

# Jackson Henry, for Vice President

Senator Daniel K. Inouye Papers

House records, Central files, J, Box HR4, Folder 9

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U. S. SENATOR  
**HENRY M. JACKSON**  
FOR VICE-PRESIDENT COMMITTEE

National Headquarters: 4122 Arcade Bldg., 1319 2nd Avenue • Seattle 1, Washington • MAin 3-7831

Dear fellow Democrat:

Senator Henry Martin Jackson should be the Democratic nominee for Vice President of the United States. The Washington delegation is calling for support of his nomination as the first Westerner ever selected by the Democratic Party on the national ticket.

Henry Jackson personifies the strength and vitality of the West. At 48, he has more Congressional experience than any legislator his age. During 12 years in the House of Representatives and eight in the Senate he has been a leader and spokesman for the West in developing our resources of land, water, energy and people.

Senator Jackson is a national figure, known for his insistence that we strengthen our moral, economic, political, and military strength to meet the Soviet challenge. Described by national columnists as a "peace-seeker without being a pacifist" and "uniquely far-sighted", Senator Jackson has been a most caustic but constructive critic of the weakening world position of the United States under the present Administration.

With Senator Henry M. Jackson as our Vice Presidential nominee, the nation can vote for a man from the West with integrity, courage, and conviction.

May we count on your support?

Best wishes,

*Luke Graham*  
LUKE GRAHAM, Chairman  
Washington State Delegation  
Democratic National Convention

7  
June 20, 1960

Honorable Lee Metcalf  
House of Representatives  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Lee:

Thank you for your letter of June 16, 1960 urging support for Senator Henry Jackson as our nominee for Vice President.

Although I will not be able to publicly place my name on your draft press release, I thoroughly agree with you that Scoop Jackson would make an excellent Vice President.

Aloha,

DANIEL K. I NOUYE  
Member of Congress

DKI:ss

LEE METCALF  
1ST DISTRICT OF MONTANA

COMMITTEE:  
WAYS AND MEANS

JUN 17 1960

MERRILL ENGLUND  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRETARIES:  
BEVERLY L. KNOWLES  
MRS. DONALDEEN WHITE

FIELD OFFICE:  
ATLAS BLOCK  
LAST CHANCE GULCH  
HELENA, MONTANA

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

June 16, 1960

Honorable Daniel K. Inouye  
House Office Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear ~~Colleagues:~~

You probably have received the same telegram I had from Luke Graham, Washington State Democratic Chairman, advising that Senator Henry M. Jackson's name will be placed in nomination for the Vice Presidency and urging support for him from western Senators and Congressmen.

I think this is an excellent idea, and in fact I have thought so since about 1953. I hope you feel the same way. The West has earned representation on the ticket, and Jackson is not only well qualified, but has a lot of steam behind him.

In the course of the next week I plan to circularize a draft press release announcing support for Jackson by a number of Westerners in the House. I would appreciate your giving some thought to joining with me on this venture, and I will be in touch with you again soon.

Sincerely yours,

  
Lee Metcalf, M.C.

LM:r

## CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a fast message unless its deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

# WESTERN UNION

## TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

SF-1201 (4-00)

## SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NL = Night Letter

LT = International Letter Telegram

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination

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1960 JUN 1 9M 9 41

PRA375 PR SEE099 SEZ2 BOOK SEZ2 NL PD SEATTLE WASH 1

HON DANIEL K INOUYE

HOUSE OFFICE BLDG WASH DC

THE WASHINGTON STATE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION HAS UNANIMOUSLY  
 ENDORSED OUR GREAT SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON FOR VICE PRESIDENT.  
 IN SPOKANE, SENATORS KENNEDY, JOHNSON, SYMINGTON AND MAGNUSON  
 STATED JACKSON TO BE SUPERBLY QUALIFIED FOR VICE PRESIDENCY.


