

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
WASHINGTON

IG 291.2-Arizona

9 August 1943.

SUBJECT: Report of inquiry regarding the Japanese situation in the State of Arizona.

TO: The Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. Under authority of the President and by direction of the Secretary of War, Major General Virgil L. Peterson, The Inspector General, made an inquiry respecting the Japanese situation in the State of Arizona at San Francisco, California, and Phoenix, Tucson, Yuma, Rivers and Florence, Arizona, during the period 16 to 29 July 1943. The following report is submitted.
2. The inquiry was directed essentially with a view to ascertaining the nature of the views held by the citizenry causing a disturbing anti-Japanese situation; estimating the present danger of violence against the Japanese in Arizona that probably would result in retaliation by ill treatment of American soldiers held as prisoners by the Japanese; to counselling moderation in the handling of the local Japanese problem; and to furnishing assurance of authoritative and active Federal concern over the possible effect of the disturbance.
3. Preliminary to the inquiry, a study was made of the various protests and representations made to the President and War Department officials by the Governor and citizens of Arizona, calling attention to the acute situation in that state resulting from the persistent agitation therein of the Japanese question based upon an anticipated influx of Japanese settlers released from war relocation camps. Conferences were held with General Staff and other War Department authorities and with United States Senator Carl Hayden and Representative Richard F. Harless of the Arizona Congressional delegation, and with Mr. Dillon S. Myer, National Director of the War Relocation Authority. En route to Arizona, Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army at San Francisco was visited where conferences were held with Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt and the two members of his staff who, at his direction, recently completed an investigation of the Japanese situation in Arizona. At this headquarters, maps, information bearing upon the military considerations involved and pertinent official documents were obtained for complete familiarity with the conditions contributing to the situation.



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4. This preliminary study of the subject, substantiated by the information obtained from the above authoritative sources, clearly disclosed that the controversy creating a Japanese problem in Arizona is centered mainly in the area of two counties, namely: Maricopa and Pinal, in which are located the rich irrigated vegetable and melon producing lands of the Salt River and Gila River Valleys. Phoenix, which is figuratively at the heart of those districts, is the sounding board reflecting the voice of the transportation, political, financial and economic interests of that district. Other irrigated sections of the state, including those distributed along the Colorado River border of California and in the vicinity of Yuma, lend sympathetic support to the anti-Japanese agitation in the Phoenix area but are not actively involved for the reason that they are within the Japanese prohibited area established by the War Department exclusion boundary.

5. In conducting my survey of conditions fostering a Japanese situation in Arizona, visits were made to Phoenix, Tucson, Yuma, Florence and Rivers, where I discussed the matter with many of Arizona's leading citizens, including public officials, the press, business and professional men, and producers. I also conferred with state representatives and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Naval and Military Intelligence, and with local law enforcement officers. Upon information from these sources, a definite conviction was inescapable that Arizonians within the affected area are unreservedly opposed to permitting the Japanese to extend their foothold in the Salt River Valley or to gain a start in settlement upon the land of other irrigated projects of the state. There is no divided opinion among these people regarding the undesirability of having Japanese, and particularly those from California and other states, settle within the borders of Arizona. With one accord they say, "We do not want the Japanese, foreign or native-born." This sentiment varies in intensity only. The unanimity of this openly expressed animosity guided me in just as frankly announcing the purpose of my visit in press interviews and personal press releases and in emphatically cautioning against aggressive acts and immoderate views upon the Japanese situation, urging reflection upon the military exigencies involved and the Administration's concern from the standpoint of American soldiers and citizens in the hands of the Japanese. Clippings of press items appearing as a result of my visit are included in the exhibits to this report.

