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DISARMAMENT: THE PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

An outline prepared for the use of the

United States Delegation to the

Interparliamentary Union

Tokyo, 1960



By
Charles R. Gellner
and
Ellen C. Collier
Foreign Affairs Division
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DISARMAMENT: THE PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Introduction

With the advent of the atomic and space ages, it has become possible to deliver tremendous destructive power huge distances in a matter of minutes. Because such a capability is possessed by both the Communist and free worlds, an increasing emphasis has been placed on the achievement of disarmament -- a term encompassing many different kinds or degrees of arms control by agreement among the nations of the world. In spite of the recognized dangers and the heavy economic burden of an uncontrolled arms race, however, little progress towards disarmament has been made.

Several fundamental difficulties are inherent in any attempt to achieve international arms control. First of all, it requires the cooperation of rival nations. It cannot be imposed upon an unwilling nation if the agreement is to be carried out, but must be mutually advantageous to both sides. Finding such mutually advantageous measures is difficult in view of differing security needs and defense systems. Second, disarmament measures require a change in the primary element of a nation's security system, its military establishment. Any alteration in a nation's defense system can be made only if the nation feels sure that its total security will not be impaired by the move. Finally, it is difficult for nations to find agreement on such basic issues of security as long as the political tension between them remains acute.

Notwithstanding these basic difficulties, disarmament negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States and its allies have gone on for the fifteen years since the end of the Second World War. During this time a wide variety of plans for achieving general disarmament have been discussed, as well as specific, isolated arms control measures which might serve as a first step toward disarmament. However, there does not appear to be any prospect for agreement soon except possibly on the matter of a ban on nuclear weapons tests with an accompanying control system.

General disarmament. The most recent statements of the proposals of the Western and Soviet Governments on general disarmament were made at the Ten-Nation Conference on disarmament at Geneva, March-June 1960. Both sets of proposals had a proclaimed goal of complete disarmament, but there was a wide difference between the two sides as to how it was to be achieved.

The Soviet approach was that a complete disarmament plan should be agreed upon ahead of time and that it should be put into effect within an agreed time period. The Soviet Union proposed four years as the time for which its total disarmament plan would be carried out, including the complete disbandment of all armed forces and the destruction of all nuclear weapons.1/

1/ For summary of the Soviet proposal, see Annex I.

The approach of the Western powers was more realistic. Since experience with measures of arms reduction and control was very limited and non-existent in some cases, the Western powers proposed reductions only when studies indicated controls could be effective and these controls had been agreed. This approach could not suitably be fitted into a time schedule and the Western powers refused to admit a fixed time limit for carrying out their plan. Moreover, four years would appear to be an impossibly short period for an undertaking as massive as disarming completely and instituting an effective system of control.

The five Western nations submitted their proposal for comprehensive disarmament on March 15, 1960. Then on June 27, 1960, the date the Soviets walked out of the negotiations, the United States submitted a revised proposal which sought to meet some of the Soviet objections to the original plan. It was not submitted as a proposal for all the Western powers because of lack of time to obtain their approval.1/

Breakdown of negotiations and subsequent events

Even before the events that led to the breakdown of the Paris Summit Conference, the negotiations at the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference did not promise any progress. The Soviet bloc was determined to seek agreement on general principles for complete and total disarmament, whereas the West wanted instead to negotiate and agree on a number of specific disarmament measures. After the recess called in anticipation of the Heads of Government Conference, the Soviets

1/ For summary of U.S. proposal of June 27, 1960, see Annex II.

became unwilling to negotiate on any practical measures and on June 27, although they had been informed that the United States was about to present a new proposal, they walked out of the conference.

On August 16, 1960, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, composed of all the members of the United Nations was convened at the request of the United States to consider the Communist withdrawal from the negotiations. Although the Communists had hinted they might boycott the meeting, they did attend. At the meeting the United States proposed that the United States and the Soviets transfer 33 tons of U-325 - fissionable uranium used in nuclear bombs - to peaceful purposes, or that they begin to close down plants producing fissionable material suitable for weapons. The proposal was rejected by the Soviets.

After three days of debate, the Commission approved a resolution submitted by a group of neutral states. The resolution placed no blame for the breakdown of the Geneva negotiations, and called for the earliest possible continuation of big power negotiations and a discussion of disarmament at the General Assembly session which would open September 20, 1960. The Soviets said the resolution lacked one thing: a call for the heads of government to attend the Assembly debate on disarmament. Later it was announced that Mr. Khrushchev and other heads of the Communist bloc states would attend the debate.

Inspection and control

It is apparent from consideration of any aspect of the disarmament negotiations that one of the principal problems in achieving

disarmament is the establishment of effective controls. The difference between the attitudes of the West and the Soviets on this question is one of the basic barriers to disarmament progress.

The Western nations have consistently insisted that every measure and step of disarmament should be adequately controlled to assure that it was faithfully carried out. They have felt that they could not agree to any disarmament measure without such assurance. They insist that sound controls be established prior to or at the same time as reduction measures.

In contrast, the Soviet Union has viewed controls not as measures to insure that agreements would be carried out but as intrusive measures which would infringe on their sovereignty and be used for intelligence purposes. The Soviets have incorporated control measures into their proposals only at the prodding of the West and in most cases the inspection measures they called for were deemed vague and inadequate by the West. The Soviet proposals for general disarmament at Geneva made only a token acknowledgment of the necessity of controls.

Actually the whole approach of the Soviet Union--calling as it did for the achievement of total disarmament in a short, fixed period of time--precluded the possibility of working out adequate controls. When the Western governments insisted on controls for disarmament, the Soviet Union charged that the West wanted "controls without disarmament" and that it was just trying to legitimatize espionage.

Limited disarmament measures

In recent disarmament negotiations, the Western governments have tried to get the Soviet Government to discuss specific concrete measures for limiting or regulating armaments, in the hope that if any one or more of these could have been put into effect it would provide a start on disarmament and open the way to broader agreement. With the exception of a ban on nuclear weapons tests, however, which will be discussed later, the Soviets have not shown much interest in this approach in recent months.

Following are some of the areas in which the Western nations have considered the possibility of first-step measures, followed by a more detailed discussion of the problems and prospects of a nuclear test ban, the only measure which is now actually under negotiation.

