

# Other materials: Other campaigns: Hawaii candidates: 1976

Senator Daniel K. Inouye Papers  
Campaign files, Box CP24, Folder 5  
<http://hdl.handle.net/10524/63041>

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TO: INITIAL

1. Senator Inouye

2.

3.

4.

X	FYI	reply	
	comment & advice	see me	
	approval	as requested	
	investigate	as promised	
	note and return	file	
	first name		
	signature		

REMARKS:

Nordy

2/8/71

FROM:

DATE:



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
Riesel, V. (February, 1970). Labor's Love Lost: Muskie Irks Powerful Union Chiefs As  
'Scoop' Jackson Moves Up Quickly and Quietly, pp. 1-2.

\*Access to articles restricted to University of Hawai'i affiliates only.

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Riesel, V. (February, 1970). New Northern Strategy: Rockefeller-Labor Alliance may  
Swing Pivotal New York State to Nixon in '72, pp. 1-2.

19th May 1970

Mr. Frank N. Hoffmann  
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee  
  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Nordy:

Per our phone conversation today, we are having to re-cut a fair amount of the film spots for the various senators because of the effect the Cambodian situation has had on what we previously filmed. During the filming, the Viet Nam war was a big issue, but the statements were all related to the Vietnamization of the war, the effect of the war on the economy, bi-partisan cooperation in solving the problems resulting from the war, etc. Many of the senators made statements for example, as Senator Proxmire did, "I think the president is right in trying to Vietnamize the Viet Nam War.." etc. Now with the Cambodian situation, none of our people obviously would want a statement like that in their film. It carried a much different meaning post-Cambodia than it did pre-Cambodia; in fact, it carries a totally reverse meaning.

Additionally, there are many expressions of bi-partisan support for what the president was trying to do. Under the present circumstances of the economy as well as Cambodia these statements now have a reverse meaning. Therefore, we are re-cutting the films accordingly.

The effect of the above will be to delay the delivery of the one-minute and less spots by about two weeks. However, as I told you, when I come in next week I will have the five-minute spots for all of the senators who wanted them, plus the complete sets of one-minute and less spots for Senators Proxmire and Gore (whom we will have finished re-cutting). Because of the delicate nature of the political situations at the moment, I would actually much prefer to have the senators look at the five-minute film to make sure there are no political "booby traps" in them since additionally, some of the minutes, 20's etc. will be extracted from some of the film used within the five-minute spots. (We can cut minute spots without using any of the film contained in the five-minute spots, but it's my feeling that we will wind up with much better minutes, 20's

MAY 21 1970

Page 2.  
Mr. Frank N. Hoffmann  
May 19, 1970

etc., if we utilize footage from the five-minute spots. This requires duplicating negatives in the laboratory, and is a more expensive and complicated process. However, my main interest is in having the best possible film - - not the cheapest or the quickest).

Regarding the scheduling for screening the film, since we will have all the film for Proxmire and Gore, we should start with them Wednesday morning. I would suggest having about 45 minutes to an hour for each one since the total running time is approximately 20 minutes and they may wish to look at it more than once. It is possible that we may have all the spots finished at that time for Hartke and Moss as well. I will let you know that by Thursday afternoon, it depends on how fast the laboratory can process the re-cut film. If not, as with everyone else listed as follows, the five-minute spots will be finished. These are the additional senators who have requested five-minute film who should be scheduled for Wednesday and/or Thursday: Hartke, Moss, Cannon, Pastore, Montoya, Burdick. With the possible exception of Hartke and Moss, we will need no more than about 20 minutes for the others since we will only be running the five-minute film for each. We will, of course, be set up in your office to take color slides for each senator at the same time, but as we discussed, this will only take a few minutes for each one. Additionally, I will be bringing with me 8 x 10 black and white glossy prints of the stills we shot during filming.

I will call you Thursday afternoon with the word on Hartke and Moss.

Best regards.

Cordially,



Lester M. Goldsmith

LMG/bv

P.S. As you know, some of the senators did not wish to have finished film made for them and requested that we supply them with master negatives and sound tracks of the raw film which we have assembled. These include Tydings, Muskie, Jackson, Hart and Kennedy. Also, McGee wished to have a combination of raw footage plus 30-second spots and no five-minute spots.

*and are forwarding  
to them directly.*



TO:

INITIAL

ER.

1. Senator Inouye

2.

3.

4.

X	FYI	reply
	comment & advice	see me
	approval	as requested
	investigate	as promised
	note and return	file
	first name	
	signature	

REMARKS:

FROM:

Nordy

DATE:

5/21/70

MEMORANDUM

*Bill  
Camp's  
Comm.*

TO: Senator

FROM: Eiler

DATE: March 7, 1969

RE: Campaign Committee

Nordie suggested that you have lunch one day with Carlos Moore of the Teamsters and Bill Dodds of the UAW to encourage coordinated effort by these two groups in the work of the Senatorial Campaigns. Do you want me to do anything on setting one up?

*Yes! —*

*Mar 24*

*Mar 24*

**KEEP BILL  
ON THE  
HILL**



**RE-ELECT  
CONGRESSMAN  
WILLIAM D.  
HATHAWAY**

Re-Elect Bill Hathaway to Congress Committee

# MAINE NEWSPAPERS HEADLINE HATHAWAY GAINS

## HATHAWAY SEEKS IMPROVED SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM—



*Lewiston—Sun, August 16, 1967*

Congressman Hathaway supported increases in the Social Security Program in Congress in 1967. "These additional benefits to people under Social Security were helpful, but they weren't enough," he said. He will work for further increases in monthly income and other benefits needed by older people and widows.


## CONGRESSMAN HATHAWAY DRAFTS TAX REFORM BILL—

*Aroostook Republican, August 16, 1967*

Bill Hathaway opposed the income tax increase. "It isn't fair," he said, "to burden some citizens with more taxes while others enjoy the advantages of tax loopholes."

Congressman Hathaway will continue his efforts for tax reform so that everyone will carry a fair share of the tax burden.

## LINCOLN MILL PURCHASER GETS FEDERAL EDA LOAN—



*Bangor News, June 25, 1968*

## LOAN APPROVED, WILL PERMIT BREWER PAPER MILL TO REOPEN—

*Bangor News, September 7-8, 1968*

Congressman Hathaway campaigned to save over 400 Maine jobs when the mill at Lincoln closed. His efforts helped save another 400 jobs at Brewer.

Bill worked with the Economic Development Administration to help local citizens reopen these pulp and paper mills.

The EDA approved loans for both mills.

## NEW BILL BY HATHAWAY WOULD LIMIT DAIRY PRODUCT IMPORTS—

*Lewiston—Sun, May 3, 1967*

Over 20% of the Maine Cash Farm Income—\$40,000,000 a year—is generated by our dairy farmers. With their families, they have invested a lifetime of work and hope in their businesses.

Bill Hathaway has worked to help preserve their investments and to keep Maine's agricultural economy strong.



## HATHAWAY BATTLES FOR OEO FUNDS—

*Portland Sunday Telegram, November 12, 1967*


"We cannot just talk about equal opportunity," says Congressman Hathaway, "OEO programs have created a better way of life than welfare checks for hundreds of Maine citizens."

Bill and Mrs. Hathaway visited a Head Start Program at Presque Isle.



## **AUBURN HOUSING PROJECT GETS \$1.5 MILLION LOAN—**

*Lewiston Journal,  
March 6, 1967*



One of the most pressing needs for people with low incomes is adequate housing. Congressman Hathaway has worked with many Maine communities to help get low cost housing projects started and to meet this requirement of our citizens.



## **POTATO COUNCIL GRATIFIED AT DIVERSION DECISION—**

*Bangor News,  
February 10, 1968*

Bill Hathaway helped Maine's potato industry by arranging a federal diversion program for surplus spuds resulting from a huge bumper crop in 1967 and averted an economic calamity in Aroostook County.

## **SBA LOAN KEEPS STRONG FIRM ON FEET—**

*Bangor News, August 11, 1967*

Since Bill Hathaway first arrived in Congress in 1965, more than 275 firms in Maine's Second District have been helped by the Small Business Administration to modernize, expand and become more profitable.

At the end of 1964, only 82 jobs had resulted from SBA and other federal business loan programs in Maine's Second District. By mid-August, 1968, a total of 888 jobs and \$13,695,058 were strengthening our economy. Congressman Bill Hathaway works closely with government and private agencies to help keep our business community healthy.

## **PANEL APPROVES HATHAWAY FARMER LOAN RESOLUTION—**

*Press Herald, May 1, 1968*

On a visit home from Washington, D. C., Congressman Hathaway learned a rash of natural disasters in Maine had wiped out Farmers Home funds and credit stricken farmers could not get loans.

Bill returned to Congress, wrote emergency legislation and recruited twenty-five colleagues in the House of Representatives to join him. He succeeded in getting a law passed in time for spring planting for \$30,000,000 in emergency loan funds. 346 Maine farmers with loan applications benefited from Bill's direct action.



## **HATHAWAY VOWS TO PROTECT MAINE'S TEXTILE INDUSTRY—**

*Lewiston—Sun,  
May 29, 1967*

Concerned that unrestricted low-cost foreign imports might rob Maine workers of jobs, Congressman Hathaway has strenuously opposed relaxation of quotas on textile fibers and finished goods and has urged comprehensive trade agreements with other nations.

## **\$516,000 GRANT OKAYED FOR SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT AT ORONO—**

*Bangor News, June 27, 1968*

Bill Hathaway has worked to help Maine communities overcome water pollution and obtain modern facilities to attract new industry.

## **HATHAWAY ATTACKS SHOE IMPORTS—**

*Maine Telegram, October 15, 1967*

Maine's important shoe industry needs protection to keep low-cost foreign imports from flooding domestic markets.

Bill has responded to the industry's need, and sponsored legislation to protect the jobs it provides for Maine workers.

## **HATHAWAY HITS AGE BIAS ON EMPLOYMENT—**

*Press Herald, December 8, 1967*

Bill strongly opposes discrimination against workers because of age. He has worked on the problem in a subcommittee of the House Labor and Education Committee of which he is a member. He supported the Age Discrimination in Employment Act signed by the President that protects the jobs and employment opportunities of older Americans.

# Training and Experience Help Bill Hathaway Serve YOU

**Congress . . .** Bill Hathaway is completing his second term as your Representative in Congress. First elected in 1964, re-elected in 1966, he has earned seniority as a member of the House Committee on Education and Labor and the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

**Lawyer . . .** Formerly Assistant County Attorney, Androscogin County; Hearing Examiner, State Liquor Commission; practiced law in Lewiston after graduating from Harvard Law School.

**Veteran . . .** Shot down and imprisoned in Europe during World War II. He knows the problems of the serviceman, their families and the veteran; he went to Viet Nam for a first hand look at the fighting there; met and talked with Maine boys.



**Family . . .** Daughter Susan is a senior in college; his wife Mary and their 12 year old son Fred spend Congressional sessions in Washington with Bill and all get home to Maine as often as possible.

# Bill Hathaway Works for You in Congress



In four years as your Congressman, Bill Hathaway has accomplished much and provided many services.

As a member of the House Education and Labor Committee, he has made significant contributions to the educational programs and the schools of our state and the nation.

He has led efforts to improve vocational and job training and to create employment opportunities in Maine.

As a result of Bill's work, we have the Dickey project authorized and partially funded. We must return him to Congress so he can continue the fight for funds to complete the project.

## Bill Hathaway works for you in Congress.

He knows and understands Maine's needs.

He introduces legislation to meet those needs.

He works with the leadership in Congress and with all departments of the Federal government to keep Maine's economy moving and growing and to make the Second District a pleasant place in which to live.


**He gets things done.**

**Keep Bill on the Hill.**

**Re-elect Congressman William D. HATHAWAY.**



A close friend, Senator Edward M. Kennedy works with Bill on projects important to Maine and New England. Ted is an outstanding supporter of our Dickey project.



In Washington, Bill works closely with Senator Edmund S. Muskie, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey and other national leaders.

Occasionally there is opportunity for social meetings like the clambake at Boothbay Harbor, when the Vice President visited Maine to enjoy our most famous delicacy.



Bill works with Maine's dynamic young Governor, Kenneth M. Curtis, to improve our state.

Eiler -

18 March

*file  
campaign  
Coburn*

The attached is being referred to you  
for information and whatever action you deem  
necessary ( the Senator is going to be away from  
D. C. tomorrow).

Kimie



MAR 17 1969

# THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE

March 14, 1969

Memo to Senator Daniel Inouye

From Senator Fred Harris

SOB 154

The next 1970 campaign planning meeting is set for the following time at the ~~Conference Room~~ of the Democratic National Committee. We hope you can be with us for this meeting.

Michigan: Senator Phil Hart  
Wednesday, March 19th

1:30 pm  
~~3:00 p.m.~~

A G E N D A  
COPE Operating Committee  
February 17, 18, 1969  
Americana Hotel  
Bal Harbour, Florida

- |     |  |                |
|-----|--|----------------|
| 1.  | Director's Report  |                |
| 2.  | Financial Report   |                |
| 3.  | Special 1969 effort in Marginal<br>Congressional and Senatorial races                  |                |
| 4.  | Special Committee on Support for<br>Federal Candidates                                 | Don Ellinger   |
| 5.  | Proposal for special effort in<br>selected marginal Congressional races                | Howard Samuel  |
| 6.  | 1970 Census and Congressional<br>Reapportionment                                       | Dick Scammon   |
| 7.  | Right-to-Work Status report  |                |
| 8.  | 1969 Minority Programs   |                |
| 9.  | Dirksen push for Constitutional Convention   | Gus Tyler      |
| 10. | Proposals for change in Presidential<br>Elections                                      | Andy Biemiller |
| 11. | Registration - 1969  | Roy Purdy      |
| 12. | 1969 COPE Area leadership meetings   |                |
| 13. | Legislative Report   | Andy Biemiller |
| 14. | Matching Grants  | Joe Rourke     |
| 15. | New Literature   |                |
| 16. | Operating Committee recommendations to<br>President Meany and Administrative Committee |                |

COPE Operating Committee Meeting  
2/17/69 9:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.  
Pan American Room - Americana Hotel  
Bal Harbour, Florida

Notes:

Al Barkan - Work finished on Wednesday.

Director's Report - Meany asked for a stepped up 1969 operation.  
.05 per month per worker assesment for registration. Full time COPE  
representation from each International.

Right-to-Work Carl McPeak for Public Employees, N. J. Legislature  
pass a bill over Government veto, right to join or not to join. Baltimore,  
Md. adopted a similar law. Jerry Worth, government employees (State, County,  
and Municipal workers), NLRB excluded, Agricultural workers and Public employees.  
Key on Public employees, Executive Order 49. (Bob Wagner) established a method  
of collective bargaining. Order 10988 by J.F.K. (1) Right to join or not  
join (2) Strike against government is like armed insurrection. Sixteen states  
have laws, six are inoperable, ten are strong, except for anti-strike clause  
which is in all laws. New York (Taylor Law) repressive. (Thornton, Shremp,  
Griffin, Hilbert and Baltimore all lost.) Taylor Law sponsored by Rockefeller  
advised by Cole, Dunlop Taylor makes even an "agency shop" illegal. Federal  
agency Task Force under Johnson, hurting and contaminating the entire situ-  
ation. Pro labor Mayor and Council in Baltimore hurt. A concept you can have  
collective bargaining without right to strike. Facing a very serious crisis  
in a spill over from public to private sector.

Gubernatorial Elections, 1969 and Mayoralty Elections. California  
elections and Wisconsin special elections. Primary March 4th in Wisconsin.  
General April 1 in 7th District (COPE Dave Olbie) Very active labor movement.  
John Schmidt-membership about 20,000. California and Wisconsin can be won,  
set up a complete COPE operation. Use this as a model. Need for a Task  
Force in these two congressional districts, do it in all 50 states. Paul Hall  
did a great job in California.

Dick Scammon - Congressional redistricting has moved from meat axe  
to sharp knife. Does not mean an equal representation. 1970 recount population  
see chart. Who draws the map? Who draws the county lines? Role of labor  
movement in 1968 elections (writing a book) was most significant in our history.  
Elections, registration, Get out the Vote all diminish in an off year election.

Barkan - worried about the state Legislative Races. We could blow  
the whole ball game. Change in Policy for 1970. Special help in state  
legislatures through state bodies. Gus Tyler(N.Y.) Enlarge the motivation  
but urge caution. Mike Johnson (Pa.) Send money quietly and get push to help  
from locals. Large population centers, Rural Industries (Phil. one new seat  
same with Allegheny) Central Pa. small Industries in South Central Pa.

Six Democrats to control Pennsylvania's lower House were won by 250 votes per district.

John Kraft - Dick Scammon

What do we do now? Al Barkan. How about dissidents. Carnston, Governor Hearnes failure to be identified. Jess Unruh. New Jersey, Hudson County only 39,000. No meetings etc.

Tom Pitts - California. Don Ellinger (How far along is your data processing in Contra Costa County. Get Unruh's 33 page document.

Thanked COPE for its help publicly in behalf of Senator Inouye and the Committee. 81.1% in 1968.

Don Ellinger 21 seats Senate to receive support from COPE.

# EVANS-NOVAK POLITICAL REPORT

Inouye

WHAT'S HAPPENING . . . WHO'S AHEAD . . . IN POLITICS TODAY

██████████ • ██████████ • ██████████ • ██████████

February 26, 1969 - No. 42

To : Our Subscribers

From: Evans-Novak

Despite the general feeling here in Washington and around the country that Richard Nixon and his administration have performed creditably to date, we see definite signs that the honeymoon period is drawing to a close - in Congress, across the nation and, most acutely, within the Republican Party. Major trouble areas today are: the economy, defense policy, Southern GOP disaffection, patronage (or the lack thereof), the GOP chairmanship, and, of course, the continuing Mideast crisis (deepened by Eshkol's death) and the Vietnam mess, heightened by the Tet offensive.

## THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION

The Economy: We see a distinct conflict between the political advice and the economic advice being offered the President. Whichever course Nixon follows, the economy will be profoundly affected. During the transition period, Nixon's economic advisors urged retention of the surtax while his political advisors wanted to let it lapse. The economists won that battle, but the outcome of the broader dispute is not yet clear.

Both the Treasury and the Council of Economic Advisors feel that deflation is absolutely necessary and, they are telling the business community, inevitable. They are saying that the economy will cool off enough - probably accompanied by some rise in unemployment - so that high yields on government bonds which now go begging may not soon be repeated.

But the political men in the Administration, including the President himself, are wary of deflation for two reasons: 1) If it results in even the mildest recession, Nixon's chance for re-election in 1972 could be gravely damaged; 2) Even a slight increase in overall unemployment will cause a huge increase in Negro unemployment, which could lead to civil unrest and further damage Nixon's relationship with the black community. For those reasons, economists who understand the political forces around Nixon expect more inflation and a net gain in the stock market during 1969. That's why the economic outlook remains so uncertain today.

Defense Policy: We see a resumption of difficulties between the Departments of State and Defense - with the roles of Rusk (Hawk) and Clifford (Dove) during the last months of the Johnson Administration now reversed by the present incumbents, Rogers and Laird. Right now the key disagreement is over the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM). Secretary of State Rogers wants to withhold deployment until after U.S.-Russian negotiations; Secretary of Defense Laird wants to deploy now and talk later. We think the Nixon line will be laid out in the following way: the U.S. will proceed with a "thin" system - however emplaced - but progress on the system will



be very slow so as not in any way to undercut talks with the Russians. A vote in the Senate cutting off the ABM might be very harmful to this strategy, which is why the Administration will pull out all stops to prevent it.

The State Department is particularly apprehensive over Laird's astonishing appointment of Professor Warren Nutter as Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs - a highly important post closely related to the State Department. Nutter, a major right-wing political theorist and Goldwater speech writer, is very bright but very ideological. High State Department appointees - Nixon men, not LBJ holdovers - told us that essential liaison between State and Defense will be badly hurt by the Nutter appointment, with some staff resignations possible.

Laird's friends say that Nutter, like Laird, is often misunderstood and is really a pragmatist. In general, however, Laird has been disappointingly unpragmatic so far, taking a position far more rigid for the ABM and hardware spending generally than was the case in his pre-Pentagon days in Congress. Based on the first month, chances of really putting a rein on Pentagon spending under Laird look bleak.

Rogers, slow to take hold at State, is now gaining the warm respect of LBJ holdovers and might even improve the low state of State's morale. A tangential but highly important Rogers decision was not to reinstate Otto Otepka, the controversial security officer and hero to the right wing.

#### REPUBLICANS

For nearly sixteen years, Republican politicians had eagerly awaited the day when they would have Dick Nixon, a real Republican politician, in the White House. Now that dream has turned into a nightmare.

At two long and separate meetings on February 16 and 17 in Washington Southern GOP leaders let White House aides Bryce Harlow, John Sears and Harry Dent know that the Administration's present course on school desegregation would absolutely prevent Nixon from winning Southern states in the 1972 election or even the delegations at the '72 convention. On February 18, HEW Secretary Robert Finch and Attorney General John Mitchell met together for the first time on the issue and agreed that the Administration would proceed against some Northern school districts, in Pasadena, California and in Illinois, among others. However, Southerners see this move as a transparent ploy and feel the Administration is unlikely to press the North as hard as the South.

The bad handling of Ray Bliss's departure as GOP chairman has really hurt Nixon with the rank-and-file. We feel that Nixon had every right to have his own man as National Chairman and that man certainly wasn't Ray Bliss. But Nixon, inexplicably, failed to make a clear, candid agreement with Bliss, who is a popular figure among state chairmen, national committeemen and, with a few exceptions, GOP Governors. Bliss's abrupt resignation stemmed from the feeling, which we do not believe was really well taken, that Nixon was trying to impose his old political mentor, Murray Chotiner.

We have been told by responsible White House officials, and we believe it, that Nixon was merely trying to find Chotiner, who is a first class political organizer, some kind of job at the National Committee and not necessarily the dominant role. But neither Bliss nor many leading party politicians believe this version, and Chotiner himself worsened matters by telling reporters that the new chairman would be merely a figurehead and that he would be really running the show.

Summing up a messy situation: Maryland Representative Rogers Morton, who was offered the National Chairmanship in December but rejected it because he didn't want to be part of a Dump Bliss movement, now has accepted the post after being guaranteed that Chotiner would be eased out. Nixon misjudged the mood of the Party twice - first, when he tried to dump Bliss prematurely; second, when he misjudged lingering resentment against Chotiner.

Although Nixon's patronage problems have eased a little due to better White House coordination with Congressmen and state leaders, we can now report strains in various Executive Departments between LBJ holdovers and Nixon appointees. This strain is particularly marked at the Justice Department. There is now considerable talk here about replacing LBJ holdovers with loyal Nixonmen - if and when suitable replacements are found.

An extreme example of Nixon's patronage problems occurred when New Jersey GOP Senator Clifford Case refused to clear New Jersey native Jacob Beam (Ambassador to Czechoslovakia) for Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. because of his anger over two minor New Jersey appointments that had not been cleared through him. Despite quick Russian agreement on Beam, Case, who had no personal objections, refused to clear him for ten days - an unprecedented situation - until assured there would be no repeat.

#### DEMOCRATS

Hubert Humphrey's strong assertions on his travels that he is The Leader, not just the titular leader, of the Democratic Party and his obvious hopes for 1972 are not helping him and are not pleasing to many of his old supporters - who would prefer him to be a dignified, elder-statesman type. We find many old HHH men around the country who vigorously fought for him against Bobby Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy now feel that Ted Kennedy will be the nominee barring an act of God - and that HHH should recognize it. Ed Muskie clearly has come down with a case of the Presidential bug, but we find very little support for him. Humphrey continues to ponder running against McCarthy in the 1970 Minnesota Senate primary, if McCarthy decides to go again.

Although Senator Fred Harris's first month as National Chairman has been partially wasted on irrelevancies, he is well liked in the party and people feel that in time he will put together a program of registration and organization. He was forced to spend a lot of time selecting members for the new Reform Committee (where Chairman George McGovern will soon name Sen. Harold Hughes to head a special five-man steering committee, temporarily soothing dissidents). Harris's prospects are better than those of the state party organizations, which are rent by neglect and factionalism. In sum, we feel the Democratic Party would be in abominable shape were it not for Teddy Kennedy's charisma. And that's no way to operate a political party.

#### SPECIAL NEW YORK REPORT

We recently studied the New York political situation, with special emphasis on the 1969 mayoralty race, and came up with these findings.

Mayoral: Despite opposition from his wife Mary, John Lindsay is 80% sure of running again. He feels he can't abandon the ship, even though it may be going down. There is no doubt that he would be a loser today. Resentment over sluggish snow removal is only the latest grievance. Lindsay's only real strength among the city's large voting groups is with Negroes.

His efforts to win back Jewish support by synagogue visiting has, we feel, been overdone and unsuccessful.

Lindsay's main hope is that the plethora of Democratic candidates will knock each other out in the June primary and come up with a poor candidate. A recent GOP poll shows the best known Democratic candidate is City Controller Mario Procacino, who Lindsay people would like to get as their opponent. The most interesting and exotic dark horse is Howard Samuels, LBJ's Small Business Administrator and Lt. Governor nominee in 1966. But Samuels, an upstate Jewish millionaire with a Manhattan apartment, is completely unknown in the city.

Lindsay looks as if he's in for a tough primary fight himself when State Senator John Marchi of Staten Island declares this week - with open backing from the Conservative Party and clandestine support from Lt. Gov. Malcolm Wilson, who would like to dispatch Lindsay as a serious Gubernatorial rival. Marchi could hurt but probably not beat Lindsay.

The 1970 races: The real Democratic glamor boys in New York - Steve Smith, Ted Sorensen, and Arthur Goldberg - are all looking to the '70 Senate and Gubernatorial races. Smith wants to run for the Governorship, Sorensen and Goldberg and Sen. Charles Goodell for Bobby Kennedy's Senate seat. A Smith-Sorensen ticket, however, would be embarrassing to Teddy Kennedy because of over-full Kennedy flavor and is, hence, unlikely.

Goodell would seem to be a sure loser to Goldberg today, but he will become better known in the next 18 months, and if Rockefeller is on the ticket, Goodell can't be written off. We find few GOP politicians who really expect Rockefeller to run again. If he doesn't, you can anticipate a really wild struggle among Malcolm Wilson, Assembly Speaker Perry Duryea and - if he is re-elected as Mayor - John Lindsay.

#### SPECIAL CALIFORNIA REPORT

We spent a week in California and report the following findings.

Republicans: We believe that the surfacing of the Reagan-Finch feud is reaching crisis proportions for the GOP. Although he slipped badly following his disastrous Presidential campaign in Miami Beach, Governor Ronald Reagan is very strong right now, riding a popular wave of resentment against San Francisco State and Berkely radicals. But trouble in the party could reach detonation point if Sen. George Murphy's health forces him out of the race for re-election after all. Then Finch would come racing back from Washington, and Reagan's hand-picked Lt. Gov. Ed Reinecke would fight him for the nomination - with possibly catastrophic results.

Democrats: On the other hand the Democratic Party of California simply does not exist today. There is neither staff nor leadership. Only factions. Nevertheless, there is considerable optimism about the Senate seat, and Rep. John Tunney is not only running hard, he has also somehow made himself welcome to all factions. No one is optimistic about knocking off Reagan, but San Francisco Mayor Joseph Alioto is definitely running and Jesse Unruh is likely to. Mayor Sam Yorty of Los Angeles leads in his re-election fight. GOP Congressman Al Bell's campaign has been devastated by his split-up with the Spencer-Roberts campaign management firm. That could pair Yorty in the run-off with Negro City Councilman Tom Bradley, the one man who can't beat Yorty head-on.

*Richard Evans*  
*Robert D. Nords*



A. R. SCHWARTZ  
DISTRICT 17  
GALVESTON, BRAZORIA, FORT BEND  
AND HARRIS COUNTIES

*The Senate of  
The State of Texas  
Austin*

May 20, 1969

MAY 28 1969

COMMITTEES:  
CHAIRMAN: RULES  
FINANCE  
STATE AFFAIRS  
NOMINATIONS  
EDUCATION  
JURISPRUDENCE  
BANKING  
INSURANCE  
FEDERAL PROGRAMS &  
RELATIONS  
MILITARY & VETERANS  
AFFAIRS

*To Hardy*

Hon. Daniel K. Inouye  
Hon. Michael J. Kirwan  
Congressional Chairmen  
Democratic Congressional Dinner Committee  
Mayflower Hotel  
Washington, D. C. 20036

Dear Senator Inouye and Congressman Kirwan:

I am writing to advise that I will be pleased to attend the Democratic Congressional Dinner on June 26th with my client and close personal friend, Mr. Shearn Moody, Jr.

Our contribution for two tickets has been made, and I look forward to seeing you at that time.

Sincerely,

*A. R. Schwartz*  
A. R. Schwartz

ARS:lc

1 APRIL 1970

## 1970 SENATORIAL RACES

State	Incumbent	Probable Candidates	Primary Date	Candidate	Winning Vote %	Remarks
Alaska	Sen. Ted Stevens (R)	Wendall Kay (D) Joe Josephson (D) Nicholas J. Begich (D) Fred McGinnis (D) Rep. Howard Pollack (R) C.R. Lewis (R) <i>Brad Phillips</i>	8/25/70			State Rep. State Sen. State Sen. President - Alaska Meth. Univ.  John Birch Society
Arizona	Sen. Paul Fannin (R)	<del>Stewart Udall (D)</del> H.L. Kelly (D) <i>Grossman - D</i>	9/8/70			Phoenix Businessman
California	Sen. George Murphy (R)	Rep. John V. Tunney (D) Rep. George Brown (D) Norton Simon (R) <i>Mrs Peter Marvick R</i> <i>Louis Salvo D</i> <i>Robt Barry (R)</i> <i>Eileen Anderson D</i>	6/2/70			Industrialist
Connecticut	Sen. Thomas Dodd (D)	Rev. Joseph Duffy (D) Sen. Edward L. Marcus (D) Alphonsus Donahue, Jr. (D) <del>Rep. John Monaghan (D)</del> Rep. Lowell P. Weiker (R) Edwin D. Etherington (R) Sen. John Lupton (R) <i>Palmer McGee R</i>				Stamford businessman  Ex-Pres. Wesleyan U.
Delaware	Sen. John J. Williams (ret) (R)	Bert Carvel (D) Robert F. Kelly (D) Sherman Tribbit (D) Jacob Zimmerman (D) David P. Buckson (R) Rep. William Roth, Jr. (R) <i>Christopher Smith (D)</i>				DuPont Liberal small business State Rep. State Attorney-General
Florida	Sen. Spessard Holland (ret) (D)	Rep. William Cramer (R) Ray Osborne (R) Sen. Lawton Chiles (D)	9/8/70			Lt. Gov.



## 1970 SENATORIAL RACES

State	Incumbent	Probable Candidates	Primary Date	Candidate	Winning Vote %	Remarks
Florida (cont)		Sen. Robert Haverfield (D) Speaker Fred Schulz (D) Alece Hasting (D) Sen. Reubin Askew (D) C. Farris Bryant (D)				Fert Lauderdale Attorney
Hawaii	Sen. Hiram Fong (R)	No announced opposition <i>William D</i>	10/3/70			
Indiana	Sen. Vance Hartke (D)	John K. Snyder (R) William Ruckelshaus (R) Rep. Richard Roudebush (R)	5/5/70			State Treas. Ass. U.S. Att-Gen. (Civil Div.)
Illinois	Sen. Ralph Smith (R)		3/17/70	Adlai Stevenson	57 %	
Maine	Sen. Edward Muskie (D)	Sen. Abbot Otto Greene (R) Chris Ritter (D) Niel S. Bishop (R)	6/15/70			Ogunquit Artist Former state Sen.
Maryland	Sen. Joseph Tydings (D)	<i>Francis Burch D</i> Rep. J. Glenn Beall (R) C. Stanley Blair (R) <i>Newton Steers R</i> <i>Wainwright Dawson R</i>	9/15/70			Agnew's staff
Massachusetts	Sen. Edward Kennedy (D)	Josia Spaulding (R)	8/4/70			
Michigan	Sen. Phillip Hart (D)	Mrs. George Romney (R) Sen. George Auber (R) James F. O'Neil (R)	8/4/70			Treas. - State Board of Ed.
Minnesota	Sen. Eugene McCarthy (D) (not running)	Hubert Humphrey (D) Rep. Clark MacGregor (R)	9/15/70			

## 1970 SENATORIAL RACES

State	Incumbent	Probable Candidates	Primary Date	Candidate	Winning Vote %	Remarks
Mississippi	Sen. John Stennis (D)	No announced Opposition	6/2/70			
Missouri	Sen. Stuart Symington (D)	<del>No announced Opposition</del> <i>John Danforth R</i> <i>Doris Bass R</i>	8/4/70			
Montana	Sen. Mike Mansfield (D)	<del>No Announced Opposition</del> <i>Harold Wallace R</i>	6/2/70			
Nebraska	Sen. Roman Hruska (R)	<u>Dr. Wallace C. Peterson (D)</u> <u>Otis Glebe (R)</u> <u>Ex-Gov. Frank Morrison (D)</u>	5/12/70			University of Nebraska Lincoln businessman
Nevada	Sen. Howard Cannon (D)	No announced opposition <i>Fike</i> <i>Ragio</i>	9/1/70			
New Jersey	Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (D)	<u>Nelson Gross (R)</u> <u>Sen. Frank J. Guarini (D)</u> <u>Paul Ylvisaker (D)</u>	6/2/70			State Community Affairs Comm.
New Mexico	Sen. Joseph Montoya (D)	<u>Gov. David Cargo (R)</u> <u>Anderson Carter (R)</u>	6/2/70			1966 Candidate
New York	Sen. Charles Goodell (R)	<u>Paul O'Dwyer (D)</u> <u>Ted Sorenson (D)</u> <u>Rep. Richard Ottinger (D)</u> <u>Morris B. Abram (D)</u> <u>Ralph de Toledano (R-C)</u> <u>Robert Reeves (R-C)</u> <u>Kevin P. McGovern (R-C)</u>	6/16/70			Ex-Pres. Brandeis Univ. Conservative Author Troy businessman Brooklyn Attorney
North Dakota	Sen. Quentin Burdick (D)	<u>Sen. I.J. Wilhite (R)</u> <u>Sen. George Longmire (R)</u> <u>Richard Elkin (R)</u> <i>Tam Kloppe (R)</i>				State Public Service Comm.