*JUN - 2 1960*  
*Jackson for V-P*

HIS NINETEEN YEARS OF DEDICATED SERVICE IN CONGRESS AND  
 TO THE DEMOCRATIC MAKE HIM A SYMBOL OF THE HOPES OF THE WESTERN  
 STATES.

HIS VISION OF THE SOVIET CHALLENGE HAS BEEN ALMOST PROPHETIC.

MAY WE COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT?

LUKE GRAHAM CHAIRMAN DEMOCRATIC STATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WASHINGTON



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W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

SF-1201 (4-60)

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STATE.



SENATOR HENRY  
**JACKSON**

MAKES SENSE AS VICE-PRESIDENT  
ON THE DEMOCRATIC TICKET



HERE'S HOW THIS BRIGHT, PERSONABLE 48-YEAR-OLD  
LAWMAKER FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON CAN  
HELP OUR PARTY WIN IN 1960

# JACKSON MAKES IDEAL CH



1

SENATOR JACKSON has worked for the 30 million people of the West for 19 years in Congress—*he knows the problems of the West, he has the confidence of the voters!*

“Perhaps no civilian in public life in the United States is better informed on the facts of missile development or more deeply concerned about their meaning for the future of this nation.”

—Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, October, 1957.

2

SENATOR JACKSON sounded the earliest warnings on U. S. missile lag . . . led the fight for atomic submarines—*he's earned the respect of the Nation and the Free World!*

“Senator Jackson is no johnny-come-lately on the nuclear submarine program . . . he has been with us all the way.

“Jackson made the first suggestion to chief of naval operations three years ago that a nuclear-powered submarine undertake an ocean crossing under the arctic ice cap . . . and you know what happened.”

ADMIRAL HYMAN RICKOVER  
Bremerton Sun, May 29, 1959



# CHOICE FOR VICE-PRESIDENT



3

SENATOR JACKSON demonstrated his coolness under fire during the McCarthy Hearings . . . today he's winning new plaudits for his statesmanlike handling of the Government Policy investigation—*we can trust his good common sense!*

"Washington is getting at least one sample these days of legislative investigation at its very best. This is the inquiry being conducted by Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, into the operations of the policy-making machinery of the Government.

". . . What Senator Jackson is doing, with the help of a competent staff, is to conduct a scholarly, objective and non-partisan study of this whole program so that when the new President of the United States stumbles exhausted out of the election campaign in November, he will have a careful analysis of this problem of modernizing the policy-making process."

JAMES RESTON  
New York Times, February 26, 1960



4

SENATOR JACKSON has never lost an election in 22 years . . . he was first elected to Congress at the age of 28 and was re-elected to the U. S. Senate in 1958 by the largest majority in state's history, 319,000 votes—*he's a proven winner!*


"The guiding genius of the subcommittee, Senator Jackson, is a quiet, hard-working, mild-mannered, youngish - looking bachelor with gentle gray eyes and guileless demeanor . . . 'I don't know how to explain him as a politician,' a long-time friend recently said, 'except by the fact he's just a hell of a nice guy with a hop on the ball and who is always up on his homework'."

NEW YORK TIMES  
May 29, 1960

# HENRY JACKSON:

MAN OF OUR TIMES...

A MAN WE'LL BE PROUD OF!



**1** JACKSON appears in Paris as U. S. chairman of a special NATO committee to promote science in the Free World. The LONDON TIMES on May 25, 1960 said JACKSON is "responsible for the new NATO scientific program of scholarships and advanced research institutes."

**2** Supporters of Hawaiian statehood congratulate SENATOR JACKSON for his leading role in putting the 50th star on the flag. The HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN declared on Feb. 2, 1959: "No Democrat has been a more enthusiastic or effective champion for Hawaiian statehood than SENATOR JACKSON."

**3** The night Alaska joined the Union! SENATOR JACKSON, floor manager during the Senate debate, wins a well-earned victory salute from Alaska's former Governor.

**4** HENRY JACKSON knows first-hand what it's like to launch scientific expeditions into Antarctica. Here he braces himself against a frigid blast prior to take-off on a flight to the South Pole station and the air drop of a D-4 Bulldozer.

