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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL  
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

October 5, 1942

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



*W 014 311 W.D.C.  
Reg. Migration - Japan*

Honorable John J. McCloy  
Assistant Secretary of War  
War Department  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I have dispatched this date to the Chief of Staff on the question presented by the proposal now under consideration by War Relocation Authority to release evacuees from relocation projects as rapidly as practicable.

I am sure you will agree with me in the view that sound policy requires a careful examination of the whole problem before any such course is followed. I am told by Colonel Bendetsen that you are sympathetic toward the development of a plan to determine whether an opportunity is now within reach for learning more about the Japanese as a people than is known at the present time. Further, it would be unfortunate in the highest degree if because of the turn of future events it became necessary only to gather them up again, once released.

I cannot emphasize too strongly my feeling that the War Department must actively secure the agreement of War Relocation Authority in the retention of evacuees until the military aspects of these important questions can be answered through thorough study.

It was a genuine pleasure to have seen you once again during your recent visit to the Pacific Coast. I regret only that circumstances prevented extending your stay.

With kind personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

*J. L. DeWitt*  
J. L. DeWitt  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army  
Commanding

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Inclosure

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*10-5-42*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Box 9  
Folder 7  
Item 22  
Page 2HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL  
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

October 5, 1942

SUBJECT: Retention of Japanese Evacuees in War Relocation Projects.

TO : Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

1. By the first of November this headquarters will have completed the transfer to the jurisdiction of War Relocation Authority at interior Relocation Projects of approximately 108,000 persons of Japanese ancestry evacuated by the Army from the Pacific Coastal frontier in satisfaction of impelling military necessity. Persons of Japanese ancestry within continental United States now fall into two general groups, namely (a) those under complete Federal supervision now in assembly or relocation centers referred to herein as "evacuees"; and (b) those who are at large, not under Federal supervision or control, referred to herein as "exempt".

2. The relation of all persons of Japanese ancestry within continental United States to the national war effort has not been fully determined. Consideration should now be given to the development of a sound national policy, implemented by adequate organization designed to so define this relation. This definition should insure that these groups will be integrated into the national war effort with maximum overall benefit. With the non-military aspects of this relationship the War Department is not directly concerned.

3. (a) With the removal of Japanese persons from the Pacific Coastal frontier, essentially as a counter-fifth column move, the danger of action in concert by this group along that frontier with a view to impairment of the war effort has been removed.

(b) The development and imposition of appropriate restrictions on dangerous elements among all Japanese whether of the evacuee or exempt classes has not been achieved. While under Army jurisdiction, during the assembly center phase of the evacuation, this was accomplished in part by universal close supervision of the evacuee group. Having reached the relocation phase of evacuation, the Army no longer exercises interior control over evacuees as jurisdiction is passing from the Army to the War Relocation Authority. Moreover, the problem of imposing appropriate restrictions on segments of the exempt class has never been met.

(c) With reference to the evacuee class there are two vital considerations:

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
TO Chief of Staff  
RE Retention of Japanese Evacuees in War  
Relocation Projects

October 5, 1942

(1) The separation of the more potentially dangerous elements from the remainder (see the two previous communications from this headquarters on that subject, copies inclosed); and

(2) The development of a technique and plan of operation to acquire maximum data about the Japanese as a race with a view to furthering the conduct of actual and psychological warfare against the enemy.

4. Pending the attainment of these objectives I recommend that the War Department undertake to provide for the retention of the evacuee class in relocation centers as a measure of urgent military necessity.

  
J. L. DeWITT  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army  
Commanding

2 Incls.

1. Letter dated Aug. 23, 1942 from  
J. L. DeWitt to Chief of Staff
2. Letter dated Sept. 8, 1942, from  
J. L. DeWitt to Chief of Staff

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY  
Office of the Commanding General  
Presidio of San Francisco, California .

8 September, 1942

014.31 (G-2)

SUBJECT: Separation of Kibei from Nisei.

TO: Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. With reference to my letter August 23, 1942, file 014.31 on the above subject:

2. There is attached three copies of a report of an alien resident of the War Relocation Authority (an independent civilian agency) camp at Manzanar, California, which clearly shows a dangerous trend in disloyalty among center residents there, especially the Kibei. The 12th Naval District evaluates the source as reliable and this headquarters estimates the information as reliable and credible.

3. The necessary comingling of all classes of Japanese in accomplishing their evacuation from the Pacific Coast has exposed the second generation Japanese to the danger of complete and irreconcilable alienation by the Japanese indoctrinated "Kibei". The latter, Japanese born in the United States but educated in Japan, are persistently undermining the second generation American educated Japanese, or "Nisei", who are largely American in outlook and education. One method of attack is achieved by pointing out the present comingling of all persons of Japanese ancestry on the same basis and without separation or distinction, regardless of background.