Prevention of surprise attack

Guarding against surprise attack has been an aim of United States disarmament policy for many years, in part because the Iron Curtain makes it so difficult for the West to be assured through normal access that preparations for surprise attack were not being made. Since the 1955 summit conference at Geneva, at which President Eisenhower made his "Open Skies" proposal for mutual aerial inspection, reduction of the danger of surprise attack by means of inspection has been one of the major goals of United States disarmament efforts. That the measure is still being actively considered was shown at the abortive Paris summit conference in the spring of 1960 when President Eisenhower

asserted his intention of proposing aerial surveillance by the United Nations for the purpose of preventing surprise attack, a variation of his original "Open Skies" plan.

In the fall of 1958, at the initiative of the United States, a conference of experts from the United States and four allies and the Soviet Union and four other Communist States met in Geneva to try to work out some of the problems involved in the prevention of surprise attack. This Conference revealed that the Soviet Union in its concepts of what was required to prevent surprise attack included many substantive disarmament measures, whereas the United States conceived of prevention of surprise attack largely in terms of inspection of the various weapons by which surprise attack might be launched. The gap between the two sides on this proposal, therefore, remains wide.

Control of outer space

Even before the first sputnik was launched in October 1957, the United States had proposed the creation of a committee to study ways on insuring that objects sent into outer space would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. At the Ten-Nation Conference, both sides had proposals relating to control of outer space weapons. The Soviets proposed that space vehicles be launched only for peaceful purposes in accordance with agreement on the inspection of launching sites. The West on March 15, 1960, proposed in the first stage prior notification of proposed launchings of space vehicles and a joint study of measures to assure compliance with an agreement that no nation shall

place into orbit or station in outer space weapons of mass destruction. The prohibition would take effect as soon as the control system was installed. In the United States proposal of June 27, 1960, the prohibition was moved up to the first stage.

Control of missiles and other delivery systems

The control of delivery systems as a first step, which overlaps both the problems of preventing surprise attack and the control of outer space, has been urged particularly by France. In the absence of controls over nuclear weapons, the control of the systems by which they might be delivered upon an enemy offers an alternative method of preventing their use for war. Some idea of the measures that might be taken along this line may be gained from related proposals at the recent Ten-Nation Conference.

In its first proposal the Soviet Union called for liquidation of all missiles and delivery systems in the third stage. In view of France's interest in the matter, however, in its proposal of June 2, 1960 the Soviets moved this measure up to the first stage and elaborated on it.

In their first proposal the Western powers called for joint study of methods to assure compliance with an agreement to give prior notification of missile launchings, followed by the establishment of such a requirement, and later control of the production of agreed categories of missiles and finally their elimination. In its subsequent June 27, 1960, proposal, the United States called first for the requirement of

Prior notification of space launchings, aerial and ground inspection, and on-site inspection at air and naval bases. In the second stage some delivery vehicles would be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses, as all would be in the third stage.

Armed forces reduction

Another measure which conceivably could be isolated in a first step is the reduction of armed forces to agreed levels. The most recent proposal of the Soviets calls for a first reduction of the major powers to 1,700,000, followed by complete disbandment. The United States has called for progressive ceilings of 2,500,000, then 2,100,000, and then, 1,700,000. Each reduction would take place only upon verification that the reductions had been carried out. Although the precise control measures to accompany such reductions have not been worked out by the Western Powers, they are not satisfied with the Soviet control proposal which calls only for verification that the required cuts have been made. In the Western view other verification measures would also be required to ensure, for example, that any men cut from the armed forces were not clandestinely mobilized elsewhere.

Ending production of fissionable material for weapons purposes

Since 1957 the United States has left open a proposal for the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Under this proposal, the production of fissionable material for peaceful uses would continue, but inspectors would be stationed at

key locations in nuclear energy facilities to make sure that no nuclear materials were diverted into weapons purposes. Stockpiles of nuclear weapons would be reduced by requiring both sides to transfer some fissionable material from weapons to peaceful uses. It was not proposed that stockpiles be eliminated since no way has yet been found to discover adequately hidden nuclear weapons stocks.

At the UN Disarmament Commission meeting on August 16, 1960, Ambassador Lodge put a new aspect on this proposal when he proposed first, that the United States and the Soviet Union each set aside 30,000 kilograms of weapons grade U-235 to transfer to peaceful uses. If the Soviet Union would not accept that proposal, he proposed that both nations shut down, one by one, under international inspection, their major plants producing enriched uranium and plutonium. So far the Soviet Union has rejected these proposals.

Regional disarmament

Another approach to limited disarmament has been to establish controls or require reductions of various kinds in one specific geographic area. Various proposals along this line have been suggested, such as the withdrawal of troops from a central zone in Europe or inspection of the Arctic, but none have yet been acceptable to both sides. One step in this direction has actually been taken with the signing of the Antarctic Treaty on December 1, 1959. This treaty provided that Antarctica should be used only for peaceful purposes and that military activities and bases were prohibited. It

also provided that inspection would be permitted at all times and places on the Antarctic continent to observe that the treaty was not being violated.

Ending nuclear weapons tests

The only phase of armaments control that is now under active negotiation is a proposal to terminate the testing of nuclear weapons. The conclusion of an agreement to end nuclear arms tests is considered of importance not only because it could be a first step toward more comprehensive disarmament but also because it would have value in slowing down or halting the development of nuclear weapons and in hindering the spread of a nuclear weapons capability to countries not now possessing it.

The Conference at Geneva on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests has now been in progress since October 31, 1958, that is, for almost two years. While a number of articles of a treaty have been agreed upon and agreement is near on a number of others, difficulties have arisen on certain key issues.

The principal difficulty centers on what is called the "phasing" of the ban on nuclear weapons testing. Both sides in the negotiations, the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States and the United Kingdom on the other, have proclaimed as their policy that all nuclear weapons tests should be suspended by international agreement and under international controls. However, there is a difference between the two sides in the matter of timing. In brief, the Western governments

believe that under present conditions it is not practical to have adequate inspection of a complete termination of nuclear weapons testing. They maintain that adequate inspection is not practical now in regard to smaller nuclear tests held underground (those about 20 kilotons and smaller) and also those that might be set off in distant space.