## 1970 SENATORIAL RACES

State	Incumbent	Probable Candidates	Primary Date	Candidate	Winning Vote %	Remarks
North Dakota (cont.)		Robert P. McCarney (R) Stan Deck (R) Rep. Thomas S. Kleppe (R)				1968 Candidate for Gov. Dickinson broadcasting Exec. <i>Congressman</i>
Ohio	Sen. Stephen Young (D) (ret)	John H. Glenn (D) Howard Metzenbaum (D) Gov. James Rhodes (R) Rep. Robert Taft (R) Dr. Kenneth W. Clement (D) <i>Wm Feighan D</i>	5/5/70			Stokes campaign manager
Pennsylvania	Sen. Hugh Scott (R)	Sen. William Sesler (D) Louis F. Waldmann (D) Rev. Frank Mesaros <i>Harval Bace D</i> <i>John Logue D</i>	5/19/70			Chester Cty. Comm. Eastern Orthodox Priest
Rhode Island	Sen John Pastore (D)	No announced opposition	9/15/70			
Tennessee	Sen. Albert Gore (D)	Rep. William Brock (R) Rep. Leonard R. Blanton (D) Tex Ritter (R)	8/6/70			
Texas	Sen. Ralph Yarborough (D)	Rep. George Bush (R) Lloyd M. Bentsen (D) <i>Robert Morris (R)</i>	5/2/70			Former Congressman
Utah	Sen Frank Moss (D)	Rep. Laurence Burton (R) Byron R. Rampton (R)	9/8/70			Former State Sen.
Vermont	Sen. Winston Prouty (R)	Gov. Phillip Hoff (D)	9/8/70			
Virginia	Sen. Harry F. Byrd (I)	George C. Rawlings (D) Alvin O. Edelson (D) <i>Clive DuVal (D)</i> <i>Ken Haggerty (R)</i>	7/14/70			Former Cong. Candidate Charlottesville attorney



## 1970 SENATORIAL RACES

State	Incumbent	Probable Candidates	Primary Date	Candidate	Winning Vote %	Remarks
Washington	Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D)	<u>Carl Maxey</u> (D)	9/15/70			Spokane Attorney
West Virginia	Sen. Robert Byrd (D)	No announced opposition	5/12/70			
Wisconsin	Sen. William Proxmire (D)	<i>Sen Gerald Lorge</i> <del>No announced opposition</del>	9/8/70			
Wyoming	Sen. Gale McGee (D)	<u>Arthur E. Linde</u> (R) <u>Rep. John Wold</u> (R)	8/18/70			

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DRAFT

Dear \_\_\_\_\_:

The campaign is on to assure a Democratic victory in the Congressional races this Fall.

To assist us in securing this victory a meeting has been scheduled with Congressional leaders to discuss facets of the forthcoming campaign.

Knowing that your experience and talents can contribute greatly to this discussion, we would like to have you join us at 5:30 pm, Monday, March 23rd, in the Chinese Room of the Mayflower Hotel.

To avoid interfering with other plans you may have for the evening, it will, we promise, be a brief session with refreshments.

Sincerely,

DANIEL K. INOUE      MICHAEL J. KIRWAN

RSVP [REDACTED]

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BUSINESS</u>
Adams, Russell B. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	Pan American World Airways
Allen, John [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	Union Oil Company of California
Allen, John R. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20036	McDonnell Douglas Corporation
Bagwell, John G. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20006	Hawaiian Sugar
Baker, Jasper S. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20005	United Fruit Company
Baker, Robert C. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20008	American Security & Trust Company
Barcella, Ernest L. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	General Motors Corporation
Barr, Honorable Joseph W. [REDACTED] Potomac, Maryland 20854	American Security & Trust Company
Bass, James P. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20036	American Airlines
Bassett, O. E. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20036	Avco Manufacturing Corporation
Beau, General Lucas V. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20036	Condec Corporation

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BUSINESS</u>
Bell, William P. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20036	Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Company
Bennett, Phil C. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	Kerr-McGee Corporation
Berry, Robert W. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20009	Litton Industries
Bigelow, K. K. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20005	Harvey Aluminum Company
Blewett, William G. [REDACTED] Annapolis, Maryland 21401	Peabody Coal Company
Botsford, C. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	Fairchild Hiller Corporation
Brawley, H. W. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	Genesco, Incorporated
Brown, George F. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20036	Bath Iron Works
Colodny, Edwin I. Barnes, Leslie O. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20001	Allegheny Airlines
Carter, Clifton C. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20036	
Caskie, Maxwell [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20006	Reynolds Metals Company
Chalk, O. Roy [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20005	D. C. Transit
Claytor, W. Graham, Jr. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20005	Southern Railways Systems
Clements, Earle C. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20006	Tobacco Institute

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BUSINESS</u>
Clifford, Clark M. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	
<del>Clifford, Clark M.</del> <del>1000 Connecticut Ave. N.W.</del> <del>Washington, D.C.</del>	<del>Gregory, Betty, Youngman &amp; Pappas</del>
Cotter, Frank [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20006	Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Coughlin, Gregg [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	Grumman Aircraft
Crosland, Edward B. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20036	American Telephone & Telegraph
Crowder, Jack A. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20036	National Association Wool Manufacturers
Davis, Honorable True [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20036	National Bank of Washington
Dobvyns, Norman L. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20036	American Can Company
Dulins, Roger [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	Pan American World Airways
Ewing, Samuel E. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20006	R. C. A. Corporation
Farrington, Robert J. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20036	Todd Shipyards
Fleming, David M. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	Ling-Temco-Vought
Foster, William C. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	Ralston Purina Company
Gardiner, Henry E. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20005	The Anaconda Company

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BUSINESS</u>
Godfrey, Horace D. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20009	American Sugar Cane
Griffith, Robert L. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	Delta Airlines
Hall, Robert E. Lee [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20036	National Coal Association
<del>Honorable W. A. [REDACTED] 2000 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]</del>	
Healy, Patrick B. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20001	National Merchants Producers
<del>Holmes, Dorothy 777 14th Street, N.W. Suite 114 Washington, D.C. 20005</del>	<del>Chicago &amp; Northwestern Railroad</del>
Helmig, Philip [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20030	Atlantic Richfield Company
Higgins, George T. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20036	Chrysler Corporation
Hoff, Irvin A. [REDACTED] Bethesda, Maryland 20014	Sugar Industries
Holton, John [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20006	American Bankers Association
Huddleston, Jr., George [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20006	North American Rockwell
Hull, William J. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20036	Ashland Oil & Refining Company
Humphreys, John L. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	TRW, Inc.
Hyde, Edd H. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C.	Reynolds Metals Company

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BUSINESS</u>
Johnson, Vernon A. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20006	Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
Johnston, Felton M. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20007	Signal Oil and Gas
Jones, Frank P., Jr. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20036	Aluminum Company of America
Keenan, Joseph D. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20005	International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
Kelly, Colonel Rennie [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20036	Aerojet General Corporation
Kevserling, Leon H. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20008	
Koser, J. D. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20006	The Bendix Corporation
Larson, General Jess [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20006	<i>Dear Jess</i>
Leebrick, J. Paul [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20006	Burrough Corporation
Lefevre, E. J. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C.	General Dynamics Corporation
Leidy, Walter H. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20036	American Optical Company
Levin, A. J. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C.	Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company
Lloyd, W. H. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	Deere and Company



<u>NAME</u>	<u>BUSINESS</u>
McConnell, John L. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20036	New York Stock Exchange
McManus, William [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20005	General Electric Company
McVickar, Ronald [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20036	Northwest Orient Airlines
Manatos, Mike [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing Company
Marklev, Rodney W., Jr. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20006	Ford Motor Company
Mente, Alvin L., Jr. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20006	National Distillers & Chemical Corporation
Moody, Joseph E. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20037	National Coal Policy Conference
Murphy, Robert J., Jr. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20006	Boeing Company
Nestigen, Ivan A. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20036	Cuna International, Inc.
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20006	Emerson Electric
O'Connor, Pat [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20006	
Opstad, Donald O. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company
Pendleton, John W. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20005	Arabian American Oil Company
Perkins, J. Carter [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20006	Shell Oil



<u>NAME</u>	<u>BUSINESS</u>
Phair, Wallace [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20006	Kaiser Industries
Porter, Paul [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20020	
Potts, Ramsey D. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20006	Emerson Electric
Quase, Dr. Harold G. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20036	
Ransford, J. A. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	Getty Oil Company
Raupe, Craig [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20006	Eastern Air Lines
Riedel, H. E. [REDACTED] Kensington, Maryland 20795	American Oil Company
Reiter, Jack [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20006	World Airways
Rudy, John Farnev [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20036	Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
Schmidt, Robert [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20036	International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation
Shapiro, Lester [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	Engelhard Industries
Slack, Carstens [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	Phillips Petroleum Company
Smart, R. W. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20006	North American Rockwell

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BUSINESS</u>
Sommers, E. T. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20036	American President Lines, Ltd.
Specht, Frank J. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C.	Schenley Industries
Sprague, Mansfield [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20006	American Machine & Foundry Company
Taylor, Thomas K. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	Trans-World Airlines
Thomas, Brig. Gen. Evert S., Jr. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	Cuna International, Inc.
Thompson, Clark [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	Tenneco, Inc.
Troop, Glen [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20004	Savings Association Political Education League
Ullom, M. E. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C.	TRW, Inc. (Good Government Fund)
Unser, Charles J. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20035	National Airlines
Van Horn, Charles R. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20006	B & O; C & O Railroads
Vice, L. T. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C.	Standard Oil Company of California
Walsh, Edward A. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20006	Natural El Paso <del>NATURAL</del> Gas
Watson, Marvin [REDACTED] Arlington, Virginia 22207	

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BUSINESS</u>
Wexler, Harvey [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20036	Continental Airlines
Wheeler, John L. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20006	Sears Roebuck & Company
Whyte, William G. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20006	United States Steel Corporation
Wild, Claude C. [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. 20036	Gulf Oil Corporation
Willey, R. F. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20036	Bethlehem Steel Corporation
Winkel, John L. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20009	Hughes Aircraft Company
Woodward, Albert Y. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20006	Signal Companies

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BUSINESS</u>
Carr, Robert S. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20004	Hiram Walker & Sons
Fitzgerald, John G. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20005	The Coca Cola Company
Gaylord, Harvey [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20036	Bell Aerospace Corporation
Gossette, Albert B. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C.	Northeast Airlines
Jacobson, Ray [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20006	
Kramer, Leo [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20006	
McDowell, W. A. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C.	The Pepsi Cola Company
Pfeiffer, Ralph A. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. 20036	IBM Corporation
Sharon, John [REDACTED] Washington, D. C.	

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BUSINESS</u>
Briscoe, Wally [REDACTED] Washington, D. C.	National Cable Television Assn.
Corcoran, Thomas G. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C.	Corcoran, Foley, Youngman & Rowe
Foley, Edward H. Investment Building [REDACTED] Washington, D. C.	Corcoran, Foley, Youngman & Rowe
Rowe, James H. Jr. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C.	Corcoran, Foley, Youngman & Rowe
Ragan, William [REDACTED] Washington, D. C.	
McIlwain, Samuel D. [REDACTED] Washington, D. C.	
Monroney, Honorable Mike World Center Building, Suite 200 [REDACTED] Washington, D. C.	<i>Dear Senator</i>
Bass, Honorable Ross [REDACTED] Washington, D. C.	<i>Dear Senator</i>

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Alexander, H. (September, 1970). Contractors' Officers Favor GOP 6-1 In Contributions,  
pp. 2290-2291.

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Alexander, H. (September, 1970). Contractors' Officers Favor GOP 6-1 In Contributions,  
pp. 2293-2294.

Senator.

I thought  
these observations  
from a former  
influential HHH  
aide might be  
of interest to  
you.

Eiler



June 3, 1970

George Wallace, the Morning After: Some Liberal  
Democratic Thoughts on What Comes Next

If he operates the way he tells us he does, our President spent a sleepless night last night while waiting for the election returns from Alabama. Harry Dent undoubtedly didn't have a final report until the early hours. Then there was the thoughtful mulling and pacing in the Oval office before Mr. Nixon finally sat down alone at dawn with his yellow legal notepad to draw up a balance sheet on the Wallace victory.

Sometime tonight, drained but feeling better for having made his judgment, Mr. Nixon will undoubtedly summon his advisers to inform them that the game plan for 1972 is: Southern Strategy Intensified.

Neither George Wallace nor Ronald Reagan, he will have concluded, are to be allowed to keep Richard Nixon from remaining first in the hearts of his target electorate. (I think of this target electorate as Genus Bud Wilkinson--white, Protestant, Anglo-Saxon (but no Eastern WASP); family auto dealerships; givers to the annual United Fund Drive but enough guts to blackball the wrong applicants at the country club; long football weekends at the state university. Not people to rush things. But hearts in the right place. Why, Bud always had one or two colored boys on his Oklahoma teams.)

So Nixon will order up a more effective Southern Strategy. But we knew that.

We pretty much know what George Wallace means to Richard Nixon. But how does he come out on a liberal Democratic balance sheet? George Wallace comes out glib, dangerous and neo-fascist. But at first glance, he nonetheless seems to offer liberal Democrats two or three apparent advantages. I say "apparent" because they are advantages I don't believe stand up under real examination. But here they are.

1. Wallace hurts Nixon's 1972 chances in the South

If you're pursuing a Southern Strategy, as Nixon is, you have to be unhappy with Wallace's victory last night. It means you've lost, for certain, two or three states you hoped to win. It means you'll have to spend effort and money to beat Wallace in six or seven other states. And it means that, in a 3-way split, the Democratic national ticket just might sneak through in some states where it wouldn't stand a chance in a two-way contest. There is a formula for Democratic victory--a formula of blacks, liberals and populist Democratic loyalists--which can possibly be made to work in several Southern and border states if Wallace and Nixon split the conservative vote. (The formula did not work, however, in 1968 when Southern black voter turnout was good, despite many wishful predictions that it would.)

2. Nixon's resultant Southern Strategy Intensified all but hands the Northeastern states to the Democrats in 1972.

Not that Mr. Nixon ever counted on much support from this contaminated area anyway--what with its effete intellectuals, labor bosses, corrupted media, Kennedys, unwashed "minority groups," and twisted Un-Wilkinsonian values. But now, with Wallace in the game, events force him to decisively discard the Northeast. Mayor Lindsay should not lie awake nights expecting any generous Model Cities or other help for New York from his federal government. Mr. Nixon must seek his votes elsewhere, and good riddance. For the 1972 Democratic national ticket, this seems to amount to a good-sized regional victory by default. On the other hand, it was a victory that was probably there anyway.

3. Wallace, and Nixon's resultant move Right, will stir up Democratic voters and contributors who have sat on their hands since 1968.

This would seem to be an immediate and real benefit to the Democratic Party. The McGovern/Hughes half-hour May broadcast on Cambodia, costing less than \$100,000, has now grossed over \$450,000 from small contributors moved by the peace issue. Nixon's Cambodian adventure has unexpectedly activated thousands of moderate college students for fall campaign activity (even though, for many candidates, their participation is a mixed blessing). There should be

nothing more certain to reactivate many older liberals than Wallace's hate rhetoric and the unmistakable re-emergence of the Old Nixon of memory.

Before we become thankful, though, for hidden blessings, we ought to check the negative side of the balance sheet.

1. Wallace's victory will increase the pace and depth of polarization in America--and that polarization is increasingly moving us toward repression and conservatism.

Already the national mood is such that a majority of Americans tell the pollsters that, in the name of law and order, they would be willing to suspend the Bill of Rights. Today candidates must think twice before publicly supporting such a mild reform as the 18-year-old vote. Why? Because the backlash against young people--any young people--continues to build. Ralph Yarborough, defeated in the Texas Democratic primary, loses, 60%-40%, counties he previously carried by the same margin. The issue: Yarborough supports permissive liberalism and its end products (riots, college students, Gene McCarthy). Ask any Congressman about the increase in his hate mail.

In such an atmosphere, give George Wallace a platform to attack those people who, as he said the other day, "believe Junior tore up the campus because his daddy didn't take him to see the Pittsburgh Pirates play when he was a little boy." Then unleash Agnew and the Mitchell Family

Singers--as they will surely be unleashed--against their favored and familiar scapegoat targets. In the months ahead, we should see some incidents which make the hard hat-student confrontation in New York seem like child's play. And, flowing from these, the demand for repression which Margaret Chase Smith warned about the other day.

2. The certainty of a Wallace Third-Party effort heightens the probability of a Fourth-Party effort on the Left.

As polarization takes place, those Democrats and Independents--particularly the young ones--who are most reformist, activist and uncompromisingly liberal, will increasingly gravitate toward the formation of a new fourth party. Most Democratic candidates--except for those fortunate enough to live in academic or silk-stocking liberal communities--will feel compelled to come to terms in varying degree with the moods (i.e., increasingly hard-hat/Poujadist) of their electorates. This, in turn, will lead to a number of primary-election challenges by candidates to their Left. When the Left candidates invariably fail in the primaries, and as their supporters feel increasingly alienated within the two-party system, many among them will favor forming a new Henry Wallace party on the Left to match the George Wallace party on the Right. ("If we can't win, we might as well educate, as the Progressives used to do. At least we'd feel better.")

I think this development is by no means certain. But, unless the Democratic Party is very much aware of the trend, and takes steps to avert it, it could in the fall of 1972 find itself operating no longer as the largest party but as the second-largest party in a Fourth Republic situation--the Just-Slightly-Left-of-Middle Party where the largest party is More-than-Slightly-Right-of-Middle.

3. Wallace's presence increases the possibility of a genuine constitutional crisis.

Assume there is no electoral reform before 1972. Even without the presence of a fourth party in the field, we will stand a real chance of undergoing a traumatic constitutional crisis. With the shift of a few votes in 1968, Wallace would have been placed in the position of setting his terms for bartering the Presidency and/or Presidential policies. Humphrey was on record with a "no deal with Wallace" pledge. Nixon wasn't so forthright. Even as it was, a North Carolina elector (the state was carried by Nixon) cast his vote for Wallace, with the statement: "What do you think this is, a democracy"?

It seems unthinkable that, after our 1968 experience, we could countenance continuation of the present system. But it looks as if that is exactly what will happen. Surely either the Ervin plan (binding the electoral votes

of each state to the candidate who carried that state) or the simple national direct-election plan would be preferable to taking the risk we now appear prepared to take in 1972.

