Geothermal action plan, element ii : review of emergency plan and response to the 12 June 1991 uncontrolled venting of the Puna Geothermal Venture (PGV) KS8 geothermal well
Date
1991-07-18
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Hazard Evaluaton and Emergency Response Office
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Submitted to Lorraine R. Inouye, Mayor of Hawaii County; and John C. Lewin, Director of Health, State of Hawaii.
"The actual implementation of the PGV Emergency Response Plan went reasonably well. Concern from fire and police personnel over health risks and confusion on the part of citizens over how to proceed during the on and off again alert notification in the Leilani Estates Subdivision were a cause for some difficulty during the response. Confusion over the applicability of temporary housing cost reimbursement in relation to the 3,500 feet perimeter and the function of the PGV Employee Alarm System also served to exacerbate the stressful nature of the emergency response to the blowout. Nonetheless, the evacuation and alert were successful. Based on the experience of the 12 June 1991 upset incident, the PGV Emergency Response Plan should be reviewed and revised appropriately. Such a review should henceforth be conducted annually, along with exercising the plan. The Pahoa Community needs to understand how these issues are resolved so there is no confusion in the event of another upset. Emergency air monitoring, concern over emergency H2S action levels and PGV emergency notification are other areas that require review and improvement. The following summary recommendations are provided based upon a preliminary review of the 12 June 1991, response to the PGV well blowout: 1. The Department of Health (DOH) should complete a revised analysis of the hazard of an uncontrolled venting of the PGV Well. 2. DOH should complete a health review of the warning, alert, and emergency action levels for H2S. 3. DOH should complete a review of H2S monitoring capability and procedures for upset conditions. 4. Upon completion of 1 through 3 of the above, the Hawaii State Emergency Response Commission and Hawaii County Local Emergency Planning Committee should review, revise and exercise the PGV Emergency Response Plan. 5. The Hawaii County Planning Department should resolve confusion over housing reimbursement and the function of the PGV employee alarm system. 6. PGV should review notification procedures and provide appropriate verbal and written notification to ensure compliance with the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986."
"The actual implementation of the PGV Emergency Response Plan went reasonably well. Concern from fire and police personnel over health risks and confusion on the part of citizens over how to proceed during the on and off again alert notification in the Leilani Estates Subdivision were a cause for some difficulty during the response. Confusion over the applicability of temporary housing cost reimbursement in relation to the 3,500 feet perimeter and the function of the PGV Employee Alarm System also served to exacerbate the stressful nature of the emergency response to the blowout. Nonetheless, the evacuation and alert were successful. Based on the experience of the 12 June 1991 upset incident, the PGV Emergency Response Plan should be reviewed and revised appropriately. Such a review should henceforth be conducted annually, along with exercising the plan. The Pahoa Community needs to understand how these issues are resolved so there is no confusion in the event of another upset. Emergency air monitoring, concern over emergency H2S action levels and PGV emergency notification are other areas that require review and improvement. The following summary recommendations are provided based upon a preliminary review of the 12 June 1991, response to the PGV well blowout: 1. The Department of Health (DOH) should complete a revised analysis of the hazard of an uncontrolled venting of the PGV Well. 2. DOH should complete a health review of the warning, alert, and emergency action levels for H2S. 3. DOH should complete a review of H2S monitoring capability and procedures for upset conditions. 4. Upon completion of 1 through 3 of the above, the Hawaii State Emergency Response Commission and Hawaii County Local Emergency Planning Committee should review, revise and exercise the PGV Emergency Response Plan. 5. The Hawaii County Planning Department should resolve confusion over housing reimbursement and the function of the PGV employee alarm system. 6. PGV should review notification procedures and provide appropriate verbal and written notification to ensure compliance with the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986."
Description
Keywords
Puna Geothermal Venture, KS-8, action plans, plans, KS-8 unplanned venting, venting, well blowout, emergency plans, Hawaii Island, Kilauea Middle East Rift Zone, Kilauea East Rift Zone, Kapoho, Kilauea, Puna, Big Island, Hawaii, Hydrogen sulfide--Environmental aspects--Hawaii--Puna, Geothermal power plants--Environmental aspects--Hawaii--Puna Region, Geothermal resources--Environmental aspects--Hawaii--Puna Region, Air quality--Standards--Hawaii
Citation
Ingoglia JM. 1991. Geothermal action plan, element ii : review of emergency plan and response to the 12 June 1991 uncontrolled venting of the Puna Geothermal Venture (PGV) KS8 geothermal well. Honolulu (HI): Hazard Evaluation and Emergency Response Office.
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17 pages
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