These conclusions are based on certain premises. The first premise is that the inspection system that would be in operation would be substantially the 180 station network that was agreed upon by the experts of the two sides at a technical conference in Geneva in mid-1958. The second premise is that the present state of scientific knowledge and of technical capabilities in regard to inspection does not permit effective control of a total test termination. If the agreed inspection network could be expanded or if the technical and scientific capabilities of detection and identification could be improved, then there would exist a possibility of extending the coverage of a test suspension. The Western proposals call for a research program to work out methods of controlling tests that cannot now be adequately inspected so that eventually a total test suspension can be put into effect.

The Soviet Government maintains that the 180 station network outlined by the Geneva experts is adequate to exercise surveillance over a total test ban, and that it is willing to conclude an agreement for a total test ban on the basis of the Geneva experts system. However, the Soviet Union also maintains that in view of the fact that the Western Governments do not think the Geneva system is adequate for a

complete test suspension, it is willing to acquiesce in the Western proposal that smaller (about 20 kilotons or less, or those creating an underground shock of seismological magnitude 4.75 or less) be exempt from a test ban treaty. But they add an important provision--that a temporary moratorium be put into operation on the treaty-exempt tests, while the research program is underway to work out scientific means of inspecting for the exempt tests.

Differences between the two sides

While both sides have agreed in general to these terms, there are important differences between them in regard to details. The Soviet Government wants the moratorium to remain in effect as long as the research program, which it envisages should take about four or five years. The Western Governments, however, do not like the idea of a long, uninspected moratorium because it might offer an opportunity for clandestine tests to be conducted. They have taken the position that they will not commit themselves on the length of a moratorium until the provisions of the research program are worked out.

But the research program is causing complications. The United States and Britain maintain that they would like to conduct underground nuclear explosions as part of their research program because that would be the only realistic basis on which to obtain reliable new data on the problems of detection and identification. The Soviet Government, on the other hand, states that it will not conduct any explosions under its research program, since it believes the Geneva experts system to be

quite sufficient as it is. The Soviet position is apparently motivated by a desire to avoid any justification for reciprocal rights of observation of underground tests by Western representatives on Soviet territory. The Soviet Government says it will agree to the Western Governments' holding underground nuclear explosions for research purposes, if safeguards will be furnished to assure the Soviet Union that they strictly serve research and not military aims. As one safeguard the Soviet representatives insist that they see inside the nuclear devices.

The latter demand, however, runs into conflict with the United States Atomic Energy Act which forbids the disclosure of this type of information. Presumably under the Atomic Energy Act the United States could declassify at least some information about nuclear devices that is now classified, but this would permit all countries to have access to this information and this might encourage the spread of a nuclear capability.

An alternative would be to request Congress to relax the Atomic Energy Act so that Soviet observers could see inside the research nuclear devices, which presumably would be of old design. At least some members on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy have been reported to be unfavorable to such a change in the law, at least as long as the Soviet Union did not concede similar rights. Still another alternative would be for the United States to proceed with research explosions without the acquiescence of the Soviet Union. In this case the Soviet Government has threatened to resume military testing. If this occurred it is widely feared that the negotiations for a treaty to suspend testing would end in failure, although this is not certain.

Other unresolved issues

Thus at present it might be said that disagreement on the research program is holding up agreement on the moratorium and lack of agreement on the moratorium and the research program is blocking agreement on a treaty. However, there are other important issues that must be resolved before the treaty can be completed. Prominent among them is the problem of on-site inspections. The world-wide network of 180 inspection stations agreed upon by the experts of both sides would not by itself be able to identify all underground nuclear explosions that might be conducted in contravention of a test ban treaty. The technical difficulties in distinguishing between earthquakes and underground explosions are such that in some cases at least inspection teams would have to be sent to the site of the detected event to determine what its character was - earthquake or nuclear explosion. The Western Governments do not believe that every detected but unidentified underground event has to be investigated in order to deter a would-be violator, but only a certain percentage of them. They have calculated that there would be about 105 detected underground events in the U.S.S.R. each year and have adopted the position that about 20 on-site inspections a year would be required. Additional on-site inspections would of course be required on the territory of other countries participating in the test suspension treaty.

The U.S.S.R. has displayed a very unfavorable attitude toward on-site inspection. Although it has conceded in principle the necessity for such inspections, it has constantly insisted that there need

be only a few of them. Its attitude is apparently based on a reluctance to permit international groups of inspectors freedom to move around in the Soviet Union. The figure which the Soviet Representative at the Geneva Conference recently proposed for the number of on-site inspections in the U.S.S.R. was three. Although this figure was inadequate in the Western view, if past experience in the talks is a guide, it probably was a negotiating, and not a final figure.

Outside the Conference other factors have arisen that have made it difficult for the negotiators to conclude a nuclear test suspension. The first of these is the deterioration in Soviet-American relations ensuing upon the U-2 incident and the torpedoing of the Summit Conference by Premier Khrushchev. The chilling of relations seems to have stiffened attitudes and heightened mutual suspicions so that both sides may be less willing to make the concessions necessary for agreement on a test termination. It can only be a matter of speculation to what extent the deterioration in relations influenced the Soviet attitude on the research program, the problem which is now possibly the main roadblock on the way to agreement.

Concern over test ban policy

In the past several months the United States Government has reviewed its policy toward a suspension of nuclear tests. One factor prompting this review has been a growing concern among some people over the length of the de facto moratorium on nuclear testing that

has been in effect since the Geneva negotiations started in late 1958. In other words, neither side has been conducting tests for almost two years, or at least both sides claim that they have not tested and neither side has charged the other with testing. At the beginning of the period the United States followed a specific policy of not testing as long as the Soviet Union did not test. But then as the negotiations lengthened, the United States as of January 1,1960, proclaimed its freedom to resume tests, although it indicated it would not hold any tests without first making an announcement. The United States has not since announced the holding of any tests, although in May the President announced an intention to carry on a series of experimental explosions for research, not military purposes. When this series will be actually carried out, however, appears to depend upon decisions made in regard to the research program mentioned above for a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests.

The drawing out of the negotiations and the extension of the attendant de facto moratorium on weapons testing has tended to strengthen the belief of some that the United States may be getting into a situation contrary to its proclaimed policy, namely, a suspension of nuclear arms tests without any international system of control or inspection.