6. A special effort was made to assemble from all the various interested and credible sources complete information that would accurately depict the underlying issues creating a critical situation over

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the Japanese question at this particular time. Analysis of the views heard upon this subject (disregarding the theories and arguments advanced to justify the anti-Japanese sentiment), I reached the conclusion that the present situation is founded upon the following basic considerations, variously entertained among groups or individuals consulted:

- a. A long existing animosity toward Japanese settlers dating back ten years or more, and opposition to their intrusion upon the rich irrigated truck farms of Arizona, probably an echo of the California experiences culminating in the Japanese exclusion law;
- b. Intensification of public sentiment antagonistic to Japanese, in general, because of the war and Japan's war methods;
- c. Apprehension of an overrunning Japanese colonization to result from introduction into Arizona of large numbers of evacuees from other states, as residents of War Relocation camps, suggestive of Arizona's inheriting, by infiltration from those camps, the undesirables of California and elsewhere;
- d. Resentment of the War Relocation Authority's policy allowing full discretion to camp authorities to release evacuees and demand for the imposition of a condition to such releases restricting evacuees from relocating in Arizona during the period of Federal relocation control;
- e. Discontent resulting from the War Department action in moving southward, from its original location, the boundary of the military prohibitive zone in Arizona, having the effect of exposing to Japanese entry the major portion of the Salt River and Gila River irrigated land projects;
- f. Public resentment of what is regarded as the excessively liberal policy of the War Relocation Authority in rationing the Japanese within relocation camps on a basis superior to the rationing privileges of the American citizenry under wartime food control regulations; failure of relocation camp authorities to control the passage of

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large numbers of evacuees in and out of relocation camps -- affording them the freedom of cities and towns and opportunity to deplete the stocks of scarce merchandise to the detriment of local residents.

7. In subsequent paragraphs are presented some of the more commonly entertained views on the Arizona Japanese problem derived from discussions with what I consider to have been a representative cross-section of citizens qualified to speak with knowledge and judgment upon the existing situation. In relating the substance of these views, it is mentioned that there is no intention of attaching thereto any supporting opinion or factual substantiation justifying Arizona's Japanese exclusion sentiment, it being fully recognized that the merits of the exclusion issue are not of appropriate War Department concern. It was ascertained, upon information furnished by the Governor and others, that as recently as three or four months ago the agitation in opposition to the presence of Japanese settlers, particularly in the Salt River Valley, rose to such a pitch that a near crisis was created with every appearance of probable culmination in forcible measures to evict from their holdings even the present comparatively few Japanese producers located within that project. The evident possibilities of the situation at that time were such as to influence the Governor in giving his official attention thereto by the issuance of a public statement to the press assuring the citizens in the affected area that he and the state Congressional delegation were giving the matter their earnest consideration and were in discussion thereof with the President, the War Department and other interested Governmental departments and that they could be very hopeful of favorable action as a result of their efforts. He counselled calm and considerate action and warned the citizens against any hostile or ill-advised action.

Long-standing opposition to Japanese settlement in Arizona.

8. The animosity of the Arizonians toward the Japanese is not of recent origin or a result of the present war with Japan, but is a sentiment of long standing. In the year 1933 or 1934 the residents of Arizona living in the Salt River Valley undertook direct action methods to eject Japanese settlers and organized themselves into roaming bands that blew up the homes of the Japanese, destroyed irrigation constructions and flooded the lands of the ranches and farms owned by American employers of Japanese labor. In its bearing upon the possibility of acts of violence arising out of the present state of affairs in the critical area of the Salt River and Gila River Valleys, that uprising occurring some ten years ago is mentioned as illustrative of the intensity of public sentiment

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antagonistic to the Japanese and of the extent to which direct action against them may be carried. One prominent and wealthy citizen of Arizona related to me that, at the time of that incident, he employed a good many Japanese on his lands in Arizona, New Mexico and Colorado. Upon learning that anti-Japanese marauders had burned, or otherwise destroyed, his Japanese tenant houses, flooded his crops and inflicted serious damage upon his irrigation installations, he chartered a plane in Colorado for hurried transportation to Arizona and was successful in arranging a conference with the perpetrators of the depredations. At a point in the outlying country to which he was conducted, he was confronted with a group, stated by him to have been some 3,000 strong, not any of whom were known to him. He stated that the aspects of the situation were such that he receded from his original intention of trying to influence them, and instead, immediately discontinued the employment of any Japanese labor in Arizona and that he has, since that time, adhered strictly to that policy, notwithstanding that he still employs Japanese labor in other states.

Intensification of animosity towards Japanese since the war with Japan.

