at the several meetings referred to in this statement, I hereby certify that the same is correct in every essential particular. F. WUNDENBURG.)

NOTE.—This person appears to be highly esteemed here. He was tendered the position of collector of customs recently by the Provisional Government and declined it. I send an extract from the Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser, showing its esteem of him.):

A PROJECTED APPOINTMENT.

It is stated that the council at its meeting yesterday recommended the appointment of F. W. Wundenberg as collector-general of customs. The appointment would be in all respects a worthy one. Mr. Wundenberg is thoroughly qualified by long business experience for the position. He is a man of great energy and character, and of unimpeachable integrity. If made collector he may be trusted to make no compromise with evil, but to light it to the bitter end.

Mr. Wundenberg was identified with the revolution from the 14th of January until the danger was over. He was placed in charge of the police station at a time when everything depended on reliable leadership, and if an uprising should occur he would follow the cause into the cannon's mouth to-day. As a recognition of valuable service at a critical moment his appointment would be peculiarly appropriate.

Mr. Wundenberg has an abundant crop of enemies. In this he does not differ from most men of positive traits. The fact will recommend him to all who desire to see a strong and fearless man collector-general.

[Inclosure 5 in No. 3.]

Mr. Cornell to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, April 24, 1893.

The following statement does not purport to be an exhaustive or full history or report of the resolution of the 17th day of January, but are simply plain facts relating to that political incident as they came within my personal knowledge and observation as a minister in Her Majesty's cabinet.

On the 14th of January Her Majesty prorogued the Legislature, with the usual ceremony pertaining to such occasion. It was noted that the foreign members of
the Legislature absented themselves as an expression of their disapproval and opposition to the cabinet, thereby indicating their threatening attitude against the Government and giving color to the rumors, which already, then, had reached us, that the Reform party was conspiring to take some steps to, if possible, recover their lost power. After prorogation Her Majesty informed the cabinet that she wished to see them at the palace, and we responded to her order at about 1:30 p. m. After our arrival the Queen stated to us that, at the request of some 8.000 of her native subjects, she had decided to promulgate a new constitution, in which the grievances of her petitioning subjects would be remedied, and she asked us to sign the document with her. We all declined to become a party to this move and refused to comply with her request, and we earnestly advised her to give up her intention, although we were well aware that more than two-thirds of the electors of the country were in favor of the change, and that nearly all the representatives in the Legislature were elected on a platform in which the main plank was a new constitution. However, after talking with her and explaining the impossibility of taking such a step, she admitted that we were in the right, although calling our attention to the precedent which the Reform party had created by the revolutionary constitution which was promulgated in 1887.

The Queen then told the people's delegates, who were assembled in the throne room, that she could not grant their request at this time, but asked them all to return home quietly and await in peace the time when a proper course could be adopted to carry out the will of the people. The people dispersed quietly, and in a short time there were no Hawaiians in the palace. The Queen then turned to us and spoke to us about the representative for Lahaina, to the effect that, while the people regretted the Queen's inability to grant the wishes of the people, they would accept the assurances of the Queen and await the proper time, which, if they were successful at the next election to be held, would be at the meeting of the Legislature in 1894. The insurgents have falsely reported the remarks of Mr. White, and in their press and otherwise represented him as making an incendiary and threatening speech. The falsehood of such statement, well known to us who were witnesses at the scene, will shortly be proven in the courts of justice, as Mr. White has retained counsel for the purpose of bringing a damage suit for malicious libel against the Pacific Commercial Advertiser, the principal organ of the reform party. Saturday evening and night were as peaceful and quiet as at any other time, but the conspirators were at work.

On Sunday morning, January 15, Mr. Thurston, the head of the revolutionary party, called on my colleagues, Ministers Colburn and Peterson, and asked them to join with himself and others in deposing the Queen, assuring them that such movement would be perfectly safe, as Minister Stevens had promised them the support of the United States forces and also that he would recognize and support a provisional government as soon as such a step could be taken. My colleagues naturally refused to entertain the infamous proposition of Mr. Thurston, and immediately communicated with myself and Minister Parker. The cabinet held several consultations with leading citizens of known loyalty to the Queen, and, knowing the strength of our forces, we felt confident that we easily could cope with any insurrection of the few malcontents.

On Monday, the 16th, we were informed that the conspirators had decided to establish a revolutionary government, giving as a reason that Her Majesty had attempted to violate the constitution, but the cabinet still felt sure that no such attempt could succeed if the insurgents depended on their own forces. The cabinet then advised the Queen to issue a proclamation to the people, in which she explained her reasons for desiring to promulgate a new constitution, and at the same time assured them that she would not make any further attempt or proposition to gain that object. This was done, and at 11 a. m. the proclamation was printed and distributed all over town. Assurances to a similar end were also sent to the foreign representatives and accepted as satisfactory. In the afternoon two mass meetings took place, one at the armory, where the actions so far taken by the so-called safety committee were indorsed, and one on Palace square, where the proclamation of the Queen was accepted and responded to in a resolution.

I will here state that of the large number of citizens who gathered at the armory meeting, perhaps not fifty understood or desired that any further steps should or could be taken. Of this I have been assured by a number of prominent citizens who were present on the occasion. It is understood that they were invited to the meeting simply for the purpose of giving a public expression that the community disapproved of the step which the Queen had desired to take, and who believed that the matter would be dropped right there. The issue of the Queen's proclamation was done after a consultation which the cabinet held Monday morning with the foreign representatives. We stated to the members of the corps diplomatique, who were present, what we intended to do, and were told that it was considered a wise step which they believed would be satisfactory. Present at the consultation were the representatives of England, France, Japan, and Portugal.
Minister Stevens declined to be present, which did not surprise us, knowing his sympathy for the revolutionists. At about 4 p.m. we were informed that the United States forces were landing.

Ministers Parker and Peterson immediately called upon Minister Stevens and gave him to understand that the Government was perfectly able to take care of the situation, and requested him to keep the troops on board. He refused, and proposed that he had landed the troops for the protection of American life and property and proposed to keep them ashore. The troops then marched up by the palace, passed as far out on King Street as the residence of Mr. J. B. Atherton, a distance of about 600 yards, and later returned and quartered for the night in the Arion Hall, a building opposite the Government building and the palace. It is noteworthy that the Arion Hall and all the buildings in the immediate vicinity are not American property, so if the troops were landed solely for the protection of American property, the placing of them so far away from the center of the property of Americans and so very close to the property of the Hawaiian Government was remarkable and very suggestive.

On Tuesday, the 17th, we were informed that the insurgents would proclaim a provisional government in the afternoon, and the cabinet called upon Minister Stevens, asking him if he would afford any assistance to the legal and lawful Government of the country to which he was accredited in case that such assistance should be required. He refused in unmistakable terms, and made us understand that he should acknowledge and support the revolutionary government as soon as it was established. We then proceeded to the station house, where we held a council of war. Our forces were enthusiastic, and volunteers enrolled so rapidly that it became necessary to close the doors of the station house. A little after 3 o'clock p.m. we were informed that a hundred of citizens had entered the Government building and that a proclamation had been read claiming that a provisional government had been established and that the Queen was deposed, and also that the United States forces, under command of Capt. Winslow, were marched up ready for action, with sharp loaded cannon and guns.

The Government had decided not to place forces in the Government building, as the immediate vicinity of the United States troops would endanger the lives of the men from the炮火 in case of a conflict with the rebels, and the Government desired, at all hazards, to avoid giving Minister Stevens any excuse or pretense for his hostile actions. After the information relating to the establishing of the Provisional Government had been received the cabinet wrote a letter from the station house to Minister Stevens and sent it to him by Mr. Charles Hopkins, a noble of the Legislature. The letter was a request to the American minister to inform the Queen's Government if he intended to recognize or support the lawful Government or the revolutionary government, which it was claimed was in existence. Mr. Stevens received the letter, and, through his daughter, informed Mr. Hopkins that he would answer it in due time. Mr. Hopkins demanded, cautiously but firmly, an immediate answer, and after considerable waiting a letter was handed to him addressed to His Excellency Samuel Parker, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which Mr. Stevens stated that he had informed the Provisional Government that they were in possession of the Government building and that the insurgents had landed troops to support the insurgents.

We realized then that any steps from our side to dislodge and arrest the rebels would unavoidably lead us into a conflict with the United States forces, and we decided to surrender to the Provisional Government with the full understanding that such surrender was under protest, the United States Government to decide if the action of their minister and the use of their forces to destroy a friendly Government was justifiable and according to American principles. The conference between the Provisional Government was carried on by Mr. S. M. Damon on their behalf and the cabinet on behalf of the Queen. Other stipulations were agreed upon, the Provisional Government showing itself ready to promise anything so long as a fight could be avoided, but all such stipulations and promises were totally ignored after the surrender was made. It was after 7 o'clock p.m. when finally the arms and ammunition of the Queen's Government were turned over to the Provisional Government, or about three hours after Minister Stevens had acknowledged that he had recognized the revolutionary government.

As a man who, for years, has taken an active part in Hawaiian politics, and as a practical sugar planter of many years' experience, it is not difficult for me to realize the true cause for the late revolution and for the subsequent desire for annexation. The depression in the sugar business, which, since the passage of the McKinley bill, has made havoc with the handsome dividends which we have enjoyed since 1875 and the loss of power by the reform party were the only and true reasons for the revolution. The prospects of the sugar bounty was and is the main motive for the desire to be annexed on the part of the handful of responsible men who still desire such step to be taken. That such plans were fully in accord with the policy of the late American Government, from which Mr. Stevens received his instructions, was the only reason why the scheme became feasible. The very idea of losing their independence as a nation is distasteful to the Hawaiians, and I say unhesitatingly,
although I am an American citizen, to a large contingent of the foreign residents here.

The Queen's attempt to give a new constitution is not the only reason which is given by the insurgents as an excuse for the revolution. The passage of the lottery bill and the opium license bill has also been used both by Mr. Stevens and the insurgents as extenuating circumstances. I opposed and voted against the lottery bill, although it was a measure of my party, because I do not believe in the principle of such a law. But the measure was favored and supported by nearly all the Americans in Honolulu, the very men who revolted and who now claim that the lottery was the cause of the revolution.

On the day of the prorogation of the Legislature Minister Stevens returned to town, after a visit to Hawaii, too late to be present at the ceremony of the prorogation, but he called at the Government building where he saw Minister Parker and myself. After having made his excuses for not attending the prorogation he asked if the Queen had signed the lottery bill. Answered in the affirmative, he became very excited, and striking the table with his clenched fist he exclaimed, over and over again: "Gentlemen, this is a direct attack on the United States Government." I told him that the Queen had signed the bill because the measure seemed to be the wish of the people, and that the petitions favoring the bill from Honolulu contained a large number of names of prominent and responsible men, and although I was personally opposed to the bill I did not consider it justifiable for the cabinet to advise the Queen to veto it.

The opium license act I consider a wise measure, and as an employer of a large number of men I claim that the regular sale of opium is of greater advantage to all classes than the prohibition of it, which no government can enforce owing to the facility for smuggling offered by the large territory of coast on the islands. The opium license law was passed not alone as a revenue measure, but for the purpose of checking the wholesale corruption which the smuggling of the drug carried with it, and was, if anything, a measure in favor of the morality of the country rather than a measure of corruption. The bill was supported by many of the leading men in the present Government and also by many planters, irrespective of political sentiments or party.

In concluding this statement I wish to call attention to the fact that Minister J. L. Stevens, in one of his official dispatches to Secretary Foster, now published, has expressed himself to the effect that I am entertaining feelings of hostility and enmity towards him. I am not aware of ever having given Mr. Stevens any reason for making such an assertion, which is utterly without foundation, and I only call the attention to the matter to avoid a possible impression that anything which I have here stated should be construed as biased or influenced by any private motives or the result of any alleged unfriendly relations with the American minister.

W. H. CORNWELL.

[Inclosure 6 in No. 3.]

Mr. Colburn to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, April 15, 1899.

Sir: As a member of Her Majesty Liliuokalani's cabinet that was deposed with her by a handful of citizens backed by the troops of the good ship Boston of the U. S. Navy, I called on you on the evening of Saturday, April 8, and paid my respects to you. You received me kindly, and during our conversation you asked me to prepare for you a statement of the facts connected with the Hawaiian revolution and all that was incident to it, and other important matters in re Hawaii, from my own knowledge and observation.

In response to your request I submit to you the following, trusting that it may be of value to you in summing up your conclusions in all that has happened, and the position of Queen Liliuokalani and the Hawaiian people.

In opening up my statement, I desire first to introduce myself thoroughly to you, so that you will recognize at once that I propose to take the responsibility of all that I write, and will produce to the extent of my ability, all such evidence as you may require, to corroborate what I write should you so desire it.

My name in full is John Francis Colburn. I was born on the 30th day of September, 1859; my father was an American and my mother a Hawaiian. My father died when I was but 2 years of age, and I, with my brother and sister, was brought up by my mother, who labored and toiled for our support with a sewing machine. I have received the whole of my education right here and have never traveled further than beyond San Francisco, Cal., when my presence was called there on business, and I made four different trips to that large city. At the age of 16 years I entered
into employment, receiving such from the firm of Lewers & Cooke, the latter being one of the commissioners of the Provisional Government who went to Washington to secure annexation. At the age of 20 years I was married, and have living to-day five children; for the last seven years I have conducted a large hay, grain, and feed business on my own account, and am still following that pursuit. I omitted to mention that I had a large number of relatives on my father's side residing in different parts of the United States, chief among them being the husband of my father's own sister, J. H. Gans, residing in Red Bud, Ill., a strong Democrat and an applicant to President Cleveland for the position of American minister to this country in place of J. L. Stevens. My great-grandfather, Thomas Colburn, was the first man killed at the battle of Bunker Hill in 1775, fighting as a patriotic American.

Lilinokalam was proclaimed Queen of the Hawaiian Islands January 29, 1891; her first cabinet had Mr. Samuel Parker as premier; he and his colleagues were voted out by a resolution of want of confidence, introduced by Mr. W. C. Wilder, one of the commissioners to Washington to seek annexation. After they were voted out the Queen appointed and commissioned a cabinet with E. C. Macfarlane as premier; they reported to the legislature and immediately upon sight L. A. Thurston moved an adjournment for two days. After adjournment, and when the members had taken their seats, W. O. Smith, the present attorney-general of the Provisional Government, introduced a resolution of want of confidence. After a long and heated discussion a vote was taken, and only twenty-four members responded to adopting the resolution; it was only lost to be re-executed again at another day. Time rolled on, and two weeks after another resolution of want of confidence was introduced against this same cabinet, but this time, through the intrigue of Thurston and his party, a vote was taken and read by a native member. A vote was taken and a sufficient number of votes were cast to oust them.

They retired and the Queen, appointed another cabinet, of which W. H. Cornwell was premier. This cabinet, as soon as it presented itself to the house, was voted out on sight; the reason of it was, that the intrigue was worked so well on some of the native members of the legislature by paying them bribes and a weekly support, that they agreed with Thurston and his faction to vote out any cabinet the Queen chose to send to the legislature, unless it be a certain four of their own party, they wanted to get in as the cabinet, and control the affairs of the country. The funds put up for this purpose was partly by S. M. Damon and C. Bolte, also by Mr. H. P. Baldwin, a large sugar plantation owner. When the Cornwell cabinet was voted out the Queen was puzzled as to what to do. She looked upon this reform party, who was doing all this work, as bringing about the defeat of the legislative; this reform party wanted to dictate to the Queen who the cabinet should be, and she, on the other hand, did not wish to recognize them to that extent, because the whole of the opposition, who had been voting cabinets out, were a mixture of three different political parties, and she was well informed that bribery was at the bottom of the whole affair.

She stood the Legislature off for a week or ten days; in the meantime she asked several well-to-do conservative business men to consult with her as to what course she should pursue, and considerable advice was given her to make the appointments of the persons whom the reform party was clamoring for, so as to bring about quiet and contentment in the business community, who was worked up to a certain pitch about the fact that the only work the Legislature was doing was to oust cabinets, and it was affecting business. The Queen paid heed to this advice given, and commissioned what was known as the Wiliwor or the missionary cabinet. They reported to the Legislature, and to show you that they were not a popular cabinet, twenty-five members were ready to vote them right out, and it was only through the influence of some of us that the resolution was not introduced then, so that this cabinet could have a fair trial. It stood in power two months when, on the 12th day of January, 1893, a resolution was introduced and they were voted out. The reform party or the missionaries, as they are better named and called, were disgruntled and dissatisfied and discouraged at this work, and openly said we will get even with you, meaning the Hawaiians. They knew this vote meant their losing their power and influence in this country for years to come, and they were hostile. However, the majority of the people were satisfied that they were voted out, and looked to the prospects of the Queen appointing a cabinet with at least two Hawaiians in it, so that the race prejudices which had been created for quite a while would wear away, and the Hawaiians and foreigners would work together; the Queen realized this matter as of great importance, and on Friday, January 13, 1893, she summoned and appointed the writer, minister of interior; Samuel Parker, minister of foreign affairs; W. H. Cornwell, minister of finance, and A. P. Peterson, attorney-general; the first two of us being the Hawaiian representation and the last two the foreign.

We repaired to the Legislature who was waiting for the Queen's new cabinet, and as this cabinet approached the Government building from the palace the former was thronged with people who were anxious to see the new cabinet and extend their
congratulations to us. That was a scene that has never before been witnessed upon
the appointment of former cabinets; however, we arrived at the Legislature and
amidst great cheering we took our seats. The House went through its work and
then adjourned. The next day was the time that had been previously set for pro-
longing the Legislature. At 10 o'clock of that day, January 14, 1883, Mr. Peterson
informed me that he had heard it rumored that it was the Queen's intention to pro-
mulgate a new constitution. I replied to him that she was making a mistake and I
would oppose her if she really intended to do it. I called out to Messrs. Parker and
Cornwell, and the four of us consulted over the matter. We all agreed that if the
Queen was determined upon doing this work, and pleasing only the native element,
we would oppose her. Mr. Parker went over at once to the palace to find out cor-
rectly if there was any truth to this rumor, but he was unable to see her, as she was
preparing herself to prorogue the Legislature. He returned and informed us that
she would not see him, and we decided to wait until the closing of Parliament.

In the meantime, however, I felt as though we should place ourselves in the right
light before the foreign element of the community, and to get their view on the
matter in case the Queen's intentions were really as rumored and she would make it
an issue with us. I left my colleagues at the Government building and repaired at
once with all haste to the office of A. S. Hartwell, an old and esteemed friend of
mine, and told him about the rumor we had heard, the consultation we had had, and
the position we would take if the Queen could not be guided by our advice, and
that was to resign. He asked me if he could ask Messrs. Thurston and Smith (the
Provisional Government commissioner at Washington and the present attorney-gen-
eral of the Provisional Government) to be together with him, and we would all con-
sult the matter over together. I consented and he summoned them. When they
arrived I went over what I had told Mr. Hartwell a short time previous and when
I had written them at that time, that I would resign, if the Queen would not agree
to consult with us on foreign policy and would then resign under any condi-
tions; if the Queen makes this an issue with you, we (meaning the foreign ele-
ment) will back you up and I feel sure Minister Stevens will." He further asked,
"are you alone in your stand?" and I replied, "no, I was positive Peterson took the
same view as I did." He spoke up again, "bring Peterson down here; we want to
talk to him."

I repaired at once to the Government building, told Peterson what I had done,
and asked him to come down to Hartwell's office with me. He consented, and we
both came down. Upon arriving there we held a consultation. Thurston submit-
ted in writing a plan for action in case the Queen was going to carry out her desire.
We took the document, which was written by Thurston himself, and told him we
would await developments. We then left them and went to the Government build-
ing. This was now approaching the noon hour. At 12 m., precisely, the Queen
arrived at the Government building and prorogued the Legislature. Immediately
after the Queen had left to return to the palace, Mr. Parker came up and said to us
that the diplomatic corps wanted to have an interview with us at once in the foreign
affairs office. We all consented and went directly upstairs to meet them. After
we were all seated, Mr. Wodehouse opened the conversation by asking us
if we knew that a known constitution was to be promulgated that afternoon by the
Queen? Mr. Parker replied that the cabinet were not aware of it, but they had
heard rumors of it; he asked again what position the cabinet would take if the
Queen did attempt to promulgate a new constitution, and Mr. Parker replied that
the cabinet would oppose it. The conversation then drifted into their inquiring as
to what reason could prompt the Queen to do anything like this, if the rumors
that they and ourselves had heard were true, and we answered that it must be from the
petition the natives had got up, signed, and presented to her. Mr. Wodehouse then
said the Queen must not promulgate a new constitution, and if she had any idea of
it she must abandon it. We assured him we would do all in our power to avoid
anything of this kind happening. During all this conversation Mr. J. L. Stevens,
who had kept perfectly quiet, not saying anything, spoke up now and asked if the
Queen had signed the lottery bill? Mr. Parker replied in the affirmative; he asked
again, did the cabinet advise the Queen to sign it? Mr. Peterson replied that the
Queen considered that the bill having passed the Legislature by a majority she
should sign it as she had no reason for vetoing it, and the cabinet acquiesced in her
action. Mr. Stevens instantly raised his cane and stamped it on the floor and said
the passing of the lottery bill and the signing of it by the Queen is a direct attack
upon the United States; and he picked up his hat and walked out of the room, but
before he was fairly out he spoke up and said, he wanted the cabinet to inform
him at once if the Queen was going to attempt what we had a little while before
discussed; we replied to him that we would, and we parted company.

The cabinet then went directly from the Government building to the palace where
there was in waiting the Queen, members of the legislature, members of several
political societies, and a large number of the public. Upon our arrival at the palace
we entered the blue room and met the Queen. After seating ourselves she said to us
that she had received a petition signed by nine thousand of her native subjects ask-
ing her for a new constitution, and she thought this was an opportune time to grant them their prayer and asked us to countersign her signature that she wanted to place on the document. Each one of us got up, one after the other, and told her that we could not accede to her wishes, and advised her to abandon the idea. She was very determined at first, and said she should promulgate it anyway. We reasoned with her and left her to think the matter over again, and at the same time take rest.

Messrs. Cornwall, Peterson, and myself left the palace and went to the Government building; we held a consultation and sent a message to each of the diplomatic corps; they all arrived and we entered into consultation again. The gentlemen of the diplomatic corps urged us very strongly to return to the palace and inform Her Majesty that she must abandon the idea at once. While this was going on at the Government building, Thurston and others who had heard of this matter were enrolling names down town with the avowed object of supporting the Cabinet in their positions and the stand they had taken. Thurston then came up to me and said to oppose the Queen's intention as the foreign element of the community did not want a new constitution, and we could receive support, all that we wanted, even if it was necessary to depose her. At 3 o'clock, of that day we left the Government building again, and started over to the palace as the Queen had just sent us a message she wanted to see us at once.

As we were hurrying over there, and just before I had got out of the gate at the entrance of the Government building yard, W. O. Smith, the present attorney-general, came rushing in in a hack very much excited, and said, "Colburn, don't be alarmed; buck the Queen all you can; the troops of the Boston will assist in supporting you in your stand; make all the haste you can. Mr. Stevens has sent an order to the captain of the Boston, and his men with their guns and ammunition are already in the guano of the ship ready to come ashore at once." I made no reply to him except telling him we were then on our way to the palace. He left me and I snuggled out to my colleagues, and told them what Smith had said to me. We arrived at the palace, and the Queen, who was waiting for us, asked us if we would read the new constitution she wanted to promulgate, and compare it with the one forced upon the late King Kalakaua by the Reform party in the revolution of 1887, and also the one promulgated by Kamehameha V in 1884. We replied that we would, sat down, and after comparing it we found some defects in it and pointed them out to her and advised her again to abandon the idea. After a little while she spoke up, and asked us if we were a unit in our advice, and we all replied yes. She then said she would pay heed to it and would inform her people who were still waiting, that she could not give them what they wanted, and to endure their grievances (this implied to the Constitution of 1887). She did so, and the people departed for their homes.

Mr. Peterson and myself went down town to the office of W. O. Smith, where there was a large gathering of the foreigners, and they asked me to speak to them. I did so and told them all that happened; some of them asked if we did not think the Queen would promulgate it at some other time, and I assured them we would never allow her to do it as long as the people who lived here were not a unit on such a subject. A little later about 4:30 p.m. of that day, Mr. Thurston came to me with a document written out by him and said, "Colburn, this is a request on Minister Stevens and Capt. Wilstee to load the troops from the Boston and render you support; you and Peterson and Cornwall must sign it and place it in my hands so that in case you are imprisoned by the Queen's orders that she can put this project of hers through, then this letter can be delivered." I replied to him that I did not think it was necessary, as I felt sure the Queen had abandoned the idea altogether; he insisted on my taking it, and I took it and handed it to Peterson, where it now is I do not know, but we never signed it, as there was no reason for it.

The next morning, Sunday, January 15, 1883 at 6 a.m., Thurston came to my house and asked me to go with him to Peterson's house. I asked him what he wanted with us at such an early hour, and his reply was, pressing business. I consented and accompanied him to Peterson's house. Upon our arriving there we entered the room, and when we were seated, the three of us, he said that he represented a committee of safety who had had a meeting at his house on Saturday evening and decided to send him to us with a proposition, and that was that we, Peterson and Colburn, should depose the Queen. We asked him who this committee of safety was, and he replied thirteen gentlemen picked out from all those that had enrolled to support the cabinet in opposing the Queen against her desires in re new constitution. We asked him to furnish their names and he did so. He then said, it is the desire of this committee you two should depose the Queen and declare a provisional government. Don't say a word about it to Parker and Cornwall, as Parker is a treacherous liar, and Cornwall is not fit for anything, and simply does what Parker tells him to do. He went on to say that it was their desire to get a division in the cabinet, and the deposeing of the Queen should appear to be done by a part of her own cabinet, or a portion of the Government itself; and he went on to say that he could inform us that
Mr. Stevens had given this committee the assurance that if we two signed a request to him to land the troops of the _Boston_ he would immediately comply with the request and have them landed to assist in carrying out this work; and further, that if we did not agree to the proposition that we could not receive aid and support from them in the future if we needed it. We told him that we would have to take the matter under advisement and would inform him as to our conclusions later on. He pressed for an answer then, but we refused to give it to him.

After his departure we went for Parker and Cornwall, and imparted to them what Thurston had proposed to us, and we entered into consultation. We decided to summon at least six responsible and conservative business men of the community to consult with us, and to get their views. We did so, and, at 1:30 p.m. of that Sunday, the following gentlemen met us: Messrs. F. A. Schaeffer, J. O. Carter, S. M. Damon, W. M. Giffard, S. C. Allen, and E. C. MacFarlane. We told them what Thurston, on behalf of the committee of thirteen, had proposed, and asked them for their views. Each one asked if the Queen had given up the idea of promulgating a new constitution altogether, and we replied in the affirmative. They said, in that case the Queen and cabinet should issue a proclamation, giving the community the assurance that this matter was at an end.

We asked them to dictate a proclamation and they did so; they one and all decided that we should inform this committee that we could not consider their proposition, and ask them to accept the assurances that were to be given in the proclamation. They also asked if the Government was in a position to suppress any uprising, and we told these gentlemen that the Government was ready and able to cope with any emergency that might happen, and to suppress any revolt. Mr. S. M. Damon spoke up and said the troops of the _Boston_ are going to be landed. Before proceeding further, I may say right here that Mr. Damon's remark seemed insignificant at the time, but as things turned out he was in with the revolutionists and knew perfectly well the attitude of Mr. Stevens, and when he made the remark at our meeting it signified a good deal; it meant that those forces were going to depose Queen Lilinokalani and place the situation of the country in the position that it is in to-day.

The next day (Monday) the proclamation dictated by these gentlemen was printed and posted and distributed all over town. Later on in the day two mass meetings were held, one by the native element and the other by the foreign element. At the former the natives accepted the proclamation, although it was directly contrary to what they wanted (a new constitution), and the latter denounced the Queen and left everything in the hands of the committee of safety spoken about. At 5 p.m. of that day the troops of the _Boston_ were landed. Immediately upon the information being conveyed to the cabinet that such was the case, Mr. Parker and myself drove with all haste to the residence of J. L. Stevens. When we arrived there, we asked him the reason the troops were being landed, and his reply was that he had received a request from a committee of safety, and he had consulted with Capt. Wilse. He went on to say that there were a number of women and old men in the town besides children that were alarmed with the rumors of a revolution, and he wanted to offer protection. Mr. Parker replied that the Government was in a position to offer everyone protection, was able to suppress any rebellion, and would offer protection to him (Stevens) and noted his protest. Mr. Stevens replied that he was informed that the Government was in a strong position to suppress any revolt, but he could not help the matter of landing, and as the troops were ashore they would stay ashore. I asked him if he intended to annex the country and he replied "No," and further said those troops are ashore to preserve the Queen on her throne, you gentlemen in your offices, and to offer protection to the community at large. We told him again we did not want the troops ashore, and we could preserve law and order ourselves. He replied by saying make your protest in writing, and if you make it in a friendly spirit I will answer in the same tone.

On Tuesday information was conveyed to us that the Queen was to be deposed, and a Provisional Government declared; we got everything in readiness to suppress the revolt expected; we had under arms 600 men with rifles, and 30,000 rounds of ammunition, 8 brass Austrian field cannon, and 2 Gatling guns. A little before 2 p.m. of that day the cabinet drove up to Mr. Stevens's residence to inquire of him as to the position he was going to take in this matter, as we were informed and suspected from all that Thurston and his followers had said that the American troops were going to assist these usurpers, who everyone knew would not attempt to bring about any such change as they were going to if they were not assured of support by the American forces. We arrived at Stevens's house and after talking quite awhile with him he gave us no definite answer and we left him and returned to the police station to make our headquarters there and to write to Mr. Stevens about his position. While the letter to Stevens was being dictated by Mr. Peterson, information was brought to us that about 30 unarmed men had taken possession of the Government Building, had read their proclamation, and had committed acts of treason.

We paid no attention to them but sent our letter with all haste at a few minutes before 3 p.m., by Mr. C. L. Hopkins to Mr. Stevens. After Stevens read the letter,
he told Hopkins to go away and come back again in an hour. Hopkins replied that the cabinet had instructed him to bring a reply forthwith, so that they would know how to act, and Stevens refused. He kept Hopkins waiting on his veranda one hour and then handed him a reply to us. While Stevens was keeping Hopkins waiting, the usurpers were preparing to resist the Government in case of attack, and we did nothing, but kept our men ready for action. The letter from Stevens carried by Hopkins to us reached us 5 minutes of 4 p.m., and after reading its contents, we concluded to surrender and yield to America.

I want to impress upon you that we never surrendered the palace, police station, and barracks till after we had received Stevens's letter, and not until we had filed our protest with the Provisional Government. The surrender was a little after 6 in the evening; these usurpers could never have overthrown the Government, as they did not have sufficient arms and ammunition; and on the other hand, it will be admitted by themselves, I think, that the munitions of war that we had would have annihilated them were it not for the United States troops and Minister Stevens.

I remain, etc.,

JOHN F. COLBURN.

[Inclosure 7 in No. 3.]

Citizens' committee of safety to Mr. Stevens.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, Honolulu, January 16, 1893.

SIR: We, the undersigned citizens and residents of Honolulu, respectfully represent that, in view of recent public events in this Kingdom, culminating in the revolutionary acts of Queen Liliuokalani on Saturday last, the public safety is menaced, and lives and property are in peril, and we appeal to you and the United States forces at your command for assistance.

The Queen, with the aid of armed force, and accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed from those with whom she was acting, attempted to proclaim a new constitution; and, while prevented for the time from accomplishing her object, declared publicly that she would only defer her action.

This conduct and action was upon an occasion and under circumstances which have created general alarm and terror.

We are unable to protect ourselves without aid and therefore pray for the protection of the United States forces.

HENRY E. COOPER,
F. W. MOORESVEN,
W. C. WILDER,
C. BOITE,
A. BROWN,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
HENRY WATERHOUSE,
THEO. F. LANSING,
ED. SUHR,
L. A. THURSTON,
JOHN EMMELETH,
WM. R. CASTLE,
J. A. MCCANDLESS,
Citizens' Committee of Safety.

No. 7.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 4.] HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, May 4, 1893.

SIR: Up to the period of the hauling down of the United States ensign from the Government building there had been inaction on the part of those opposed to annexation. Since then, inspired by that fact, the natives have seemed to act with freedom in expressing their views on the subject of annexation and of the revolution dethroning Liliuokalani. Annexationists and antiannexationists have been active
in procuring subscribers to declarations in favor of and against annexation.

I have abstained from any indication of my opinion or wishes concerning the question. When memorials and petitions have been presented, I have made it a rule to state substantially that I would accept the papers simply as a fact in the situation in the Islands, but could not enter into any expression of views thereon.

At this time the indications are unmistakable that a large majority of the people of the Islands are utterly opposed to annexation. I do not look for any change from this situation through future information. I shall be careful, however, to keep myself free to entertain any and all facts in relation thereto, that I may report with accuracy to you.

There is a strong disposition on the part of the annexation element to suppress expressions against annexation by social and business hostility.

I inclose you herewith a newspaper extract containing proceedings of the executive and advisory councils on the subject of the restoration of the monarchy (Inclosure No. 1).

The morning following, delegations from all the Islands were to assemble for the purpose of presenting resolutions to the United States Commissioner indicating their opinion on the present political situation. The reform party are in favor of annexation. The opponents of this party are generally in favor of the restoration of Liliuokalani, but a small minority are inclined to an independent Republic.

I send you a memorial presented to me by a committee of delegates of all the branch associations of the Hawaiian Patriotic League (Inclosure No. 2). It was presented by a committee composed of John Richardson, J. A. Akina, Ben. Nankana, J. R. Kaihiopulani, and S. H. K. Ne.

To this memorial I made response, taken down by our stenographer, Mr. Mills, in the language following:

I will accept it, as I have all memorials, as a matter of information. I can not enter into a discussion of it with you. I am glad to meet you, gentlemen.

It was this body which incited Mr. Emmeleuth to offer his resolution, I presume.

I have five petitions signed by natives in favor of annexation, but always coupled with a condition that the right to vote is to be preserved to them. This is the feeling of all the natives who have signed petitions for annexation. It is by assurances that the right of suffrage will be preserved to them that some are induced to sign the petitions. In the future all petitions presenting the views of the people will be fully reported.

I send you an interview with Mr. S. A. Damon, president of the advisory council (Inclosure No. 3); also one with Mr. Henry Waterhouse, a member of the advisory council (Inclosure No. 4); also a letter, in original, from Mr. J. O. Carter; also a copy of a letter from Lieut. Swinburne, and affidavits from Messrs. Charles L. Hopkins, I. F. Colburn, and A. B. Peterson.

These are sent simply as indicating something of the elements which brought about the dethronement of Liliuokalani. I will endeavor to dissipate all the mists connected with this subject before a great while. I think it will be shown that the American minister recognized the Provisional Government when the chief points of defense of the Queen, to wit: the station house and barracks, had not surrendered, and would not have surrendered but for that recognition. It is unquestionably the fact that Liliuokalani was induced to sign the protest already com-
municated to the State Department by Mr. Stevens and to surrender her forces by the belief that she could not successfully contest with the United States, which appeared to her mind to be a party in the impending conflict of arms. She was induced to believe that she would have a hearing on the merits of the interference by the American minister, and gave to it doubtless the fullest faith.

The mail leaves in two and a half hours from now, and this makes it necessary for me to avoid any attempt to elaborate on the condition of affairs at this time.

I am, etc.,

J. H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

Since closing the foregoing dispatch I have received an affidavit from Charles B. Wilson, which I send as Inclosure 10. I shall gather all the evidence on this subject which I can obtain from both sides touching the question as to whether the recognition came before or after the surrender of the forces of Lilinokalani. This Wilson is the man described in Minister Stevens's dispatches as the paramour of the Queen. Whatever there may be in these charges (concerning which I have little information), I am very much inclined to think his affidavit is substantially true.

J. H. B.

[Inclosure 10 in No. 4.]

HAWAIIAN DAILY STAR, MAY 1, 1893.—PROVISIONAL LEGISLATURE.

Mr. Emmeluth moved a resolution that agitation in favor of the restoration of the monarchy be declared as coming under the terms of the sedition act.

Mr. Waterhouse moved that the resolution pass. It was high time to take action when treason was being conducted under their noses. Here were natives coming from the other islands to agitate for restoration, and receiving encouragement from the Queen, who told them to have hope and courage.

Mr. Emmeluth held that as annexation was the object for which this Provisional Government was formed, it should be regarded as treason for anybody to discuss restoration or an independent republic. It would be only justice to the ignorant Hawaiians to give a clear expression of the Government on this matter. He related an instance of superstition among the natives. A Hawaiian neighbor of his died after four days' illness, and his widow asked the speaker what her late husband had done that the Government people should have done that to him?

Mr. Young was one who would go the farthest towards toleration, but he believed Mr. Emmeluth was right in the main. It was time they knew whether they were to have a government or not.

Minister Smith said the question had come before him in requests for advice from sheriffs. The Government should deal with the matter cautiously, as there was danger of going too far. Peaceful discussion of the situation he did not think came within the category of sedition. It was certainly lawful under the constitution.

Mr. Brown counseled going slow. Mr. Blount was sent here, it was understood, to ascertain the sentiment of the Hawaiian people, and nothing should be done to obstruct his investigation. Hawaiians loved their flag above everything else. They were like children. If they could retain their flag they would not think much about the loss of the monarchy. Were the monarch of the Kamalameha line it might be different. As it was he thought only a few in Honolulu were wanting restoration, and these because they believed in that event they should come on top.

Mr. Emmeluth was not for suppressing those who were misled, but those who were misleading the Hawaiians.

Mr. Damon thought if the Government was weak it ought to jump on any movement looking toward restoration. The freedom of speech and the freedom of the press was favorable to safety. The Government surely had sufficient standing by this time to be past the necessity for extreme measures.