In addition to those who have been worried about the policy considerations involved in extending a suspension of testing without international controls, there have been also those who have had misgivings about an international agreement to terminate nuclear weapons tests for other reasons. Some Americans - of whom Dr. Edward Teller is a prominent

example - do not think that the United States should agree to a termination of nuclear weapons tests without other disarmament measures, because they believe testing is militarily vital to develop new kinds of nuclear weapons necessary for American and free world defense. Still others believe that the Soviet Union would try, and would be able, to evade an international control system and would conduct clandestine tests.

However, those who favor a continuation of the negotiations as long as there appears to be some chance of success stress the political advantages that would accrue from conclusion of a test suspension treaty - the opening of a way to further disarmament, an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union, the strengthening of peace, and the penetration of the Soviet "closed society" with an international inspection system. There is the further consideration that world opinion so favors an agreement to end the testing of nuclear armaments that it would be seriously damaging to the prestige of any government to break off negotiations deliberately without good cause.

Within the past several months impatience because of the continued failure to reach agreement on the final terms of a treaty has been growing. Officials in the Executive Branch conducted a review of policy on the nuclear arms ban in August but decided not to make any move to break off the Geneva negotiations.1/

1/ New York Times, August 13, 1960: 1 and 3.

Prospects of concluding an agreement on a test ban

Qualified observers of the nuclear test termination parleys, and also, according to reports,[1] American and British officials do not expect that a treaty will be concluded this year. One reason is the unfavorable attitude shown by Premier Khrushchev to the Eisenhower Administration as a result of the U-2 incident. This disfavor has apparently intensified the Soviet Union's usual reluctance to make the concessions required for a successful agreement. It likewise appears unlikely that President Eisenhower will agree to the Soviet demand for observance of the interior of American nuclear test devices either because of the one-sidedness of the demand or because he will not obtain from Congress a relaxation of the law prohibiting disclosure of nuclear weapons secrets. Moreover, there are still a number of other outstanding unresolved issues in the negotiations that would take time to work out in any case. Thus it would seem that there would virtually be no prospect of agreement before January 1961. What the prospects then would be would depend on circumstances at that time.

1/ Washington Post, August 19, 1960: A8.

Annex I:

Summary of Soviet proposal as modified and presented on June 3, 1960

First stage:

Joint study to effect cessation of production and destruction of stockpiles of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

Destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons and stopping of their manufacture.

Joint study to effect destruction of stockpiles and cessation of production of nuclear weapons.

Withdrawal of foreign troops and dismantling of bases.

Launching of space vehicles only for peaceful purposes in accordance with agreement on inspection of launching sites.

International supervision to check on arms reductions and the observance of prohibitions.

Second stage:

Reduction of armed forces of US and USSR to 1,700,000.

Corresponding amount of conventional weapons to be destroyed or used for peaceful purposes.

Production of chemical and biological weapons prohibited.

Complete prohibition, cessation of production, and destruction of existing stockpiles of all nuclear weapons.

Inspectors to verify destruction of weapons and troops; inspect production of atomic materials; control organization to have free access to material on military budget.

Joint study on measures to insure compliance with the treaty on general disarmament after all measures provided for have been completed. Joint study on measures to maintain peace in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Control Organization to report on progress toward disarmament to UN Security Council and General Assembly.

Third stage: Completion of disbandment of armed forces of all states. States to retain only agreed upon police with small arms.

All remaining conventional arms to be destroyed or used for peaceful purposes. Military production to be ended except for limited output of small arms.

Control organization may send inspectors to verify abolition of military establishments. Aerial observation and photography may be undertaken as necessary. Mobile inspection teams may be sent to any point or facility in states.

Measures to maintain peace and security in accordance with Charter of UN shall be carried out. States shall make available contingents of their police to the Security Council when necessary.

Annex II:

United States proposal of June 27, 1960

First stage: Establishment of ceiling of 2,500,000 for armed forces of United States and USSR. After accession to the treaty of other militarily significant nations and verification that the initial force levels were being observed, reduction to 2,100,000 and agreed appropriate levels for other militarily significant states.

Agreed types and quantities of armaments, corresponding to armed force levels, to be placed in storage depots in own territory under supervision of International Disarmament Control Organization (IDCO).

Prior notification of all proposed launchings of space vehicles and missiles; establishment of aerial and ground inspection zones in U.S. and U.S.S.R. On-site inspection at agreed air bases, missile launching pads, submarine and naval bases to establish a basis for later control over nuclear delivery systems.

Stoppage of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, when adequate controls established, and transfer of fissionable material from past production to peaceful uses, conditional upon satisfactory progress in field of conventional disarmament.

Prohibition of placing into outer space vehicles carrying weapons capable of mass destruction.

Establishment of International Disarmament Control Organization (IDCO) in framework of United Nations.

Second stage:

Reduction of force levels to 1,700,000 for U.S. and USSR and agreed levels for other states.

Quantities of all kinds of armaments, including chemical, biological, and weapons of mass destruction and means for their delivery, to be reduced to agreed levels and excesses destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

Nuclear armaments to be further reduced.

Progressive establishment of an international peace force within the United Nations with strength sufficient to preserve world peace when general disarmament is achieved.

Third stage:

Forces of all states reduced to levels required to maintain internal security and provide contingents to international peace force.

All armaments, except those agreed to be necessary for the international peace force and remaining agreed contingents of national forces, to be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. Manufacture of any except agreed armaments to be prohibited.

All remaining weapons of mass destruction and vehicles for their delivery to be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

International peace force to be armed only with agreed types and quantities of weapons.

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NOTES ON THE CONSTITUTIONS OF CERTAIN ASIAN COUNTRIES

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

By
Lee Graham
Foreign Affairs Division
September, 1960

Washington 25, D.C.

NOTES ON THE CONSTITUTIONS OF CERTAIN ASIAN COUNTRIES

Burma

The Union Constitution came into existence in 1948.

The President is elected by both Chambers of Parliament for a five-year term. He summons, prorogues, and dissolves the Chamber of Deputies on the advice of the Prime Minister. He has no right of veto.

Parliament consists of the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of Nationalities, which have 250 and 125 members, respectively.