**5** Admiral Rickover checks out SENATOR JACKSON at the controls of the atomic submarine U.S.S. George Washington. Rickover credits JACKSON with awakening the Congress

and the nation to the possibilities in underseas atomic craft. Columnist Stewart Alsop said Dec. 27, 1957, that JACKSON was "one of a few honorable exceptions who did not give America a false picture of the real balance of military power."

**6** JACKSON joins General Alfred H. Gruenther at SHAPE headquarters in Paris upon the General's retirement. Commenting on Jackson's unique ability to be outspoken on defense matters and still hold the respect of military leaders, Arthur Krock of the New York Times described the Senator as "one of the pioneer critics of the Administration's defense policies in a vein of constructive non-partisanship."

# 'Subtle Spectacular' on Capitol Hill

It is a Senate subcommittee's little noted study of an area—policy planning—that has suddenly been spotlighted by the summit collapse and the affair of the U-2.



Conference—Senator Jackson (right), head of the subcommittee, talks with staff aides J. K. Mansfield and Dorothy Fosdick.

WASHINGTON.

By **CABELL PHILLIPS**

CONGRESSIONAL investigations are usually of two kinds. They either overwhelm the spectator with their gaudy dramatics, or lull him to sleep with dullness. Currently, there is one in progress that bridges these extremes—it is a subtle spectacular being played before an almost non-existent audience in an out-of-the-way hearing room by the improbably titled Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. By the script, this should be pretty soporific stuff, but its impact is such as to keep a good many people in high places awake and on the edge of their seats.

The stated mandate of this small band of inquisitors is innocuous enough—to look into ways of improving the machinery through which high policy for the cold war is made. But inevitably it is being drawn into an examination of policy itself: of the decisions this Administration has made, and is following, in the sensitive field of national security. No prerogative lies closer to the heart of the soldier-President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, than this, and no issue has more explosive potential in this political year than the question of whether all that needs to be done is being done to win the cold war.

Frightening urgency has been given to such questions as these by the U-2 espionage incident and the débâcle of the summit conference in Paris only two weeks ago. For here, most competent observers believe, was an obvious failure of planning and coordination at a most critical juncture of the cold war. As a consequence, the subcommittee is looking into the whole U-2 affair as a "timely case study." Under its mandate it will be concerned with *what* went wrong rather than with *who* did wrong, but it may be impossible to separate the two in the public hearings.

**S**PARKS of controversy were struck at the first open hearing several weeks ago. What had been planned as a rather academic walk-through of the policy-planning mechanism at the White House level veered off into a chilling indictment of "complacency" in the face of the mounting Communist offensive. The testimony—restrained but direct to the bull's-eye—came from Robert A. Lovett, financier and former Secretary of Defense; Robert C. Sprague, chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, and Thomas J. Watson Jr., president of the International Business Machines Corporation.

These are men whose experience and knowledge and motives are beyond any challenge of pettiness or partisanship, and an ominous consensus has emerged from their testimony. It is that the mechanics of policy planning at the highest level have been made obsolete by the speed of a technology that has welded political, economic and military considerations into a single imperative—national survival; that vital policy decisions are often extemporized, or based on inadequate information, or constricted by habits of thought that have been outmoded; and, finally, that there is a failure at the top policy level to sense either the magnitude of the threat facing the country or the immensity of the effort needed to combat it.

As Mr. Lovett put it: "I feel that we are doing something short of our best . . . If [Khrushchev's] statement, 'We will bury you,' does not carry the message to us, then words have lost their meaning. If we are not prepared after that statement to admit that we are in a struggle for survival, then we have truly succumbed to the hard sell of the soft attitude."

And Dr. Perkins, appearing a few weeks later, was even more specific. "Somebody would have to prove to me," he said, "that we have not given up important capabilities in the field of air defense and limited war, and maybe even in our deterrent program, as the price for getting all our requirements within a stable military budget."