Mr. Young withdrew his motion to pass, and the resolution was referred to the executive council.

The council went into executive session at 3:35.
Whereas His Excellency, Grover Cleveland, President of the United States of America, has honored the Hawaiian nation by sending to us the Hon. James H. Blount as a Special Commissioner to find out the true wishes of the Hawaiian people as to the proposed annexation of their country to their great friend the United States; therefore,

We, the people of the Hawaiian Islands, through the delegates of the branches of the Hawaiian Patriotic League of all the districts throughout the kingdom, in convention assembled, take this mode of submitting our appeal and expression of our unanimous wishes to the people of our great and good friend, the Republic of the United States of America, with whom we always entertained the most cordial relations, whom we have learned to look upon as our patrons and most reliable protectors, and whose honor, integrity, and sense of justice and equity we have ever confidently relied for investigation into the grievous wrongs that have been committed against us as a people, against the person of our sovereign, and the independence of our land.

And while we are anxious to promote the closest and most intimate political and commercial relations with the United States, we do not believe that the time has yet come for us to be deprived of our nationality and of our sovereignty by annexation to any foreign power.

And therefore we do hereby earnestly and sincerely pray that the great wrongs committed against us may be righted by the restoration of the independent autocracy and constitutional government of our Kingdom under our beloved Queen Liliuokalani, in whom we have the utmost confidence as a conscientious and popular ruler.

DELEGATES ISLAND OF HAWAII.

S. T. Pihonua.
Henry Weat.
K. M. Koahou.
D. Hoakimaa.
T. P. Kaeae.
J. H. Halawale.
S. H. K. Ne.
W. E. N. Kanealii.
G. G. Naepo.

ISLAND OF MAUI.

R. H. Makekau.
J. K. Kealoli'i.
D. Kana'a.
John Richardson.
Thomas Clark.
John Kalima.
J. Kamakele.
S. D. Kapera.
S. W. Kaai.

ISLAND OF MOLOKAI.

J. N. Uahini'i.
J. K. Kaipoeapolani.

Approved:

HONOLULU, March 2, 1893.

ISLAND OF MOLOKAI—Continued.

D. Himeni.
J. P. Kapaohaale.
Kekoo'wai.
S. K. Kuhalehulu.
S. K. Piliapo'o.

ISLAND OF OAHU.

F. S. Keike.
C. Keawe.
John Kapamawahoe Prendergast.
Enoch Johnson.
Sam K. Pua.
S. K. Kaupu.
D. W. Kelilokamoku.
S. W. Kaiheiha.
Benj. Naukana.
Kimo.

ISLAND OF KAUA'I.

Chas. Kahee.
Geo. W. Mahikoa.
J. A. Akiha.
D. N. Kama'ili'a'e.
Sam P. Kaleikini.
J. Molokui.

JOSEPH NAWAIHO,
President Patriotic League.
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 4.]

Interview between Mr. Damon and Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, April 29, 1893.

Mr. Blount. How long have you lived here?
Mr. Damon. I was born here in 1845. I have been away several times—perhaps to the extent of three or four years in that time.

Q. Where were you on the 11th of January, 1893, at the time the proclamation dethroning the Queen and establishing the Provisional Government was read?
A. I was at Honolulu. I was one of the members of that body who went up.

Q. The paper was read by Mr. Cooper?
A. By Judge Cooper.

Q. How many of you were there in that body which went up—about?
A. The whole body. There would be four of the executive and fourteen of the advisory.

Q. Please look at this paper and see if they are the persons (Senate Ex. Doc. No. 76, Fifty-second Congress, second session).
A. Thurston was not present, and I do not think Wilhelm was there.

Q. Where did you start from?
A. From W. O. Smith's office on Fort street.

Q. And what street did you take going from there?
A. We walked up directly to the Government house on Merchant street. It was suggested that a part should go by the way of Queen street, but a majority of us went by way of Merchant street.

Q. What was the idea for dividing the committee?
A. So that it should not attract so much attention, and it would be safer perhaps to have it divided than going in mass.

Q. Was it because it occurred to them that it might invite attack if they went in mass?
A. That was partly the idea—that it was more prudent. I think we, most of us, walked together—not compactly, but together.

Q. Any crowd following you?
A. No; the crowd was attracted to the corner of Fort and King streets, owing to the shot that was fired by Mr. Good at a policeman. In fact, the crowd cleared from the Government house and was attracted there. From all directions they centered at the corner of Hall's store.

Q. You found, then, scarcely anyone at the Government house when the committee arrived?
A. Scarcely anyone there except porters. After Mr. Cooper began to read the proclamation—then different ones came out of the offices—clerks and officials—while the proclamation was being read.

Q. Some of the Provisional Government troops, or rather troops raised at the direction of the Committee of Safety, came on the ground before the reading of the proclamation was finished?
A. When we arrived there was but one man with a rifle on the premises, Mr. Oscar White; but some little time later they commenced to come in from the armory, troops that were under the supervision of Col. Soper.

Q. Was that before or during the reading of the proclamation?
A. During the reading. Toward the end of it.

Q. How many troops came in? Do you have any knowledge of the number you had enlisted?
A. There were enough came in to make us feel more decidedly at ease than before they arrived.

Q. You could not say how many there were?
A. No; they kept coming in right along. They got to be quite a body.

Q. After the reading of the proclamation the late ministers were sent for?
A. After the reading of the proclamation we adjourned to the office of the Minister of Interior, and then we commenced to formulate our plans and get ourselves into working order. Mr. Dole was at the head. While we were there in consultation Mr. Cornwall and Mr. Parker came up there from the Station House and held a conference with us.

Q. What was the purport of that conference?
A. The result of that conference was that Mr. Bolte and myself were requested to return with Mr. Cornwall and Mr. Parker to the Station House and recommend and urge upon the parties in power at the Police Station to surrender to the Provisional Government. We had a conference with the ministers in the room occupied generally by the deputy marshal. There were present Messrs. Peterson, Colburn, Parker, Cornwall, Bolte, and later Mr. Neumann, who was asked to come in. After consultation of the matter of their yielding up their power to the Provisional Government they asked to be let alone for a few moments, and I went into one of the rear cells in
the corridor with Marshal Wilson and urged him very strongly to give up any hope or any thought of making any attack, or resistance, more properly.

Q. What reason did you give him?
A. I can not remember at the present moment giving him a reason, but I remember distinctly saying to him: "Now, if you will cooperate with us, if in future I can be of service to you I will do so.

Q. Was there any suggestion of sympathy on the part of the United States Minister in your movement?
A. While I was in the Station House a man by the name of Bowler said to me: "We are all prepared, but I will never fight against the American flag."

Q. Was there anything in the conversation between you and him in which any intimation direct or indirect that the United States Minister was in sympathy with you or the United States troops and officers?
A. I can not remember any definite thing, but from Mr. Bowler's remark they must have thought that the United States troops were here for some purpose.

Q. Was Mr. Bowler with the Queen's party?
A. He was. He was part of the force in the Station House.

Q. Did you say anything at all indicating an opinion that there was any sympathy on the part of Mr. Stevens or Capt. Wiltse with the movement for the new government?
A. I can not remember. I may possibly have said so.

Q. Did you think so at that time?
A. I may have had an impression, but I know nothing about it.

Q. What was your impression?
A. My impression was, seeing the troops landed here in this time of excitement and turmoil, that—well, I suppose I might say that they could not stand it any longer—the Americans could not stand it any longer.

Q. Your impression, then, was that the American Minister and Captain Wiltse and the troops were in sympathy with the movement of the white residents here in the pending controversy between them and the Queen?
A. While we were in the Government building and during the reading of the proclamation and while we were all extremely nervous as to our personal safety, I asked one of the men with me there: "Will not the American troops support us?" Finally I asked one of the men to go over and ask Lieut. Swinburne if he was not going to send someone over to protect us? The man returned and said to me, "Capt. Wiltse's orders are 'I remain passive.'" That is all I know of what passed between us.

Q. You speak of your impression. That relates to a particular conversation between two or three persons; but what was your impression as to the matter of whether or not the American Minister and the American naval officers were in sympathy with the movement?
A. I was perfectly nonplussed by not receiving any support. I could not imagine why we were there without being supported by American troops, prior to the troops coming from the armory. We were not supported in any way.

Q. You had not been in council with the Committee of Public Safety up to that time?
A. No.

Q. Well, the troops were—how far off from the reading of the proclamation?
A. They were over in that yard known as Gilson yard in the rear of the music hall. They were quartered there.

Q. Any artillery?
A. I think they had a small gun—Gatling gun and howitzer.

Q. Where were they pointed—in what direction?
A. I can not tell you.

Q. You were surprised that they did not come into the grounds while the proclamation was being read. Is that what you mean by not supporting you?
A. I had no definite information what the movement was, as I told you before in a private interview, but knowing that they were on shore I supposed that they would support us, and when they did not support us, and we were there for fifteen or twenty minutes I was perfectly astonished that we were in that position without any support.

Q. How far would you say, in yards, it was from where the proclamation was being read to where the nearest troops were?
A. I think about 75 yards.

Q. Was there a piece of artillery in the street between the building the troops were stationed in and the Government building?
A. The only piece of firearms of any kind in that street was Oscar White's rifle.

Q. Did you have occasion to look there to see?
A. We stopped before turning into the side gate to converse with Oscar White, before proceeding into the Government building.
Q. Are you sure there was not a piece of artillery in that street before the reading of the proclamation?
A. I can not tell you; but the only gun I could see was Oscar White's. I remarked: "Oscar, this is not so very prudent for you to be here with only one rifle in this street."

Q. Where did you see the troops first?
A. I came up from Monolalu by a back street and turned into Nuuanu street, one house above Mr. Stevens', and as I turned the corner I saw the American troops marching up towards Mr. Stevens' house, and directly in front of his house.

Q. Did you meet Mr. Henry Waterhouse?
A. I met him there at that time.

Q. What conversation passed between you?
A. I think I said: "Henry, what does all this mean?" If I remember rightly now, he said: "It is all up."

Q. And what did you understand by the expression, "It is all up."
A. I understand from that that the American troops had taken possession of the island. That was my impression.

Q. And was that favorable to the Queen or favorable to the other side, as you understood it?
A. That was distinctly favorable to the foreign element here.

Q. You mean the movement for a Provisional Government?
A. Yes.

Q. Did you see Mr. Stevens that day?
A. No; I did not see him that day.

Q. What is Mr. Waterhouse doing now?
A. He is a member of the council.

Q. Was he a member of the Committee of Public Safety?
A. If I remember right, he was.

Q. Is that his signature [exhibiting letter of Committee of Public Safety to Mr. Stevens]?
The letter is as follows:

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, Honolulu, January 16, 1893.

Sir: We, the undersigned, citizens and residents of Honolulu, respectfully represent that in view of recent public events in this Kingdom, culminating in the revolutionary acts of Queen Lilinokalani on Saturday last, the public safety is menaced, and lives and property are in peril, and we appeal to you and to the United States forces at your command for assistance.

The Queen, with the aid of armed force and accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed from those with whom she was acting, attempted to proclaim a new constitution, and while prevented for the time from accomplishing her object, declared publicly that she would only defer her action.

This conduct and action was upon an occasion and under circumstances which have created general alarm and terror.

We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore pray for the protection of the United States forces.

HENRY E. COOPER,
F. W. MCCHESSNEY,
W. C. WILDER,
C. BOLTE,
A. BROWN,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
HENRY WATERHOUSE,
THEO. F. LANSING,
ED. SCHR.
L. A. THURSTON,
JOHN EMMELUTH,
WM. R. CASTLE,
J. A. MCCANDLESS,
Citizens' Committee of Safety.

His Excellency, John L. Stephens,
American Minister Resident,

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Did he seem then pleased or alarmed?
A. He was very much strained and excited. There was no pleasure in it, but still there was a feeling of security. That was it. He evinced a feeling of security. He was not saying: "It is all up."

Q. It was not a joking time. Well, you say there was nothing in the first visit of yours to the Station House to indicate any impression on your part that you
believed the United States Minister or the United States troops, or both, were in sympathy with the movement of the committee of safety!

A. I was nonplussed. I did suppose they were going to support us.
Q. You did not say anything to the people in the Station House to lead them to suppose you were hopeful of aid?
A. I can not remember saying it now; I might have done so.
Q. Did you say it at any place?
A. I do not remember; I may have said it.
Q. Was there an effort on the part of those who were moving for a change of government to make that impression?
A. I think there was.
Q. Was that impression among the whites generally.
A. That I can not say. I know there was that impression. Some of the members tried to convey that impression.
Q. On what occasion?
A. Many occasions. One particular occasion was while we were in the Government building the day the proclamation was read.
Q. What was said, and who said it?
A. Charles Carter said to me: "After you are in possession of the Government building the troops will support you." I think that was his remark.
Q. Was he on the committee of public safety?
A. I think so.
Q. Was he in the party that went up to read the proclamation?
A. He was present there during the time it was read. Whether he went up with us or not I do not remember.
Q. It was during that time he made that remark?
A. Yes.
Q. Was he an active promoter of the movement?
A. I think he was.
Q. Has he any connection with the Government to-day?
A. No, except he is one of the Commissioners in Washington.
Q. You have been in previous revolutions here?
A. I have been in the Wilcox revolution. I took quite a prominent part in its suppression. I was one of the ministers at the time.
Q. You had a conversation with Mr. Carter about the time the proclamation was being read?
A. Yes.
Q. You were somewhat anxious as to whether or not you would be supported by United States troops?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you express any fear in the presence of Mr. Carter?
A. Well, no man likes to tell he was afraid.
Q. I do not mean in a cowardly sense.
A. Well, with others, I was convinced that we were in a position of danger.
Q. What did Mr. Carter say?
A. He gave me to understand that we would be protected.
Q. By United States troops?
A. Yes; and when we were not protected by them I wanted to know the reason why.
Q. Do you mean by that that you expected them to march over?
A. I was under the impression that they would.
Q. What did you accomplish by that first visit to the Station House—any agreement?
A. We accomplished this—that it was a virtual giving up.
Q. What was said? What did the ministers say?
A. This is my impression of it to-day: That if they had only to contend with the Provisional Government and the forces of the Provisional Government that they would not give up. That was the impression that I gathered from them; that they felt themselves equal to the occasion so far as the Provisional Government went.
Q. Then having that sort of feeling, what did they propose to do?
A. They proposed to immediately deliver up. Then they went up, four of them, and had a parley with Mr. Dole and the Provisional Government. They agreed to desist, but said they must go to the Queen and get her to confer with them.
Q. So far as they were concerned they were willing to yield, provided the Queen was?
A. Yes. Then I went along with them to the palace. We all met in the Blue Room. There were present the Queen, two young princes, the four ministers, Judge Widdeman, Paul Neumann, J. O. Carter, E. C. McFarland and myself. We went over between 4 and 5 and remained until 6 discussing the situation.
Q. In that conversation you asked for a surrender of the forces, and the ministers advised it?
A. The different ones spoke and they all recommended it. Each one spoke. At
first, Judge Widdeman was opposed to it, but he finally changed his mind on the advice of Mr. Neumann. Mr. Neumann advised yielding. Each one advised it.

Q. Was this advice of Neumann and the cabinet based on the idea that the Queen would have to contend with the United States forces as well as the forces of the Provisional Government?
A. It was the Queen's idea that she could surrender pending a settlement at Washington, and it was on that condition that she gave up. If I remember right I spoke to her also. I said she could surrender or abdicate under protest.

Q. And that the protest would be considered at a later period at Washington?
A. At a later period.

Q. Did the cabinet in recommending her to yield to the Provisional Government give her to understand that they supposed that the American minister and the United States troops were in sympathy with the Provisional Government or with the Committee of Public Safety?
A. I know it was the Queen's idea that Mr. Stevens was in sympathy with this movement.

Q. But I am asking now as to what reasons the ministers gave for her acquiescence.
A. It was their idea that it was useless to carry on—that it would be provocative of bloodshed and trouble if she persisted in this matter longer; that it was wiser for her to abdicate under protest and have a hearing at a later time. That the forces against her were too strong.

Q. Did they indicate the United States forces at all in any way?
A. I do not remember their doing so.

Q. Do you know whether or not at that time they were under the impression that the United States forces were in sympathy with the revolution?
A. Beyond an impression I know nothing definite.

Q. What was the result of this conference with the Queen? What was agreed on?
A. She signed a document surrendering her rights to the Provisional Government under protest.

Q. Is this the protest on page 22, Ex. Doc. No. 76, 52d Cong., 2d Sess?
A. Yes. This was written out by Mr. Neumann and J. O. Carter while we were present. She was reluctant to agree to this, but was advised that the whole subject would come up for final consideration at Washington.

Q. Did you at the time consent to recommend this proposition or not?
A. I was there as a member of the Provisional Government, but I did not advise as to the wording of it. I did tell her that she would have a perfect right to be heard at a later period.

Q. By the United States Government?
A. Yes.

Q. You, yourself, at that time, before consulting with your colleagues, were favorably impressed with that settlement?
A. Well, it was the only settlement that could be brought about. Personally I was satisfied with it.

Q. And you took that back to the Provisional Government?
A. Yes.

Q. And they rejected it?
A. It was received and endorsed by Mr. Dole.

Q. Now, was there any message sent to the Queen after that?
A. No.

Q. No message declaring that they would not accept it?
A. No.

Q. The surrender was then made on that proposition?
A. Yes; well, then she sent down word through Mr. Peterson to Mr. Wilson to deliver up the Station House. That wound up the whole affair. We immediately took possession of it. It was not delivered up until after this conference.

Q. How long after that was it before the Provisional Government was recognized?
A. Mr. Stevens sent Cadet Pringle, his aid, and Capt. Wiltse sent one of his officers to personally examine the building and report if the Provisional Government was in actual possession of the Government building. That was done that afternoon.

Q. What time?
A. Between 4 and 5.

Q. What time was the interview with the Queen?
A. After 4, and ended at 6.

Q. You took reply?
A. Mr. Neumann took the reply to Mr. Dole.

Q. Now, when this interview was going on between you, the cabinet ministers, and the Queen, it was known then that the Government had been recognized?
A. That the Queen knew it? I do not think she was told. I do not remember of it being spoken of.
Q. Didn't you know it?
A. I think I knew it.
Q. Didn't these ministers know it then?
A. They may have been present. I can not say. The Provisional Government were all present when Mr. Stevens recognized it as the de facto government.
Q. What I mean is this: Before you took the message of the Queen back—this protest—the Provisional Government had been recognized?
A. Yes; that is my impression.
Q. Had that been done at the time you left the Government house to go with the cabinet ministers to talk with the Queen?
A. If my memory serves me right, it had.
Q. Did not the cabinet officers know of it at this time?
A. I can not say.
Q. What do you know about the contents of the constitution she wanted to proclaim?
A. It is too long to write down. I can tell you my connection with it.
Q. Have you seen it?
A. No.
Q. What is the aspiration of the native mind as to the form of government?
A. I think that their ambition is to obtain the power through the vote. They have tasted what it is to hold the control by the vote, and they are very tenacious of that right. They are to a certain extent enslaved in that idea; but the trouble comes in that they have not used that power wisely, and it is the fact of the Polynesians combining in their votes to retain the power—and forgetting the intelligent power of the Anglo-Saxons, even when in a minority—that has caused the trouble. The real break in the Hawaiian system of government commenced at the time of Kamehameha V, when he took away their old constitution and gave them a constitution of his own making. That started revolutions in this country. There is the starting point where the roads diverged which has brought about the succession of unrest in different governments from that day to this. Now, the Hawaiians from that date, or within close proximity to it, commenced to feel what it was to have the vote, and what influence they could exert, and naturally the Hawaiian, as the weaker race, have attempted in every succeeding Legislature to work together, but there has always been a disintegration in every Legislature. They could not hold themselves together compactly as a body. Whenever they have had the opportunity to exercise this power it has not been at the level of the intelligent Anglo-Saxon idea of making laws or carrying out a system of government. It has chafed the Anglo-Saxon. He would not tolerate it. He has found that he could control it indirectly, if he could not directly, by his superior education and intelligence. The Hawaiians had grown to a feeling of independence, and in company with the Queen they wanted to throw off that Anglo-Saxon domination which has been with them and controlled them all these years. When it came to that point that they felt that they could do it, then the clash came. Of course there are other reasons which brought it about. But it is the clashing of two nationalities for supremacy.
Q. That was the great underlying cause! The financial questions were incidental questions?
A. That was the underlying cause—the Hawaiian thinking, because he had a majority of votes, that it gave him power. He didn't recognize that the intelligence and strong will of the Anglo-Saxon would beat him every time.
Q. The Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1891 states that in the general election for 1890 the total vote for nobles throughout the islands was 3,187, and that the total vote for representatives was 11,671. That is about correct?
A. I should judge so—that is a very correct source of information.
Q. That would make 8,484 more for representatives than for nobles?
A. Yes.
Q. Does that difference grow out of the fact that there is no moneyed qualification to vote for representatives, but for nobles there is required a property qualification of $3,000 (unincumbered) or an income of $600?
A. Unquestionably. That disparity of numbers, if it had been carried to a fine point, would have been very much larger, but there was and is a laxity in the admittance of many people to vote for nobles.
Q. Now, that 3,187 votes for nobles was generally a white vote, was it not?
A. There was a good many Hawaiians in that vote for nobles.
Q. What proportion would you say as between whites and natives?
A. I think those statistics could be got for you. It would not be wise for me to say. I should think about 25 per cent.
Q. Native vote?
A. Yes.
Q. The balance was a white vote?
A. Yes.
Q. It was in the power, then, of the whites united to elect the body of nobles, was it not?
A. The whites as a rule used all their influence to control the noble vote.
Q. Why did the whites use all their influence to control the noble vote?
A. Because it was their only hope of controlling or influencing legislation.
Q. How many nobles and how many representatives were there under the constitution?
A. Equal—about 21 each.
Q. If the whites could get the 21 votes of the nobles, then they had an absolute bar to any action by the representatives or the King?
A. That was the intention.
Q. If they got two or three representatives they had control of legislation so far as that legislative body was concerned?
A. If it had been carried out to its logical conclusion it would have been so, but as the result proved, they were not able to entirely control the noble vote.
Q. Now, if they had been able to entirely control the noble vote, and to get some of the representatives, they could have determined the question of the cabinet?
A. Yes.
Q. They could have removed any cabinet that did not suit them?
A. Yes; provided all the whites had banded together.
Q. I suppose sometimes the whites didn’t keep banded together—and the natives in all things?
A. Yes.
Q. You had within yourselves those sources of power?
A. Yes.
Q. That was the principal cause of agitation for many years in elections?
A. Yes. Where the Hawaiian felt that his cause was weak, and it was to that point that, so far as they were able, they were striving so as to maintain the control.
Q. Now, Mr. Damon, do you think that you could have good government here on the basis of an educational qualification for voters, so as to allow everybody who could read and write to vote?
A. Yes; provided there was some strong power, as one might say it—as in an unruly school—to preserve order.
Q. Do you think that you could maintain a state government like the states of the American Union with that sort of suffrage?
A. My personal opinion is that we could grow up into that by a period of trial, until the voter appreciated what a vote really meant.
Q. How long do you think that would take to get the native population up to the high standard of the whites on that question? Can you see any time definitely or clearly?
A. I am of this opinion—that they have had so much given to them in this country—everything has been so free to them, that they have not appreciated the advantages that they have; but when they get to be deprived of the franchise for a period of, say, five years, until they have wrestled for it and waited for it, that when it is given to them eventually they will appreciate it.
Q. Do you think that in five years after annexation you could give to every native who could read and write the right to vote?
A. Yes; provided the franchise was extended to other nationalities here.
Q. What other nationalities here?
A. There is a growing Portuguese element here. There is a growing intelligent Japanese element here of the better classes, and those Chinese who are born in the country and have interests here,
Q. What sort of interests?
A. Either commercial, agricultural, or professional.
Q. You make the same qualification as to votes for all of them?
A. Yes.
Q. Suppose the Chinese were not allowed to vote—then what?
A. They have not the same desire except in isolated cases for voting that the Hawaiians, Portuguese, and Japanese have. They have not been accustomed to it.
Q. Do you allow any Japanese to vote here now?
A. No; not at present.
Q. I mean before the revolution?
A. No.
Q. Any Chinese allowed to vote?
A. No.
Q. Is there anything you desire to say Mr. Damon other than what you have said?
A. I would say that I was born here, brought up here, and have a sincere regard for the Hawaiian people, because they have many good traits. They have shown a desire, especially the generation which is now and that which is coming on, to put themselves forward if they knew how, and though they may be a diminishing race
they are a hopeful race that have not given up the struggle to keep up the Hawaiian name. If we are going to educate them it is just so much thrown away unless they can have some hope held before them that they will be recognized as men in future, and if there is anything I could do to assist them, especially the young and upright Hawaiians, I would like to do it, because they have invariably treated me—whether sovereign, chief, or common Hawaiian—with such invariable kindness that I should be lacking in manhood if I did not want to help them up if possible.

Q. As to integrity in business matters, how do they compare with people in their condition in life generally?
A. I think the mistake has been made that you take a Hawaiian and compare him with the Anglo-Saxon standard and expect him to be up even with him when he has not had time and opportunity to fit himself for that standard. You should compare the Hawaiian with what he is to-day and what he was fifty years ago.

Q. It is better to compare him with some race that exists to-day.
A. He does lack what is called backbone to carry out to a finish any project that he has.

Q. Business or otherwise?
A. Yes.
Q. But would you say that generally he was an honest man?
A. I should say so; yes.
Q. Is there any fear of violence to the persons of women on the part of the natives?
A. I think he is in advance of what is called the ordinary white man in that respect.
Q. That is a striking feature in his make up, and that is always appreciated by the best elements here?
A. Yes; and why it is so is that it is only a few years since he looked to the white man as a superior race, and he at heart feels that they are a superior race to-day.

Q. Now is that entirely correct?
A. A more powerful race, perhaps.
Q. Well now, as to another point let me ask you: Wilson lived in the bungalow with his wife and children?
A. His son is in California. He has no other child.
Q. He lived with his wife then?
A. Yes. I have heard that he had a strong influence over the Queen for many years, because Dominis, her husband, was a weak man. Wilson is a strong-willed, powerful man, and she has looked to him as a protector.
Q. He was in command of the police forces?
A. Yes; at the time, and ever since she was Queen.
Q. The Palace gates have been guarded?
A. Always.
Q. Who commanded the guards?
A. Nowlein and Wilson commanded the police force. Both were intimate friends of the Queen.
Q. He lived in the Palace?
A. He lived in the bungalow—report said so. He has his own dwelling about a mile from here.
Q. You do not understand that he and his family lived in the Palace proper, with the Queen?
A. No; they had a house in the yard.
Q. If the question of annexation was submitted to the people of these islands, with no property qualification, but only the qualification that the elector should read and write, and conducted on what is sometimes termed the Australian-ballot law, what do you think would be the result of a free expression of the people in the matter of annexation at this time?
A. The sentiment is a growing sentiment, but at this time I think a majority would not vote in favor of it, but, given time to realize it, they would.
Q. How much time do you think would be necessary to bring about such a condition of things in these islands?
A. I think if the Provisional Government is kept in very long they will home it very quick. They do not like the Provisional Government, for the reason that it is a government that has not been placed there by their votes. I am quite sure I have given you a correct answer.
Q. At the time of the dethronement of the Queen was it known in the other islands?
A. No.
Q. They knew nothing of it until after it was accomplished?
A. They did not.
Q. Then it was accomplished by the Honolulu movement?
A. Yes.
Q. What is your condition here as to the matter of acquiescence of the natives with existing authority—their observing order?
A. If they had a real, able leader, in whom they had perfect confidence, he could collect quite a force to follow him.
Q. To attack the existing Government?
A. Yes.
Q. You do not apprehend any such movement?
A. No, unless that in a period of excitement it should spring up; and, therefore, I have advised a strong force being retained, because we did not know but in some moment of excitement somebody would take advantage of it and make trouble.
Q. What number of troops have you under pay?
A. One hundred and seventy in all.
Q. The artillery is hardly to be spoken of—but one company?
Q. How many pieces?
A. They have some eight or ten pieces, but, from motives of prudence, they have locked up the intricate parts in vaults.
Q. So far as you know, the natives have no artillery?
A. No.
Q. No arms?
A. No great quantity. They have scattered rifles and pistols.
Q. Do they amount to anything in case of contest?
A. We have no means of telling at this time.

TUESDAY, May 2, 1893.

Q. Mr. Damon, at the time of the writing of the protest of the Queen on the 17th day of January, 1893, signed by herself and Ministers, had the Provisional Government been recognized by the American Minister, Mr. Stevens?
A. It is my impression that it had been, but I cannot say positively.
Q. Would the conversation you had with the Queen on that day aid you in determining that fact?
A. I do not think it would.
Q. In referring to Mrs. Wilson living with the Queen, in a previous part of this statement, did you mean to say that she stayed with her at night?
A. I meant to say that she was with the Queen a great deal of the time—both day and night.
Q. As a companion?
A. Yes; as a personal friend and companion.
Q. But where do you suppose she slept—at the bungalow or palace?
A. My impression is that her quarters were with her husband in the bungalow.
I have carefully read through the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of the two interviews between Mr. Blount and myself.

S. M. DAMON.

[Inclosure 4 in No. 4.]

Interview between Mr. Waterhouse and Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, May 2, 1893.

Mr. BLOUNT. How long have you lived in Honolulu?
A. I came here in 1851.
Q. Born where?
A. In Tasmania.
Q. What nationality were your ancestors?
A. My father and mother were from the old country—from England.
Q. How old were you when you came here?
A. Six years old.
Q. You have lived here ever since?
A. Yes.
Q. In this city?
A. Yes, in Honolulu.
Q. Where were you on January 14, 15, 16, and 17, 1893?
A. I was in Honolulu.
Q. What was the cause of the revolution that resulted in the dethronement of Liliuokalani?
A. It started from the lottery bill and the opium bill and the bribery and corruption we had heard of. It came to me first through minister of finance John F. Colburn. That was the first intimation I had. There was no idea of the dethronement of the Queen at that time. That did not come until after the committee of safety was formed on Saturday. That was the first time we anticipated anything of the kind, but before that, on Tuesday, we called upon Mr. P. C. Jones, minister of finance. I told him what was going to happen. This information came from Mr. Colburn, the
last minister of finance. I do not know that I ought to mention it. It came from Marcus Colburn, brother of John F. Colburn. He was feeling troubled. He said, "I want to tell you, Henry, that it is of importance that the ministry should understand what John, my brother, is up to. Do not give me away. If you do I will be discharged from the office." He said in substance that Mr. P. C. Jones was to receive an anonymous letter from his brother, and he wished me to say to Mr. Jones not to be alarmed, but at the same time not to tell who it was that gave him this information; also that the Queen was going to promulgate a new constitution, and in case she was not able to get out the Wilcox ministry the plan was, after the prorogation of the legislature, to invite the four ministers over there—that is, the Wilcox ministry—and lay before them a constitution that she had prepared and in case they didn't sign they would be held prisoners. That was the information I gave to Mr. Jones. Of course he acted upon it.

The ministry after that was put out by a vote of the legislature. I can state right here that the vote was carried by bribery. The money was placed in Mr. Sam Parker's hands, some $7,000, to assist in voting them out. Quite a number of members of the legislature—Hawaiians—came down to talk to me, those who were against putting out the ministry, and also those who were in favor of doing so. One in particular—Hoapoli—told me what he wanted was good, stable government, and he felt sure if we kept the Wilcox ministry in we would have it. He was sent for by the ex-Queen and she persuaded him. She said if he had any love for her that he would vote against the ministry. Quite a number of the other members came and asked if I would assist them in money; said that they were getting short; had been down here so long. I told them no; that was not my business. I did not propose to advance them any money. A few days after they all seemed to be quite flush, and after the legislature was prorogued they went home. They had new furniture and seemed to be well provided for in every way.

On Saturday, about 10 o'clock, John Colburn, minister of finance, came down to the office.

Q. What office?
A. My office on Queen street. He was very anxious to talk with me. I was out. When I came back I went over to his office. He had left word with his brother to say that the Queen was going to promulgate a new constitution immediately after the prorogation of the legislature, and wanted me to know. Between 1 and 2 o'clock I was up near W. O. Smith's office. That seemed to be the center then to get the news. News came down that the ex-Queen was attempting to force the ministry to sign the new constitution.

Q. Who did this news come by?
A. It was sent by Mr. Colburn to the office of W. O. Smith.

Q. By whom?
A. I can not state. There were so many there at the time. They met in the back office of W. O. Smith. There were a great many in front of the office at the time to talk over the situation. I sat beside Paul Neumann. We were all very much excited, feeling that our rights were being taken away from us, and we decided then and there we would not submit to it. After a short time we heard that the ministers had gone back to the Government house. The way they put it—they ran away. The parties who came from the Government house put it in that way. I remember stating to Mr. Neumann that I was glad we were at last of one opinion. He said this was a thing we ought not to tolerate. After discussing the matter for some time John F. Colburn and the attorney-general, Mr. Peterson, both came down. Mr. Colburn made a statement that the ex-Queen had got them into the room and had requested them to sign this new constitution, and, after talking with her sometime he said they had asked her for half an hour's time to think over it. In the meantime the natives were talking quite loud and as Mr. Colburn expressed it, he thought it was about time for him to get out of it. So they went out the back way back to the Government house.

Q. The back way was the direct way to the Government house?
A. No; but if they had gone out the front way the natives were all in front, and they were afraid. He wanted to know if the merchants would support them in their position. After discussing the matter there was a committee of safety appointed. They considered it very important that such a committee should be appointed. There was a great deal of talk that came to the ears of certain parties in regard to the way in which the natives had been talked up—inflammatory talk—and we all felt that it was very important we should keep a strict watch on their movements.

Q. Did you think they were in sympathy with the Queen?
A. There was what they called the Hui Kalāaina, a lot of old men. They formerly met right opposite our office, on Queen street. They were in sympathy with her principally. After the committee of safety had been appointed we met and talked over the situation and decided to call a mass meeting.
During the meeting on Monday we were threatened that if we held any more meetings we would be arrested. Marshal Wilson came right up and said to Mr. Thurston that we would be arrested. Mr. Thurston answered right up and said if he wished to arrest us we were ready. We were not doing anything against the Government, that it was for the interest of the country that we had been appointed as a committee of safety. All that we were doing was talking in regard to a mess meeting. We had not decided when it was to be held. We decided afterwards to call a public meeting on Monday afternoon at 2 o'clock—that was the 16th.

Q. You mean you decided that on Saturday?
A. No; we decided that on Sunday after talking it over. It was to talk up the situation and to make a report from the committee of safety. The meeting was held at 2 o'clock Monday. In the meantime Marshal Wilson had sent around to all Government employees to muster in the station house, and after the meeting they all seemed to be quite demoralized on account of the number that turned out and was in sympathy with the committee of safety. The question that was uppermost in their minds was stable Government. They had fully made up their minds not to allow their rights to be trampled on. After the meeting the committee of safety met again to consider what should be next done, as power had been given them by the meeting which had been held that afternoon. After discussing the matter we decided that the only course to do was to call out those who were in sympathy with us and take possession.

Q. Of what?
A. Of the Government house and take possession of the Government. That was on Monday afternoon. Monday evening we met again at my house on Neumann avenue. We there planned what should be done on Tuesday, the 17th. We met again on Tuesday morning, when the proclamation was discussed for the first time. That was the first time we had it before us. I do not remember having it before. Of course we had a committee to frame the proclamation. We met again on Tuesday morning and decided to take possession at 2 o'clock that afternoon. At 2 o'clock we marched up to the Government house, expecting to have them resist us, as we had heard the report that there was to be a hundred men up there under Mr. McCarty. We arrived up there and took possession. While we were going into the door the various volunteers kept coming into the yard with their rifles. That is as far as I know of that. Where do you want me to go from there?

Q. Just go on and tell the whole story.
A. Then the council met, after we had taken possession of the Government house, and decided to take the station house. We had only possession of the Government house and had to take the station house, where all the arms were. They had taken all arms there from various houses, so as to have them on hand. After discussing it we sent word. I think Mr. Damon went down and had an interview with the four ministers in the station house.

Q. You were not present?
A. No, I was not present. I know nothing in regard to that. Afterwards part of the ministers came up to the Government house to talk with the council.

Q. You were a member of the council?
A. I am. I was then. I was a member of the committee of safety also. They agreed to give up the station house. We took possession.

Q. Do you mean that that happened just that way? That they agreed to give it up and you took it? Do you mean that those things followed right after one another just as quick as you relate them?
A. No. Mr. Damon had to go down to the station house and Hopkins came up. The ministers were afraid to come up. They thought that it was a trap to get them up there. When they came up they said: “It does not seem to us that we need be afraid. You seem to be acting in a square, friendly manner in regard to treating us as men.” They spoke of that at the time. The first thing that was done we declared martial law. That was one of the first acts.

Q. Do you know what hour the station house was given up?
A. I can not say. I was very much excited that day. I think it was somewhere near 3 o'clock.

Q. Have you anything to help you fix 3 o'clock in your mind?
A. I know we were afraid of its getting dark, and it would be much harder for us to take the building after dark, and were we planning what to do in case of darkness. That is what makes me think it was somewhere near that time.

Q. You spoke of the causes of the revolution being lottery and opium legislation and bribery. Now, as to the lottery bill, do you know of money being used there?
A. Of course I could not go on the stand and say that there was, but men who ran it were very flush.