The four states of Shan, Kachin, Karen, and Kayah, and the Special Division of the Chins enjoy a large measure of administrative autonomy.

There are no provisions for suspension of the Constitution.

Cambodia

On May 6, 1947, King Sihanouk promulgated a constitution providing for parliamentary government. Since then reforms have been implemented.

The King is the Head of State. The Cabinet Council is responsible to Parliament, which consists of the National Assembly and the Council of the Kingdom. The members of the National Assembly are elected. In the Council of the Kingdom 2 are appointed from the Royal Family; 2 are elected by the National Assembly; 8 are elected by Province Councillors Chiefs, and common councilmen; and 12 are directly elected. The Council can only delay the legislation passed by the National Assembly.

The Government (i.e. the King) alone holds the initiative of the Estimates. Debates of the National Assembly are valid only if two-thirds of the members are present.

Certain enumerated rights can be suspended for a renewable six-month period during a state of emergency.

Ceylon

The Constitution is the Ceylon Independence Act, 1947. The nominal source of sovereign power is the British King, but the country is fully-independent politically and the elected House of Representatives and the Cabinet are the sources of real power. Parliament consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. In the Senate, 15 are elected by the House, and 15 are appointed by the Governor-General. Members of the House are elected from over 140 electoral districts.

The Governor-General summons, prorogues, and dissolves Parliament on the advice of the Prime Minister who, with his Cabinet, is responsible to Parliament. There is no provision for suspension of the Constitution.

India

Its Constitution was put into effect January 26, 1950. It has since been amended seven times. It is a federal form of government, comprising a "Union of States" with a President as Head of State. The President holds all executive power, but this is exercised on the advice of ministers responsible to Parliament. The President is elected by an electoral college for a five-year term.

Parliament consists of the Council of States and the House of the People. In the Council, twelve members are nominated by the President, and the other 238 are elected by state assemblies. It is a permanent body, not

subject to dissolution. The House of the People has a maximum of 500 members elected from constituencies. The House may be dissolved by the President on the advice of his ministers.

There are three list of legislative powers--Union, State and Concurrent. The Union Parliament has exclusive power in non-enumerated areas.

The President may promulgate ordinances between sessions of Parliament; but such ordinances are no longer in effect six weeks after the Parliament reassembles.

There is no provision for suspension of the Constitution.

Indonesia

President Sukarno dissolved Parliament and suspended the Constitution on March 6, 1960. He took full control of all political parties, giving himself the power to dissolve them. He announced the formation of a mass political organization called the National Front, and a supreme parliamentary body called the People's Congress. Congress is composed of elected representatives of provinces, present members of Parliament, and members of "financial groups" nominated by the President. Thus the President is at present ruling by decree.

Japan

The Constitution of May 3, 1947 establishes the Emperor as the Head of State; but it deprives him of executive powers.

Executive powers rest with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. The Prime Minister is elected by the Diet from its own members.

Legislative power resides in the House of Representatives of 467 members, and the House of Councillors (250).

The lower house controls the budget and approves treaties with foreign powers.

There is no provision for suspension of the Constitution or for emergency powers.

Laos

According to the Constitution of 1954, the King is the Head of State, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Supreme religious authority. He appoints the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers, who are responsible to the National Assembly.

The National Assembly is subject to dissolution by the King. The Council of the King, of nine members, gives its opinion on legislation; but a two-thirds vote of the National Assembly overrides its decision. Deputies of the National Assembly have the right of initiative.

There is no provision for suspension of the Constitution.

Malaya

Adopted in 1956, the Constitution provides for one of the nine rulers of the Malay States to be elected from among themselves as the Supreme Head of the Federation for a five-year term.

Parliament consists of two "Majlis"--the Senate and House of Representatives. Parliament is subject to dissolution by the Supreme Head on

the advice of his ministers, who are responsible to the Majlis. The Senate consists of 16 members appointed by the Supreme Head of State, and 2 elected by each state legislature. The House contains 104 elected members.

Pakistan

On March 23, 1956, it was proclaimed an Islamic Republic. The Constitution that was adopted at that time called for a federal system of government, with provision for temporary unitary rule in case of need. But the Constitution was repealed October 7, 1958, by President Mirza. General Ayub Khan was appointed Martial Law Administrator, and has ruled by decree ever since.

Philippines

The Constitution, modeled largely after that of the United States, was adopted in 1935 and amended in 1940 and 1946.

The President is given more power than in the United States. He personally directs legislation, and initiates most measures. He is assisted by 10 departmental secretaries and 5 other officials.

The House of Representatives is elected from Electoral Districts, while the Senate is elected by a national vote.

The Philippines has a centralized and unitary, not a federal, system of government.

There are no provisions for emergency rule or suspension of the Constitution.

South Vietnam

On October 26, 1956, a new Constitution was adopted which vested executive power in a President. He may veto all legislation of the National Assembly, and rules by decree when the Assembly is not in session. There is only one house in the Assembly. The President is given wide emergency powers.

Thailand

The Constitution has been repealed a number of times during the past few years. On January 28, 1959, an interim Constitution was decreed. This provides for the appointment by the government of a constitutional assembly of 240 members to draft a permanent constitution. In the meantime, Field-Marshal Sarit will act as Prime Minister and govern by decree.

JN Asia

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PROBLEMS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY
IN ASIAN COUNTRIES

Prepared for the use of the

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

By
Ann R. Willner
Foreign Affairs Division
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Washington 25, D.C.

PROBLEMS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN ASIAN COUNTRIES

I. Introduction

When the majority of nations in Asia emerged from colonial rule, their new governments were designed on the models of Western democracies. Since most of these countries had been led to independence by Western-educated leaders who favored Western-type representative government, it is not surprising that they established one or another or some combination of those democratic forms of government with which they were familiar. And even those countries which had not undergone colonial rule modified their governments along more democratic lines, whether as the result of defeat and occupation as in the case of Japan or through internal pressures as in the case of Thailand.

In practice, initial experience with representative government has revealed that considerable difficulties stand in the way of democratic functioning despite the existence of formal democratic structures and mechanisms such as constitutions, parliaments and elections. In some countries such as Pakistan and Indonesia, the difficulties have proven to be so great that special types of authoritarian regimes have now emerged in the effort to overcome political weakness and the semi-paralysis of government.