**T**HE genesis of this significant inquiry lies in one man's worry, for a long period of time, over the provocative question: How can a free society organize to outthink, outplan and outperform totalitarianism and achieve security in freedom?

The worrier was Senator Henry M. Jackson, Washington Democrat and a leading member of both the Armed Services and Joint Atomic Energy Committees. Last summer, he proposed to the Senate, and the Senate approved, a study of the whole policy-making apparatus relating to national security.

He promised a scholarly, nonpolitical approach and said that the subcommittee's report would not be released until after the election. He also sought the blessing of the White House, since he would have to delve deeply into its inner workings, and particularly into its central policy-making organ, the National Security Council. After a good deal of skeptical deliberation, this was granted, but with a number of caveats attached—that any probing into the *substantive* operations of the N. S. C. should be off-limits, that a White House representative should be on hand for *all* discussions of the N. S. C., and that the subcommittee should describe its mission as an "inquiry" and not an "investigation."

"We took this," Jackson said, "in order to avoid fights over prerogatives. Moreover, we really aren't out to 'get' the White House or the Security Council or anybody else. This is something that has to do with national survival, and we need the cooperation of everybody concerned."

Serving on the subcommittee with him are Democrats Hubert H. Humphrey, Minnesota, and Edmund S. Muskie, Maine, and Republicans Karl E. Mundt, South Dakota, and Jacob K. Javits, New York. But the subcommittee is pretty much Jack- (Continued)

Reprinted from May 29, 1960  
New York Times Magazine by

**JACKSON** for VICE-PRESIDENT COMMITTEE  
National Headquarters: 4122 Arcade Bldg., 1319 2nd Ave., Seattle 1, Wash.



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What these men from the world of finance said was later reinforced by witnesses from the world of science, among them Dr. James A. Perkins, vice president of the Carnegie Corporation and a member of the 1957 Gaiher Commission; Dr. James B. Fisk,

By **CABELL PHILLIPS**

president of Bell Telephone Laboratories and vice-chairman of the President's Science Advisory Committee, and Dr. Eugene P. Wigner, Professor of Mathematical Physics at Princeton.

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# The New York Times Magazine

May 29, 1960

SECTION 6

**CABELL PHILLIPS** is the Washington correspondent for The Times Sunday Department.



## 'Spectacular' on Capitol Hill

son's baby, and he has had a free hand in running it.

For staff he turned first to Dorothy Fosdick, who was a member of Dean Acheson's policy-planning staff when he was Secretary of State, and to J. K. Mansfield, a former teacher of international relations at Yale and an in-and-outer in many high-level consultative posts with the Government. The chief consultant is Robert Tufts, Professor of Economics at Oberlin College and former policy-planning staffer at the Department of State. In all, there are ten staff members and part-time consultants.

**F**OR six months this staff read, talked, thought, and wrote memos to itself. The members interviewed the chiefs and other members of all the important Government agencies in town, and they fanned out to the major universities, foundations and laboratories across the country. They asked:

What was thought about the planning operation as it now exists?

What happens to ideas on their way up the bureaucratic pipeline from incubation level to action level?

What is the effect of compartmentalization among military, economic and political sectors of planning?

Should administrators be depended on for primary planning?

What are the weaknesses of the present operation, and how can they be corrected?

Out of more than 500 separate interviews the subcommittee has accumulated a vast file of factual data and personal opinion. It has staked out as major areas for attention these matters: the roles of the President and the National Security Council, the roles of the State and Defense departments, budget-making and problems of economic growth, science and technology, and finally, the part individuals play in relation to the whole planning process. It has already begun to shape its ideas about how the planning machinery can be improved, and these ideas are being reinforced and modified by the expert witnesses who testify before the committee.

**I**NEVITABLY, the subcommittee's public performance partakes more of the graduate seminar than of the Congressional inquisition, except when it is unexpectedly enlivened by a sharply revealing or critical comment from one of the witnesses. Such sallies bring prompt ripostes from the subcommittee's alert minority

counsel, Edward Pendleton, who by questions and elucidation attempts to dull or deflect these stray missiles.