9. The population of Arizona of about 500,000 persons, aside from Mexicans, is relatively free of foreign elements. Throughout the state patriotic sentiment in the form of outspoken Americanism runs high and much pride is taken in the fact that the state has one of the largest percentages of its population in the service of the Army and Navy. The residents are predominantly of the rugged, pioneering type, who are inclined to resort to self-enforcement of counter measures where their welfare and independent interests are involved. This characteristic makes them especially susceptible to the agitation of public questions on the basis of patriotic consideration, a circumstance giving a patriotic impulse to political agitation of the exclusion issue and furnishing the leaders of the vegetable producing and marketing interests a convenient disguise to their agitation for the elimination of Japanese competition. Political aspirants and this growers' competitive group have supported a fairly continuous anti-Japanese propaganda and the present fervor of anti-Japanese war sentiment has permitted them to stress the undesirability of Japanese in Arizona upon representations of the danger of their presence to the many installations within the state of critical military value. Notwithstanding that there is little evidence of intent upon sabotage, or of intrusion upon military installations, by Japanese in Arizona and no very great opportunity for material accomplishment of that nature, it is unquestioned that agitators' exaggeration of war dangers

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has had a noticeable influence in activating anti-Japanese sentiment in the south-central portion of the state increasing the possibility of overt acts of hostility upon supposed patriotic motives.

Effect upon the Arizona problem of the relocation camps established in that state for Japanese evacuees from other states.

10. As a result of the continuing animosity towards Japanese settlers on the part of the American citizenry, and the direct action methods that they have employed on several occasions in recent years to exclude Japanese from the irrigated valleys, the number of the Japanese settlers in Arizona has been materially reduced in the past ten years. From the best statistical data obtainable, including the Federal census figures for the years 1930 and 1940, it appears that the number of Japanese in Arizona, between those years, decreased from 1200 to approximately one-half that number and that recent decreases by evacuation to WRA camps have brought the present figure down to an estimated 300 Japanese who are independently established outside the relocation centers. This estimated 300 is, however, a fluctuating figure due to the fact that there is some migration in and out of the Salt River Valley as the present antagonistic agitation influences certain ones to depart, while others, supposedly from among those who have been released from WRA camps, arrive to replace them. The consensus of opinion of persons interviewed, especially among those holding a more conservative opinion, because of no direct effect upon them commercially or politically by Japanese residents, was to the effect that there was little cause for anticipation of trouble on account of the present number of Japanese in Arizona outside relocation camps, but that there was a general apprehension of, and violent opposition to, any increase of that number through infiltration of Japanese evacuated from other states. Hence, the camps of Arizona are looked upon as visible sources from which infiltration is a possibility and the masses of Japanese congregated in the camps are an irritation, apparently symbolical of what is to be expected from the feared migration upon Arizona's limited resources. I was informed that, comparatively recently, a near approach to a demonstration of anti-Japanese violence was witnessed when a packing shed belonging to Chet Johns, a prominent produce marketer of Salt River Valley, was mysteriously destroyed by fire. A fervor of excitement, pointing to possible citizens' reprisal upon Japanese, was engendered when, within twenty-four hours later, a large cold storage warehouse, a partnership property of Johns and Cecil Miller, was also destroyed by fire. Rumors were circulated of three Japanese having been seen fleeing from the premises of this second fire. These rumors

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were not only discredited by subsequent F.B.I., M.I.S., O.N.I., and sheriff's investigations, but were effectively controverted by evidence indicating that the fires resulted from other causes. It was told to me, however, that, at this time, had Mr. Johns given his nod of acquiescence, or had an aggressive leader taken up the movement, a serious incident of violence would have ensued. The suggestion of some such spark inflaming the smoldering inclination toward violence is apparent. This trend toward direct action at this time develops from an undercurrent of opinion favoring positive action in advance that may forestall a possible more difficult preventive problem later on when the wartime control of Japanese is removed and a broad Japanese resettlement movement will occur with the opportunities of Arizona forming a leading attraction to them.

11. The temper of the people, who regard the establishment of these camps in Arizona as a possible outlet upon that state for evacuees from other Coast states, may be judged from the disposition of the last Arizona legislature in passing, practically as a steam-roller measure, House Bill No. 187 which (while not assuming to describe it as a bill of attainder) would have the effect of making it most difficult to have any business relations with restricted persons, i.e., persons of Japanese ancestry. The act was approved by the Governor but, upon its being promptly contested at law, was declared by the court of original jurisdiction to be unconstitutional. The intent behind it persists, however, as a State's appeal from that decision has been taken.