Crucial to understanding the problems of democracy in Asia is the recognition that the democratic political process in Western countries is the outgrowth of a number of traditions and institutions in these countries that have accommodated to each other over time and work

interdependently. Although there are variations among these countries, certain factors may be seen as common to the political process in all of them and whose existence may be vital to what we regard as democratic functioning. Among these are the following:

1. A population sufficiently homogeneous in language, culture and values for its members to feel a common identity as citizens of the same state despite regional, religious, occupational and other differences;

2. The organization among the population of specific interest groups (e.g. farmers federations, trade associations, labor unions, church groups) through which people with similar interests and needs can express them and gain support on the political scene;

3. A system of political parties through which sets of common interests can be combined in terms of political goals and programs of action and represented on the level of government;

4. An electoral process in which political parties compete among the population for participation in governmental decision-making and through which governmental decision-makers are responsible to the people;

5. A governmental structure with specialization of function and distribution of power permitting assignment of responsibility among its units and curbing over-concentration of authority in any one of them; 1/

6. A nation-wide network of mass media communicating politically neutral information on political matters as well as specific points of view.

In such a system the parliament plays a pivotal role in that through the electoral process it represents the dominant choices of the electorate and

1/ In practice, despite the formal assignment of one function to each branch, e.g. law-making to the legislative, several branches may participate in the performance of a single major function and several functions may be performed by a single branch, e.g. legislative measures may also be formulated or introduced by the cabinet or a party. But in the last analysis, performance of the function is controlled through the branch to which it is allocated, e.g. legislation must pass through the parliament.

it combines them into the laws by which people live. At the same time, it serves to protect the people against the arbitrary exercise of power by executive organs.

Asian countries are on the whole in a transitional stage between several types of political systems, of which the democratic system has been the last to be introduced. Thus some of the factors listed above have not yet been developed and others function only partially. At the same time there exist traditions and institutions that have been inherited from indigenous systems and from colonial systems, some of which bear little relation to a democratic process and even serve to hinder its development. Below are described briefly: (a) some of the conditions that inhibit the rapid development of democratic institutions; (b) some of the problems that limit the functioning of the democratic structures that have been established; and (c) some of the factors that encourage the development of parliamentary democracy.

II. Conditions Inhibiting Rapid Development of Democratic Institutions

A. Diversity of populations

In the case of many of the Asian countries, political unity was accomplished by a colonial power which conquered different peoples and administered them as a single political unit. These units which are now independent countries contain within their borders people of different ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious traditions and in different stages of technological development. Thus in India there are 14 major languages, 24 minor ones and 700 dialects. Burma includes various groups originally tribal such as Shans, Kachins, Chins and

Karens, each with its own traditions, in addition to the dominant Burmans. In Indonesia, the Sumatrans, Menadonese and Macassarese feel little sense of identity with the predominant Javanese.[1] In addition, many of these countries contain large foreign minorities, many of whose ancestors were imported as laborers or immigrated during the colonial period, as the Chinese in Indonesia and Thailand and the Indians in Burma and Ceylon. In most cases, these groups have become successful entrepreneurs and attained a dominant economic position in the host country, arousing resentment among indigenous groups who find economic competition with them difficult.

Opposition to colonial regimes and the struggles for independence served to unify these diverse groups. But now that colonial regimes no longer exist, the conflict of interests among them has emerged sharply as each fears attempts by the others to dominate the political future of the country.

B. Rural-urban and class distinctions

Historically the populations of many of these countries were divided into two distinct classes, the town or court-centered aristocracy or gentry and the rural peasantry. And although middle classes have begun to emerge,[2] the vast majority of the populations still live in semi-isolated rural villages. Their horizons and view of the world do not

1/ While the United States is also composed of people of diverse backgrounds and traditions, it should be recognized that at the time we attained independence, our population was largely of Anglo-Saxon origin and subsequent groups have assimilated much of the Anglo-Saxon tradition.

2/ Japan and India have had a longer tradition of distinct middle class groups than the other non-Communist countries.

extend far beyond these village and district units and they are little conscious of being part of a nation-state. Their loyalties are to these small units of family, clan and village.

C. Tradition of one-way rule

Governments have traditionally been either feudal or colonial bureaucracies with authority and direction flowing down from the top and obedience expected from below. The majority of these peoples have had little experience in expressing preferences, making choices and decisions and exercising initiative.

D. Recent tradition of opposition

Those elements of the population with national consciousness and political experience gained much of this in nationalist groups fighting colonial regimes. They have been accustomed to the strategy of opposition and revolt and are unaccustomed to roles demanding constructive action. While many can formulate high-sounding goals, few can easily define specific objectives and concrete plans and measures.

E. Cultural traditions of consensus

Decision-making in traditional cultural situations in which groups formulate decisions has not been on the basis of clear-cut issues in which a voting majority prevails and a minority acquiesces but rather a process of achieving consensus and apparent unanimity by a gradual reconciliation and compromise of initially diverse positions.

III. Limitations on the Functioning of Democratic Structures

A. National unity and regional interests

One of the major problems in most of these countries is that of allowing political expression and a degree of autonomy to regional interests without endangering national unity and security. In India and Burma where federal structures have been created, regional conflicts and demands for complete autonomy have forced the central government to intervene. In India which is one of the most stable countries of Asia, emergency powers of the president were resorted to four times between 1950 and 1956. In Ceylon martial law was imposed during the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict in 1958. In Indonesia some groups did not recognize the central government after independence and have continually been in revolt against it and in the last two years regional insurrection has been widespread and the country under martial law. In South Vietnam, the threat posed by the Communist underground has curbed the possibility of regional and local autonomy.

B. Limited existence of specific interest groups

Again with the exception of Japan and India there has been no widespread development of independent specific interest groups apart from the traditional ones mentioned above. Although there exist formally organized labor unions, farmers' associations, etc., these have often been created from above by political parties or individuals seeking power and serve mainly as vehicles to mobilize support for them.