"Throughout this discussion," he reminded one witness recently, "you have referred to the President. Do you mean by 'the President' any particular occupant of that position?"

"I was talking about the Presidency," the other responded.

"And not the present incumbent in particular?"

"No, sir."

The high quotient of sensitivity arises from the fact that there is here an implicit invasion by the Legislative branch of the jealously guarded precincts of the Executive. Such an inquiry in the hands of a biased or an imperceptive Senator could create serious frictions and hamper rather than help the policy-making process.

Fortunately, this is unlikely to happen. The guiding genius of the subcommittee, Senator Jackson, is a quiet, hard-working, mild-mannered, youngish-looking bachelor with gentle gray eyes and guileless demeanor, who is more noted among his colleagues for plodding earnestness than for crusading zeal. He approaches his present mission as a student seriously intent on finding the answer to a knotty problem of government.

Jackson was born in Everett, Wash., of Norwegian immigrant parents, on May 31,

1912. He waited on table to pay his way through the University of Washington, where he got his law degree in 1935, and five years later, at the age of 28, was elected to the House of Representatives. For a politician with a career singularly free of color or controversy, he has achieved a remarkable string of electoral successes. He moved up to the Senate in the Republican landslide year of 1952 by polling 30,000 more votes in his state than Mr. Eisenhower.

**I** don't know how to explain him as a politician," a long-time friend recently said, "except by the fact that he's just a hell of a nice guy with a hop on the ball and who is always up on his homework."

His addiction to homework has much to do with his standing in the Senate. Early in his Congressional career he became absorbed in the twin problems of nuclear energy and national defense and set about learning everything he could in these fields. Today, his knowledge and his opinions command the highest respect not only in the Senate but in the Pentagon and in Government scientific circles as well.

For the past several years he has hammered at the question of whether this nation's defenses are adequate. He has been skeptical of the bland assurances offered by high military and civilian officials, and he often has pinned them



**WITNESSES** who criticized policy planning. Top, l. to r., Robert A. Lovett, ex-Secretary of Defense; Robert C. Sprague, chairman, Fed-

eral Reserve Bank of Boston; Thomas J. Watson Jr., president, International Business Machines Corp. Bottom, l. to r., James B. Fish, presi-

dent, Bell Telephone Laboratories; Eugene P. Wigner, professor of physics; James A. Perkins, vice president of the Carnegie Corp.

down with his own superior knowledge. He was primarily responsible for "rescuing" Capt.—now Vice Admiral—Hyman Rickover from Navy Department obscurity and getting him a go-ahead for the development of the nuclear submarine. And he won a two-year battle with the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission on stepping up the output of weapon-producing plutonium.

In a lecture at the National War College a year ago the Senator summarized his views in these words:

"What seems most to be missing is a coherent and purposeful national program that sets forth in simple terms what we have to do to survive, and why. In wartime there is a basic strategy to defeat the enemy. Our leaders know, and our people know, what they are trying to do and what is demanded of them. \* \* \* We have no comparable strategy for the cold war. \* \* \*

**I**NEVITABLY, the Jackson subcommittee's work has come to focus—for the present, at least—on the National Security Council, the Government's highest strategy-plan-

ing operation, and how can they be corrected? Out of more than 500 separate interviews the subcommittee has accumulated a vast file of factual data and personal opinion. It has staked out as major areas for attention these matters: the roles of the President and the National Security Council, the roles of the State and Defense departments, budget-making and problems of economic growth, science and technology, and finally, the part individuals play in relation to the whole planning process. It has already begun to shape its ideas about how the planning machinery can be improved, and these ideas are being reinforced and modified by the expert witnesses who testify before the committee.

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**B**UT with the proliferation of cold war threats and crises and with the birth of the age of space, many feel that the Security Council is no longer capable of meeting the demands put upon it. This complaint goes primarily to the question of its structure but it also embraces the manner of its use. Such disquieting fears have been expressed by many responsible individuals who have had a look behind

"If I were to make a general judgment about the N. S. C.," Dr. Perkins told the committee, "it is that the President has not received from the normal N. S. C. routine the kind of sharp debate, the clear differences of opinion, the new ideas that would require major modifications of program."