Q. Is that what you judge from?
A. Yes.
Q. The same as to the opium bill?
A. Well, that was supposed to be a measure from the outside, as some of those in the Legislature expected to get money from the Chinese.
Q. Was that a supposition, or did you have any evidence of the fact of the use of money to pass the opium bill in the way of bribing members?
A. That is just a supposition.
Q. You spoke of money being used for purposes of bribery. Did you mean in the sense that you just stated—that it was supposition that it was done?
A. I stated it from what a party said, who could substantiate what he said.
Q. Who was he?
A. Cecil Brown.
Q. Did he tell you he would be able to prove that money was used for the purpose of getting out the ministry?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he tell you who furnished the money?
A. From the ex-Queen.
Q. He told you it came from her?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you had any knowledge of any money being used by the other side—by the reform party—in controlling votes at any time on any of these questions or any question?
A. Only what I saw in opposition papers. I do not know anything of my own knowledge.
Q. Do you know it on any information you had from others?
A. John Colburn told me that he had used money.
Q. Who did he say he got it from?
A. It was from his own money. He was trying to get the McFarland cabinet out.
Q. He was acting as a liberal?
A. Yes.
Q. And the liberal and reform party were acting together in the matter of getting out this cabinet?
A. I do not know about the reform so much. I dropped out from the reform party when they joined with the liberal. We were all split up then.
Q. Could you have voted out that cabinet unless you had had the reform party and the liberal party combined?
A. We could not. It took both parties to vote them out.
Q. Did Colburn tell you he was using his own money?
A. He claimed that he had promises from other parties.
Q. Who did he say they were?
A. He did not give me names. I was going away to the States at the time.
Q. You say on Monday Wilson came and notified the committee of safety through Mr. Thurston that he intended to arrest them?
A. He did, and Mr. Thurston replied—told him to go ahead if he saw fit to arrest us.
Q. Your statement was that he could arrest you if he wanted to—that you were doing nothing against the Government?
A. Yes; I said that. We were only discussing the meeting.
Q. Were you discussing the question of the dethronement of the Queen?
A. We were not then. We were discussing in regard to the meeting to be held.
Q. Had you in your Saturday's meeting or any time in your meetings debated the matter of the dethronement of the Queen?
A. I think we had spoken of it. We all felt we could not stand the monarchy. We had made up our minds to that.
Q. Then the expression that you were doing nothing against the Government was a strategic expression?
A. Yes. Wilson, of course, wanted very much to declare martial law then, but Cleghorn declined to sign the declaration.
Q. Who was Cleghorn?
A. He was governor.
Q. You held a mass meeting at 2 o'clock?
A. Yes; 2 o'clock on the 16th.
Q. There was no declaration for dethronement in that meeting?
A. I do not know if it came out. You could understand by expressions that they were all there for good government. Of course, they did not come right flat-footed out.
Q. How many troops had you then organized and armed; can you state accurately?
A. I can not.
Q. About how many; have you any information?
A. I have not. We were backed up by the mass meeting. Nearly all were ready at a moment's notice. Those who backed up the committee of safety were willing to back them up in everything they did.
Q. Did you poll the meeting to see how many would support you?
A. I think so. I think that they got the signatures of quite a number.

Q. How many?
A. I can not tell you.

Q. You could not say that the whole of the mass meeting signed?
A. I could not.

Q. Could you say that as many as half the mass meeting signed?
A. I should think so.

Q. Have you examined the signatures?
A. No. There were various committees. I was a committee for a portion of the rally and went around to their residences to see what arms they had and if they were prepared in case of trouble.

Q. In case of any trouble, did you tell them that you were going to dethrone the Queen and ask if they would be ready in case of resistance? Did you say that when you got signatures?
A. When I went around I didn't get signatures. I got it verbally from them to find out if they had arms and were ready to support the committee of safety.

Q. Did you mention to them the purpose to dethrone the Queen?
A. That was understood.

Q. Did you communicate to them in reference to arms?
A. The fact of the case is I did not know exactly what we were going to do.

Q. So that when you went around, you simply wanted to know if they had arms, in the event of trouble?
A. Yes.

Q. It was in that way that you judged of their sentiments in the matter of supporting the committee of safety in the effort to dethrone the Queen?
A. Yes.

Q. After the mass meeting what did the committee do?
A. The committee of safety met that afternoon shortly after the mass meeting.

Q. What did you do in that afternoon meeting?
A. We discussed the matter. We did not have a very long session in the afternoon. In the afternoon, at first, we were all going right up then and there, but afterwards considered it. The fact is, we hadn't our papers all ready. It was getting dark. We thought it was better to have daylight on our side. We decided to meet again on Monday evening and get everything in shape. It was after the mass meeting that we fully decided to take the step.

Q. What hour of Monday did you determine to take the step?
A. It was immediately after the mass meeting.

Q. Did anybody communicate the determination to the American minister?
A. I cannot say. He must have seen by the way the people were excited that day, and the incendiary talk among certain of the other side in regard to their setting fire to buildings.

Q. How many times did you hear it?
A. A great many times.

Q. How many?
A. People would keep coming into the office and meet me and say: "We are going to have trouble."

Q. Did you hear any persons say they proposed to fire the town?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many; I mean the people opposed to you?
A. No; I didn't hear the people actually say it. It was rumors from outside. It was not direct from them or they would have been looked up.

Q. You do not know anything at all of anybody having talked to Mr. Stevens about the situation on Monday in regard to the movement that you were all making or contemplated making. Was there anybody who said in the meeting that Mr. Stevens knew anything of what was going on?
A. I guess he must have kept posted.

Q. I want to know whether there was anything said by Thurston or anybody else of Mr. Stevens's knowledge of the movement?
A. I cannot say positively.

Q. What is your impression?
A. My impression is that there was. I can not remember what it was that was said.

Q. Was it to the effect that he had knowledge of the movement of the reform party?
A. I do not remember. It just comes upon me as a flash.

Q. What is the impression you say you have?
A. I do not see how he could have helped it.

Q. I will ask you again. In the meeting of the committee of safety in the afternoon of Monday, after the mass meeting had adjourned, was there anything said on
the part of Mr. Thurston, or any other member of the committee of safety, indicating
that the American minister knew anything of the movement of the reform party?
A. Yes; I should say that there was.
Q. By whom?
A. Either Carter or Thurston.
Q. What did they say?
A. I can not state. There was something said. It does not come to my mind now.
Q. Was the purport of it that he knew of the movement?
A. Yes, it was; that is, after the meeting.
Q. How did they know that he knew of the movement?
A. I suppose they had had an interview with him. I can not say for certain.
Q. Did they say as much?
A. That is what I understood at the time.
Q. Well, now, in that meeting was the subject discussed of asking him to land
the American troops?
A. I think that was done by the committee of safety before.
Q. Were you present when they asked for the troops to be landed?
A. I was.
Q. The troops were ordered here on Monday and this mass meeting was on Tuesday!
A. No; the mass meeting was on Monday; the troops came on shore Monday evening
just about dark. I might say that it was a surprise to us to hear that the troops
were coming on shore.
Q. You expected them to come ashore later?
A. No; I didn't know when they were coming ashore.
Q. But you expected them to come ashore?
A. Yes; I expected they would come.
Q. By reason of any communication with the American minister?
A. No; I think it was by request of the committee of safety.
Q. I have a copy of the communication from the committee of safety of January
16, 1893—Monday.
A. Yes; Monday afternoon.
Q. What time Monday afternoon?
A. After the mass meeting.
Q. How long after?
A. I think about 5.
Q. It was after the adjournment of the mass meeting you say the request to land
troops was made?
A. I think it was about 4 o'clock.
Q. What time did the mass meeting adjourn?
A. A little after 3.
Q. And then the committee of safety met?
A. We met immediately; walked down from the meeting to Smith's office.
Q. And then you took up the subject of calling on the American minister to land
troops?
A. Yes.
Q. Who took that communication to him?
A. I think it was Charlie Carter. I can not be positive.
Q. Is he one of the present commissioners?
A. Yes.
Q. How long was he gone?
A. Not long.
Q. What did he say when he came back?
A. He said the marines would be landed.
Q. Did he say whether they would support the Provisional Government movement
if they took the public buildings?
A. He came back and said the troops were coming ashore. That was as far as I
could remember now.
Q. He brought no response in writing?
A. I do not think so.
Q. Did the committee of safety want the troops brought on shore?
A. They felt that it would be for the welfare of the town to have them ashore.
We felt as a committee of safety that we had this matter in our hands and would be
held responsible.
Q. Did you expect that the presence of the troops on shore would have a quieting
effect on the natives and prevent any demonstration?
A. It was thought so.
Q. That was your idea?
A. Yes.
Q. You expected that when they got on shore that any hostile movement would be
brought to a standstill by their presence?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Suppose they had not come on shore, would you have been able to have protected yourselves?
A. I think so; but I think there would have been a great deal of bloodshed.
Q. Did not you always expect that American troops would be landed in case of conflict or threatened conflict?
A. Yes.
Q. And therefore you did not much expect a conflict after they landed?
A. No; I thought that naturally Wilson would try to do something. I expected there would be bloodshed before we got through.
Q. Unless American troops were landed?
A. Yes, sir. Of course I didn’t know whether they would attempt it then.
Q. You had a meeting you say on Monday night at your house. Who was present?
A. There were the committee of safety.
Q. Who were they?
A. Cooper was there. I think Wilder was not there. There was Brown, Smith, and Lansing. I do not think Suhr was there. Dole was there. We sent for Dole. Carter and Loper were there.
Q. What was the object in sending for Mr. Dole?
A. To ask him if he would accept the position he now holds.
Q. What did he say?
A. He debated in his mind. He wanted to think over it until morning.
Q. What was Loper doing there?
A. Loper was invited there. He was to take charge of the forces.
Q. Was that agreed upon that night?
A. That was agreed upon.
Q. Did you and Mr. Loper and Mr. Carter go to the American minister that night?
A. I didn’t.
Q. Did anybody go from your meeting?
A. Nobody that I know of. If anyone went I know nothing about it.
Q. Was there any hesitation on the part of Loper to take command that night?
A. Yes; he did hesitate.
Q. What reason did he give?
A. That he would rather be with the marshal.
Q. Was there anything said as to the probability of a conflict the next day?
A. We talked over the matter with Loper; discussed what could be done. He started out to get the men together.
Q. After he left the committee of safety?
A. Yes.
Q. Where were they to be placed?
A. They were to meet at the old armory here, and from there go right down to the Government house.
Q. Didn’t you think the impression that these marines would have on the natives would be that they would not be in sympathy with them, and that they would be in sympathy with the white people?
A. That is what I think.
Q. You were amongst the committee of safety that went up to take charge of the Government house?
A. Yes.
Q. How many of you were there?
A. I think there was fourteen, but we did not all go up.
Q. Where did you start from?
A. We started from W. O. Smith’s office, on Fort street.
Q. Which street did you go up going to the Government building?
A. We went up Queen street and up to the Government house—Mr. Wilder and myself.
Q. What street did the others go on?
A. They went on Merchant street.
Q. When you got to the Government building who was the first person you saw?
A. Hassinger.
Q. Is he a porter?
A. He is first clerk of the interior department.
Q. When you got there was the proclamation read immediately?
A. The proclamation was read by Mr. Cooper.
Q. Were there any troops there during the reading of the proclamation?
A. I could see one or two coming in.
Q. By the time it was concluded how many men did you have?
A. It would be impossible for me to say how many. I was so excited at the time.
Q. Do you remember the bringing of a paper to the Provisional Government, dated
January 17, 1883, signed by Liliuokalani and her several ministers, and printed in this document (Senate Ex. Doc. No. 56, Fifty-second Congress, second session)

A. I do.
Q. You were then in possession of the Government building?
A. We were.
Q. Any other buildings at that time?
A. Only the Government building at that time.
Q. How long after that before you got Mr. Stevens's letter of recognition?
A. It was shortly after the station house was given over.
Q. Are you not mistaken about that?
A. No; I believe I am not. I do not think I am.
Q. What about the barracks; had they been given up?
A. They had.
Q. Who were at the barracks?
A. Nowlein.
Q. Where was Wilson?
A. He was at the station house.
Q. And he gave that up before you had notice of the recognition?
A. According to my best knowledge and belief.
Q. Was there any communication, by writing or by word, from any member of the committee of safety, or any other person by their authority, to Mr. Stevens that you planned taking the Government building?
A. Not as far as I know. It is from hearsay.
Q. Who did you hear say it?
A. It would be impossible for me to answer that.
Q. Was it understood in the committee of safety on Monday night, by anybody, that he knew you intended to take the Government building?
A. Not unless somebody left the meeting afterwards and told him.
Q. Was there anything said by any person at the meeting at your house the night before the building was taken indicating that Mr. Stevens knew of the move to take the Government building the next day?
A. I do not remember.
Q. What was your impression—did you think that he knew of your movement?
A. I did; I was in hopes that he did.
Q. Why did you think he knew of your movement?
A. It was common talk.
Q. Common talk Monday, as well as Tuesday?
A. Yes.
Q. It was common talk before the troops were landed on Monday?
A. It was common talk that we were going to make a move—that the committee of safety were urged upon to make a move.
Q. Did you all understand that Mr. Stevens's sympathies were with you?
A. Yes.
Q. How did you get the idea that his sympathies were with you?
A. From remarks made by different persons in regard to certain matters that had come up; and we felt that we had been wronged.
Q. What matters do you refer to?
A. All during the last few days and also during the session of the Legislature.
Q. He would manifest his approval and disapproval of acts of the Queen and her adherents in matters of legislation?
A. Whenever it was against the interests of the American people. Of course, a few days before that, up to Saturday, he was not here. We had a great deal of talking during that time. He lost all that.
Q. He participated freely in political discussions without exciting comment?
A. I do not know that he discussed it. People would naturally come and talk to him and open their hearts to him.
Q. And in that way they got to feel that he was in sympathy with them?
A. Yes.
Q. Was there ever any suggestion on his part to the committee of safety to desist from their movement against the Queen?
A. I have never heard of any.
Q. Was there any expectation when the troops landed that they were to enforce the authority of the Queen in bringing order in the city on the part of the committee of safety?
A. I did not hear any rumor that led me to think that. The way I understood it was that they were here to preserve order.
Q. Now, in the matter of preserving order, if the Queen's forces and the Provisional Government forces got into fighting, would that mean that he was to interfere and stop the fighting?
A. I thought he was only to protect American interests here
Q. How would he go about it?
A. I suppose that most of the Americans would naturally go for protection on American ground, and I suppose that would be up at his place or around the consulate.

Q. You expected he would protect them in those places?
A. Yes; I might say, after the meeting on Monday, there was a falling off in the ranks of the Queen's party and they felt that the stronger elements were against them. The mass meeting brought things to an issue.

Q. You anticipated that the American troops expected to protect at the consulate and American legion American citizens who resorted there for protection?
A. That is what I expected they would do, but I did not know how far they would have gone in case there was bloodshed.

Q. Did you expect them to confine themselves to operations around the legation and consulate?
A. No; I would have expected if the Queen's people overpowered us that they would, of course, have to protect her. If we came out on the top and asked for protection we would get the protection, and we felt we would be strong enough.

Q. You expected him to land his troops and protect American people at the legation and consulate until you whipped the Queen or the Queen whipped you?
A. I do not know that.

Q. Did you expect him to do more than protect American citizens who resorted to the consulate or legation for protection?
A. That in case there was any bloodshed that they would, if called upon, protect the party in power, and I expected we were going to be in power forthwith.

Q. How did you expect to get into power without a little bloodshed?
A. We knew the feeling of those who were in power then—that they were cowards; that by going up with a bold front, and they supposing that the American troops would assist us, that would help us out.

Q. Assist whom?
A. The committee of safety.

Q. That was the general calculation?
A. Yes.

Q. In the conference?
A. Yes. They felt that their being there would be a great help to them. Even their presence ashore would have done that.

Q. When did you first determine to take the building?
A. Monday.

Q. Did you talk over it at Monday afternoon session?
A. Yes.

Q. And did you then determine to do it?
A. That afternoon. We were on the point of going up that afternoon, but things were not ready and it would take until dark and we thought we had better wait until the next day.

Q. Was that the purpose you had, to get the influence of the troops for the purpose of preventing resistance on the part of the Queen's Government?
A. That was not in my mind at all.

Q. What did you want troops for? What was in your mind?
A. In my mind it was going to stop bloodshed. The very presence of them here.

Q. You expected, then, if you got them on shore that you could go on with the plan of taking possession of the Government building and other properties without bloodshed? That was your idea?
A. That was my idea.

Q. Was that the impression of the committee of safety?
A. I think that they felt just the same as I did in regard to it.

(Before leaving Mr. Waterhouse was shown the letter of January 16. from the committee of safety to Mr. Stevens, and identified it.) The letter is as follows:

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, HONOLULU, January 16, 1893.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
American Minister Resident:

SIR: We, the undersigned, citizens and residents of Honolulu, respectfully represent that, in view of recent public events in this Kingdom, culminating in the revolutionary acts of Queen Liliuokalani on Saturday last, the public safety is menaced and lives and property are in peril, and we appeal to you and the United States forces at your command for assistance.

The Queen, with the aid of armed force, and accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed from those with whom she was acting, attempted to proclaim a new constitution; and while prevented for the time from accomplishing her object declared publicly that she would only defer her action.
This conduct and action was upon an occasion and under circumstances which have created general alarm and terror.

We are unable to protect ourselves without aid and, therefore, pray for the protection of the United States forces.

Henry E. Cooper,
F. W. McChesney,
W. C. Wilder,
C. Bolte,
A. Brown,
William O. Smith,
Henry Waterhouse,
Theo. F. Lansing,
Ed. Suhb,
L. A. Thurston,
John Emmeluth,
Wm. R. Castle,
J. A. McCandless,
Citizens' Committee of Safety.

I have read the foregoing carefully, and pronounce it a correct report of my interview with Mr. Blount.

Henry Waterhouse.

[Inclosure 5 in No. 4.]

Mr. Carter to Mr. Blount.

Hon. James H. Blount,
Commissioner of the United States of America:

Sir: At your request the following statement is made of incidents of the 17th day of January last, as they came under my observation:

After dining that day (dinner hour being 5:30 o'clock, say between 6:30 and 6:40 o'clock) Officer Mehrten, of the police force, drove up to my residence in a hack, and said to me that my presence was required at the Government building, and that he would give me a seat in his carriage if I was ready. I was at once driven to the building and taken to the room of the minister of finance, where I met quite a concourse of men, among which I now recall Judge S. B. Dole, Charles L. Carter, Capt. James King, Rev. S. G. Beckwith, Hon. S. M. Damon, and some twenty or thirty other leading members of our community.

There was a deal of excitement and earnest discussion going on among groups of persons, and while standing among them I overheard among other things that Minister Stevens had recognized the new government and that a steamer was to be made ready at once to carry to San Francisco, en route to Washington, commissioners of the new government. I asked what was required of me, and was told that a committee was to be sent to the palace to inform Her Majesty the Queen that she was deposed, and to assist her in making any protest she desired to make, and that I was to be of the committee. I joined the party headed by Mr. Damon, and proceeded to the palace, where, in the blue room, was Her Majesty, one or both of the young princes, the Hon. H. A. Widerman, and Paul Neumann, Her Majesty's ministers, E. C. Macfarlane, and others. Mr. Damon informed Her Majesty of the establishment of a provisional government, and of her being deposed, and that she might prepare a protest if she wished to. An awkward pause followed, which I broke by addressing Her Majesty, expressing sympathy, and advised her that any demonstration on the part of her forces would precipitate a conflict with the forces of the United States; that it was desirable that such a conflict be avoided; that her case would be considered at Washington, and a peaceful submission to force on her part would greatly help her case; that the persons in command of her forces at the barracks and police station should be ordered to surrender. The Hon. H. A. Widerman then addressed Her Majesty, fully indorsing my advice, and adding that he believed that the result would be a repetition of the scenes of 1843, when the sovereign and flag were restored to Hawaii by Great Britain.

I was moved to advise Her Majesty as I did because it was reported on the street that Minister Stevens had said if the revolutionists obtained possession of a government building that he would recognize them as a government. I saw that the building was in possession of armed men, and knew that the forces of the U.S.S. Boston were near at hand, and heard that recognition was a fact.
The Hon. Paul Neumann was requested to prepare the protest for Her Majesty’s signature, and I was also requested to assist in preparing the document. While the protest was in course of preparation word was sent to Marshal Wilson to disband the force at the station house and surrender the building, arms, and ammunition.

After the protest had been signed by Her Majesty and the ministers word was brought that Marshal Wilson refused to give up the station house except upon the written command of Her Majesty. The order was prepared, signed by the Queen, and sent to the marshal. The protest of the Queen was placed in the hands of President Dole, and I saw that he indorsed the document as received in due form.

Very respectfully, yours,

J. O. CARTER.

[Inclosure 6 in No. 1.]

Mr. Swinburne to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, May 3, 1893.

Hon. J. H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of United States:

Sir: In response to your verbal request for a written communication from me regarding certain facts connected with the recognition of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands by the United States minister to that country on the afternoon of January 17, 1893, I have to state as follows:

On the afternoon in question I was present at an interview between Capt. Wiltsie, commanding the Boston, who was at that time present in his official capacity with the battalion then landed in Honolulu, and Mr. Dole and other gentlemen representing the present Provisional Government, in the executive chamber of the Government building. During the interview we were informed that the party represented by the men there present was in complete possession of the Government building, the archives, and the treasury, and that a Provisional Government had been established by them.

In answer Capt. Wiltsie asked if their Government had possession of the police station and barracks. To this the reply was made that they had not possession then, but expected to hear of it in a few minutes, or very soon. To this Capt. Wiltsie replied, “Very well, gentlemen, I can not recognize you as a de facto Government until you have possession of the police station and are prepared to guarantee protection to life and property,” or words to that effect. Here our interview was interrupted by other visitors, and we withdrew and returned to the camp at Arion Hall. As far as I can recollect, this must have been about 5 o’clock p. m. About half-past 6 Capt. Wiltsie left the camp, and as he did so he informed me that the United States minister to the Hawaiian Islands had recognized the Provisional Government established by the party in charge of the Government building as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands. About half-past 7 p. m. I was informed by telephone by Lieut. Draper, who was then in charge of a squad of marines at the United States consulate, that the citizen troops had taken possession of the police station, and that everything was quiet.

Very respectfully,

WM. SWINBURNE,
Lieutenant-Commander, U. S. Navy.

[Inclosure 7 in No. 4.]

Affidavit of Mr. Hopkins.

HONOLULU OAHU, Hawaiian Islands, 89:

And now comes Charles L. Hopkins, of Honolulu, aforesaid, and upon oath deposes and says:

That on the 17th day of January, A.D. 1893, he arrived at the police station in Honolulu aforesaid about 2:30 p. m. o’clock and saw Mr. Antoni Rosa writing a letter addressed to John L. Stevens, United States minister, and said letter was afterwards signed by Her Majesty’s ministers and handed to your affiant to be delivered to the said American minister with instructions to wait for an answer. Your affiant left said police station at about 2:40 p. m. of said day in a carriage, arriving at the legation about 2:45 p. m. He saw on the verandah Miss Stevens, to whom the letter
of Her Majesty’s ministers was handed. She asked if an answer was required; your affiant said "Yes."

Miss Stevens then went into the house and about ten minutes afterwards returned saying, "My father is too unwell to write an answer now, but if you will go and return in about an hour’s time he will have the answer ready." Your affiant replied that his instructions were to wait for an answer, upon which she went in the house again and then came out and said, "My father will try and answer the letter." She disappeared again, and in about ten minutes came out and handed me a letter addressed to Samuel Parker, minister of foreign affairs. Your affiant then left the legation, arriving at the police station about 3:10 p.m., and handed Mr. Stevens’s letter to Mr. Samuel Parker, who went into the deputy marshal’s office with it. Later in the afternoon your affiant read the letter of Minister Stevens in which he stated that he recognized the Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

CHARLES L. HOPKINS.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3d day of May, A.D. 1893.

[SEAL.]

F. J. TESTA,

Notary Public, First Judicial District.

[Inclosure 8 in No. 4.]

Affidavit of Peterson and Colburn.

HONOLULU OAHU, 1893:

We, John F. Colburn and A. P. Peterson, being duly sworn, on oath depose and say that on the afternoon of Tuesday, January 17, 1893, we held portfolios in the cabinet of Queen Lilinokalani and were at the station house in Honolulu; that at 2:30 o’clock the Queen’s cabinet addressed a letter to his excellency J. L. Stevens, asking if the report then current that he had recognized the Provisional Government was true. This letter was sent to Mr. Stevens through Hon. C. L. Hopkins. Shortly after 3 o’clock Mr. Hopkins returned with an answer from Mr. Stevens to the Queen’s cabinet, stating that he, Mr. Stevens, had recognized the Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands. Shortly after, Mr. S. M. Damon and Mr. C. Bolte, members of the advisory council, came to the station house to consult with the Queen’s cabinet as to the situation. Mr. Damon stated that Mr. Stevens had recognized the Provisional Government and that the United States forces would assist them and that it was useless for us to resist, but asked us in the interest of peace and to save bloodshed not to do so. Mr. Damon handed us a copy of the proclamation of the committee of safety, which was read aloud by A. P. Peterson.

Shortly after 4 o’clock, nothing definite having been arrived at, the Queen’s cabinet, at the request of the Provisional Government, went with Mr. Damon and Mr. Bolte to the Government building to consult with the executive council. We were in the Government building fifteen or twenty minutes, during which time Mr. S. B. Dole, President of the Provisional Government, said that he desired us to give up the station house and other Government property under our control, in the interests of law and order. We answered that it would be necessary for us to consult first with Queen Lilinokalani. We then left the Government building and together with Mr. S. M. Damon went direct to the palace. At the palace, after some consultation the Queen’s cabinet came to the conclusion that it was not advisable to oppose the United States forces, Mr. Stevens having already recognized the Provisional Government, and so advised the Queen to surrender to the superior force of the United States, because of the course of Mr. Stevens, American minister, and of such recognition. At this time, 5:30 o’clock, the Queen’s Government had possession of the station house, barracks, and palace, nine-tenths of the arms and ammunition on the island except that in the possession of foreign governments, and a large body of men under arms. The Queen accepted the advice and her protest was immediately drawn up and signed, and she instructed her cabinet to attend to all necessary matters, which was then done.

The reply of Mr. Stevens, stating that he had recognized the Provisional Government, was placed in the hands of Hon. Paul Neumann, who carried it with his other documents on his mission to Washington, and although we have made every effort to procure the same have been unable to do so and do not know its whereabouts at the present time.

JOHN F. COLBURN.
A. P. PETERSON.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3d day of May, 1893.

[SEAL.]

J. H. THOMPSON,
Notary Public, Island of Oahu.
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

[Inclosure 9 in No. 4.]

Interview between Hawaiian Patriotic League and Mr. Blount.

MAY 2, 1893.

[Committee of delegates of all the branch associations of the Hawaiian Patriotic League: John Richardson, chairman; J. A. Akina, Ben. Naukana, J. K. Kalihopulani, S. H. K. No.]

Q. Mr. Richardson, are you chairman of this delegation?
A. Yes.
Q. How are delegates from these Islands selected?
A. They are selected by meetings in different districts held by people who have become members of local clubs.
Q. Organized for what purpose?
A. Organized for the purpose of beseeching the maintenance of their independence, and also the perpetuation of a monarchical form of government and against annexation.
Q. How many persons are in these several clubs.
A. The number varies in each club, but the approximate total of the various clubs represented here is to the tune of about 7,000 voters.
Q. How do you get at that number?
A. We have had rolls from the different clubs, and as the Central Club wishes to get time to have the names recorded in the register of the Central Club in Honolulu we have been unable to bring with us the original document holding the list of the names.
Q. How do you get the figures 7,000?
A. By taking the total from each club.
Q. Have you had the totals from each club?
A. Yes.
Q. And putting them together makes an aggregate of 7,000?
A. Yes.
Q. Are they all voters?
A. They are all voters.

Mr. Blount, I will accept it as I have all memorials as a matter of information. I can not enter into a discussion of it with you. I am glad to meet you, gentlemen.

[Inclosure 10 in No. 4.]

Affidavit of Mr. Wilson.

HONOLULU, OAHU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, ss:

And now comes Charles B. Wilson, of Honolulu aforesaid, and upon oath deposes and says:

That on the 17th day of January, A. D. 1893, between 3:30 and 4 p.m., of that day, while he was in charge of the police station as marshal of the Kingdom, he saw and read a letter from the American Minister Stevens addressed to Her Majesty’s ministers, wherein Minister Stevens stated that he had recognized the Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

CHAS. B. WILSON.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of May, A. D. 1893.

[Seal.]

F. J. TESTA,
Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit.

No. 8.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
May 6, 1893.

SIR: Since my last dispatch I examined Mr. Bolte, a member of the advisory council. He and Mr. Waterhouse, whose evidence I forwarded to you, stated positively that the station house and barracks were
delivered up before Mr. Stevens recognized the Provisional Government. The manner of their testimony caused me to suspect their truthfulness. I had learned from members of the cabinet of the ex-Queen of correspondence with Mr. Stevens which contradicted these assertions. Some weeks ago I had called upon him for the legation records, and was furnished with a book containing correspondence with the State Department. This threw no light on the question of fact I was seeking to settle.

On the 5th instant I went to the legation, feeling that such papers must be there in some form.

In the conversation he spoke of a paper from the Queen which was in his files; said that these files were put in a volume when there were enough to make up one. I said I would like to have the volume for January. He said it had not been made up. I then asked him if he had a paper which the ministry had addressed to him inquiring if he had recognized the Provisional Government. He went out to look for it and returned with a book entitled "Correspondence with Hawaiian Government." In this he showed me a memorandum he had made of a reply to a communication from the ministers, a copy of which I send (Inclosure No. 1).

Believing that he must have the communication itself, this morning I sent my secretary, Mr. Mills, to ask for it. He returned with the paper saying that before giving it to him Mr. Stevens seemed to be at a loss as to whether he had such a paper. This same difficulty occurred when I called upon him for the communication from the committee of safety asking for the landing of the troops of the Boston.

I inclose herewith a copy of the letter in question (Inclosure No. 2).

You will see that in the memorandum referred to he says the letter was received about 4 or 5 p.m. on January 17 and that he informed them that he had already recognized the Provisional Government.

In the conversation I had with him when he turned over the record of the correspondence with the Hawaiian Government he said he had recognized the Provisional Government before the barracks and station house had been surrendered; that he did not consider their surrender of any importance.

In my last dispatch Lieut. Swinburne fixes the surrender of the station house at about half-past 7 o'clock. This morning he called and informed me that Lieut. Draper had said to him yesterday that the station house was not surrendered until after dark. I sent for Lieut. Draper and obtained from him a statement, which I inclose (Inclosure No. 3).

I consider that it is now established beyond controversy that Mr. Stevens recognized the Provisional Government before the barracks and station house had been surrendered or agreed to be surrendered.

Before the committee of thirteen went up to proclaim the Provisional Government they sent a gentleman to see if there were any troops in the Government building. On learning the fact that there were none, the committee quietly went up in two or more squads and, uniting at the Government building, read their proclamation.

Without making any demand for the surrender of the palace, in which were the Queen and her friends, with some 50 soldiers; the barracks, a little beyond the palace, with about 80 men, well equipped with small arms and artillery, and with the station house, some 600 yards off, occupied by some 200 men, well armed and equipped, they asked and obtained from the American minister recognition as a Government de facto. On this basis the minds of the cabinet and Queen were operated upon to give up the barracks and station house
and to have her surrender to the Provisional Government. In this way the revolution reached its solution.

I invite your attention to a letter, dated on the 16th of January, 1893, from Mr. Stevens to Mr. W. M. Giffard, as follows:

United States Legation,  
Honolulu, January 16, 1893.

Mr. W. M. Giffard:
Sir: Please allow Capt. Wiltse and his men the use of the opera house hall for a fair compensation for the same.

Yours truly,

John L. Stevens.

This letter was obtained from Mr. Giffard, who had charge of the building as agent for Spreckels & Co. He declined to let Mr. Stevens have it, because, he said, if any damage occurred while the American troops occupied it it would affect the insurance, as the building was liable to be damaged; that in the insurrection of 1889, when Wilcox and his followers had obtained possession of the palace, the Government forces had used the upper portion of this building to fire on the insurrectionists and that more than $1,000 worth of damage was then done to it by the cannon used by Wilcox and his followers.

This building, Lieut. Swinburne informs me, was agreed upon on board the Boston before the troops were landed as the best place for the location of the Boston’s men. He suggested on shipboard that the troops be quartered near the wharf, so as to be near to their base of supply, the same having been so done when Admiral Skerrett landed troops in 1874. Capt. Wiltse and Mr. Stevens thought it was better that they should be located in the opera house. Failing to get this building, Arion hall, which is on a line with it and adjoins it, and is across the street from the Government building, was obtained for the location of the troops. The men were placed in the rear of Arion hall, but in full view of the palace. A street intervened between the Government building and the palace. It was about 350 yards from one of these buildings to the other.

The American troops were on the same side of the latter street with the Provisional Government troops, which did not probably number 100 men. You will see from the map prepared by Mr. Loevenstein, which I have previously forwarded to you, the location of Arion hall, the Government building, the palace, the barracks, the station house, and the armory. If the Queen’s troops should have attacked the Provisional Government troops our men were in danger of being injured, which might have brought them into collision with the Queen’s troops. The same is true if the Provisional Government troops had advanced on the palace. If the American troops were landed to protect American property and the persons of American citizens, their location at this place, unfortunately, signified a different purpose.

The Queen, her cabinet, and her followers undoubtedly believed, from the location of the American troops and the quick recognition of the Provisional Government by Mr. Stevens, that the United States forces would aid the Provisional Government forces in the event of a conflict.

The request of the committee of safety, on which the landing of the troops was made, did not ask for the protection of the property and persons of American citizens. This paper you have already in your possession. It was signed by Germans, Americans, and natives. Mr. W. O. Smith and Mr. L. A. Thurston, the leading men signing this paper, are natives of these islands, and seemed to be concerned to have
the troops protect themselves and all others in the islands from the operation of the Queen's forces.

In one of the local papers, yesterday morning, there appeared an alleged interview with Mr. Loud, a member of Congress from California, in which he is reported as criticising the authorities for not having arrested and sent Liliuokalani out of the island. In view of your telegraphic instruction of the 25th ultimo (which was received by me on the 4th instant) and the possibility that Mr. Loud's alleged advice might be pursued and that hostile collision between the friends of the Queen and the Provisional Government might grow out of it, I had an interview this morning with the attorney-general, Mr. W. O. Smith, in which I invited his attention to the reported interview with Mr. Loud. I asked him if he felt free to say to me whether or not the arrest of the Queen was contemplated; that I desired the information because such action on the part of the Provisional Government might produce a condition of affairs which required action on my part. He said that this action was not contemplated by the Provisional Government, but that they were prepared, in the event of hostilities, to take care of certain prominent persons amongst the Royalists. I asked him if those included the Queen. He answered, "confidentially, Yes."

The feeling of the annexationists is very intense, and doubtless the Provisional Government is very much pressed to take action against the person of the Queen by confinement or deportation. Should this occur I believe that it will produce a bloody conflict.

It is my purpose soon to announce to American citizens that if they participate in any conflict in behalf of either party I shall direct that the American troops shall not be used for their protection. This, I think, to be in line with your views. I believe that it will tend to prevent extreme action on the part of the Provisional Government.

I have not and shall not intimate any desire to the Provisional Government as to what they should do with the Queen or with any other person connected with the royal cause.

I do not see any occasion for my remaining longer here for the purpose of making further inquiry as to the condition of affairs in the islands. I believe, however, that my departure prior to your sending out a successor to Mr. Stevens would result in serious trouble. The attorney-general said to me this morning there would be no trouble while I remained here, but he had some apprehensions if I should leave.

The native population seem to have great respect for me, growing out of the idea that I represent the President of the United States in an effort to get at the causes of the revolution and a hope that out of that investigation they will regain the political power they have lost.

I have been careful every moment to avoid making an impression on either party that I was here to interfere in their domestic affairs or for any purpose other than that of inquiry, or to indicate what disposition you or the President might make of any information I should report.

Do not infer from these observations that I have any desire to remain here any longer.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

P. S.—Since closing the foregoing dispatch the affidavits marked 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 have been handed to me.

(Filed with other affidavits.)*

* Published with affidavits.
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 5.]

Extract from records of the United States legation.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH HAWAIIAN GOVERNMENT.

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

About 4 to 5 p.m. of this date—I am not certain of the precise time—the note on file from the four ministers of the deposed Queen, inquiring if I had recognized the Provisional Government came to my hands, while I was lying sick on the couch. Not far from 5 p.m.—I did not think to look at the watch—I addressed a short note to Hon. Samuel Parker, Hon. Wm. H. Cornwell, Hon. John F. Colburn, and Hon. A. P. Peterson—no longer regarding them ministers—informing them that I had recognized the Provisional Government.

JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Minister.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 5.]

Queen's ministers to Mr. Stevens.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary:

Sir: Her Hawaiian Majesty's Government having been informed that certain persons to them unknown have issued proclamation declaring a Provisional Government to exist in opposition to Her Majesty's Government, and having pretended to depose the Queen, her cabinet and marshal, and that certain treasonable persons at present occupy the Government building in Honolulu with an armed force, and pretending that your excellency, in behalf of the United States of America, has recognized such Provisional Government, Her Majesty's cabinet asks respectfully: Has your excellency recognized said Provisional Government? and if not, Her Majesty's Government, under the above existing circumstances, respectfully requests the assistance of your Government in preserving the peace of the country.

We have the honor to be your excellency's obedient servants,

SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
WM. H. CORNWELL,
Minister of Finance.
JOHN F. COLBURN,
Minister of the Interior.
A. P. PETerson,
Attorney-General.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 5.]

Statement of Lieut. Draper.

May 5, 1893. Herbert L. Draper, Lieutenant Marine Corps, attached to Boston:
I was at the United States consulate-general at the time the Provisional Government troops went to the station house and it was turned over to them by Marshal Wilson. It was about half past 7 o'clock. The station house is near the consulate-general on the same street. As soon as it happened I telephoned it to the ship. I wanted my commanding officer to know, as I regarded it as an especially important thing.
I was the commanding officer at the consulate-general. There was no other United States officer there at the time excepting myself.
The above is a correct statement.