Effect upon the Arizona situation resulting from the WRA policy giving camp supervisors discretionary authority to release evacuees.

12. The enlargement upon Arizona's concern over the Japanese question, contributed by the WRA camps in the state, results from what is voiced as a disillusionment regarding the operation of those camps. It appears that it was generally supposed that the camps were to be conducted very much in the manner of internment camps involving the confinement of the evacuees for the duration. Their interim release with the privilege of re-establishing themselves outside the restricted zones from which evacuated was not a recognized possibility. Under the regulations governing the maintenance of relocation camps, the directors thereof are permitted, following such inquiry as they deem appropriate, to determine which evacuees are loyal as a basis for permitting such individuals to leave the relocation camps on indefinite leave whenever they can find suitable and desirable employment outside the prohibited zones. As a result of this policy, many

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evacuees were released from the relocation camps in Arizona and elsewhere for the purpose of establishing themselves in Arizona. It is the common view that opportunities within the state are insufficient to absorb any great number of Japanese without supplanting Americans and the citizenry particularly objected to any influx of Japanese from California or other restricted states. Arizonians are especially fearful of the state's becoming flooded with California Japanese because of the restrictions against their relocation in that state or other parts of the Pacific Coast where truck gardening is profitable. In this connection, they attach special significance to the fact that the State of California has under consideration amendments to its constitution, as well as legislation, directed to the exclusion of all Japanese from that state upon termination of the present emergency. Because of the fear that the relocation camps within the state would promote a large influx of Japanese from among those formerly residing in California, the Governor, members of the Congressional delegation and other citizens petitioned the WRA, the President and the War Department to take the matter in hand and afford protection to Arizona against this prospect. As a result of these protests, Honorable Dillon S. Myer, National Director, War Relocation Authority, under date of 2 June 1943, wrote United States Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona that the WRA had withdrawn from its intention to carry out a relocation program in Arizona and that releases for direct relocation in that state would be discontinued. Publication of that letter has not been made and general knowledge of the modification of the WRA policy in that regard is lacking, although faint notice was taken by one newspaper of a repetition of the announcement made recently by Mr. Myer in a public address at Denver. A probable reason for inattention to the dissemination of this purported assurance is observed from the fact that Mr. Myer's letter proceeded to point out its own lack of effectiveness by mentioning that the 20,000 or more Japanese in the United States not under control of the WRA were free to migrate to Arizona and, further, that evacuees, once released for relocation elsewhere than in Arizona were, thereafter, beyond WRA control and were free to make their own determination and to, later, select Arizona as their place of relocation.

13. In view of the qualified, and therefore indefinite, assurance of the restriction upon the relocation of Japanese in the disturbed area of Arizona, given by Mr. Myer's letter, above referred to, and another letter between the same parties substantially to the same effect dated 14 June 1943, I was impressed by the statement made to me by Mr. Lin B. Orme, President of the Salt River Valley Water Users' Association, to the effect that if authoritative written

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assurance could be obtained by him, or should it be given in that form to the Governor, that definite Federal control would be exercised to prevent the resettlement of Japanese evacuees in the irrigated truck farming districts of Arizona, he would exert his every influence to allay further public apprehension upon the present Japanese situation and would take the lead toward counteracting the prospect of any untoward incident through direct action measures to exclude Japanese from the community. The association, of which Mr. Orme is the head, is a facility serving water for irrigation purposes to 14,000 consumers of the Salt River Valley project. He probably may be regarded as the leader and spokesman of the producer element of that section. His is, at least, a representative voice in their behalf. However, it was my impression that the proposal expressed by him was, in a manner, joined in by many others who indicated that a cessation of infiltration into the irrigated districts by Japanese evacuated from other states would allay one of the most immediate causes aggravating the present Japanese situation. It is the fact that the tensivity of the situation has, of late, considerably abated. It is most probable that this is the direct result of the modified WRA policy restricting the release of evacuees for immediate relocation in Arizona which may be referred to as tangible evidence that any affirmative measure directed to the control of infiltration into Arizona from among the evacuees will have a suppressive effect by eliminating a main ground for agitation of the question.