4. The recommendations contained in my letter quoted in Par.1 above are reiterated and emphasized and the early separation of "Kibei" and "Issei", or alien Japanese, from "Nisei" and the adoption of appropriate steps for the eventual repatriation of segments of the former two classes, is urgently recommended.

/s/ J. L. DeWitt

J. L. DEWITT  
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.  
Commanding

1 Inc. "Report Submitted by Non-Citizen" Block Leader #11, Member, Executive Council, 11-6-3, Manzanar, California

Sent to Dillon Myer, 10-29-42 with request that it be returned.

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311  
revised. Separation - for  
Hess  
to  
to  
Rec with  
Chief of Staff

9-8-42

Report submitted by

non-citizen

Block Leader #11          Member, Executive Council

11-6-3 Manganar, California

I am presenting this personal and confidential report because my observations during the past four months in Manzanar and the events which are taking place in this relocation center convince me that we are beginning to witness a start of a serious problem that must be faced by the administration.

To begin with, it has been a tragic mistake that urgency of evacuation and military expediency, together with consideration for family ties, had grouped two distinct sections of the Japanese population together. The government of the United States, or more particularly the Western Command, has, in the process of evacuating the Japanese, made little, if any, distinction between aliens of enemy nationality (issei) and American citizens of Japanese parentage (nisei). While these groups are racially alike, and are closely bound in family ties, their background and conditioning are as far apart as those found in any other immigrant group. Perhaps this gulf is wider among the Japanese, since the first generation have tenaciously clung to their old world ideals and have been subjected to a more intense nationalistic propaganda from their homeland than say the Chinese, Italians, Irish or other immigrant stock.

The nisei, and here I am speaking of those citizens who have resided here since their birth and have received the major part of their education in this country, are conscious of their American citizenship, their training in American school in American way of thinking, and are imbued with ideals of American institutions. Before the outbreak of the present war they had come a long way toward assimilation, politically and economically, if not socially, into the American scene. They were just arriving at a stage where they can assert independence

from the family control by the issei. We have many nisei in this relocation center whose loyalty is unquestioned, who consider themselves thoroughly Americans in everything except their physical appearance.

The average age of nisei in Manzanar is about eighteen years. The great majority of nisei are still seriously influenced by the issei. The greater majority of nisei, have not, before the outbreak of present hostilities, given this question of loyalty much thought, and being still in a formative age, are easily influenced today one way or the other depending upon the aggressiveness and vociferousness of the partisans. It is with the attitude of this great bulk of nisei population, who are fundamentally Americans, but who are confused, disillusioned, bitter and desperate, toward the evacuation, the life in a relocation center, and toward the war that this report is most concerned. As I make this report it is quite likely that my personal opinions and convictions are mixed together with observations, but please bear in mind that my opinions are based upon things I have seen and heard in Manzanar.

I am, and no doubt you are, seriously concerned with the entire program of relocation and its relationship to the pursuit of the present war effort of the United States. The two things must be considered together; that is, in the establishment of a relocation program, I for one believe that such a program should fit into the general war program. This, of course, means that not only the immediate problem of evacuating the Japanese nationals and nisei as a military measure must be completed in the shortest time, but that in the establishment of relocation centers, every effort be made to make use of earnest, loyal American citizens in these centers to contribute toward the war

effort, to educate the nisei toward better Americanism, to explain the issues of the war carefully and thoroughly to confused nisei, so that they will not, in moments of bitterness turn for consolation in a Japanese victory. Also in consideration of postwar America, if America really desires the contribution of American citizens of Japanese ancestry toward the rebuilding of this nation into a great and democratic country, then the training of these young Americans in Manzanar and other centers toward that end must be considered. And over and above all this, country has a difficult war to win to administer a decisive defeat to the Axis aggressors. This nation cannot afford to have any of its citizens indifferent or opposed to the supreme war aim; this nation cannot afford to have its citizens secretly or openly applauding every Axis victory.

I have been in Manzanar for over four months, three of which I have spent as a block leader. Circulating among the people, talking to them, discussing various problems with them and listening to their opinions which they will never impart to any Caucasian official, I have become aware of the seriousness of the problem facing this relocation center. I might add that this problem must be faced by other centers sooner or later. In Manzanar, although the conflict between the loyalty of the two generations has existed from the start, the question did not come to a head until very recently, almost four months since its establishment, because at first the evacuees were all absorbed in the construction of the camp, the newness of their residence and environment.