HERBERT L. DRAPER,
First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps.
Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

Honolulu, H. I., May 9, 1893.

Sir: There has appeared in annexation papers on several occasions innuendoes of an offensive character relating to myself. It has been my custom to give no attention to them, because of the greatness of our own Government and the weakness of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

On my arrival here—the opinion obtaining through the newspapers, especially of American origin, that I was to investigate, amongst other things, the disposition of the people of the Islands towards annexation—a campaign in the form of signatures to petitions for and against annexation commenced, and has been continuing until this hour.

Manifestation of the native element soon became very pronounced against annexation, whereupon the papers of the annexationists began to charge the ex-Queen with treason and to insist upon her arrest and trial for treason or her deportation. With this I had nothing to do.

This state of opinion of a majority of the people against annexation has become so well defined as to renew the cry for her arrest in more ardent temper.

Yesterday afternoon the Hawaiian Star, the organ of the annexation club, contained an article, a copy of which is inclosed herewith. (Inclosure No. 1.)

I felt aggrieved at the dishonorable implication as to my own conduct with the Queen contained therein. I immediately addressed a letter to President Dole, a copy of which is inclosed. (Inclosure No. 2.)

Four hours afterward I received a reply from Mr. Dole, a copy of which I send. (Inclosure No. 3.)

The language used is not only objectionable in its offensive reference to myself, but was designed to intimidate antiannexationists in communicating their views to me, and so prevent any successful acquisition of the true state of the public mind in these Islands in its relation to the Provisional Government.

This latter criticism I did not communicate to the Provisional Government, regarding it as inconsistent with my instructions not to interfere in domestic controversies here.

I am, etc.,

James H. Blount,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure I in No. 6.]

Extract from the Hawaiian Star, Monday, May 8, 1893.

What of the Queen?

The ex-Queen professed to have yielded her throne to the "superior force of the United States," and has kept up that pretense since. Her present attitude is one of waiting. Before doing anything further she desires to know whether or not the United States means to take the islands. From such an attitude it follows that if President Cleveland and Congress should decide to keep their hands off Hawaii, then Liliuokalani will deem herself absolved from her obligation to stay quiet. It must be noted that she has never yet surrendered directly to the Government, or even entered into an armistice with it. She calls herself Queen, and rarely signs her name to a letter without the royal R. It is her hope, that if annexation is defeated, to be
restored, and she is now the center and nucleus of all the royal politics in the islands which look to that end.

So long as things remain in their present shape the ex-Queen is not particularly dangerous; but if the Hawaiian question should be left to stew in its own juice, then she might become an unpleasant quantity to deal with. The United States would have formally refused to accept her surrender. She would have yielded to none else, and would be at liberty to negotiate with, say, the Japanese for a protectorate. Certainly, her right to treat with a foreign envoy has not been denied, as witness her unhindered interviews with Commissioner Blount. Out of such a conjunction of affairs as this might come a vast amount of political trouble and expense. Even if Lilinokalani did not seek foreign help—as she was quick to do at the beginning of her troubles in a letter to Queen Victoria—her presence here would continually breed mischief, provoke unrest, alarm capital, excite the emotions of her old party, harass the existing Government, require a large military force to be sustained, and cause an impression to go out that if the new regime should at any time be caught napping the old order of things might be restored.

It is pretty generally admitted now that it was a mistake not to have shipped the ex-Queen abroad when she was deprived of her throne. That was one of the errors of a hurried time which, if it had been avoided, would have left the annexationists cause in much better shape than it is. But what is past can not be mended. Only that which is to come may be kept from the need of mending. The Star believes to be the duty of the Government to protect itself and the people from the danger that Lilinokalani's presence here might breed by sending her out of the country under the act—which may be enlarged if necessary—that deals with "undesirable residents." This course might, it is true, work a certain hardship, but compared with the hardship that the ex-Queen's continuance on this soil would visit upon property and business interests, it would hardly be worth noting. Its severity might, of course, be modified by some provision for the expenses of travel abroad, but this is a matter of detail. The main thing is to have the disturbing influence of the royal pretender out of the way when the time comes to tranquilize the country and get it ready for the responsibilities of its future. No better preliminary to that status could be had than the deportation of the woman at once. This would afford ample time, before the American decision could be had, to get the country perfectly in hand and to meet anything that might happen.

There need be no fear that such an act would make a bad impression in the United States or elsewhere, as it is one of the unwritten laws of popular uprisings that when the people overthrow the throne, the occupant of it must leave the country. So far as Hawaii is concerned every sensible politician in America would justify deportation under the existing circumstances.

{Inclosure 2 in No. 6.}

Mr. Blount to Mr. Dole.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, May 3, 1893.

His Excellency Sanford B. DOLE,
President of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

Sir: In the Hawaiian Star of May 8, an editorial headed "What of the Queen?" to which I invite your attention, uses this language:

"Certainly her right to treat with a foreign envoy has not been denied, as witness her unhindered interviews with Commissioner Blount."

It has been my purpose to studiously avoid any word or act calculated to produce on the mind of any individual an impression of a disposition on my part to interfere with the political affairs of these islands. In this article I am made to hold unhindered interviews with the ex-Queen Lilinokalani. These alleged interviews with me are treated as treasonable on her part. This can not be true without an implication of dishonorable conduct on my part. As such, it is insulting to the Government of the United States.

I have held one interview with the ex-Queen, of which you had knowledge before and afterwards. This is the only one. I can not believe that the editorial, in so far as it relates to myself, can be approved by the Provisional Government. I respectfully request a reply.

With assurances of the highest consideration, I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLount,
Special Commissioner of the United States.
Mr. Dole to Mr. Blount.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, May 9, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of even date calling my attention to an editorial in last evening's issue of the Hawaiian Star touching on your interviews with the ex-Queen.

The Government sincerely regrets the publication referred to in your communication, and I hasten to assure you that it is in no way responsible for the expressions of that or any other paper, and thoroughly disapproves of anything that may be published that can be taken as implying any action on your part that is not entirely consistent with your mission.

The management of the Star have promised to make the amende honorable in this evening's issue.

With the sincere hope that nothing may arise that will in any way disturb the cordial and amicable relations that exist between the authorities of the Provisional Government and yourself as the honored representative of a nation that is our nearest and greatest friend, I have the honor to be with the highest respect and consideration,

Your most, etc.,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Hon. JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States, Honolulu.

No. 10.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, May 21, 1893.

SIR: Recurring to the correspondence between President Dole and myself in relation to the article in the Hawaiian Star, I inclose hereewith a copy of an additional letter which I wrote to him. (Inclosure No. 1.)

Subsequently Vice-President Damon called to see me in relation to the matter, and I said I should not ask the attention of the Government hereafter to any articles of an offensive character in that paper; that I would forward any offensive matter contained therein to the State Department, with the statement that it was the organ of the annexation club, and that the Government was unable to control its conduct. A similar statement was made by me to the Attorney-General, Mr. Smith. In the conversation with me he deplored the article and added that the editor had told the cabinet some days before that he had positive proof of two long interviews between myself and the Queen.

Since this correspondence with President Dole this paper has changed its tone into one of frequent compliment to myself. I presume the Annexation Club found that my reporting their offensive articles was not likely to advance their cause, and changed what had been the uniform course of the paper heretofore. The demeanor of this paper was doubtless intended to impress the native population with the idea that they could not only dominate them, but could insult the representative of the United States with impunity. I shall probably have no more trouble in this direction.

More than 8,000 names have been signed to memorials by the Women's Hawaiian Patriotic League, asking for the restoration of Queen Liliuokalani.
Memorials have been signed against annexation by 7,500 native voters. The delegates of the latter organization report that the request for the restoration of the Queen was omitted because they feared that if inserted in their memorial they would be arrested for treason.

The Annexation Club inform me that they have on their books 5,180 names for annexation. This is signed generally by American citizens whether they have registered here as voters or not. Some natives have signed this last document, who are on the police force and occupy other government positions—doubtless in order to hold their places. Other natives who have signed are the hired laborers of sugar planters, having been systematically worked upon to do so, and, feeling largely dependent upon the planters for employment, fear discharge.

I have put this question to several leading annexationists, whose statements have been taken in writing and certified to by them: "If the question of annexation were submitted to the people of these Islands, who were qualified to vote for representatives under the Constitution of 1887, under the Australian ballot system, which has been adopted by your legislature, what would be the result?" They have almost without exception declared that annexation would certainly be defeated.

Threats to arrest the Queen and deport leading natives have been repeatedly urged in the annexation organs, and have caused the native people uneasiness and alarm. It has restrained outward manifestations of interest on their part. These threats were founded on charges that the Queen and these natives were engaged in treasonable conduct in urging the natives to vote against annexation.

There is not an annexationist in the islands, so far as I have been able to observe, who would be willing to submit the question of annexation to a popular vote. They have men at work in all of the islands urging the natives to sign petitions for annexation. They seek to impress them with the opinion that if annexed they will be allowed the right to vote. Quite a number of petitions have been signed by natives asking for annexation, provided they were allowed the right to vote. In other instances delegations made up of white men and natives have brought in small petitions signed by natives, and on being asked if the natives were in favor of annexation without the right to vote have always answered that they were not. While this is done I have never yet found an annexationist who did not insist that stable government could not be had without so large a restriction of the native vote as would leave political power in the hands of the whites.

I have had ample opportunity to observe the feeling of the native population on the question of annexation. There is no doubt that the whole race—men and women—are deeply concerned about the independence of their native land. Their mind is not turning to England or to any other country for protection. Their devotion to the United States is continually asserted. If the question of annexation by the United States should be made to depend upon the popular will in these islands the proposition had as well be abandoned at once. There are a great many whites here in addition to the natives who are opposed to annexation, and who are now preparing to sign memorials of this character to the President of the United States.

While I have presented these observations I wish here to assert that I have abstained from expressing any wish for or against annexation
to any person in these islands. I have by no act of mine sought to influence opinion on this subject, either one way or the other.

Hereafter I shall discuss this matter from official data, and from the evidence of persons who have filed certified statements with me.

There frequently occurs in Mr. Stevens' correspondence with the State Department the allegation that the Queen has for a paramour ex-Marshal Wilson. Ordinarily such scandalous statements would be unworthy of attention. Its use to prejudice the minds of the American people against her in connection with the question of annexation has caused me to make some inquiry into the subject. A number of reputable gentlemen have stated in writing their utter disbelief in this allegation. She has been received with apparent admiration through all the years of her reign in the most refined circles in this city. The white population have resorted eagerly to the palace to participate in its social enjoyments without any reserve on account of the Queen's character.

On April 19, 1892, the American minister gave her a breakfast, to which a number of prominent persons were invited.

Wilson is ten years the junior of the ex-Queen. He married a girl who was reared by her and lived with her at the time of his marriage.

He has never lived in the palace. He lived in the palace grounds with his wife, in a building 75 yards from the palace, where the Queen resided. They were moved into this building after the death of the Queen's husband at the instance of the Queen. Wilson is universally recognized as a brave man and loyal to the Queen. The frequent revolutions here on the part of the whites doubtless caused her to make him marshal, and put him at the head of the police force, which was the real military force of the Kingdom. Because of his marriage with a native woman, and her connection with the Queen, and her confidence in his courage and fidelity, she trusted him rather than any of the whites in this position.

I forbear any further statement on this subject at this time. Evidently this charge against the Queen has for its foundation the looseness which comes from passionate and vindictive partisan struggles in Honolulu.

On the 16th instant I published my instructions in full, accompanied by the following statement:

While I shall abstain from interference between conflicting forces of whatever nationality for supremacy, I will protect American citizens not participating in such conflict.

I send you newspaper comments on the instructions and the foregoing declaration, in the nature of an interpretation of my instructions. (Inclosure No. 2).

From what I can learn many American citizens intensly active in the late revolution in these islands, and promoters of the cause of annexation, and supporters of the Provisional Government, took offense at the latter language. It seems very difficult for that class of persons to understand why they can not be permitted to participate in political and military movements on these islands with a guarantee of protection from opposing forces by the troops of the United States.

On the 19th instant I published your dispatch of May 9 in relation to my appointment as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States. I believed it calculated to produce an impression on the minds of the people claiming to be American citizens that under no false pretense of preserving order or protecting American
citizens could they be allowed to command the services of American troops to promote political schemes here.

I invite your attention to a communication and plat from Admiral Skerrett, which I inclose herewith. (Inclosure No. 3.)

The plat should have shown Music Hall immediately on the corner of the block, and the side of Arion Hall next to the Music Hall nearly on a line with the front line of the Government building.

It is easy to see that any attack on the Government building by the Queen's troops from the east would have exposed our men to their fire. Any attempt to occupy Music Hall and Arion Hall by the Queen's troops for the purpose of taking the Government building would have encountered the American troops. Any attempt by the Queen's troops from the direction of the palace would have exposed our troops to their fire.

In the insurrection of 1889, Music Hall was occupied by sharpshooters of the Government, who contributed more to the suppression of the insurrection than any other forces. This place Mr. Stevens sought to obtain for the United States troops on the 16th of January last, and failing in this, selected Arion Hall.

Admiral Skerrett well says that the place was well chosen if the design of Mr. Stevens and Capt. Wiltse was the support of the Provisional Government troops. It was certainly suggestive of this design to the Queen and her adherents.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLount,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 7.]

Mr. Blount to Mr. Dole.

HONOLULU, H. I., May 10, 1893.

Hon. SANford B. Dole,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Honolulu, H. I.

Sir: Your communication of the 8th instant, in reply to my letter of the same date, concerning a reflection upon myself as Commissioner of the United States, is acknowledged.

It gives me pleasure to be assured, of what I had previously believed, that a most cordial feeling on the part of your Government existed toward myself as the representative of the Government of the United States, and that the article referred to would not be approved of by your Government.

The disavowal in the Star of yesterday did not at all meet the situation. I shall not ask any further action in relation thereto, preferring to content myself with your communication rather than to expose my Government to the charge of ungenerous action in the present condition of affairs in these Islands, by insisting on further and fuller apology on the part of the managers of the Star.

With assurances of the highest consideration,

I am, etc.

JAMES H. BLount,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 7.—Hawaiian Star, May 16, 1893.]

Blount's instructions.

Three mooted points were settled as follows by the text of the instructions given Commissioner Blount by Secretary Gresham:

I. The Commissioner brought with him no authority to restore the ex-Queen, nor to interfere in any way with the domestic policy of the Provisional Government.

II. The power of the United States will be exercised against foreign aggrandizement upon these islands.
III. The settlement of annexation does not fall within the scope of the Commissioner's duty, but is especially reserved to the President and Congress.

As to the announcement made by Commissioner Blount that he will not interfere in any struggle that may arise locally for the possession of this Government, except to protect American citizens not participating in the conflict, and to keep foreign powers from taking a hand in it, we do not see why it should excite either surprise or indignation. It is not the business of the United States, except where the Monroe doctrine is threatened, to concern itself in the internal quarrels of any foreign country. Neither is it considered the right or privilege of any nation to shield its citizens who may be in the military or civil service or in the political activities of a foreign state from the legal consequences of their acts. America gave no protection to Americans who aided the Cuban revolutionists; and during the civil war Great Britain never raised a protest if an English-built blockade runner, commanded by a subject of the Queen, manned by British sailors, and loaded with Birmingham consignments, was shelled and sunk by the United States blockading fleets. By these examples it is easy to see that Mr. Blount merely expresses a principle of international law in the appendix to his instructions; and that the statement of his exact position, far from being a superfluous hint to the "abhorrent and forbidden forces" in Hawaiian politics to do their worst, was a proper recognition of his duty to his own Government and countrymen, serving a useful purpose here, in that it showed the annexation party its exact bearings and forewarned it that it might be forearmed.

By way of side comment, it may be well enough to say that in the remote event of a political émeute on these islands, there will be no necessity for Commissioner Blount to land forces to protect any American's property. No citizen of the United States worthy of the name will need to appeal to him for such assistance here. The Government is in American hands, and so long as the United States is pledged by its "consistent and established policy" to keep foreign powers from interfering with it, the existing administration may be relied upon to maintain its peace against any and all comers, and to see that the homes and families of its citizens are held inviolate.

[Extract Hawaiian Daily Bulletin, May 16, 1893.]

Mr. Blount's instructions.

"Hon. James H. Blount's instructions from the Secretary of State of the United States, which the Bulletin had the honor of presenting for the first time to the public, contain nothing contrary to the opinions held, from the first until now, by the opponents of the revolutionary scheme of annexation regarding the Special Commissioner's mission to these Islands. It was from the opposite side that the intimidation came, in advance of any mention in the United States press, that a commission of investigation was to be sent here by President Cleveland. This news was contemptuously denied by the press of the party of violence, but next mail steamer brought its definite confirmation. Among other things to be investigated the instructions denominate "the causes of the revolution by which the Queen's Government was overthrown." This certainly includes the question of whether or not the United States diplomatic representative and the naval commander acting with him contributed aid to that revolution. An answer in the affirmative to this question returned by the Commissioner as a result of his investigation would lead inevitably to possibilities of the nature of those that the revolutionary press is in unwise haste to declare are beyond the scope of the Commissioner's power.

"The instructions published are only the original ones, and they inform the Commissioner that he is expected to correspond with the Secretary of State, "communicating information or soliciting special instruction on such points as" he "may deem necessary." As there will by to-morrow's expected mail have been ample time for a reply to voluminous information communicated to Washington, doubtless coupled with the solicitation of special instructions based on the facts as reported, it is only the usual rashness of the revolutionary press from the beginning which seeks to impress its readers with the view that this, that, or the other thing is absurd and impossible. The fact stands out, more prominent than almost anything else, that the United States Government, contrary to the desires and in spite of the strenuus efforts of the Provisional Government and its agents, has with all respect received the protest of the deposed Queen, and will adjudicate thereupon strictly on the merits as well as in accordance with the traditional policy of fairness and friendliness toward weak and friendly neighbors which has hitherto been among the glories of the great Republic.

"Mr. Blount's instructions bring out in high relief the policy of his Government in regard to the occasions when the landing of troops on Hawaiian territory is justi-
fable. There is small comfort in them for those who have been laboring to justify the fact and the manner of the investment of Honolulu by United States naval troops on the 16th of January. Until the facts on this point, as ascertained by the impartial investigation of Mr. Blount, see the light, however, assertion and comment, beyond what has been given already, would only be in the line of the example set by the Government organs, which have tiresomely asserted from the first that the Commissioner could find out nothing which had not been reported at Washington by the Provisional Government's commissioners, supplemented by the prejudiced and well-stuffed communications of newspaper correspondents. More interesting, if not more important, than the contents of his instructions from the Secretary of State is the terse prescription given by the Commissioner himself, in his communication to the Hawaiian people, of the status of American citizens participating in any conflict between partisans for supremacy on these islands. This is in conformity with the law of nations in similar cases provided, with which citizens and subjects of different powers, who desire to know, were made acquainted at the crisis of 1887.

"To what extent American citizens who took up arms for overthrowing the Government of this country, friendly to their own, were encouraged to rely on the support of their nation's strong arm, and by whom any such encouragement might have been proffered, are other questions that may as well be left to Mr. Blount's inquiry for solution. In this, as in other respects, the opposition can afford to maintain its unvarying coolness and patience, joined with confidence that the United States will not uphold wrong committed in her name, and the subsidized and mercenary press might, with advantage to its feelings at a later stage, try to imitate the same condition of equanimity. Americans who are opposed to filibustering and violence will be prouder of their great nation than ever as they read the words in which President Cleveland's representatives assure the law-abiding and peace-loving of his fellow-citizens on this foreign strand that they will be protected in any emergency.

"While I shall refrain from interference between conflicting forces, on whatever nationality, for supremacy, I will protect American citizens not participating in such conflict."

[Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser, Tuesday, May 14, 1895.]

Political developments.

"At present it would be useless to speculate as to the causes which have determined Commissioner Blount to publish his instructions from the State Department at Washington under which he is acting. That he has reached a point in his investigations which justifies his action none will doubt. That there is more or less significance in the publication at the present state of affairs must be admitted by all accustomed to studying the course of international diplomacy. In any event the publication will serve to throw light upon many points doubtful heretofore and will render of their baseless hopes and wilder theories regarding Commissioner Blount's intentions and alleged assurances which have passed current in royalist circles from the moment the United States stemmer Bush entered the field the more alarming than before.

"It is not our purpose to attempt an analysis of Commissioner Blount's instructions. They are certainly plain enough to need no commentary, as they are full enough to exclude all doubts as to his future action. The fullest inquiry here and report to the United States Government will be made. In the meantime the existing treaty of annexation will be held in abeyance; but the United States will, pending investigation and settlement, give adequate protection to the life and property of citizens of the United States, and, if necessary, will repress any lawless and tumultuous acts threatening them.

"Commissioner Blount's note at the end of his instructions corresponds fully with what he stated on his arrival to the Provisional Government, and seems to us the act of a wise and cautious diplomat, such as he is reported to be.

"There is one point deserving of notice in the document, and that is while the inquiry into Hawaiian affairs in detail is left to the wisdom and sound discretion of Commissioner Blount, final decision on the merits of the case is tacitly if not directly reserved. The instructions, in fact, throw no special light upon the subject of annexation. Pending the settlement of the question, however, the document is decisive and outspoken. The United States will adhere to its consistent and established policy and will not acquiesce in domestic interference by foreign powers.

As to the effect which will be produced by the publication of the instructions there can be little or no doubt. Both the Provisional Government and Americans generally have fully and freely intrusted the annexation cause to Mr. Blount, subject to any investigations he might see fit to make under his instructions. At no time
Hawaiian Islands.

have they attempted to anticipate his action or lead him to prejudge the case. They have at all times rigidly adhered to the argument of facts and figures, coupled with evident national conditions and tendencies backed by the moral and political forces of the community, which they believe to be irresistible for the establishment of stable government and the future welfare of the Islands. They hopefully retain this stand, and the text of Commissioner Blount's instructions now gives them surer hope in doing so.

The publication of Commissioner Blount's instructions is a severe blow to the political tactics of the ex-Queen's following. For some time it has been known that the royalist cause has been bolstered principally by allegations made upon the Commissioner's power and instructions to restore the monarchy. The whole mainstay of the royalist cause consequently falls to the ground with the publication of the document itself. Within the last fortnight the ex-Queen actually told a prominent native citizen of Mani to go home and continue to support her cause, as she would be restored to the throne by the middle of July. Just so long as the contents of the Commissioner's instructions remained unknown the royalists were enabled to hold the natives to their cause with hopes and promises which they knew had no foundation in fact.

An incident of the raising of the American flag in California, similar to the raising of the flag in Honolulu, has been recalled by the early settlers there. In 1842 Commodore Jones of the U.S. Navy, under the impression that the United States were at war with Mexico, took forcible possession of Monterey, hoisted the Stars and Stripes, and proclaimed California a Territory of the United States. Discerning his mistake the following day he hauled down the flag and made such apology as the circumstances would admit. A few years later, however, the flag was raised again and remained up.9

[Inclosure 3 in No. 7.]

Admiral Skerrett to Mr. Blount.

No. 167.]

U. S. S. Boston, Flagship of the Pacific Station,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, May 20, 1893.

Sir: I have examined with a view of inspection the premises first occupied by the force landed from the U. S. S. Boston, and known as Arion Hall, situated on the west side of the Government building. The position of this location is in the rear of a large brick building known as Music Hall. The street it faces is comparatively a narrow one, the building itself facing the Government building. In my opinion it was unadvisable to locate the troops there, if they were landed for the protection of the United States citizens, being distantly removed from the business portion of the town, and generally far away from the United States legation and consulate-general, as well as being distant from the houses and residences of United States citizens. It will be seen from the accompanying sketch that had the Provisional Government troops been attacked from the east, such attack would have placed them in the line of fire.

Had Music Hall been seized by the Queen's troops, they would have been under their fire, had such been their desire. It is for these reasons that I consider the position occupied as illly selected. Naturally, if they were landed with a view to support the Provisional Government troops, then occupying the Government building, it was a wise choice, as they could enfilade any troops attacking them from the palace grounds in front. There is nothing further for me to state with reference to this matter, and as has been called by you to my attention—all of which is submitted for your consideration.

Very respectfully,

J. S. Skerrett,

Rear Admiral U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

Col. J. H. Blount,

U. S. Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.
Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, June 1, 1893.

SIR: The population of the Hawaiian Islands can but be studied by one unfamiliar with the native tongue from its several census reports. A census is taken every six years. The last report is for the year 1890. From this it appears that the whole population numbers 89,990. This number includes natives, or, to use another designation, Kanakas, half-castes (persons containing an admixture of other than native blood in any proportion with it), Hawaiian-born foreigners of all races or nationalities other than natives, Americans, British, Germans, French, Portuguese, Norwegians, Chinese, Polynesians, and other nationalities.

Americans number 1,928, natives and half-castes, 40,612; Chinese,
15,301; Japanese, 12,360; Portuguese, 8,602; British, 1,344; Germans, 1,084; French, 70; Norwegians, 227; Polynesians, 588; and other foreigners 419.

It is well at this point to say that of the 7,495 Hawaiian-born foreigners 4,117 are Portuguese, 1,701 Chinese and Japanese, 1,617 other white foreigners, and 60 of other nationalities.

There are 58,714 males. Of these 18,364 are pure natives, and 3,055 are half-castes, making together 21,449. Fourteen thousand five hundred and twenty-two are Chinese. The Japanese number 10,079. The Portuguese contribute 4,770. These four nationalities furnish 50,820 of the male population.

The Americans furnish .............................................. 1,298
The British .............................................................. 982
The Germans ............................................................ 729
The French ............................................................... 46
The Norwegians .......................................................... 133

These five nationalities combined furnish 3,170 of the total male population.

The first four nationalities, when compared with the last five in male population, are nearly sixteenfold the largest in number.

The Americans are to those of the four aforementioned group of nationalities as 39 to 1—nearly as 40 to 1.

It is as convenient here as at any other place to give some facts in relation to the Portuguese. They have been brought here from time to time from the Madeira and Cape Verde Islands by the Hawaiian Government as laborers on plantations, just as has been done in relation to Chinese, Japanese, Polynesians, etc. They are the most ignorant of all imported laborers and reported to be very thievish. They are not pure Europeans, but a commingling of many races, especially the negro. They intermarry with the natives and belong to the laboring classes. Very few of them can read and write. Their children are being taught in the public schools, as all races are. It is wrong to class them as Europeans.

The character of the people of these islands is and must be overwhelmingly Asiatic. Let it not be imagined that the Chinese, Japanese, and Portuguese disappear at the end of their contract term. From the report of the inspector in chief of Japanese immigrants on March 31, 1892, it appears that twenty “lots” of Japanese immigrants have been brought here by the Hawaiian Government, numbering 21,110. Of these 2,517 have returned to Japan; 8,592, having worked out their contract term, remain, and 9,626 are still working out their contract term. More than 75 per cent may be said to locate here permanently.

There are 13,067 Chinamen engaged in various occupations, to wit: 8,763 laborers, 1,479 farmers, 133 fishermen, 74 drivers and teamsters, 564 mechanics, 42 planters and ranchers, 776 merchants and traders, 164 clerks and salesmen, 12 professional men and teachers, and 1,056 in various other occupations.

The number of merchants and traders in the entire country is 1,238. Of this number 776 are Chinamen and 81 are Americans.

The largest part of the retail trade seems to be conducted by Chinamen.

Of 20,536 laborers on sugar plantations only 2,617 are Chinese. Of this latter number only 396 are contract laborers.

The Portuguese population in 1884 amounted to 9,377 and in 1890 to 8,602—a loss of 775. These have been leaving in considerable numbers for the past eighteen months, making their way generally to the United
States. In 1890 the males were classified as to occupation thus: Laborers, 2,653, farmers, 136, fishermen, 3, mariners, 10, drivers and teamsters, 63, mechanics, 167, planters and ranchers, 17, merchants and traders, 56, clerks and salesmen, 13, professional men and teachers, 11, other occupations, 123; total, 3,266. On the cane plantations there are of male Portuguese, 277 under contract and 1,651 day laborers.

Of the population in 1892, 20,536 were laborers on sugar-cane plantations, 16,723 being Portuguese, Japanese, and Chinese. Of the whole number 10,991 are contract laborers. The remainder are designated as day laborers. The total number of laborers in the islands by the census of 1890 was 25,466.

In 1890 there were 23,863 male laborers. Of this number 18,728 were Chinese and Japanese. At this period there were 41,073 persons of all occupations. Of this number 24,432 were Chinese and Japanese.

Of the total number of persons in the various avocations, of European and American origin, it appears that 1,106 were Americans, 819 British, 518 Germans, 45 French, and 200 Norwegians, making a total of 2,688 persons.

The natives furnished 8,871 persons and the half-castes 884.

The Hawaiians, therefore, may be said to have furnished 9,755.

There are 196 persons designated as planters and ranchers. Of this number 18 are Americans, 30 are British, and 6 are Germans. The remainder are principally Japanese, Portuguese, Chinese, and Hawaiians.

There are 5,181 persons designated as farmers. Of these, 3,392 are natives and half-castes, and 1,500 are Chinese. These two furnish 4,779, leaving a residue of 402 taken from all other nationalities. Of these, 26 are Americans.

For a more minute examination of the avocation of the people, I append a tabular statement from the last census year, 1890. (%

Closer No. 1.)

It will be interesting, if not pleasing, to examine the number of the various sexes by nationalities.

The grand total of the population is 89,990. The male population is 58,714; the females are 31,276.

The natives and half-castes furnish 21,449 males and 19,174 females.

The Chinese furnish 14,522 males and 779 females.

The Japanese furnish 10,079 males and 2,281 females.

The Portuguese furnish 4,770 males and 3,832 females.

The American males are 1,298, females 630.

The British males are 982, females 362.

The German males are 729, females 305.

This disparity of the sexes applies to all nationalities, save the native race.

The most striking feature is that the Chinese men outnumber the women by more than 18 to 1.

The Japanese men outnumber their women by nearly 5 to 1. In all foreign nationalities the males largely exceed the females in numbers.

The natives and half-castes furnish nearly two-thirds of the women.

For a moment let us see how far this disparity of sexes in 1884 compares with that of 1890:

In 1884 there were 51,539 males, 29,039 females, and a total population of 80,578.

In 1890 the males numbered 58,714, the females 31,276, and the total number was 89,990.

The males increased from 1884 to 1890, 7,175. The females increased from 1884 to 1890, 2,237.
During this period there appears to have been the following gains and losses by nationalities:

Gains: Half-castes, 1,963; Hawaiian-born foreigners (mostly Portuguese), 5,455; British, 62; Japanese, 12,244.
Losses: Natives, 5,578; Americans, 138; Germans, 566; French, 122; Portuguese, 775; Norwegians, 135; Chinese, 2,638; Polynesians, 368.

The net gain is 9,412. Had it not been for the large importation of Japanese for plantation laborers there would have been a net loss of 2,832.

There was a net loss of Europeans and Americans combined numbering 899.

While the population is increasing in numbers the per cent of females is largely decreasing.

In 1866 the percentage of females was 45.25 per cent; in 1872 it was 44.37; in 1878 41.19; in 1884 36.04; in 1890 34.75.

This condition has been reached by the importation of contract labor by the Hawaiian Government for the sugar plantations.

In 1890 there was in the island of Oahu a population of 31,194. Of this number 1,239 were Americans.

There was in the island of Hawaii a population of 26,754. Of this number 289 were Americans.

In the islands of Molokai and Lanai there was a population of 2,826. Of this number 23 were Americans.

In the island of Maui there was a population of 17,357. Of this number 211 were Americans.

In the islands of Kanai and Niihau there was a population of 11,859. Of this number 112 were Americans.

The total population was 89,990. Of this number 1,928 were Americans.

It appears that in 1890, the period of the last census, that in a population of 89,990 persons 51,610 were unable to read and write. The natives and half-castes, numbering 40,622, had 27,901 able to read and write.

The Chinese, with a population of 15,301 persons, had 13,277 unable to read and write.

The Japanese, with a population of 12,360, had 12,053 persons unable to read and write.

The Portuguese, with a population of 8,602, had 6,376 unable to read and write. These are mostly children.

For more minute examination reference is made to the table enclosed herewith, from the census report of 1890. (Inclosure No. 2.)

The total number of registered voters at this period was 13,593.

Of these 9,551 were natives and half-castes; 146 Hawaiian-born foreigners, 637 Americans, 505 British, 382 Germans, 22 French, 2,091 Portuguese, 78 Norwegians, 42 Polynesians, and other nationalities 136.

From this it appears that the Hawaiians exceeded all other nationalities of voters 4,039.

The Portuguese of an age to vote generally can not read and write. The natives alone had this restriction. Place this upon the Portuguese and other nationalities and the natives would have nine-tenths of the votes.

The minister of finance informs me that the taxes paid by Americans and Europeans amount to $274,516.74; those by natives, $71,386.82; half-castes, $26,868.68; Chinese, $87,266.10; Japanese, $67,326.07; other nationalities, $729.82.
A very large proportion of the Americans and Europeans paying these taxes are antiannexationists.

He also informs me that the acreage on which taxes are paid by various nationalities is: Europeans and Americans, 1,052,492 acres; natives, 237,457 acres; half-castes, 531,545 acres; Chinese, 12,324 acres; Japanese, 200 acres; other nationalities, none.

The surveyor-general reports the crown lands for 1893 as containing 915,288 acres. Of these he reports 94,116 acres available for lease. Of this latter number only 47,000 acres are reported to be good, arable land. He likewise reports the Government land as containing 828,370 acres. He reports these, estimated in 1890, to be worth $2,128,830. The annual income from them is $67,636. Of this income $19,500 is from wharfage and $7,800 from rent of land with buildings thereon.

The cane and arable land is estimated at 35,150 acres.

It is important here to recall his statement made to the Legislature in 1891 in the following language: "Most Government lands at the present time consist of mere remnants left here and there and of the worthless and unsaleable portions remaining after the rest had been sold." And in the same communication he declares that between the years 1850 and 1860 nearly all of the desirable Government land was sold, generally to natives.

In 1890 the census report discloses that only 4,695 persons owned real estate in these Islands. With a population estimated at this time at 95,000 the vast number of landless people here is discouraging to the idea of immigrants from the United States being able to find encouragement in the matter of obtaining homes in these Islands.

I shall in a future report endeavor to inform you of the legislation in relation to the lands—the distribution of them and such other matters as would be interesting in connection therewith in the event they should figure in the consideration of future political relations with the United States.

It may be proper here to say that the landless condition of the native population grows out of the original distribution thereof by the laws of the country and does not come from its shiftlessness.

On the 30th ultimo the attorney-general and marshal called to see me. They informed me that the order of the community was threatened, according to the reports of their detectives, with a movement on the part of the antiannexation whites to take possession of the Government and restore the Queen. After some considerable presentation of details I was informed that part of the scheme was to drug me.

It so happened that during the afternoon of the preceding day a white man called to ask my opinion as to the propriety of a contemplated meeting on that evening to protest against a movement believed to be on foot by the Provisional Government to propose a new form of treaty with the United States. He said that certain white men were movers in it and he was debating whether he should advise the natives to attend; that he could see no reason for it; that they were awaiting the action of the Government of the United States on the various questions connected with the formation of the present Government, and believed that was the attitude for them to occupy. Of course I declined to express any opinion. He left me saying that he would see the natives did not attend. There was no meeting.

I said to the attorney-general that I was satisfied from communications made by the natives that they would not cooperate in any disorderly action, preferring, as they say, to submit their cause to the decision of the Government of the United States.
A meeting of half-castes, which seemed to be a part of the cause of alarm to the attorney-general and marshal, I said to them was, I believed, nothing more than an effort to prevent the aforesaid meeting.

This they accepted as the probable solution of it, and finally assented to the idea that there was no ground for a belief that there would be any disturbance such as was indicated.

On the 31st ultimo President Dole called on me and informed me that there was a petition signed by fifty persons—British subjects—requesting the British minister to prevent the sailing of the English war vessel Hyacinth, which has orders to leave here tomorrow. This seemed to occasion him some uneasiness. He finally said that the petition was being carried around by a man who had been in the military service of the Provisional Government, and had left it on account of inability to get an office which he desired.

I informed him that two nights ago the British minister had expressed to me his gratification that the vessel was going to leave; that its presence here simply furnished the opportunity for some persons to avow some unfriendly intention of his Government.

I further said that I was assured by the British minister on his own motion, in a desire to manifest his friendly disposition, that in no event would the British troops be used to advance the interests of any political movement here. He seemed to accept this as a relief from any apprehension.

The Provisional Government officials are excited by many groundless rumors, and communicate them very freely to me. I have not indicated any line of conduct which I should pursue in the event of a conflict other than that I have communicated to you.

A great deal of testimony in relation to the causes of the revolution and the circumstances attending it has been taken.

The physical inability of the stenographer up to the present time to transcribe the whole of the mass of notes which has accumulated has prevented me from fully considering them and presenting my opinions thereon.

I hope to be able to furnish you with much of interest as soon as this difficulty has been overcome.

I think the condition of the public mind here is just as formerly reported.