Discontent resulting from the action in moving southward the military prohibitive boundary.

14. As late as January 1943, because of labor shortage, much of the long staple cotton grown in Arizona remained in the fields. This cotton was of very high quality and especially useful for certain war purposes so that the War Department was particularly anxious to have this cotton conserved. To attain such end, arrangements were made to work volunteers from the relocation camp at Rivers, Arizona, under military guard. On or about the 20th day of January 1943, there was addressed to Honorable John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, a joint letter signed by the entire Congressional delegation from Arizona, requesting the relocation of the exclusion lines in the State of Arizona in order to permit Japanese evacuees from the relocation camps in Arizona to work in the cotton fields of Arizona without military guard. Before this request was acted upon, it had become apparent that the Japanese did not like the work of picking cotton. Only a very limited number volunteered and at no time during the experiment did the number engaged in this work exceed 300. Because of the unsatisfactory character of their services and the limited number who volunteered, the idea was abandoned and the evacuees were all

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returned to the relocation camps. Following this action, however, and on the 2nd day of March 1943, by Public Proclamation No. 16, Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, the exclusion line in Arizona was moved southward so as to exclude from the restricted zone substantially all of the cotton lands of Arizona. It was a circumstance, however, that this relocation, to embrace the cotton area, carried with it the removal from the Arizona prohibited zone the major portion of the Salt River Valley irrigation project and the entire Gila River project which had theretofore been excluded from Japanese entry. Following this change of the exclusion line and on or about the 28th day of March 1943, the relocation camps in Arizona and elsewhere began to release evacuees in large numbers for resettlement in places outside the prohibited areas. The inauguration of this program of the WRA at once had the effect of furnishing a new cause of incitement to aggravate the Japanese problem of that state. It was regarded by the public officials, political groups and producers as giving imminency to the threat of Japanese colonization of those districts and created a fear that Arizona would become a dumping ground for thousands of California Japanese. Between the 20th day of March 1943 and the 10th day of June 1943, 552 evacuees were released from the Gila Camp at Rivers, Arizona, on indefinite leave for resettlement in Arizona and elsewhere. This was at a rate averaging about 50 per week from that one camp. What was said to have been a noticeable increase in the Japanese population of the Salt River and Gila River Valleys, resulting from that event, had an aggravating effect upon the Arizona Japanese problem and, unquestionably precipitated the tense situation of present War Department concern.

15. It would appear to be highly inconsistent on the part of public officials of Arizona who acceded to the proposal for the movement of the prohibitive line, and took affirmative steps to secure its removal, to now reverse their former position and be in open advocacy of the restoration of that line to its former location (even advocating its re-establishment still farther north, practically midway of the north and south boundaries of the state). The apparent inconsistency in their position in this respect is defended by them, however, upon the ground that the subsequently disclosed policy of the WRA in permitting evacuees to relocate themselves outside their former states constitutes an extenuating consideration justifying their revised position with respect to this matter. Since the exclusive purpose in establishing the prohibited zone is to provide protection for installations within the state of military importance, and against interior hostilities in general, it would ordinarily be a pure matter of expediency to give consideration to the location of

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the exclusion line for the express purpose of satisfying a citizenship problem engendered by racial antagonism. Consideration of that question, however, under the Arizona situation is not entirely a matter of non-military expediency for the reason that continued dissatisfaction of the citizenry over a non-solution of their Japanese problem is almost certain to appear to them as just cause for self-solution by direct action measures against the Japanese. An aspect of military expediency would then be given to the question of moving the prohibitive line as a measure to avert violence that would certainly result in retaliation upon American citizens and soldiers held as hostages by the Japanese. It is mentioned, therefore, that while there is no present evidence of necessity for the restoration of the exclusion line for the protection of vital installations, consideration of that question might well remain an open subject for final decision according to future developments as they may be observed in the light of necessity or advisability. In my interview with Governor Sidney P. Osborn, he made the statement that there was no greater and, in his opinion, not even as great a military necessity for placing the whole of California within the prohibited military zone, as there was for changing the boundary so as to place all of the southern half of Arizona within such prohibited zone so as to include therein the aviation fields and other military installations, the irrigation dams and projects and the whole of the Salt River Valley. He contends that the segregation of from 30,000 to 35,000 Japanese in the two relocation camps in close proximity to strategic installations created a danger from sabotage, and was practically an invitation to sabotage, because of the freedom with which the evacuees were permitted to come and go in and out of said relocation camps.