To state frankly and generally from the start, Manzanar is rife with anti-American sentiment. It is seeping into every strata of

Manzanar life. At first the people talked in whispers, criticising the American government, ridiculing the American conduct of the war. They still remembered the early days of the war when an expression of anti-American sentiment was the fastest route to an Internment camp. They still remembered the FBI raids on the coast Japanese communities. But today, in the relative freedom of this center, under a liberal policy of the administration, open condemnation of American war policy is being carried on without fear of reprisal. Abuses are heaped upon individuals who defend this country's policies, bodily harm and mob action is threatened those who denounce the anti-American elements. The bulk of issei, fundamentally loyal Americans, are vacillating and bewildered. This is the picture of Manzanar today.

The issei, although many of them have resided in this country for more than thirty years, have never relinquished their attachment to the homeland. This was largely due to the fact that they have been denied the right to become naturalized citizens of this country, and to many personal experiences of discrimination they received here. During the course of their life here, they have built a defense mechanism and an escape from frustration by identifying themselves with Japanese aspirations on the Asiatic mainland. There is also the fact that the Japanese government has never relaxed their policy during the past ten years to instill pro-Japan propaganda in their colonists abroad.

The issei's stand in this war, with few exceptions, has been that of passive non-resistance. They have faithfully conformed to all government regulations concerning aliens of enemy nationality during wartime. They have shown, as in Manzanar, willingness to work and to cooperate

with the administration. Whatever grievance they may have, they have never expressed it openly to the administration. Therefore, it is very difficult for the administrators of this camp to determine the attitude and reactions of its issei population. But deep down in the heart of every issei is the desire that Japan be victorious in this war. They follow avidly and agree with all the militarist propaganda about such matters as "Asia for the Asiatics", "Japan's manifest destiny for the Orient." They have cheered the Japanese victories over the British, American, and Dutch in Malaya, Burma, the Phillipines and the East Indies. Some of them are still keeping this sentiment to themselves, while more vocal members of the issei group are openly predicting and hoping for a Japanese victory.

You can see what a tremendous influence this type of thinking has upon their children the nisei, particularly when the majority of nisei are still in their teens and when the entire population live congested and compact as they do in Manzanar. Nisei are openly taunted when they express pro-America sympathies. The general line of argument used by issei and many kibei toward nisei is that as a group nisei's citizenship is worthless, otherwise they would not be in a camp today. The following are some examples:

"Look at your citizenship. Is it helping you any in this camp? The American government has put you in concentration camp and is treating you just like they are treating enemy aliens. There is no difference in the food, the shelter and the treatment that we enemy aliens receive and what you get. In the eyes of the government and the American public we are all plain 'Japs'. Whenever it's convenient for the government they say you are citizens and make you go to work on the

camouflage nets at sixteen dollars a month while American citizens outside get more than a dollar an hour for the same kind of defense work." or

"Don't think of yourself as an American. When you do you are just kidding yourself. We all are Japanese and should stick together as Japanese. When this war is over there'll be plenty of opportunity in Malaya, East Indies and Australia where you'll be able to live like kings." or

"You nisei have no guts. If they treat me like they are treating you citizens, I'll throw the citizenship paper right back in their face." or

"If you think you are citizens, just try to walk out of the camp past the sentry line. If the sentries don't shoot you, I'll believe you are citizens." (This remark made in a kibe meeting held on the night on August 8 before four hundred people.)

The above are not exaggerations; they are typical of the kind of talk we hear daily throughout the center. Since the American citizens have not received any particular recognition of their status in Manzanar, this line of argument is getting a tremendous following from many confused nisei, who are, to begin with, bitter about the evacuation and the conditions they find here.

The nisei who openly expresses his hopes for an American victory and even one who preaches loyalty to this country, is denounced and called a "spy" and "traitor." Any pro-American nisei is ridiculed here, so much so that even though a great many nisei are for this country, they keep this opinion to themselves. It is a sad mockery that here in America pro-America expressions are boo'd and cowed. At the

last kibel meeting, a police escort was needed to protect two pro-American kibel, Karl Ioneda and James Oda, from mob violence. A police protection is being given Fokle Slocum, veteran of the last war and outspoken patriot, because his very life is endangered. We are approaching a stage when it means bodily harm for anyone to speak in favor of this nation. A Japanese-American who was one of the first to go to work on the camouflage net project and father of six children is now ostracised by his neighbors since he began work. Net workers are ridiculed and sometimes threatened.