**S**OME witnesses have questioned the recent tendency to make policy decisions within a predetermined budget ceiling. "The budget officer," Mr. Lovett told the committee, "should be a consultant and a participant, but not a decision-maker." Others have deplored the lack of proper coordination of policies between the Departments of State and Defense.

But inevitably such discussions of the process of planning become involved with the product of planning, and this leads into sensitive appraisals of the personal judgment that goes into the making of policy decisions. Thus, Mr. Sprague told the committee he thought the President was the only man who could awaken the country to the need for a greater effort to secure our

and, as one member explained, "We aren't likely to get any meaningful results out of all this unless the public becomes interested in what we're doing."

The end result the committee seeks is to have ready for whoever the next occupant of the White House may be a blueprint for a refurbished policy-planning mechanism that will, in Jackson's words, "not only improve the planning process itself but help the new President to identify the areas in which fresh and imaginative planning has become essential."

**W**HAT this may mean is not yet known, but it seems likely that an extensive overhaul of the N. S. C. will be high among the committee's eventual recommendations. The aim will be, probably, to reconstitute it as a more compact forum for the debate of basic policy questions unencumbered by bureaucratic handicaps. This might involve better staffing, better coordination between planning functions of the State and Defense Departments and, possibly, legislation to put appropriations for certain national security operations, such as foreign aid and defense, on a long-term instead of a one-year basis. Another idea taking form is the creation of a Science Advisory Council for the President which would have a status comparable to that of the present Council of Economic Advisers.

A persistent question the committee faces is this: are we geared to put the best minds available to work on vast problems of policy and strategy? Out of this have come the beginnings of an idea that perhaps provision should be made for some sort of elite corps of "thinkers"—scholars and experts who, free of administrative responsibility and attachment to particular services or departments, would have no other function than to cerebrate about basic problems.

**M**OST such ideas, Jackson notes, are still in the germinal state at this point. A long period of study will be necessary after the hearings are concluded before concrete proposals begin to take shape. It will then be necessary to get the authority from Congress to put them into effect or, where legislation is not required, to persuade the new

oratories across the country. They asked:

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Jackson was born in Everett, Wash., of Norwegian immigrant parents, on May 31,

command the highest respect not only in the Senate but in the Pentagon and in Government scientific circles as well.

For the past several years he has hammered at the question of whether this nation's defenses are adequate. He has been skeptical of the bland assurances offered by high military and civilian officials, and he often has pinned them



**WITNESSES** who criticized policy planning. Top, l. to r., Robert A. Lovett, ex-Secretary of Defense; Robert C. Sprague, chairman, Fed-

eral Reserve Bank of Boston; Thomas J. Watson Jr., president, International Business Machines Corp. Bottom, l. to r., James B. Fish, presi-

dent, Bell Telephone Laboratories; Eugene P. Wigner, professor of physics; James A. Perkins, vice president of the Carnegie Corp.

down with his own superior knowledge. He was primarily responsible for "rescuing" Capt.—now Vice Admiral—Hyman Rickover from Navy Department obscurity and getting him a go-ahead for the development of the nuclear submarine. And he won a two-year battle with the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission on stepping up the output of weapon-producing plutonium.

In a lecture at the National War College a year ago the Senator summarized his views in these words:

"What seems most to be missing is a coherent and purposeful national program that sets forth in simple terms what we have to do to survive, and why. In wartime there is a basic strategy to defeat the enemy. Our leaders know, and our people know, what they are trying to do and what is demanded of them. \* \* \* We have no comparable strategy for the cold war. \* \* \*"

INEVITABLY, the Jackson subcommittee's work has come to focus—for the present, at least—on the National Security Council, the Government's highest strategy-planning board.