4. The long-term course of the Democratic Party in the South will be in doubt.

Albert Brewer is no flaming progressive. But his defeat of Wallace would at least have heartened those Southern Democrats who preach a moderately-progressive New South doctrine. Wallace's victory will have an immediate impact in other Southern and border states where Wallace Party state-level and congressional candidates will gain a credibility they previously lacked. Feeling the pressures in their constituencies, moderate Democratic candidates may nudge a bit more to the Right. At the same time, younger and more militant black voters may more seriously consider dropping their general support for state and congressional-level Democratic candidates (since it so often seems to have little effect, or even counter-effect) and concentrating instead on electing black candidates at county and local level. (The same will be true of younger Chicano voters in Texas.) Despite the fact that Wallace's presence would seem, at a national electoral level, to hurt Republican chances in several states, a Wallace Party presence may in the meantime draw away increasing numbers of longstanding courthouse, populist and rural Southern Democrats--in time perhaps threatening to make the Democratic Party the "third" party there.

Summary

A few months ago I read the mood of the electorate as neither liberal nor conservative, but rather as confused and angry. Confused and angry about a mistaken war that seemed without end...about new and continuing revelations of immorality by people in high places...the breakdown in "law and order"...high taxes...inflation...youthful rebellion...drugs...My Lai...deteriorating schools...expensive medical care...clogged highways...foul air and water...big business...big labor...TV sets and plumbing that don't work--in summary, confused and angry about the low return they were receiving for their conscientious application all these years of the Protestant Ethic lessons.

But that was before Agnew set off on his calculated polarizing attacks on the media, the young, the Eastern Establishment, open admissions policies, effete intellectuals...before people, institutions and publications began being singled out by their government for public criticism and reprimand...before the heads of veterans' organizations were incited to personally attack dove Senators and Congressmen. As Eric Sevareid said recently in his Elmer Davis lecture at Columbia: It was one thing when these things were being said and done by a Senator (Joe McCarthy); it is another when they are being said and done by a Vice President and an Attorney General.

The public mood of anger and confusion was read correctly by the Nixon-Agnew Administration. And it took



immediate steps to channel voter concern away from Indochina, the handling of the economy, and the lack of action on our national problems. It did some effortless deep knee bends about a noncontroversial neat-and-clean middleclass issue--the environment--and then began whaling away at some handy scapegoats to divert the voters' attention even further. Got some problems?: Then it's the kids, the press, permissiveness, militant blacks, New York and Eastern (read that Jewish) eggheads. Not us.

To a degree, they've succeeded. Their own incompetence has knocked down their public-confidence ratings. But they've nonetheless set us up for a long and dangerous period. The return of George Wallace makes it worse.

For liberal Democrats--those who want to stay within their party yet see it remain the country's leading force for social change--there would seem in these times to be several imperatives.

--- Don't surrender the Silent Majority.

There is no valid reason why working people, the white-collar class, or the small town and rural dissatisfied should be sold the proposition that either Wallace or Nixon have the answers to their discontents. These are the American children who were raised with pictures of FDR hanging in every room. They will still respond to leadership which they feel has not forgotten them, or does not

snearingly refer to them as the Silent Majority. Liberal Democrats need to speak on campus. But they also need to rediscover plant gates and assembly lines; door-to-door canvassing in working neighborhoods; shirtsleeve fraternal picnics; and shopping centers in the \$6,000-\$16,000-a-year-family-income suburbs. They will meet few beautiful people. But they will meet the parents whose sons have done the dying in Vietnam, and who are sad and angry when their children's schools and campuses close down. They're paying the tuition with their life savings. These people are not Bud Wilkinson. They never got that lucky. If liberal Democrats don't pay attention, and listen to them, they will lose their confidence and their votes.

--- Despite their present unpopularity, don't write off the idealistic young, the black, and the poor.

To do so would not only invite a fourth-party movement, and a high rate of political dropout, but would distort the character of a Democratic Party which has for 40 years identified with and drawn strength and energy from these sources.

Right now many Democratic candidates are highly confused about this. They tend to see an either/or

situation--believing they risk working class and middleclass support if they can be identified too closely with the Wallace/Agnew targets. In some few cases they do. But a close reading of in-depth polls shows, for instance, that a majority percentage of the same middle-America voters who are most concerned about campus and ghetto disturbances, and crime in the streets, are also more than willing to give the black and poor an even break, and to pay higher taxes if necessary to do it. These same people in many cases oppose the war. (But they don't like to see flags and draft cards burned as a means of opposition.)

It is neither right nor necessary for the Democratic Party or Democratic candidates to abandon their most highly-motivated constituencies. It is proper, however, that they take special care not to address themselves solely to them (as noted above), lest they alienate large numbers of other voters who want their problems addressed in at least equal measure. More on this in the next paragraph.

--- Project strength and personal toughness on the issues.

I recall, in the 1968 Presidential campaign, a long strategy meeting on the law and order issue.

The situation was clear: Humphrey lagged far behind Nixon and Wallace in having any voter support on the issue. About half the group urged a change in Humphrey's stance--the issuance of Nixon-like position papers, and a halt to all campaigning in the ghettos and black communities. The view which prevailed, and I think rightly, was that Hubert Humphrey would not and should not talk and act like Nixon or Wallace. It would be both dishonest and ineffective. Rather, his only option was to strongly--and without apology--carry his own case, even in the face of savage heckling from both Left and Right. Where possible, he should talk the hecklers down. What was important was not that he take repressive positions, but that he not appear personally permissive.

By the same token, in 1970 and 1971, liberal Democrats will only defeat themselves if they attempt to make themselves pale ideological imitations of more-conservative opponents. Rather, they must establish themselves in clear focus and as definable personalities. Of course, they cannot expect to win if they make central campaign issues of legalized-marijuana and abortion. But they will stand a good chance of winning, with forthright positions on civil rights and the war, if they also

offer sharply-defined and directly-stated positions which strike the general electorate as making sense on such issues as street crime, narcotics-control, the economy and crumbling public services. And if they project personal strength and toughness in those 60 and 90-second evening cameos on Cronkite, Huntley-Brinkley, and their local TV news equivalents. Robert Kennedy knew the formula. Harold Hughes has done it successfully. A liberal Vince Lombardi (perhaps an impossibility) would be perfect.

--- Redefine the central issue.

For the past generation, liberal Democrats have almost by instinct become accustomed to being on the defensive. New Deal, Fair Deal, New Frontier, Great Society--the general approaches of liberal do-goodism and social welfare--have been under constant attack. But we kept getting elected, so it really didn't seem to matter. Now, just as we spent 20 years attacking Hoover after his term of office, Nixon and Wallace fully intend to attack the liberal social welfare ethic for as long as they can get away with it.

The issue in 1970 America, however, is not the liberal social welfare ethic. It is what Nixon/Agnew/Mitchell, goaded by Wallace, are and will be

doing to our society. The issue is calculated divisiveness and political manipulation at the cost of progress. There is no vision. There is only prime-time papier mache. And that is the ground where the fight must be made.

But the people do not know it. They only know that the Republican incumbents, and again now Wallace, are talking a language which strikes inner chords. They have to be told what No-Knock means. They must know that the Agnew speeches are a blatant attempt at public puppeteering. They must know that there was not and is not any "secret plan" to end the war in Vietnam. More importantly, they must have confidence that there are tough liberals who will not only end a war, but also clean up cities; stop narcotics traffic; and solve the problems of the overburdened middle classes as well as those of the black, the poor and the young.

Along with all of this, of course, there is the continuing need to get organized and to rediscover what the 1968 McCarthy volunteers learned: Hard door-to-door canvassing, personal attention to voters, an attempt to break through the self-contained job/home/TV cocoon which American households have become--it works.

The Wallace victory signals bad things to come in American politics.

It also forces liberals to explain more clearly and forcefully what is happening in this country. And it compels them to remember that there will be a future for them only to the degree that they address not only the more glamorous and forward issues, but also challenge the particular problems of a majority of the people.

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The "Northeastern Strategy" and its "Emerging Democratic Majority"
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The first five papers and the first four pages of the sixth paper present a number of key facets of the national political scene today. The remainder of the sixth paper and the last two papers will unite these facets into a possible projection of the national political scene to 1972.

None of the numerous facts presented in the papers have been documented as such a process would expend a great deal of time. Pertinent facts and opinions have been clipped from various newspapers and magazines or mentioned in my own notes. Virtually all can be documented if the need arises.



The preceding papers have attempted to prove three fundamental facets of the national political scene; one, that the Republicans' national political strategy, the "Southern strategy," can be political suicide for its reason for existence, a conservative national political sentiment, does not necessarily exist; secondly, that the success of the Southern strategy is dependent upon the belief that the Democratic party can no longer provide a credible threat on the national level to the Republican party and thirdly, that the success of the Southern strategy is dependent upon the policies adopted and leadership exercised by the national Democratic party.

It is therefore essential that the national Democratic party not follow the predictions and presumptions upon which the Southern strategy is based. Regardless of the opinions of the "kamikaze Democrats," the party must remain within the center of the political spectrum and focus its policies upon the dominant elements of the center. Political commentators have stressed the point that the Democratic party must not become the spokesman of the "new Democrats." This point is not entirely correct nor is it entirely incorrect. The Democratic party can profitably become the instrument by which the aspirations of the new Democrats can be realized only if those aspirations can be identified as being within the larger spectrum of today's social and economic malaise. The Democratic party cannot achieve national primacy if it appears as the party of any particular insular group. Its programs and strategies must be designed, as Senator Edward Kennedy recently noted, to appeal to more than "minorities," student activists, liberals and intellectuals. Those

programs and strategies must attract four elements of the American people; blacks, middle class urban whites, liberals and intellectuals and the large numbers of young people, black and white, student and non-student alike, who are approaching the voting age.

To create and maintain this coalition, the party must project itself as the protector of the interests of the individual against that all-encompassing "system." Senator Mondale, when speaking of the plight of migrant farm workers, commented on the ability of that "system" to "mangle" anyone who cannot completely adopt or adjust to it. A graduate student at the University of Illinois wrote that an irritant of students is the belief that ". . . the institutions of our country (are) . . . incapable of responding to the . . . needs of its citizens." With a heavy dose of demagoguery, these were the positions on which George Wallace campaigned in 1964 and 1968 in the Northeast. The danger of being "mangled" and the disgust at the "incapability to respond" is not limited to migrant farm workers and students. It also includes the white urban middle class and blacks trapped in the decaying cities by a deteriorating economic position. This is the "Great Silent Majority"; "great" because it encompassess large numbers of people and cuts across racial, social, educational and economic differences and "silent" because it does not yet have a spokesman of national prominence.

There is a basic division of the nation's white middle class communities. The middle class of the suburbs, the Southwest and the West, the group that Kevin Phillips emphasizes as the key to Republican supremacy, tends to be in a higher economic bracket and more inclined to Republican conservatism than the urban middle class. The urban middle class appears to be the focus of the term "Forgotten" or "Middle" American. This

group, symbolized by the "hardhat," is just as alienated from the American social and economic mainstreams, if not more so, than the students and blacks. Generally speaking, the white urban middle class consists of first and second generation citizens of Southern, Eastern and Central European origin and is in the \$5,000-\$12,000 economic bracket. It is this group that is as seriously hurt by the urban crisis as the blacks. It earns enough to remain above the economic brackets of "minority" groups (blacks, Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans and Indians) and is thus ineligible for the benefits to which the minorities are entitled. On the other hand, it is not within the higher economic bracket of the "suburban middle class." Therefore, it cannot escape the cities to the suburbs and has more difficulty in meeting the skyrocketing costs of medical care, housing, education, etc. The urban middle class sees its taxes providing aid to minorities while similar aid is not available to assist in solving its problems. Like the blacks, it is pressed by growing urban problems and, as with the blacks, feels powerless to do anything about those problems. Being closer to and directly affected by those problems, the urban middle class is far more inclined than the "suburban middle class" to support the reforms and innovations necessary to solve them.

The urban middle class does not object to aid to minorities but believes that it should receive a commensurate amount of concern for its problems. It becomes angry, and occasionally that anger turns to violence, when black militants and young radicals become the center of attention. The mutual fear, hatred and mistrust masks those voices--all to Republican satisfaction--which could make both groups realize they have far more in common than not. It is the urban middle class, which has

traditionally voted Democratic, that the cry for "positive polarization" is directed. It is this group that the Republicans are hoping to convince that the Democratic party, allegedly composed of and led by the "new Democrats," is no longer responsive to and understanding of its needs.

But in spite of Republican beliefs to the contrary, the urban middle class has not yet converted to Republican conservatism. Nixon happily noted that Republican gubernatorial candidates in Virginia and New Jersey did well among ex-Wallace voters and, in New Jersey, the Republican victor did well in working-class areas that normally vote Democratic. In typical Republican fashion, he failed to notice those instances where his preconceived theories were not duplicated in practice: that Wallace did well in the 1968 election among voters in Lake County, Indiana that had earlier voted overwhelmingly for Robert Kennedy in the Presidential primary, that Peter Flaherty, who was elected with about 64% of the vote, polled approximately the same percentage in the eight (of a total of thirty two) wards in Pittsburgh where Wallace had received his largest percentages of votes the previous year and that Hubert Humphrey, who had received approximately 51% of the Pittsburgh vote in 1968, had also maintained his city-wide average in those eight wards where Wallace was strongest. Nixon has not yet learned that the slide rule can "work both ways."

Even though the Southern strategy dismisses the white urban middle class vote, the Republicans will still invest some energies to lure it from the Democratic column. A recent advisory report to the White House estimated the number of white urban middle class citizens at approximately seventy million---over one-third of the population. If the Republicans are successful in enticing the middle class vote from the Democrats, the

political consequences can be drastic.. An official of the National Confederation of American Ethnic Groups accurately summarized those possibilities: ". . .the ethnic vote is up for grabs. Our people are as. . .shy of the Republicans as of the liberal Democrats. If the Republicans grab the opportunity they can forge an alliance with ethnics and remain in power for a long time." Again, the success of this Republican tactic is inversely dependent upon the type of policies practiced and leadership exercised by the Democrats. Middle class antagonisms can be focused against the Republicans by demonstrating how "positive polarization" has diluted middle class political power. Antagonisms against blacks, because blacks appear to be the center of governmental and public attention, can be focused against the Republicans for giving special attention to the political potential of the South and the suburbs and also ignoring the urban middle class. The use of some of the old FDR rhetoric in appropriate situations may also assist in maintaining and strengthening the traditional loyalties of the white urban middle class to the Democratic party.

There also appear to be growing similarities between college students and their working class peers. Just as the students are dissatisfied with remote and unconcerned university administrators and "irrelevant" courses, young workers are gradually becoming agitated with unresponsive labor unions designed to appeal to an older generation and dull assembly-line work. Just as students have released their frustrations through political activity, drugs, or "dropping out," their working class peers have expressed their frustrations through votes for Wallace and an increasing disinterest in their work--resulting in the declining quality of many manufactured products. Soldiers in Vietnam, many of whom come from

working class backgrounds, have begun affecting peace symbols, "V for victory" hand signals, marijuana and public disenchantment with and disobedience of traditional authorities; considered the traits solely of student radicals only a few short years ago.

The Democrats' problem of leadership is not as serious as it superficially appears. In a display of candidness, Senator Mansfield declared that the Democratic party could not offer a candidate with the requisite charisma and national following to defeat Nixon in 1972.

This is the manner in which the Republican party also views the Democrats' apparent lack of leadership. It does not see a "new Democrat" that can appeal to the "New Deal coalition" of middle class urban whites. Conversely, it does not see a member of the New Deal coalition who can appeal to the new Democrats. Therefore, the Republicans do not see any Democrat who has or can command the requisite support to wrest the Presidency from their party.

Contrary to Mansfield's opinion, personal charisma and "charm," as he phrased it, are not necessarily essential qualities for political leadership today. At a time when the American people are looking for positive leadership and a "father image" of reassurance, a flamboyant or charismatic style could actually be a detriment. A low key manner under these circumstances would therefore be more of an asset than a liability. The less pretentious a candidate may be, the less he will fit the traditional image of a "politician," the image of a Tammany Hall type, which the "new politics" regards as more of a detriment than an advantage. A low key manner may be more suitable than a charismatic style for a low key manner is one that people are more inclined to accept as honest and sincere.

Nor is it necessary at this date for a Presidential possibility to command, as Mansfield said, a "following." Over-exposure at an early date can be as detrimental as under-exposure at a later date. The most important ability a Presidential hopeful must have is the capacity to develop and maintain a broadly based national following when the requisite time arises. The question of leadership is not so much a question of individuals who have the capabilities to assume a leadership role. A few prominent Democrats do possess those capabilities. The questions of leadership are more of policies and programs than personalities: will the national party adopt the necessary policies and programs that will enable it and its Presidential candidate to win the 1972 election? Will the party remain in and direct its appeal to the center of the political spectrum?

The Republicans, through Agnew's speeches, have attempted to split the Democrats by stressing and exacerbating their social differences; hoping that such a tactic would blind them to their mutual economic and political interests. By this policy of "divide and conquer," it is hoped that after thirty-eight years, Republican conservatism can again re-assert itself as the basis of national policy. One need only observe, in addition to the Haynesworth and Carswell nominations, the nomination of J. Richard Lucas as director of the Bureau of Mines and Sidney Marland as commissioner of education as examples of the attempted exercise of this tactic. The extent to which such tactics can be defeated and the political power possessed by the urban white middle class and blacks, as represented by unions and civil rights groups, became apparent with the defeat of the Haynesworth and Carswell nominations. Of the twenty-six Senators from the thirteen Northeastern states (fifteen Democrats and

eleven Republicans) only one Republican, Smith of Illinois, voted for both nominees. Three Republicans, Saxbe, Scott and Griffin supported Carswell after having voted against Haynesworth. All three were under heavy pressure to also vote against Carswell. The remaining twenty-two, Democrat and Republican alike, voted against both nominees.