So far the administration has not given any recognition to those whose loyalty is with this country. We have in Manzanar today among the ten thousand people the gradation of attachment to this country ranging from an absolute zero to one hundred per cent. They are looked upon and treated without any distinction. Those who are loyal are wondering today whether their loyalty means anything to the administration or to the government. Of course, I realize that the question of loyalty is a hard one to determine. You cannot simply pigeonhole one person as loyal and another as disloyal. But you certainly can see that any American citizen who gets up in a public meeting and declares that his citizenship isn't worth a damn and hopes that the government will take it away from him is not exactly loyal to this nation.

The nisei as a group are dissatisfied with the treatment they have received from the government. They are disillusioned--bitter. Many of them are frustrated and desperate. The American army is classifying the nisei as 4C in the same category as aliens, while on the other hand, thousands of nisei already drafted previous to the war are serving in the United States army. The nisei are bitter because they feel that the stigma

of disloyalty is already attached to them as a whole, that individually they won't have a chance, after the war, in this country. Some of them are bitter because their fathers and mothers have been sent to internment camps, such being the case of young Terminal Island boys in Manzanar whose fishermen fathers have been taken away wholesale from them.

It is a known fact that we have in the camp today certain elements who are working upon the bitterness of the nisei. These individuals are making agitational talks privately and publicly to whip the nisei sentiment into an anti-American mob hysteria. They are finding a ready response from many dissatisfied nisei. Then too, the nisei are contributing their share, as I have already said, by painting rosy pictures of nisei's future in "greater Japan" at the end of the war. As long as the military situation in the Pacific favors the Japanese, as long as America is on the defensive, this type of propaganda, about the ultimate victory of Japan, and talks of nisei future will circulate and receive response from the nisei.

My own little girl, seven years old, was stopped the other day on her way from school by an issei. The issei asked her pointblank, "Little girl, who's going to win this war?" "Of course, the United States," she replied. "Who told you?" "My mother said so." Then the issei became angry and told her to go back and tell her mother that "Japan is going to win this war." This Manzanar may be part of America, but I certainly would not like to bring up my own children, who are American citizens, in this kind of atmosphere.

The sum total of all I have explained above is that the government is doing a good job of making good Japanese out of nisei; but Uncle Sam is doing a poor job of making good Americans out of them. At the rate

we are going, at the end of the war, we shall all go out of the gates of Manzanar, conscious that we are Japanese and not Americans. The nisei are accepting this war as a racial war, rather than that of the democratic forces of the world against fascist aggression, simply because their own treatment has been on a racial line so far. You cannot convince them otherwise. Those of us who understand the issues, the danger of a fascist victory to our American way of life, are becoming more and more in the minority.

Are the present block leaders aware of this acute problem? The composition of the block leaders' council is about three-fifths issei. The issei do not express themselves on political or war issues, although they do so privately. Two of the leading members of the council are known to have aired their views privately, to wit, that Japan will win this war and that the nisei's future lies in Japan. One respected member of the council, outwardly an Americanized issei, stated that when the peace terms are signed, we'll stay in this country and tell the Americans how to run this government. The nisei members of the council are for the most part pro-Japan. Karl Yoneda and myself are only ones who hold pro-democratic convictions and are working in the council to support the government war efforts.

For the sake of internal unity, it may be convenient to treat both citizens and aliens alike in Manzanar. The block leaders as an institution have done well enough in assisting the administration in the management of the center. This report does not mean to deny the merit of the present council. It does state, however, that the spirit of "Little Tokyo" is being perpetuated, i.e. Japanism, issei-nisei conflict and compromise, the tendency to belittle the ability of nisei in administration of camp welfare, etc.

A typical example of how the block leaders react to question of Americanism can be seen in the following: In the course of discussion upon the merit of changing the Manzanar Free Press from a mimeograph to printed newspaper, when the question hung on whether it will be worthwhile for the community enterprise to subsidize the paper out of its profit, I stood up and recommended that the paper be printed and devote more space to international and domestic news to inform the nisei of what is taking place outside and to impress upon them the sacrifices being made by the American people outside to win this war. I further suggested that the paper be used to serve as an educational medium for the nisei. Immediately one member, a kibei, stood up and replied that the people do not trust the American report on the war because the news is biased in favor of the allies. Another member stood up and replied that it was not necessary to educate the nisei through the Free Press, the nisei can get all the education they want by buying the Los Angeles Times and Examiner at the canteen.

Recently when a group of loyal citizens here circulated petitions for the opening of a second front in Europe and to offer their services to this country for front line duties, the petition was opposed, in private, by practically all the block leaders, although none expressed their opposition in public.

If it is the policy of the War Relocation Authority to maintain harmony within the camp at all cost, to avoid any conflict between the attitudes of citizens and aliens, to regard all as simply inmates of the relocation center and nothing more, the present setup is satisfactory. The pro-Japan elements are predominant in camp and nisei are slowly but surely turning into race-conscious Japanese. A compromise can be worked

out between the issei and nisei on the basis that they are all Japanese.