The N. S. C. was created under the National Security Act of 1947 as a part of the Executive Office of the President. Its statutory membership is limited to the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Director of Civil Defense and Mobilization, with a professional staff to help. However, President Eisenhower has expanded the

N. S. C. by adding other top Government officials as regular or occasional members. In theory it acts as a funnel to put before the President all the essential information he must have to formulate policy in any area affecting national security.

There has never been much of a quarrel about the basic concept of the N. S. C. It was born out of the shock of Pearl Harbor and the war that followed. Its major assignment soon became the masterminding of the cold war, and it nurtured such innovations in United States policy as foreign aid, the "containment" of Communist imperialism, and the doctrine of collective security.

BUT with the proliferation of cold war threats and crises and with the birth of the age of space, many feel that the Security Council is no longer capable of meeting the demands put upon it. This complaint goes primarily to the question of its structure but it also embraces the manner of its use. Such disquieting fears have been expressed by many responsible individuals who have had a look behind the curtain of secrecy that surrounds the agency.

The substance of what is being said in the subcommittee hearings is that the Security Council has become too big, too diffuse, that it has lost its sense of purpose. Instead of serving as a sharp, unambiguous focus on basic policy problems, it has, according to its critics, become "little more than a paper mill."

"If I were to make a general judgment about the N. S. C.," Dr. Perkins told the committee, "it is that the President has not received from the normal N. S. C. routine the kind of sharp debate, the clear differences of opinion, the new ideas that would require major modifications of program."

SOME witnesses have questioned the recent tendency to make policy decisions within a predetermined budget ceiling. "The budget officer," Mr. Lovett told the committee, "should be a consultant and a participant, but not a decision-maker." Others have deplored the lack of proper coordination of policies between the Departments of State and Defense.

But inevitably such discussions of the process of planning become involved with the product of planning, and this leads into sensitive appraisals of the personal judgment that goes into the making of policy decisions. Thus, Mr. Sprague told the committee he thought the President was the only man who could awaken the country to the need for a greater effort to secure our survival, adding, "I believe that the danger is more serious than the President has expressed, himself, to the American public."

Jackson and his staff do not try to stifle such spontaneous and pointed observations, but neither do they openly encourage them. They are realists enough, however, to know that they help draw public attention to their work,

and, as one member explained, "We aren't likely to get any meaningful results out of all this unless the public becomes interested in what we're doing."

The end result the committee seeks is to have ready for whoever the next occupant of the White House may be a blueprint for a refurbished policy-planning mechanism that will, in Jackson's words, "not only improve the planning process itself but help the new President to identify the areas in which fresh and imaginative planning has become essential."

WHAT this may mean is not yet known, but it seems likely that an extensive overhaul of the N. S. C. will be high among the committee's eventual recommendations. The aim will be, probably, to reconstitute it as a more compact forum for the debate of basic policy questions unencumbered by bureaucratic handicaps. This might involve better staffing, better coordination between planning functions of the State and Defense Departments and, possibly, legislation to put appropriations for certain national security operations, such as foreign aid and defense, on a long-term instead of a one-year basis. Another idea taking form is the creation of a Science Advisory Council for the President which would have a status comparable to that of the present Council of Economic Advisers.

A persistent question the committee faces is this: are we geared to put the best minds available to work on vast problems of policy and strategy? Out of this have come the beginnings of an idea that perhaps provision should be made for some sort of élite corps of "thinkers"—scholars and experts who, free of administrative responsibility and attachment to particular services or departments, would have no other function than to cerebrate about basic problems.

MOST such ideas, Jackson notes, are still in the germinal state at this point. A long period of study will be necessary after the hearings are concluded before concrete proposals begin to take shape. It will then be necessary to get the authority from Congress to put them into effect or, where legislation is not required, to persuade the new Administration to adopt them. But the important thing, he feels, is to bring some new light and fresh ideas to the task of creating government policy to meet the challenge of the Nineteen Sixties.

"When you realize," he says, "that there has been no serious Congressional review of the policy-planning process for thirteen years, it is reasonable to think there may be some room for improvement."