C. Political party systems

With the exception of Japan and the Philippines the stable, widely-organized two-party system as it exists in this country and Great Britain has not developed on the Asian scene. On the one hand there has prevailed a pattern of narrow, poorly-organized parties without mass support and representing little more than the personal followings of individual leaders, as in Thailand, Pakistan, Cambodia and Laos. The other pattern is that of a single dominant party, as in India and Burma, which is the outgrowth of an all-embracing nationalist movement, with other parties of minor significance. Whereas the first type does not reflect a wide range of popular interests, the second has had the problem of maintaining unity in the face of the varied interests of its members.

D. Concentration of power and decision-making

As a result of the above factors, political power and participation in national decision-making have tended to be concentrated in a small elite in most of these countries. In India most of the major policies are decided within the working committee of the dominant Congress Party and in Burma by the group controlling its dominant party. In many cases the members of these groups also hold the leading cabinet posts. This is not to imply that differences do not exist and alternative policies not considered, but that they are generally reconciled within the top level of the party rather than on the formal level of government. In Thailand political power is concentrated at the top level of the civil

bureaucracy and army and competition for it takes place between cliques within this group. The particular situation in Vietnam has resulted in a concentration of power at the top level of the bureaucracy and especially within the presidential office.

E. Predominance of single leader

What is also characteristic of many Asian countries in their present state of political development is the great influence and power of decision vested in a single national figure, such as Nehru in India, U Nu in Burma, Sukarno in Indonesia, Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam. This is partly explained by their leadership of the nationalist movements and the fact that they are the symbols of independence in their countries. It is also partly understandable in the light of the cultural tradition of personalized government in this area, the force of the personalities of these men and the authoritative positions they hold in their governments. Each of these factors tends to reinforce the others.

F. Limitations of legislatures

As compared with the Western democracies, parliaments in Asia play a lesser role in decision-making and exercise fewer controls over the executive arms of government. One of the reasons for this is that parliaments are the newest organs in the governmental apparatus. In colonial regimes administrative organs were highly developed even where there were few indigenous officials on the highest levels. In some instances the political tradition has been such that parliament members

have few opportunities for autonomous decision-making. Thus in Thailand, a portion of the membership is appointive and elected officials have no organized party support behind them. Those controlling the country have in turn dissolved, reorganized or silenced parliament and generally manage to extract agreement for their program from parliament members by a variety of means. The government has the power to make emergency expenditures in advance of parliamentary approval or extend a previous budget if a new act has not been passed, thus limiting parliament's budgetary control. In Burma and India the domination of the parliament by a single party generally assures that governmental measures will be approved by sizeable majorities. In Indonesia, action in parliament was generally at a stalemate as under its multi-party system factions were more intent on opposition to cabinets than to passing legislation and an elected parliament has recently been replaced by an appointed one.

G. Role of mass media

Because of the problems of illiteracy, communications and linguistic multiplicity, a nationwide press that serves as an effective medium for the dissemination of information has been slow in developing in many of these countries. In many cases those media that exist are primarily the organs of particular interests or political parties and are not accustomed to impartial dissemination of news. Language diversity leads to a fragmentation of the press, editors slanting the news in each language to the known or supposed aspirations of each linguistic minority. Because of the existence in some countries of irresponsible

segments of the press of a sensational "yellow journalism" type, governments have claimed justification for exerting controls and have in some instances tended to use these controls to silence legitimate criticism and opposition. Burma, India, Ceylon and the Philippines probably have the freest press on the whole.

IV. Factors Favoring the Development of Democratic Institutions

However different the actual practice may appear from the formal structure of parliamentary democracy in many Asian countries today, there are still strong factors favoring the ultimate development of democracy.

1. Even what appears to be a reversion to authoritarian rule in the form of dominant army elites that have asserted control in some of these countries may be said to have an optimistic aspect. For the army bureaucracy and in some cases the civilian bureaucracy are the major groups who have been trained to national loyalty and national consciousness. In many cases their assertion of control is a reaction against undisciplined and unproductive factionalism, regional antagonisms, corruption and the lack of implementation of needed programs. These groups represent a "modernist", "rational" and "anti-traditional" approach. Their control may represent an "interregnum" while modern institutions are strengthened.

2. While it is difficult to assess the motivations of the national leaders who seem to be pushing aside formal representative institutions

and who often assume more than their constitutional prerogatives, the majority appear to be concerned with the strengthening of democratic institutions. Their use of power often seems to be more in the direction of facilitating needed development than in the direction of utilizing power for personal benefit and is usually the result of impatience with the shortcomings and ambiguities of the present political system.

3. While elections and parliaments have grave weaknesses by our standards, time and repetition in unaccustomed modes of behavior may remedy some of these. The electoral process and parliamentary debate serve an educative function in familiarizing people with these institutions and their purposes.

4. In some respects the pace of social change is fast, particularly when it is deliberately induced. Thus programs of extending education, development of rural communities, improving communications networks can bring many of those hitherto divorced from the political process into the framework of active political participation in one generation.

August 18, 1960

(Outline for Tokyo Meeting of the
Inter-Parliamentary Union on
September 28, 1960)

Methods of Improving the International Distribution System for Primary Products and The Relation of Their Prices to Those of Manufactured Goods

I. Introduction: Persistent failure of prices of primary products to keep pace with increases in the prices of manufactured goods has intensified interest in problems relating to the international distribution of primary products.

A. The demand for primary products is inelastic. Industrialized countries need primary products regardless of price. On the up-swing this is good for the raw material-producing countries. But, on the down-swing, when industrialized economies slow down, purchases of raw materials are curtailed, regardless of price.

B. Supplies of most primary products are also inelastic in that they do not adjust readily to changes in demand.

C. Many primary products are produced in economically underdeveloped countries under conditions of intense specialization. These countries are peculiarly vulnerable to changes in economic conditions in industrialized countries.

D. The problem involves both the long-run adaptation of supply to demand and the shorter-run ironing out of erratic changes in demand.

II. Price Changes

A. Between 1953 and 1958 the price index of manufactured goods increased 8 percent. In the same period, the price index of all primary products, considered together, decreased 5 percent, thus changing the terms of trade [the price index of primary products divided by the price index of manufactured goods] from 100 to 88. This decline indicates loss of purchasing power by countries producing primary products.

B. The U.S. wholesale price index of all commodities increased from 100 in 1950 to 122 in 1959. In the same interval, changes in the price indexes of individual primary products [on the basis of 100 in 1950] were: lead 93, zinc 79, tin 108, rubber 95, wool 78, wheat 91, and sugar 57.