But if it is the avowed policy of the W.R.A. to instill faith in the American way of life, institutions, and war aims on the part of the nisei, and if the authority wishes to see good Americans come out of the relocation center, some drastic steps must be taken to correct the present situation. Certainly in war time no compromise can be made on loyalty.

I am convinced, based upon my observation, that there are certain irreconcilable differences between the issei and nisei--namely, the question of attachment to their respective countries. Of course, every immigrant stock faces a conflict between the first generation with its old world ideals, philosophy and customs and the second generation to become extremely Americanized. The Chinese, the Irish, the Italians and the rest have gone through this experience. The only marked, but extremely important difference with the Japanese, is that at the present time this generation-conflict is closely tied up with the question of loyalty, since Japan and the United States are at war. I believe it is time that this difference be clearly recognized and some program be adopted to solve the present dilemma. To slurr over conflicts of this nature for sake of outward harmony is dangerous to the present war efforts of the United States to defeat the Axis. Soon, we may see the time again when nisei will be drafted into the U.S. army. In such an event, their training in Wanzanar is important in determining their attitude during their service.

I will say that the issei are doing good work in maintaining harmony within the camp. For example, when the carpenters went on strike about a month ago over wage grievances, it took an issei block leader to go over and "talk" to the boys and send them back to work. They are cooperative

to the point of being obsequious, and therefore, are very useful to the administrators of this camp. This, however, does not alter the fact that the issei are fundamentally accepting their lot with good grace and praying for the day when their country is victorious.

I need not dwell too much upon the question of kibei in the relocation center. You are well aware that a large segment of the kibei population is more avidly and intensely nationalistic than the issei. Having been accused as "potentially the most dangerous element among the Japanese population" the kibei as a group is resenting this discrimination. But even the kibei themselves cannot deny that many of them who have been educated in Japan after the Manchuria incident, when the Japanese government adopted an intense, fascist training for its youths, have returned to this country, carrying with them the rabid pro-Japan training, and are American citizens in name only. Their influence upon the nisei is also strong, and in many cases they act as spokesmen for the group of dissatisfied nisei. At the kibei mass meeting held last Saturday, August 8, words were expressed which can only be regarded as treasonable in the time of war. I suggest you ask for the minutes of that meeting, conducted entirely in Japanese, and read some of the views expressed, before the assembly was disbanded by Mr. Temple. It will be a revelation on the kind of thinking done by many kibei and nisei in this camp.

On the other hand, I would like to point out that there are some kibei who are sincerely and intensely loyal to the United States. They know the plight of the Japanese people under the iron yoke of the Japanese military clique and hope to see the defeat of the present government in Japan so that the people can again be liberated to enjoy freedom of speech and thought. The United States government will do well to recognize

these kibei, to encourage them, rather than to classify them with the rest.

Finally, there are some issei, who are technically enemy aliens, but are just as loyal and more so than many nisei or kibei. These individuals, for the most part, have arrived in this country when very young and have been educated and raised as Americans. Were it not for the act of Congress forbidding their naturalization, they would have become citizens long ago. There are few others, who, because of political convictions, were anti-fascist even before the outbreak of the present war, and can contribute substantially toward the American war effort and are anxious that they be called upon to perform some service to this country. They are, in a sense, in a same category as Germany refugees in this country. The government should recognize the desire and position of such individuals so that some recognition of their loyalty can be made, rather than to pursue the present policy of regarding them as enemy aliens.

What, then, would be my suggestions for the solution to this problem?

First of all, I would like to see a thorough investigation, by properly constituted authority, of the pro-Axis propaganda and influence being spread in Manzanar. Certainly the government should look into the role of agitators and ringleaders of the pro-Axis elements, be they aliens or American citizens. But I would oppose at this time any stringent restriction upon the freedom of speech, gag rules and others for the camp as a whole, as any too severe suppressory measure only helps to infuriate and dissatisfy the residents and give more ammunition to the pro-Axis elements.

Secondly, for those nisei and kibei who do not think much of their American citizenship and are willing to renounce it, the American govern-

ment should provide the opportunity for them to do so. A federal court may hear their case and repatriate them. A great many kibel have applied to repatriate and be sent to Japan on an exchange basis. This should be done with all kibel and nisei. Then, the government will know definitely how the nisei stand.