The universal feeling towards me so far as I can gather is one of kindness and respect. This is due in largest measure to my abstention from expressing my views on political questions.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

P. S.—Since closing the foregoing communication the inclosure (marked No. 3) has been handed to me by Mr. Samuel Parker, the genuineness of which I do not question.
### Table 6: Classification of each nationality and sex by occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Native males</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Labora.</td>
<td>2,213</td>
<td>2,311</td>
<td>4,524</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farmers.</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>117</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fishermen.</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>668</td>
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<td>Mariners.</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>559</td>
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<td>Driven and teams.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanics.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>633</td>
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<tr>
<td>Photographers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Merchants and traders.</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chefs and saloon men.</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional men and teachers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other occupations.</td>
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<td>826</td>
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<td>2,253</td>
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<td>108</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariners.</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driven and teams.</td>
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<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mechanics.</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>Photographers.</td>
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<td>113</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td><strong>American males</strong></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>American females</strong></td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>British males</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>British females</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>German males</strong></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>63</td>
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<td><strong>German females</strong></td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>66</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>French females</strong></td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Portuguese males</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Portuguese females</strong></td>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>136</td>
<td>2,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Norwegian males</strong></td>
<td>79</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Norwegian females</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>81</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chinese males</strong></td>
<td>8,793</td>
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<td>115</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>8,887</td>
<td>1,497</td>
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<td>5,535</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5,573</td>
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<tr>
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<td>27</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>6,936</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>7,391</td>
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<tr>
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<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polynesian females</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>300</td>
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<td><strong>Other nationalities</strong></td>
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<td>Males</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Females</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>91</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total males</strong></td>
<td>23,863</td>
<td>5,087</td>
<td>28,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total females</strong></td>
<td>1,063</td>
<td>94</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td>24,926</td>
<td>5,181</td>
<td>29,107</td>
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### Table 1.—Classification of each nationality and sex by social condition, education, school attendance, possession of electoral franchise, and ownership of real estate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Unmarried</th>
<th>Widowers</th>
<th>Widows</th>
<th>Divorced</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Attending school</th>
<th>Able to read and write</th>
<th>Owning real estate</th>
<th>Registered voters</th>
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<td>Native males</td>
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<td>9,578</td>
<td>1,299</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>18,384</td>
<td>2,980</td>
<td>17,756</td>
<td>5,304</td>
<td>2,371</td>
<td>8,777</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8,866</td>
<td>1,616</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>15,973</td>
<td>2,822</td>
<td>10,311</td>
<td>7,677</td>
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<td>18,444</td>
<td>2,915</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>34,357</td>
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<td>28,067</td>
<td>10,077</td>
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<td>66</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>883</td>
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<td>Half-caste females</td>
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<td>105</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>875</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>6,866</td>
<td>1,758</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3,809</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>602</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>630</td>
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<td>362</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td></td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>192</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>124</td>
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<td>15,067</td>
<td>1,057</td>
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<td>Grand total</td>
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<td>283</td>
<td>50,090</td>
<td>9,872</td>
<td>38,380</td>
<td>4,055</td>
<td>13,593</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Hon. J. H. Blount,

Special Commissioner of the United States to Hawaii:

Sir: On Friday afternoon, January 13, about 2 o'clock, we, Samuel Parker, W. H. Cornwell, J. F. Colburn, and A. P. Peterson were called by Her Majesty to the palace and asked to accept positions in a new cabinet, the Wilcox cabinet having tendered their resignations the day previous. We accepted and were handed our commissions, and took the oath of office before Chief Justice Judd in the blue room. It was then thought advisable that the announcement be made to the Legislature, which was accordingly done, after which the cabinet went again to the palace to consult with Her Majesty as to what bills, having passed the Legislature, should be signed by her. Her Majesty asked the advice of the cabinet as to whether she should sign the lottery bill, the opium bill, and the registration act, which laws were then before her. At the same time she expressed a desire to satisfy her lady friends by vetoing the opium bill, and also expressed doubts as to the advisability of signing the registration act. The cabinet advised that as a majority of the Legislature and the mass of the people were in favor of the lottery and opium bills it was the duty of the Sovereign to sign them, and also that as the registration act was deemed important to the planting interests, although opposed very strenuously by a large number of people, it would be advisable to sign that also, as no bill of importance had been vetoed during the session and it was not advisable to do so.

The next day, Saturday, the Legislature met at the usual hour and transacted the business which remained, and adjourned until 12 o'clock the same day for prorogation. Both at the morning session and at the ceremonies attending the prorogation the members of the Reform party in the Legislature, to a man, were conspicuous by their absence, although occasionally one of their number would show himself and then report proceedings down town. Immediately after the ceremonies the cabinet were notified that the foreign representatives desired to meet them, and accordingly a meeting was held in the foreign office, all of the foreign representatives being present. Mr. Wodehouse, the English commissioner, stated that they were informed that Her Majesty intended to promulgate a new constitution upon that day, and asked what the cabinet intended to do about the matter, if this proved correct. Mr. Parker replied for the cabinet, and stated that he had heard of the matter and that the cabinet had decided to advise Her Majesty against such a course.

This reply was satisfactory to all the representatives except to Mr. Stevens, the American minister, who became excited, and dropping the subject under discussion pounded his cane upon the floor and stated in a loud voice that the United States had been insulted, and that the passage of the lottery bill was a direct attack upon his Government. The other representatives tried to change the subject, and, finally succeeding, the meeting broke up after several of them had disclaimed any approbation of Mr. Stevens's remarks. The cabinet then went to the palace and met the Queen in the blue room, where she stated that at the desire of a large number of her subjects she wished to promulgate a new constitution. The cabinet then spoke of the meeting just held with the foreign representatives and advised Her Majesty not to do it, as they considered the time inopportune and the action inadvisable. The Queen, after considerable hesitation, finally yielded to the advice of her ministers, and so notified the people who were assembled in the palace and throughout the grounds. Early Sunday morning the cabinet met in Mr. Cornwell's residence to consider the situation. Mr. W. M. Giffard, manager of W. G. Irwin & Co., and of Mr. Spreckels's business in Honolulu at that time, notified them that it had been agreed between their bank and the bank of Bishop & Co. that they would render such financial assistance as the Government might need.

It was also reported by Mr. Colburn and Mr. Peterson that an organization known as the "Committee of Safety" had been formed the night before at the house of Mr. L. A. Thurston, and had made overtures to them as members of the cabinet to assist them in deposing the Queen. That they intended to go ahead and that Mr. Stevens's assistance, together with that of his Government, had been guaranteed them. This statement was from Mr. Thurston himself. It was finally decided to ask a number of the most influential merchants and citizens to meet the cabinet and discuss the situation. The meeting was set for 1 o'clock in the afternoon, and in the meantime the cabinet repaired to the station house to consult with the marshal as to the best means of keeping the peace. Everything was found to be in readiness for any disturbance that might arise. At the appointed time the cabinet met in the foreign office with Mr. W. M. Giffard, representing Claus Spreckels; Mr. S. M. Damon representing Bishop & Co.; Mr. J. O. Carter, representing C. Brewer & Co.; Mr. S. C. Allen, representing Allen & Robinson and the Robinson estate; Mr. F. A. Schaefer,
of F. A. Schaefer & Co., and E. C. Macfarlane. The situation was then discussed by all present and methods proposed which would relieve it.

During this discussion Mr. S. M. Damon remarked, the subject having been brought up by the information as to the intentions of the committee of safety, that the Boston's troops would allow whether the Government liked it or not. It was finally decided that the best course to allay public feeling, and one which must be satisfactory to the people at large and the business interests generally, was for the Cabinet to procure from Her Majesty a statement that no further attempt would be made to promulgate a new constitution. This was accordingly done, and the next day, Monday, such statement was sent to the different members of the diplomatic corps, as well as printed and circulated throughout the town. Sunday evening Mr. Parker and Mr. Peterson reported to the cabinet the result of an interview between Mr. Stevens and themselves in which Mr. Stevens had stated that he would not assist the Government as long as Mr. C. B. Wilson remained marshal, and a number of other statements made by him showing his hostility toward the Government and bearing out the information which had previously been received as to his friendly attitude toward the committee of safety. On Monday morning, after the assurance of Her Majesty that no new attempt would be made to promulgate a new constitution was made public, a feeling of satisfaction was generally manifested and an attempt was made by a number of leading citizens to postpone the mass meeting, which had been called for that afternoon and was unnecessary; but Mr. Thurston protested and thought the meeting should go ahead and at least express their disapproval of the course pursued by the Queen.

After the people attending the two mass meetings had quietly dispersed to their homes, and the city was as quiet as Sunday, the cabinet was informed, late Monday afternoon, that troops, armed with rifles and bringing Gatling guns, were being landed from the U.S. S. Boston. They immediately asked Mr. Stevens what this landing of troops meant, he not having asked the usual permission from the Government, and he, although sending a written reply, did not answer the question, but evaded it. The Boston troops took up a position commanding the Government building and the palace, and a position which commanded no American property. Monday evening was exceedingly quiet, the only disquietude being caused by the landing of foreign troops, which was generally disapproved of. On Tuesday information was received that the committee of safety were recruiting troops for the purpose of forming a provisional government; that they were inducing men to enlist with them on the promise that the Boston's troops would interfere and assist them without it being necessary for them to fire a shot or incur any risk. Shortly after noon Mr. Parker and Mr. Peterson returned from an interview with Mr. Stevens, and reported that he (Mr. Stevens) had said that if any number of what he called responsible citizens should take possession of any building in town and form a provisional government he should recognize them and assist them to the extent of his power, and that he should refuse any assistance to the Queen's Government. The cabinet then made the station house their headquarters, as has always been the custom in any troubled times, the Government building always having been considered untenable. They then sent for a number of prominent citizens to consult with them.

Although being satisfied as to Mr. Stevens' position it was deemed best by the cabinet to get something from him in writing, and accordingly they sent a letter to him between 2 and 3 o'clock, asking whether the report was true that he had recognized the Provisional Government. In a little over half an hour his reply was received which stated that he had done so. Shortly after this Mr. S. M. Damon and Mr. C. Bolte came to the station house as messengers from the Provisional Government to consult with the Queen's cabinet as to an amicable settlement of the difficulty without resort to arms. Mr. Damon during the interview said it would merely be a waste of blood to resist, as the Boston and the Boston's troops stood ready to assist the Provisional Government. The cabinet gave them no reply but agreed to go with them and consult with the executive council of the Provisional Government at the Government building, which they accordingly did. At this meeting President Dole stated that it was their desire to have the matter settled without any resort to arms, and asked the Queen's cabinet to deliver up to them what Government property was in their possession. The cabinet replied that before any answer could be given it would be necessary to consult with Her Majesty. This was agreed upon, and the cabinet, accompanied by Mr. S. M. Damon, proceeded to the palace and met the Queen. There were present at that time, besides Her Majesty and her ministers, H. A. Widemann, Paul Neumann, E. C. Macfarlane, J. O. Carter, and S. M. Damon.

The question as to the surrender of the Queen was discussed by nearly all present, and Mr. Stevens' attitude and letter recognizing the Provisional Government were also spoken of, and the unanimous opinion of those present was, that although the Queen's Government had possession of the station house, the barracks, and the palace, together with the greater part of the arms and ammunition in the kingdom,
and all the Gatling guns and field pieces except those under the control of foreign nations, and men enough, both foreign and native, to make them absolutely impregnable so far as any force which could be brought against them from people resident within the Kingdom was concerned, and with force enough to put down any disturbance and to keep the peace of the country, unless such disturbance was assisted by foreign troops. Considering the position taken by the representative of the United States it was useless to make war against that country, which any resistance on the part of the Queen's Government plainly meant, and that the wiser course to pursue was to surrender the Government property under a protest to the United States, the superior force of that country having brought about the situation. The protest was immediately drawn and signed by Her Majesty and her ministers and taken to President Dole, who indorsed the receipt of it. At a little after 7 o'clock that evening the Provisional Government took possession of the station house and other Government buildings and of the arms and ammunition then in possession of the Queen's Government.

SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
WM. H. CORNEW,
Minister of Finance.
JOHN F. COLBURN,
Minister of Interior.
A. P. PETTERSON,
Attorney-General.

In view of the facts stated above, which can not be controverted, and in view of the fact that your investigations concerning the matter are shortly likely to terminate, we, Liliuokalani and her cabinet, who formed the Government of the Hawaiian Islands on the 17th of January last, having surrendered that Government to the superior force of the United States of America, now most respectfully ask that you use your good offices in undoing the acts of a representative of your great country and place the Government of the Hawaiian Islands as Mr. Stevens found them. Believing that the principle of justice which has ever dominated American action will prevail in this instance, we remain,

Yours, respectfully,

LILIUOKALANI, R.
SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
WM. H. CORNEW,
Minister of Finance.
JOHN F. COLBURN,
Minister of Interior.
A. P. PETTERSON,
Attorney-General.

No. 12.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 9.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, June 6, 1893.

Sir: I have the honor to report that the political conditions of the Islands do not import any conflict of arms. The Government is very alert in watching every movement which threatens it. Almost any trilling assemblage of natives at night is the occasion of alarm.

The natives are favoring public order, and looking for some action on my part favorable to them. Notwithstanding the publication of my instructions, and my previous declaration that I had no power to restore the Queen, there remains in the native mind a strong faith that, owing to the interference of the American minister and the American marines, resulting in the surrender to the Provisional Government by the Queen of her forces, the United States will ultimately restore her to power.

The action of Admiral Thomas, in 1843, in restoring the Hawaiian flag is written deeply in the minds of the native people. A public
square has been set apart and beautified in honor of his memory and action. This, and the friendly relations between our Government and that of these Islands, seems to be the inspiration of buoyant hope in their final independence.

Should this fail them, and they be left free from interference by foreign powers, the peace of to-day may change into warlike action against the existing order of things.

It can not be truthfully stated that the present peace is the result of the power of the Provisional Government.

I deem it proper at this time to indulge in some observations in relation to landed property here.

To understand the present distribution it is necessary to understand the ancient system of land tenure as well as the modern.

And now as to the first:

Each island was divided into several districts. The next subdivision is the Ahupuaa. Typically this is a long narrow strip extending from the sea to the mountain, so that its chief may have his share of all the various products of the mountain region, the cultivated land, and the sea. It was generally, though not always, subdivided into ilis, each with its own name and carefully defined boundary.

There were two kinds of ilis. The first was a mere subdivision of the Ahupuaa for the convenience of the chief holding the same, who received its revenues from his agent. The other class did not pay tribute to a chief.

The ilis were again subdivided, and many of the larger patches had individual names.

The patches cultivated exclusively for the chief were called koele or hakunaie. The tenants were obliged to work for him on Fridays. In the "principles adopted by the land commission to quiet land titles," approved by the legislative council October 26, 1846, it is stated that—

When the islands were conquered by Kamehameha I, he followed the example of his predecessors, and divided out the lands among his principal warrior chiefs, retaining, however, a portion in his own hands to be cultivated or managed by his own immediate servants or attendants. Each principal chief divided his lands anew and gave them out to an inferior order of chiefs, by whom they were subdivided again and again, often passing through the hands of four, five, or six persons from the King down to the lowest class of tenants. All these persons were considered to have rights in these lands, or the productions of them, the proportions of which rights were not clearly defined, although universally acknowledged. All persons possessing landed property, whether superior landlords, tenants, or subtenants, owed and paid to the King not only a land tax, which he assessed at pleasure, but also service, which was called for at discretion, on all the grades, from the highest down. They also owed and paid some portion of the productions of the land, in addition to the yearly taxes. A failure to render any of these was always considered a just cause for which to forfeit the lands. The same rights which the King possessed over the superior landlords and all under them, the various grades of landlords possessed over their inferiors, so that there was a joint ownership of the land, the King really owning the allotium, and the persons in whose hands he placed the land, holding it in trust.

The land taxes were really rents and went to the King as his private income. The idea of a nation or government as distinguished from the person of the King first began to be recognized in the Constitution of 1840. When the labor tax first began to be regulated by law, every tenant was required to work one day in every week (Tuesday) for the King, and one day (Friday) for the landlord.

The long reign of Kamehameha evolved greater permanency and security in the possession of the lands.

On the accession of his son Liholiho no general redistribution of lands took place.
The common people were merely tenants at will, liable to be dispossessed at any time, and even to be stripped of their personal property at the will of their chiefs.

Laws were passed in 1839 and 1840 to prevent evictions without cause and the wanton seizure of the property of tenants.

The King and chiefs resolved to divide and define the shares which each held in undivided shares of the lands of the Kingdom. The following rules were noted by the privy council December 18, 1847:

Whereas it has become necessary to the prosperity of our Kingdom and the proper physical, mental, and moral improvement of our people that the undivided rights at present existing in the lands of our Kingdom shall be separated and distinctly defined;

Therefore, We, Kamehameha III, King of the Hawaiian Islands, and his chiefs, in privy council assembled, do solemnly resolve that we will be guided in such division by the following rules:

1. His Majesty, our most Gracious Lord and King, shall, in accordance with the constitution and laws of the land, retain all his private lands as his own individual property, subject only to the rights of the tenants, to have and hold to him, his heirs and successors forever.

2. One-third of the remaining lands of the Kingdom shall be set aside as the property of the Hawaiian Government, subject to the direction and control of His Majesty as pointed out by the constitution and laws, one-third to the chiefs and konohikis in proportion to their possessions to have and to hold, to them, their heirs and successors forever, and the remaining third to the tenants, the actual possessors and cultivators of the soil, to have and to hold, to them, their heirs and successors forever.

3. The division between the chiefs or the konohikis and their tenants, prescribed by rule 2d, shall take place whenever any chief, konohiki, or tenant shall desire such division, subject only to confirmation by the King in privy council.

4. The tenants of His Majesty's private lands shall be entitled to a fee-simple title to one-third of the lands possessed and cultivated by them; which shall be set off to the said tenants in fee simple whenever His Majesty or any of said tenants shall desire such division.

5. The division prescribed in the foregoing rules shall in no wise interfere with any lands that may have been granted by His Majesty or his predecessors in fee simple to any Hawaiian subject or foreigner, nor in any way operate to the injury of the holders of the unexpired leases.

6. It shall be optional with any chief or konohiki, holding lands in which the Government has a share, in the place of setting aside one-third of the said lands as Government property, to pay into the treasury one-third of the unimproved value of said lands, which payment shall operate as a total extinguishment of the Government right in said lands.

7. All the lands of His Majesty shall be recorded in a book entitled "Register of the lands belonging to Kamehameha III, King of the Hawaiian Islands," and deposited with the registry of land titles in the office of the minister of the interior; and all lands set aside as the lands of the Hawaiian Government shall be recorded in a book entitled "Register of the lands belonging to the Hawaiian Government," and fee-simple titles shall be granted to all other allottees upon the award of the board of commissioners to quiet land titles.

The division between the King and his chiefs was settled by a committee March 7, 1848. The book containing a record of this division also contains releases signed by the several chiefs to the King, of the lands they surrendered, and releases by the King to the several chiefs of his feudal rights in the land remaining to them as their shares.

These formal awards were made, after evidence of title, which could be converted into alodial title by payment of the consideration provided for in rules 6 and 7, above cited.

On the 8th of March, 1848, the King set apart for the use of the Government the larger part of his royal domain, specified by name, and reserved the residue for himself, his heirs, and successors. On June 7, 1848, the legislative council passed an act confirming and ratifying what had been done by the King.

In 1850 most of the chiefs ceded a third part of their lands to the Government to obtain an alodial title. This was accepted by the privy council the same year.
The Crown lands received their designation from the cession by the King of his share, founded on rule 1, above cited, to the Government. The Government lands were derived under rule 2 and from cession from the chiefs in 1850.

In all awards of ahupu'a and i l i s the rights of tenants are reserved. The acts of August 6, 1850, and July 11, 1851, protect the common people in the right to take wood, thatch, kileaf, etc. They were also guaranteed the right to water and the right of way, but not the right of pasturage on the land of the konohiki, or chief. The right of fishing in the sea appurtenant to the land and to sell the fish caught by him was secured to every bona fide resident on land. The fee-simple title, free of all commutation, to all native tenants was secured finally by the act of August 6, 1850. The right of lords over tenants was thus ended.

Mr. W. D. Alexander, superintendent of Government surveys, defines Government lands in this language:

The great mass of the Government lands consists of those lands which were surrendered and made over to the Government by the King, Kamehameha III, and which are enumerated by name in the act of June 7, 1848. To these must be added the lands ceded by the several chiefs in lieu of commutation, those lands purchased by the Government at different times, and also all lands forfeited to the Government by the neglect of their claimants to present their claims within the period fixed by law. By virtue of various statutes, from time to time sales of these lands have taken place.

The same authority says that between the years 1850 and 1860 nearly all the desirable Government lands was sold, generally to natives. The total number of grants issued before April 1, 1890, was 3,475.

In 1850 one-twentieth part of all the lands belonging to the Government was set apart for the purposes of education. Most of these have been sold.

Mr. Alexander says: "The term 'Crown lands' is applied to those lands reserved by Kamehameha III, March 8, 1848, for himself, his heirs, and successors forever, as his private property."

Kamehameha III and his successors dealt with these as with their private property, selling, leasing, and mortgaging the same, and conveying good titles.

The supreme court held that the inheritance to the Crown lands was limited to the successors to the throne, and at the same time that the possessor might regulate and dispose of the same as his private property. Subsequently an act of the legislature made them inalienable and declared that they should not be leased for a period to exceed thirty years.

When the division of lands was determined upon the chiefs and tenants alike were required to make proofs of the lands they occupied. Failing in this, their rights were barred.

In view of the principles laid down for a division of the land, the inference is that the common people received their share of one-third. Now, what are the facts? Before this division many natives lived with chiefs and occupied no land. Others occupied small parcels for taro patches, and took fish from the waters, and thus obtained their food. These patches did not generally exceed 1 acre, and were designated as kulenas in the native tongue. Proof of this occupation of land had to be made before the land commission, involving such forms and proofs that the ignorant native failed in many instances to comply with the regulations, and so lost his property. These little holdings were all that they ever obtained.

The historian of land titles (quoted here as the highest authority) omits this great fact. In examining his work with him, he admits what
I have asserted in relation to the lands assigned to the common people. This is also confirmed to me by the present minister of finance, Mr. Damon (formerly vice-president of the advisory council).

Much is said here of the natives being wasteful, and in consequence becoming landless. To my mind, when Japanese, Chinese, and Portuguese cheap labor was substituted for his own and he sought employment in other avocations more remunerative and turned from these insignificant possessions, he followed only the suggestions which would have come to any person of any race.

Subsequently natives purchased Government land under a law providing for the sale of portions of them to residents in lots from 1 to 50 acres. To this I shall recur hereafter.

The lands here are designated as Crown lands, Government lands, the Bishop lands, and those owned by private parties.

The Government lands contain 827,370 acres; the Crown lands, 915,288 acres; the Bishop lands (a gift from a native, Mrs. C. R. Bishop) are devoted to educational purposes and contain 406,829 acres. The private lands amount to 1,854,001 acres. Of these Europeans and Americans now own 1,052,462; natives, 257,457; half-castes, 531,545; Chinese, 12,324 acres; Japanese 200 acres; other nationalities, none.

The Bishop lands mentioned above are included in the 531,545 acres taxed as belonging to half-castes.

Mr. Albert Loebenstein, of Hilo, Hawaii, in a conversation with me, written out and certified by him, says:

The Crown lands generally are leased to corporations for cane culture and grazing, at a very low price for a long term of years. Most of the Government lands are in the hands of sugar-planters.

He estimates the award of kuleanas to natives at about 11,000 acres. He estimates that the Government has sold 290,000 acres of land to residents, and that two-thirds of this was sold to natives, and is now owned by corporations for cane culture. He thinks the natives sold on account of their improvidence in encumbering themselves with debt.

It appears to me that, with small holdings and no right of pasturage, they could find but little opportunity for a good living on them. They are certainly engaged in labor in various employments offering a life of more comfort.

If American laborers can not compete with Chinese and Japanese contract labor it is not a sign of indolence that the Kanaka should fly from its crushing competition. It is still less so when he sees his own Government seeking cheap labor for cane-growers and enforcing its efficiency by laws intended to compel them to fulfill their contracts.

Mr. C. R. Bishop tells in his statement the simple story of the land division on which the real property of the country rests. He says a land commission was created for the purpose of giving title to all the people who had claim to lands. The King and chiefs made this division in 1847. It was agreed that the people should have their small holdings, which they occupied and cultivated since 1839. That year was fixed because it was the year in which the first draft of the constitution defining the rights of the people was made.

The principle upon which the lands were divided he states thus:

The chiefs had been given lands by former kings, by Kamehameha I, especially. They could not sell or lease them without the consent of the King and premiers. There were other lands supposed to be the King's private lands. When the division was made these lands, which he claimed were his own, were set apart and called crown lands. That was his private estate really, and the others belonged to the Government, the chiefs, and the people. The people got theirs out of the Government land,
the King's land, and the chiefs' land. These were called kuleanas. The King's lands were called Crown lands, from which he derived his support. The Government lands were for the support of the Government. The King had a right to and did sell Crown lands at his pleasure until 1864.

In the division of lands the Crown lands were large in amount, the Government received a large share, and the largest part of the remainder went to the chiefs. The Government lands are nearly sold out. The kuleanas would not average more than 2 or 3 acres. A great many natives were seamen, mechanics, fishermen, teachers, and followers of chiefs, who received no land. The children of these awardees of kuleanas generally have no land. The sugar planters derive their titles from the Government and the chiefs.

The King and the chiefs were extravagant; got into debt, and then had to pay. When they got the title to their lands these debts were paid by many of the chiefs with lands. During their lifetime they got rid of a great deal of land. The plantations have come nearly altogether from the Government and the chiefs, and considerable of the land is leased from Crown lands.

Mr. Bishop's statement, which will be duly reported, though freed from the technicalities and formalities of a trained lawyer, brings out all that is practical and vital in the origin and progress of the land system of the Hawaiian Islands.

Attention is here invited to the character of the early surveys and surveys of grants from a report made by the Surveyor-General to the legislature in 1891:

**CHARACTER OF THE EARLY SURVEYS.**

First in order are the old surveys made under the direction of the land commission, and commonly known as “kuleana” surveys. These had the same defects as the first surveys in most new countries. These defects were, in great part, owing to the want of any proper supervision. There was no bureau of surveying, and the president of the land commission was so overwhelmed with work that he had no time to spare for the superintendence of the surveying. As has been truly said, there was little money to pay out and little time to wait for the work. Political reasons also added to the haste with which the work was pushed through, and barely completed before the death of Kamehameha III.

No uniform rules or instructions were given to the surveyors employed, who were practically irresponsible. Few of them could be regarded as thoroughly competent surveyors, while some were not only incompetent, but careless and unscrupulous. The result was that almost every possible method of measurement was adopted. Some used 50-foot chains, and others the 4-rod chain divided into links; some attempted to survey by the true meridian, others by the average magnetic meridian, while most made no allowance for local variations of the needle. There are some surveys recorded which were made with a ship's compass, or even a pocket compass. Few of them took much pains to mark corners or to note the topographical features of the country. Rarely was one section or district assigned to one man. It is said that over a dozen were employed in surveying Waikiki, for instance, not one of whom knew what the other surveyors had done or tried to make his surveys agree with theirs where they adjoined one another. As might be expected, overlaps and gaps are the rule rather than the exception, so that it is generally impossible to put these old surveys together correctly on paper without ascertaining their true relative positions by actual measurement on the ground.

The board of commissioners to quiet land titles were empowered by the law of August 6, 1850, not only to "define and separate the portions of land belonging to different individuals," but "to provide for an equitable exchange of such different portions where it can be done, so that each man's land may be by itself." This, however, was rarely done, and the kuleanas very often consist of several sections or "apanas" apiece, scattered here and there in the most irregular manner imaginable. No general rules were laid down in regard to the size of kuleanas, though mere house lots were limited to one-quarter of an acre by the act just cited, section 5. The consequence was that the responsibility was mainly thrown upon the surveyors, and there was the greatest variety of practice among them in different districts. The act above mentioned provided that fee-simple titles should "be granted to native tenants for the lands they occupy and improve." This was differently interpreted by different surveyors, so that in fact the "kuleanas" vary from 1 to 10 acres in extent. General maps of whole districts, even shupuaas, exhibiting the exact location of all the different claims contained within them, were scarcely thought of, if hardly could have been made with the inferior instruments and defective methods used by most of the kuleana surveyors of that time.
Surveys of grants were of a similar character to those of kuleanas. Formerly it was not the policy of the Government to have Government lands surveyed as wholes, or to have their boundaries settled. Portions of Government land sold to private persons were surveyed at the expense of the purchaser. It was seldom the case that an entire "ahupuaa" was sold at once. The pieces sold were of all sizes and shapes, sometimes cutting across half a dozen ahupuna, and were generally surveyed without reference to the surveys of adjoining land sales or awards. Hence most Government lands at the present time consist of mere remnants left here and there, and of the worthless and unsalable portions remaining after the rest had been sold. It follows that, even supposing all the outside boundaries of a Government land to have been surveyed and duly settled by the commissioneer of boundaries, it would still be necessary to locate on the ground all the grants and awards contained within the land in question in order to ascertain how much of it is left. Nothing short of a general survey of the country will bring to light all these facts, will exhibit the Government lands in their true position in relation to other lands, and enable the minister of the interior as well as applicants for land to judge of their actual value. It was considerations like these which induced the then minister of the interior, Dr. Hutchinson, to institute the Government survey in 1871. An account of that survey, its objects, methods, and results, was published in pamphlet form in 1883.

W. D. ALEXANDER,
Superintendent of Government Survey.

In view of the foregoing observations it appears to me that if a humane feeling towards the native population of these islands is to have place in American thought there will arise a conviction that instead of inviting immigrants from the United States or other countries to these islands in the hope of obtaining homes, whatever of lands may be used in this way are more than needed by the native population. They seem moreover, to suggest that if the native has not advanced in mental and moral culture up to the highest standard it can not be denied that the policy of the Hawaiian Government in the distribution of its lands has been a great hindrance to him.

His advancement in the future under the conditions now surrounding him are by no means encouraging. If his advancement should reach the most desirable stage there will in all probability arise a discontent well calculated to unsettle any social fabric which sought to give it permanency.

It has been made to appear in official reports of the Hawaiian Government, and in magazine and newspaper articles, that the native population was dying out and would in a few years become extinct. The best opinion I can obtain here is that the death rate no longer exceeds the birth rate, but that there is a gradual increase in the native population. The extinction of the native, therefore, can no longer afford any excuse for any distribution of the land of the country on that account.

Out of a population of 40,622 natives and half-casts, 23,473 are officially reported as able to read and write. They are generally allied in their religious affiliations with the Protestant and Catholic churches.

Mr. Sereno E. Bishop, an ardent annexationist, and with an eye quick to discern all their faults, in 1888 uses the following language:

The Hawaiian race is one that is well worth saving. With all their sad frailties, they are a noble race of men, physically and morally. They are manly, courageous, enterprising, cordial, generous, unselfish. They are highly receptive of good. They love to look forward and upward, though very facile to temptations to slide backward and downward. In an unusual degree they possess a capacity for fine and ardent enthusiasm for noble ends.

Can a Christian civilization doom such a people to annihilation by any policy of legislation?

I see in the letters from here to the New York World and Sun statements that I had expressed my own opinions in reference to political
questions in these islands, and declaring the opinion of the President on the subject of annexation.

I send you herewith the statement of Mr. Fred. Wundenberg. He is a gentleman of excellent sense and character. It touches upon several questions with so much aptness that I have thought it perhaps might interest you.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

Interview of Mr. Wundenberg. MAY 15, 1893.

Q. Where were you born?
A. On the island of Kanai.

Q. How long have you lived in the Islands?
A. I was born in 1850 and have lived here ever since.

Q. What are you engaged in?
A. At present I am deputy clerk of the supreme court.

Q. Have you been recently offered the position of collector-general of customs?
A. I have.

Q. Did you decline it?
A. I did.

Q. I see in the correspondence between the American minister at this point and the State Department the allegation that Mr. Wilson is the paramour of the Queen. What knowledge have you of the relations between these parties?

A. Queen Lilinokalani, before she was Queen, was in the habit of providing for a number of Hawaiian girls—in some cases educating them at her own expense; bringing them into society, and teaching them manners, dancing and all that sort of business and providing them with suitable husbands. Miss Townsend, the present wife of Wilson, is one of her beneficiaries, and her marriage with Wilson was brought about in the same way. Mrs. Wilson was Emmeline Townsend. She was a particular personal friend of Lilinokalani—always attended her—as a sort of maid of honor, and that relation has existed right up to the present time.

Wilson, in that way became the intimate acquaintance and friend of Lilinokalani, and he also was the personal friend of Dominis. Wilson was fond of horse racing and fond of shooting and rowing—and the old governor was a great sportsman. He was fond of boats: he had the best boats. He tried to have the best horses; prided himself on the best guns. Wilson was an admirer of all that sort of thing, and they naturally drifted together in that way. That was prior to Lilinokalani being Queen. After she became Queen, Dominis was in ill health, and the revolution of 1887 had taken place; the Wilcox riot had taken place, and the woman was in constant dread of something of the kind, and Wilson, being near to her person, and a reliable friend of hers, and a man of known courage, it was the most natural thing in the world that she would want him to be marshal. She insisted upon it. Loper at that time was marshal. Loper, as well as most of us, had taken a hand in the affair of 1887. She wanted things in shape that she could see she had control of things. The station house was an arsenal. They kept arms there, and ordnance; cannon, Gatling guns, etc., had been removed in 1887 down there and placed under the charge of Marshal Loper, who was in sympathy and connection with the 1887 party. So when she came in power it was one of the first demands she made, that some of her friends should be placed in charge of that institution. I was postmaster then, and one of the demands made was that I should be removed, and I was removed on account of my affiliation with the 1887 party.

Q. The change from Loper to Wilson gave offense to the other side—the Reform party?
A. There was a little interregnum in which another man named Hopkins, was put in temporary charge before Wilson formally took office, but practically Wilson followed Loper. This little administration of Hopkins did not amount to anything.

Q. Wilson going in there gave offense to the Reform party?
A. No; nothing seemed to be said about it. After they began to find things were going against them, and the results of the elections of 1890—the National Reform party swept the field—then they began their old games of attacking through the press. They attacked everybody and everything—not only Wilson, but everybody.
If a chicken thief was caught, Wilson was held up for ridicule. For every drunk, robber, etc., Wilson was blamed. They attacked him broadcast through the press.

Q. Any efforts made to impeach him?
A. I do not think so; not to my knowledge.

Q. Where was he born?
A. Wilson is the son of the English consul at Tahiti, by a Tahitian chiefess.

Q. Did he come here as a boy?
A. Yes. He is about the same age I am. I am rather better informed than anybody else regarding Wilson. My mother, the daughter of missionaries, was born in Tahiti and was well acquainted with the Wilson family.

Q. How old was he when he came here?
A. His father was interested in shipping ventures, and among other places of trade, I think either owned totally, or in connection with other parties, Fannings Island. He had interests there, and it was in one of these trading voyages that he was lost. Old Capt. English, who is here now, took the two boys—the brothers—and carried them to Fannings Island. They lived there, and when they were old enough, the old man brought them here and put them to school. That was in the early fifties. I think they went to school with Captain Smith.

Q. How old would that make him?
A. About 43 years old. As was usually the case with half-whites of that class, they did not have the best opportunities for education. After they got the ordinary rudiments they would be put to a trade. He was put to a trade. He learned the blacksmith’s trade. He was a man of strong character and ability. He dropped that and went into Government employ. He was made superintendent of waterworks and made a good one.

Q. What sort of marshal did he make?
A. An exceptionally good one.
Q. Was that generally the opinion?
A. I do not think they have ever had a marshal here at any time who could equal him, and I think it would be a hard matter to get anyone—with this one exception—like most of the natives Wilson was careless in money matters. I have to admit that Wilson was careless.

Q. Behind in his accounts?
A. In his business arrangements he has been careless. When he was superintendent of waterworks he got behind considerably. I saw his difficulties. There was a shortage of something like nine or ten thousand dollars. We advanced the money for him, myself and the present Queen. That transaction was open to explanation. I think Wilson was made the residuary legatee of a long series of old fossils. It had been considered a place of no importance. They kept accounts very badly. They kept a system of receipt books with stubs. The investigation was held by Gulick. These stubs were added up and Wilson was made to account for it. I can not say whether he was responsible for it.

Q. Did he ever live in the palace with the Queen?
A. I do not think Wilson ever lived in the palace. Wilson and his wife occupied the bungalow.

Q. How far is that from the palace?
A. It is located in the corner of Richard and Palace Walk, in the palace yard. I know that Wilson and his wife occupied some of the apartments. The other apartments were occupied by others of her household, servants and retainers. She occupied the palace herself, or lived in her own place, at Washington Place.

Q. How far is the bungalow from the palace?
A. Sixty or 100 yards. I used to visit him at times. The palace stands in the middle of the square.

Q. Have you ever heard it stated from any reliable source that Mr. Wilson was lodged in the palace?
A. Never.

Q. How was the Queen received here in society?
A. She was always received with the greatest respect.

Q. Please illustrate what you mean by that?
A. No entertainment of any importance—reception, ball—was considered complete without the presence of the Queen. The chief justice on one occasion gave a ball or entertainment of some kind; I think it was a reception to Armstrong. I was present. The Queen was there. The chief justice was very attentive to the Queen. W. R. Castle gave an entertainment not a great while ago at his residence to some children, which the Queen attended. Castle was extremely attentive to her. In fact, whenever the so-called missionary party gave any entertainment they were always desirous of having the Queen. She received the most marked attention from them.