Federal control upon the release of evacuees by positive measures to prohibit their relocation in Arizona.

16. As an alternative to a solution of the Arizona situation by reestablishment of the exclusion line to its former location, and in view of the possibility of that question being disposed of through effective alternative measures to prevent the settlement of Japanese evacuees in Arizona, it is suggested that one possible measure to effect this control may be available to the War Relocation Authority through the simple expedient of appending as a condition to the release of evacuees a prohibition to resettlement in Arizona for the period of Federal control under the relocation program -- this condition to apply as a restriction against their being released ostensibly for settlement elsewhere and then, having been released, turning about to locate in Arizona.

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17. While the truck gardeners may have the greatest financial interest in excluding the Japanese from the Salt River Valley, they nevertheless maintain that their interest is not limited to fear of lower prices through competition. They emphasize that the Japanese cannot be assimilated and remain as an alien element of the community, stressing that the Japanese permanently and unfailingly segregate themselves in the community and confine themselves exclusively to their interests as a class, separate and distinct.

18. While the politicians may also be using the antipathy of the Arizonians for the Japanese to further political ends, it would not be entirely appropriate to say that this is a controversial political issue because all of the political groups are unqualifiedly opposed to the Japanese settling within Arizona -- the differences, if any, being only in the intensity with which it is played upon. Also, it is mentioned that the antagonism towards Japanese settling in Arizona is not limited to political interests or to persons who would be financially affected. While some of the prominent citizens suggested that the elimination of about 20 to 25 leaders and agitators would, in their opinion, practically eliminate the Japanese problem, it is believed by the undersigned that the hostility toward the Japanese is deeper rooted than that and that a suppression of the present leaders in the agitation would only result in the appearance of additional and different ones. It has also been suggested that the problem might solve itself upon the recent discontinuance of releasing Japanese for relocation in the State of Arizona. However, there is at present no restriction on the movement to Arizona of Japanese released for relocation in other states and the fears of Arizonians that such Japanese will seek to settle in the Salt River Valley where the agricultural conditions are similar to those pertaining on their former lands on the West Coast appear to be well founded.

19. In interviewing the various categories of citizens, heretofore mentioned, I particularly emphasized the great concern of the War Department for the welfare and safety of American prisoners in the hands of the Japanese and the danger of retaliatory measures against such American prisoners if the citizens of Arizona resorted to violence and bloodshed in dealing with the Japanese situation in their state. Practically all of those interviewed promised to take an active part in counselling against any resort to force in dealing with the Japanese situation. I am convinced that these persons have a better understanding of, and a more sympathetic interest towards,

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the problems faced by the War Department as a result of these interviews and that actual progress was made towards averting, at least for the time being, action which would prejudice the safety of American prisoners. However, it is also believed that there is a limit to the effect of any such moderating influences in the event that any large numbers of Japanese should be permitted to move into Arizona.

20. I have appended hereto, as exhibits, clippings from various newspaper articles and editorials, the publication of which was a direct result of my efforts to secure desirable newspaper assistance in disseminating information concerning my visit and of the Administration's active interest in promoting a solution of the present problem. The items selected are from among those appearing only during, and since, my visit. To the extent that public sentiment may be influenced by this publicity, it would appear that some substantial effect has been attained toward allaying the imminency of what is regarded as an actually existing latent danger of violence. Supplementing the reference to these newspaper items, it is believed that particular significance may be attached to the following quotation from a letter received by me from the President of the leading bank of Arizona under the Phoenix date line of 27 July 1943:

"Since I did not get to see you before you left Arizona, I take this means of telling you that your visit here, your interviews with the newspapers and many of our leading citizens, has done more to solve the so-called Japanese problem than anything that has so far occurred.

"The articles that have appeared in our local papers, with certain assurances that you are quite aware of the problem existing here, and your wise counsel to our citizens to consider this problem with temperance and forbearance, have poured oil upon the trouble waters. This appraisal of your work is based upon many comments I have heard during and after your visit."