Thirdly, and as the most important and urgent step, I would like to see the loyal Americans separated from and away from the influence of pro-Axis elements, lest they remain too long and come under the latter's influence. A separate citizens' camp or settlement is needed immediately where they can establish an American community, where they can express their loyalty without fear of bodily reprisals or ostracism. They should be given job opportunities for defense work or other work at such a settlement where they will be paid the prevailing wages. If they wish to take their parents with them, the parents should be thoroughly investigated and the nisei be responsible for the conduct of the parents. If the nisei prefers to stay with the parents in an alien camp, he should also be permitted to do so. Of course, these citizens who have renounced their citizenship in a federal court will remain with the issei with no stigma attached. Every comfort and consideration be given to the aliens under the program now followed by the WRA except that they have no self-government. On the other hand, the citizens' camp shall have a city government with minimum of interference.

Also a special hearing board should be instituted to allow loyal issei to join such a citizens' camp. (personally being an alien, I would like to obtain such a consideration, as I would feel entirely out of place with pro-Axis issei.)

I believe every intelligent American realizes that the entire evacuation

of the Japanese from the Pacific Coast should have been done on an individual basis. However, they also agree that time did not permit the establishment of such a machinery to determine individual cases. Here in a relocation center, where we're all tucked away, there is plenty of time and an urgent need that each individual case should be studied.

As to the question of separation of families, I would say again, that in time of war, you cannot compromise with loyalty. If the separation of family means you are separating the local American citizens from contamination of pro-Axis poison, if it means you will be giving American citizens a chance to express their loyalty without fear of mob action, I would say that it would be a good thing for this country. Today, hundreds of thousands of American soldiers are being separated from their families to serve this nation. The nisei should be, and are willing to make the same sacrifice. Of course, the very small children under sixteen should remain with their parents, or have an older nisei member of the family as their guardian. Detail adjustments can be made if thorough study is made on this subject. The main question is to give the nisei a chance to reaffirm his faith in America, make him feel that he is part of America, and give him brighter hopes for the future so that he will not have illusions about another future in Japan.

As a temporary and immediate measure, which by no means solves the problem, all representatives of the people in the self-government should be American citizens. This does not solve the problem because the issei influence will still predominate in the camp. The representatives may not win the confidence of the people, and every effort will be made by the pro-Axis elements to elect citizens (particularly kibe) who hold pro-Axis convictions.

The entire world, including our enemies and particularly Tokyo, is watching how a democratic America handles the treatment of its citizens. It will be a powerful weapon in the hands of Japanese militarists if they can point out that this country is treating its citizen Japanese in the same manner as alien Japanese. They would like to see this war accepted as a race war, and the United States should not give them the opportunity to do so.

The question of one bad apple spoiling others is out of place here. The situation in Manzanar calls for saving a few good ones left and to salvage hundreds of others before they are spoiled beyond saving. The Manzanar relocation center, should not, in my opinion, be left an island of a Japanese race in the sea of America. If we do not solve this problem, the nisei who leave this camp after the war, intensely nationalistic, anti-American, race conscious and unassimilable will be a cancer on the side of America. The government should not leave its citizens to such a fate.

The situation at Manzanar is acute. Basis for mob violence and agitation is already laid by the dissatisfied elements, fanned and encouraged by pro-Axis elements. It may get out of hand if the situation is not handled right. I do not wish to sound like an alarmist. I am only reporting the actual facts as they present themselves. The solution to this problem must be a basic one. No more surface adjustment can correct the situation that has come up in Manzanar and will undoubtedly come up in other relocation centers.

Respectfully submitted,

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL  
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

August 23, 1942

SUBJECT: Separation of Kibei from Nisei

TO : Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, War Department

1. Substantial numbers of persons of Japanese ancestry born in the United States have been educated and indoctrinated in Japan during their formative years. While the Japanese word "Kibei" includes any Japanese who has returned to Japan from another country, as used in this letter it is intended to designate that group of American-born Japanese who fall in the class described in the first sentence hereof.

2. The evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast (the west half of Washington and Oregon, all of California and the south half of Arizona) has brought approximately 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry under federal supervision. Of these approximately 70,000 remain in Army hands and 40,000 have been transferred by the Army to War Relocation Authority, an independent civilian agency. There are approximately 127,000 persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States. This means that roughly 17,000 (exclusive of the relatively few in internment camps and in the Army) are not under direct supervision. An estimate based on an examination of the San Pedro (Los Angeles) Port of Entry figures, showing the traffic of Japanese persons in and out of that port, indicates that between one-third and one-quarter of all American-born Japanese fall within the Kibei classification. American-born Japanese number approximately two-thirds of the total Japanese in the United States. This means there are nearly 85,000 American-born, and of these between 20,000 and 30,000 are Kibei. Establishing the proportion of total Japanese both in and out of direct supervision, the conclusion is reached that roughly one-fifth of the Kibei are not under federal supervision. In summary then, based on available figures, there are between 20,000 and 30,000 Kibei in the United States. Of these, on the basis of the roughest estimate, between 4,000 and 6,000 are not under supervision.