Q. Were these ladies active in social life about the palace?
A. Yes; whenever the Queen would give entertainments these people always attended.
Q. With as much freedom as other classes of people?
A. I think so.
Q. You spoke of the Queen educating Hawaiian girls. At what school?
A. At a number of schools. The school I am most acquainted with is Kawaihao Seminary.
Q. Who were the teachers there?
A. Miss Bingham was the principal. Latterly they have been compelled to send abroad to get assistance. The management was always in the hands of the missionaries. It is a missionary institution.
Q. Did she generally prefer that institution for these girls?
A. I think most of the girls have been educated there. I think she has had several educated at Maui, at Makawao Seminary, another institution.
Q. Are you a man of family?
A. No, sir; I am not a married man. We are a very large family. I have a number of sisters living here.
Q. Did they associate with the Queen without reserve, as other people here?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you feel like they were with a reputable person?
A. Yes; I never felt anything out of the way. In fact, I know that a great many people at times would feel slighted if they did not receive invitations to attend entertainments there.
Q. Were you one of the active participants in the revolution of 1887?
A. I was an active participant in the events of 1887. I was not a leader.
Q. Will you tell me the cause of that revolution?
A. I want to say that the reasons and causes that actuated different participants were no doubt numerous. The mainspring was this same Missionary party. They were smarting under defeats they had sustained repeatedly from Gibson. They had used large amounts of money in attempting to control the elections, but Gibson seemed to have a strong influence on the King and defeated them and held his power, I think, over a period of six years, and the King, under his direction, was allowed to go into all kinds of follies. This “Kualoa” escapade was one. The King had the idea in his head for some time previous of causing a confederation of the Pacific Islands. I have never heard him say he was ambitious of becoming Emperor of the Pacific, as has been attributed to him. Gibson, who was too astute and far-seeing to believe in anything of the kind, still felt it was necessary to humor him in a number of these projects, of which this was one. That escapade is familiar with everybody. They sent Bush down there and it resulted in disaster. That was made one of the ostensible reasons. Also the opium scandal. There had always been a great deal said regarding the opium business; some thought it should be entirely prohibited others thought it was impossible to do so. They favored licensing the business. A bill passed the Legislature authorizing licenses. Then the Chinese began to bid for these licenses and that resulted in what is known as the Ah Kin Khoo scandal, in which it is claimed that the King received sixty or seventy thousand dollars to let a certain Chinese firm have the license. That was another cause put forward.
Q. Did they make him pay that back?
A. Yes; his estate paid that back, eventually.
Q. Was it generally believed that he acted corruptly in that matter?
A. Yes; those are the ostensible reasons put forward, and general extravagance and mismanagement of finances. That led up to this business.
Q. What do you mean by ostensible reasons; were there any other reasons behind these?
A. I do not know that I would have any right to put forward convictions and beliefs which lead from way back. I do not think that these reasons, though they were powerful agents at the time, were the only cause. I think it was the persistent determination of a clique here to get the power again which Gibson had wrested from it.
Q. They had been directing public affairs up to Gibson’s time?
A. Yes.
Q. And during that time lost control?
A. Yes. To go back a little farther: The same party had held power in various forms and degrees up to about 1853. I think then that the decline of Dr. Judd’s power began. He held despotic sway under Kamehameha III. In 1853 a committee of thirteen, representing people who had become tired of this arbitrary rule of Dr. Judd, waited on the King and demanded his removal from power. From that time, over a period of twenty years, is where the country received the very best administration it ever got, from men like Robert C. Wiley, Judge Lee, and, in later days, Harris and Hutchinson—men of that style. That carried through the reigns of Kamehameha IV and V. The missionaries were out of power. These men would not tolerate them at all.
Q. Was there extravagance then?
A. That was the very best period of Hawaiian history. That was the foundation of the Hawaiian Islands being received into the family of nations. She took her standing under the guidance of Wyley and Harris. At the death of Kamehameha V, Lunaliu came in and the missionaries regained their power through him. He was the highest chief living, but an intemperate fellow. He was as good a fellow as ever lived. He was a drunkard. Missionaries went into power under him. He lived a year, then came Kalakaua. They continued their hold on affairs during the early part of Kalakaua's reign, until Gibson came in. He overthrew them, I think, in 1880. Gibson reigned supreme in 1880. He was returned to the Legislature in 1880 and held power to 1887. Kalakaua was extravagant, and Gibson, in order to hold his power, had to yield to a good many of the King's foibles in that way. If Gibson had received generous support from outside he would have been able to hold the King in check, but in order to hold his power he had to yield to the King in order to hold his position against opposition. The chamber of commerce, the Planters' Labor and Supply Company—everything combined against him. It is a marvel how he managed to hold his own against the tremendous odds that were used against him.

While the natives had, as a rule, generally yielded the Government into the hands of the whites, still they always felt that they should have some sort of representation in the Government, and a native Hawaiian usually occupied one of the cabinet positions. In addition to the native Hawaiian there was a new element coming on the field, which consisted of native born of foreign parents, and somewhere around about 1884 we began to feel that we should have representation as well as the foreigners, and placed the proposition before Kalakaua. He recognized the justice of this, and C. T. Gulick was made minister of the interior in compliance with the wishes of this element. This cabinet was overthrown in 1886 by Mr. Spreckels' influence. Mr. Spreckels had advanced large sums of money to the Government, and demanded the deeding over of the wharfsage, the city front from the Pacific Mail to the Oceanic docks, the Honolulu waterworks, and other governmental property in town. This proposition was acceded to by Gibson, but resisted by Gulick, who succeeded in frustrating the whole scheme, but which resulted in the overthrow of the cabinet finally through Spreckels' influence. Spreckels was instrumental in forming a new cabinet composed of Gibson, John T. Dare (a lawyer he brought from San Francisco), and, I think, Robert Creighton, and they put one Hawaiian in—some old dummy, I forget now who he was. This was naturally offensive to the Hawaiian element previously alluded to, and we reproached Gibson for his action in the matter, and when the events of 1887 turned up, a large majority of the element alluded to joined the movement to overthrow Gibson, and of course the other party were only too glad to have additions to the strength of their party. I think that answers the question why I joined the movement of 1887.

Q. What was the demand made upon Kalakaua as far as a new constitution went?
A. They made a demand that he should grant them a new constitution, which he agreed to immediately.

Q. And that is the present constitution?
A. Yes; that is the present constitution.

Q. What sort of cabinet did he appoint then?
A. He appointed a cabinet to their dictation: L. A. Thurston, W. L. Green, C. W. Ashford, and Jonathan Austin.

Q. Is Mr. Thurston native-born?
A. Yes.

Q. Educated here?
A. Yes; most of his education. He went abroad to study law.

Q. His life has been spent here?
A. Yes; he is identified with this community.

Q. Has he been an active member of the Planters' Labor and Supply Company?
A. He has always been invited to their meetings. He never was a planter.

Q. Might he not have owned stock?
A. He may have owned some little stock.

Q. He is not an American citizen?
A. No, sir; he is a Hawaiian.

Q. Where is Mr. Green from?
A. He is an Englishman. He came here in early days. He is head of the firm of J. L. Green & Company.

Q. Where is Mr. Ashford from?
A. Ashford is a Canadian. He arrived here in the early part of 1880.

Q. Was he especially active then in military movements?
A. Yes; very active in 1887.

Q. He commanded troops?
A. His brother, Volney V. Ashford; he was the man who put it through.
Q. What do you mean when you say that he was the man who put it through?

A. V. V. Ashford was the organizer and guide of the whole of the movement, which was expected to have operated in the event of any open resistance having occurred. Of course, the Missionary party—Thurston, Smith, Dole, and others—were organizers of the movement, but when it came down to actual working V. V. Ashford was one. He was colonel of the existing forces—four or five companies of Hawaiian rifles, and this riffsall that you find around the Provisional Government to-day—that was the crowd that flocked in around them. They were the ones that would have been used. Whenever danger was in the way they were scarce, but when it came to asking positions, they were there.

Q. Who was Jonathan Austin?

A. He was an American—a New Yorker, I think. He was a brother of H. L. Austin, of Hawaii. He was a comparatively newcomer.

Q. None of these were of native blood?

A. None of them.

Q. They continued in power how long?

A. From immediately after the 30th of June, 1887, up to the Legislature of 1890. The elections were in February. The house met in April or May, 1890. Shortly after the house went into session they passed a vote of want of confidence.

Q. The reform element had been beaten in elections?

A. Yes.

Q. And that brought about an antireform cabinet?

A. Yes.

Q. Now in the Legislature of 1892 there was a continual turning out of cabinets; was that a struggle for power?

A. It was a struggle for power. This same reform or missionary element was fighting to regain the reins of government. They united with a faction known as Liberals. These two elements put together could vote out the other crowd, and they voted them out until the G. N. Wilcox cabinet was formed.

Q. With this cabinet the Reform party was content?

A. Yes.

Q. How did the Liberals take it—did they get offended?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they make a combination with the National Reform party?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the Wilcox cabinet voted out as a result of that combination?

A. Yes.

Q. The Wilcox cabinet was voted out on the 13th of January, 1893?

A. Yes.

Q. The Legislature was prorogued on the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. If this cabinet had not been voted out before the prorogation of the Legislature the Reform element through this cabinet would have had control of the Government for two years?

A. Yes.

Q. How did they receiye the voting out of the Wilcox cabinet?

A. It was not liked.

Q. Did they feel like they had lost power?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you at Mr. W. O. Smith’s office at the meeting on Saturday, January 14, 1893?

A. Yes; I was there in the afternoon.

Q. Was the subject of the dethronement of the Queen discussed?

A. No.

Q. Was the subject of annexation discussed?

A. No.

Q. What was in the mind of that meeting; anything definite?

A. No; nothing definite. The idea was that this attempted proclaiming of a new constitution was the cause of unsettling affairs, and that there was danger for the public safety. This committee of public safety was organized for that purpose.

Q. Anything said about landing troops?

A. No.

Q. There were subsequent meetings of the committee of safety. Did you attend any of them? Were you invited?

A. I attended one that was held at Henry Waterhouse’s on Monday evening, the 16th.

Q. Did you attend any of any earlier date?

A. I attended one at Thurston’s house on Saturday evening.

Q. Was the subject of the dethronement of the Queen discussed there?

A. I would not like to give any information regarding anything that took place
at Thurston's house that night, as I considered it as confidential. Thurston reposed confidence in me, and I should not like to betray it.

Q. Where was the other meeting?
A. The only other meeting I attended was the meeting at Waterhouse's.

Q. Who was present? Any members of the present Provisional Government?
A. Most of the members of the committee of safety were there.

Q. Please give the names of such as you can remember.
A. H. E. Cooper, I think, was there; Andrew Brown was there; J. A. McCandless was there; T. F. Lansing was there; I think John Emmeluth was there; C. Bolte was there; Henry Waterhouse was there; F. W. McClesney was there; W. O. Smith was there; C. L. Carter was also present.

Q. Any others connected with the Government?
A. Mr. Dole was sent for and invited to be present and he attended.

Q. Was there anything said at that meeting on the subject of aid by the troops of the United States and the American minister?
A. Yes; the general impression and the general talk all through the business was the fact that they would obtain or receive both moral and material assistance from the United States minister and from the troops from the Boston.

Q. Did they expect to fight?
A. No; I do not think they did.

Q. Their idea was that the sympathy of the American minister and troops was with them?
A. Yes; the people knew if the United States minister, or any vessel in port, moved in the matter that would be the end of the matter. If they sent one marine ashore it would end the matter.

Q. Was that the drift of the meeting?
A. Yes; everybody knew that and felt that.

Q. Was there any portion of that meeting that went to see the American minister?
A. Yes. Mr. Loper was offered the position of commander in chief of what forces they might get together. He did not see his way clear; he did not want to assume any position which was not tangible, and the arguments put to him were about this support we would receive.

Q. What sort of support?
A. The support from the United States minister and from the Boston. Loper still hesitated. He did not feel satisfied with the assurances. It was suggested that he go over and see the minister himself, which he did in company with some of the others. I think C. L. Carter was one—I do not know for certain.

Q. Henry Waterhouse was one?
A. I think so, but I do not know. I have an impression that Waterhouse and Carter went there.

Q. Did they come back?
A. Yes.

Q. What did they report?
A. I understood them to say that Mr. Stevens had told them that if they would take possession of the Government building and read their proclamation he would immediately recognize them and support them, or, failing to get the Government building, any building in Honolulu. They deny that, but I understood any building in Honolulu. Anyway, from what Mr. Loper heard he was satisfied and accepted the offer.

Q. Was the city quiet when the troops came in?
A. Yes; quiet as Sunday.

Q. Women and children on the streets?
A. Yes; the public at large did not know what was going on. The band played at the hotel. I do not think anyone knew what was going on except the politicians and those who were behind the scenes, as you might say.

Q. How long after the proclamation was read before Mr. Stevens recognized the Provisional Government?
A. That I do not know. The current report around there was that it was between 3 and 4 o'clock. I understood the United States minister had recognized the Government.

Q. Who said that?
A. It is impossible for me to say. It was common talk.

Q. How long after that before the station house and barracks were surrendered?
A. Somewhere, I should judge, between 6 and 7 o'clock. The lamps were lighted. Loper said Wilson had agreed to turn over the station house. He said: "Will you go down and take possession?" I said: "No; I have nothing to do with this concern." He said: "We must have someone to go down there." I said: "Take some of your own folks; take McCandless down." He did. He had not been gone long before he telephoned up, "I want you; you must come down; McCandless won't stop." I think before I started I met McCandless. He said: "Loper wants you
down there." I don't want to stop there. I considered the matter. A number of friends of mine wanted me to go. They said: "It is a critical moment. We want a Hawaiian who can talk to the natives and prevent any friction between the natives and foreigners." I said: "In the interest of law and order I will go down." I went down. Most of the force that Wilson had was retiring. This guard of 20 men that Loper had taken down of this "German 500," had marched in. I went in and was placed in charge. The street lamps were lighted.

Q. What was the occasion of your separating from the people who were at the meeting at Mr. Waterhouse's?
A. The first proposition was made by Thurston himself. He asked me if I was willing to stay in the movement for maintaining law and order, and try to preserve the fundamental law of the land? I told him I would. We went over to the attorney-general's office and met the cabinet, who had come over from the polls. I heard the statements of Parker, Peterson, and Colburn. It was then proposed by Thurston and others that we should support the cabinet against the overt acts of the Queen, and that meeting at Smith's office was for that purpose. Peterson went there.

Q. You separated from them, then, when it was developed that they meant to overthrow the Queen?
A. Yes. I stopped on Wednesday, when I found it began to develop. I began to be suspicious. I simply went to this meeting at Waterhouse's and was a listener. I was interested in affairs of the country.

Q. You took no part in the organization of the Provisional Government?
A. None whatever.

Q. How many troops did they have there at the time the proclamation was read?
A. When the proclamation was read there were two policemen taken off an ammunition wagon and put at the front door.

Q. How many troops did they have at the close of the reading of the proclamation?
A. None, excepting those two.

Q. How long after that before other troops arrived?
A. Just about 3 o'clock. This Capt. Zeigler, with about 30 men, marched in the back way, indifferently armed.

Q. Then other troops came in afterwards?
A. After that another body of similar number—25 to 30—made up of young fellows from around various offices, marched in. That was all there were. It was not until it was generally known that the United States minister had recognized the Government that the crowd came flocking in—mostly men discharged from the station house by Wilson. They jumped in there with a view of being paid. They enlisted after being discharged by Wilson.

Q. Are those fellows in the service now?
A. Yes.

Q. Making part of the Provisional forces at this time?
A. Yes; and a great many of the citizens, those who compose the Annexation Club, when they saw the thing was sure, the United States forces within pistol shot, and that Wilson had given up the station house, and that the barracks would be surrendered, then they wanted to be on the top side. They came in.

Q. Before that they had been quiet?
A. Yes; then they rushed in.

Q. Were you at the mass meeting on Monday?
A. Yes.

Q. How many people were there?
A. I should judge about 700 or 800, possibly 900.

Q. What nationalities?
A. Heterogeneous.

Q. Many Portuguese?
A. A great many.

Q. How is the white population in this city on the subject of annexation?
A. It is very hard to arrive at an exact statement. You can only get it by making your own views known. You will find out that men who are pretending to be in with a party are really at heart opposed to it.

Q. How many people are not pretending to be with the party in power and are opposed to annexation?
A. I should judge about half and half.

Q. People who are frank about their views?
A. Yes. You take the independent Americans who are not under the influence of the Missionary faction, they are as a rule opposed to it, as are most of the English people and some Germans, and almost all foreigners outside of the particular American class who are under the influence of the missionaries and planters.

Q. What part of the United States is this American element who favor annexation from?
A. The New England States, generally.
Q. Are they in point of numbers in a majority of the Americans here?
A. I do not know. I do not think that they are, but their influence is the largest in account of wealth.
Q. And intelligence?
A. I won't add intelligence; I beg to be excused from that.
Q. Do you know whether or not the committee that went up and organized the Provisional Government sent anybody to the Government building to see if there were any soldiers there or not?
A. I can not say that. I remained in my office until I felt something was going on, and then I walked out on the street. What they did after leaving Waterhouse's I don't know.
Q. Was everything quiet at the Government building at the time the proclamation was read?
A. Oh, yes. All the offices were running right along very quietly; nobody knew anything.
Q. None of the officers knew of the movement?
A. I do not think they did. Everything was going on just the same as usual. They knew there were rumors, but I do not think much attention was paid to it. The presence of the United States troops was a matter of curiosity and comment.
Q. Well, then, so far as the reading of that proclamation dethroning the Queen was concerned, it was known to very few people that it was to be done?
A. I do not think it was known to anybody except themselves. The whole thing was a surprise to everyone. Wilson might have had some inkling of it. He was trying his best to keep posted, but of course his actions would have been guided entirely by what information he got regarding the attitude of the United States troops.

JUNE 5, 1893.

Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Wundenberg, I omitted to ask you as to the feeling of the natives on the subject of annexation at the former interview. Please tell me now.
A. To the best of my knowledge and belief—and I am well acquainted with the natives—I do not think there is a native in favor of annexation. Many may have declared themselves so, but it is my belief that they have done so under pressure—that is, their interests were controlled by those who desire annexation; they are afraid of offending them and of being deprived of privileges they now possess.
Q. What sort of privileges?
A. In a number of cases they have stock running on lands of large landowners who would make them remove them, and that would deprive them of their means of livelihood. Some of them hold positions under planters and others.
Q. Any of them in Government employ?
A. A good many of them are in Government employ. There is only one that I know of who openly comes out and advocates annexation—a young man by the name of Notley, who is employed in the waterworks. Others do it in a subdued manner. If they advocate the matter at all they do it as a matter of policy. The natives have the same love of country as you will find anywhere. The term they use is Aloha aina.
Q. Are there any whites in the islands against annexation?
A. A great many.
Q. What proportion of them—I mean Americans and Europeans?
A. I think if a fair canvass was made that you would find fully one-half opposed to it.
Q. Suppose the question of annexation was submitted to the people of these islands, or such of them as were qualified to vote for representatives under the constitution just abrogated, and with the Australian ballot system which you had adopted, what would be the result of the vote?
A. It would be overwhelmingly defeated—almost to a man by the native Hawaiians, and I think a great many of the foreigners who now are supposed to be in favor of annexation would vote against it.
Q. What would be the proportion of annexationists to anti-annexationists?
A. All the native voters, with very few exceptions, would vote against it. I think most of the native-born of Hawaiian parents would vote against it, with the exception possibly of those few that are mixed up in the annexation movement here. I think most of the foreign element that are independent and outside of what is known as the Missionary party would vote against it, and I think a great many of those who are now on the rolls of the Annexation Club would vote against it. Their names appear there simply for policy.

I have carefully read the foregoing and find it to be an accurate report of my interviews with Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, June 5, 1893.

P. WUNDENBERG.
No. 10.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, June 17, 1893.

Sir: To-morrow, June 18, the China leaves here for San Francisco. Your letter of the 26th ultimo, informing me of a desire for my final report, was received. Up to this time I have devoted myself to the study of various questions here and the taking of testimony. The latter has been necessarily slow, because Mr. Mills had no aid in transcribing notes, which occupied a great deal of time.

I had supposed it was your wish that I should not undertake to prepare a report until the lapse of two or three months, in order that I might assure myself of a correct comprehension of the situation here. So little had been said in your correspondence with me that I feared to commence too early lest you should suppose I was acting hastily.

Some recent information has made it well that this delay has taken place. I will immediately commence my report and devote myself to it continuously until it is completed.

There is nothing of special importance occurring here now. There is no indication of any movement against the Provisional Government. There seems to be a universal acquiescence on the part of all parties in the idea of awaiting the action of the Government of the United States.

It may be of interest to you to know that in an examination this afternoon of Col. Soper, commanding the military forces of the Provisional Government since the 17th of January last, he stated that at a meeting at the house of Henry Waterhouse, on the night of the 16th of January, composed of members of the committee of safety, and some persons called in, he was offered the command of the military forces; that he declined to accept it until the next day; that in this meeting it was accepted by all as true that Mr. Stevens had agreed that if the persons seeking to dethrone the Queen got possession of the Government building and proclaimed a new government he would recognize it as a de facto government, that he (Soper) never accepted the command until after he had knowledge of this fact; that he is a citizen of the United States and claims allegiance thereto.

I send you a copy of the oath Col. Soper and other foreigners take in order to participate in public affairs in these islands.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLount,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, Island of ——, District of ———, ss:

I, , aged ——, a native of ———, residing at ———, in said district, do solemnly swear, in the presence of Almighty God, that I will support the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, promulgated and proclaimed on the 7th day of July, 1887, and the laws of said Kingdom, not hereby renouncing but expressly reserving all allegiance and citizenship now owing or held by me.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ——— day of ———, A. D. 18—.

Inspector of Election.
HAIZIAN ISLANDS.

No —

HAIZIAN ISLANDS, Island of——, District of——, ss:

I, the undersigned, inspector of election, duly appointed and commissioned, do hereby certify that ———, aged ———, a native of ———, residing at ———, in said district, has this day taken, before me, the oath to support the Constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, promulgated and proclaimed on the 7th day of July, 1887, and the laws of said Kingdom.

———, 18——.

Inspector of Election.

No. 14.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 11.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
June 28, 1893.

SIR: On yesterday I found amongst the unfiled papers of the legation a document, of which the inclosure sent herewith is a true copy.

My final report will be completed within the next ten days, probably much earlier. It will be forwarded by the first opportunity.

In my dispatch to the Department of April 26 I said: "Mr. Paul Neumann is generally regarded here as a bright, plausible, unscrupulous person." I desire now to say that so far as the expression "unscrupulous" is concerned a better knowledge of public opinion satisfies me that I was not justified in its use. I deem it my duty to place this on the records of the Department.

Three persons have been arrested for conspiracy to overthrow the Government. They are whites of the laboring class.

I see no reason to think that there is likely to be any movement against the Provisional Government or the peace of society at this time.

On the 18th of this month 1,757 Japanese contract laborers were landed here for the sugar plantations. Of this number 1,410 were men and 347 women.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLount,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure in No. 11.]

Mr. Dole to Mr. Stevens.

GOVERNMENT BUILDING,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Minister Resident:

SIR: I acknowledge the receipt of your valued communication of this day, recognizing the Hawaiian Provisional Government, and expressing deep appreciation of the same.

We have conferred with the ministers of the late government and have made demand upon the marshal to surrender the station house. We are not actually yet in possession of the station house, but as night is approaching and our forces may be insufficient to maintain order, we request the immediate support of the United States forces, and would request that the commander of the United States forces take command of our military forces so that they may act together for the protection of the city.

Respectfully, etc.,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Chairman Executive Council.

(Note of Mr. Stevens at the end of the above communication: "The above request not complied with.—Stevens.")
HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
July 7, 1853.

SIR: The steamer Peru leaves Honolulu for San Francisco to-morrow.
It will take me three or four days longer to complete my report, which
will be forwarded to you by the first steamer leaving here after that
time.

Recalling to your mind the letter from Mr. Dole to Mr. Stevens (a
copy of which was sent with my last dispatch) I ask you to examine a
statement made by the commissioners of the Hawaiian Provisional
Government on page 41 of Senate Executive Document, No. 76, Fifty-
second Congress, second session, designated as the "sixth" in the
statement of facts by them.

I wrote President Dole a communication asking for a copy of Mr.
Stevens's reply to this letter, omitting therefrom its reference to his
recognition.

Verbally he says he does not recollect writing the letter and has not
been able to find the reply. I have asked him for his reply in writ-
ing, which he has promised to give me after making a more thorough
search.

The annexation element have endeavored to utilize the celebration
of the Fourth of July in the advancement of their cause.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
July 17, 1893.

SIR: The report which is forwarded herewith has been delayed by
the slowness of movements of persons interested in either party; by
the difficulty of communication with the several islands, and by a de-
sire to assure myself of the true import of the facts testified to from
time to time by a great number of persons.

Public documents had to be examined, as well as the testimony of a
great number of witnesses, which was delayed in being transcribed
from the stenographic notes from lack of clerical aid. This testimony
will be promptly forwarded.

Few quotations have been indulged in lest this paper should attain
inconvenient length.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.
Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

HONOLULU, H. I., July 17, 1893.

SIR: On the 11th of March, 1893, I was appointed by the President of the United States as special commissioner to the Hawaiian Islands. At the same time the following instructions were given to me by you:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, March 11, 1893.

SIR: The situation created in the Hawaiian Islands by the recent deposition of Queen Liliuokalani and the erection of a Provisional Government demands the fullest consideration of the President, and in order to obtain trustworthy information on the subject, as well as for the discharge of other duties herein specified, he has decided to dispatch you to the Hawaiian Islands as his special commissioner, in which capacity you will hereafter receive a commission and also a letter whereby the President accredits you to the president of the executive and advisory councils of the Hawaiian Islands.

The comprehensive, delicate, and confidential character of your mission can now only be briefly outlined, the details of its execution being necessarily left, in great measure, to your good judgment and wise discretion.

You will investigate and fully report to the President all the facts you can learn respecting the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, the causes of the revolution by which the Queen's Government was overthrown, the sentiment of the people towards existing authority, and, in general, all that can fully enlighten the President touching the subjects of your mission.

To enable you to fulfill this charge, your authority in all matters touching the relations of this Government to the existing or other government of the islands, and the protection of our citizens therein, is paramount, and in you alone, acting in cooperation with the commander of the naval forces, is vested full discretion and power to determine when such forces should be landed or withdrawn.

You are, however, authorized to avail yourself of such aid and information as you may desire from the present minister of the United States at Honolulu, Mr. John L. Stevens, who will continue until further notice to perform the usual functions attaching to his office not inconsistent with the powers entrusted to you. An instruction will be sent to Mr. Stevens directing him to facilitate your presentation to the head of the Government upon your arrival, and to render you all needed assistance.

The withdrawal from the Senate of the recently signed treaty of annexation for reexamination by the President leaves its subject-matter in abeyance, and you are not charged with any duty in respect thereto. It may be well, however, for you to dispel any possible misapprehension which its withdrawal may have excited touching the entire friendliness of the President and the Government of the United States towards the people of the Hawaiian Islands, or the earnest solicitude here felt for their welfare, tranquility, and progress.

Historical precedents, and the general course of the United States, authorize the employment of its armed force in foreign territory for the security of the lives and property of American citizens and for the repression of lawless and tumultuous acts threatening them; and the powers conferred to that end upon the representatives of the United States are both necessary and proper, subject always to the exercise of a sound discretion in their application.

In the judgment of the President, your authority as well as that of the commander of the naval forces in Hawaiian waters should be and is limited in the use of physical force to such measures as are necessary to protect the persons and property of our citizens, and while abstaining from any manner of interference with the domestic concerns of the islands, you should indicate your willingness to intervene with your friendly offices in the interests of a peaceful settlement of troubles within the limits of sound discretion.

Should it be necessary to land an armed force upon Hawaiian territory on occasions of popular disturbance, when the local authority may be unable to give adequate protection to the life and property of citizens of the United States, the assent of such authority should first be obtained if it can be done without prejudice to the interests involved.

Your power in this regard should not, however, be claimed to the exclusion of similar measures by the representatives of other powers for the protection of the lives and property of their citizens or subjects residing in the islands.
While the United States claim no right to interfere in the political or domestic affairs or in the internal conflicts of the Hawaiian Islands otherwise than as herein stated, or for the purpose of maintaining any treaty or other rights which they possess, this Government will adhere to its consistent and established policy in relation to them, and it will not acquiesce in domestic interference by other powers.

The foregoing general exposition of the President's views will indicate the safe courses within which your action should be shaped and mark the limits of your discretion in calling upon the naval commander for cooperation.

The United States revenue cutter Rukan is under orders to await you at San Francisco and convey you to Honolulu.

A stenographic clerk will be detailed to accompany you and remain subject to your orders.

It is expected that you will use all convenient dispatch for the fulfillment of your mission, as it is the President's desire to have the results before him at the earliest possible day. Besides the connected report you are expected to furnish, you will from time to time, as occasion may offer, correspond with the Secretary of State, communicating information or soliciting special instruction on such points as you may deem necessary. In case of urgency you may telegraph either in plain text or in the cipher of the Navy Department through the kind offices of the admiral commanding, which may be sent to Mr. W. A. Cooper, United States dispatch agent at San Francisco, to be transmitted thence.

Reposing the fullest confidence in your ability and zeal for the realization of the trust confided to you,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

Hon. James H. Blount, etc.

W. Q. Gresham.

On the 29th of the same month I reached the city of Honolulu. The American minister, Hon. John L. Stevens, accompanied by a committee from the Annexation Club, came on board the vessel which had brought me. He informed me that this club had rented an elegant house, well furnished, and provided servants and a carriage and horses for my use; that I could pay for this accommodation just what I chose, from nothing up. He urged me very earnestly to accept the offer. I declined it, and informed him that I should go to a hotel.

The committee soon after this renewed the offer, which I again declined.

Soon afterwards the ex-Queen, through her chamberlain, tendered her carriage to convey me to my hotel. This I courteously declined.

I located myself at the Hawaiian Hotel. For several days I was engaged receiving calls from persons of all classes and of various political views. I soon became conscious of the fact that all minds were quietly and anxiously looking to see what action the Government of the United States would take.

The troops from the Boston were doing military duty for the Provisional Government. The American flag was floating over the government building. Within it the Provisional Government conducted its business under an American protectorate, to be continued, according to the avowed purpose of the American minister, during negotiations with the United States for annexation.

My instructions directed me to make inquiries which in the interest of candor and truth could not be done when the minds of thousands of Hawaiian citizens were full of uncertainty as to what the presence of American troops, the American flag, and the American protectorate implied. It seemed necessary that all these influences must be withdrawn before those inquiries could be prosecuted in a manner befitting the dignity and power of the United States.

Inspired with such feelings and confident no disorder would ensue, I directed the removal of the flag of the United States from the government building and the return of the American troops to their ves-
sels. This was accomplished without any demonstration of joy or grief on the part of the populace.

The afternoon before, in an interview with President Dole, in response to my inquiry, he said that the Provisional Government was now able to preserve order, although it could not have done so for several weeks after the proclamation establishing it.

In the evening of this same day the American minister called on me with a Mr. Walter G. Smith, who, he said, desired to make an important communication to me, and whom he knew to be very intelligent and reliable. Thereupon Mr. Smith, with intense gravity, informed me that he knew beyond doubt that it had been arranged between the Queen and the Japanese commissioner that if the American flag and troops were removed the troops from the Japanese man of war Nanica would land and reinstate the Queen.

Mr. Smith was the editor of the Hawaiian Star, established by the Annexation Club for the purpose of advocating annexation.

The American minister expressed his belief in the statement of Mr. Smith and urged the importance of the American troops remaining on shore until I could communicate with you and you could have the opportunity to communicate with the Japanese Government and obtain from it assurances that Japanese troops would not be landed to enforce any policy on the Government or people of the Hawaiian Islands.

I was not impressed much with these statements.

When the Japanese commissioner learned that the presence of the Japanese man of war was giving currency to suggestions that his Government intended to interfere with domestic affairs here, he wrote to his Government asking that the vessel be ordered away, which was done. He expressed to me his deep regret that any one should charge that the Empire of Japan, having so many reasons to value the friendship of the Government of the United States, would consent to offend that Government by interfering in the political conflicts in these islands, to which it was averse.

In the light of subsequent events, I trust the correctness of my action will be more fully justified.

The Provisional Government left to its own preservation, the people freed from any fear of free intercourse with me insofar as my action could accomplish it, the disposition of the minds of all people to peace pending the consideration by the Government of the United States as to what should be its action in connection with affairs here, cleared the way for me to commence the investigation with which I was charged.

The causes of the revolution culminating in the dethronement of the Queen and the establishment of the Provisional Government, January 17, 1893, are remote and proximate. A brief presentation of the former will aid in a fuller apprehension of the latter.

On June 14, 1852, a constitution was granted by Kamehameha III, by and with the advice and consent of the nobles and representatives in legislative council. This instrument provided for a house of nobles, holding their seats for life, and that the number should not exceed thirty, and a house of representatives composed of not less than twenty-four nor more than forty members. Every male subject, whether native or naturalized, and every denizen of the Kingdom who had paid his taxes, attained the age of twenty-one years, and had resided in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the time of election was entitled to vote for the representative or representatives of the district in which he may have resided three months next preceding the day of election.
For convenience the following extracts from that instrument are inserted here:

ART. 32. He has the power, by and with the advice of his cabinet, and the approval of his privy council, to appoint and remove at his pleasure any of the several heads of the executive departments, and he may require information in writing from any of the officers in the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices.

ART. 35. The person of the King is inviolable and sacred; his ministers are responsible; to the King belongs the executive power; all laws that have passed both houses of the legislature, for their validity, shall be signed by His Majesty and the Kuhina Nui; all his other official acts shall be approved by the privy council, countersigned by the Kuhina Nui, and by the minister to whose department such act may belong.

ART. 51. The ministers of the King are appointed and commissioned by him, and hold their offices during His Majesty's pleasure, subject to impeachment.

ART. 72. The King appoints the members of the house of nobles, who hold their seats during life, subject to the provision of article 67; but their number shall not exceed thirty.

ART. 75. The house of representatives shall be composed of not less than twenty-four nor more than forty members, who shall be elected annually.

ART. 78. Every male subject of His Majesty, whether native or naturalized, and every denizen of the Kingdom who shall have paid his taxes who shall have attained the full age of 20 years, and who shall have resided in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the time of election, shall be entitled to vote for the representative or representatives of the district in which he may have resided three months next preceding the day of election; provided that no insane person, nor any person who shall at any time have been convicted of any infamous crime within the Kingdom, unless he shall have been pardoned by the King, and by the terms of such pardon been restored to all the rights of a subject, shall be allowed to vote.

ART. 105. Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either branch of the legislature, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members of each house such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on their journals, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the next legislature; which proposed amendment or amendments shall be published for three months previous to the election of the next house of representatives. And if, in the next legislature, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of each house, and be approved by the King, such amendment or amendments shall become part of the Constitution of this Kingdom.

In November, 1863, Kamehameha V was proclaimed King, on the death of Kamehameha IV. He issued a proclamation for the election of delegates to a constitutional convention to be held June 13, 1864. The convention was composed of sixteen nobles and twenty-seven elected delegates, presided over by the King in person. That body decided it had a right to proceed to make a new constitution. Not being in accord with the King on the question of a property qualification for voters, on the 13th day of August, 1864, he declared the constitution of 1852 abrogated and prorogued the convention. On the 20th of August following he proclaimed a new constitution upon his own authority, which continued in force twenty-three years.

From this the following extracts are made:

ART. 45. The legislative power of the three estates of this Kingdom is vested in the King and the legislative assembly, which assembly shall consist of the nobles appointed by the King and of the representatives of the people, sitting together.

ART. 57. The King appoints the nobles, who shall hold their appointments during life, subject to the provisions of article 53; but their number shall not exceed twenty.

ART. 61. No person shall be eligible for a representative of the people who is insane or an idiot; nor unless he be a male subject of the Kingdom, who shall have arrived at the full age of twenty-one years, who shall know how to read and write, who shall understand accounts, and shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for at least three years, the last of which shall be the year immediately preceding his election, and who shall own real estate within the Kingdom of a clear value, over and above all incumbrances, of at least five hundred dollars, or who shall have an annual income of at least two hundred and fifty dollars derived from any property or some lawful employment.
ART. 62. Every male subject of the Kingdom, who shall have paid his taxes, who shall have attained the age of twenty years, and shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the election, and shall be possessed of real property in this Kingdom to the value over and above all incumbrances of one hundred and fifty dollars—or of a leasehold property on which the rent is twenty-five dollars per year—or of an income of not less than seventy-five dollars per year, derived from any property or some lawful employment and shall know how to read and write, if born since the year 1840 and shall have caused his name to be entered on the list of voters of his district as may be provided by law, shall be entitled to one vote for the representative or representatives of that district; provided, however, that no insane or idiotic person, nor any person who shall have been convicted of any infamous crime within this Kingdom, unless he shall have been pardoned by the King, and by the terms of such pardon have been restored to all the rights of a subject, shall be allowed to vote.

ART. 80. Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in the legislative assembly, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members thereof, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on its journal, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the next legislature; which proposed amendment or amendments shall be published for three months previous to the next election of representatives; and if in the next legislature such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of the legislative assembly, and be approved by the King, such amendment or amendments shall become part of the constitution of this country.

On the 18th of February, 1874, David Kalakaua was proclaimed King. In 1875 a treaty of commercial reciprocity between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands was ratified, and the laws necessary to carry it into operation were enacted in 1876. It provided, as you are aware, for the free importation into the United States of several articles, amongst which was muscovado, brown, and all other unrefined sugars, sirups of sugar cane, melada, and molasses, produced in the Hawaiian Islands.

From it there came to the islands an intoxicating increase of wealth, a new labor system, an Asiatic population, an alienation between the native and white races, an impoverishment of the former, an enrichment of the latter, and the many so-called revolutions, which are the foundation for the opinion that stable government can not be maintained.

(The deaths in all these revolutions were seven. There were also seven wounded.)

The sugar export in 1876 was 26,072,429 pounds; in 1887 it was 212,763,647. The total value of all domestic exports was in 1876, $1,994,833.55, and in 1887, $9,435,204. The bounty paid on sugar by the United States to the sugar planters in the remission of customs on sugar before the McKinley bill was passed, is estimated by competent persons as reaching $5,000,000 annually.

The government and crown lands were bought and leased and operated by whites of American, English, and German origin, and the sugar industry went into the hands of corporations.