The political power of blacks and whites, when united by their mutual concerns and interests, makes suspect the Administration's intentions in devising the Labor Department's Philadelphia Plan and supporting low income housing projects in middle class communities. The Administration may have viewed these policies as a means to irrevocably split the combined political power of urban whites and blacks by emphasizing the issues that are likely to "positively polarize" them. Through equivocal and lax enforcement, what Whitney Young has described as "now you see it, now you don't," the successful execution of this tactic would create political liabilities for any "liberal" senator from the Northeast.

The disintegration of the "New Deal coalition" is only partially a result of a divergence of social interests. Just as material as this divergence has been the failure and, in some instances, the unwillingness of some Democrats to maintain it. With the emergence of a leader acceptable to the majority of the New Deal coalition and the new Democrats and an unequivocal commitment to remain within and appeal to the center of the political spectrum, the New Deal coalition and the new Democrats can be united into the "emerging Democratic majority."

The Republicans have two fundamental issues working against them. One, the economy, is circumstantial and probably would have troubled Hubert Humphrey to some extent had he been elected. The other, and potentially more significant issue, is self-imposed. This issue concerns



the conscious and deliberate attempts to foster and stimulate national disunity and divisiveness as a political ploy. The return of a healthy economy and a significant reduction of American troops in Vietnam will not necessarily solve this more serious problem.

The Republicans can escape these political liabilities which, for the unintended benefit of the Democrats, they have created for themselves. The ability to escape, as with the success of the Republicans' national political strategy itself, is dependent upon policies exercised and positions assumed by the Democrats.

One political hazard for the Democrats is Vietnam. This issue is especially dangerous because of its ability to deprive many of the new Democrats of their rational political judgment. Vietnam and the problem of social differences between the elements of the "emerging Democratic majority" are two issues which the Republicans believe will assist them in their attempts to "divide and conquer" the Democratic party.

Regardless of the Republicans' two political liabilities, Nixon can neatly maneuver away from them by stressing Vietnam as he did last fall. But this issue cannot be used to the Democrats' disadvantage unless they resurrect it--as many of the new Democrats did through the October and November moratoriums. However, Nixon's success last fall with the Vietnam issue could be a pyrrhic victory. Implicit in his criticism of his liberal opposition was a request that Vietnam be removed as an issue of partisan politics. The Democrats would do well to honor that request for the time being; thus removing one issue that the Republicans can exploit to their benefit. However, when a Democratic leader emerges who can command the trust and confidence of a broad spectrum of the people, this issue can then be turned against the Republicans. The people will

switch their support to a leader in whom they have greater trust and confidence--regardless of his position on the issue--and regardless of the issue itself.

A second political hazard for the Democratic party is a change in its ideological direction. As previously mentioned, there are elements of the "new Democrats" who favor turning the party from the center to the left to become a "beard and sandal party"; regardless of the effect such a course would have on any chances of electoral victories. The party would do well to remember the choice presented--and the warning made--by Richard Scammon in his latest book: that a political party that wishes to achieve national primacy must direct its appeal to the center of the political spectrum and the problems facing the center that cut across social and economic differences. Such a party must avoid the extremes of the left or the right; young anarchists and violence-prone black militants on one hand and die-hard Southern segregationists on the other. Specifically, the Democratic party must not become, or appear to have become, the party of chauvinistic student radicals, black militants and masochistic liberals apologizing for the behavior of those radicals and militants. Key party figures must show as much concern for murdered police officers as for injured student demonstrators and as much indignation over destruction wrought by young radicals as is shown over police and "hardhat" brutality. Hubert Humphrey appropriately summarized the most urgent responsibilities of liberals when he told the American Bar Association that liberals "must let the hardhats know they understand what is bugging them. . . ." As an additional caveat, liberals must also show the "hardhats" that they sympathize and are concerned with and desire to remedy "what is bugging them." To the cliché "law and order,"

the term "justice" must be added; not only justice before the law for blacks but also social and economic justice for middle class urban whites and blacks. Liberalism and the policies of the Democratic party must not be perceived by urban whites as the Republicans describe them; approval of domestic violence and defeat in Southeast Asia, disregard for middle class values and traditions, and a lack of concern for middle class social and economic problems. The party and its policies must be viewed as the unaltered base of Democratic liberalism since the days of the New Deal; social and economic equality and justice for all. Liberalism, if viewed in the former manner, will relegate the Democratic party to a minor role in national politics. Liberalism viewed in the latter form will greatly assist the Democrats in becoming the dominant national political party; particularly when contrasted with policies of "positive polarization" and "constructive division" utilized by the Republicans.

Nor can liberals let their opinions on national priorities override common political sense. It would be an error to call for cuts in defense and aerospace spending in Seattle or other areas dependent upon these industries for a livelihood if alternatives are not proposed. Liberals must not forget that the "bread and butter" aspects of military spending may be more significant than the political aspects.

The Democrats cannot successfully attempt to satisfy the left and the center of the political spectrum. The seventh paper presented the difficulties Nixon is facing--and will face--in his attempts to satisfy the right and the center. The Democrats can find themselves in a similar predicament should they attempt to play the left against the center just as Nixon is attempting to play the right against the center.

The failure of the Republicans to sever middle class urban whites

from the Democratic party could be the proximate result of their failure to carefully analyze the reasons for the alleged growth of a conservative political sentiment. While many whites have become, at best, skeptical, of the vast social and cultural upheaval of the past few years, their economic status has become more dependent upon the fiscal policies of the Federal government. Any fear for their economic security can, regardless of social issues or the Vietnam War, turn the middle class to the Democratic party for protection--if the party is sensitive to the importance of that security.

Regardless of social and economic problems and the issue of Vietnam, the Democratic party cannot become the dominant national political party unless it directs its appeal toward the problems of middle class urban whites; almost all of which are shared with lower and middle class blacks of the big cities. The Democratic party must direct its attention to the fears, real or imagined, of those whites in Milwaukee, Chicago, Gary, Detroit, Cleveland, Pittsburgh and Buffalo who are faced with rising crime rates, inflation and unemployment, black neighbors and the destruction of traditional mores and values. It must give equal attention to the problems of the West and South Sides, Hough, Harlem and Roxbury. The self-exalted opinions of the "beautiful people" of Cambridge, mid-Manhattan and Hyde Park are secondary. Even though students, liberals and intellectuals are an element of the "emerging Democratic majority," they are the "odd men out" of this group and must politically defer to the "majority" of the "emerging majority." Both whites and blacks are singularly important to the success of a "Northeastern strategy." If the Democratic party cannot attract the vast majority of voters from both groups, it cannot achieve national primacy.

Since the 1968 election, the Democrats have remained on the political "defensive." Financial difficulties, the absence of visible leadership and the erroneous belief that the Republicans had pre-empted the Democrats of all the principal issues contributed to a static political posture.

However, the strategical and tactical errors of the Southern strategy have given the Democrats a fresh start for the 1970 and 1972 elections. The 1970 elections are merely one but nevertheless an extremely important step toward a Democratic victory in 1972. Each Republican error is a Democratic asset. But the converse also applies. The Democrats must not succumb to their own weaknesses. Only through a party united around those figures with the broadest public appeal can the exercise of leadership be most effective and able to defeat Nixon, Agnew, et al. Various groups within the party must put aside their parochial interests and support such figures; regardless of past differences and misgivings. The stakes in 1970 and 1972 are too great to permit the Democrats to engage in and defeat themselves with petty bickering.

An alternative to Republican negativism, in the form of Democratic leadership, must be publicly presented and emphasized during this year's elections. Key party figures must begin a carefully orchestrated plan of speaking out emphatically and regularly on national issues. The political trap in which the President has placed himself must be sprung. Nixon, the political chameleon, must be forced to show his true colors; the avoidance of which has become a prerequisite to his political survival. Agnew's slurs and innuendos must be answered. He must be forcefully rebuked for his inflammatory and divisive rhetoric of the past

year. The national Republican party and its policies of negativism must be presented with a credible opposition.

One of the results of a Democratic political "offensive" may be at least a partial splitting of moderate and liberal Republicans from the national party. Such a result, while resembling a "positive polarization" of its own, will be a natural and unavoidable part of the Democratic "offensive" and Nixon's attempts to play the right against the center.

The three principal problems created for Nixon through the exercise of the Southern strategy will, together, confront him at his political armageddon. First, Nixon is not fully acceptable to either moderate and liberal or conservative, ultra-conservative and reactionary Republicans. The problems between Senators Percy, Hatfield, Javits and Scott and other liberals and moderates and the White House are numerous and well-known. Such respected moderate-conservatives as John Sherman Cooper, George Aiken and Margaret Chase Smith have been alienated because of the conduct of the President and the White House staff. John Steiger, a Nixon ally who lost a Congressional by-election in Southern California to a member of the John Birch Society, remarked that ultra-conservatives within the party "only tolerate" the President. Strom Thurmond has criticized Nixon for not rigidly adhering to his own reactionary course. Secondly, Nixon does not have a personal following, as do Reagan and Agnew, within the party. The absence of a personal following would make it that much easier for his party to discard him in 1972 if it so desires. Thirdly, when and if the Democratic "offensive" shifts into high gear, Nixon will be forced to identify himself with either the liberals, moderates and moderate-conservatives or the conservatives, ultra-conservatives

and reactionaries of the Reagan and Thurmond variety. If he identifies himself with the former group, he automatically loses the Deep South to Wallace, places the "outer South" and border states in doubt and risks losing the nomination in 1972 by alienating the Reagan and Wallace adherents in the party--without being assured of carrying the Upper Midwest. If he can become identified, only tenuously at best, with the ultra-conservatives and reactionaries he will split the party as did Goldwater in 1964. Nixon will have to fight Wallace in the Deep South, the "outer South" and border states and Texas and the Democrats for the Upper Midwest, Texas and California. Neither Wallace nor the Democrats face a threat in their strongholds, the Deep South and the Northern Atlantic states. The only state in which Nixon can take the initiative--which he is doing--is California. A Nixon offensive is needed there to maintain--let alone increase--his narrow margin of victory of 1968.

Even if Wallace is not a candidate in 1972, Democratic opportunities should not be materially threatened if the party exercises the necessary leadership and campaigns on the requisite policies. With or without the presence of the "Wallace factor," the Democrats must adhere to the "Northeastern strategy." In the 1968 election, the thirteen Northeastern states commanded a total of 245 electoral votes, twenty five shy of the required 270. The other states carried by Humphrey, Maine (with 4 electoral votes), West Virginia (7), Minnesota (10), Washington (9), Hawaii (4) and the District of Columbia (3) total thirty-seven votes. Texas, which Humphrey carried (with 1% of the popular vote), and California, which he lost by a narrow margin, possess twenty-five and forty votes respectively.

This is not to say that the Democrats can carry all of the North-

eastern states, the above five states, the District of Columbia and Texas and/or California. Not all of the Northeastern states will be "pushovers." Indiana will probably be the most difficult and New Jersey only somewhat less so. Humphrey's margins were narrow in Maryland (2%) and Pennsylvania (5%). However, of the six Northeastern states that Nixon carried, in only one, Indiana, was his margin of victory greater than 4%. The potential for victory for a "Northeastern strategy" does exist. It rests on a firmer base than does the Southern strategy. Unlike the Southern strategy, the factors that will ultimately spell victory for a Northeastern strategy, the exercise of positive leadership coupled with the proper policies, programs and ideological direction, lay with its adherents and are not dependent upon factors outside of their control and influence, as is the Southern strategy.

Even though the urban areas of the Northeast have been losing residents to their suburbs and the West and Southwest, these urban areas, with their potentially overwhelming number of Democratic votes, can more than compensate for defections to the Republicans among those moving to the suburbs and the "sun country" (as Kevin Phillips has described the West and Southwest). The Democrats' problem is not emigration to the suburbs and changes of partisan affiliations but what appears to be their declining ability to convince their urban constituencies of blacks and middle class whites to go to the polls on election day. Again, this problem can be remedied only by positive leadership and adherence to the policies and programs that are responsive to the mutual needs of urban blacks and whites.

While the suburban areas and the "sun country" have more residents than the urban areas of the Northeast, the potentially huge Democratic



pluralities in the cities--or the lack of them---will still determine which presidential candidate will carry the Northeastern states. Because of the electoral college, the balance of national political power remains in the Northeast, particularly in the Upper Midwest.

The success of the Northeastern strategy is partially dependent upon the retention of the electoral college. Ironically, Democrats, who have the most to gain from it, wish to abolish it while Republicans, against whom the system works, wish to retain it.

The electoral college works to the Democrats' advantage in the Upper Midwest where the two parties attract an almost equal number of popular votes. The votes of a relatively small minority, such as the blacks, can give a state's total number of electoral votes to the Democratic candidate even though his plurality is extremely small. It is possible that the Democratic candidate in 1972 could carry all of the Northeastern states and a handful of other states by narrow margins and squeeze into the Presidency. The Republican candidate could lose the election with a plurality of the total popular vote if he fails in each Northeastern state by a narrow margin, thus polling an almost equal amount of votes in this region as his opponent, and sweeps almost all of the other states by large margins.

In spite of the predictions of the Southern strategists that social differences will outweigh the importance of economic security and constructive political leadership, the primary issue of the 1970 elections will concern the state of the economy. As usual, Republican policies on the issue are ambiguous. The President has recently vetoed three appropriation bills because they were "inflationary." He is attempting to portray himself as a representative of fiscal responsibility waging a

desperate battle against spendthrift Democratic liberals. However, two of the three vetoes were overridden with extensive Republican assistance. It is difficult to see how the President can successfully castigate Democrats in Congress for fiscal irresponsibility when many members of his own party joined the Democrats in opposing his policies. The transparency of such a tactic was evident in Hugh Scott's comment that he would vote to override the latest veto unless his vote would make the difference. Whether the economy is "bottoming out" may be a moot point. Paul McCracken's statistics are meaningless to those affected by unemployment and inflation. A strike by the United Auto Workers could nullify any fragile economic improvements and all but destroy Republican political fortunes this fall.

The 1970 election campaign will probably see a return to the pre-Cambodia pre-Kent State rhetoric of the "old Agnew." Republican strategists were confident that by having Agnew stress the social differences between the elements of the "emerging Democratic majority," they could "positively polarize" the Democratic party and blind those elements to their mutual economic and political concerns around which the emerging Democratic majority will coalesce and on which the Republicans are politically vulnerable. But in spite of Republican efforts to "divide and conquer," their policy has not been completely successful. The issue of economic security will probably outweigh the social differences between various elements of the electorate. The issue has given a new "lease on life" to those Democratic candidates who would otherwise have little chance of success. Because of this added factor, Agnew can be expected to be at his vituperative best (or worst--depending upon the observer's viewpoint.)

Agnew is expected to concentrate his efforts in Tennessee to defeat Albert Gore in his bid for re-election. Agnew has already described Gore in a dictatorial manner; that he has been in office ". . . far too long and needs to be removed." This Tennessee election promises to be one of the severest tests of that fundamental tenet of the Southern strategy; that social differences between the population can prevail over issues of economic security. That the election is in Tennessee provides the Republicans with an added advantage. The Tennessee electorate, because it does not face the problems that exist in the urban Northeast, cannot be considered a part of the New Deal coalition that will become an element of the "emerging Democratic majority."

The Republicans have chosen a difficult opponent to test that tenet. Gore, a "scrappy" campaigner in the best populist tradition, promises to "go down swinging." He has even found an asset in Agnew's promise to do all he can to defeat him: "I am grateful for Agnew's promised assistance. There is nothing the voters of Tennessee appreciate more than having distinguished outsiders come in and instruct them on how to vote." Gore will emphasize to the utmost the fact that he was the principal sponsor of last year's income tax reform and that his opponent, a millionaire who qualifies as a member of the "country club folks" despised by Wallace and his Southern constituency (Wallace received 34% of the Tennessee vote in 1968), has no genuine concern for or empathy with the voters.

Republican strategists consider Agnew as their most valuable campaign asset. His sharp rhetoric appeals to those who, regardless of partisan affiliation, are frightened by the vast social and cultural upheaval of the past few years. However, it is quite possible that

Agnew's appeal will begin to erode and may even become a liability among those in the urban areas of the Northeast who bear the burden of the nation's political, social and economic shortcomings. Neither mud-slinging nor demagoguery are aspects of the "new politics" and mud-slinging and demagoguery are the only political tactics at which Agnew is skillful.

The Republicans may revert to mud-slinging and gutter politics in those campaigns where their candidate, particularly an incumbent, is trailing his opponent. Such tactics have already been utilized by Ralph Smith in Illinois. Agnew has moderated his rhetoric over the summer but Republican strategists cannot resist what they consider as the appeal of his "old" style and, because of the shadow cast by the economy over Republican political fortunes this year, may have him revert to that style upon his return from Asia (the intractability of American allies in East Asia may add another dimension to his criticism of "liberals"). Some of Agnew's speeches prior to his departure for Asia, particularly those concerning the McGovern-Fatfield resolution, Kenneth C'Donnell's comments about the Vietnam policies of the late President Kennedy and Lawrence O'Brien's concession that the Vietnam intervention was an error, plus the gravity of the 1970 elections, indicate a return to that "old" style. That old style may be what the Republicans regard as the most effective manner of asking the voters why, in spite of a previously milder rhetoric and "what is right" with the nation, dissent continues.

However, this fall, Agnew must come to an "eyeball-to-eyeball" confrontation with Democratic leadership, particularly over the issues of dissent, campus unrest and the practice of "liberal" politics. Along with his party, Agnew must be put on the defensive and forced to re-act

to Democratic attacks.

