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November 20, 1942

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Subject: Potential Number of Nisei Japanese available for Military Service.

To: Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. War Department

1. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, has requested the compilation of certain statistics to be developed from the records of this Headquarters, with regard to persons of Japanese ancestry evacuated from military areas of the West Coast. The request was directed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, this Headquarters, by confidential teletype. The request indicated that the statistics were desired for use in connection with a study in progress as to the feasibility of organizing combat units composed of American-born Japanese for employment in theaters where no Japanese enemy troops appear. The request also called for certain expressions of opinion as to the number of American-born Japanese who might be expected to volunteer for military service and for a statement of views on the methods which might best be employed in raising such a force from among evacuees and other American-born Japanese.

2. Pursuant to that request, a memorandum has been prepared at these Headquarters and is forwarded herewith. The statements of opinion in the memorandum are chiefly those of the person who gathered the statistics and do not necessarily reflect my own views.

3. The Wartime Civil Control Administration, an agency of this Command, created by my general order in March of 1942, was the agency through which the evacuation program - particularly the operation of assembly centers, protection of property, etc. - was primarily accomplished. Recently the Chief of the Statistical Division of the Wartime Civil Control Administration was in Washington on official business. At that time he had an informal interview with the Assistant Secretary of War. The Assistant Secretary of War expressed a desire for the development of statistics similar to those requested by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. By reason of that request, a copy of the enclosed memorandum is also being forwarded the Assistant Secretary of War.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority 740002
By [Signature]
Date 7/1/74

J. L. DeWitt
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

Inclosure - 1
Statistical report

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November 20, 1942

Subject: Potential number of Nisei Japanese available for Military Service

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

1. a. The Statistical Division, Wartime Civil Control Administration, has been directed to assemble data reflecting the potential number of American-born Japanese who might be available for military service. This memorandum is in response to that directive.

b. In addition to statistical data, this memorandum includes the expression of certain opinions based on observation of the evacuation program and certain policy recommendations which are predicated on these opinions. In the assembly of the statistics themselves, these opinions have not influenced the compilation of the subject statistical data.

2. How many Nisei are there?

a. The total Japanese population of the United States in 1940 was 126,947; today it is approximately 126,000. The following table summarizes the nativity and sex composition of the present Japanese population of continental United States:

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
Total Japanese population	126,000	71,000	55,000
Native-born Japanese (United States)	81,200	43,100	38,100
Foreign-born Japanese	44,800	27,900	16,900

Of this population approximately 110,500 have been evacuated from West Coast military areas and are now under the supervision of the War Relocation Authority.

b. The Nisei or native-born Japanese now constitute 65 per cent of the total, 43,100 males and 38,100 females. These are nearly all less than 35 years of age; a large proportion are children. Figure 1 shows the unusual age distribution of the foreign-born and the native-born Japanese. It should be noted that there is a missing generation of males between 25 and 50 years of age, and of females between 25 and 40. This was caused by the reduction of immigration in 1924.

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c. The following table presents a summary estimate of the native-born Japanese population 18 to 35 years of age for the United States as of April, 1942. (The estimate may be low to the extent that the decennial census of population undercounted the Japanese population.)

	Total U. S.	Evacuated Japanese	Other Japanese
Total, 18 to 35 years	21,250	18,727	2,523
18 and 19 years	4,070	3,745	325
20 to 24 years	8,940	7,649	1,291
25 to 29 years	5,430	4,774	656
30 to 34 years	2,450	2,231	219
35 years	360	328	32

There are approximately 22,330 native born Japanese males 18 to 44 years of age; 21,250 in the 18 to 35 group; and 18,440 in ages 18 to 29. In addition, there are 1,780 youths of 17 who will pass their 18th birthday by April 1, 1943.

d. A more detailed picture of the age distribution of the male native-born group is provided by Figure 2. These data are for the evacuated population only and are presented in detail in Table 1 (Tab A.) Less than the normally expected number of males are in the ages 22 to 25 years. This is probably the result of (1) selective service, (2) voluntary migration from the west-coast prior to evacuation and (3) some migration of Nisei from the United States to Japan.

e. The Relocation Center destination of 18,727 native-born, male Japanese evacuees 18 to 35 years of age is shown in Table 2 (Tab A.)

3. How many Nisei would be available for military service?

a. An accurate answer to this question will require considerable research. Chief among the questions which must be answered are:

(1) How many of the native-born Japanese feel some degree of loyalty to the Emperor of Japan because of education, Japanese military training, Shinto worship, membership in alien organizations, etc.

(2) How many are physically unfit for active military service?

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(3) How many have wives and other dependents?