From 1852 to 1876 there had been imported 2,625 Chinese, 148 Japanese, and 7 South Sea Islanders, making a total of 2,780. From 1876 to 1887 there were imported 23,268 Chinese, 2,777 Japanese, 10,216 Portuguese, 615 Norwegians, 1,052 Germans, 1,998 South Sea Islanders, making a total for this one decade of 39,926 immigrants. The Government expended from 1876 to 1887 $1,026,212.30 in aid of the importation of labor for the planters, who for the same period expended $565,547.74. It negotiated with various governments treaties under which labor was imported for a term of years to work at a very low figure, and under which the laborer was to be compelled by fines

* The property qualification was removed by an amendment.
and imprisonment to labor faithfully and to remain with his employer to the end of the contract term.

Of 14,439 laborers on plantations in 1885, 2,136 were natives and the remainder imported labor. Generally, the rule has obtained of bringing twenty-five women for every one hundred men. The immigrants were of the poor and ignorant classes. The Portuguese especially, as a rule, could not read or write and were remarkably thievish. The women of Japanese and Chinese origin were grossly unchaste.

The price of all property advanced. The price of labor was depressed by enormous importations and by the efficiency accruing from compulsory performance of the contract by the Government.

In the year 1845, under the influence of white residents, the lands were so distributed between the crown, the Government, the chiefs, and the people as to leave the latter with an insignificant interest in lands—27,830 acres.

The story of this division is discreditable to King, chiefs, and white residents, but would be tedious here. The chiefs became largely indebted to the whites, and thus the foundation for the large holdings of the latter was laid.

Prior to 1876 the kings were controlled largely by such men as Dr. Judd, Mr. Wyllie, and other leading white citizens holding positions in their cabinets.

A king rarely changed his cabinet. The important offices were held by white men. A feeling of amity existed between the native and foreign races unmired by hostile conflict. It should be noted that at this period the native generally knew how to read and write his native tongue, into which the Bible and a few English works were translated. To this, native newspapers of extensive circulation contributed to the awakening of his intellect. He also generally read and wrote English.

From 1820 to 1866 missionaries of various nationalities, especially American, with unselfishness, toil, patience, and piety, had devoted themselves to the improvement of the native. They gave them a language, a religion, and an immense movement on the lines of civilization. In process of time the descendants of these good men grew up in secular pursuits. Superior by nature, education, and other opportunities, they acquired wealth. They sought to succeed to the political control exercised by their fathers. The revered missionary disappeared. In his stead there came the Anglo-Saxon in the person of his son, ambitious to acquire wealth and to continue that political control reverently conceded to his pious ancestor. Hence, in satire, the native designated him a “missionary,” which has become a campaign phrase of wonderful potency. Other white foreigners came into the country, especially Americans, English, and Germans. These, as a rule, did not become naturalized and participate in the voting franchise. Business and race affiliation occasioned sympathy and cooperation between these two classes of persons of foreign extraction.

Does this narration of facts portray a situation in a government in whole or in part representative favorable to the ambition of a leader who will espouse the native cause? Would it be strange for him to stir the native heart by picturing a system of political control under which the foreigner had wickedly become possessed of the soil, degraded free labor by an uncivilized system of coolie labor, prostituted society by injecting into it a people hostile to Christianity and the civilization of the nineteenth century, exposed their own daughters to the evil influences of an overwhelming male population of a degraded type, implanted Japanese and Chinese women almost insensible to feelings of chastity, and then loudly boasted of their Christianity?
On the other hand, was it not natural for the white race to vaunt their wealth and intelligence, their Christian success in rescuing the native from barbarism, their gift of a Government regal in name but containing many of the principles of freedom; to find in the natives defective intelligence, tendencies to idolatry, to race prejudice, and a disposition under the influence of white and half-white leaders to exercise political domination; to speak of their thriftlessness in private life and susceptibility to bribes in legislative action; to proclaim the unchasteness of native women, and to take at all hazards the direction of public affairs from the native?

With such a powerful tendency to divergence and political strife, with its attendant bitterness and exaggerations, we must enter upon the field of inquiry pointed out in your instructions.

It is not my purpose to take up this racial controversy at its birth, but when it had reached striking proportions and powerfully acted in the evolution of grave political events culminating in the present status. Nor shall I relate all the minute details of political controversy at any given period, but only such and to such extent as may illustrate the purpose just indicated.

It has already appeared that under the constitution of 1852 the legislature consisted of two bodies—one elected by the people and the other chosen by the King—and that no property qualifications hindered the right of suffrage. The King and people through the two bodies held a check on each other. It has also been shown that in 1864 by a royal proclamation a new constitution, sanctioned by a cabinet of prominent white men, was established, restricting the right of suffrage and combining the representative and nobles into one body. This latter provision was designed to strengthen the power of the Crown by removing a body distinctly representative. This instrument remained in force twenty-three years. The Crown appointed the nobles generally from white men of property and intelligence. In like manner the King selected his cabinet. These remained in office for a long series of years and directed the general conduct of public affairs.

Chief Justice Judd, of the supreme court of the Hawaiian Islands, in a formal statement uses this language:

Under every constitution prior to 1887 the ministers were appointed by the King and removed by him; but until Kalakaua's reign it was a very rare thing that any King changed his ministry. They had a pretty long lease of political life. My father was minister for seven or ten years and Mr. Wyllie for a longer period. It was a very rare political occurrence and made a great sensation when a change was made. Under Kalakaua things were different. I think we had twenty-six different cabinets during his reign.

The record discloses thirteen cabinets. Two of these were directly forced on him by the reformers. Of the others, six were in sympathy with the reformers and eminent in their confidence. The great stir in cabinet changes commenced with the Gibson cabinet in 1882. He was a man of large information, free from all suspicion of bribery, politically ambitious, and led the natives and some whites.

It may not be amiss to present some of the criticisms against Kalakaua and his party formally filed with me by Prof. W. D. Alexander, a representative reformer.

On the 12th of February, 1874, Kalakaua was elected King by the legislature. The popular choice lay between him and the Queen Dowager.

In regard to this, Mr. Alexander says that "the cabinet and the American party used all their influence in favor of the former, while the English favored Queen Emma, who was devoted to their interest."
Notwithstanding there were objections to Kalakaua's character, he says: "It was believed, however, that if Queen Emma should be elected there would be no hope of our obtaining a reciprocity treaty with the United States."

He gives an account of various obnoxious measures advocated by the King which were defeated.

In 1882 he says the race issue was raised by Mr. Gibson, and only two white men were elected to the legislature on the islands.

A bill prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors to natives was repealed at this session.

A $10,000,000 loan bill was again introduced, but was shelved in committee. The appropriation bill was swelled to double the estimated receipts of the Government, including $30,000 for coronation expenses, besides large sums for military expenses, foreign embassies, etc.

A bill was reported giving the King power to appoint district justices, which had formerly been done by the justices of the supreme court.

A million of dollars of silver was coined by the King, worth 84 cents to the dollar, which was intended to be exchanged for gold bonds at par, under the loan act of 1882. This proceeding was enjoined by the court. The privy council declared the coin to be of the legal value expressed on their face, subject to the legal-tender act, and they were gradually put into circulation. A profit of $150,000 is said to have been made on this transaction.

In 1884 a reform legislature was elected. A lottery bill, an opium license bill, and an $8,000,000 loan bill were defeated.

In the election for the legislature of 1886 it is alleged that by the use of gin, chiefly furnished by the King, and by the use of his patronage, it was carried against the reform party; that out of twenty-eight candidates, twenty-six were office-holders—one a tax assessor and one the Queen's secretary. There was only one white man on the Government ticket—Gibson's son-in-law. Only ten reform candidates were elected.

In this legislature an opium bill was passed providing for a license for four years, to be granted by the minister of the interior without the consent of the King, for $30,000 per annum.

Another act was passed to create a Hawaiian board of health, consisting of five native doctors, appointed by the King, with power to issue certificates to native kahunas (doctors) to practice medicine.

A $2,000,000 loan bill was passed, which was used largely in taking up bonds on a former loan.

It is claimed that in granting the lottery franchise the King fraudulently obtained $75,000 for the franchise and then sold it to another person, and that subsequently the King was compelled to refund the same.

These are the principal allegations on which the revolution of 1887 is justified.

None of the legislation complained of would have been considered a cause for revolution in any one of the United States, but would have been used in the elections to expel the authors from power. The alleged corrupt action of the King could have been avoided by more careful legislation and would have been a complete remedy for the future.

The rate of taxation on real or personal property never exceeded 1 per cent.

To all this the answer comes from the reformers: "The native is unfit for government and his power must be curtailed."

The general belief that the King had accepted what is termed the
opium bribe and the failure of his efforts to unite the Samoan Islands with his own Kingdom had a depressing influence on his friends, and his opponents used it with all the effect they could.

The last cabinet prior to the revolution of 1887 was anti-reform. Three of its members were half castes; two of them were and are recognized as lawyers of ability by all.

At this point I invite attention to the following extract from a formal colloquy between Chief Justice Judd and myself touching the means adopted to extort the constitution of 1887, and the fundamental changes wrought through that instrument:

Q. Will you be kind enough to state how this new constitution was established?
A. The two events which brought this matter to a culminating point were (1) the opium steal of $71,000 by which a Chinaman named Aki was made by the King to pay him a bribe of $71,000 of hard coin in order to obtain the exclusive franchise for selling opium, and (2) the expense of the expedition to Samoa in the "Kaimilea." A secret league was formed all over the islands, the result of which was the King was asked to promulgate a new constitution containing those provisions that I have before alluded to. It was very adroitly managed by the Ashfords, and more especially by V. V. Ashford, who obtained the confidence of the King and Mr. Gibson. He was the colonel of the Rifles, and he assured them that if he was paid a certain sum of money and made minister to Canada that he would arrange it so that the movement would be futile.

Q. How was he to do that?
A. By preventing the use of the military, I suppose; and he arranged with the military authorities and Capt. Haley that they should be called out to preserve public order, although it was this large and well-drilled force which made the King fear that if he didn’t yield things would be very critical for him.

Q. Was that a Government force?
A. It was organized under the laws.
Q. A volunteer organization?
A. Yes.
Q. So that the men in sympathy with the movement of this secret league went into it and constituted it under form of law.
A. Of course I do not know what was told the King privately, but I knew that he felt it would be very dangerous to refuse to promulgate the new constitution. I have no doubt that a great many things were circulated which came to his ears in the way of threats that was unfounded.

Q. What was the outside manifestation?
A. One great feature of it was its secrecy. The King was frightened at this secrecy. It was very well managed. The judges of the supreme court were not told of it until just before the event took place. I think it was the 2d or 3d of July, 1887.

Q. Was there then a mass meeting?
A. There was a large mass meeting held and a set of resolutions was presented to the King requiring that a new ministry be formed by Mr. W. L. Green and one other person, whose name I have forgotten.

Q. Was there any display of force?
A. The Honolulu Rifles were in detachments marched about in different portions of the town, having been called out by the legal military authorities.

Q. Who were the legal military authorities?
A. The governor of the island, Dominis, and Capt. H. Burrill Haley, the adjutant-general.

Q. Were they in sympathy with the movement?
A. No, sir; the officers of the corps were in sympathy with the movement.
Q. Who were they?
A. Ashford and Hobbard. I do not remember all.
Q. Did the governor order them out, not knowing of this state of things?
A. I think he did. I think he knew it, but it was to prevent, as I believe, something worse happening. As I said, there were threats made.

Q. Of what sort?
A. I understood that at one time there was a very strong feeling that the King should be forced to abdicate altogether, and it was only the more conservative men born here who said that the King and the Hawaiians should have another opportunity.

Q. Were there not two elements in that movement, one for a republic and the other for restraining the power of the King?
A. Yes.
Q. Were there not two forces in this movement cooperating together up to a certain point, to wit, those who were in favor of restraining the King by virtue of the provisions of the constitution of 1887 and those who were in favor of dethroning the King and establishing a republic?
A. I understand that there were, and that the more conservative view prevailed.
Q. And the men who were in favor of a republic were discontented at the outcome?
A. They were, and they didn't want the Hawaiians to vote at all; and the reason that the Portuguese were allowed to vote was to balance the native vote.
Q. Whose idea was that—was that the idea of the men who made the new constitution?
A. Of the men who made the new constitution.
Q. It was to balance the native vote with the Portuguese vote?
A. That was the idea.
Q. And that would throw the political power into the hands of the intelligence and wealth of the country?
A. That was the aim.
Q. How was this military used?
A. It was put about in squads over the city.
Q. The officers of the corps were really in favor of the movement for the new constitution and were called out by Governor Dominis to preserve order?
A. Yes. After the affair was over he was thanked by a military order from headquarters.
Q. Do you suppose that he was gratified with thanks under the circumstances?
A. Haley said to me when he showed me the order: “It is a little funny to thank a man who kicked you out, but I suppose I've got to do it.”
Q. The King acceded to the demand for a new constitution and of a cabinet of given character?
A. In the first place he acceded to the proposition to make a new cabinet named by Mr. Green. The former cabinet, consisting of Mr. Gibson and three Hawaiians, had just resigned a day or two before. In three or four days the cabinet waited upon him with the constitution.
Q. What cabinet?
A. The cabinet consisting of Mr. Green, minister of foreign affairs; Mr. Thurston, minister of the interior; Mr. C. W. Ashford, attorney-general; and Mr. Godfrey Brown, minister of finance. I was sent for in the afternoon of July 5 to swear the King to the constitution. When I reached the palace they were all there, and the King asked me in Hawaiian whether he had better sign it or not. I said, “You must follow the advice of your responsible ministers.” He signed it.
Q. This ministry had been appointed as the result of the demand of the mass meeting?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And then having been appointed, they presented him with the constitution of 1887?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And he signed it?
A. He did.
Q. Was that constitution ever submitted to a popular vote for ratification?
A. No; it was not. There was no direct vote ratifying the constitution, but its provisions requiring that no one should vote unless he had taken an oath to support it, and a large number voted at that first election, was considered a virtual ratification of the constitution.
Q. If they voted at all they were considered as accepting it?
A. Yes, sir. I do not think any large number refused to take the oath to it.
Q. It was not contemplated by the mass meeting, nor the cabinet, nor anybody in power to submit the matter of ratification at all?
A. No, it was not. It was considered a revolution. It was a successful revolutionary act.
Q. And, therefore, was not submitted to a popular vote for ratification?
A. Yes, sir. It had mischievous effects in encouraging the Wilcox revolution of 1889, which was unsuccessful. I think it was a bad precedent, only the exigencies of the occasion seemed to demand it.

Without adding other testimony on the mode of extorting the new constitution or accepting this statement as full and unbiased, it is enough that it brings me to a point at which I may present important changes in the Hawaiian constitution and their application to the social and political conditions of the time. Your attention is now invited to the following amendments in the constitution of 1887:

Art. 41. The cabinet shall consist of the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of the interior, the minister of finance, and the attorney-general, and they shall
be His Majesty's special advisers in the executive affairs of the Kingdom; and they shall be ex officio members of His Majesty's privy council of state. They shall be appointed and commissioned by the King, and shall be removed by him only upon a vote of want of confidence passed by a majority of all the elective members of the legislature, or upon conviction of felony, and shall be subject to impeachment. No act of the King shall have any effect unless it be countersigned by a member of the cabinet, who, by that signature, makes himself responsible.

Art. 42. Each member of the cabinet shall keep an office at the seat of Government, and shall be accountable for the conduct of his deputies and clerks. The cabinet hold seats ex officio in the legislature, with the right to vote, except on a question of want of confidence in them.

Art. 47. The legislature has full power and authority to amend the constitution as hereinafter provided, and from time to time to make all manner of wholesome laws, not repugnant to the constitution.

Art. 56. A noble shall be a subject of the Kingdom, who shall have attained the age of twenty-five years, and resided in the Kingdom three years, and shall be the owner of taxable property in this Kingdom of the value of three thousand dollars over and above all encumbrances, or in receipt of an income of not less than $600 per annum.

Art. 58. Twenty-four nobles shall be elected as follows: Six from the Island of Hawaii; six from the Islands of Maui, Molokai, and Lanai; nine from the Island of Oahu; and three from the islands of Kauai and Niuhau. At the first election held under this constitution, the nobles shall be elected to serve until the general election to the legislature for the first year of our Lord 1890, at which election, and thereafter, the nobles shall be elected at the same time and places as the representatives. At the election for the year of our Lord 1890, one-third of the nobles from each of the divisions aforesaid shall be elected for two years, and one-third for four years, and one-third for six years, and the electors shall ballot for them for such terms, respectively; and at all subsequent general elections they shall be elected for six years. The nobles shall serve without pay.

Art. 59. Every male resident of the Hawaiian Islands, of Hawaiian, American, or European birth or descent, who shall have attained the age of twenty years, and shall have paid his taxes, and shall have caused his name to be entered on the list of voters for nobles of his district, shall be an elector of nobles, and shall be entitled to vote at any election of nobles, provided:

First. That he shall have resided in this country not less than three years, and in the district in which he offers to vote not less than three months immediately preceding the election at which he offers to vote;

Second. That he shall own and be possessed, in his own right, of taxable property in this country of the value of not less than $3,000 over and above all encumbrances, or shall have actually received an income of not less than $600 during the year next preceding his registration for such election;

Third. That he shall be able to read and comprehend an ordinary newspaper printed in either the Hawaiian, English, or some European language;

Fourth. That he shall have taken an oath to support the constitution and laws, such oath to be administered by any person authorized to administer oaths, or by any inspector of elections;

Provided, however, That the requirements of a three years' residence and of ability to read and comprehend an ordinary newspaper, printed either in the Hawaiian, English, or some European language, shall not apply to persons residing in the Kingdom at the time of the promulgation of this constitution, if they shall register and vote at the first election which shall be held under this constitution.

Art. 60. There shall be twenty-four representatives of the people elected biennially, except those first elected under this constitution, who shall serve until the general election for the year of our Lord 1890. The representation shall be based upon the principles of equality and shall be regulated and apportioned by the legislature according to the population to be ascertained from time to time by the official census. But until such apportionment by the legislature, the apportionment now established by law shall remain in force, with the following exceptions, namely: There shall be but two representatives for the districts of Hilo and Puna on the island of Hawaii, but one for the districts of Lahaina and Kaanapali on the island of Maui, and but one for the districts of Koolau and Waihina on the island of Oahu.

Art. 61. No person shall be eligible as a representative of the people unless he be a male subject of the Kingdom, who shall have arrived at the full age of twenty-one years; who shall know how to read and write either the Hawaiian, English, or some European language; who shall understand accounts; who shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for at least three years, the last of which shall be the year immediately preceding his election; and who shall own real estate within the Kingdom of a clear value, over and above all encumbrances, of at least $500; or who shall have an annual income of at least $250, derived from any property or some lawful employment.
ART. 62. Every male resident of the Kingdom, of Hawaiian, American, or European birth or descent, who shall have taken an oath to support the constitution and laws in the manner provided for electors of nobles; who shall have paid his taxes; who shall have attained the age of twenty years; and shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the election, and shall know how to read and write either the Hawaiian, English, or some European language (if born since the year 1810), and shall have caused his name to be entered on the list of voters of his district as may be provided by law, shall be entitled to one vote for the representative or representatives of that district, provided, however, that the requirements of being domiciled in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the election, and of knowing how to read and write either the Hawaiian, English, or some European language, shall not apply to persons residing in this Kingdom at the time of the promulgation of this constitution, if they shall register and vote at the first election which shall be held under this constitution.

ART. 63. No person shall sit as a noble or representative in the legislature unless elected under and in conformity with the provisions of this constitution. The property of income qualification of representatives, of nobles, and of electors of nobles may be increased by law, and a property or income qualification of electors of representatives may be created and altered by law.

ART. 80. The cabinet shall have power to make and publish all necessary rules and regulations for the holding of any election or elections under this constitution prior to the passage by the legislature of appropriate laws for such purpose, and to provide for administering to officials, subjects, and residents the oath to support this constitution. The first election hereunder shall be held within ninety days after the promulgation of this constitution, and the legislature then elected may be convened at Honolulu, upon the call of the cabinet council in extraordinary session at such time as the cabinet council may deem necessary, thirty days' notice thereof being previously given.

ART. 82. Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in the legislature, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members thereof, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on its journal, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the next legislature; which proposed amendment or amendments shall be published for three months previous to the next election of representatives and nobles; and if in the next legislature such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of the legislature, such amendment or amendments shall become part of the constitution of this Kingdom.

These sections disclose:

First. A purpose to take from the King the power to appoint nobles and to vest it in persons having $3,000 worth of unincumbered property or an annual income above the expense of living of $600. This gave to the whites three-fourths of the vote for nobles and one-fourth to the natives.

The provisions to the fourth section of article 59 and article 62 have this significant application. Between the years 1878 and 1886 the Hawaiian Government imported from Madeira and the Azores Islands 10,216 contract laborers, men, women, and children. Assume, for convenience of argument, that 2,000 of these were males of twenty years and upward. Very few of them could read and write. Only three of them were naturalized up to 1888, and since then only five more have become so. The remainder are subjects of Portugal. These were admitted to vote on taking the following oath and receiving the accompanying certificate:

No. —
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
Island of ——, district of ——, &c.

I, ——, aged ——, a native of ——, residing at ——, in said district, do solemnly swear, in the presence of Almighty God, that I will support the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom promulgated and proclaimed on the 7th day of July, 1887, and the laws of said Kingdom. Not hereby renouncing, but expressly reserving, all allegiance and citizenship now owing or held by me ——.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this — day of ——, A.D. 18—.

Inspector of Election.
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

No.——.
Hawaiian Islands,
Island of ———, District of ———, 88.
I, the undersigned, inspector of election, duly appointed and commissioned, do hereby certify that ———, aged ———, a native of ———, residing at ———, in said district, has this day taken before me the oath to support the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom promulgated and proclaimed on the 7th day of July, and the laws of said Kingdom.

———— 18——.

Inspector of Election.

These ignorant laborers were taken before the election from the cane fields in large numbers by the overseer before the proper officer to administer the oath and then carried to the polls and voted according to the will of the plantation manager. Why was this done? In the language of the Chief Justice Judd, “to balance the native vote with the Portuguese vote.” This same purpose is admitted by all persons here. Again, large numbers of Americans, Germans, English, and other foreigners unnaturalized were permitted to vote under the foregoing form.

Two-thirds of this number were never naturalized, but voted under the above form of oath and certificate. They were citizens of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain, invited to vote under this constitution to neutralize further the native voting strength. This same action was taken in connection with other European populations.

For the first time in the history of the country the number of nobles is made equal to the number of representatives. This furnished a veto power over the representatives of the popular vote to the nobles, who were selected by persons mostly holding foreign allegiance, and not subjects of the Kingdom. The election of a single representative by the foreign element gave to it the legislature.

The power of appointing a cabinet was left with the King. His power to remove one was taken away. The removal could only be accomplished by a vote of want of confidence by a majority of all the elective members of the legislature. The tenure of office of a cabinet minister henceforth depends on the pleasure of the legislature, or, to speak practically, on the favor of certain foreigners, Americans and Europeans.

Then it is declared that no act of the King shall have any effect unless it be countersigned by a member of the cabinet, who by that signature makes himself responsible. Power is taken from the King in the selection of nobles, not to be given to the masses but to the wealthy classes, a large majority of whom are not subjects of the Kingdom. Power to remove a cabinet is taken away from him, not to be conferred on a popular body but on one designed to be ruled by foreign subjects. Power to do any act was taken from the King unless countersigned by a member of the cabinet. This instrument was never submitted to the people for approval or rejection, nor was it ever contemplated by its friends and promoters, and of this no man will make issue.

Prior to this revolution large quantities of arms had been brought by a secret league from San Francisco and placed amongst its members. The first election under this constitution took place with the foreign population well armed and the troops hostile to the crown and people. The result was the election of what was termed a reform legislature. The mind of an observer of these events notes henceforth a division of the people by the terms native and foreigner. It does not import race hostility simply. It is founded rather upon the attempted control of the country by a population of foreign origin and zealously holding alle-
glance to foreign powers. It had an alliance with natives of foreign parentage, some of whom were the descendants of missionary ancestors. Hence the terms "foreigner" and "missionary" in Hawaiian politics have their peculiar significance.

Foreign ships of great powers lying in the port of Honolulu to protect the persons and property of their citizens, and these same citizens left by their Governments without reproof for participation in such events as I have related, must have restrained the native mind or indeed any mind from a resort to physical force. Its means of resistance was naturally what was left of political power.

In 1890 a legislature was elected in favor of a new constitution. The calculation of the reformers to elect all the nobles failed, owing to a defection of whites, especially amongst the intelligent laboring classes in the city of Honolulu, who were qualified to vote for nobles under the income clause. The cabinet installed by the revolution was voted out. A new cabinet, in harmony with the popular will, was appointed and remained in power until the death of the King in 1891.

In 1892 another legislature was elected. Thrum's Handbook of Information for 1893, whose author, a reformer and annexationist, is intelligent and in the employ of the Provisional Government, and whose work is highly valued by all persons, says, concerning this election:

The result brought to the legislature three rather evenly balanced parties. This, with an admixture of self-interest in certain quarters, has been the means of much delay in the progress of the session, during which there have been no less than three new cabinets on "want of confidence" resolutions.

Judge Widemann, of the national reform party, divides the legislature up thus: "Three parties and some independents. The national reform, reform, and liberal." There were nine members of the national reform party, fourteen members of the reform, twenty-one liberals, and four independents."

The liberals favored the old mode of selecting nobles; the national reform party was in favor of a new constitution reducing the qualification of voters for nobles, and the reform party was in opposition to both these ideas.

There were a number of members of all these factions aspiring to be cabinet officers. This made certain individuals ignore party lines and form combinations to advance personal interests. The reform party seized upon the situation and made such combinations as voted out cabinet after cabinet until finally what was termed the Wilcox cabinet was appointed. This was made up entirely of reformers. Those members of the national reform and liberal parties who had been acting with the reform party to this point, and expecting representation in the cabinet, being disappointed, set to work to vote out this cabinet, which was finally accomplished.

There was never a time when the reform party had any approach to a majority of members of the legislature.

Let it be borne in mind that the time now was near at hand when the legislature would probably be prorogued. Whatever cabinet was in power at the time of the prorogation had control of public affairs until a new legislature should assemble two years afterwards and longer unless expelled by a vote of want of confidence.

An anti-reform cabinet was appointed by the Queen. Some faint struggle was made towards organizing to vote out this cabinet, but it was abandoned. The legislature was prorogued. The reform mem-
bers absented themselves from the session of that day in manifestation of their disappointment in the loss of power through the cabinet for the ensuing two years.

The letters of the American minister and naval officers stationed at Honolulu in 1892 indicate that any failure to appoint a ministry of the reform party would produce a political crisis. The voting out of the Wileox cabinet produced a discontent amongst the reformers verging very closely towards one, and had more to do with the revolution than the Queen’s proclamation. The first was the foundation—the latter the opportunity.

In the legislatures of 1890 and 1892 many petitions were filed asking for a new constitution. Many were presented to the King and Queen. The discontent with the constitution of 1887 and eagerness to escape from it, controlled the elections against the party which had established it. Divisions on the mode of changing the constitution, whether by legislative action or by constitutional convention, and the necessity for a two-thirds vote of the legislature to effect amendments, prevented relief by either method. Such was the situation at the proration of the legislature of 1892.

This was followed by the usual ceremonies at the palace on the day of proration—the presence of the cabinet, supreme court judges, diplomatic corps, and troops.

The Queen informed her cabinet of her purpose to proclaim a new constitution, and requested them to sign it.

From the best information I can obtain the changes to the constitution of 1887 were as follows:

Art. 20. By adding to exceptions: Members of the privy council, notary public, agents to take acknowledgments.
Art. 22. By adding Princess Kawananakoa and Kalanianaole as heirs to the throne.
Art. 46. Changing the session of the legislature to the month of April.
Art. 49. That the Queen shall sign and approve all bills and resolutions, even to those that are voted when passed over her veto.
Art. 56. Pay of representatives raised to $500 instead of $250 for biennial term.
Art. 57. The Queen shall appoint the nobles, not to exceed twenty-four.
Art. 60. The representatives may be increased from twenty-four, as at present, to forty-eight.
Art. 62. Only subjects shall vote.
Art. 65. The term of appointment of the supreme court judges, not for life, as before, but for six years.
Art. 75. The appointment of governors of each island for four-years term.

Her ministers declined to sign, and two of them communicated to leading reformers (Mr. L. A. Thurston, Mr. W. O. Smith, and others) the Queen’s purpose and the position of the cabinet. Finding herself thwarted by the position of the cabinet, she declared to the crowd around the palace that she could not give them a new constitution at that time on account of the action of her ministers, and that she would do so at some future time. This was construed by some to mean that she would do so at an early day when some undefined, favorable opportunity should occur, and by others when a new legislature should assemble and a new cabinet might favor her policy, or some other than an extreme and revolutionary course could be resorted to.

It seems that the members of the Queen’s cabinet, after much urging, prevailed upon her to abandon the idea of proclaiming a new constitution. The cooperation of the cabinet appears to have been, in the mind of the Queen, necessary to give effect to her proclamation. This method had been adopted by Kamehameha V in proclaiming the constitution of 1864. The constitution of 1887 preserved this same
form, in having the King proclaim that constitution on the recommendation of the cabinet, which he had been prevailed upon by a committee from the mass meeting to appoint.

The leaders of the movement urged the members of the Queen’s cabinet not to resign, feeling assured that until they had done so the Queen would not feel that the power rested in her alone to proclaim a new constitution. In order to give further evidence of her purpose to abandon the design of proclaiming it, a proclamation was published on the morning of the 16th of January, signed by herself and her ministers, pledging her not to do so, and was communicated to Minister Stevens that morning.

The following papers were among the files of the legation when turned over to me:

**DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,**
Honolulu, H. I., January 16, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose to your excellency a copy of a “By Authority” Notice issued this morning by Her Majesty’s ministers under Her Majesty’s sanction and approval.

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your excellency’s obedient servant,

SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

To His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Honolulu.

BY AUTHORITY.

Her Majesty’s ministers desire to express their appreciation for the quiet and order which have prevailed in this community since the events of Saturday, and are authorized to say that the position taken by Her Majesty in regard to the promulgation of a new constitution was under stress of her native subjects.

Authority is given for the assurance that any changes desired in the fundamental law of the land will be sought only by methods provided in the constitution itself.

Her Majesty’s ministers request all citizens to accept the assurance of Her Majesty in the same spirit in which it is given.

LILUOKALANI,
Samuel Parker,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
W. H. CORNWELL,
Minister of Finance.
John E. Colburn,
Minister of the Interior.
A. P. Peterson,
Attorney-General.

On the same day a mass meeting of between fifteen hundred and two thousand people assembled, attended by the leading men in the liberal and national reform parties, and adopted resolutions as follows:

Resolved, That the assurance of Her Majesty the Queen contained in this day’s proclamation is accepted by the people as a satisfactory guaranty that the Government does not and will not seek any modification of the constitution by any other means than those provided in the organic law.

Resolved, That accepting this assurance, the citizens here assembled will give their cordial support to the administration, and indorse them in sustaining that policy.

To the communication inclosing the Queen’s proclamation just cited, there appears to have been no response. On the next day, as if to give further assurance, the following paper was sent to Mr. Stevens:

Sir: The assurances conveyed by a royal proclamation by myself and ministers yesterday having been received by my native subjects, and by them ratified at a mass meeting, was received in a different spirit by the meeting representing the foreign population and interests in my Kingdom. It is now my desire to give to your excellency, as the diplomatic representative of the United States of America at my court, the solemn assurance that the present constitution will be upheld and maintained by me and my ministers, and no changes will be made except by the methods therein provided.
I desire to express to your excellency this assurance in the spirit of that friendship which has ever existed between my Kingdom and that of the Government of the United States of America, and which I trust will long continue.

By the Queen:

Samuel Parker,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Wm. H. Cornwell,
Minister of Finance.

John F. Colburn,
Minister of the Interior.

A. P. Peterson,
Attorney-General.

Iolani Palace,
Honolulu, January 17, 1854.

His Excellency John L. Stevens,
United States Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Honolulu.

On the back of the first page of this communication written in pencil is the word "Declined." Immediately under the signature of the attorney-general, also in pencil, is written "1.30 to 1.45," and at the end of the second and last page this sentence, written in ink, appears: "Received at the U. S. Legation about 2 p.m."

The cabinet itself could not be removed for two years, and the views of its members were well known to be against establishing a new constitution by proclamation of the Queen and cabinet.

Nearly all of the arms on the island of Oahu, in which Honolulu is situated, were in the possession of the Queen's government. A military force, organized and drilled, occupied the station house, the barracks, and the palace—the only points of any strategic significance in the event of a conflict.

The great body of the people moved in their usual course. Women and children passed to and fro through the streets, seemingly unconscious of any impending danger, and yet there were secret conferences held by a small body of men, some of whom were Germans, some Americans, and some native-born subjects of foreign origin.

On Saturday evening, the 14th of January, they took up the subject of dethroning the Queen and proclaiming a new Government with a view of annexation to the United States.

The first and most momentous question with them was to devise some plan to have the United States troops landed. Mr. Thurston, who appears to have been the leading spirit, on Sunday sought two members of the Queen's cabinet and urged them to head a movement against the Queen, and to ask Minister Stevens to land the troops, assuring them that in such an event Mr. Stevens would do so. Failing to enlist any of the Queen's cabinet in the cause, it was necessary to devise some other mode to accomplish this purpose. A committee of safety, consisting of thirteen members, had been formed from a little body of men assembled in W. O. Smith's office. A deputation of these, informing Mr. Stevens of their plans, arranged with him to land the troops if they would ask it "for the purpose of protecting life and property." It was further agreed between him and them that in the event they should occupy the government building and proclaim a new government he would recognize it. The two leading members of the committee, Messrs. Thurston and Smith, growing uneasy as to the safety of their persons, went to him to know if he would protect them in the event of their arrest by the authorities, to which he gave his assent.

At the mass meeting, called by the committee of safety on the 16th of January, there was no communication to the crowd of any purpose to dethrone the Queen or to change the form of government, but only
to authorize the committee to take steps to prevent a consummation of
the Queen's purposes and to have guarantees of public safety. The
committee on public safety had kept their purposes from the public
view at this mass meeting and at their small gatherings for fear of pro-
ceedings against them by the government of the Queen.

After the mass meeting had closed a call on the American minister
for troops was made in the following terms, and signed indiscriminately
by Germans, by Americans, and by Hawaiian subjects of foreign
extraction:

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
Honolulu, January 16, 1893.

To His Excellency John L. Stevens,
American Minister Resident:

Sir: We, the undersigned, citizens and residents of Honolulu, respectfully repre-
sent that, in view of recent public events in this Kingdom, culminating in the
revolutionary acts of Queen Liliuokalani on Saturday last, the public safety is
menaced and lives and property are in peril, and we appeal to you and the United
States forces at your command for assistance.

The Queen, with the aid of armed force and accompanied by threats of violence
and bloodshed from those with whom she was acting, attempted to proclaim a new
constitution; and while prevented for the time from accomplishing her object, de-
clared publicly that she would only defer her action.

This conduct and action was upon an occasion and under circumstances which
have created general alarm and terror.

We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and, therefore, pray for the pro-
tection of the United States forces.

Henry E. Cooper,
F. W. McChesney,
W. C. Wilder,
C. Bolte,
A. Brown,
William O. Smith,
Henry Waterhouse,
Theo. F. Lansing,
Ed. Suhr,
L. A. Thurston,
John Emmeluth,
Wm. R. Castle,
J. A. McCandless,
Citizen's Committee of Safety.

The response to that call does not appear in the files or on the rec-
ords of the American legation. It, therefore, can not speak for itself.
The request of the committee of safety was, however, consented to by
the American minister. The troops were landed.

On that very night the committee assembled at the house of Henry
Waterhouse, one of its members, living the next door to Mr. Stevens,
and finally determined on the dethronement of the Queen; selected
its officers, civil and military, and adjourned to meet the next morning.

Col. J. H. Soper, an American citizen, was selected to command the
military forces. At this Waterhouse meeting it was assented to by
all that Mr. Stevens had agreed with the committee of safety that in
the event it occupied the Government building and proclaimed a Pro-
visional Government he would recognize it as a de facto government.

When the troops were landed on Monday evening, January 16, about
5 o'clock, and began their march through the streets with their small
arms, artillery, etc., a great surprise burst upon the community. To
but few was it understood. Not much time elapsed before it was given
out by members of the committee of safety that they were designed to
support them. At the palace, with the cabinet, amongst the leaders
of the Queen's military forces, and the great body of the people who
were loyal to the Queen, the apprehension came that it was a move-
ment hostile to the existing Government. Protests were filed by the minister of foreign affairs and by the governor of the island against the landing of the troops.

Messrs. Parker and Peterson testify that on Tuesday at 1 o'clock they called on Mr. Stevens, and by him were informed that in the event the Queen's forces assailed the insurrectionary forces he would intervene.

At 2:30 o'clock of the same day the members of the Provisional Government proceeded to the Government building in squads and read their proclamation. They had separated in their march to the Government building for fear of observation and arrest. There was no sign of an insurrectionary soldier on the street. The committee of safety sent to the Government building a Mr. A. S. Wilecox to see who was there, and, on being informed that there were no Government forces on the grounds, proceeded in the manner I have related and read their proclamation. Just before concluding the reading of this instrument fifteen volunteer troops appeared. Within a half hour afterward some thirty or forty made their appearance.

A part of the Queen's forces, numbering 224, were located at the station house, about one-third of a mile from the Government building. The Queen, with a body of 50 troops, was located at the palace, north of the Government building about 400 yards. A little northeast of the palace and some 200 yards from it, at the barracks, was another body of 272 troops. These forces had 14 pieces of artillery, 386 rifles, and 16 revolvers. West of the Government building and across a narrow street were posted Capt. Wiltse and his troops, these likewise having artillery and small-arms.