Nothing could please the Republicans more than an autumn of campus turmoil. The Republicans' belief that a candidate who utilizes student volunteers will automatically fail in his bid for office was recently repeated by John Mitchell. He must relish the report of a long-haired worker for the Rev. Joseph Duffey in Connecticut being chased from a neighborhood by a gun-wielding citizen. In typical Republican fashion of ignoring facts that contradict preconceived notions, Mitchell failed to ascertain that student support had greatly assisted two challengers in Congressional primaries this spring. In New Jersey, Lewis Kaden received more votes than had any other primary challenger in his district. In New York, Peter Eikenberry, running in a middle class area of the Bronx, was defeated by a bare one thousand votes. Kaden's campaigners made their share of tactical errors; they encouraged supporters of their incumbent opponent to vote because they did not carefully check the areas in their district where the potential support for their candidate existed.

In Connecticut, supporters of the Rev. Joseph Duffey followed the maxim of Sam Brown, the organizer of last year's Vietnam moratoriums and the McCarthy campaign of 1968: that middle class voters, although against the War, have a deeper dislike for long hair or any other trait that may link a student volunteer to campus radicals. Middle class voters must be reached in a manner that does not detract from their beliefs; i.e., by polite and neatly dressed young people who understand and respect, rather than offend, middle class values. Because of this policy and Duffey's previous picketing of General Electric plants with striking workers last winter, he did especially well among middle class and blue collar workers and received extensive black support as well

(even though the primary turn-out was low). The only liabilities now facing Duffey are a divided party and the independent candidacy of Senator Thomas Dodd. But his fledgling grass roots organization and practice of the "new politics" may be able to replace the loss of organized support. Masses of polite and clean-cut young people working in political campaigns and/or other socially acceptable projects may convince the electorate that young people are not as bad as the Vice President portrays them.

Even if Democratic candidates exercise the necessary leadership and campaign on the requisite policies, they must bear in mind one fundamental fact. Much of the present American malaise is due to unfulfilled promises made and hopes created during the early and middle 1960s. Democratic candidates should not make promises for the future for promises do not rapidly materialize. They should promise only sincere efforts to attempt to solve the problems permeating American society.

The Democrats can take one lesson from the Republicans. Whatever their faults may be, Republicans are concerned with the efficiency of government--and political campaigns. This trait is notably lacking among liberals. A governmental policy or a political campaign, regardless of its motives, is useless if it becomes bogged down in its own inertia, bureaucracy and red tape. Democratic liberals would do well to substitute some of their excess idealism for pragmatism and efficiency.

The justification of one of the themes of these papers, that the Democratic party must remain responsive to the needs of the white middle class, could be found in the interview with AFL-CIO President George Meany in the August 31 edition of the New York Times. In the September 2 issue of the Times, an editorial took exception to Meany's complaint

that the Democratic party is becoming "the party of the extremists. . . or new lefts (sic)." The Times' editorial board solemnly declared that since Jerry Rubin and Tom Hayden would not be ideologically comfortable in the Democratic party, Meany's opinion was less than accurate.

This exchange of opinions is, in and of itself, indicative of the gap that exists between what these papers have, for brevity, referred to as the "liberals and intellectuals," "white urban middle class" and the "kamikazee Democrats."

When Meany referred to "extremists" and "new Lefts," he was speaking of the "kamikazee Democrats." He did not refer to Rubin and Hayden whom the Times' editorial board regards as extremists. To the vast majority of urban middle class whites who tend to vote Democratic, there is no difference between the "kamikazee Democrats" and Rubin and Hayden. Merely because the Times' editorial board sees a distinction does not indicate that the Democrats' middle class constituency accepts that distinction.

Actually, the "kamikazee Democrats" have not, as Meany said, "taken over" the party. Nor do they have the ability to do so. But truth, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. It only appears to the Democrats' middle class constituency that the "kamikazee Democrats" have the ability to do so and are exercising it.

To the middle class, which is hurt by economic and urban problems, the preoccupation of many "liberals" with the war and the problems of the blacks and "alienated" students, is offending. The war does not weigh as heavily on "Middle America" as it did a year or two ago. For better or for worse, the middle class presently appears satisfied with the President's Vietnam policies. It is now preoccupied with economic

and urban problems and the continuing attack on its system of values by its former "liberal" allies. It is disturbed when it sees those "liberals" preoccupied with other than middle class concerns. (Many blacks have the same complaint; that liberals were preoccupied first with the war and now with the state of the environment-- so as to avoid their problems.)

This alleged trait of disregard for the concerns of others has, to the middle class, marked the "peace movement" and other "liberal" institutions since the beginning of the large scale American involvement in Vietnam. The peace movement proclaimed its own policies and adopted what appeared to the middle class as a paternalistic and haughty attitude; that it knew what was and was not in the nation's best interests and everyone else should defer to its allegedly better judgment. The surprise at the comments about "national masochism" and "effete snobs" is not justified. What is surprising is that the comments were made at such a late date.

The middle class is well aware of these "liberal" attitudes and what appears to be the "liberal" belief that unless one is an intellectual and social equal and has the same reasons for opposing the war as does the "liberal", he is somehow intellectually and morally inferior. It remembers some of the more fervent "new McCarthyites" who eagerly anticipated and publicly called for Hubert Humphrey's defeat so they could "take over" the party and make it "responsive to the people"; i.e., themselves. Some of them were probably more concerned over those close races in California, Missouri, Illinois, Ohio and New Jersey than was Richard Nixon himself. (One may wonder how many of those New Yorkers who supported McCarthy because he "won" primaries in 1968 supported John Marchi or Mario Procaccino because they "won" primaries in 1969.)



To be brutally frank, Agnew's statement was not incorrect. It indicated that traditional Democratic liberalism had lost contact with those, black and white alike, whom it was designed to serve. It should have alerted at least some "liberals" to their political and social shortcomings. But it did not. It did push them further into their ideological isolation from the American political mainstream. One young campaign worker in Chicago neatly summarized the "liberal" attitude toward the middle class when he sarcastically remarked that "Some of my best friends are 'Middle Americans'." It is easy to understand the reasons why Republican strategists believe that all they have to do is wait to "pick up the pieces."

The interview with Meany accurately illustrated two fundamental points presented by these papers: one; that unless the liberal and intellectual communities terminate their social and ideological isolation from their former (pre-Vietnam) middle class allies, and, as Hubert Humphrey said, show those former allies to their satisfaction that they understand and are concerned with "what is bugging them" they will relegate the Democratic party to a minor status as a national institution, and secondly; that Democratic leadership is urgently needed now to unite these two elements of the "emerging Democratic majority," have them "lower their voices" and realize their many mutual interests--as well as the consequences of their continued "positive polarization" and "constructive division."

That leadership, if exercised, will be able to produce the necessary and required unity. Meany said that "our people" are not so much turning to the Republicans as they are looking less to what they regard as a Democratic party growing unresponsive to and unconcerned with their

political, social and economic needs. The importance of positive leadership has been stressed since the first paper. Its exercise is essential to unite the elements of the "emerging Democratic majority" and effectively utilize the "Northeastern strategy." Its importance cannot be overly emphasized.

The "vocal minority" of the new Democrats must be rebuked as strongly as the Republicans who are pushing the American people to their political and social "failsafe" points for partisan benefits. These papers have illustrated that the potential for a victory in 1972 is greater for the Democrats than for the Republicans. If the Republicans are successful, it will arise from the Democrats' forfeiture of their numerous opportunities for success.

The sixth paper compared the Southern strategy to a "ticket on the Titanic." The Titanic was the greatest ship of its day. It was guaranteed unsinkable by icebergs. Yet, on its maiden voyage, it was sunk by an iceberg--against which it was specifically protected. An analogy was also made to the well-known Aesop's Fable of the race between the hare and the tortoise. The only crucible is that the "Democratic tortoise" remain on the road to the finish line. It has the potential to win the race before the "Republican hare" realizes that his smug self-assurance has caused him to fall asleep and lose his direction.

Not all of the analogies are optimistic. One has dawned on me that is, to say the least, frightening. It is, of course, common knowledge that the bald eagle is our national symbol. One may suggest that pollution of the air and water which, in the last analysis, is a by-product of our national avarice, is symbolic of our national ills. And DDT can

be considered symbolic of pollution for it was--and is--so recklessly used. Conservationists are warning that accumulations of DDT in bald eagles can destroy their reproductive systems. As an added facet, the Nixon Administration is not strictly enforcing the ban on the sale and use of DDT.

But analogies do have a positive aspect. Former Pittsburgh mayor Joseph Barr made a comment shortly before the mayoralty election in which Peter Flaherty scored his overwhelming victory: "If that's the new politics. . . (my) faith rests in the old politics." If "that's" (Flaherty's victory) the consequence of the new politics, then the Democrats would be well advised to practice it to find what a letter-to-the-editor of the Chicago Sun-Times so plaintively requested: "Lost: one nation indivisible. If found: Please return to heirs. Roward: Gratitude of a people."

## ADDENDA A

Last fall, the printed media began to emphasize the political, social, and economic problems of the "Middle American." I noticed a number of common themes while reading features on that topic. Those themes, combined with the facts and circumstances surrounding Flaherty's victory in Pittsburgh, crystallized into the main point of these papers last November. Many of the opinions, theories and conclusions mentioned in these papers were formed by mid-April..

The new book by Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg, The Real Majority, had not come to my attention until I had completed the seventh paper about August 1. The Real Majority presents an interesting alternative to Kevin Phillips' Emerging Republican Majority. The reaction of Republican strategists to The Real Majority will be interesting to observe. They can either adjust their ideological emphasis to the center, as Scammon and Wattenberg recommend, or regard the Scammon and Wattenberg thesis as faulty and misleading, just as these papers have considered Phillips' book.

The theories of Scammon and Wattenberg and Phillips' - and my own theories and opinions - are all suppositions and presumptions rather than concrete conclusions. The accuracy of these suppositions and presumptions depends upon the precepts and premises on which they are based. Unlike a physical phenomena, such as water boiling when reaching a temperature of 212°F. (the analogy made on P.8 of the seventh paper), human behavior will not necessarily repeat itself when continually subjected to the same conditions and surrounding circumstances. However, the political scientist, like the physical scientist, should concern himself with why a phenomena has occurred (the factors causing it to occur and the degree and type of change that can be stimulated by outside and/or extraneous influences and forces) as much as he concerns himself with what has occurred. In the last analysis, since hu-

man behavior is not necessarily predictable (and politics is a form of human behavior), only the future can decide whether the conclusions of Scammon and Wattenberg or Phillips are correct. I believe that the conclusions of Scammon and Wattenberg are more realistic than Phillips'.

I have independently reached conclusions similar to theirs. To justify those conclusions, it was incumbent upon me to explain the rationalizations behind them. Not even remotely approaching their knowledge and competency, I was obligated, in addition to stating why I believe my conclusions are correct, to state why those of the "opposition" are erroneous. I recall Cicero's statement; that if one knows only his side of the story, he knows even little of that.

I have also attempted to keep another idea in mind while observing the current electoral and political trends: where could my theories, conclusions and interpretations be erroneous? It is easier to discard, rather than objectively analyze, those facts and opinions that do not conform to one's preconceived conclusions. I have attempted to illustrate where Republican strategists had become the victims of their own rhetoric. I hope that I - and "our" analysts - can avoid such a temptation.

## THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF PRESIDENT NIXON

### (The First Sixty Days)

In his first sixty days, President Richard M. Nixon made as dramatic an impact on the national spirit as did Franklin Roosevelt in those first 100 days in which he took command of the nation in 1933.

They succeeded in vastly different ways. Roosevelt made his mark with a blizzard of legislation -- and a flurry of activity in a country that had been idled and had become desperate for action. President Nixon took office in vastly different circumstances, when rancor and bitterness had envenomed the national dialogue, and the chasms between races and generations and parties and people were as deep and bitter as ever in our history. We needed a President not to churn the waters, but to calm the seas; and within sixty days President Nixon had gone as far as any American could have gone to accomplish this objective -- seemingly impossible when one considers the climate in this country at the end of the Johnson Presidency.

Nixon has assumed office with serenity and dignity; he has turned the temperature of national debate to the point where Americans are not shouting at each other, but speaking to each other once again.

Yet, with quiet dignity and efficiency and purpose, he has already imperceptibly changed the direction of government for generations to come. Consider just a few of the specifics.

#### Statesmanship Above Politics

1. President Nixon within days in office moved to remove partisan politics from the huge postal service, an historic reform, a change that Presidents have shrunk from since the days of Benjamin Franklin. The end result of this will make the enormous Post Office Department a

merit system for the first time in its history. It will mean chance for advancement for thousands of men who were otherwise frozen into their jobs for life. It was but one example of how this new Administration came to Washington equipped with the most efficient of business practices as well as a social conscience. This is the first step toward better postal service.

#### National Security

2. In the area of national security, the President stood up against some loud voices and asked Congress for a defense for the American deterrent -- threatened by the enormous strides in Soviet weaponry in recent years. This step was taken despite strong opposition. Agree with the decision or not, it took Presidential courage to make it. The decision was made by the President after careful study of all the facts available. "Safeguard" is what its name implies, a safeguard against nuclear war. It allows flexibility and adds to our deterrent defensive power.

In his decision on ABM, in his action in the Berlin collision in February and March, the President showed that he could take action in the interest of immediate national security, while yet maintaining contact and communication with the Soviets in the long-term interests of peace.

The President has moved American-Soviet relations onto a new plane. The Russians have been brought around to agreement on four-power talks; talks on arms control are in the offing. This is an astounding achievement when one considers that only a few months ago syndicated columnists were writing that Richard Nixon ought not to be elected, because he couldn't get along with the Russians.

The success of the President's trip to Europe is recognized by all. Mr. Nixon re-established a strong relationship with our allies, a much needed move.



President Nixon has in two months given the world demonstration that a realistic defense of America's just interests is not an impediment but a necessity for a modus vivendi with the Soviets.

#### Crime

3. The President, in his first days in office, alerted the entire nation to the crime crisis in its capital in Washington and provided the personal thrust for a new anticrime program that is already moving through the city government of the District of Columbia. He established one of the finest Departments of Justice seen in this country -- a department for once determined to prosecute violations of the law. The change from the previous Administration is dramatic. Finally, the nation has a department willing to use every legal weapon at its disposal to fight organized crime. He has the will and the sense of urgency to get at the problem of crime in every way possible.

#### Hunger

4. When reports came in of hunger in South Carolina, the Administration within hours broke the log-jam that had held up Orville Freeman for years. Malnutrition, for the first time in decades, has been brought to national attention -- and it was placed on the front burner of the Federal Government -- by a Republican Administration. And the Administration objective here is solving the malnutrition crisis -- performance not publicity.

#### Lung Disease

5. Moved by the mine disasters in West Virginia late in 1968, President Nixon on taking office proposed some of the toughest mine-safety legislation ever sent up to the Hill -- featuring strong preventive safeguards against the killer disease of miners, "black lung." This action came little more than a month after the President had taken office.



### Poverty Program

6. Within a month after taking his oath, the President had moved to reorganize the entire poverty war -- from top to bottom.

### Sound Economics

7. Two of the initial moves by the President have great long-range economic impact. As he extended the surtax to battle the inflation cycle which ran wild during the Johnson Administration, the President also moved to make further cuts in Federal spending. This is difficult but it gives the Nation added protection against the inflationary cycle which threatened to engulf the savings of millions of Americans. The Administration also sent to the Congress a proposal regulating one-bank holding companies. In financial circles, this is recognized as a much needed economic proposal in strengthening our competitive free enterprise system.

### Reorganization

8. One of the first pieces of legislation sought by the President was one authorizing reorganization. Already the Labor Department has been reorganized to provide less bureaucracy and more efficiency. Under the reorganization act now passed, other departments are moving swiftly. Field bureaus in eight regions of the United States are being reorganized to provide more efficiency.

One of the chief achievements of the new Administration has been an intangible one: restoring public respect for the Presidency.

This has been a matter of style as well as substance.

In his own public appearances, the President has consistently come across as a man of genuine good humor and keen intelligence, sure of himself, and refreshingly free of pomposity or pretension: a President who levels with

the people, who trusts the people, and who has the assured self-confidence that goes with being on top of his job and enjoying it.

The President and his strikingly attractive family have conducted themselves with dignity, with decorum, with a fine sense of propriety, and yet in a refreshingly open, easy manner. Ceremonial functions have been gracefully and tastefully handled.

President Nixon has set the tone for open Government, one in which Administration officials are urged to reveal to the public the facts concerning their departments. This emphasis on truth and candor is helping restore public confidence in Government. The President's own press conferences provide best example of this willingness to be frank with the public.

The Nixons, in fact, have swept through the White House with the freshness of a spring breeze -- and the people are responding. The Nixon style has been both candid and dignified. His evident zest for his job has been contagious.

The Nixon White House is emerging as clearly a place where standards are high; where excellence is the norm; where decency and dignity are the rule.

## GEARED FOR THE SEVENTIES

Perhaps the time has come for a thoughtful discussion of how we measure "action" in modern government. What kind of yardstick or thermometer do we use? Unfortunately, we tend too often to measure action by counting laws. How many bills have been introduced, we ask. How much legislation has been enacted? The test is primarily legislative -- a carryover from a simpler time when everyone assumed that when government decided to do something, it would have no problem achieving its goal.

At such a time, attention naturally centered on whether government would choose to undertake a new role or not -- and that was usually a legislative question. Once a bill was passed and signed into law, the government was said to have "acted."

Nowadays, we know better than this. We realize that legislation is only a primary step, that the real work of government comes when we try to implement these laws in confused and complex situations. And that is the stage where today's government often breaks down. As the President has said very recently: "Many of the disappointments and frustrations of the last several years can be blamed on the fact that administrative performance has not kept pace with legislative promise."