3. Most American-born Japanese are dual citizens. It is legally possible for a dual citizen to forfeit one of the two citizenships he possesses by action showing an election. American-born Japanese who fall within the Kibei classification have, by their action, indicated an intention to bear allegiance to the emperor of Japan. If this proposition can be established, the persons within this classification become enemy aliens, subject to internment.

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NNA 740862

Day 1942 11/15/41

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Separation of Kibei from Nisei.

August 23, 1942

4. The co-mingling of Kibei indoctrinated in Japan with Nisei is dangerous and tends further to alienate all Nisei by constant exposure to Japanese indoctrination. The presence of substantial numbers of Kibei at large in the interior is a danger to national security. Their presence also renders less tenable the position of Nisei, among whom are doubtless large numbers with a strong desire to be loyal and to demonstrate their loyalty.

5. It is believed feasible to segregate Kibei from Nisei on the basis of the definition indicated in the opening paragraph of this letter, through the following means:

- a. A survey of Immigration and Naturalization Service Port of Entry records, to determine the identity, age and length of stay in Japan of all American-born persons who have been to Japan and returned to the United States. This would be a clerical task.
- b. The use of information obtainable from cooperative Nisei, such information to be applied to the list developed by the survey proposed above. To accomplish this would require the cooperation of War Relocation Authority, into whose custody the Army will have transferred, by October 31, 1942, the remaining Japanese evacuees now in its hands.

6. Accordingly, I recommend that the War Department direct the accomplishment of a project designed to accomplish:

- a. Determination of the identity of Kibei through use of appropriate methods along the lines herein suggested.
- b. The separation of all such Kibei under federal supervision from Nisei.
- c. The forfeiture through appropriate legal processes or means of the U. S. citizenship of all such Kibei, to be undertaken in collaboration with the Department of Justice, and their internment for the duration of the war with a view to their repatriation as rapidly as opportunity affords. The proposal to intern would embrace all Kibei, whether or not presently under federal supervision.

/s/ J. L. DEWITT

J. L. DeWITT  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army  
Commanding

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2, HQ. WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND & FOURTH ARMY  
(Office of Headquarters)

(CID) 254 (1-10-43)

Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.  
(Place)

January 15, 1943

Subject: Japanese Suspects at  
MANZANAR WAR RELOCATION PROJECT and  
COLORADO RIVER WAR RELOCATION PROJECT.

(Date)

Summary of Information:

1. The following Japanese residents of MANZANAR WAR RELOCATION PROJECT have been recommended for segregation because of their subversive records:

a. KEIJI ARATAKA.

(1) An alien Japanese who entered the United States in 1906. Reported to have been un-American in his utterances among the Japanese, and to have made numerous statements to the effect that when the opportunity arose, he would gladly assist the Japanese Army or Navy through fifth column activities.

(2) Has admitted membership in Seicho-no-Iye, a strongly nationalistic religious and philosophical organization which flourished in Southern California.

(3) ARATAKA was a member of the Los Angeles Japanese Chamber of Commerce, which was actually the Japanese Association of Los Angeles and an affiliate of the pro-Japan Central Japanese Association of America.

(4) Has requested repatriation to Japan.

b. JOSEPH KURIHARA.

(1) A Hawaiian-born veteran of World War I, who has been an accountant, and a navigator on a fishing vessel.

(2) At a meeting of Kibei at the Manzanar War Relocation

Previous Distribution:

(CONT'D)

Distribution:

Asst. Sec. of War (3)  
MIS, WD (2)  
FILE

	-of source	-of information
	Reliable	1
	Credible	
	Questionable	
	Undetermined	

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Project, July 8, 1942, KURIHARA stated that he had "Japanese national spirit" and was one hundred percent for Japan.

(3) In an interview with an agent of the FBI, October 14, 1942, KURIHARA freely stated that he felt very bitter toward the United States; that his sympathies are for Japan; and that in his opinion Japan has already won the war.

(4) KURIHARA was chairman of the Committee of Five who were intermediaries in settling the riot of December 5-6, 1942, and is believed to have been a leader of the group which was behind the disturbance.

c. KOZO "FRED" OGURA.

(1) OGURA was born and educated in Japan and has been reported to this office as one of the leaders of a subversive group seeking to gain control of the relocation project.

(2) He was taken into military custody after participating in the riot at Manzanar, December 5-6, 1942.

d. SHIGETOSHI TATEISHI.

(1) During the seditious Kibei meeting, July 8, 1942, at Manzanar, TATEISHI delivered a speech in which he stated that he had "Yamato Damashii" (Japanese national spirit) and that American citizenship rights are valueless.