The Government building is in a quadrangular-shaped piece of ground surrounded by streets. The American troops were so posted as to be in front of any movement of troops which should approach the Government building on three sides, the fourth being occupied by themselves. Any attack on the Government building from the east side would expose the American troops to the direct fire of the attacking force. Any movement of troops from the palace toward the Government building in the event of a conflict between the military forces would have exposed them to the fire of the Queen's troops. In fact, it would have been impossible for a struggle between the Queen's forces and the forces of the committee of safety to have taken place without exposing them to the shots of the Queen's forces. To use the language of Admiral Skerrett, the American troops were well located if designed to promote the movement for the Provisional Government and very improperly located if only intended to protect American citizens in person and property.

They were doubtless so located to suggest to the Queen and her counsellors that they were in co-operation with the insurrectionary movement, and would when the emergency arose manifest it by active support.

It did doubtless suggest to the men who read the proclamation that they were having the support of the American minister and naval commander and were safe from personal harm.

Why had the American minister located the troops in such a situation and then assured the members of the committee of safety that on their occupation of the Government building he would recognize it as a government de facto, and as such give it support? Why was the Government building designated to them as the place which, when their proclamation was announced therefrom, would be followed by his
recognition. It was not a point of any strategic consequence. It did not involve the employment of a single soldier.

A building was chosen where there were no troops stationed, where there was no struggle to be made to obtain access, with an American force immediately contiguous, with the mass of the population impressed with its unfriendly attitude. Aye, more than this—before any demand for surrender had even been made on the Queen or on the commander or any officer of any of her military forces at any of the points where her troops were located, the American minister had recognized the Provisional Government and was ready to give it the support of the United States troops!

Mr. Damon, the vice-president of the Provisional Government and a member of the advisory council, first went to the station house, which was in command of Marshal Wilson. The cabinet was there located. The vice-president importuned the cabinet and the military commander to yield up the military forces on the ground that the American minister had recognized the Provisional Government and that there ought to be no blood shed.

After considerable conference between Mr. Damon and the ministers he and they went to the government building.

The cabinet then and there was prevailed upon to go with the vice-president and some other friends to the Queen and urge her to acquiesce in the situation. It was pressed upon her by the ministers and other persons at that conference that it was useless for her to make any contest, because it was one with the United States; that she could file her protest against what had taken place and would be entitled to a hearing in the city of Washington. After consideration of more than an hour she finally concluded, under the advice of her cabinet and friends, to order the delivery up of her military forces to the Provisional Government under protest. That paper is in the following form:

I, Liliuokalani, by the grace of God and under the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a provisional government of and for this Kingdom.

That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose minister plenipotentiary, His Excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the said provisional government.

Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces and perhaps the loss of life, I do, under this protest, and impelled by said force, yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon the facts being presented to it, under the action of its representatives and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

Done at Honolulu this 17th day of January, A. D. 1893.

LILIUOKALANI, R.

S. M. P. PARKER,

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

W. H. CORNWELL,

Minister of Finance.

JNO. P. COLBURN,

Minister of the Interior.

DR. F. PETERSON,

Attorney-General.

All this was accomplished without the firing of a gun, without a demand for surrender on the part of the insurrectionary forces until they had been converted into a de facto government by the recognition of the American minister with American troops, then ready to interfere in the event of an attack.
In pursuance of a prearranged plan, the Government thus established hastened off commissioners to Washington to make a treaty for the purpose of annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States.

During the progress of the movement the committee of safety, alarmed at the fact that the insurrectionists had no troops and no organization, despatched to Mr. Stevens three persons, to wit, Messrs. L. A. Thurston, W. C. Wilder, and H. F. Glade, "to inform him of the situation and ascertain from him what if any protection or assistance could be afforded by the United States forces for the protection of life and property, the unanimous sentiment and feeling being that life and property were in danger." Mr. Thurston is a native-born subject; Mr. Wilder is of American origin, but has absolved his allegiance to the United States and is a naturalized subject; Mr. Glade is a German subject.

The declaration as to the purposes of the Queen contained in the formal request for the appointment of a committee of safety in view of the facts which have been recited, to wit, the action of the Queen and her cabinet, the action of the Royalist mass meeting, and the peaceful movement of her followers, indicating assurances of their abandonment, seem strained in so far as any situation then requiring the landing of troops might exact.

The request was made, too, by men avowedly intending to overthrow the existing government and substitute a provisional government therefor, and who, with such purpose in progress of being effected, could not proceed therewith, but fearing arrest and imprisonment and without any thought of abandoning that purpose, sought the aid of the American troops in this situation to prevent any harm to their persons and property. To consent to an application for such a purpose without any suggestion dissuading the applicants from it on the part of the American minister, with naval forces under his command, could not otherwise be construed than as complicity with their plans.

The committee, to use their own language, say: "We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and, therefore, pray for the protection of the United States forces."

In less than thirty hours the petitioners have overturned the throne, established a new government, and obtained the recognition of foreign powers.

Let us see whether any of these petitioners are American citizens, and if so whether they were entitled to protection, and if entitled to protection at this point whether or not subsequently thereto their conduct was such as could be sanctioned as proper on the part of American citizens in a foreign country.

Mr. Henry E. Cooper is an American citizen; was a member of the the committee of safety; was a participant from the beginning in their schemes to overthrow the Queen, establish a Provisional Government, and visited Capt. Wiltsie's vessel, with a view of securing the aid of American troops, and made an encouraging report thereon. He, an American citizen, read the proclamation dethroning the Queen and establishing the Provisional Government.

Mr. F. W. McChesney is an American citizen; was cooperating in the revolutionary movement, and had been a member of the advisory council from its inception.

Mr. W. C. Wilder is a naturalized citizen of the Hawaiian Islands, owing no allegiance to any other country. He was one of the original members of the advisory council, and one of the orators in the mass meeting on the morning of January 16.
Mr. C. Bolte is of German origin, but a regularly naturalized citizen of the Hawaiian Islands.

Mr. A. Brown is a Scotchman and has never been naturalized.

Mr. W. O. Smith is a native of foreign origin and a subject of the Islands.

Mr. Henry Waterhouse, originally from Tasmania, is a naturalized citizen of the islands.

Mr. Theo. F. Lansing is a citizen of the United States, owing and claiming allegiance thereto. He has never been naturalized in this country.

Mr. Ed. Suhr is a German subject.

Mr. L. A. Thurston is a native-born subject of the Hawaiian Islands, of foreign origin.

Mr. John Emmeluth is an American citizen.

Mr. W. R. Castle is a Hawaiian of foreign parentage.

Mr. J. A. McCandless is a citizen of the United States—never having been naturalized here.

Six are Hawaiians subjects; five are American citizens; one English, and one German. A majority are foreign subjects.

It will be observed that they sign as "Citizens' committee of safety."

This is the first time American troops were ever landed on these islands at the instance of a committee of safety without notice to the existing government.

It is to be observed that they claim to be a citizens' committee of safety and that they are not simply applicants for the protection of the property and lives of American citizens.

The chief actors in this movement were Messrs. L. A. Thurston and W. O. Smith.

Alluding to the meeting of the committee of safety held at Mr. W. R. Castle's on Sunday afternoon, January 15, Mr. W. O. Smith says:

After we adjourned Mr. Thurston and I called upon the American minister again and informed him of what was being done. Among other things we talked over with him what had better be done in case of our being arrested, or extreme or violent measures being taken by the monarchy in regard to us. We did not know what steps would be taken, and there was a feeling of great unrest and sense of danger in the community. Mr. Stevens gave assurance of his earnest purpose to afford all the protection that was in his power to protect life and property. He emphasized the fact that while he would call for the United States troops to protect life and property, he could not recognize any government until actually established.

Mr. Damon, the vice-president of the Provisional Government, returning from the country on the evening of the 16th, and seeing the troops in the streets, inquired of Mr. Henry Waterhouse, "Henry, what does all this mean?" To which he says, if he "remembers rightly," Mr. Waterhouse replied, "It is all up!" On being questioned by me as to his understanding of the expression, "It is all up," he said he understood from it that the American troops had taken possession of the island.

Mr. C. L. Carter, at the government house, assured Mr. Damon that the United States troops would protect them. Mr. Damon was astonished when they were not immediately marched over from Arion Hall to the government building and became uneasy. He only saw protection in the bodily presence of the American troops in this building. The committee of safety, with its frequent interviews with Mr. Stevens, saw it in the significance of the position occupied by the United States troops and in the assurance of Mr. Stevens that he would interfere for the purpose of protecting life and property, and that when they should
have occupied the government building and read their proclamation dethroning the Queen and establishing the Provisional Government he would recognize it.

The committee of safety, recognizing the fact that the landing of the troops under existing circumstances could, according to all law and precedent, be done only on the request of the existing Government, having failed in utilizing the Queen's cabinet, resorted to the new device of a committee of safety, made up of Germans, British, Americans, and natives of foreign origin, led and directed by two native subjects of the Hawaiian Islands.

With these leaders, subjects of the Hawaiian Islands, the American minister consulted freely as to the revolutionary movement and gave them assurance of protection from danger at the hands of the royal Government and forces.

On January 17 the following communication, prepared at the station house, which is one-third of a mile from the Government building and two-thirds of a mile from the residence of the American minister, was sent to him:

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
Envoi Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, etc.:

SIR: Her Hawaiian Majesty's Government, having been informed that certain persons to them unknown, have issued proclamation declaring a Provisional Government to exist in opposition to Her Majesty's Government, and having pretended to depose the Queen, her cabinet and marshal, and that certain treasonable persons at present occupy the Government building in Honolulu with an armed force, and pretending that your excellency, on behalf of the United States of America, has recognized such Provisional Government, Her Majesty's cabinet asks respectfully, has your excellency recognized said Provisional Government, and, if not, Her Majesty's Government under the above existing circumstances respectfully requests the assistance of your Government in preserving the peace of the country.

We have the honor to be your excellency's obedient servants,

SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister Foreign Affairs.

WM. H. CORNWELL,
Minister of Finance.

JOHN F. COLBURN,
Minister of the Interior.

A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

In it will be observed the declaration that the Provisional Government is claiming to have had his recognition. The reply of Mr. Stevens is not to be found in the records or files of the legation, but on those records appears the following entry:

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

About 4 to 5 p.m. of this date—am not certain of the precise time—the note on file from the four ministers of the deposed Queen, inquiring if I had recognized the Provisional Government, came to my hands while I was lying sick on the couch. Not far from 5 p.m.—I did not think to look at my watch—I addressed a short note to Hon. Samuel Parker, Hon. Wm. H. Cornwell, Hon. John F. Colburn, and Hon. A. P. Peterson, no longer regarding them as ministers, informing them that I had recognized the Provisional Government.

JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Minister.

This communication was received at the station house and read by all of the ministers and by a number of other persons.

After this Mr. Samuel M. Damon, the vice-president of the Provisional Government, and Mr. Bolte, a member of the advisory council, came to the station house and gave information of the proclamation
and asked for the delivery up of the station house, the former urging that the government had been recognized by the American minister, and that any struggle would cause useless bloodshed.

The marshal declared that he was able to cope with the forces of the Provisional Government and those of the United States successfully, if the latter interfered, and that he would not surrender except by the written order of the Queen.

After considerable conference, the cabinet went with Messrs. Damon and Bolte to the Government building and met the Provisional Government, and there indicated a disposition to yield, but said that they must first consult with the Queen.

The members of the Queen's cabinet, accompanied by Mr. Damon, preceded by the police, and met the Queen. There were also present Messrs. H. A. Widemann, Paul Neumann, E. C. Macfarlane, J. O. Carter, and others.

As to what occurred there I invite your attention to the following statement, made by the vice-president of the Provisional Government, and certified by him to be correct:

Q. In that conversation you asked for a surrender of the forces and the ministers advised it?
A. The different ones spoke and they all recommended it. Each one spoke. At first Judge Widemann was opposed to it, but he finally changed his mind on the advice of Mr. Neumann. Mr. Neumann advised yielding. Each one advised it.

Q. Was the advice of Neumann and the cabinet based on the idea that the Queen would have to contend with the United States forces as well as the forces of the Provisional Government?
A. It was the Queen's idea that she could surrender pending a settlement at Washington, and it was on that condition that she gave up. If I remember right I spoke to her also. I said she could surrender or abdicate under protest.

Q. And that the protest would be considered at a later period at Washington?
A. At a later period.

I knew it was the Queen's idea that Mr. Stevens was in sympathy with this movement.

Q. But I am asking now as to what reasons the ministers gave for her acquiescence?
A. It was their idea that it was useless to carry on; that it would be provocative of bloodshed and trouble if she persisted in the matter longer; that it was wiser for her to abdicate under protest and have a hearing at a later time; that the forces against her were too strong.

Q. Did they indicate the United States forces in any way?
A. I do not remember their doing so.

Q. Do you know whether or not at that time they were under the impression that the United States forces were in sympathy with the revolution?
A. Beyond an impression I know nothing definite.

Q. What was the result of this conference with the Queen? What was agreed on?
A. She signed a document surrendering her rights to the Provisional Government under protest.

She was reluctant to agree to this, but was advised that the whole subject would come up for final consideration at Washington.

I did tell her that she would have a perfect right to be heard at a later period.

Q. By the United States Government?
A. Yes.

All the persons present except Mr. Damon formally state and certify that in this discussion it was conceded by all that Mr. Stevens had recognized the Provisional Government. This Mr. Damon says he does not clearly recollect, but that he is under the impression that at that time the Provisional Government had been recognized. Save Mr. Damon, these witnesses testify to the impression made on their minds and on that of the Queen that the American minister and the American naval commander were cooperating in the insurrectionary movement.
As a result of the conference, there was then and there prepared the protest which has been cited.

The time occupied in this conference is indicated in the following language by Mr. Damon:

We went over (to the Palace) between 4 and 5 and remained until 6 discussing the situation.

Mr. Damon and the cabinet returned to the Provisional Government, presented the protest, and President Dole indorsed on the same:

Received by the hands of the late cabinet this 17th day of January, A. D. 1893. Sanford B. Dole,

Chairman of the Executive Council of Provisional Government.

After this protest the Queen ordered the delivery up of the station house, where was an important portion of the military forces, and the barracks, where was another force.

The statements of many witnesses at the station house and at the conference with the Queen, that the reply of Mr. Stevens to the cabinet on the subject of recognition had been received when Mr. Damon and Mr. Bolte called there, and also the statements at the conference with the Queen that the recognition had taken place, are not contradicted by Mr. Damon; but when inquired of touching these matters, he uses such expressions as "I can not remember. It might have been so."

Mr. Damon says that he is under the impression that he knew when he went to this conference with the Queen that the recognition had taken place.

Mr. Bolte, another member of the Provisional Government, in a formal statement made and certified to by him, shows very much confusion of memory, but says: "I can not say what time in the day Mr. Stevens sent his recognition." He thinks it was after sunset.

Mr. Henry Waterhouse, another member of the Provisional Government, says: "We had taken possession of the barracks and station house before the recognition took place."

It will be observed that I have taken the communication of the Queen's ministers and the memorandum of Mr. Stevens as to his reply and the time thereof, to wit: "Not far from 5 p.m. I did not think to look at my watch."

This information was then transmitted to the station house, a distance of two-thirds of a mile, and before the arrival of Messrs. Damon and Bolte. This fact is supported by nine persons present at the interview with Mr. Damon and Mr. Bolte. Then another period of time intervenes between the departure of Mr. Damon and the cabinet, passing over a distance of one-third of a mile to the Government building. Then some further time is consumed in a conference with the Provisional Government before the departure of Mr. Damon and the cabinet to the palace, where was the Queen. The testimony of all persons present proves that the recognition by Mr. Stevens had then taken place. Subsequent to the signing of the protest occurred the turning over of the military to the Provisional Government.

Inquiry as to the credibility of all these witnesses satisfies me as to their character for veracity, save one person, Mr. Colburn. He is a merchant, and it is said he makes misstatements in business transactions. No man can reasonably doubt the truth of the statements of the witnesses that Mr. Stevens had recognized the Provisional Government before Messrs. Damon and Bolte went to the station house.

Recurring to Mr. Stevens's statement as to the time of his reply to the
letter of the cabinet, it does not appear how long before this reply he had recognized the Provisional Government. Some witnesses fix it at three and some at half-past three. According to Mr. Damon he went over with the cabinet to meet the Queen between four and five, and, taking into account the periods of time as indicated by the several events antecedent to this visit to the palace, it is quite probable that the recognition took place in the neighborhood of 3 o'clock. This would be within one-half hour from the time that Mr. Cooper commenced to read the proclamation establishing that Government, and, allowing twenty minutes for its reading, in ten minutes thereafter the recognition must have taken place.

Assuming that the recognition took place at half-past 3, there was not at the Government building with the Provisional Government exceeding 60 raw soldiers.

In conversation with me Mr. Stevens said that he knew the barracks and station-house had not been delivered up when he recognized the Provisional Government; that he did not care anything about that, for 25 men, well armed, could have run the whole crowd.

There appears on the files of the legation this communication:

GOVERNMENT BUILDING,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

His Excellency John L. Stevens,
United States Minister Resident:

Sir: I acknowledge receipt of your valued communication of this day, recognizing the Hawaiian Provisional Government, and express deep appreciation of the same.

We have conferred with the ministers of the late government, and have made demand upon the marshal to surrender the station-house. We are not actually yet in possession of the station-house; but as night is approaching and our forces may be insufficient to maintain order, we request the immediate support of the United States forces, and would request that the commander of the U. S. forces take command of our military forces, so that they may act together for the protection of the city.

Respectfully yours,

Sanford B. Dole,
Chairman Executive Council.

After the recognition by Mr. Stevens, Mr. Dole thus informs him of his having seen the Queen's Cabinet and demanded the surrender of the forces at the station-house. This paper contains the evidence that before Mr. Dole had ever had any conference with the Queen's ministers, or made any demand for the surrender of her military forces, the Provisional Government had been recognized by Mr. Stevens.

On this paper is written the following:

The above request not complied with.—Stevens.

This is the only reference to it to be found on the records or among the files of the legation.

This memorandum is not dated.

With the Provisional Government and its forces in a two-acre lot, and the Queen's forces undisturbed by their presence, this formal, dignified declaration on the part of the President of the Provisional Government to the American minister, after first thanking him for his recognition, informing him of his meeting with the Queen's cabinet, and admitting that the station-house had not been surrendered, and stating that his forces may not be sufficient to maintain order, and asking that the American commander unite the forces of the United States with those of the Provisional Government to protect the city, is in ludicrous contrast with the declaration of the American minister in his
previous letter of recognition that the Provisional Government was in full possession of the Government buildings, the archives, the treasury, and in control of the Hawaiian capital.

In Mr. Stevens's dispatch to Mr. Foster, No. 79, January 18, 1803, is this paragraph:

As soon as practicable a Provisional Government was constituted, composed of four highly respectable men, with Judge Dole at the head, he having resigned his place on the supreme bench to assume this responsibility. He was born in Honolulu, of American parentage, educated here and in the United States, and is of the highest reputation among all citizens, both natives and whites. P. C. Jones is a native of Boston, Mass., wealthy, possessing property interests in the island, and a resident here for many years. The other two members are of the highest respectability. The committee of public safety forthwith took possession of the Government buildings, archives, and treasury, and installed the Provisional Government at the heads of the respective departments. This being an accomplished fact, I promptly recognized the Provisional Government as the de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands. The English minister, the Portuguese chargé d'affaires, the French and the Japanese commissioners promptly did the same; these, with myself, being the only members of the diplomatic corps residing here.

Read in the light of what has immediately preceded, it is clear that he recognized the Provisional Government very soon after the proclamation of it was made. This proclamation announced the organization of the Government, its form and officials. The quick recognition was the performance of his pledge to the committee of safety. The recognition by foreign powers, as herein stated, is incorrect. They are dated on the 18th, the day following that of Mr. Stevens.

On the day of the revolution neither the Portuguese chargé d'affaires nor the French commissioner had any communication, written or oral, with the Provisional Government until after dark, when they went to the Government building to understand the situation of affairs. They did not then announce their recognition.

The British minister, several hours after Mr. Stevens's recognition, believing that the Provisional Government was sustained by the American minister and naval forces, and that the Queen's troops could not and ought not to enter into a struggle with the United States forces, and having so previously informed the Queen's cabinet, did go to the Provisional Government and indicate his purpose to recognize it.

I can not assure myself about the action of the Japanese commissioner. Mr. Stevens was at his home sick, and some one evidently misinformed him as to the three first.

In a letter of the Hawaiian commissioners to Mr. Foster, dated February 11, is this paragraph:

Sixth. At the time the Provisional Government took possession of the Government buildings no American troops or officers were present or took part in such proceedings in any manner whatever. No public recognition was accorded the Provisional Government by the American minister until they were in possession of the Government buildings, the archives, and the treasury, supported by several hundred armed men and after the abdication by the Queen and the surrender to the Provisional Government of her forces.

Mark the words, "and after the abdication by the Queen and the surrender to the Provisional Government of her forces." It is signed L. A. Thurston, W. C. Wilder, William R. Castle, J. Marsden, and Charles L. Carter.

Did the spirit of annexation mislead these gentlemen. If not, what malign influence tempted President Dole to a contrary statement in his cited letter to the American minister?

The Government building is a tasteful structure, with ample space for the wants of a city government of 20,000 people. It is near the
center of a 2-acre lot. In it the legislature and supreme court hold their sessions and the cabinet ministers have their offices.

In one corner of this lot in the rear is an ordinary two-story structure containing eight rooms. This building was used by the tax assessor, the superintendent of waterworks, and the Government survey office. In another corner is a small wooden structure containing two rooms used by the board of health.

These constitute what is termed in the correspondence between the Provisional Government and the American minister and the Government of the United States "government departmental buildings."

Whatever lack of harmony of statement as to time may appear in the evidence, the statements in documents and the consecutive order of events in which the witnesses agree, all do force us to but one conclusion—that the American minister recognized the Provisional Government on the simple fact that it had entered a house designated sometimes as Aliiolani Hale (sic), which had never been regarded as tenable in military operations and was not so regarded by the Queen's officers in the disposition of their military forces, these being at the station house, at the palace, and at the barracks.

Mr. Stevens consulted freely with the leaders of the revolutionary movement from the evening of the 14th. These disclosed to him all their plans. They feared arrest and punishment. He promised them protection. They needed the troops on shore to overawe the Queen's supporters and Government. This he agreed to and did furnish. They had few arms and no trained soldiers. They did not mean to fight. It was arranged between them and the American minister that the proclamation dethroning the Queen and organizing a provisional government should be read from the Government building and he would follow it with a speedy recognition. All this was to be done with American troops provided with small-arms and artillery across a narrow street within a stone's throw. This was done.

Then commenced arguments and importunities to the military commander and the Queen that the United States had recognized the Provisional Government and would support it; that for them to persist involved useless bloodshed.

No soldier of the Provisional Government ever left the 2-acre lot.

The Queen finally surrendered, not to these soldiers and their leaders but to the Provisional Government on the conviction that the American minister and the American troops were promoters and supporters of the revolution, and that she could only appeal to the Government of the United States to render justice to her.

The leaders of the revolutionary movement would not have undertaken it but for Mr. Stevens's promise to protect them against any danger from the Government. But for this their mass meeting would not have been held. But for this no request to land the troops would have been made. Had the troops not been landed no measures for the organization of a new Government would have been taken.

The American minister and the revolutionary leaders had determined on annexation to the United States, and had agreed on the part each was to act to the very end.

Prior to 1887 two-thirds of the foreigners did not become naturalized. The Americans, British, and Germans especially would not give up the protection of those strong governments and rely upon that of the Hawaiian Islands. To such persons the constitution of 1887
declared: "We need your vote to overcome that of our own native subjects. Take the oath to support the Hawaiian Government, with a distinction of allegiance to your own." Two-thirds of the Europeans and Americans now voting were thus induced to vote in a strange country with the pledge that such act did not affect their citizenship to their native country. The purport and form of this affidavit appear in the citations from the constitution of 1887 and the form of oath of a foreign voter. See page 12.

The list of registered voters of American and European origin, including Portuguese, discloses 3,715; 2,091 of this number are Portuguese. Only eight of these imported Portuguese have ever been naturalized in these islands. To this should be added 106 persons, mostly negroes, from the Cape Verde Islands, who came here voluntarily several years prior to the period of state importation of laborers.

The commander of the military forces of the Provisional Government on the day of the dethroning of the Queen and up to this hour has never given up his American citizenship, but expressly reserved the same in the form of oath already disclosed and by a continuous assertion of the same.

The advisory council of the Provisional Government, as established by the proclamation, consisted of John Emmeluth, an American, not naturalized; Andrew Brown, a Scotchman, not naturalized; C. Bolte, naturalized; James F. Morgan, naturalized; Henry Waterhouse, naturalized; S. M. Damon, native; W. G. Ashley, an American, not naturalized; E. D. Teuney, an American, not naturalized; F. W. McClesney, an American, not naturalized; W. C. Wilder, naturalized; J. A. McCandless, an American, not naturalized; W. R. Castle, a native; Lorrina A. Thurston, a native; F. J. Wilhelm, an American, not naturalized.

One-half of this body, then, was made up of persons owing allegiance to the United States and Great Britain. The annexation mass meeting of the 16th of January was made up in this same manner.

On the 25th of February, 1843, under pressure of British naval forces, the King ceded the country to Lord George Paulet, "subject to the decision of the British Government after full information." That Government restored their independence. It made a deep impression on the native mind.

This national experience was recalled by Judge Widemann, a German of character and wealth, to the Queen to satisfy her that the establishment of the Provisional Government, through the action of Capt. Wiltsie and Mr. Stevens, would be repudiated by the United States Government, and that she could appeal to it. Mr. Damon urged upon her that she would be entitled to such a hearing. He was the representative of the Provisional Government, and accepted her protest and turned it over to President Dole. This was followed by large expenditures from her private purse to present her cause and to invoke her restoration.

That a deep wrong has been done the Queen and the native race by American officials pervades the native mind and that of the Queen, as well as a hope for redress from the United States, there can be no doubt.

In this connection it is important to note the inability of the Hawaiian people to cope with any great powers, and their recognition of it by never offering resistance to their encroachments.

The suddenness of the landing of the United States troops, the reading of the proclamation of the Provisional Government almost in their
presence, and the quick recognition by Mr. Stevens, easily prepared
her for the suggestion that the President of the United States had no
knowledge of these occurrences and must know of and approve or dis-
approve of what had occurred at a future time. This, too, must have
contributed to her disposition to accept the suggestions of Judge Wide-
mann and Mr. Damon. Indeed, who could have supposed that the
circumstances surrounding her could have been foreseen and sanctioned
deliberately by the President of the United States.

Her uniform conduct and the prevailing sentiment amongst the na-
tives point to her belief as well as theirs that the spirit of justice on the
part of the President would restore her crown.

Attention is now invited to the following table, showing the census
of the Hawaiian Islands by districts and islands in 1890:

*Latest official census of the Hawaiian Islands, taken December 28, 1890, by districts and islands.*

**Hawaii.**

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<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hilo</td>
<td>3,625</td>
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<tr>
<td>Puna</td>
<td>684</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kau</td>
<td>2,577</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Kona</td>
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<tr>
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**Maui.**

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**Oahu.**

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<td>Ewa</td>
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**Kauai.**

<table>
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<td>Waimea</td>
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<td>Hanalei</td>
<td>2,472</td>
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<td>Lihue</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>11,859</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Total population, 1890, 89,990. Total population, 1884, 80,573.
The island of Oahu, on which Honolulu is situated, appears, then, to have had a population of 31,194. The total population was 89,970. This total has been increased since by adding several thousand Japanese contract laborers. Fifty-eight thousand seven hundred and ninety-six, a majority of the people, lived on the other islands.

Nothing was known of the revolutionary movement at Honolulu in the other islands until several days after its accomplishment, and no opportunity to consider and approve or reject it has been permitted.

Lieut. Fox, of Admiral Skerrett’s staff, furnishes me the following information, in the shape of a memorandum, showing the movements of American troops to and from American vessels in Honolulu:

Account of the forces landed from the U. S. S. Boston at Honolulu, January 16, 1893, together with those landed from and returned to the ship at different times:

Landed at 4:30 or 5 p. m., January 16—

- Three companies of blue jackets, 36 each ............................................. 108
- One company marines and two musicians .................................................. 32
- Musicians for battalion .............................................................................. 12
- Officers—9 naval, 1 marine ....................................................................... 10

Extra men landed—

- January 24 for Camp Boston ................................................................... 2
- February 16 for Camp Boston .................................................................. 1
- March 15 for marine guard ........................................................................ 1
- March 17 for Camp Boston ...................................................................... 14

Total 182

Total number of men and officers landed for service .................................. 180

Returned on board:

- January 27, men ..................................................................................... 2
- January 30, men ..................................................................................... 1
- February 3, Lieut. Young’s company ......................................................... 55
- February 3, officers ................................................................................. 2
- February 23, men ................................................................................... 2
- February 27, men ................................................................................... 2
- February 28, one marine and one blue jacket ........................................... 2
- March 1, men ........................................................................................... 1
- March 13, men ......................................................................................... 1
- March 15, men ........................................................................................ 2
- March 18, men ......................................................................................... 1
- March 20, Lieut. Coffman’s company ....................................................... 36
- March 20, officers .................................................................................... 1
- March 22, men ........................................................................................ 1

Total 98

Total number of men and officers returned before April 1 .......................... 89
Total number of men and officers landed before April 1 .............................. 180

On February 15 Lieut. Young’s company landed for the admiral’s review and returned after the review the same day. There were 36 men in the company and 2 officers.

The total number of men at Camp Boston.—

- April 1, men ......................................................................................... 52
- April 1, officers ....................................................................................... 6
- April 1, marines at Government building .................................................. 33
- April 1, officers ....................................................................................... 1

Total force withdrawn from shore April 1, 1893 ........................................ 92

The United States troops, it thus appears, were doing military duty for the Provisional Government before the protectorate was assumed, just as afterwards. The condition of the community at the time of the assumption of the protectorate was one of quiet and acquiescence,
pending negotiations with the United States, so far as I have been able to learn.

A few days before my arrival here news of the withdrawal by the President from the Senate of the treaty of annexation and his purpose to send a commissioner to inquire into the revolution was received.

An organization known as the Annexation Club commenced to obtain signatures to a petition in favor of annexation. This work has been continued ever since.

The result is reported on July 9, 1893, thus:

HEADQUARTERS ANNEXATION CLUB,
Honolulu, H. I., July 9, 1893.

Hon. J. H. BLOUNT,
U. S. E. E. & M. P.:

In answer to your communication of May I would say that the names on our great register to date are 5,500 and that we are advised of 190 odd on rolls not yet entered on the other islands.

Of those which are entered I would estimate that 1,218 are Americans, being 90 odd per cent of the total number of Americans on the islands and 20 odd per cent of those on the club rolls.

English 251, being 26 per cent of those on the islands and 4 per cent of club rolls.

One thousand and twenty-two Hawaiians, being 11 per cent of those on islands and 18 per cent of club rolls.

Two thousand two hundred and sixty-one Portuguese, being 73 per cent of Portuguese on islands and 41 per cent of club rolls.

Sixty-nine Norwegians, being 50 per cent of those on islands and 1 per cent of club rolls.

Three hundred and fifty-one Germans, being 53 per cent of those on islands and 6 per cent of club rolls.

Others, 328, unclassified.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

J. W. JONES,
Secretary Annexation Club.

Compare this with the exhibit in the following number of registered voters:

The census of 1890, by age and nationality, showing number of registered voters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Under 15 years</th>
<th>15 to 30 years</th>
<th>30 to 45 years</th>
<th>Over 45 years</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Registered voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>10,240</td>
<td>9,329</td>
<td>6,716</td>
<td>8,151</td>
<td>34,436</td>
<td>8,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half castes</td>
<td>3,427</td>
<td>1,744</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>6,165</td>
<td>777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian-born foreigners</td>
<td>6,797</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>7,495</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americans</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>1,928</td>
<td>637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>1,344</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>2,233</td>
<td>2,862</td>
<td>2,426</td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>8,652</td>
<td>2,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegians</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5,921</td>
<td>6,918</td>
<td>3,270</td>
<td>15,391</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>7,069</td>
<td>5,073</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>12,380</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polynesians</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nationalities</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23,518</td>
<td>29,118</td>
<td>24,157</td>
<td>13,217</td>
<td>69,990</td>
<td>13,569</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Denominations, as shown by the census of 1884, were: Protestants, 29,685; Roman Catholics, 20,072; and unreported, 30,821. Of this latter 17,639 were Chinese and 116 were Japanese. At the recent census this feature of the work was omitted.

This shows the number of registered voters and the looseness of the method of the Annexation Club.

After my arrival the adherents of the Queen commenced to obtain signatures amongst the natives against annexation, under attacks from the press and annexationists of treasonable purposes. They report 7,000 signatures. In addition to this, petition against annexation by whites, little circulated, contains 249 signatures.
The Portuguese have generally signed the annexation rolls. These, as I have already stated, are nearly all Portuguese subjects. A majority of the whites of American and European birth who have signed the same roll are not Hawaiian subjects and are not entitled to vote under any laws of the Kingdom.

The testimony of leading annexationists is that if the question of annexation was submitted to a popular vote, excluding all persons who could not read and write except foreigners (under the Australian-ballot system, which is the law of the land), that annexation would be defeated.

From a careful inquiry I am satisfied that it would be defeated by a vote of at least two to one. If the votes of persons claiming allegiance to foreign countries were excluded, it would be defeated by more than five to one.

The undoubted sentiment of the people is for the Queen, against the Provisional Government and against annexation. A majority of the whites, especially Americans, are for annexation.

The native registered vote in 1890 was 9,700; the foreign vote was 3,893. This native vote is generally aligned against the annexation whites. No relief is hoped for from admitting to the right of suffrage the overwhelming Asiatic population. In this situation the annexation whites declare that good government is unattainable.

The controlling element in the white population is connected with the sugar industry. In its interests the Government here has negotiated treaties from time to time for the purpose of securing contract laborers for terms of years for the plantations, and paid out large sums for their transportation and for building plantation wharves, etc.

These contracts provide for compelling the laborer to work faithfully by fines and damage suits brought by the planters against them, with the right on the part of the planter to deduct the damages and cost of suit out of the laborer's wages. They also provide for compelling the laborer to remain with the planter during the contract term. They are sanctioned by law and enforced by civil remedies and penal laws. The general belief amongst the planters at the so-called revolution was that, notwithstanding the laws against importing labor into the United States in the event of their annexation to that Government, these laws would not be made operative in the Hawaiian Islands on account of their peculiar conditions. Their faith in the building of a cable between Honolulu and San Francisco, and large expenditures at Pearl Harbor in the event of annexation have also as much to do with the desire for it.

In addition to these was the hope of escape from duties on rice and fruits and receiving the sugar-bounty, either by general or special law.

The repeal of the duty on sugar in the McKinley act was regarded a severe blow to their interests, and the great idea of statesmanship has been to do something in the shape of treaties with the United States, reducing their duties on agricultural products of the Hawaiian Islands, out of which profit might be derived. Annexation has for its charm the complete abolition of all duties on their exports to the United States.

The annexationists expect the United States to govern the islands by so abridging the right of suffrage as to place them in control of the whites.

The Americans, of what is sometimes termed the better class, in point of intelligence, refinement, and good morals, are fully up to the best standard in American social life. Their homes are tasteful and distin-
guished for a generous hospitality. Education and religion receive at
their hands zealous support. The remainder of them contain good
people of the laboring class and the vicious characters of a seaport
city. These general observations can be applied to the English and
German population.

The native population, numbering in 1890 40,622 persons, contained
27,901 able to read and write. No country in Europe, except per-
haps Germany and England, can make such a showing. While the
native generally reads and writes in native and English, he usually
speaks the Kanaka language. Foreigners generally acquire it. The
Chinese and Japanese learn to use it and know very little English.

Among the natives there is not a superior class, indicated by great
wealth, enterprise, and culture, directing the race, as with the whites.
This comes from several causes.

In the distribution of lands most of it was assigned to the King, chiefs,
some whites, and to the Government for its support. Of the masses
11,132 persons received 27,830 acres—about two and a half acres to an
individual—called Kuleanas. The majority received nothing. The
foreigners soon traded the chiefs out of a large portion of their shares,
and later purchased from the Government government lands and
obtained long leases on the crown lands. Avoiding details it must be
said that the native never held much of the land. It is well known
that it has been about seventy years since he commenced to emerge
from idolatry and the simplicity of thought and habits and immoralities
belonging to it. National tradition has done little for him, and before
the whites led him to education its influence was not operative. Until
within the last twenty years white leaders were generally accepted and
preferred by the King in his selections of cabinets, nobles, and judges,
and native leadership was not wanted.

Their religious affiliations are with the Protestant and Catholic
churches. They are over-generous, hospitable, almost free from re-
venge, very courteous—especially to females. Their talent for oratory
and the higher branches of mathematics is unusually marked. In per
son they have large physique, good features, and the complexion of the
brown races. They have been greatly advanced by civilization, but
have done little towards its advancement. The small amount of thiev-
ing and absence of beggary are more marked than amongst the best races
of the world. What they are capable of under fair conditions is an
unsolved problem.

Idols and idol worship have long since disappeared.

The following observations in relation to population are presented,
though some repetition will be observed:

The population of the Hawaiian Islands can best be studied, by one
unfamiliar with the native tongue, from its several census reports. A
census is taken every six years. The last report is for the year 1890.
From this it appears that the whole population numbers 89,990. This
number includes natives or, to use another designation, Kanakas,
half-castes (persons containing an admixture of other than native
blood in any proportion with it), Hawaiian-born foreigners of all races
or nationalities other than natives, Americans, British, Germans,
French, Portuguese, Norwegians, Chinese, Polynesians, and other
nationalities.

(In all the official documents of the Hawaiian Islands, whether in
relation to population, ownership of property, taxation, or any other
question, the designation "American," "Briton," "German," or other
foreign nationality does not discriminate between the naturalized citi-