In strengthening the Administration the President has instituted major changes. These include:

The new Urban Affairs Council -- and its several subgroups

The revival of the National Security Council

The new Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy

The Office of Intergovernmental Relations --  
under the Vice President

The Labor Department's massively restructured  
Manpower Administration  
Post Office reforms -- new ways to select  
Postmasters  
Changes in the Office of Economic Opportunity,  
particularly Head Start and the Job Corps  
The new Minority Business Enterprise program  
in the Department of Commerce  
And, most recently, the restructuring of field  
operations for five social service oriented  
departments and agencies. This reform  
redraws regional boundaries, relocates  
regional centers, and takes steps both to  
coordinate and decentralize decision-making.

Two further points can be made about reorganiza-  
tion. First, the time spent in reorganizing is the  
most important time in the life of an Administration.  
One can make a mistake in substance and correct it in  
subsequent decisions. But an organizational error will  
affect every decision which is made thereafter. Analogy:  
one can make a wrong turn at the corner and turn around  
down the road. But a badly built engine will ruin the  
whole journey.

The second point is that it takes courage to  
reform structures. People have talked about taking  
the Post Office out of politics for over one hundred  
years. But it took a no-nonsense Administration, backed  
by Republicans in Congress, to do what others were re-  
luctant to attempt. In the past, the party in power  
opposed such change and the party out of power advocated  
it. Republicans changed this!

Similarly, the field organization reforms have  
been kicking around for almost a decade. They were  
put off again and again by timid souls and finally  
implemented this week only because this Administration  
was willing to "bite the bullet."



Another means of illustrating the extent of activity is provided by the list of 94 Presidential directives to Cabinet Officers and other high officials. At the President's request, this list was released to the press on March 1. The sheer quantity overwhelmed many reporters at the time, and there were very few stories on the matter. But the package remains a convincing piece of evidence that the wheels of government are vigorously in motion.

### THE WORD IS COOL

One way to illustrate what has taken place is to borrow the word of our young people -- COOL.

The word "cool" fits the Republican approach; it is in contrast to the often heated approach of Mr. Johnson.

This Administration is COOL because:

C----Confidence in the Office of the Presidency and in the ability of the government to meet the needs of the people has been restored. This confidence is reflected in the numerous polls and the editorial opinion (e.g., re press conferences) which, while it might disagree with the President on some issues, agrees that the situation is in capable hands. This belief, this confidence in a President, is one of the most important aspects of the first sixty days. Once again, Americans have confidence in their President.

O----Organization. President Nixon has, through his directives to all major departments, begun a process of planning and organization at all levels of government. Post Office decentralization, restructuring of the government service systems, Office of Economic Opportunity, Job Corps...all of these tasks of reorganization display the same basic concern with orderly processes of government. Before we can move ahead toward a goal, we must get together. The Nixon way is to make certain that progress is not turned into chaos through a lack of planning. It is directed to increase efficiency, decrease bureaucracy.

O----Originality. The Nixon Administration has been innovative from the method of presenting Cabinet officials to the press conferences without notes. Minority enterprise programs and the voluntary action program are original concepts of dealing with economic problems. What this means is that the next three and a half years will be years of carefully thought through innovation and creativity in all fields. The first sixty days of this Administration has demonstrated this President's willingness to try new approaches.

L----Leadership. President Nixon's European trip was a triumph because he demonstrated to all European leaders his leadership qualities of judgment, intelligence, purpose, and experience. He has shown also a welcome desire to listen and gather facts from all sides. His strong leadership at home is best illustrated by his decision on the Safeguard missile defense, a move to provide needed deterrent power for the seventies.

The cool approach toward the problems of America and the world does not mean that this Administration lacks a heart. Indeed, the great compassion of the American people for the poor and unfortunate was ill-served by helter-skelter schemes and wild rhetoric of previous days. The sixty days of this Administration have restored to government a sense of purpose directed by reason and inspired by compassion.

An additional note of interest is the President's press conferences. It has been said (by the President's critics among others) that a man can't hide his true self from the television camera. Mr. Nixon believes this. That is why he wants no prop, no teleprompter, no notes to come between him and the people.

His press conference is directed as much toward the individual American as it is toward the press.

For too long there have been artificial barriers between the Presidency and the people; barriers of words, of slogans, of teleprompters. Now we have a President

whose words and actions on television, and his coverage in newspapers, reflects a confidence in himself and a confidence in the people to judge the worth of his proposals. His presentation of the Safeguard system could have been done in any number of ways, but he chose to go directly in front of those all-seeing cameras, without props or assistants, and present his case.

Quite often it is the intangible things which make the difference between triumph and tragedy. The tone of Winston Churchill's voice over the radio during World War II was as much a factor in the Battle of Britain as the Spitfire. His tone said more than his words ever could.

So it is with Nixon. He has set a tone to the Presidency that is uniquely his: cool, professional, alert, calm, listening more than talking, humane, balanced. It is this tone, a tone which can be sensed in more than his words or the sound of his voice, which is the key to the success of the first sixty days; it is a success of encounter. The American people have met their new President in a variety of roles.

This "brief encounter" of a President with the people has proven to be a success because he has been frank and open with them and they have given him a chance to be frank. This alone makes the first sixty days historic. It was only a short while ago that Americans in general distrusted the entire government apparatus. Mr. Nixon's candid approach, seen best in his conferences, has made the people take a second look at government, a look of interest and approval.

The philosophy of government seems to run in cycles. In the first third of the Twentieth Century the Federal government reflected the laissez-faire philosophy. The Presidential administration was that of a caretaker. The New Deal saw the emergence of another cycle. The Federal government became more of a planner with a philosophy of centralization.

A new role for the Federal government is already distinguishable in the Nixon Administration as it assumes leadership in the last third of the Twentieth Century. The role is that of the Activator and the governmental philosophy might be called dynamic pluralism. Dynamic pluralism differs from the passive government of McKinley and the "big government" of the New Deal and Great Society. It calls to action the forces of federalism, capitalism and voluntarism. It energizes the state governments to be innovators; it stimulates community initiative; it encourages the involvement of business with urban problems; it rallies America's myriad voluntary agencies to address themselves to society's needs.

It would be a very easy thing for a new Administration to come into office, and to send a barrage of legislative proposals to Capitol Hill in the first few weeks. Anyone can propose a billion for this or a billion for that; anyone can create catchy new "wars" to be launched on the various ills that plague mankind. But merely to do this is one thing; to do it responsibly is another. The Republican aim is to ensure that what we do is done responsibly. This is an enormously complex process, in which there are dozens, scores or hundreds of bases to be touched -- not only in a formalistic way, but because in the departments and the agencies, on Capitol Hill, in the States and the communities and in private organizations, there are enormous numbers of people with special knowledge about virtually every problem or program. Their views are considered. Scrapping bad proposals is fully as important a part of the decision-making process as advancing good ones -- and a part that has been too often slighted in recent years by those who measure progress in numbers of laws passed, billions spent and slogans coined.



In short, the nation can be as proud of what Congress and the Administration have not done as it is of what they have done. To do less is often to achieve more.

True, there are clearly desirable things the Administration has not achieved.

It has not ended the war. It has not yet brought permanent peace. It has not ended inflation. It has not harmonized the races. It has not brought the old and the young to lie down together like lion and lamb. It has not ended crime. It has not cured mankind of greed, or dishonesty, or the impulse to violence. In short, the Administration has not done in 10 weeks what was not done in the 2000 years preceding.

But it has made a strong beginning.

The Nixon Administration has begun to chart what is possible in the short run, and to adjust both promise and expectation to the limits -- and to the reach -- of the possible. The President has assembled a team of extraordinary intelligence and rare perception. In the Western Alliance, he has created a new willingness to work together. Here at home, he has midwived the birth of a new spirit of reason and moderation.

The machinery of government is working. The ideas that were launched during the campaign, those that were collected and winnowed by the transition task forces, and those that have been brought in since inauguration, all are making their way through those processes of selection and refinement that are necessary if concept is to be translated into program, and competing programs, each of individual merit, are to be measured against one another.

One by one, those that survive the selection process are emerging as legislative proposals.

This is the path which must be taken. It is the path to sound government, geared to the needs of the seventies.

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March 1968

REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE SERVICES TO INCUMBENTS

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Minority Advisor. Joe Clarke is available to consult with Members on minority groups, organizations and problems. A list of the 85 major Negro newspapers is available at the Minority Room (Tom Lankford) and will be run free on your envelopes. Most of the papers are published weekly, near the end of the week, with deadlines early in each week.

Campaign Division. Each month, the Committee will furnish a description of roll call votes and the number of Members in each party who voted yea or nay, along with the final vote. These looseleaf sheets should be filled in with the Member's vote and saved. Statistical information on your District and its voting history may be obtained from Pete Purves.

Public Relations. Copies of the weekly Newsletter will be furnished each Member's office. Other material distributed by mail to each office includes Issue of the Day, Radio-TV Script, occasional speeches and public relations checklists and suggested projects. Advice is available from experienced newsmen, but each Member should have someone permanently available to handle routine press releases, etc. Committee personnel will edit and polish any material and will help with major press releases, press conferences, etc., as time allows. An experienced broadcaster is available to assist in that field, including shooting film in the area.

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GOP Asks: Have Soviets Really Mellowed? (1968, August 26). *Republican Congressional Committee Newsletter*, pp. 1–8.

Report on

CONFERENCE ON STRATEGIES IN THE NEW POLITICS  
"Communication Versus Manipulation"

at the

Center of Adult Education  
University of Maryland

December 4th - 6th, 1970

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was the distinguished list of speakers that was available. There were a number of academic types who were able to stand above partisan politics and who were not inhibited by the "for hire" syndrome of the professional political consultants of campaigning and thereby were able to give in depth analysis of the science of the various aspects of campaigning. The best speaker by far, in my estimation, was Dr. Ithiel deSola Pool, who is a professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. Pool spoke in the wind-up session which was titled "Where Will the New Politics Take Us in 1972." I'll go into some detail on his remarks later on. Dr. Robert E. Lane, President of the American Political Science Association, also spoke in this last session. I didn't find his remarks of the caliber of Dr. Pool's but, he was also quite good.

The sub-title of the conference "Communication Versus Manipulation" posed a question which was never directly answered at the conference. I assume we were all to draw our own conclusion. I did. My conclusion was not based solely on this conference but, on a combination of my experience over the last year and possibly the last several years. I conclude that there is a great deal of manipulation and a minimum of communication as the system now works.

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE USE OF NEW POLITICAL TECHNIQUES  
IN THE 1970 CAMPAIGN

This subject is really the essence of the "new politics". The speakers used here were Dr. Walter DeVries, from the University of Michigan, who worked with the Milliken campaign in Michigan. I felt much of the information he gave was valuable but, as I found in the case of many of the political consultants (Dr. DeVries is a professional political consultant in addition to being a university professor) that they spend a lot of time - after the fact - explaining with great precision and certainty how they did it. I get the impression that the finely drawn plans, which assured victory, that they so readily describe at these conferences, were in reality quite fuzzy or non-existent before and during the campaign. Retrospect produces interesting history once the campaign has been won. Everyone wants to hear at that point how it was done. They oblige. Perhaps I should point out at this juncture, that I am a firm advocate of the use of professional political consultants. Campaigns are now so complex that the failure to employ experts in the technical areas is stupid. I simply don't believe that they have all the answers and have themselves as their primary clients - which is, of course, a natural business practice. You must be aware of their limitations.



Milliken won with 50.7% of the vote. Their polling showed (and the final election substantiated it) that the consensus among the electorate was 60/40 against the position Milliken had taken on six ballot issues. In spite of this, so said DeVries, through very intricate planning and constant polling, they were able to overcome this disadvantage and win a very close victory.

Having listened to so many political consultants describe their victories, I was suspect. I checked with Sid Wollner of Senator Hart's staff. I asked him what position Sandy Levin, Milliken's opponent, took on these same ballot issues. He said Levin's stand on all the issues was exactly the same as Milliken's. Obviously, under these circumstances DeVries taking credit for engineering a victory in spite of Milliken's opposition to public consensus is less impressive. Where was the electorate to go?

This aside, I felt he was one of the better speakers and did offer other valuable information. He theorizes that the techniques of the "new politics" have succeeded because the parties have failed. At various times during the conference this was expressed from the opposite viewpoint - i.e. that the success of the "new politics" has produced a near collapse of the parties. In either case

the result is the same. DeVries is of the opinion that the "new politics" is doing a great service to the public and to the candidates because it provides a better means of communication than was previously available. He sermizes that the primary party objection to the "new politics" is that it has produced a ticket splitting electorate, thus further deminishing the party function. He gave examples of ticket splitting, which he assembled by polling after the election to see why the public voted as it did.

Before getting into this DeVries study, I should point out that the definition of "new politics" was never clearly enunciated at the conference. It appears each speaker had his own idea of what the term means. The thrust of most of the analysis amounted to the view that it was a concentration on the use of media, especially television, and the use of sophisticated polling, demographic and direct mail, etc. techniques.

The post election survey mentioned above, which was conducted by DeVries, first went into how voters make up their minds about candidates. The period prior to the entry of the "new politics" found voters motivated first by party loyalty, second by group affiliations, third by the candidate, and fourth by issues. Today, possibly because

of the "new politics" or more likely, in my opinion, because of better communication with the public through television contact other than paid commercials, the pattern has shifted considerably. Now the primary factor is the candidate himself. This is subdivided into a) his ability to handle the job and b) his personality. The next most important factor is the issues. This is subdivided into a) the candidate's stands on issues and b) the candidate's and his party's ability to handle the problems (here the party still enters into the picture). Ranking third in importance today is the party. And as a fourth consideration, group affiliations, such as religion, ethnic origin and occupation.

Dr. DeVries made another interesting point, which he says is borne out in every analysis he has done. He says, the undecided votes in any given pre-election poll reflects the ticket splitters you can expect on election day. For instance, if you got a consistent polling result of 25% undecided, you could expect 25% of the persons who actually vote on election day to split tickets.

Possibly the most interesting aspect of his survey was his analysis of the relative importance of factors that influence the voters decisions. He broke this down into three categories - very important, important and not important.

Under the very important category he had rankings as follows:

1) television newscasts, 2) television documentaries and specials, 3) newspaper editorials, 4) newspaper stories, 5) television editorials, 6) television talk show, 7) television educational programs, 8) talks with families, 9) radio educational programs, 10) radio newscasts, 11) the Democratic party, and 12) contacts with candidates. Under the important category were listed: 1) talks with friends, 2) radio talk shows, 3) magazine editorials, 4) talks with political party workers, 5) talks with work associates, 6) radio editorials, 7) political brochures, 8) talks with neighbors, 9) magazine stories, 10) newspaper advertisements, 11) the Republican party, 12) television advertisements, 13) books, 14) political mailings, 15) membership in religious organizations, 16) membership in professional or business organizations, and 17) radio advertisements. Under not important he found: 1) magazine advertisements, 2) television entertainers, 3) billboards, 4) telephone campaign messages, 5) movies, 6) stage plays, and 7) phonograph records.

This analysis points out that the things that are very important are virtually all uncontrollable factors. You have to get down to the end of the very important list before

you run into a factor which can be controlled somewhat by the candidate. That is number (12) contacts with the candidates. There is nothing in the very important category which you can purchase.

When you get to the important column, it's not until you reach the fourth item that you find something the candidate or the campaign organization can control - i.e. talks with political party workers. Even here it's not something you can purchase. When you get to the seventh item in the important category, you finally run into something which can be purchased - political brochures. Surprisingly newspaper advertisements rank ahead of television advertisements. Both items can be purchased of course but, very little emphasis nowadays is put on newspaper advertisements.

The message here of course is that television is still the most important item in a campaign but, it is not the purchased time which has the greatest influence, but the television newscasts and television documentaries and specials and even television editorials, television talk shows, television educational programs that have the greatest impact on the public. Here there is communication with the public. In order to run a successful campaign you must gear

your effort to audio and visual coverage by the television and radio stations. If you rely strictly on purchased time, for one thing your campaign becomes something of a side-show, and for another you lose credibility with the public by not appearing in a natural news setting.

DeVries and all the other speakers appeared to agree on at least one aspect, that is the use of a soft-sell approach. You can't say your candidate is the "end all" and be credible. You must show he is competent to handle the job. DeVries is also in favor of constant polling. This is the approach that was used so successfully by Rockefeller in New York and Reagan in California among others. It is extremely expensive but, you can respond to shifts in voter trends by this device.

DeVries feels the campaign was won in the last five days, which, of course, is possible since the election was very close. He feels their constant polling techniques put them in a position to direct their efforts to the proper areas of public concern, during these critical closing days and thereby win by this very small margin. He stated that if he had read and followed Scammon's thesis, expressed in the "Real Majority", they would have lost. He also feels that mass mailings were very effective. He



ranks direct mail ahead of purchased TV in value.

Joe Napolitan followed the same scenario regarding the fact that the professional consultant does nothing more than provide expertise to win an election. He can't produce a winner out of a loser. However, he went on to explain how he did just that in the Burns campaign in Hawaii (which was covered in the report on the New York conference). To quote Napolitan, they were "dealing here with an old inarticulate man" and therefore had to devise techniques to counter this problem. For some reason he feels this is communication rather than manipulation. I take issue with him on this point.

He favors the "spurt technique" for buying time. In this technique they put the time buying on a curve, going on early when no one else is on. For a week at a time with a break of a couple weeks in between up until the final month when you go on every day. This creates the impression that you're never off the air. He also favors timely radio spots to fit with current news. This is agreed to by most of the professionals. By issuing or producing a spot, generally with the candidate speaking on a subject, which relates to a current event, the impression is given to the public that the candidate is involved somehow in

the event and establishes himself as a leader. If this can be done on a news spot this is fine but, they favor buying spots and feeding them to the station to assure yourself of getting on the air. They are handled as much as possible as a news interview spot would be handled. In some cases, where you have the equipment and the TV stations are close enough, this technique can be used with video tape as well as audio tape.

This ties in with the extensive use of the "beepers". In the case of purchased radio time, the message can be "beepered" to a station which may or may not use it as a news item but, will have to use it in purchased time.