(2) TATEISHI has been reported by confidential informants of this office as one of the leaders of subversive activities at Manzanar.

(3) TATEISHI was taken into military custody after participating in the riot, December 5-6, 1942, and jailed at Lone Pine, California.

e. HARRY UENO.

(1) UENO has been reported to be a troublemaker and responsible for much of the unrest in the relocation project, and to be very outspoken in his sympathies toward Japan. He is said to have made the statements, "Of course, this is a race war. We're all Japanese. We've got to realize that. This is no democracy, it never has been ...."

(2) UENO was jailed as a suspect after the beating of FRED TAYAMA which precipitated the riot at Manzanar, and was later

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removed to the Inyo County Jail, Independence, California.

f. BOB MATSUDA.

(1) MATSUDA is reported to be a troublemaker and to be associated with the Terminal Island Yogores and the Los Angeles Dunbar gang, both of which have caused unrest in the relocation project. He is reported to have had a local police record and to have been in the Preston Reformatory.

(2) MATSUDA is said to have "egged on" TOSHI ARASHI to attack two members of the Manzanar Free Press staff in August, 1942.

2. The following Japanese residents of COLORADO RIVER WAR RELOCATION PROJECT have been recommended for segregation because of their subversive records:

a. UMETARO HARA.

(1) HARA was a member of Hokubei Butoku Kai (Military Virtue Society of North America), a highly nationalistic organization formed to teach the Japanese "military virtues" to young Japanese boys.

(2) He received a medal from the Japanese Consulate for his long residence in the United States.

(3) He made contributions to the Japanese Army and possessed \$1,500.00 worth of Japanese Steel Company stock.

(4) A search of his premises, February 15, 1942, revealed contraband flashlights and photographic developing equipment.

(5) Paroled from Fort Lincoln, North Dakota.

b. KAZUMA MATSUMOTO.

(1) MATSUMOTO was a member of Sakura Kai (Cherry Association), a branch of Heimusha Kai (Japanese Military Conscripts Association) which was organized by Lt. Commander I. ONTAMI, I.J.N., Japanese espionage agent. Sakura Kai was a sponsor for the activities of Kaigun Kyokai (Navy League) which engaged in naval espionage for Japan.

(2) MATSUMOTO is reported to have been a member of the Committee of 72, which acted as intermediary in the disturbance at the relocation project, November 18-25, 1942, and is believed to have been the "steering committee" in the disturbance.

c. IMAO ROBERT OKAZAKI.

(1) OKAZAKI was affiliated with the Japanese Cultural Society of Southern California, a registered Japanese propaganda agency.

(2) He was a member of the Committee of 72 which played an important part in the disturbance of November 18-25, 1942.

(3) Has openly declared his intention to return to Japan at the close of the war.

d. HARVEY SUZUKI.

SUZUKI has been reported to this office as a troublemaker and undesirable in the relocation project. He is a Kibei, and was a leader in the strike at Poston, November 18-25, 1942 and a member of the Committee of 72.

e. MASUKICHI UEKI.

(1) Alien, paroled from Santa Fe, New Mexico.

(2) Member of Board of Directors of Japanese Language School at San Juan Bautista, California. The Japanese language schools were often centers of Japanese propaganda and frequently used texts supplied by the Japanese Ministry of Education.

(3) Officer of the Japanese Association of San Benito, Calif.

(4) Reported to have been a member of Sokoku Kai, a branch of the notorious Black Dragon Society.

(5) UEKI was a leader in the strike at Poston, November 18-25, 1942.

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BY THE ARMY BY TAG FSN 210806

Box 9  
Folder 7  
Item 22  
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WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Dispatched 6 August, 1943

ADDRESSEE: Major General A. W. Gullion **PERSONAL**

The Provost Marshal General

Room 1058, Munitions Building

SUBJECT: Transfer of Japanese evacuees between War Relocation

Receipt of the following ~~secret~~ ~~confidential~~ paper from the Centers

Office of the Assistant Secretary of War is acknowledged:

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DECLASSIFIED  
 (E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(c) and 5(D) of (E))  
 Authority: **740062**  
 By: **CKE** NAPS, Date: **6/25/74**

NND

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
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 (Signature)  
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 (Grade)  
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 (Office)

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

NOTE: This receipt is to be signed and returned immediately to:

Assistant Secretary of War  
Room 3-E-961, Pentagon Bldg.  
Washington, D. C.

Note - New Address  
4E-886, Pentagon Building  
Arlington, Virginia

Vertical handwritten notes on the right margin, including "6 Aug 43" and "43/1000".