✓ b. There are no statistical data on loyalty to the United States, or loyalty to Japan. The writer believes that under present circumstances at least one-third of the native-born group would be of doubtful loyalty to the United States. In this one-third would be found the Kibei (educated in Japan), the children of persons detained in Army and INS camps, and those who are embittered by the evacuation. This group is increasing because of the pro-Japanese pressures in Centers.

c. The only data immediately available as to the physical fitness of Japanese, is that compiled from records of the San Francisco Recruiting and Induction Station for the calendar year 1941. Of the 463 Japanese selectees, Class 1-A, who reported for examination, 42, or 9.1 percent, were rejected. During the same period at this station 3.6 percent of the white selectees were rejected. (See Table 5, Tab B.)

d. Twenty-one percent of the native-born Japanese who registered for evacuation were registered with a wife. Most of the group are too young to be married. (See Figure 2.) Those who were evacuated with their wives, and those without wives but with a parent 65 years old or over, are shown separately in the tables in Tab A. Probably more men were married than are shown "with wife" because some men were evacuated later than their families and some families listed daughter-in-laws as daughters.

e. Preliminary estimates. Assuming: (1) That only native-born males from 18 to 35 years of age are desired; (2) that only one-third of these are ineligible because of pro-Japanese sentiment; (3) that one-fifth have wives or other immediate dependents; and (4) that one-tenth of the remainder are unable to pass the Army physical test for combat duty:

Native-born males 18 to 35	21,250
Pro-Japanese	- 7,083
	<u>14,167</u>
Wives and other dependents	<u>2,833</u>
	11,334
Physically unsuited	<u>1,133</u>
Potential recruits	10,201

The writer believes this to be a high rather than an average or low estimate of potential recruits. Of the 10,200 potential

recruits, 9,200 should be found in Centers for evacuees.

4. Recruitment policy.

a. Any Japanese is now automatically in class 4-C in Selective Service. An order dated March 30, 1942, stopped all induction of Japanese in this area.

b. A resumption of Selective Service induction of Japanese would create numerous problems, because nine of every ten men lived in evacuated areas.

(1) Registrants were at their normal homes for the first three registrations. Many Japanese were in Assembly Centers during the fourth registration last April.

(2) A draftee could not visit his board in evacuated area without a permit and escort.

(3) Substantial numbers of single Japanese men would be called immediately by boards in this area, because these boards have exhausted registers of single men. This would raise an issue of board favoritism, create resentment among many who might be willing to volunteer.

✓ If compulsion must be used—and this writer is opposed to it—then it would be advisable to amend Selective Service regulations to the extent of providing for re-registration (or deposit of original registrations) in special boards at Centers, or in near-by communities.

✓ c. An intensive drive to get volunteers would probably produce the desired results over a period of time. Such an effort would require the direction of an army officer who is thoroughly familiar with the evacuation program, life in Assembly and Relocation Centers, and the psychology of the evacuees. Evidence has reached this office that certain Nisei would welcome an opportunity to volunteer for European service. A petition to the President of the United States requesting permission to volunteer as a unit for European operations was circulated at Manzanar and had 218 names at one time. It is not known whether this petition was forwarded to the White House. The absence of business enterprises requiring personal attention, the assurance that members of the family will be taken care of by a Federal agency, the increased compensation paid to enlisted men, plus the benefits of the Service Men's Dependents Allowance Act of 1942, the desire of young men to escape from the domination and economic control of their parents,—these are but a few of the factors which would be

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expected to further successful voluntary enlistment. The principle factor which would work against such a program would be activities of the Kibei, parolees, repatriates, and other pro-Japanese groups in bringing pressure on potential recruits and their families. Such pressure was exercised on the signers of the above-mentioned petition at Manzanar.

d. A successful campaign to secure volunteers must begin with an effort to change the attitudes of the present community toward military service. To do this the following steps are necessary:

(1) The segregation of at least the anti-American elements must be a first step for any volunteer recruiting. Not only must the Nisei be relieved from the jibes and threats of the Kibei and pro-Japanese Issei, but the prospective volunteers must be given the assurance that these groups will not run the Centers and dominate their wives, children, and parents during their absence.

(2) A definite program must be undertaken to stimulate patriotism in Centers by such steps as: Furloughs in the Centers for sons now in the army; encouragement for display of service flags; special functions for parents of men in service; exhibits and contests in schools, art classes, etc.

(3) That there will be a post-war advantage from military service not only for the individual Nisei, but also for the American Japanese as a group, must become a credo in the Center. Issei who acquired citizenship as a result of service in the last war could provide considerable leadership in this.

e. The recruiting of Japanese should be an Army function. There are relatively few Japanese now in the Navy or the Marine Corps according to our best information. On the other hand, there are organized Army units consisting entirely or largely of Japanese in the Army. A letter has been sent to the Adjutant General requesting information as to the number of Japanese in the service and their branch of service.

5. Relocation Center problems for the WRA.

a. The removal of any substantial number of young Nisei males from the Centers would seriously effect the active labor force. As indicated in Chart 1, the labor force 15 years of age and over consists of two distinct groups: (1) The old

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Issei, most of whom are between 50 and 65 years of age, and
(2) the young Nisei who are between 15 and 35 years of age.
Much of the labor force now available for employment outside
of Centers is recruited from the young Nisei.

b. The sex-age ratio of the Center would be seriously
upset, as is that of any community when large numbers of young
men are removed. The very old, the very young and the women
require a different Center program of employment, health,
recreation, etc., from that adapted to a normal population.

g. Mention has been made above of the probable domination
of the community by pro-Japanese Issei and Kibei after removal
of the Nisei if a satisfactory segregation program is not in-
stituted.

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