The polling techniques according to Napolitan are getting much deeper into voter motivation. By discerning what voter motivation is important to a given segment of the public you can target in on that group with a specific message. He also favors the constant use of straw polls by non-professional campaign workers. These are either done by telephone or at shopping centers. He does not consider this to be hard data but, feels that the cumulative results over a long period of time show important trends.



According to a survey which was done by Napolitan the most important consideration for the general public in selecting for whom to vote is that the candidate must appear to be honest. 47% of the people polled considered this to be the prime consideration. The next most important item is that he must appear to be competent to handle the job. 16% of the people thought this was most important. The rest of the qualities of the candidate ranked far behind these two considerations.

He ended with a commercial message on behalf of all specialists working in the area of campaigns. He said that experts are becoming more and more specialized and even though they are expensive, in the long run they will save you money. I agree with him to some extent.

F. Clifton White delivered a wide ranging speech which touched lightly on all aspects of campaigning. He offered one sage bit of advise in saying that we shouldn't get too wrapped up in techniques. Sometimes we may lose sight of the "objective". He feels that we've seen TV reach its zenith. He also feels that buying a lot of TV time can be counter productive. A campaign must have balance between TV, radio, direct mailing, etc. The balance is essential to reach various segments of the voting public.

Not all people can be reached by TV nor can all be reached by radio or direct mail, etc.

He is a great believer in early planning of a campaign. However, in most cases political consultants find themselves brought into the act at the eleventh hour. He also relies heavily on early polls and continuous polling. He also is an advocate of the straw poll to detect voter trends.

He touched on his definition of the new politics which amounted basically to the elimination of the old party politics and a trend to the candidate oriented campaign. He does not discount entirely the value of a party structure, but feels that they can only be useful in organizational work. This has been true in Wisconsin for the last several years.

White mentioned that we should watch for significant shifts in voting patterns at the New York conference but, failed to elaborate on it at that time. He did offer some illumination to the subject on this occasion. He stated that if you trace back through history you can find five or six times throughout the political history of this country where great shifts in voting patterns have occurred.

He feels that we are in the midst of one of these significant shifts at this time.

He feels that people have established habits which you're not going to change through any technique that you use, so you have to cater to their habit patterns. You should plan your activities around these habit patterns and try to gain maximum free exposure by doing so. Of course, the trick to getting free exposure is to either be close to media at all times or to be able to get your material to the media while it is still news. He feels also that you have to be prepared to take advantage of current events. The public is concerned with things that are happening now. By involving yourself you show that you share their concern. This makes you a partner with the voter. There is a certain danger in this. You are not certain, on many issues, what side the public is going to support. An immediate response, of course, would not allow you to first poll the public to determine which candidate response would be received most favorably by the public.

During the group discussion period, I asked the question "If campaign reform comes, which it appears is likely because the latest polls show that 78% of the public thinks there should be reform, won't this revitalize the

old politics, since the new politics is responsible for both the increase in cost and the length of campaigns that we are experiencing now?" I didn't get a straight answer on this. The panelists were defensive. The only positive statement made was by Bob Squires. He said they will operate under any rules that are formulated. This was, in my opinion, a good answer, I'm sure any change will not produce the demise of the professional political consultant. It may very well make them more valuable, since dollars will be in shorter supply, thereby requiring more careful and wise spending.

#### THE HARD FACTS OF THE 1970 CAMPAIGN

Richard M. Scammon, the author of THE REAL MAJORITY, spoke on the subject of The Hard Facts of the 1970 Campaign. He opened by addressing himself to the question, "Who won in 1970?" He concluded both parties won and lost and felt that the 1970 election year had both stability and continuity. He based this on his observation that there was no great disaster on either side such as there was in 1964 or in 1958. However, he did feel that the Democrats came out a little bit better.

He discerned that no issue was paramount in importance

during this campaign year. He felt the Vietnam issue was neutralized by Nixon's winding down of the war. He also felt the social issue had little impact and couldn't quite understand the naivete of the Administration in trying to feed this to the public as the major issue. As an aside, he thought this could very well transfer to the Democrats as a legitimate issue in 1972 when they can ask the question, "What has the White House done about all these problems they talked about in 1970?" He failed to see that the economic issue had widespread impact. He observed no real change in the people but, merely a re-inforcing of their previous thinking - they returned to voting patterns of the past.

The obvious question is, "What did win or lose for candidates in 1970?" According to Scammon, it boiled down to the individual candidates and issues, directly effecting that candidate alone, in a given state due to the absence of a major national issue.

He commented that people do not really move to the center, as is so often said, but that the issues move and gravitate toward the center, making it appear that way. That what is considered radical or reactionary today, may tomorrow be accepted as the norm thereby occupying the center.



## MEDIA AND THE NEW POLITICS

The basic consideration in dealing with television is that you must remember that you can't fabricate the truth or realism. Your candidate comes across as he is - no better - no worse (of course, I've heard dozens of examples to the contrary from political consultants when they're explaining how they won the campaign for candidate X).

One of the major complaints against political advertising on TV is that it rarely articulates the issues. The feeling was expressed that this was not necessarily the function of political advertising but, that this was a function of the news media. This, of course, is basically how the system operates at this point but, there is no reason why TV paid commercials can't serve the same purpose.

Bob Squires stated that the people own the airwaves and therefore should be allowed to borrow it back when it is useful for the most important public purpose - i.e. in connection with elections. He feels that there should be extensive free TV time made available to candidates.

The subject of Cable TV was brought up twice during the conference. Once to illustrate the great potential it has as a campaign tool; and the other to illustrate how it would sound the death knell for political TV commercials.

In the first instance, the use of cable TV gives the potential to target in on a specific home. By knowing which home the TV would be entering or which population segment it was reaching, you could key your commercial to a select group rather than using the blanket approach, which is necessary at this point. Dr. Pool informed us that technology is available at this point through cable TV to transmit 30 or 40 channels into a given home. It's just a matter of the implimentation. Under these circumstances, he reasons, it would be financially impractical to try to cover all the stations with commercial messages. Therefore, TV would become less of a consideration for commercial use in any campaigns other than those national in scope. However, he did say that the advent of this wide selection would make a considerable number of talk shows and news shows available to candidates. This goes pretty much along with the thinking of gearing your campaign to uncontrolled or free time.

#### 'POLLING

The pollsters noted there was a great amount of shifting of position by the public from one poll to the next. Therefore, one of the most important developments, which

must come in polling if it is to remain useful, is to develop techniques to speed up the process. Right now the lag time between formulating the questions for the poll and actually getting the results in hand, is about six to eight weeks. If the voting public is shifting its position, as was the case in 1970, the polls are of little value.

There are eight key questions that you must ask when you are interpreting a political poll.

1. Who was interviewed?

To appraise the findings of a poll it is important to know who was asked what. For instance, were the people interviewed representative of all adults in the country? Only those registered to vote? Or, only those who, at the time the survey was taken, say they "intend" to vote? Just Republicans? Just Democrats? Voters in key precincts? Or, who?

2. How many people were interviewed?

No poll, however well designed, is completely free from possible sampling error. Since only a sample of the eligible respondents is interviewed, every poll result is subject to possible error. The degree of reliability that can be placed on the results depends importantly on how



many people were interviewed. Increasing the number of people interviewed tends to increase the accuracy of a poll.

3: How were the people interviewed selected?

The manner of selection is even more important than how many people were interviewed. Those interviewed in a well conducted poll are selected in accordance with probability sampling methods, whereby the mathematical probabilities selection of every eligible person can be estimated in advance. No choice is given the interviewer in determining whom he will interview. Each interviewer is given a specific assignment and a complete set of instructions for selecting respondents within that assignment. Any method of selection that allows the interviewer to choose who will or will not be interviewed could bias the poll results. Polls quoted in the news media do not always cite the sampling method used, yet this is critical in evaluating the poll.

4. How were the interviews conducted?

Polls are usually conducted by personal in the home interviews, by telephone, by self administered questionnaires, or by a combination of these. The procedure which ordinarily assures the least error is a personal interview.

With telephone interviews, of course, those people who do not have telephones are excluded. The most serious bias enters into the self administered questionnaires, such as those used in mail surveys. It is all too easy for people simply not to bother with them, thus impairing the representativeness of the sample.

5. When was the interviewing done?

A poll shows the strength of political candidates at a particular point in time. Opinions about a candidate are influenced by events and, therefore, it is essential to know exactly when the interviewing was conducted.

Occasionally a few weeks may intervene between the time interviewing is completed and the date of release. In a fast moving situation, this may make the data obsolete and even misleading.

6. How were the questions worded?

In examining the results of a poll, the exact question wording should be noted. What might on the surface appear to be insignificant differences in question wording can produce substantial differences in results between two polls. For example, if a candidate's party affiliation is included in one wording of a preference question and not in another, this can make a big difference

in the results. Some people choose a candidate on the basis of party alone.

7. Who conducted the poll?

Knowing the name of the organization which conducted the poll is no guarantee that everything was handled properly. However, it is of some value if you recognize the organization as one with a sound reputation.

8. Were any special analytical or statistical procedures used?

The report of poll finding should specify any special procedures that were used. For example, how was the undecided vote handled - split evenly among the candidates, omitted entirely, weighted according to the views of those with an opinion, or what? If any data are reported on only part of the sample this should be specified and the number of people in that segment should be reported. A technique that may be used in political research is a panel survey in which the same persons are interviewed at several points in time. This is very useful for observing exactly where opinion change is taking place. However, it is important to know if a panel was used. While the panel technique reduces sampling error between surveys, it may sensitize respondents to candidates and issues to a greater

extent than is true of the public at large.

I asked the question: "Should there be any control over political polls?" The people that were directly involved in polling flatly said, "no", not for professional polls, but they thought newspaper polls should be outlawed. They felt strongly about this because the methods used in newspaper polling are generally unscientific and also the methods and the sample and a variety of other factors are not told at the time the results are published. Even if the technique and the size of the sample is revealed to the public, the public is generally not aware of the difference between a professional poll and a straw poll. I suggested that it would not be a bad idea to ban the publication of all poll results including the professional ones. I based this on the same argument that unscientific polls could be misleading and that in the case of scientific polls the candidates release the polls only when they feel it is to their advantage to do so. So the poll becomes not communication with the public but, an attempt to move him in one direction or another by the publication of the results. The pollsters did not argue.

JAMES M. PERRY, POLITICAL REPORTER, THE NATIONAL OBSERVER,  
and AUTHOR OF "THE NEW POLITICS"

James Perry coined the phrase "New Politics". He was

one of the speakers at the Saturday night dinner. He was humorous in a caustic way but, really didn't say anything.

DAVID BRODER, POLITICAL REPORTER and COLUMIST, WASHINGTON POST

In the afternoon session, the question was asked by one of the university professors, "If Adolf Hitler ran for office on an anti-semetic platform, because the polls showed it as the gut issue, could he find a consulting firm willing to represent him?" This question was deferred by the panelists to be answered by David Broder or James Perry at the dinner session, since their speeches were billed as "Communication Versus Manipulation - Ethics in the New Politics." Perry did not address himself to this subject. However, Broder did and answered in the affirmative. I think this is an accurate statement. Political consultants are professional and shouldn't be required to sit in moral judgment of their clients - although some profess to do so.

Broder addressed himself to the problems of the "New Politics" in presenting a balanced picture to the electorate. He cited a number of examples of the abuse of the techniques of the "New Politics". However, he closed with the happy conclusion that all this didn't make much differ-



ence because the voters had shown considerable ability to distinguish between the quality of the candidates in spite of the images presented to them by the techniques of the "New Politics". He went on to cite examples of, so called, "Dirty Politics" charges of the past dating back to periods in the 19th Century. On this basis he said there was really nothing new in shabby campaigning. Therefore, we just simply should not be too concerned about it.

I asked him after the dinner whether what he was telling us was that, since politics, throughout history, had been tainted, that we should make no attempt at this time or be concerned about what happens during this time regarding our political methods and techniques. He said this wasn't the point he was making. He is concerned about the trends in politics. But, he is apparently not a strong advocate of stringent reform measures. He indicated he feels the problems will work themselves out. The only area in which he advocated the focusing of reform attention is that of campaign financing, which he said was completely out of hand. This, of course, is the key, in my opinion, to all other reform. Perhaps on this basis the problems will then "work themselves out."

WHERE WILL THE NEW POLITICS TAKE US IN 1972?  
ITHIEL deSOLA POOL, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,  
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY.

Dr. Pool was not at the sessions which preceeded the final session of the conference. Therefore, he was unaware of all the defenses offered by the professional political consultants to the charge that they were merely "image makers". He noted in his opening remarks that the TV blitz had a striking ability to mold a candidate's image over night. However, he thought this would change. He looked on 1970 as the peak of the, so called, TV blitz technique. His reasoning was based partly on the fact that there was a certainty that Congress would impose some kind of spending limit on campaigns and also, as I mentioned in the opening of this report, the fact that cable TV would have a profound impact in this area.

He thinks the most valuable tool of a campaign is good scientific polling. He doesn't worry about diabolical manipulative use of polls. Good polling is expensive and from his observation campaigns are, therefore, relying too much on primitive, almost medieval, polling techniques which are substantially unreliable. They often do more harm to the candidate's cause, if he relies on them, than if the poll had not been taken at all. He thought the next

step in the evolution of polling would combine the use of computers in determining not what the public opinions were at the moment the poll was taken but, rather they would be capable of predicting what public opinion would be at future times. He said, to this point, the computer has merely been employed to perform substantially mundane tasks. It would be much more valuable in the future, as those who work with them become more enterprising and develop it to its full potential.

He had some consoling words for the professional campaign consultants, sympathizing with the precarious path they were forced to walk. Basically his message was the same as I've outlined previously: they have two tasks which are almost diametrically opposed to each other. The first is to convince clients and potential clients that they have great, almost mystical, powers to offer for the election of a candidate. At the same time they must convince the public that these powers really don't exist; that they merely aid in the projection of the hidden, true image of the candidate.

He also agrees that the parties have declined in importance. He pointed to the fact that there has been a near total disintegration of the ward boss system. He offered



some soothing ointment for whatever wounds may have been inflicted within the ranks of the political consultants in the aftermath of the '70 campaigns, by offering the opinion that they are important and will become more important in the future as technology further complicates the political scene.

He looks on the "New Politics" as a means of emphasizing the issues in a campaign. He basks this on the fact that the "New Politics" have produced a decline in the strength of political machines, thereby forcing the candidate to rely on his individual efforts and qualities to put himself across to the public. I didn't quite follow his reasoning process. What really has happened is that although it's true the political machines have virtually disappeared but, to a great extent they have been replaced by the professional political consultant who in effect performs the same function, even more efficiently. The candidate, if he so chooses, does not have to rely on individual efforts and qualities.

He closed with the observation that the effects of the so called "New Politics" are not really evident at this time. Then added, that it is quite possible that what everyone believes now to be the impact of the "New Politics" will

become a reality at some future time.

ROBERT E. LANE, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE  
ASSOCIATION

Dr. Lane delivered a rather rambling discussion in a style which was very difficult to follow. The main thrust of his speech, as I perceived it, is that sometime in the near future the alienated groups of our society, i.e. those who reject society's standards, values and conventions and those whom society has rejected, will become a powerful factor in American politics. He includes in this group the intellectuals, the youth, the blacks, working men who observe a large body of people receiving free the things they have to struggle for. (It's difficult to imagine these groups with diverse and conflicting interests forming a political coalition.)

This group, he stated, is not greatly influenced by the impact of mass media. They feel skeptical of TV advertising of all types, since, in their view it distorts and makes phoney claims. They've developed a hard shell of cynicism. Therefore, some other method would have to be devised to reach them.

Dr. Lane anticipates that we can look forward to more protest in our society rather than a decline as has been

predicted by some. The history of protests, such as marching in the streets, picketing and other collective actions, have proven that disquieting technique pays off.

SAMUEL ARCHIBALD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF FAIR CAMPAIGN PRACTICES COMMITTEE

Mr. Archibald appeared as moderator for the "Campaign Handler and the New Politics" section of the conference. He gratuitously offered his views on the level of ethics in the last campaign. He stated that 1970 could be called "the year that taught people to play dirty politics and lose." He quoted from political writings of the past, which complained of the scurrilous campaign tactics employed in those times and suggested that nothing has really changed. Although he did observe that 1970 produced a bumper crop of unethical practices complaints. He added that there are a number of unfair practices which never see the light of day because both sides employ somewhat the same tactics and are therefore reticent about making a complaint. To further elaborate his theory, that dirty politics lose, he noted that seven of the eight Senators who were attacked in full page ads purchased by a right wing organization, won their elections handily. In some cases those being attacked felt the ads actually produced an effect beneficial

to their cause.

#### SELECTED NOTABLE TELEVISION SPOTS AND CAMPAIGN FILMS

The most entertaining and possibly instructional part of the conference was the viewing of a sizeable number of television spots dating back to 1952 when the first spots appeared. The contrast between these early offerings and those which are produced today was quite startling. However, in viewing the early spots, which were substantially comprised of the candidate merely sitting before a camera talking to the electorate, and the sophisticated image building techniques of today, I got the impression that the ancient ones weren't all that bad. They attempted, in a dull uninteresting manner, to bring the issues to the public. The majority of the "New Politics", which are beautiful and very effective, concentrate on projecting an image of a warm, regular guy - discussion of issues is incidental or completely ignored. The most overworked scene in current commercials is of the shirt-sleeved candidate, collar open, coat casually slung over his shoulder. Possibly what's needed is an updating of the early commercial techniques, where issues are discussed but, brought to the electorate in a more visually pleasing and entertaining manner. If the theory is correct, that the public is becoming more and more issue oriented, shirt-sleeves may be out in '72.