To similar effect, Major James S. Hughes, MI, who cooperated with me in arranging interviews, wrote under date of 4 August 1943 regarding the mission I left in his hands for interviewing Mr. Ernest Douglas, Editor, Arizona Farmer, as follows:

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"Mr. Douglas returned to Phoenix today and conversation with him reflects that he has been made cognizant of your visit and believes that the situation here is much more quiet than ever before. He has also received assurance, unofficially, from the WRA that no more Japanese will be relocated in Arizona, and that it is possible both Poston and Rivers may be closed as a result of the current WRA segregation policy. I am sure that he will do his utmost to prevent any rise of public feeling against the Japanese. He emphasized particularly, however, that the people of Arizona are unalterably opposed to large groups of Japanese settling in the State."

CONCLUSIONS:

21. It is concluded upon the basis of the information gathered during the course of this inquiry:

- a. That citizenship opposition to the settling of Japanese in Arizona and, particularly, in the Salt River Valley of that state, has existed for a number of years and, in 1933 or 1934, the prevailing animosity toward them resulted in outbreaks of violence and the loss of life and destruction of property of the Japanese; that this animosity has been intensified by the present war.
- b. That antagonism toward the Japanese is not limited to truck gardeners, who have the greatest financial interest in excluding the Japanese, or to the political interests but is participated in by the citizens of Arizona, generally.
- c. That the citizens of Arizona are sincerely apprehensive lest a large number of Japanese released from relocation camps settle permanently in the Salt River Valley as a consequence of the present restriction upon their returning to their former truck garden farms on the West Coast and they regard these Japanese as socially undesirable, of doubtful loyalty and as a threat to their American standard of living.
- d. That as a result of interviews conducted by the undersigned and the newspaper publicity given to this inquiry, in which the concern of the War Department for the welfare and safety of American prisoners held in Japanese prison camps was emphasized, substantial progress was made toward abating a present trend toward citizenship action which would prejudice the safety of American prisoners.

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e. That there is no indication of imminent danger of uprisings against Japanese because of any problem presented by the present quota of Japanese now residing in Arizona outside of relocation camps. However, there is grave danger that violence, attended by probable retaliation upon American prisoners, would result from the pursuance of policies that would admit of any substantial increase in the number of Japanese settlers in Arizona.

f. That, in view of the War Department responsibility with regard to the welfare and security of American soldiers in enemy prison camps, consideration should be given to the fixation of War Department policy with respect to such alternative courses of action as may be open to the War Department and Federal Government for solution of the Japanese problem in the State of Arizona, including the following:

(1) Movement of the present war zone prohibitive boundary in Arizona to a point sufficiently north to embrace the Salt River Valley and the dams and installations connected with irrigation projects located therein, and the maintenance of such boundary until termination of the present war with Japan and six months thereafter.

(2) Retention of all Japanese evacuees in the Army relocation camps until the termination of the war with Japan and the conclusion of peace treaties to result therefrom.


(3) Continuation of the present policy of the Relocation Authority by which no future evacuees shall be released for relocation in Arizona and the adoption of a policy by which no evacuees heretofore, or hereafter, released shall be permitted to migrate to, or settle in, Arizona until after the war and the adoption of peace treaties terminating same.

(4) Continuation of present procedure in observation of the existing situation in the expectation that this Inspector General's inquiry and his public statements cautioning moderation in the interest of American prisoners; and the possibility of no further incitement of trouble as a result of the curtailment upon resettlement in Arizona through the modified WRA policy; will have the effect of sustaining a suppressive influence upon the situation, as personally observed to exist, and as indicated by the two letters quoted in paragraph 20, above.

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g. That, irrespective of which of the foregoing courses of action, or combinations of such courses, may be favored as Federal measures, the War Department should cause constant surveillance of this situation to be maintained by the Military Intelligence field agencies in Arizona to the end that the War Department may be apprised if the vigor of anti-Japanese agitation is renewed or in the event that indications of impending disorders shall develop from any cause, in order that it may be prepared to take prompt and effective action to meet any requirement that may arise to prevent violence that might cause retaliation upon American prisoners -- even to the extent of relocating the prohibitive boundary should circumstances so dictate.


VIRGIL L. PETERSON,
Major General,
The Inspector General.

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