C. According to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the price index of all raw materials imported into Europe decreased from 100 to 96 between 1950 and 1959. Foodstuffs decreased from 100 to 92, and other raw materials from 100 to 97.

D. Since almost 90 percent of the foreign exchange earned by underdeveloped countries is derived from the sale of primary products, the failure of these products to earn foreign exchange results in a contraction of imports. There is, thus, a slowing down of economic growth, together with contraction of real incomes.

E. It would be difficult to exaggerate the political significance of unemployment and economic depression in the underdeveloped countries at a time when Communist countries are using every device to purchase surpluses of raw materials in the uncommitted countries at bargain prices.

III. Areas affected include some of the most strategically-situated in Latin America, Asia and Africa.

A. Latin America

1. Chile is heavily dependent on copper, the price of which dropped 38 percent between 1956 and 1959.

2. Prices of lead and zinc, both of which are important to Mexico and Peru, declined approximately one-third between 1956 and 1958, resulting in unemployment for thousands of mine workers, owing to loss of foreign exchange.

3. Approximately 60 percent of the foreign exchange earnings of Bolivia are derived from exports of tin, a drop in the price of which has caused earnings of that country to reach their lowest point since the War.

4. Brazil, Colombia, and certain Central American republics rely on coffee for over three-fourths of their export earnings. At the present time there is a surplus of coffee and its price is low.

B. Asia

The Federation of Malaya is dependent on exports of rubber and tin, both of which earned less foreign exchange in 1958 than in 1957. By 1959 more than a third of the country's tin mines were closed down and over half the labor force engaged in mining tin was unemployed.

C. In Africa low prices of copper have resulted in deterioration of the balance of payments position of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

IV. International Commodity Agreements

A. Various plans have been proposed to stabilize commodity markets, principally through international agreements.

----Such proposals have encountered considerable opposition in certain large raw material-consuming countries. Because of inherent difficulties of protecting the interests of consumers, as well as the interests of producers, some countries have feared that attempts to stabilize commodity prices will lead to rising prices and increased costs of production.

B. At the present time four international commodity agreements are in operation, namely--

1. International Wheat Agreement, operating under the principle of multilateral, long-term contracts

2. International Sugar Agreement, operating under the principle of export quotas

3. International Coffee Agreement, operating under the principle of export quotas

4. International Tin Agreement, operating under the international buffer stock principle

C. Successful international commodity agreements are difficult to institute and operate.

1. So many commodities are involved that it is difficult to formulate a separate agreement for each.

2. Most commodities are not homogeneous and problems arise regarding grades and qualities.

3. Most difficult of all is the problem of obtaining agreement among producing and consuming interests in various countries.

4. Large exporting countries, not parties to an agreement, can under-bid the market price or sell such large quantities as to upset the planned balance between international supply and international demand [This was the difficulty encountered by the Stevenson Plan for stabilizing the rubber market in the mid-1920's].

5. There is a temptation to use commodity agreements to fix prices, while disregarding the problem of adjusting supply to demand.

a. Under the free price system, the function of "price" is to bring supply into line with demand. Unless a price stabilization arrangement results in such adjustment it is likely to aggrevate the problem.

b. The United States and certain other large producing countries have learned this lesson the hard way through various agricultural support programs. When prices are fixed and production is not controlled there is a tendency for supply to outstrip demand and to result in unmarketable surpluses. The United States is sensitive to this problem and the difficulties that it has had with its agricultural support programs is one of the reasons why it has not been enthusiastic over international commodity agreements.

[The objective of stabilizing prices around a long-term trend is laudable, but the problem is to know, and to agree upon, what that trend is and to adapt supplies to it]

6. The importance of substitutes

a. When satisfactory substitutes are available there is danger that price supports will stimulate the use of lower-priced substitutes, thereby under-cutting the international agreement.

b. Such as copper for aluminum (and vice versa) depending largely on price relationships.

c. Synthetic fibers are easily substitutable for natural fibers, especially wool and cotton.

D. Notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in international commodity agreements, the problem of stabilizing prices and production of primary products is so important that there is little alternative but to continue attempts to solve it.

V. Principles of Stabilization via International Commodity Agreements

A. Producing and consuming interests within the country should be equitably represented.

B. All important producing and consuming countries should be brought into the agreement.

C. The economic function of price should be kept paramount and attempts made to bring supply into line with demand. This usually calls for production controls.

D. Ceiling and floor prices, as well as quantities to be marketed, need to be clearly specified.

VI. Conclusions

A. Other devices have been proposed to solve the stabilization problem, such as: State marketing arrangements, national buffer stocks, exchange rate manipulation, variable export duties, and quotas.

The difficulty of trying to solve the stabilization problem in these ways is that seldom is a single country in a sufficiently strong position to control world price. Such an approach can be successful only when the producing country enjoys a virtual monopoly of a product and when there are no readily available substitutes.

B. Another possible approach--Instead of attempting to establish complicated international commodity agreements, the prices of raw materials could be allowed to find their own levels and the industrialized consuming countries could make available to raw material-exporting countries capital funds proportional to what the latter countries would stand to gain if export proceeds were raised to a more normal level. It has been claimed that this approach would avoid disputes with respect to surpluses, prices, etc. and would provide funds that would enter investment channels more completely than do proceeds from export sales.

C. The vulnerability of underdeveloped countries to fluctuations in the prices of their specialized primary products is a consequence of the fact that those countries are economically underdeveloped. As they develop, production will become diversified and they will become less dependent on one or two primary products. It is to the interest of the advanced industrialized countries, therefore, to assist the economic development of the underdeveloped raw material-producing countries.

D. The possibilities of processing primary commodities within the countries in which they are produced vary from one product to another. In the tea-producing countries, for example, about all that can be done is to blend and pack the tea. In countries producing copra and other vegetable oils, on the other hand, there is greater opportunity for processing.

E. There is no simple solution to the problem of stabilizing prices and production of primary products. It is essential that all countries, developed and underdeveloped alike, do their part in helping keep economic fluctuations at a minimum and to face, realistically and forcefully, the problem of establishing workable international stabilization machinery.